Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act currently before the Senate presents us with a difficult decision. I am sure we all favor the early return of freedom in Cuba. I am sure the sponsor of this act believes that this legislation would contribute to that aim. There are those of us, though, who have grave doubts. Mr. President, I am particularly concerned about the impact of this proposed legislation on our Nation's national security interests. For that reason, I requested the views of our responsible military commander Jack Sheehan, commander in chief of the United States Atlantic command, under whose command Cuba falls. I would like to share the letter I received, dated October 15, from General Sheehan, who is in direct charge of the security aspects of Cuba under his command. It says: Dear Senator Nunn: I am writing to provide my assessment of the potential effect of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act * * * could have on the United States Atlantic command and operations in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. There are currently 8,000 Cuban migrants in camps at Guantanamo Bay, down from 20,000 5 months ago. The Department of Defense has processed more than 100,000 Cuban and Haitian migrants in Guantanamo Bay over the last few years. When the migrant population was at its peak, it cost the Department of Defense over $1 million a day in operation and maintenance--money which was not in the budget. Additionally, prior to the White House policy announcement in May, we had more than 6,000 U.S. personnel in a potentially explosive situation--guarding and caring for Cuban migrants who were frustrated because there was no hope of leaving the camps. From a military perspective, the current version of the Helms-Burton bill could create conditions for more migrants. I believe the Cuban economy is at a low point. I have this on interviews of more than 40,000 Cubans who have been through Guantanamo. They say one of the primary reasons for leaving Cuba is to be able to provide a basic quality of food and shelter for their families. The bill in its current form could further punish the people, not Castro or the privileged elites. Furthermore, rather than promoting a peaceful transition in Cuba, the bill could give Castro an excuse to maintain his focus on ``U.S. aggression,'' rather than his own failed ideology. I also question the bill's implied assumption that strengthening the embargo would lead to a revolt from within and create the conditions for a transition to democracy. Cuba is not Haiti--the circumstances which allowed for a successful intervention in Haiti, with only one American casualty, do not exist in Cuba. Any operations involving U.S. forces in Cuba would likely have a much higher cost in terms of lives and national treasury. Our policy objective should be the peaceful transition of power in Cuba, and I support any congressional language that brings about that change. Mr. President, in short, General Sheehan believes that our policy objective should be the peaceful transition of power in Cuba to democracy. But he does not believe the legislation before us will make a net contribution to this objective. He believes that this legislation, in fact, will have the opposite effect and that it will basically cause an increase in the very migration that has now finally subsided. Mr. President, I hope we can work out, before this legislation is concluded, a satisfactory bill that can be agreed to on both sides of the aisle and supported by the administration. I do not believe this legislation meets that test. I thank the Senator for the time. I yield back whatever time I have remaining. I ask unanimous consent that General Sheehan's letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like the Senate to recognize Maj. Gen. James M. Hurley on the occasion of his retirement from active duty with the U.S. Air Force. General Hurley will retire from his position as the Director of Plans and Programs at Headquarters Air Combat Command at Langley AFB, VA. Throughout his tenure in this position, General Hurley has been responsible for the development of concepts, policies, and doctrine for the employment of Combat Air Forces. In addition, he has overseen the force structure requirements and budgeting for all Combat Air Forces programs and aircraft assignments as well as the interactions between Combat Air Forces and the FAA. During his college years at Texas A&M University, General Hurley participated in the Reserve Officer Training Corps program. After his graduation from college in May 1965, he began his career in the Air Force. He earned a command pilot rating and has logged more than 3,300 flight hours, primarily in fighter aircraft such as the F-4 and F-16. He flew 143 combat missions over North Vietnam and Laos. From January 1978 to November 1981, General Hurley commanded a squadron in the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing at Moody AFB, GA. His next assignment was at Headquarters U.S. Air Force in Washington, DC, where he served as the Chief of Flying Training for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel. From July 1987 through June 1988, General Hurley served as the vice commander and wing commander of the 474th Tactical Fighter Wing based at Nellis AFB, NV. In 1987, General Hurley returned to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force to assume the post of Deputy Director, and later, the post of Director of Personnel Plans. From July 1989 through July 1991, he served as the Chief of Staff for NATO's 2d Tactical Air Force in Germany. In July 1991, General Hurley became the Director of Manpower and Organization at Headquarters U.S. Air Force. He remained in that position until May 1992, when he undertook his current assignment. General Hurley has served the United States with great distinction and honor. Throughout his outstanding career in the U.S. Air Force, General Hurley has received numerous decorations and medals, including the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Meritorious Service Medal with 4 oak leaf clusters, the Air Medal with 11 oak leaf clusters, the Presidential Unit Citation, and the Vietnam Service Medal with 3 bronze stars. Mr. President, on behalf of a grateful Nation, I ask my colleagues to join me in thanking Maj. Gen. James M. Hurley for his exemplary service in the U.S. Air Force. We wish him, his wife Donna, and their two daughters, Lisa and April, Godspeed and every success in their future endeavors.