Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Arkansas that is a good question. I think that ought to be directed to the majority. I was not in on that negotiation. I have read that language and I would be hesitant to try to interpret it. I think Senator Cohen has been involved in it, and also Senator Lott. I am sure Senator Thurmond is familiar with it. So, I think you would be better served to direct the questions to them.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I repeat for all Senators that I think we ought to have a good debate on this bill. I think there are things that are serious here that ought to be discussed. Voting against this bill is certainly not something that I relish. There is military pay in here for our troops. I hope we can find some other way because I do not want to go through the process of replacing a number of provisions in this bill. But, on the matter of military pay, I will do everything I can, if this bill does not become law, to see that we find another vehicle. I think it is enormously important that we be able to resolve that problem before we go home. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. I would say two things on that point. One is in the original reconciliation bill there was a mandate for sale, so when we brought this through the committee we debated it, we put safeguards in it, and there were many of us who were concerned that the timeframe was too compressed. When the President originally proposed this, he proposed it over a 2-year period. The difficulty, I say to my friend from Virginia, is not so much the sale itself. But if there is going to be a sale of this very large asset, the feeling has been that it ought to be over a period of time sufficient so that other companies that may bid, so they can go in and study it, and so forth. The provision in this bill is 1 year. So it is a move from the administration request of 2 years to 1 year, and that greatly compresses the schedule and puts on a whole lot more pressure. That was not put in by the Senate, but the House. I understand the House conferees insisted on it, and I think it is a mistake. There is a safeguard here that the Secretary of Energy can negate the sale, but there will be great pressure for her not to do so because, if she negates the sale saying she cannot do it in 12 months, then there would be no authority to make the sale. So the pressure is going to be there for an early, quick sale of this asset, particularly if this bill becomes law, and particularly with the pressure on the budget. That is what the problem is.

Mr. NUNN. I would have to check with the Democratic leader, but I would be glad to do that and get back to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, Senator Thurmond has shown great patience and endurance through a long and difficult negotiation with the House. I have great respect for Senator Thurmond and for his leadership. I commend him for his diligent efforts. Without his strong efforts we would have never been able to get this report out of conference. It has been a very difficult year. I signed the conference report out of my great respect for Senator Thurmond, and I have also voted in favor of the motion to proceed. This will give the Senate the opportunity to consider this conference report. As I said this morning on the floor of the Senate, contrary to one newspaper article, I am not lobbying Senators to vote against this bill. To the contrary, I am making sure that everyone understands my position. I do have serious reservations. I will vote against the bill. But everyone will have the conference report before them and they can make up their own minds. I think this bill deserves to be voted on. I have urged everyone on our side not to cause any kind of undue delay. There are a number of Members who want to speak and there are a number of Members who will speak, I am sure. But it is certainly my hope that we will be able to come to a conclusion on this bill. I will do everything I can to cooperate in bringing this bill to a vote and in making sure the conference report is sent to the President for whatever he may decide to do. As I said on the floor of the Senate this morning, and as I said when I signed the conference report earlier this week, I have serious reservations about the conference report and I will vote against the it when we vote. I also made it clear this morning that, in my judgment, the report speaks for itself. Each Senator can readily make his or her own judgment as to whether the conference report merits their support. On Monday I will give a detailed speech outlining my concerns-- assuming we are on the conference report on Monday, or whenever we are on it. For now, I will just highlight my major objections. The ballistic missile defense legislation contains national defense language which goes well beyond the mandates both of the House-passed and of the Senate-passed bill. As Senators will recall on this subject, during the debate on the Senate bill, Senator Thurmond asked that Senator Levin and I join Senator Warner and Senator Cohen to work on the missile defense language because there were obviously a great number of Senators who were very concerned about that language. A number of us had voted against that language in the committee. I was concerned about it. It was apparent that the bill on the Senate floor was going to have a hard time being brought to a conclusion without some consensus on ballistic missile defense. We spent about 4 or 5 days working very carefully with every word of that language. We made very substantial changes from what had come out of the Senate committee. We worked closely with the White House to make sure that whatever product we presented as a compromise would be something that the President would be able to sign. We achieved that through a great deal of effort. In the conference to work this out, I again worked with Senator Thurmond and others, including Congressman Curt Weldon on the House side, and Members on our side, to try to achieve a compromise between the Senate and the House versions in a way that would not lose the approval of the administration. The administration had been reluctant to move as far as we did on the Senate bill but did agree with it before we passed that bill. Mr. President, the bottom line of all this is that the missile defense language in this act goes well beyond the mandates both of the House-passed bill and the Senate-passed bill. I will go into more detail on Monday on this, or whenever I speak again. But this is not an issue to be taken lightly. This is not an issue that is a question of one word or two words or one sentence. This is enormously important. We have achieved, under Republican Presidents primarily, an arms control agreement called START II. That arms control agreement, I believe, has come out of the Foreign Relations Committee now. Although I am not certain, I believe the vote was unanimous. There is no doubt in my mind that all the defense experts that I know have concluded that this agreement is in the best national security interests of the United States and Russia. This START II Treaty has not been approved by the Duma in Russia and it is much more controversial there than it is here. The one thing we know is that if we convey the impression in this bill or in this conference report that the United States Senate is going to breach in any way or disregard or have an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty, that action will make it extremely unlikely that the Russian Duma will ratify the START II Treaty. In the name of protecting our own country against missiles that may be aimed against this country in the future, it would be the supreme folly if we passed a piece of legislation that is going to unwind the efforts made by several Presidents to get to the point where we have dramatically reduced the number of Russian missiles that are aimed at the United States. Those reductions are going to occur in START II, if that treaty is ratified. If we do something in this legislation, whether we intend it or not, that inadvertently causes that treaty not to be ratified in the Russian Duma, then we would have taken probably the most gigantic step backward in arms control that we have taken in many years. I emphasize, this START II Treaty basically requires dismantling literally thousands of missiles that for years have been aimed at the United States, including missiles that we called MIRV'd, multiple warhead missiles. We have feared for years that these missiles could cause tremendous problems in terms of the nuclear balance and could lead to an incentive for one side to strike first. This is not trifling. This is not picking at words. Every word in this Missile Defense Act is of great importance and the White House, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council and the State Department have every reason to examine every word. And, regarding things to which we do not completely attach the same significance, we must remember that they are the ones negotiating with the Russians. They are the ones in touch with the Russians on a day-by- day basis, and it is the executive branch that really has to work on this matter. So we have to have, I think, some deference to their judgment. This conference struggled and tried. We tried to get it worked out. I think it was a good-faith effort by Senator Lott, the Senator from Mississippi, Congressman Weldon, myself and others. But we did not achieve that goal, primarily because the House insisted we continue to work from the House language. Every time we worked out one problem with two or three words here, two or three words there, instead of working off the Senate language so we would have known what the underlying fundamental provisions were, it came back in some sort of a new conglomeration of House language. All of this is in multiple pages, anywhere from 10 to 20 pages. Therefore, we had to go over every word again. This went on and on and on. Finally, I had suggested many times that we should work off the Senate language, which would have narrowed the scope of what we had to examine. But, finally the time came when I know Senator Thurmond had to make a decision, as did his counterpart, Congressman Spence, to complete this conference report. I understand their position. But this is enormously important. The Department of Defense and the White House disagree with this language. There are legitimate and sincere fears that this kind of language could end up being extremely counterproductive to our Nation's security. I share those apprehensions and I will urge all Senators to take a close look at this language. My second problem with this bill is that it includes a specific legislative provision that would abolish the statutory requirement which came from the Congress of the United States--Senator Cohen and I led the way on this--for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. I believe that abolishing that statutory authority could undermine civilian oversight of special operations. Special operations forces are absolutely necessary. These are the specialists. These are the people-- the SEALS and the special forces--who go into very dangerous situations in almost every area. They are the best trained military individuals we have. They take the most risk. They are in many types of activities, including activities of a highly classified nature. The Special Operation Force was begun by a legislative act which Senator Cohen and I co-authored. We decided at that time--and I think that the wisdom of that decision has been demonstrated very clearly-- that, if we are going to have those kinds of special forces, we need civilian control not just in the general sense but in the sense of having an Assistant Secretary of Defense who is responsible for the Special Operation Forces. The issue is civilian control. We do not want to lose the civilian control of those forces. But this legislation, in my view, mistakenly abolishes