Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2103

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared by both sides. This amendment by the Senator from California extends for 1 year, fiscal year 1993 project authorization for a $1.553 million fuel facility project at Los Alamitos Reserve Center in California.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have an amendment by Senator Akaka. I send the amendment to the desk and ask for its consideration.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, Senator Pryor is the prime author of the ``Troops to Teachers'' amendment, and Senator Feinstein is the prime author of the ``Troops to Cops'' part of this amendment. They have both worked diligently in this entire area, and in the transition of our military personnel, which has been a very large success.

Mr. NUNN. The Senator from Virginia is correct. That amendment has been cleared. If you will give us just one minute, we want to make sure we have the right amendment. Amendment No. 2095 (Purpose: To improve the section establishing uniform national discharge standards for the control of water pollution from vessels of the Armed Forces)

Mr. NUNN. I yield the remainder of my time.

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2099 (Purpose: To provide a substitute for section 543, relating to military intelligence personnel prevented by secrecy from being considered for decorations and award)

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared, and I urge its adoption.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask my friend from Virginia if he would go to the next amendment and set this one aside very briefly. We need to do a little more checking on this amendment.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief question?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am going to make some remarks on the Levin amendment and I am going to try to cut my remarks down. I think this is a very important amendment. I support the amendment. I would like to lay out what I consider to be the defects in the bill as it now exists and why I think this amendment is important and why I will support the amendment. If this amendment fails I anticipate another amendment in this area. Mr. President, the defects in the majority's Missile Defense Act of 1995 are simple and straightforward. First, the Missile Defense Act constitutes what, in law, I would call--reflecting back years ago on my law school courses--I would call this an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. Only in this case, it is not a contract, as in law school. The bill before us proposes to breach an international treaty, the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, now succeeded by Russia, on the limitation of the antiballistic missile systems known as the ABM Treaty. Thus the Missile Defense Act if we pass it, if it became law, puts this body on record as directing the United States to knowingly violate an existing international treaty without first seeking amendments to the treaty and without reference to the provisions in the treaty which permit either party to withdraw upon 6 months' notice. The ABM Treaty was entered into, not as a sacred document to be adhered to forever, but rather as a document that reflected the security interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States at that time. I am not wedded to every word in the ABM Treaty, as I will review in a moment. I do believe amendments are in order. But why not negotiate the amendments? Why act as if there is no treaty? That is what this bill does. If we cannot negotiate the amendments, if the Russians will not budge after a good-faith effort, why not then consider whether to withdraw from the treaty under the provisions of the treaty? That is the way you get out of a treaty if you do not feel it is in your national security interests. The second problem with the Missile Defense Act is that this breach is wholly unnecessary to the conducting of the near-term missile defense program run by the ballistic missile defense organization. In other words, we are basically serving notice that the treaty is going to be breached and it is not getting us anything in the next fiscal year--nothing. There is no program in this bill that would violate the ABM Treaty in the next fiscal year. Enactment of the Missile Defense Act authorizes no activity by the ballistic missile defense office during fiscal year 1996 that would otherwise be proscribed by the ABM Treaty. So, what we have is we are asked to take a gratuitous poke at the eye of the Russians, while helping to persuade them that the United States Congress is bent on resurrecting what some have called star wars. In my view the Russians do not have the resources to compete in this arena in the near term. So they will certainly be frustrated, in the sense that they see us moving to breach the ABM Treaty when they do not have the resources to compete. They just simply do not have the finances to compete. But, what they do have is thousands of missiles. Not a few hundred, but thousands of missiles that they are supposed to dismantle under START I, and they already are doing that under START I, and thousands more missiles they are supposed to dismantle under START II, which has been negotiated, and signed by President Bush but is now pending ratification both in the Duma and here in the Senate. What they can do very easily is they can simply continue to target those thousands of missiles at the United States. That is likely to be their response to what they see as a breach of the ABM Treaty. Do we really, on the floor of the U.S. Senate, after going through the Reagan administration, the Bush administration, basically negotiating carefully arms control agreements and trying to carry them out, getting thousands of nuclear warheads dismantled, do we want to turn around and do something in this bill that is going to say to the Russians, in effect: We are going to break out of the ABM Treaty. Now whatever you do is up to you? I know what they are going to do. I believe I know what they are going to do. They do not have billions of dollars to conduct defenses now. They may in the future. In the future I think it is in their interests also to have some defenses. I think both countries ought to have some limited defenses against accidental launch, against any kind of unauthorized