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise this morning to pay tribute to a wonderful lady and wonderful friend, Rachel Mellinger Schlesinger. Rachel died yesterday morning in Arlington, VA. Rachel was the wife of James Schlesinger, a remarkable public servant who served in Cabinet positions in three administrations. In a real sense Rachel served as first lady of the Department of Defense, first lady of the Department of Energy, and first lady of the Central Intelligence Agency, when Jim Schlesinger held these important Cabinet posts. Rachel was a remarkable and accomplished woman, by every measure. She was a talented musician. She was active in the mental health movement, historic preservation, and in the preservation of the rural lands that she loved so much. She was also founder and first chairman of the Ballston Symphony and a deacon in her church. Rachel rarely involved herself in public issues. She always had her own convictions and opinions, but her capacity to deal with crisis was famous. She accompanied Jim to many distant places in connection with his work and on several occasions, by putting herself willingly in dangerous situations, she helped calm and reassure her friends and our friends around the world and our allies around the world. On one occasion which reached public attention, Jim was then Chairman of [[Page S 14959]] the Atomic Energy Commission. A Spartan missile warhead test was scheduled in the Aleutians, and there was widespread fear that it would cause an earthquake and a tidal wave known as a tsunami in that area. Rachel packed up her two daughters and her husband and moved them to the island where the test was to take place. The family's presence was widely publicized and calmed much of the alarm in that area. Rachel traveled with Jim on an extended trip to Asia in 1975 when Jim became the first United States Secretary of Defense to visit Japan for many years. It was after the fall of Saigon, and there were widespread demonstrations. But the trip also generated an outpouring of support, due in no small part to Rachel Schlesinger's presence by Jim Schlesinger's side. Rachel served as college editor of Mademoiselle magazine after graduation from Radcliffe with honors in American history and literature. After her marriage to Jim, she did some freelance writing for a time, but she soon devoted herself entirely to their growing family, and of course she was very, very proud of their eight wonderful and successful children. After their eight children had grown up, she became active again in charitable and cultural affairs. One of those eight, their daughter, Clara, served very ably in my office as an intern in 1985. Rachel was a violinist with the Arlington Symphony since 1983. She was on the board of directors and on the executive committee of the symphony. She served on the overseers' committee of the Memorial Church at Harvard, was a deacon and Sunday school teacher at Georgetown Presbyterian Church, and distributed food on many, many occasions to the homeless over a large number of years. Rachel was absolutely committed to mental health, and she worked closely with the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, including testifying before the Congress. Rachel always retained her love of the land, from her childhood days on the family farm in Ohio. In the 1980's, she began to raise Christmas trees in the Shenandoah Valley, delivering them herself near Christmastime, including the delivery of several to the Nunn home just in time for our Christmas celebration. Rachel's long battle with cancer is now over, but the memory of her rare spirit will comfort and sustain those she loved and cared for in a life of courage and a life of commitment. I thank the Chair.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I want to thank my colleague and friend from Texas on two points. One is her very kind comments about my difficult decision which has now been made. I appreciate very much her thoughtfulness and her comments. I appreciate her friendship, and serving with her on the Armed Services Committee has been a great pleasure. I also commend her for her substantive remarks on the question of NATO expansion. I will have more to say about that in a few minutes as we proceed to discuss that very important issue. But I know that the Senator from Kansas has been on the floor. I [[Page S 14845]] would much prefer to hear her address the subject. She has another bill to manage. I will listen to her attentively, and then I will make some comments on the substantive issue myself. I thank the Chair and I thank my friend from Texas for her kind remarks.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Texas, we have had some very interesting meetings in both Russia and this country with our Russian parliamentarian friends. And I believe that it is clear in those meetings that the fear among reformers and democrats is that this issue, which most of them do not realistically see as a threat to Russia, but that this expansion of NATO will give the nationalists, the extremists, the demagogues, those who want to restructure and rebuild the empire and threaten their neighbors, will give them an argument to be made for the Russian population that has been hearing that NATO is an enemy for the last 40, 45 years. So, it is the great concern of the reformers in Russia that I believe we have to take into account. We will not be doing anyone in Europe a favor if, by taking certain action regarding NATO expansion, we end up giving an edge in the political process to the most extremist elements in Russia. This is not to say that we should give them a veto. They should have no veto. NATO should make its own decisions. But Russian behavior and economic reality in Europe also should play a very important role in how we go about taking these important steps.