the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. That does not mean, in theory, that there will not continue to be civilian control with the Secretary of Defense in charge. It means that the focus of civilian control over special operations on a daily and weekly basis is likely to be eliminated with the abolishment of the statutory requirement for that position. I think this is a mistake. It is a fundamental mistake. There is legislation in the conference report in which I know many people will be interested on the floor of the Senate because, again, it addresses another position that was created by the Congress. I know the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Iowa were very involved in an effort that language in this conference report that would abolish: the statutory requirement for an independent Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. Many fear--and I share this fear--that abolishing the statutory requirement for this position could undermine objective, unbiased testing of major weapons systems. In other words, it would abolish the statutory requirement to get testing and evaluation away from the program managers who have been somewhat generous in seeing that it worked which many times resulted in a lack of objectivity either in reality or in perception. Another problem I have with this conference report is that the Naval Petroleum Reserve sale provision establishes a 1-year timeframe for the sale even though the budget reconciliation bill no longer mandates sale within 1 year. Originally, this was mandated in the reconciliation bill in order to raise revenue. The Naval Petroleum Reserve is a complex operation, and compressing the timeframe for sale to within 1 year, I believe, is insufficient time. I fear that the taxpayers will not get the maximum value through knowledgeable competitive bidding. It could give one or two companies a real inside position on an enormous amount of value in terms of competitive bidding. So, that is also a provision about which I am concerned, Mr. President. I also have problems with the directive for procurement of specific ships at specific shipyards that are not tied to any clear industrial base requirement. Sometimes it is justified, but when there is no industrial base requirement, it undermines the cost-saving potential of competition. This is micromanagement in a sense that costs the taxpayers money in almost every case. Mr. President, I think this bill has a vast number of certifications and reports, and it gets into micromanagement. We have had some of that in past bills. I do not say that it is unique in this one. But it is of concern. I am also concerned about Buy American provisions for ships and naval equipment which will result in significant cost increases for naval vessels and which could produce an unfavorable reaction against U.S. military sales abroad. Mr. President, military equipment is one of the areas where we have a trade surplus. If we start putting numerous provisions in here saying you can only buy this product from America, the people who are going to end up paying the price are the workers for aerospace companies and for other companies that now have very strong export business. Believe me, when you put a Buy American provision in here, you pay a price for it. Other countries retaliate, and there we go in terms of restricting trade and increasing prices. Mr. President, I also am concerned about something which I know the appropriators have felt keenly about in the past. I am not sure how they feel about it at this point in time. But Senator Byrd and I have talked about this on numerous occasions in relation to this bill. There are mandated spending floors in the shipbuilding language; that is, requirements that say you have to spend this much money--not an authorization saying you can spend this much money, but a floor saying you have to spend this much money. Mr. President, this directly contravenes a longstanding agreement between the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committees where I, at least as chairman, pledged not to place floors in the authorization bill. We put the ceiling on. We say you cannot spend any more in this area or that area. But, in this conference report, we become the floor. If we say you cannot spend any less, that in effect cuts out the appropriations process in that particular area. The reason I object to this is because I think the appropriators must respect that we are the ceiling. If they do not pay attention to our ceiling, if they go over those ceilings, there is no point of an authorization process. In other words, if we say that we are not only the ceiling but we are also the floor, you cannot spend more but you also cannot spend less than this for a certain item, then it undermines the appropriations process. The only way authorization and appropriations can work together is if we are the ceiling on weapons systems and on major considerations and if the appropriators have the ability to come and cut under our amount as they see in their discretion. Finally, there is an earmark for noncompetitive ship maintenance contracts for a specific shipyard. I do not know that the amount of money involved is vast. I am not sure how much the amount of money is. I will find out by the time of my next speech on this subject. But I think the principle of having an earmark for a noncompetitive maintenance contract for a specific shipyard is a very bad practice that will cost the taxpayers money. It certainly does away with competition. And that can, as we have seen in the past, cause a containment problem. If one shipyard has it, another shipyard wants it. And if another shipyard has it, the other shipyard wants it. Pretty soon you have eliminated competition and you have gone to a very serious erosion of stewardship in terms of the taxpayers' money. Finally, Mr. President, there is the creation of a special congressional panel on submarines. This probably will not concern other Senators. It concerns me because that is our job on the Armed Services Committee. But, this bill creates a congressional panel, and I think that needlessly duplicates the oversight role of the Armed Services Committee. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement I released when this conference report came out be printed in the Record, and I will make further remarks at a later point in time during this debate.

Mr. NUNN. I will be glad to work toward that end. It is a good suggestion.

Mr. NUNN. If I could make a brief observation.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Arkansas, I would not go quite that far. I would say that is the apprehension that the interpretation of this language could lead some, perhaps all in the Russian Duma that will be considering this, to believe that this is in the nature of what I would call, for lack of a better term going back to law schools days, an anticipatory breach. I do not think anyone could say that this is a direct breach because nothing has happened. Passing a law does not make it happen. But there is an old story from law school I recall well in a course on contracts in which the professor was trying to explain what anticipatory breach meant, and he said: Let's assume that a man goes from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York and negotiates for 2 weeks to sell the Hurt Building. This was a big building in downtown Atlanta. Now it is not one of the big ones, but it was well known back when I was in law school. He finally concludes the contract. They sign the deal, and the buyer agrees to buy it for a certain amount and the seller agrees to sell it. And so the buyer says, ``Let's go out to dinner and celebrate. We have been negotiating long and hard.'' But the seller says, ``No, I can't do it. I've got to rush back to Atlanta.'' The buyer then said, ``Why? You have been here 2 weeks. Why don't you relax and celebrate. You have just sold a big building. I don't see why you have to go back to Atlanta.'' To which the seller replied ``Because I have to go back down there and buy that building.'' Well, he just sold something he did not own. Now, the contract did not call for performance for another 30 days. So it was not direct breach, but it is in the legal terms an anticipatory breach. And that is what the fear is here, that this could be taken as anticipatory breach.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I think that is a very good article to place in the Record. I thank the Senator from Virginia, my friend from Virginia, for his recollection, which is entirely consistent with my own. Mr. President, during the cold war--in a long period of nuclear confrontation--all of us and most Americans instinctively understood that the Commander in Chief had to make a quick and decisive decision with potentially fatal consequences if certain events took place. In effect, every President of the United States from 1945 on has had the acknowledged authority and responsibility to respond to aggression by using nuclear weapons, which could result in the destruction of a large portion of mankind, including most of the United States. With this awesome authority being accepted for so long, recognizing that, if the former Soviet Union attacked the United States, and certainly if they used nuclear weapons, there would not be time for 30 days of congressional debate or probably even 3 days. With that kind of reality having taken place for so long and that kind of assumed authority being vested in the Commander in Chief, how then, in 1995, in a totally different set of circumstances, does Congress exercise its constitutional responsibility to ``declare war?'' And even more relevant in my view, how do we exercise our responsibility in funding these operations? That is the ultimate power of Congress. Senator Byrd reminds us of that frequently. The ultimate power of Congress is we pay the bills on behalf of the American people. We appropriate the money. Mr. President, in Grenada, in Panama, Congress played almost no role in those military operations. In Lebanon, we heard President Reagan declare that our military commitment in Lebanon was vital--he used the word ``vital'' several times--to our national security interests. Congress approved the deployment of U.S. military forces with a time certain to perform an ill-defined and uncertain mission which I opposed. It was almost the ultimate backward way of doing things. We put a time certain on completion of the mission but did not define the mission. So we ended up with a time certain to perform something that no one knew really what it was. That was, I think, a backward way of doing things. To the credit of the Dole-McCain amendment--and I participated in helping draft the final version of that amendment--I do think that the current approach is a much better approach than we have had in the past in the sense that, at least, we make it clear what the mission is and there is an effort to define an exit strategy. We did neither of those things in the Lebanon situation. I voted against it. But, nevertheless, in Lebanon we witnessed the tragic death of hundreds of our marines, uncertain as to why they were there or what they were supposed to do. We saw President Reagan pull the troops out of this ``vital'' area overnight. Since then, we paid very little heed to events in this so-called vital country. In the Persian Gulf, Congress, without speaking formally, acquiesced in the commitment of several hundred thousand ground troops to protect Saudi Arabia. We watched without taking any action as President Bush deployed such a large force in November of that year, that its rotation was infeasible, and made international commitments at the same time, or very shortly thereafter, to go to war against Iraq on a date certain. Those international commitments to go to war on a date certain were without congressional approval. By a close vote on the eve of the war, Congress gave President Bush the authority to do what he had committed to do with or without