launch or against a Third World country that emerges as a threat. I think we ought to have those kind of defenses. I think the Russians ought to, too. But if we strike out unilaterally they are going to do what we would do if we were in their circumstances. What is that? We would not dismantle our strategic offensive forces. We would find a way to proliferate the offensive forces because those offensive forces are going to have defenses that they have to contend with. And, what the Russians would fear, as we would fear, is that the combination of going to a lower START level, dismantling warheads, going down to START II, doing that, limiting the number of warheads; then having the United States embarked on a breach of the ABM Treaty, saying we are clearly going to deploy defenses without regard to negotiation, without regard to amendments, without regard to the provisions of the treaty--the combination of those two things says to them: Limited warheads, defenses by the United States, possible preemptive attack. We would never do that. We know that. But they do not know that just like we do not know that about them. That is the basis of our deterrence policy. We do not know that and we are not going to bank on it. But the combination limiting the number of warheads, defenses in this country that basically breach the ABM Treaty, plus a preemptive attack, means that they would lose the ability to retaliate. That is paranoia. But the whole equation of deterrence for years has [[Page S 11248]] been based on both sides being somewhat paranoid. And not irrationally so, based on the former confrontation all over the globe. This breach of the ABM Treaty is wholly unnecessary. This poke in the eye to Russia leads to a third problem. That problem is one with serious, perhaps even tragic consequences. While enactment of the Missile Defense Act permits nothing within our own missile defense programs that we cannot already do in the next fiscal year, it may very well persuade the Russians that we have abandoned our obligations under the ABM Treaty. Perhaps the majority does not really want to do that. If so, we have room to work out wording that would change that impression in this bill. The Russians have repeatedly told us, those in the executive branch as well as those of us in the Senate who have met with them on many occasions, they have told us of the importance they attach to continued compliance with the ABM Treaty by both parties. And they have suggested if they conclude we are abandoning the ABM Treaty unilaterally, this would call into question Russia's continued compliance with their international agreements. Thus we may be jeopardizing START I and START II, thousands of warheads that would continue to be pointed at the United States, it will take us 10 or 12 years at best to build the defenses, yet we have a chance of dismantling thousands of warheads that are aimed at us. Which is more cost effective? Embarking on a unilateral course without regard to the people we entered into the treaty with? Or negotiating with them, and determining what we would do if negotiations fail? Why do we want to get thousands more warheads pointed at the United States? I do not. I do not think anybody in this body does. I do not think the American people do. That is the result of where we are heading, unless this bill is changed. Mr. President, it is not only the two START agreements, it is also the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. That is the treaty where the Russians dismantled and continue to dismantle literally thousands--they are moving at least thousands and thousands of tanks and other threatening equipment, artillery tubes under the CFE Treaty in Europe. They already are frustrated by that treaty. They already are making signs that this treaty causes them big problems. It is going to be a problem whether we pass this amendment or not. But, if we pass this amendment, it is going to be a bigger problem very quickly. The two START treaties, if fully entered into force, will reduce by three-fourths the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads in their arsenal--a far greater reduction of nuclear warheads potentially threatening the United States than any defensive system could possibly offer or that we have any capability of developing and paying for in the next 10 years. Three-fourths of the warheads are coming off under START I and START II. Do we really want to jeopardize that? The Russians have complained frequently about the enormous cost to them of compliance with these two START treaties and the CFE. But so far they are complying. We may reach a point where they do not. But they are so far complying. How much more will it cost us in our own defense budget if the START treaties go by the boards? Also, many Members are aware the Russians have been seeking relief from the limitations imposed under the CFE Treaty on the level of conventional forces and equipment they are permitted to station on their volatile southern flank. If the full Senate adopts the Missile Defense Act, this will give them a plausible excuse to ignore the CFE limits on stationing forces and equipment. To repeat, Mr. President, all of these serious consequences and costs may be brought upon us by adoption of the Senate Armed Services Committee majority's Missile Defense Act, which itself allows us to do no more than we already planned to do in the short run, unless the bill is changed. The fourth problem with the Missile Defense Act is that it tries legislatively to have it both ways: the Senate Armed Services Committee majority wants the ABM Treaty to go away, and legislates as though it had already gone away; yet they do not take the straightforward approach of using legal remedy. Mr. President, if the Senate believes adherence to the ABM Treaty is no longer in our national interest, then we should have availed ourselves of a straightforward and honorable resolution. Under article XV, paragraph 2, of the ABM Treaty, the United States can withdraw from the ABM Treaty, after giving 6 months notice to Russia. Is the Senate ready to take that step? Or will we adopt the language of the Missile Defense Act to squeeze past, a direct confrontation with the ABM Treaty, by pretending that it is not there. It seems to me that is the course we are on, pretending it is not there. This unwillingness to confront the ABM Treaty