Mr. NUNN. I agree with the Senator from Texas on that. I think that is the way we ought to structure it. I believe having the natural approach of an economic admission to the European Community be one path, one option which is a natural course and would lead inevitably to NATO eligibility for those countries. That is one course. But the other course ought to be very clear, the military-threat- based course. But where we are now is between those courses. We are saying that the European Community is not going to be able to expand fast enough and saying there is no threat from Russia. And we are saying that Russia can be a member of NATO at some point in time--and that simply does not ring true to people who have observed this process over a period of time from the European perspective, it does not ring very true to those in the Ukraine who worry about Russian reaction and know they will not be the first country, one of the first countries, to be admitted, does not ring true to the Baltics where they know that they can be subverted by Russia on a 48-hour basis. It would take years for Russia to be able to muster the military power to invade Poland, but to destabilize politically the Baltics would take a matter of days. And that may very well be the pattern that could emerge if we are not prudent in how we go about this situation.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Texas, I could not agree more with her on what she said. The threat in Europe now is not Russian invasion of one of the Visegrad countries. The threat is the huge proliferation problem with nuclear materials being smuggled across the borders to these countries, with Russian scientists under severe economic pressure being in demand in various parts of the world. But, hopefully, we can work together to prevent that. That is the threat. The threat is terrorism, the threat is ethnic strife, the threat is religious strife. It could change in 10 years. Ten years from now Russia could reemerge as a real military threat to some of those countries. We have to be prepared for that. We have to make sure we are in a position to react to that. But now we have many mutual interests, and not just with Russians, but with the East Europeans and others, in proliferation and working together against organized crime, which is one of the biggest challenges Russia has right now, their organized criminal activity which is devastating to confidence for investment, economic kinds of commitments by business people from all over the world. So we have so many mutual interests with Russia. We are also going to have many differences with Russia. They do not have the same interests we have in many parts of the world. They have historically had different interests. But we have got to build the common bridges. And even when we have a disagreement, we have to continue to [[Page S 14849]] work at this proliferation problem because we do not want to wake up in 3 years or 5 years and find that the kind of people who just derailed Amtrak, if that was a terrorist group, the kind of people that blew up the Federal building in Oklahoma, or the kind of people who carried out a chemical attack in Tokyo, we do not want to wake up and find those people possess awesome weapons of mass destruction. Only by working with the elements in Russia who are willing to work on this are we going to be able to prevent this from happening. It will be difficult at best. So I think this factor has to be very much considered in our overall deliberations about how we go about expanding a security alliance which, after all, is supposed to be about security. And this is the heart of our security threat. It is also the heart of Russia's security threat. I, like the Senator from Texas, believe they have a threat of missiles on their borders at some point. I believe that at some point we will find it conducive to them and to us to work together in this overall area of preventing the spread of missile technology and also defending against it where required and where necessary. So I agree with the Senator from Texas and again commend her for her leadership and her thoughts on this subject. The Future of NATO--Enlarging for a New Century

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Kansas, Senator Kassebaum, for her kind remarks about my service in the U.S. Senate. I am not here today to precipitate that discussion. We probably had enough retirement announcements around this institution for 1 year. That is not my purpose in taking the floor today, but I do thank her for her remarks. I also agree with her words of caution on NATO expansion. We have a lot of thinking to do. We have a lot of debating to do. We have a lot of discussion to conduct, to make the right kind of decision, both for the alliance itself and for the stability of Europe. I thank my friend from Texas, again, for organizing this discussion this morning. I think it is going to be very fruitful in precipitating other people to think and also speak on the subject. I talked to enough Senators on both sides of the aisle to know there are a number of people who are concerned, deeply concerned, and who have a lot of thoughts and a lot of questions about this matter. I think we will be hearing from them in the days and weeks ahead. So I thank both of my colleagues for their remarks. I say to the Senator from Kansas, she has been a very fine leader. We have relied on her for so long in the field of foreign policy as well as many other fields, and I have such deep admiration for her and her leadership, and I am grateful to her for that. Mr. President, the issue of NATO expansion deserves thorough and careful consideration because it has important ramifications for the future of NATO, for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for the future of Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union, and for the future security order throughout Europe, East and West. President Clinton has declared, and NATO has concurred, the organization's enlargement is not an issue of whether but of when and how. I, like the Senator from Kansas, believe the when and how need to be discussed more thoroughly. On September 28 of this year, NATO released a study on the why and how of enlargement. It reserves for future decisions the question of who and when. On the positive side, the study declares that NATO enlargement will be gradual, deliberate, and transparent. It presents no fixed set of criteria for membership but specifies that enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis, with the key judgments being whether a given country's admission will contribute to Europe's stability and security. It states that new members will have the same benefits and obligations as all other members and it anticipates no change in NATO nuclear policy or in the forward basing of NATO ground forces. On the less positive side, I believe three large gaps exist in the study and give it an unrealistically optimistic tone. First, the study provides no satisfactory answer to the key question of why, and merely expresses what NATO hopes will be the outcome of expansion: increased stability for all in the Euro-Atlantic area. All of us hope for that, but that does not really get down to the essential reasons of how and why expansion will lead to that result. [[Page S 14846]] Second, it glosses over the increasingly negative Russian reaction to NATO expansion. Third, it asserts that enlargement is part of a broad security architecture in Europe that transcends the idea of dividing lines in Europe, yet it is silent about the fact that gradual enlargement will create dividing lines between those countries admitted and those countries that are not admitted. NATO was established primarily to protect the Western democracies from an expansionist Soviet Union that, after World War II, seemed determined to spread its influence through subversion, through political intimidation, and through the threat of the use of military force. With the end of the cold war, we have witnessed a heart pounding, terrain altering set of earthquakes centered in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. These seismic events have ended an international era. The European security environment has changed. We have moved from a world of high risk but also high stability, because of the danger of escalation and the balance of terror on both sides, to a world of much lower risk but much lower stability. We are all aware of the dramatic change in the threat environment in Europe resulting from these seismic changes. The immediate danger is posed by violent terrorist groups, by isolated rogue states, by ethnic, religious and other types