congressional approval. Mr. President, I do not blame the Presidents for acting and exercising leadership. They can make mistakes like anyone else. That is why we have three branches of Government. That is why the Founding Fathers very carefully separated the right to declare war from the Commander in Chief and placed it in the legislative branch of Government. That is also why all funds have to come from the Congress. So, the President, whether President Bush or President Reagan or President Clinton, is, when making these decisions, exercising Executive leadership. And they are doing it too many times with a vacuum, a void, coming from the Congress in terms of a response. So, it is our job to say what the congressional role is. We put up the money, and it is our job to say what we demand in terms of a role. And, so far, I do not think we have done it. I believe this is the time for the Congress to acknowledge formally what is plain for all to see, and that is the War Powers Resolution does not work. Furthermore, it is not going to work. The longer this outmoded and unworkable legislation remains on the books in its present form, the longer we will continue the illusion--and it is an illusion-- that Congress has a meaningful role in the commitment of U.S. military forces to these types of missions. Certainly, we can come along and we can take an action after the mission is already well underway to cut off funds. That is always a very difficult, very painful way to do business. We have done that only on one or two occasions. We did it in Somalia, in effect, and we do not think we should have to rely on that as the way we do business. We may have to do it again, but it is certainly not the desired way for this Government to function, certainly not in international affairs. No President will allow U.S. forces to be withdrawn from a military mission because of congressional inaction, as set forth in the War Powers Resolution, nor, in my opinion, should they. The War Powers Resolution provides that if the President commits forces in a hostile area, then Congress, by its inaction, can require those forces be brought home by doing nothing. That has never worked. I voted for the War Powers Resolution. I wish now I had not because it will never work. It is not sensible. It defies reason. Congress sitting on its hands requiring a President who has committed our military forces to a foreign area where they are in harm's way--maybe even in a war or conflict--and we do not do anything. And the War Powers Act presumes the President will then bring them home. That has never worked. It never will work. The longer we continue to keep this legislation on the books, the more impotent the Congress of the United States will be in exercising its real authority under the Constitution. Mr. President, we should either amend the War Powers Act to make it workable or we should repeal it and replace it with legislation that is realistic and workable. That is long overdue. In the post-cold-war world in which the United States is called on to intervene in ethnic, religious and other conflicts in areas that may be important but less than vital, we must find a way to create regular, frequent and comprehensive consultation between the President and the Congress before the President makes concrete commitments and before U.S. troops are committed to harm's way. Such consultation can, in theory and in reality, take many forms. My preference is the formation of a Congressional Consultation Group, as was proposed almost 7 years ago, by myself, Senator Byrd, Senator Mitchell, Senator Cohen, Senator Warner, Senator Boren and Senator Danforth in a bill to amend the War Powers Resolution. I believe Senator Biden from Delaware had a similar resolution which he sponsored. Under that bill, the congressional leadership, including the chairmen and ranking members of the Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees would meet on a regular and frequent basis with the President to discuss real-world situations that could lead to the involvement of the United States forces. Some have suggested having that group meet on a regular basis with the National Security Council, chaired by the President. It seems to me that thought is worthy of pursuit. I certainly believe that would be one form that this could take. But whatever the form of consultation, I believe there also needs to be an attempt to forge an executive-congressional consensus on a set of principles that will guide the use of United States forces in the future. This approach starts with the proposition that the United States is the world's only superpower and that we have certain responsibilities that no other nation on earth can fill. Too many times, when we get into a Third World situation or a situation like Bosnia, or a humanitarian mission like Somalia, or a mission like Haiti, or a mission in other areas of the world, we forget--as our allies urge us to come in and play our role--we forget that we are the only country in the world that can do certain things. Too many times our allies forget that, too. They, of course, want us on the scene every time there is a problem. But, Mr. President, we need to keep in mind that we are the only nation in the world that can deter the use of weapons of mass destruction. We are the only nation in the world that can lead and coordinate the worldwide effort to avoid the spread of weapons of mass destruction to the Third World and to terrorist groups. We are the only nation in the world that can help preserve the stability in Europe by the presence of American forces that, although dramatically reduced in number, are still very significant in terms of their psychological and their political impact. We are the only nation in the world that, with our allies in South Korea, can deter and defeat the aggression of North Korea or come to the rescue of nations in the Middle East that are the world's primary source of oil. We are the only nation that can perform those key and vital functions. By our military presence, we are the only nation in the world that can give the Japanese the confidence to resist any urge they might have in the future to develop nuclear weapons and go on a real rearmament program that would have a profoundly destabilizing effect in northeast Asia and beyond. And we are the only nation in the world that can keep open the sea lanes of communication on which not only our trade but also the trade of the world and the economy of the world depend. Mr. President, these are all key functions. That does not mean we cannot perform other functions like Bosnia, but it does mean that, when we undertake this kind of mission, we and our allies should understand the United States should not be expected to continue a large ground force in an area like Bosnia for a prolonged period of time, because if something goes wrong in Korea, if something goes wrong in the Middle East, if something goes wrong elsewhere in the world, who is going to play the role of superpower? There is no one else on the block. I believe we can divide America's interests into three broad categories: one is humanitarian; two is important; and three I would call vital. There is other terminology that people might want to use, but I would like to stimulate at least some discussion and thought about the areas where the United States may be involved. A humanitarian interest is an interest in which we want to see an alleviation of suffering, but where we do not have a significant strategic interest. This includes cases like Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Bangladesh, Sudan--places where people are going through tragic turmoil and, in many places, actually starving. We see them on television. It brings tears to our eyes. We want to do something about it, but, in my view, this does not mean we should automatically think about sending military forces. In those cases where we want to alleviate suffering, I think our responsibility--again keeping in mind the other responsibilities we have as a superpower that no one else can perform--our responsibility, generally speaking and in most cases, is to say to our allies: we will help you with logistics, we will help you with airlift, we will help you with sealift, we will help you with intelligence, and we will help you with communications, but we want you to do your job by putting in ground forces where necessary for peacekeeping or peace enforcement purposes. Not only to our allies in the traditional sense, but also to nations in the region where the tragedy is occurring. In other words, on most such occasions, we should do the things only we can do and let others do things they can do. Mr. President, this probably does not meet the definition of a national security strategy, but I believe we need to start thinking along those lines. America cannot deploy military forces in all of these humanitarian areas, and when we do, we can get into serious and severe difficulty. Somalia is the best example of that. To me, a vital interest is one that we are willing to fight for and, if necessary, willing to send our young people off to die for. This is an awesome responsibility. There are not many of those interests in the world, by the very definition of that word, and we have to be very careful in designating an area as a place where we have a vital interest. That word ought to be used very carefully. Korea is a place where we have vital interests. Without any doubt, we would fight in Korea, if necessary. We have already demonstrated that. We continue to demonstrate it with the presence of thousands of American military forces. We have already demonstrated we have a vital interest in the Middle East in the Persian Gulf war and by the deployment we had--a couple of deployments--just in the last 2 years when the Iraqis again started threatening Kuwait. Mr. President, we also have had a vital interest in Europe since World War II, and we continue to have a vital interest in Europe. We are a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for a collective defense in the case of an armed attack against one or more of the parties. The United States also has entered into bilateral defense treaties with Japan, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea. We have entered into a multilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand-- although in the latter case, our obligations under that treaty have been suspended with respect to New Zealand since September of 1986 because of differences on the question of port visits of nuclear- powered warships. Mr. President, under that treaty, we have committed to meet the common dangers of an armed attack on our treaty partners in accordance with our constitutional processes. That is the case in most of these treaties. And, of course, the area Senator Lugar and I have emphasized more than any other in the last 2 or 3 years, and where we have the most profound and difficult national security challenge in the next 10, 20 years, or even longer, is that we have a vital interest in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--not simply nuclear weapons, but chemical as well as biological weapons, which can literally kill tens of thousands of people in an instant. That is also a vital interest because it could be a direct threat to our Nation and to our friends in the world. Now, the most difficult of all of these areas is the third category, the one that fits between vital and humanitarian, and the term that I use is ``important interest.'' An important interest is an interest that is more than a mere humanitarian interest, but does not rise to the level of a vital interest. There are overlaps between these categories. They no longer come in a neat package. The most difficult can be exemplified by Bosnia, where I have long believed we have had an important interest but not a vital interest. I do believe that we have a strategic and even a vital interest in preventing that conflict from spreading. If it spreads to other areas, then it