head-on, Mr. President, leads to the fifth problem with the Missile Defense Act. By ignoring the ABM Treaty, rather than proposing U.S. withdrawal from it, the Senate Armed Services Committee majority are forced to try to negate its effect by the following legislative device: They restrict the use of appropriated funds to enforce our obligations under the ABM Treaty. In attempting to negate the treaty in this way, Mr. President, the Senate Armed Services Committee majority sets up a direct constitutional conflict between the executive and the legislative branches regarding responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy and the enforcement of this Nation's international obligations. Mr. President, consider what is at stake here. Should the Missile Defense Act approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee majority be enacted in the next couple of years, we stand to gain nothing, but we stand to lose a great deal: we could lose the agreed drawdowns of nuclear arsenals under START I and II; we could lose the CFE Treaty's constraints on Russian conventional force deployments near troubled areas. Now, some in the Senate Armed Service Committee majority will argue that the Missile Defense Act does not really breach the ABM Treaty, because only some subsequent testing or deployment action would technically place us in violation of the treaty. They will argue this by saying that only some subsequent testing or deployment would technically place us in violation of the treaty. Mr. President, this is too clever by one-half. If the Russian Republic were to announce tomorrow that it no longer intended to meet the timetable for reduction of nuclear systems under the START I Treaty, that it was not going to renegotiate them, that it simply was going to move forward as if START I did not exist, and that there was nothing we could do about it, would the Senate Armed Services Committee come to the Senate floor to calmly inform us that this is not a breach of their obligations under the treaty? Would they argue that the START I Treaty can only be breached once the deadline for implementing reductions is past? Or would they say instead, as I think would be the case, breach is inevitable, and based on what the Russians have told us, we should now move to prepare for this breach and take the necessary security precautions? I think that the majority--and I would be in that majority--would say let us assume that they are going to do what they say they are going to do; they are going to breach the treaty, and we had better start recognizing that. To recap, Mr. President, the Senate Armed Services Committee's Missile Defense Act provision has major problems: First, it abandons United States adherence to the ABM Treaty; second, abandoning adherence now is unnecessary--we can conduct an effective missile defense program in the near-term while continuing adherence; third, abandoning adherence now is likely to impose huge costs on us, if Russia declines to carry out some of its legal obligations in response to our breach; fourth, the Senate Armed Services Committee bill abandons adherence by stealth, rather directing the administration to use the legal withdrawal procedures contained in the treaty; and fifth, by failing to use the legal option, the Senate is forced to try to compel the executive branch to abandon adherence by usurping certain powers of the [[Page S 11249]] executive branch over the conduct of foreign policy, a move that raises serious constitutional issues, and could lead to this act never becoming law even if it passed as is. Mr. President, I do not want any Senator to misconstrue my message regarding the ABM Treaty, and I am sure there will be people on this side who will not listen to the latter part of this message. I am not a diehard supporter of the ABM Treaty as some sacred document that cannot be changed. I think that would be a mistake in view of this treaty. Circumstances change. The circumstances surrounding the treaty's establishment have changed significantly since it was entered into in the early 1970's. Therefore, either the treaty itself must be changed to reflect the new realities, or the Congress and the President must at some point make the decision that the treaty's usefulness has ended and exercise our legal right to withdraw from the treaty. The ABM Treaty condition contains provisions for renegotiation; indeed, that is precisely what the Clinton administration has been trying to do at Geneva, and they really need the backing of Congress to do that. Thus, it is not a foregone conclusion that the treaty cannot be amended by mutual agreement to allow us to deploy the missile defenses we consider necessary to meet our national security requirements. But Russia must understand that these negotiations must make progress and that the time period available for negotiations is not infinite. It is finite. I think that message needs to go forth to the Russians clearly. It would be useful if it went forth in a united way from both the administration and from the Congress. But we will not have any united message because we are going to be too busy deciding whether there is an anticipatory breach by ignoring any negotiations and by ignoring the treaty itself. Mr. President, I intend to vote in favor of the amendment by the Senator from Michigan; I hope it is successful. If it fails to pass, I believe the Senate then will face a major dilemma. I believe that, unless the problems I have outlined above are dealt with, this bill faces a bleak future. The administration is already on record that the House version of the Missile Defense Act is unacceptable, as is the provision in this bill as passed by the committee. Thus, the prospects for an outcome in conference that will become law are indeed bleak unless we make some fundamental changes. The Senator from Michigan seeks to correct the flaws by striking whole sections. If this approach is shown to be unacceptable to a majority of Senators present and voting, then the only remaining possibility will be to try to modify the language. And I will certainly have an amendment to do that after we decide what happens on this amendment. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. Has the Senator from Nebraska had a chance to make a statement this morning?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, if Senator Exon has a question?