of subnational passions that can flare into vicious armed conflict, as we have seen too well and too thoroughly in the Bosnian conflict. The lethality of any and all of these threats can be greatly magnified by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as by the spread of destabilizing conventional weapons. At the same time, Russia currently possesses at least 20,000 nuclear weapons--in fact over 20,000--at least 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, advanced biological warfare capability, hundreds of tons of fissile material, huge stores of conventional weapons, plus literally thousands of scientists and technicians skilled in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, this is the first time in history that an empire has disintegrated while possessing such enormous destructive capabilities. Even if these capabilities are greatly reduced, the know-how, the production capability, and the dangers of proliferation will endure for many years. Even if we do our very best job, this is going to be our No. 1 security threat for America, for NATO, and for the world in terms of decades; not simply a few years. As we contemplate NATO enlargement, I believe that we must carefully measure NATO enlargement's effect on this proliferation security problem, which is our No. 1 security problem. Threats cannot be cleanly delinked, resulting in one section on proliferation and another section on NATO enlargement as if there is no connectivity. Those two subjects are intimately related. And in the longer term, we cannot dismiss the possibility of a resurgent and threatening Russia. Russia not only has inherited the still dangerous remnants of the Soviet war machine, but in its current weakened condition Russia contains potential resources by virtue of its size and strategic location. Russia exerts considerable weight in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Meanwhile, Russia has inherited the former Soviet Union's veto power in the U.N. Security Council, and, therefore, has a major voice in multilateral decisionmaking. Mr. President, Russia will be a major factor, for better or for worse, across the entire spectrum of actual and potential threats that face us over the next years ahead. Russia can fuel regional conflicts with high-technology conventional weapons along with other political and material support, or, on the other hand, Russia can cooperate with us in diffusing such conflicts, particularly by preventing the spread of Russian weaponry to irresponsible hands. Russia can emerge as a militarily aggressive power. That is certainly possible. Or Russia can assist the United States and the Western World and the free world in averting new rivalry among major powers that poison the international security environment. Russia can pursue a confrontational course that undermines the security and cooperation in Europe, or Russia can work with us to broaden and strengthen the emerging system of multilateral security in Europe. Mr. President, no one knows the answer to any of these questions at this juncture. Russia itself does not know the answer because it is in a period of economic stress, and political challenge and turmoil. Mr. President, out of this background come five fundamental points. First, preventing or curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the most important and the most difficult security challenge we face. And that is particularly true when you have a very large growth of organized crime, international organized crime, and terrorism in our own country and around the world. Second, Russia is a vast reservoir of weaponry, weapons material, and weapons know-how. Thousands of people in Russia and throughout the former Soviet Union have the knowledge, the access, and the strong economic incentives to engage in weapons traffic. Mr. President, there are literally thousands of scientists in Russia that know how to make weapons of mass destruction, that know how to make high-technology weapons that can shoot down aircraft in the air including passenger liners, that know how to make missile technology to deliver these weapons of mass destruction across borders, and even across continents. They have this knowledge. But several thousand of them at least do not know where their next paycheck is coming from. They do not know how they are going to feed their families, and they are in great demand around the world from both terrorist organizations and from rogue Third World countries. The third conclusion is that increased Russian isolation, paranoia, or instability would make our No. 1 security challenge more difficult and more dangerous. The fourth conclusion: Although the West cannot control events in Russia, and probably can assist political and economic reform there only on the margins, as the medical doctors say, our first principle should be to do no harm. Fifth, we must avoid being so preoccupied with NATO enlargement that we ignore the consequences it may have for even more important security priorities. Mr. President, it is against this background that I offer a few observations on the current approach to NATO enlargement. NATO was founded on a fundamental truth: The vital interests of the countries of NATO were put at risk by the military power and political intimidation of the Soviet Union. As President Harry Truman said in his memoirs, ``The [NATO] pact was a shield against aggression and against the fear of aggression.'' Because NATO was built on this fundamental truth, and because we discussed it openly and faced it truthfully with our people, the NATO alliance endured and prevailed. There was no misunderstanding about why we were forming NATO when we did it. Today, we seem to be saying different things to different people on the subject of NATO enlargement. To the Partnership for Peace countries, we are saying that you are all theoretically eligible, and, if you meet NATO's entrance criteria, you will move to the top of the list. To the Russians we are also saying that NATO enlargement is not threat-based, and it is not aimed at you. In fact, we say to Russia you, too, can eventually became a member of NATO. This raises a serious question. Are we really going to be able to convince the East Europeans that we are protecting them from their historical threats--that usually boils down to Russia--while we convince the Russians that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with Russia as a potential military threat? Are we really going to be able to convince the Ukraine and the Baltic countries that they are somehow more secure when NATO expands eastward but draws protective lines short of their borders and places them in what Russians are bound to perceive as the buffer zone? Is that going to make them feel more secure? In short, Mr. President, are we trying to bridge the unbridgeable, to explain the unexplainable? Are we deluding others, or are we deluding ourselves? [[Page S 14847]] The advantages of NATO's current course toward enlargement cannot be ignored, and I do not ignore that. If NATO expands in the near term to take in the Visegrad countries, these countries would gain in self- confidence and stability. It is possible that border disputes and major ethnic conflicts would be settled before entry--for instance, the dispute involving the Hungarian minority in Romania. What these countries really want and what they really need is the ability to have trade and economic relations with the European Community and the rest of the world. They really need markets now--not military protection. Their threat is economic at this moment, and probably for the few years to come. No one can conceive of an invasion by Russia in the near term. The question is in the long term. That is another matter. But in the near term, economic trade and entry into the European Community is what they need most of all to stabilize their democratic efforts and their economy. Serious disadvantages must also be thought through carefully. If NATO's enlargement stays on its current course, reaction in Russia is almost inevitably going to be a sense of isolation by those that are committed to democracy and democratic reform with varying degrees of paranoia, nationalism, and demagoguery emerging from across the current political spectrum. In next few years Russia will have neither the resources nor the wherewithal to respond to any NATO enlargement with a conventional military buildup. They simply do not have the resources to do that, even if they choose to. If, however, the more nationalist and more extreme political forces gain the upper hand by election or otherwise, we are likely to see other responses that are more