could indeed become vital. When an important but not vital interest becomes a test of NATO solidarity--as has happened in the case of Bosnia--when an important interest becomes a test of United States leadership in NATO and of United States credibility and commitment in the world, it moves into a category beyond important. Such is the case in Bosnia. We must also bear in mind when considering the deployment of our forces for other than a vital interest that the cumulative impact of such deployments may interfere with our responsibilities as the world's lone superpower in areas which are truly vital to U.S. security and the American people. Returning, briefly, to the subject of Executive-Congressional consultation, I note that the majority leader, Senator Dole, introduced S. 5, the Peace Powers Act of 1995 earlier this year, which, in part, would have repealed the War Powers Resolution but re-enacted the consultation and reporting provisions of the War Powers Resolution. Mr. President, I also note that the May 1994 White Paper entitled ``The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,'' stated that the administration would support legislation along the lines of that introduced by myself, Senators Mitchell, Byrd, Warner, and Cohen, to amend the War Powers Resolution to introduce a consultative mechanism and to eliminate the 60-day withdrawal provisions. Based upon these developments, Mr. President, I believe it is very important in the next year that we have a chance to forge a bipartisan approach that would meet the needs both of the Congress and of the administration and that would foster a more cooperative approach between the two branches on important national security decisions. When our military forces go into harm's way, they have every right to expect that both the executive branch and the legislative branch have been involved in the decisionmaking and are behind the mission. That is something we owe the military men and women who serve in our forces abroad. Mr. President, I intend to introduce legislation early next year to address this very important issue. It has been delayed too long in terms of dealing with it. I repeat, the longer we pretend that we have on the books legislation that covers congressional responsibility in this important, crucial area, the longer we deal with an illusion which has no basis in reality. Mr. President, I solicit input from all Members of the Senate on both sides of the aisle on this issue. I hope we can address it before the next crisis arises. I thank the Chair, and I yield back whatever time I have remaining. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to discuss the overall concept of war powers and the congressional role in making decisions to deploy United States forces abroad. There was not sufficient time in the debate on Bosnia during which I alluded to my frustration in this regard, but did not go into detail. Today I hope to lay out my views in a more complete fashion. Mr. President, during Wednesday's debate on the Bosnia resolutions, I noted that when President Clinton publicly committed the United States to participate in implementing a peace agreement by putting U.S. forces on the ground in Bosnia, he did so without consulting with Congress prior to making that commitment, as far as I know. I was not consulted, and I do not know of others who were. I certainly do not know of any kind of formal consultation or any kind of leadership meeting before that commitment to deploy U.S. ground forces was made to the world and to our allies. It was a very important commitment. At that time, we were not on the verge of a peace agreement, so it was not taken as being important by the news media or by those people in Congress in leadership positions; but it was important. And I think all of us need to understand that when Presidents make these kinds of commitments internationally, and when they do so without consulting Congress, then the cards are already dealt. Those of us in the Congress who have certain constitutional responsibilities, if we do not do a better job ourselves, then this kind of pattern--it has not only been President Clinton, but it has been the same with other recent Presidents--will continue. President Reagan made commitments and certainly took action in Panama and Grenada and Congress played almost no role. President Bush, though he did, to his great credit, come to Congress before actually going to war, deployed hundreds of thousands of troops to Saudi Arabia without any congressional action. Congress did not take any action. I do not blame President Bush for that. Congress did not act. And President Bush then virtually doubled the number of forces in Saudi Arabia, which prevented a troop rotation, which meant that the clock was ticking. There was no way to rotate those forces. Therefore, they either had to be used in some kind of conflict or it had to be resolved. So, the clock was ticking there. Then President Bush also made it clear that whatever Congress did, even though he sought congressional authority, he was going to go forward. So, all of this leads me to think that it is time, way past time, probably 10 or 15 years past time, for Congress to rethink its own role. I think this is fundamentally a congressional responsibility. I do not think it is going to be solved by a President, whether it is a Republican President or Democratic President. It is not their job. I would hope that any President would cooperate if Congress takes its own initiative to exercise its own responsibility and authority. But, at this stage, I do not expect the President to solve our own problem.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I agree with every word in this letter. I think they are absolutely right on target. This is where we are today. And this is the kind of consideration that the Senate must take into account today. We will have plenty of time to debate how we got to this point. But today I think we first and foremost need to consider the effect of what we do on not only the military forces themselves that are in the process of deploying, but on their families and on their mission. Mr. President, I urge the Senate today to support--or tomorrow, whenever we vote--the Dole-McCain resolution. This resolution has been the subject of intense and constructive negotiations on a bipartisan basis with a Democratic working group headed by Senator Daschle, Senator Pell and myself. The Dole-McCain resolution, as now worded, has a key paragraph which I believe conveys the kind of support our American troops and their families both need and deserve. I quote that paragraph because I think it basically follows almost exactly what these distinguished retired military generals and admirals have said to us in the way of advice. Quoting the paragraph in the Dole-McCain resolution: The Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of our Armed Forces who are carrying out their mission in support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery and believes that they must be given all necessary resources and support to carry out their mission and ensure their security. Mr. President, that is the heart of what we are going to be voting on. I hope that our colleagues on both sides of the aisle will understand the importance of what we are doing, and I hope they will put the military forces first and foremost in their minds. Mr. President, before we vote on the Dole-McCain resolution, it is my understanding we will vote on the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. I have great respect for both Senators who sponsored this resolution. They are on the Armed Services Committee, and they do a sterling job of representing their States and representing the American people on this committee. But the Hutchison resolution does not provide what our troops need. It does not provide a sense that the Senate backs them and their mission. It tells our military forces, in effect--``We don't agree with your mission. What you're doing is not important to the United States. It's not important enough for you to risk your life.'' These are the people who are going to be risking their lives. ``It's not important enough for you to risk your life and neither is the NATO alliance and its mission.'' ``Enforcing the peace agreement in Bosnia''--and this is my paraphrasing of the Hutchison-Inhofe message; these are not the words. I do not want anyone to think I am quoting the words. This is the effect of those words. ``Enforcing the peace agreement in Bosnia is not something we agree with.'' That is what we are going to be saying implicitly if we adopt this resolution. Certainly we will be saying it if we adopt this resolution and do not pass the Dole-McCain resolution. We are also saying implicitly the President is totally on his own without the backing of the Congress and the American people. We go forward and say in the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution--again, in effect, these are my words--``We will pay you, we will equip you and we will wish you well. We don't agree with the mission, we don't think it's important enough for you to risk your life, but we are going to equip you, support you and wish you well.'' Now, how are our military men and women and their families going to feel about undertaking this kind of mission where, indeed, many of them will be risking their lives? I hope not many will end up being injured or killed. I hope none. But nevertheless, there is a very serious risk here. We know that. How are they going to feel if we send them off on this undertaking with this message from the U.S. Senate? Mr. President, I understand the temptation of my colleagues to vote for the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. It gives Senators the ability to say we were against this mission from the beginning but we support our troops. This resolution, which will be voted on today or tomorrow, may be what some Senators need, but it is not what our troops need at this juncture. It is entirely possible--I hope it does not happen--but it is entirely possible the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution could be agreed to and the Dole-McCain resolution could fail. If this occurs, then our American military will have the worst of both worlds. We will be saying, ``Full speed ahead on a risky mission that we don't agree with, don't approve of''--and that is what we are going to be saying--``Full speed ahead on a risky mission with the clear knowledge the mission is denounced at the outset by the U.S. Senate.'' I urge my colleagues to vote against the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, and I urge them to vote for the Dole-McCain resolution. I urge all of those who at this stage are thinking about voting for the Hutchison resolution to think very carefully. It is essential for the morale of our military forces that we send the clear message of the Dole-McCain resolution which says, in effect, ``We may not agree with the President or how we got to this point, but we believe the commitment of U.S. military forces to Bosnia is important; it is important to prevent the spread of the conflict, to maintain United States leadership in NATO, to stop the tragic loss of life, to fulfill American commitments and to preserve United States credibility.'' There is a different message, a fundamentally different message that will go forward if we adopt the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. If we pass the Dole-McCain resolution, in spite of the clear concern expressed in that resolution about how we got to this point, there is no doubt that the Dole-McCain resolution fully supports the American military forces and fully supports the mission that they are going to be undertaking. I want to read again the paragraph in the Dole-McCain resolution that makes this abundantly clear, and I hope Senators will concentrate on the difference between this language and what is in the Hutchison- Inhofe language. The language in the Dole-McCain