Mr. NUNN. If I may say to my friend from Virginia, the Senator from Michigan made such a powerful speech on this subject, with the intervention of the Senator from Massachusetts, and I plan to make a speech on it, and I know the Senator from Nebraska plans to speak, perhaps by the time our colleagues hear these speeches, they will not feel the need to speak as long on this subject. That remains to be seen. I hope we can cut that time down. I will work with the Senator from Michigan. This is an important amendment. This is the heart of the bill in terms of the opposition to the bill. This is the heart of it. While I would like to accelerate this process and will work hard to do that, I do think that once this matter is settled one way or the other on this amendment, and perhaps on another amendment that may follow if this one fails, I think once we do that, we will begin to make a lot more progress on the bill. So, I say to my friend from Virginia and my friend from South Carolina, I know they want to move this bill, I will continue to work with them to see if we cannot reach some time agreement. Mr. President, I would like to be recognized.

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2098 (Purpose: To modify the authority to transfer funds regarding foreign currency fluctuations so that the authority does not apply to appropriations for fiscal years before fiscal year 1996)

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its consideration.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I inquire of my friend from Virginia. We have two amendments I would like to present. I believe they have been cleared, but I want to check with my friend before I send them to the desk, by Senator Pryor and Senator Feinstein. The two amendments coupled together are the ``Troops to Teachers'' and the ``Troops to Cops'' program. The amendments provide $42 million for the ``Troops to Teachers'' program, offset from excess military personnel funds, and provides $10 million for the ``Troops to Cops'' program, offset from the same source. Mr. President, ``Troops to Teachers'' was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993 as part of the Transition Assistance Program, designed to help service members affected by downsizing. Troops to Cops was added to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994. Individuals can receive a $5,000 stipend to assist in obtaining the necessary training and certification. In addition, if a service member is part of an early 15-year retirement, the individual will receive time or credit for up to 5 years if he or she completes 5 years of teaching or law enforcement assignment. That was an amendment that I proposed that became law, and I think it is working very well. The school systems or law enforcement agencies that hire a participant receives funds to assist in paying the salary ranging from up to $25,000 for an individual's first year down to $2,500 for an individual's fifth year. There is a win-win program benefiting separating service members, helping them get employment, and helping our Nation. Frankly, we will never have this reservoir of talented people coming out into the job market from the military in this number of people in any period in the future that I can envision at this point because this is part of the drawdown in our military. We have literally tens of thousands of people in the military that are extremely well qualified in math and science and languages, and encouraging them and facilitating them going into teaching and going into law enforcement at the local level and helping the States and local governments, to me, is not only helping the State and local government but helping the military and strengthening our Nation. So these amendments provide for prudent steps. Troops to Teachers receives $65 million in fiscal year 1995. This amendment calls for $42 million, which is a reduced program. The drawdown is being reduced. These will not be permanent programs. After you get through the drawdown and you level off the military personnel, then you would not, in all likelihood, have these programs. The Troops to Cops program receives $15 million in fiscal year 1995. This amendment calls for $10 million, which is a substantial reduction.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared on this side of the aisle. I urge its adoption.

Mr. NUNN. I thank my friend from Virginia and look forward to further debate on the bill tomorrow morning.

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we have cleared this amendment. I urge its adoption.