achievable, and also even more dangerous to European stability. For example, while Russia would take years to mount a sustained military threat to Eastern Europe, it can within weeks or months exert severe external and internal pressures on its immediate neighbors to the west, including the Baltic countries, and including the Ukraine. This could set in motion a dangerous action- reaction cycle. Moreover, because a conventional military response from Russia in answer to NATO enlargement is not feasible economically, a nuclear response in the form of a higher alert status for Russia's remaining strategic nuclear weapons and conceivably renewed deployment of tactical nuclear weapons is more likely. I recall very well when the United States and our allies felt we were overwhelmed with conventional forces by the former Soviet Union. How did we respond? We responded by building up tactical nuclear forces. We responded by deploying thousands of tactical nuclear forces because we did not have the tanks, we did not have the artillery tubes to meet the conventional challenge. Are we confident the Russians would be so different from us if they truly have a nationalistic surge and end up believing the NATO enlargement is a threat to them? I am not confident that would not be their response as it was ours years ago. The security of NATO, Russia's neighbors and the countries of Eastern Europe will not be enhanced if the Russian military finger moves closer to the nuclear trigger. Where do we go from here? I recognize full well it is much easier to criticize than to construct, so let me make a few suggestions. I am not opposed to NATO expansion per se, but I feel that we need to alter the course of that expansion. I suggest a two-track approach to NATO enlargement. The first track would be evolutionary and would depend on political and economic developments within the European countries that aspire to full NATO membership. When a country becomes eligible for European Union membership, it will also be eligible to join the Western European Union, and then it will be prepared for NATO membership, subject, of course, to NATO's formal approval. This is a natural process connecting economic and security interests. We can honestly say to Russia, and particularly the democrats in Russia who are struggling to be able to have a democracy in that country, this process is economic in nature and is not aimed at you. The second track would also be a clear track. It would be a threat- based track. An accelerated and, if necessary, immediate expansion of NATO would depend on Russian behavior. We should be candid with the Russian leadership and the Russian people, above all be honest with the Russian people by telling them, frankly, if you respect the sovereignty of your neighbors, carry out your solemn arms control commitments and other international obligations, and if you continue down the path of democracy and economic reform, your neighbors will not view you as a threat and neither will NATO. We will watch, however, and we will react to aggressive moves against other sovereign states, to militarily significant violations of your arms control and other legally binding obligations pertinent to the security of Europe, and to the emergence of a nondemocratic Russian Government that impedes fair elections, suppresses domestic freedoms or institutes a foreign policy incompatible with the existing European security system. These developments would be threatening to the security of Europe and would require a significant NATO response, including expansion eastward. We would be enlarging NATO based on a real threat. We would not, however, be helping to create the very threat we are trying to guard against. And the Senator from Texas made this point very well a few minutes ago in her remarks. Mr. President, this would change the psychology of the NATO expansion because the democrats in Russia would be able to say to their own people: Our behavior, what we do with our military forces, what we do with our tactical nuclear posture, what we do regarding human rights and freedom of the press, what we do regarding our solemn arms control obligations will have a bearing on whether NATO expands. If we do not cause a threat, we in turn are not likely to be threatened. That changes the psychology completely from where it is now where the nationalists, any time you are in a meeting with Russian parliamentarians--and I am sure the Senator from Kansas and the Senator from Texas have experienced this--what you see is that when the nationalists hear about NATO expansion, they start smiling and almost clapping because it feeds right into what they want to convince their people of, that is, they have to reconstitute not only the military but the empire. On the other hand, when you talk about NATO expansion, those parliamentarians that truly believe in democracy start wiping their brow with their handkerchief because they know the kind of problems it is going to cause them politically in their own country. Finally, Mr. President, Partnership for Peace, I believe, is a sound framework for this two-track approach. Its role would be to prepare candidate countries and NATO itself for enlargement on either the European track or the threat-based track. Programs of joint training and exercises, development of a common operational doctrine and establishment of the interoperational weaponry, technology and communications would continue based on more realistic contingencies. Tough issues such as nuclear policy and forward stationing of NATO troops would be discussed in a threat-based environment, one which we would hope would remain theoretical. I know there are those in Europe and there are those here who say, How can we handle this expansion of the European community? We have complex matters like farm products. How do we handle farm products coming in from Eastern Europe, or any other type product? When you expand NATO, you are extending a nuclear umbrella over the countries coming in. Are we to be told it is easier to say that if a country is attacked, America is going to respond if necessary with nuclear weapons, than it is to decide how many farm products come across our border? I do not buy the argument that economic expansion is more difficult and more challenging than extending the nuclear umbrella. As the Russian leaders and people make their important choices, they should know that Russian behavior will be a key and relative factor for NATO's future. This straightforward approach does not give them a veto. I do not favor giving Russia a veto. But I do favor putting them on notice that [[Page S 14848]] what they do themselves in creating threats to others may very well determine what the others do in terms of enlarging NATO and enlarging the security umbrella. This straightforward approach is also important for our own citizens here in this country who will have to pay the bills. They will have to make the sacrifices required by expanded NATO security commitments. Again, I am not against expanding NATO. I think there are countries in Eastern Europe and Central Europe that will be eligible for NATO membership, democracies that will qualify and be eventual members. I am concerned about how we do it and how we go about explaining our logic. It makes a big difference. The profound historical contrast between post-World War I Germany and post-World War II Germany should tell us that neocontainment of Russia is not the answer at this critical historical juncture. If future developments require the containment of Russia, it should be real containment based on real threats. I thank again my colleague from Texas for organizing this. I know there are others who are not back in town who want to speak on this subject, and I hope by her leadership and the discussions we have had this morning we will precipitate debate on this subject. I know there will be debate on both sides. There are other people, whom I respect greatly, who have different views on this subject, but it is time for us to start paying attention before we get down to the point of having some agreement presented to the Senate for our ratification that we have not studied, that we have not contemplated, but that has profound implications. I at this point again thank my colleague from Texas and yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Louisiana for his kind remarks, for his friendship and leadership. As he well knows, I have the greatest esteem for him. We have been colleagues from day one. He tried to claim seniority when he first came here and had to be awakened to the fact that he did not have it. I was the senior Member of the new class of 1972, now ancient.