resolution says: The Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of our Armed Forces who are carrying out their missions in support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery, and believes they must be given all necessary resources and support to carry out their missions and ensure their security. Mr. President, in closing, I urge the passage of the Dole-McCain resolution so that our military forces and their families will understand not only that we in Congress support them, but that the mission they are undertaking and the risks they will bear are important to America. I know there are others waiting to speak, and I am not going to go into great detail, but I do want to say, just in summarizing my prepared remarks, which I will not give today but will give at a later point in this debate or thereafter, that the Congress of the United States needs to take a fundamental look at the role we are playing or not playing in terms of these national security decisions. Congress must understand--if we do not at this point, we must begin to, and I have understood it for a number of years--the War Powers Act does not work. The longer this outmoded and unworkable legislation remains on the books, the longer we will continue the illusion that Congress is playing a meaningful role in the commitment of U.S. military forces to these types of missions. President Clinton will be viewed by most in Congress as assuming the full responsibility for the fate of the United States military mission in Bosnia. That is because this commitment by President Clinton was made in 1993 without consultation with the Congress or the congressional leadership. There is a similarity between this and the Persian Gulf where the President of the United States, President Bush then, committed the United States internationally without an approval of Congress. That is the parallel. We are going to face this situation over and over and over again, where Presidents commit internationally before they get approval at home. We have to address this. I think it is in our court. I think it is Congress' responsibility to make the correction. An awful lot of this comes from the illusion that the War Powers Act may some day miraculously work. It has never worked. It is not going to work. It is based on the fundamental flaw that assumes that congressional inaction can require the Commander in Chief to withdraw forces from abroad. Congressional inaction will never, ever force a Commander in Chief to withdraw forces. The only way we can do that is by cutting off funds, and we need to recognize this. No President will or should allow U.S. forces to be withdrawn from a military mission because of simple congressional inaction. I think, Mr. President, it is time to repeal the War Powers Act and replace it with legislation that is realistic and workable. We must find a way to create regular, full, and comprehensive consultation between the President and the Congress before the President makes concrete commitments and before U.S. troops are committed to harm's way. We do not have that mechanism now. We do not have the consultation taking place in a timely fashion, and that has been true both in Republican and in Democratic administrations. So I hope out of this we will begin looking at the War Powers Act and begin to make changes to correct it. I see that the Senator from Delaware is on the floor. He and I and Senator Byrd, as well as Senator Warner and several other Republicans, several years ago sponsored a revision of the War Powers Act. I hope our colleagues will begin to think along those lines because it is leading us down the primrose path of having a law on the books that supposedly involves Congress in these decisions when, by the time Congress gets involved, the international commitment has already been made and the choices are regrettably limited. I yield the floor. Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, today or tomorrow the Senate will be voting on the President's decision to deploy United States military forces as part of a NATO peace enforcement mission in Bosnia. There are many different views of how we got to this point. You have my own views on that. I will discuss them at another time. I have already discussed them in the past on numerous occasions. But it is my hope that the Senate will now be able to concentrate its focus on the choices that are now before us. There are few things about the current situation that we know; a few things that we believe based on reasonable judgments but not certainty; and many unknowns that are subject only to reasonable speculation at this point, even if it is reasonable speculation. The things that we know are what I will try to deal with in a short and brief set of remarks today. First of all, we know that President Clinton has decided to commit United States military forces to this mission in Bosnia. Second, we know that NATO has decided to commit the NATO alliance to this peace enforcement mission. And we know that all NATO nations that have military forces are participating. Third, we know that several hundred American troops are now on the ground in Bosnia; and several thousand troops will be on the ground in Bosnia in the next few weeks. Fourth, we can debate the constitutional power of the Commander in Chief, as we have many times in the past and we will again, and we can debate congressional responsibility to declare war, but we all know that Congress has neither the ways nor the means to prevent this deployment unless we cut off the funds. We know that. It has already been decided by the Senate today that we are not going to cut off the funds. We know that. Fifth, we know that the Defense appropriations bill has passed, been signed, and the President, like his predecessors of both parties, will finance the operation out of operation and maintenance funds and then seek reimbursement of these funds next year in a supplemental appropriation. Sixth, we know that if Congress cuts off the funds at this point, it would require a majority in both Houses to pass and two-thirds vote in both the Senate and House to override a certain veto. The Senate rejected this cutoff of funds decisively today when we voted on the first resolution because I believe the Senators concluded this would have an adverse effect on our own military forces, an adverse effect on our allies, an adverse effect on our leadership in NATO and the world, as well as an adverse effect on the parties on the ground in Bosnia. The President has decided on deployment. The NATO alliance has decided on deployment. The United States forces are on the way to Bosnia. What then is the congressional role in this important national security decision? Mr. President, I would like to talk at length today about some of the constitutional challenges we have in terms of determining the role of Congress in the post-cold war era. I will return to that subject shortly. But today we must face a world of reality. The cards have been dealt. The administration's actions--starting with the President's commitment almost 3 years ago--and that was a public and international commitment that United States forces would participate in a NATO force to implement a Bosnian peace agreement--have put Congress in a situation in which a great deal is at stake, including United States reliability and leadership, but also including the peace agreement itself, the ending of the tragedy in Bosnia, as well as the future of NATO as an alliance. We also know that a cut off of funds will not become law, but passage of this type of legislation--followed by a veto and a vote to override, if the House passes it or we pass it today--would put our military forces in limbo in the middle of their deployment--when they are most vulnerable. To me this is unthinkable and unacceptable. We also know that the effect of such action would erode the value of U.S. commitments around the world and would increase the danger to U.S. military personnel in harm's way that are stationed in dangerous places around the world. That danger certainly would be an increase to our military forces whether in the Korean Peninsula or in Europe or in the Middle East because the greatest thing they have behind them is United States credibility and the credibility of our own word. The bottom line--Mr. President--if today Congress found a way to prevent the President from going forward with his commitment, the damage to America and the increased danger to our troops in the world is certain. There is really no doubt about that. If we do give the President the green light and permit the mission to go forward in a carefully prescribed manner, the risks are considerable but there is at least a chance of success if that term is narrowly and carefully defined. I will not dwell on the definition of success in these remarks today. But before the week is out I do want to give a much more detailed presentation including what I think we should do in terms of the definition of success, including the risk of this operation as well as the opportunities of this operation. Mr. President, my main concern today however is the message the Senate sends to our military forces who are about to embark on this NATO mission to Bosnia. I would like to read into the Record and place in the Record a letter I received today. It was dated December 12. It is signed by Michael S. Davison, General, U.S. Army, retired--many will remember General Davison for his service to our Nation--Andrew J. Goodpaster, General, U.S. Army, retired, who also served as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe as well as the head of NATO forces, Walter T. Kerwin, General, U.S. Army, retired, who had a very distinguished career in the Army, William J. McCaffrey, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, retired, William Y. Smith, U.S. Air Force, retired, Harry D. Train, Admiral, U.S. Navy, retired, and others. For those of us who have been here very long in the Senate, this is a sterling list of outstanding military leaders that have served our Nation with distinction. Here is what they say: Dear Senator Nunn: As American military forces are being prepared for commitment in Bosnia, we believe it is essential that they go with a clear understanding that they are supported by their country--that is, by the whole American people--in their difficult and dangerous assignment. Our military forces serving in Bosnia will be under American command, acting in concert with military forces from NATO and other nations that participate in the military implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. The mission statement and the NATO chain of command must make it clear that the military forces are not to be drawn into mission- creep nation-building but are to be used for tasks military in nature, and will not be subjected to attempts at micro- management from afar, or to ``dual-key'' aberrations. Continuing the quote from these distinguished retired military officials. As our leaders consider our country's involvement in Bosnia, we encourage them to send a message to our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines wherever they may be (and to all others as well) that our country is giving them its full backing in the accomplishment of their assigned mission. We believe it is time to close ranks, support our troops in the field, and concentrate on helping them do their job in the best possible way. And then the letter is signed by these generals. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Reserving the right to object. Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I would like to make a few remarks on this very subject. I think the 7-year number for balancing the budget in 7 years is a reasonable goal. I would hope that the President would agree with that goal as we proceed to try to find a way to end this Government shutdown and pass a continuing resolution.

Mr. NUNN. If my friend from Nevada would yield on that point, while the Senator from Nebraska is here.

Mr. NUNN. It is my understanding that is what is being talked about now. But the Congressional Budget Office [CBO], I happen to believe they have more conservative numbers and should be agreed to as the basis for the overall approach to get a balanced budget, because we have seen time and time again that we end up erring on the side of optimism, and we do not end up achieving the savings that were projected. But, having said that, I think no President of the United States is going to accept the CBO numbers for a 7-year period and have that dictated to by Congress in law. It is one thing to agree to 1 year as an estimate; it is another thing to have the congressional branch tell the executive branch that it has to abide by those numbers. Congress passes those numbers, can use the CBO numbers, but Congress then has to send the bill to the President. The President has a right to veto it under the Constitution. This business of shutting down Government if the President will not agree for a 7-year period to the congressional numbers is a way of trying to avoid the constitutional procedures that were set up by our Founding Fathers which have worked pretty darn well. Shutting down Government to prevent the President from using his veto is something that I think is a sad mistake and is going to hurt more and more people as time goes on. I say that as one who watched Republican Presidents make virtually the same point. I do not believe President Reagan or President Bush would have accepted a dictate by a Democratic Congress that they use CBO numbers during their periods in office. I have talked to the former Directors of OMB under the previous Presidents, and they have confirmed that opinion. I do not believe President Dole or President Gramm or President Specter or President Lugar would allow the Congress to say, ``You are going to use CBO numbers''--a Democratic Congress particularly, reversing the present scenario--``We are going to require you to use these numbers.'' Billions and billions of dollars are at stake, and also a separation of powers is at stake. [[Page S 17444]] So while I favor using the CBO numbers, I do not favor putting into law and holding the President hostage in terms of a shutdown of Government if he does not agree to that, because if I were President of the United States I would not agree to it. It does not have much to do with the question of the budget. It has a lot to do with the question of separation of powers. We are going to be visiting, as the Senator from Nebraska said, these issues every year, whatever the results of this compromise that I hope will emerge in negotiating a final reconciliation bill. We will have to have a compromise. These are going to be estimates. We are going to make mistakes. The Medicare-Medicaid savings--I applaud the Republicans for taking on these entitlements; I think it is long overdue. I think those of us on the Democratic side need to muster up some courage to begin to take on the entitlements also. But I believe we are going to have to go back and have a lot of corrections made to the changes that are being made because all of these are estimates. We do not know how much is going to be saved. That is one of the reasons I feel that going forward with a front-end tax cut is a mistake now because we are going to have to have some money to patch up the mistakes as we go along and we find out people are really being hurt in an unjustified way. So I hope out of all of this, we will reach some compromise very soon that will have the President basically agree to the 7-year target and goal but not have Congress impose by law the CBO numbers. There are lots of ways to be able to do that, and I hope we will find a way before too many more hours go by. I thank the Senator for yielding. I did want to comment on that one point.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be given 10 minutes.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, last month, I joined my colleagues, Senator Lieberman and former Secretary William Bennett, who was the former Secretary of Education, at a news conference in which they were shining a spotlight on what I believe is the problem that for too long has been ignored by television executives, corporate advertisers, the news media, as well as the American people. The problem is the content of some of our television programming and the corrosive effect this programming is having on our culture. Nowhere is this cultural erosion or ``cultural rot,'' in the words of Secretary Bennett, more evident than in the content of many of today's daytime talk shows. The news media are finally beginning to report on these issues, even though many Americans have been voicing their concern for a long time. I know that I have been speaking out on these matters for a number of years, as have a number of my colleagues, and as have Americans from all walks of life and all parts of the country. The media has not been listening until recently, but they are listening now, and I think that is having a real effect. I would not be speaking out today, or in the past, if I believed television was not important. It is very important. According to the World Almanac for 1995, Americans watch approximately 16\1/2\ hours of television per week; teenagers watch about 12 hours per week. I think the number is higher than that, but that is what this says. Our children watch approximately 13 hours per week. For adults, this amounts to two full 8-hour working days of television viewing per week. For children and teenagers, this amounts to 2 extra days of ``television school.'' For children, this is far more time than they devote to homework. The second most widely circulated magazine in America is TV Guide, a magazine about television. Billions and billions of dollars are spent on television advertising. We all know that market forces would not pour that kind of money into television if it did not have a powerful impact on the people watching it. All of these statistics point to the fact that television has a powerful and profound affect on all of our lives. Given the tremendous impact of television on American culture, the content of our television programming is important. To illustrate this point, I refer my colleagues to the June 1992 edition of the Journal of the American Medical Association, which reported on a study that concluded there was a direct relationship between the level of violence on television and the growth of violent crime in our society. The study--headed up by Dr. Brandon Centerwall, a Seattle, WA, psychiatrist--concludes: ``The epidemiological evidence indicates that if, hypothetically, television technology had never been developed, there would today be 10,000 fewer homicides each year in the United States, 70,000 fewer rapes, and 700,000 fewer injurious assaults.'' Neither I, nor Senator Lieberman, nor former Secretary Bennett is talking about turning back our technological clock by 50 years. There are many good programs on television. There is much education on television in a positive sense. However, violent television programming is not a necessary part of television technology, and the logical conclusion from Dr. Centerwall's study, and numerous other such studies along this line, is that a reduction in the level of violence in television programming will, over the long term, lead to a reduction in violence in our society. Nowhere is the content of television more depraved and more sensational, nowhere does television unapologet- ically appeal to people's most prurient interests and worst instincts than on daytime talk shows. These are shows that do not even pretend to excuse themselves under a disclaimer that they present fantasy or fiction. They pump up their ratings by portraying their contents as ``real life.'' As a consequence, they demean and exploit real people. By implication, they tell their audiences that men, women, and children who have serious problems in life are an object of freak-show fascination. I doubt that many of the producers or sponsors of these shows will tell you that they are proud of what they do. If you asked them why they do it, in private, and if they were honest, I imagine they would confess they do it purely for money. During the Lieberman-Bennett press conference last month, which I joined, some clips from these shows were shown to illustrate our point that much of this programming has gone far beyond the pale, and that we as citizens, as leaders, and as consumers should let television executives know and should let companies who advertise know that we believe it is unacceptable for those shows to continue to cultivate the seeds of cultural and moral decline in our Nation. In subsequent responses to these comments we made at the news conference, and in an effort to defend this medium, some defenders of daytime talk shows suggested that we were out of line by speaking out against the content of these shows. They even raised the question of the first amendment. Some suggested that daytime talk shows were the victims of broad generalizations, perhaps suggesting that we found a few sensationalized, anomalous episodes and were holding those up as the standard daytime talk show fare. To follow up on this issue, one member of my staff voluntarily conducted an unscientific survey of the topics of daytime talk shows. Every hour or so, he would scan the television on his desk and see what the day's topics were for the daytime talk shows. The results added to the concern that I already had. The first day, one show was called, ``Stop Pretending To Be a Girl'' and featured young boys whose parents were upset that their sons dressed and acted like a girl. Another show offered a show entitled ``Boys Who Only Have Sex With Virgins.'' Yet another show featured a girl dumping her boyfriend on national television and asking her new ``significant other,'' another girl, to commit to her. Mr. President, I thought that surely the next day's shows would pale in comparison to these. I was wrong. Subsequent days' reviews of these shows found titles such as ``One-night Stand Reunions.'' Another show was entitled ``I'm Ready To Have Sex With You Now.'' And another show was called, ``I Cheat and I'm Proud of It.'' One show featured a woman who chose to tell her fiance on national television that she cheated on him with her sister's boyfriend and that she lied to him about a miscarriage which was actually an abortion. Another show reunited pornographic stars, strippers, and transvestites with their past lovers. Perhaps the most appropriately titled show of all was the one entitled ``You Look Like a Freak.'' Quoting again from Dr. Centerwall, babies ``are born with an instinctive capacity and desire to imitate adult human behavior.'' Continuing the quote, ``It is a most useful instinct, for the developing child must learn and master a vast repertoire of behavior in short order.'' The problem is that children do not possess an instinct for gauging a priori whether a behavior ought to be imitated. Therein, Mr. President, lies the problem. We should not hesitate to speak out against things we feel are harmful to our children and to our society. The people that produce television and radio and newspapers have a first amendment right; no doubt about that. We all hold it sacred. But we also have a constitutional guarantee of free speech as citizens. We do not have to be Senators to have that right. Citizens have that right in America. While our guarantee under the first amendment allows programs such as these to exist, it also allows them to be criticized. Further, it allows us to encourage the corporations and businesses whose advertising dollars make these broadcasts possible to rethink their sponsorship. That is what I have been doing for at least the last 5 years. If they do not rethink their sponsorship of these programs, the first amendment and our marketplace allows us, as consumers, to no longer support the products of the corporations that fund programs [[Page S 17446]] that we find offensive. That is our right as citizens. I believe that corporate executives need to pay attention to what their dollars are sponsoring, and I believe they need to rethink whether or not they want their firms associated with many of these shows. Indeed, the point is not whether such shows can be shown on television. They can be. We know that. The question is whether such shows should be on television. For too long, this second question has been ignored. It appears that this question may finally be getting the attention it deserves. In recent days, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Times, and NBC News have reported that companies, including Procter & Gamble, the Nation's largest television advertiser, are withdrawing their advertising support from some daytime talk shows because they do not meet company standards of quality and decency. Mr. President, this is precisely the kind of corporate effort that can have a significant impact on the content of television programming. All of this is run by money, and if the money starts shifting, believe me, there will be a response. I applaud Procter & Gamble officials, and those in other companies, who are beginning to realize--too slowly in my view, but finally--that they have an obligation beyond getting rating points. They have a responsibility as citizens for the kind of America we live in and how we raise our children. As a final note, the heavy sexual content in soap operas, the excessive gratuitous violence, profanity, and sex in prime time shows and, most importantly, the lack of parental supervision should not escape this debate over television. We all have our responsibilities. These are aspects of television that are just as important as the content of the daytime talk shows. Mr. President, I have spoken out before against these negative aspects and I will have more to say in the months ahead.