Mr. NUNN. The Senator is corrected on that. I appreciate his kind words and leadership. I appreciate him coming to the floor. He has basically been a keen observer of the national security scene and the NATO scene for a long, long time. All of us who have had dealings in this area realize that this is a subject that needs some really careful consideration. So I thank the Senator from Louisiana for his comments.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, of that time, I yield to the Senator from Illinois 1 minute and I yield to the Senator from Connecticut 55 seconds.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe I am in control.

Mr. NUNN. I reserve the remainder of my time. How much time do I have remaining?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. NUNN. I yield myself 30 seconds. I will respond to the Senator from Michigan that his question should be answered, yes, it would be consistent. There is a great deal of difference in expressing to the President what the view of the Senate is and then passing a law that binds the President, particularly when this kind of negotiation is going on. So it would be consistent.

Mr. NUNN. I yield myself 1 more minute, Mr. President. Mr. President, the other question that occurs to me at this moment is whether NATO is clearly going to be in charge. NATO must be in charge. There must be no dual key. We cannot have a repeat of what we have had in the last 2 years with the United Nations having the dual key. I believe it is also imperative, if we are going to deploy NATO forces and U.S. forces, that we deploy a robust force, a force that is big enough and tough enough and well enough equipped not to be pushed around and to defend itself in the event of any kind of conflict. There must be clear rules of engagement. And those rules of engagement must permit a very vigorous response to any attack on U.S. forces or NATO forces. Mr. President, these are just a few of the questions that I believe are important. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. NUNN. I yield the Senator from Michigan 1 minute.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, could I be notified after 4 minutes? Mr. President, I agree with this amendment expressing the sense of the Senate that none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this act shall be used for deployment of combat equipped forces of the Armed Forces of the United States for any ground operations in Bosnia unless, and then the two conditions as set forth: Congress approves in advance deployment of such forces of the Armed Forces and the temporary deployment authority. Mr. President, this amendment does not have the effect of law and does not tie the President's hands. It does state the sentiment and view of the Senate of the United States. If it did tie the President's hands at this critical juncture while the peace negotiations are underway, I would oppose it and vote against it. We should not tie the hands of the President at this critical juncture. If the word went out that there was going to be no U.S. participation after a peace agreement is entered into, then there likely would be no peace agreement entered into by the parties. Mr. President, America must lead. We have seen what happens when we do not lead. We have recently seen what happens when we do lead. Our leadership must be in NATO and through NATO. Our objections to deployment, if there are objections to deployment, of troops by the United States should also be applicable to NATO troops because we are part of that alliance. It is not just the United States we are concerned about. It is also our allies and the alliance itself. Our conditions for deployment should be made known through NATO and that forum. Before any decision is made to deploy U.S. forces or in my view NATO forces pursuant to a peace agreement, we should ask a number of questions, a very difficult set of questions, a very important set of questions regarding that deployment. The first question that I would have--and there would probably be others that would occur to me as time goes on--are the borders between the various factions under the peace agreement both definable and defendable? Is [[Page S 14635]] this a sound peace agreement? If we are deploying pursuant to a peace agreement, the key question is, what kind of peace agreement? Is it a sound peace agreement? Does it have a reasonable chance of success? And can U.S. forces and NATO forces enhance the prospects of success? The second question I would have: Has the President clearly made the case to the American people that the deployment of U.S. ground forces is important to America's national security? That case must be made. The American people must understand this. They must support it. That is a condition that has to be fulfilled if we are going to have a sustainable position if things get rough in Bosnia. And they could get rough--no one should be mistaken about that--although the risk has gone down substantially compared to a month ago when the lines were not as clear as they have been since the recent ground action. Mr. President, the concern I have would not be simply the rights of the Bosnian Moslems versus the Bosnian Serbs but also the rights of the Bosnian Moslems vis-a-vis the Croatian-Bosnians, if that kind of federation breaks up. And it is very important that federation not break up. Another question, Mr. President, that I think has to be discussed by our executive branch and by Congress, do we have an exit strategy? By that I mean, do we know when the mission will be successful, when it will end and how we define success? That involves at least deciding in advance with our allies whether we are going to arm the Bosnian Moslems before we exit--before we exit--or whether we are going to find another way to level the playing field so that the parties can defend their own territory including the possibility of a build down.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Has there been a motion to reconsider and a motion to lay on the table?