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to join my colleagues Senators Kassebaum, Gregg, and Gorton in introducing legislation to reform the Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA]. As my colleagues know, OSHA is one of the most frequently criticized agencies in the Federal Government. Recent polls show that OSHA ties with the Internal Revenue Service as the Federal agency which causes the most dissatisfaction among Americans. While everyone agrees that Government has a responsibility to help ensure safe and healthy workplaces, OSHA's reputation in this area is one of inefficient methods of promoting workplace safety that often alienate businesses and workers alike. I understand that some in Congress favor abolishing the agency entirely in order to remove the expensive and bureaucratic compliance burdens from business. Others favor maintaining the status quo or would have OSHA impose stiffer penalties and more specific requirements on businesses in order to coerce greater levels of workplace safety. I do not agree with any of these approaches. Instead, I am pleased to join my colleagues in crafting a common-sense approach which addresses past problems and keeps OSHA as a viable agency that is more responsive to the needs of business and more efficient in protecting workers. The bill has two main thrusts. The first is to rebalance the focus of OSHA away from solely the ``stick'' method of ensuring compliance which consists of stiff fines and to-the-letter enforcement of rules. Instead, we attempt to codify and extend OSHA's ongoing efforts to shift toward the ``carrot'' method, which rewards companies making successful, good-faith efforts at maintaining and improving safety in [[Page S 17348]] the workplace. The enforcement authority available to OSHA would still remain, however OSHA would be able to utilize other tools to improve workplace safety. The second thrust of the bill is to make OSHA's operations more efficient. Studies have shown that many sites of serious workplace accidents have not been inspected by federal OSHA inspectors for several years prior to the accident. The studies showed that this problem is due in part to a shortage of inspectors and a mandate that OSHA follow up all complaints, no matter how minor. This proposed legislation would allow OSHA greater flexibility in allocating its resources so it can give the most serious workplace problems its highest priority. Mr. President, this bill, like all other legislative proposals, needs careful examination and can be approved. I am confident, however, that this proposal represents a good start to addressing the problems that affect this agency. I look forward to working with my colleague from Kansas, Senator Kassebaum, my colleague from New Hampshire, Senator Gregg, and my colleague from Washington, Senator Gorton at perfecting the measure, and I encourage our other Senate Colleagues to join with us in this process.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to join my colleagues Senators Kassebaum, Gregg, and Gorton in introducing legislation to reform the Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA]. As my colleagues know, OSHA is one of the most frequently criticized agencies in the Federal Government. Recent polls show that OSHA ties with the Internal Revenue Service as the Federal agency which causes the most dissatisfaction among Americans. While everyone agrees that Government has a responsibility to help ensure safe and healthy workplaces, OSHA's reputation in this area is one of inefficient methods of promoting workplace safety that often alienate businesses and workers alike. I understand that some in Congress favor abolishing the agency entirely in order to remove the expensive and bureaucratic compliance burdens from business. Others favor maintaining the status quo or would have OSHA impose stiffer penalties and more specific requirements on businesses in order to coerce greater levels of workplace safety. I do not agree with any of these approaches. Instead, I am pleased to join my colleagues in crafting a common-sense approach which addresses past problems and keeps OSHA as a viable agency that is more responsive to the needs of business and more efficient in protecting workers. The bill has two main thrusts. The first is to rebalance the focus of OSHA away from solely the ``stick'' method of ensuring compliance which consists of stiff fines and to-the-letter enforcement of rules. Instead, we attempt to codify and extend OSHA's ongoing efforts to shift toward the ``carrot'' method, which rewards companies making successful, good-faith efforts at maintaining and improving safety in [[Page S 17348]] the workplace. The enforcement authority available to OSHA would still remain, however OSHA would be able to utilize other tools to improve workplace safety. The second thrust of the bill is to make OSHA's operations more efficient. Studies have shown that many sites of serious workplace accidents have not been inspected by federal OSHA inspectors for several years prior to the accident. The studies showed that this problem is due in part to a shortage of inspectors and a mandate that OSHA follow up all complaints, no matter how minor. This proposed legislation would allow OSHA greater flexibility in allocating its resources so it can give the most serious workplace problems its highest priority. Mr. President, this bill, like all other legislative proposals, needs careful examination and can be approved. I am confident, however, that this proposal represents a good start to addressing the problems that affect this agency. I look forward to working with my colleague from Kansas, Senator Kassebaum, my colleague from New Hampshire, Senator Gregg, and my colleague from Washington, Senator Gorton at perfecting the measure, and I encourage our other Senate Colleagues to join with us in this process.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I want to start by commending the Senator from Alaska and the Senator from Hawaii for the all hard work I know they have put in to bring this conference report before the senate. This is a good bill, Mr. President, and I believe the Senate should support it and the President should sign it. Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye have produced a conference report which addresses our national security needs in a fiscally responsible manner. Anybody who has known Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye as long as I have would expect nothing less. This conference report preserves funding for some of the administration's top priorities, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Technology Reinvestment Program known as TRP, and the third Seawolf submarine. The House bill eliminated funding for the Seawolf and the TRP, and cut the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program almost in half, so this conference agreement preserve the Senate position on some key items of interest to the administration. This bill also avoids legislative provisions that try to dictate to the President when or how he can deploy our military forces. As I have stated on many occasions, I believe the defense budget has been cut too far, too fast. Our forces are simply much busier than I believe anyone really anticipated when the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were dissolving. Today our force structure is much smaller than it was 5 years ago. We all agreed that based on the reductions in the threat and the increased warning time for any kind of global conflict, these reductions were prudent and necessary. But the smaller force we have left is busier than it has ever been. The fact is we simply cannot keep on reducing the defense budget the way we have been. The people are wearing out. The equipment is wearing out. So I think the budget resolution moved us in the right direction by providing for a small increase for defense over the next few years. I do not think a lot of people realize how small that increase is. First of all, compared to the baseline concept that we use for entitlement programs, defense is not even getting an increase. The amounts provided for defense in the budget resolution over the next 7 years do not even come close to keeping the defense budget as large as it is today, after taking account of inflation. We would need to add at least another $100 billion over the next few years to stay even compared to a so-called current services baseline. Compared to the administration's plan, the budget resolution increases defense by only $19 billion over the next 7 years, which is equivalent to a 1-percent increase over the administration plan. That is the defense increase Congress has agreed to. Many of us felt the increase should be larger, especially in the outyears from 2000 through 2002, when defense is projected to be lower under the budget resolution than under the administration's plan. I also recall very well that over the past 5 or 6 years defense was the only part of the budget coming down, so it seems that the principle that defense has to be cut if something else is being cut is not always applied consistently. Most of the increases in this bill over the administration's plan are in the modernization accounts which are the key to future readiness. We cannot continue to stay in the deep procurement through we have been in for the past few years indefinitely. We have cut procurement deeply to take advantage of the shrinking force structure, but our military can't live off its stock of old capital forever any more than any business could. I want to briefly discuss the one program that represents two tenths of 1 percent of the funding in this bill, but that seems to get more discussion than the other 99.8 percent of the programs in this conference report. Many people argue, and I am sure they truly believe, that the B-2 bomber is unaffordable. In my view, Mr. President, the argument that the B-2 is unaffordable is No. 1, false, and No. 2, a false issue. Over and over I have seen people focus on the price of the B-2 without ever hearing a word about the cost of the collection of systems you would need to do the same job without the B-2. People tend to look at it as if the choice were buying the B-2 or doing nothing. They don't look at the whole picture. The only real argument I hear from the Defense Department against the B-2 is that they would like to have it but they don't want to give anything up to get it. But that is a false issue, because Congress has made more funds available over the next few years specifically for programs like the B-2. It is not necessary to slow down the modernization of one part of our forces in order to modernize our bombers. I am disappointed that this conference agreement does not fund the Corps SAM program at the requested level as in the Senate bill. The Corps SAM program represents just 1 percent of the funding for the ballistic missile defense program, and I regret that this conference agreement did not contain full funding for this important program on which we have asked for allied cooperation. [[Page S 17169]] While the modernization accounts always get the most attention, this conference agreement also seeks to protect current readiness by partially funding the cost of ongoing operations which were not included in the administration's budget. The conference agreement includes $647 million to fund the fiscal year 1996 costs of our continuing missions in and around Iraq, operations Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq and Southern Watch in Southern Iraq. This was one of the administration's highest funding priorities, if not the highest. The conferees added nearly $1 billion to the requested level in the readiness accounts--pesonnel and operation and maintenance--and much of it was to fund these ongoing operations. In my view, it made no sense to add substantial funds to the defense budget request without taking account of must-pay bills we know we are going to face either this fall or next spring. By providing funding for these ongoing operations, Congress has not only attempted to avoid a readiness problem in next year, but it may allow us to actually make some progress in one of reducing the backlog of maintenance and repair on our barracks and other facilities where our forces live and work. The bill adds $700 million to the request to the reduce the maintenance backlog on barracks and other facilities. This is not the first time Congress has added funding for real property maintenance or depot maintenance. But what usually happens, and what would most certainly happen this year if we did not set aside funds to cover the cost of these ongoing operations, is that the increases we set aside for maintenance get diverted to cover must pay bills. I hope that the approach the conferees have taken in this bill will allow us to avoid that trap. Mr. President, this is not a perfect bill. No bill is. But I think this is a good bill, a bill that should be signed, and I once again commend Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye for their leadership.