Mr. NUNN. Just a procedural question, Mr. President. Has this nomination passed the Senate by voice vote?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the nomination of Gen. John S. Shalikashvili for a second 2-year term as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have worked closely with General Shalikashvili or General Shali, as he is usually referred to, over the years. This has been particularly true since August 1989 when then Lieutenant General Shali was the deputy commander-in-chief of the U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army. During that assignment, General Shali commanded the Combined Task Force Provide Comfort that provided humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq. That very difficult operation, which involved providing assistance to between 500 and 700,000 Iraqi Kurds who had taken to the mountains and coaxing them back down to resettle their towns and villages, saved tens of thousands of lives. From August 1991 to June 1992, then Lieutenant General Shali served as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In that position, General Shali represented the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, in interagency fora. Based upon his performance in those demanding assignments, General Shali was promoted to four-star general in June 1992 and was assigned as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the senior military officer of NATO, and Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command. General Shali has served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since October 1993. General Shali has testified numerous times before the Armed Services Committee since his advancement to four-star rank. He also testified before the Armed Services Committee in September 1993 in connection with his initial nomination to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and testified again before the Committee last week in connection with his nomination for a second 2-year term. The Committee voted unanimously to favorably report his nomination to the Senate. I think that it is important to review the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I find that many people believe that the Chairman has far more authority than he does. Under the law, the JCS Chairman is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Communications between the President and the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders are transmitted through the JCS Chairman. The Secretary of Defense has assigned to the [[Page S 14643]] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the responsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant commanders but that assignment does not confer any command authority on the Chairman. The Chairman outranks all other officers of the armed services but he does not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces. In other words, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the senior member of our armed forces and the principal military adviser to our civilian leaders but he does not exercise command over any element of the armed forces and is not in the chain of command for our armed forces. General Shali is responsible for giving the best military advice that he can. There is no guarantee, however, that his military advice will carry the day on any issue. He has agreed if asked, to give the Congress his personal views on any issue even if those views differ from the Administration. I have no doubt that he has fulfilled that agreement. As a matter of fact, General Shali's testimony before the Armed Services Committee last week was germaane to both of these points. With respect to providing military advice he testified as follows: I am very much convinced that . . . the Secretary of Defense and the President, and for that matter, the National Security Council, not only welcome military advice, seek it, give me every opportunity to voice my views. Again I say that does not mean that my views are always the ones that prevail, but I can think of only a few where they have not prevailed and not in cases where I felt that whatever was decided was such that I needed to walk away from it because I could not in clear conscience support that. With respect to a decision that was contrary to his advice, General Shali testified as follows with respect to the complicated issue of demarcation between theater and national missile defense: . . . the Chiefs met on a number of occasions during this period when demarcation and particularly specific limits on interceptors were discussed, and we were always of the view, all of us, that we should not place any limits on them. When it came to the decision, everyone in the administration was aware that my view and the view of the Joint Chiefs was that we should not put any limits on it. The debate and the decision went the other way. At the earliest possible opportunity, I raised the issue that we need to reopen that point and that we need to pursue without limits on interceptors. I believe that is essentially where we are today. So, I feel good that my view in the long term has prevailed. If the opposition is because of disagreement with the administration's Bosnia policies or past Bosnia policies, then the opposition is misplaced because General Shali is an adviser not a decisionmaker. General Shali has my unqualified and strong support for confirmation for a second 2-year term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment is important in many ways, and I am proud to join my colleague from Georgia in bringing this matter to the attention of the U.S. [[Page S 14669]] Senate. As many Americans know, the Centennial Olympic games will begin in Atlanta on July 19, 1996, and conclude on August 4. Many people do not know, however, that just 12 days after the conclusion of the 1996 Summer Olympics, another sporting event of great magnitude will begin. The Paralympic opening ceremony will be held August 16 and over the next 12 days more than 3,500 athletes from 119 nations will compete in 19 different sports. This will be the largest gathering of people with disabilities ever assembled anywhere in the world. The origins of the Paralympic movement goes back to 1946 when Sir Ludwig Guttman organized the International Wheelchair Games to coincide with the 1948 London Olympics. Since that time, the official Paralympic organization has been established, and the Paralympic Games have been held nine times in nine countries across the globe. The 1996 Atlanta paralympics will mark the tenth and largest gathering with an expected 1.5 million spectators. Over the years, the Paralympics have expanded from wheelchair athletes to include amputees, the blind, those with cerebral palsy, dwarfs and those with a variety of other physical limitations. In 1994, Congress expanded the U.S. Information Agency's mission to include direction to promote exchange and training activities on disability matters. This American leadership has helped to create international visibility and awareness of disability concerns and has encouraged and reinforced the provision of opportunity for people with disabilities around the world. The Paralympics gives people with disabilities not only the right, but the opportunity to show what they are able to do. Consider, for example, Ajibola Adoye, a Nigerian runner who, despite the amputation of one arm, ran faster than the fastest, able-bodied runner in his country in the 1992 Olympic Games. The Paralympics lets athletes like Ajibola Adoye represent their countries in international competition at the Olympic level. While many events have been modified in certain ways to accomodate the disabilities of the participants, amazingly, many Paralympic athletes still remain competitive in standard Olympic events. In addition to celebrating the outstanding talents and achievements of disabled athletes, next summer's Paralympiad also serves another important function. It will serve as an international forum, bringing leaders in the international disability community to Atlanta to address issues vital to the disabled worldwide. Developments in disability- related technology and public policy in the United States and other nations will be highlighted. The Paralympiad is an unprecedented chance to showcase American leadership in creating opportunities for people With disabilities. The Americans with Disabilities Act is just one example of such leadership. The United State is a leader in the development of prosthetic equipment and disability health care. U.S. Paralympic athletes will make use of the most state-of-the-art prosthetic equipment when they compete in the games. Regrettably, much of this equipment is unavailable to the developing nations. The experience of many countries torn by war and conflict, where many people, including children, have lost limbs from land mines and other weapons of war, demonstrates the pressing need for advanced prosthetic devices. The Paralympiad brings representatives of those countries to the United States to see our latest developments and fosters their export to the world. A fundamental goal of U.S. disability-related public policy has been to foster increased economic independence among the disabled. Sport is an established pathway for the disabled to reach self-sufficiency, helping to break the expectation of life-long dependence among the disabled. It is also a powerful tool to change attitudes among the general public. We know that changing attitudes is more effective than mandating behavior. The impact of watching a sprinter run less than two-seconds off Carl Lewis' pace on two prosthetic legs can change the way the world perceives the abilities of people with disabilities. By bringing many of the disabled from around the world to the United States, this one event will do more to communicate our achievements and commitment to ensuring opportunity than holding a number of smaller- scale individual exchanges, which would be considerably more expensive. I believe the types of exchange activities envisioned by the Paralympic Organizing Committee are perfectly consistent with the USIA mandate. Last year, the Congress saw fit to appropriate $1.5 million in USIA funding for the Paralympics games. This amendment, if adopted, would reserve $5 million from the USIA's general accounts for the Paralympic Games. It is consistent with the report language adopted by both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees which urged ``that support be increased for this program to the maximum extent possible within the resources provided, since this is the year the program will take place.'' This funding would help support the international exchange events centered around the competition, including the international forum on disability, adaptive technology displays, as well as follow-through dissemination of materials and information. In addition, every Federal dollar is expected to attract at least $8 of private support. Let me also add that funding is contingent upon satisfactory compliance with financial oversight and reporting procedures just like any Federal contract. If the Paralympic Organizing Committee does not comply, USIA may exercise its discretion not to release any of this funding. The 1996 Paralympiad presents an unparalleled opportunity for cultural exchange and education. The Paralympics has never before been hosted by a country with a comprehensive disability rights law, and international expectations could not be higher. Leaders from around the world will be drawn to witness the progress the United States has made in the inclusion of those with physical disabilities. I am pleased to support this measure.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Nebraska. The Senator from Pennsylvania was quite right when he said that the creation of this new joint military budget account was a sign of the times. The old accounting categories are becoming blurred by the versatility of intelligence systems today. The creation of JMIP put a strain on the relationship between the two committees, but I think we have fixed it for this year in a satisfactory way. Next year may bring additional change, and we are creating an inter-committee working group to determine how we adapt our procedures to the changed circumstances. I understand, and I believe my Intelligence Committee colleagues understand, that each committee has a distinct and complementary role in authorizing these programs. We will do a far better job working together than separately. Let me explain the Armed Services Committee's concerns about these programs. There have been occasions in the past when the Intelligence Committee and the Armed Services Committee disagreed about systems to support the military which we and the military thought were extremely important. One of these was Joint STARS, a program that made a great contribution during the gulf war and is now a mainstay of tactical intelligence. We had sole authorization over the budget category of which Joint STARS had a part. If our Committee had not supported it strongly, our military, might not have this system today. So we take our responsibilities regarding intelligence support to the military very seriously. The chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee are no less serious, and we have six crossover Members to insure that our common efforts keep on track. I am, therefore, confident that our close relation will continue, to the country's benefit.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Madam President, this resolution is very similar to the resolution we passed in 1993. If I had my way, I would not have brought up the resolution at this point in time. Of course, every Senator has the right to bring up whatever they would like on any bill under our procedure. The peace agreement is being negotiated now. This resolution, in my view, is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution that does not have the effect of law. It is not binding on the President. It does make it clear the Senate of the United States expects the President of the United States to, basically, have Congress speak to this issue before we have deployment of troops. We had a good meeting at the White House today. I think the President made it clear his position is very similar to what President Bush's position was before the Persian Gulf war, that is, he would welcome an expression by Congress approving this peacekeeping mission, but he at this point in time certainly is going to consult with Congress in any event. Madam President, there are a lot of questions that need to be asked by the United States before this deployment takes place. We need to have hearings in the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee. We need to ask a lot of tough questions. Most of all, the American people need to be informed by the President that this is truly in our national interest before we make any commitment under our NATO alliance. But the United States must lead. If there is a deployment that takes place after an agreement, it is important for the United States to ask the tough questions before deployment within the NATO context, but it is also important for the United States to lead. So, we have a long way to go before there is a peace agreement. We have a lot to do before we, in the Congress, have done our duty by asking the questions. This is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution that is not binding. It indicates the will of the Senate. I will vote aye.