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss one of our Nation's most critical problems--the lack of affordable housing for low income people. As my colleagues know, housing is one of the most basic human needs. Lack of it is a problem which plagues every State, in both urban and rural areas. Today I would like to remind my colleagues of an organization founded on the belief that this is unacceptable. This organization is Habitat for Humanity International. Habitat is a nonprofit, ecumenical Christian housing ministry founded in 1976 by Millard and Linda Fuller and based in Americus, GA. Its ambitious goal is nothing less than to eliminate poverty housing and homelessness from the world. Since 1976, Habitat has constructed 40,000 homes worldwide, in every U.S. State and in 45 other countries. As a result of Habitat's efforts, a quarter of a million people worldwide are living in safe, decent, and affordable housing. Though Habitat has chapters all over the globe, its work is done on a truly grass roots, individual basis. Through volunteer labor and tax deductible donations of money and materials, Habitat joins with the partner family to build or rehabilitate a house. Habitat houses are then sold to partner families at no profit, financed with affordable loans with no interest. The homeowners' monthly mortgage payments go into a revolving fund which finances the building of more houses. As the numbers I mentioned a moment ago demonstrate, this has been a fantastically successful concept. In my view, though, the idea at the heart of Habitat's success is the idea of ``sweat equity.'' Part of the deal presented to a potential homeowner is that they must contribute their own hard work and sweat to the construction of their home and the homes of others. In this way, the family builds a tangible bond to the finished product, and therefore has a strong interest in maintaining it. In addition, the contribution of sweat equity leads new homeowners to a stronger sense of community responsibility--contributing to the decency and safety of their street and neighborhood. In this way, Habitat not only builds new homes, it also helps rebuild the internal sense of community that has declined in our Nation. By giving families a home--not a handout from a faceless Government bureaucrat, not a benefit check, but an opportunity to dedicate their hard work to owning their own home--Habitat helps to combat the despair and apathy evident in so many of our communities. For these reasons, I am introducing today the Homesteading and Neighborhood Restoration Act of 1995. This legislation, which is supported by such diverse interests as former President Carter, Speaker Gingrich, and HUD Secretary Cisneros, directs the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to reprogram $50 million in existing HUD funds into a grant program for Habitat for Humanity and other low cost housing organizations. In keeping with Habitat's policy of refusing to accept Government funds for actual construction work on dwellings, the funds could only be used for land acquisition or infrastructure improvements, and only in the United States. The bill directs that half of the reprogrammed dollars would be granted to Habitat, and the other half would be held in reserve for other similar organizations to compete for. Any funds not claimed by qualified organizations would be granted to Habitat. My estimates indicate that the funds included in this legislation would allow Habitat to begin construction on 5,000 new dwellings across the Nation immediately. Additionally, as new homeowners begin to pay back their loans, the money would be recycled to build even more homes. So many times we in Congress must allocate Government dollars based on a sense of trust--with very little assurance that the taxpayers' funds will actually yield any results at all. Thankfully, this legislation does not necessitate Congress taking such a leap of faith. The successes of Habitat for Humanity are standing already in brick and mortar in 40,000 places around the world. This legislation will enable them to expand their successes to many more locations. This is a private initiative that really works, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss one of our Nation's most critical problems--the lack of affordable housing for low income people. As my colleagues know, housing is one of the most basic human needs. Lack of it is a problem which plagues every State, in both urban and rural areas. Today I would like to remind my colleagues of an organization founded on the belief that this is unacceptable. This organization is Habitat for Humanity International. Habitat is a nonprofit, ecumenical Christian housing ministry founded in 1976 by Millard and Linda Fuller and based in Americus, GA. Its ambitious goal is nothing less than to eliminate poverty housing and homelessness from the world. Since 1976, Habitat has constructed 40,000 homes worldwide, in every U.S. State and in 45 other countries. As a result of Habitat's efforts, a quarter of a million people worldwide are living in safe, decent, and affordable housing. Though Habitat has chapters all over the globe, its work is done on a truly grass roots, individual basis. Through volunteer labor and tax deductible donations of money and materials, Habitat joins with the partner family to build or rehabilitate a house. Habitat houses are then sold to partner families at no profit, financed with affordable loans with no interest. The homeowners' monthly mortgage payments go into a revolving fund which finances the building of more houses. As the numbers I mentioned a moment ago demonstrate, this has been a fantastically successful concept. In my view, though, the idea at the heart of Habitat's success is the idea of ``sweat equity.'' Part of the deal presented to a potential homeowner is that they must contribute their own hard work and sweat to the construction of their home and the homes of others. In this way, the family builds a tangible bond to the finished product, and therefore has a strong interest in maintaining it. In addition, the contribution of sweat equity leads new homeowners to a stronger sense of community responsibility--contributing to the decency and safety of their street and neighborhood. In this way, Habitat not only builds new homes, it also helps rebuild the internal sense of community that has declined in our Nation. By giving families a home--not a handout from a faceless Government bureaucrat, not a benefit check, but an opportunity to dedicate their hard work to owning their own home--Habitat helps to combat the despair and apathy evident in so many of our communities. For these reasons, I am introducing today the Homesteading and Neighborhood Restoration Act of 1995. This legislation, which is supported by such diverse interests as former President Carter, Speaker Gingrich, and HUD Secretary Cisneros, directs the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to reprogram $50 million in existing HUD funds into a grant program for Habitat for Humanity and other low cost housing organizations. In keeping with Habitat's policy of refusing to accept Government funds for actual construction work on dwellings, the funds could only be used for land acquisition or infrastructure improvements, and only in the United States. The bill directs that half of the reprogrammed dollars would be granted to Habitat, and the other half would be held in reserve for other similar organizations to compete for. Any funds not claimed by qualified organizations would be granted to Habitat. My estimates indicate that the funds included in this legislation would allow Habitat to begin construction on 5,000 new dwellings across the Nation immediately. Additionally, as new homeowners begin to pay back their loans, the money would be recycled to build even more homes. So many times we in Congress must allocate Government dollars based on a sense of trust--with very little assurance that the taxpayers' funds will actually yield any results at all. Thankfully, this legislation does not necessitate Congress taking such a leap of faith. The successes of Habitat for Humanity are standing already in brick and mortar in 40,000 places around the world. This legislation will enable them to expand their successes to many more locations. This is a private initiative that really works, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I join with Senator Thurmond in paying tribute to the memory of Judge Robert E. Wiss of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Judge Wiss, who was in the midst of his term on the Court, passed away on October 23, 1995. Judge Wiss joined the court in 1991 after a distinguished career in both the public and private sectors. In his civilian career, he served as a special counsel to the city of Chicago and as general counsel to Cook County. He had a very successful private practice, rising to senior partnership with the firm of Foran, Wiss, & Schultz. He also was a distinguished teacher, serving on the faculty of the John Marshall Law School in Chicago. He also played a leading role in many bar associations and civic activities. In addition to his very active civilian practice, Judge Wiss had a lifelong commitment to military law. He served on active duty from 1950 to 1953, and in the Naval Reserve from 1953 to 1988, advancing to the grade of rear admiral. Highlights of his military career included services as director of the Naval Reserve Law Program and commanding officer of the Navy and Marine Appellate Review activity. Judge Wiss appeared before our committee in 1991 following his nomination to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces-- which was then denominated as the Court of Military Appeals. He received the unanimous approval of our committee and was confirmed by the Senate. In his 4 years on the court, Judge Wiss distinguished himself by his thorough scholarship, probing questions, and keen interest in preserving the dignity and fairness of the military justice system. He will be missed by his colleagues on the court, the lawyers who practiced before him, and his many other friends and admirers. I would like to extend my deepest sympathy to his wife Charlene, and to his children, Julia Leahy, Karen Wiss, and Laurel Latimer. They can be very proud of his outstanding contribution to our Nation.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my only question will be, there are some of us who want to speak on the Cuban matter before the vote. The vote is at 5 o'clock. I do not know how many people are lined up to speak. I am enjoying the Senator's speech. I would like to listen to it. Can we extend the vote for 5 or 10 minutes?