Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2109 (Purpose: To provide funding for the activities of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission for the remainder of 1995)

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2108

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of Senator from California, Mrs. Feinstein.

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2105 (Purpose: To extend the fiscal year 1993 project authorization for the JP-8 fuel facility at the Los Alamitos Reserve Center, California)

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2104 (Purpose: To make various amendments to the provisions relating to the Naval Petroleum Reserves)

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I support the Nickles amendment, which will strengthen the bill's provisions on depot maintenance workload. Section 311 of the bill requires the Secretary of defense to submit to Congress a comprehensive policy on the performance of depot-level maintenance and repair not later than March 31, 1996. The policy must: First, define purpose of public depots; second, provide for performance of core capabilities at public depots; third, provide sufficient personnel, equipment, and facilities at public depots; fourth, address environmental liability; fifth provide for public private competition when there is sufficient potential for realizing cost savings based on adequate private sector competition and technical capabilities; sixth require merit-based selection when workload of a depot is changed; seventh provide transition provisions for persons in DOD depots; and eighth address related issues on exchange of technical data, efficiency, and effects on the Federal workforce. The bill makes it clear that no changes may be made in the statutes requiring that at least 60 percent of the workload be preformed in public depots, and the requirements to for public/private competition for any change in workload requirements unless Congress enacts separate legislation approving or modifying the DOD policy. The Nickles amendment would require a detailed analysis by the General Accounting Office of DOD's proposed depot maintenance policy. GAO oversight is necessary to assess the validity of DOD data and studies. The importance of GAO report has been demonstrated in the base closure process, where their data provided important perspective to the BRAC Commission. While there may well be opportunities for increased contractor participation, these should be developed on the basis of careful analysis, not theoretical beliefs. Depot-level maintenance and repair activities are essential to wartime readiness and sustainability. The current system has proved to be highly effective in meeting national security needs, and should not be subjected to significant changes without a clear understanding of the consequences of a new policy. At the confirmation hearing for Deputy Secretary of Defense John White, he was closely questioned about the recommendations of the Roles and Missions Commission concerning privatization of depot workload. He acknowledged that the Commission did not conduct a comprehensive analysis of specific DOD functions to determine which should be privatized; that the recommendation reflected a general philosophical approach; that Commission did not develop a specific definition of the inherently governmental functions that should not be privatized; that the Commission had not developed a specific concept of what core capabilities should be retained; that there had been no analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness of current depots; and that the Commission did not have a specific plan for transitioning from public to private entities. He also agreed that it was very important to ensure that any workload assigned to the private sector be subject to adequate private sector competition. GAO review is needed to ensure that any changes in policy are developed on the basis of sound analysis rather than abstract philosophy.

Mr. NUNN. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. NUNN. How much time do I have?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge all Members on both sides of the aisle to read this, of course, because some people may disagree with it, parts of it, particularly on my side of the aisle. I do not disagree with anything in the Cohen resolution. I think it is helpful in the sense that it points in the right direction for the President to negotiate changes rather than simply assert changes. And that is clear in paragraph 4. I think also that it is the correct procedure for the negotiations. If the negotiations fail with the Russians, the President is urged to consult with the Senate about the option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty under provision of article XV of the treaty. I agree with some of the findings. Some of the people on this side of the aisle may not agree with the findings. I do. This is very close to what we had in the Missile Defense Act that Senator Warner and I sponsored 2 or 3 years ago in the Missile Defense Act. What is the problem with it? There is no problem with it that would keep me from voting for it, but it does not correct any of the things that we pointed out as being what we considered --most of us on this side and a few on that side of the aisle--to be fatal flaws with the bill itself. What it does not do because it is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, it does not change any of the operative provisions in the underlying bill. And the operative provisions have the force of law. So we have got sense-of-the-Senate legislation that cannot by its very nature change the force of law. So anyone who thinks there are problems in the underlying bill would not be comforted by this. This does not cure the problem. That is the reason I have not cosponsored it, not because I am not going to vote for it, not because it is not in the right direction, because it is. But it does not change the operative provisions of the bill which establish a number of legal restrictions on the President. This is, I believe, the first time I have seen provisions that restrict the President as to what he can negotiate. The underlying bill restricts the President of the United States in terms of his ability to negotiate. Now, I believe that will be challenged by many as unconstitutional. I do not try to make a judgment on it. But I imagine that those in the executive branch would assert it is unconstitutional on its face. Whether that is the case or not, in my view it is bad policy, because if the President of the United States cannot negotiate, who can? We do not have a negotiating team from the U.S. Senate that I know of. We have an arms control observer group, but we make it clear we never negotiate; we simply discuss. So if the President cannot negotiate these changes, even if they are changes that the majority wants, how do we get changes in the treaty? The Cohen amendment deals with one set of changes. And I think it appropriately says the President should negotiate the amendments to the ABM Treaty as necessary to provide for the national missile defense system specified in section 235. So the sense-of-the-Senate resolution does urge him to move in that direction. The restrictions on negotiations of the President, however, do not relate to that section; they relate to the section that we talked about at length earlier in the debate which gets to the demarcation point between theater ballistic missiles and strategic ballistic missiles. And the defense against strategic ballistic missiles is that restricted by the ABM Treaty. The provision on theater ballistic missiles is not. And that demarcation point is defined in the underlying bill as a matter of law, and the President in the underlying bill is told that he cannot negotiate on that point. He cannot do anything on that point. And, therefore, I do not see how the Russians would ever accept that. Now, maybe no one cares whether they accept it or not. But as I said earlier today, I do not think they have the option to go to defenses at this stage because of their economic condition. What they do have the option to do, and what they have said repeatedly they will do. So unless you believe they will not do what they said they are going to do, there is nothing in this amendment that changes the problem of the bill. And that is, it encourages, in fact it makes it clear to the Russians that we are going to move forward notwithstanding any concerns they may have on the ABM Treaty and that we will not comply with ABM Treaty in certain respects. And if they want to take action, then they will take action. What action will they take? In my opinion they will simply not ratify START II. They will not, in my view, continue to draw down their missile forces under START I. So, inadvertently, in the name of defending the United States and the people in the United States, the underlying bill, in my view, almost, not quite, because you cannot ever predict with certainty a foreign country's behavior, but it almost assures that the United States will end up with thousands of more missiles pointed at this country than we would otherwise have. I do not see how that improves our defense. We are basically saying we want to move forward in 10 years to defend against threats that may be here in 10 years, that are not here now. But the threat that is here now, that is, the SS-18's the SS-24's that are pointed at us now that we want to take down, and the two Republican presidents have negotiated successfully to get the Russians to take down, we do not worry about that threat. It is now being dismantled. We put provisions in here that are likely to require or at least to encourage the Russians to keep those missiles pointed at us. I do not see how I can go home and tell my people that I voted for an underlying provision in a bill that is likely to keep thousands of missiles that we have described as the foremost threat that is aimed at the United States that we spent 15 to 20 years trying to figure out how to either negate through a deterrence policy, through a policy of negotiations, one way or the other, either through defenses or negotiation that we finally had two Republican Presidents, President Reagan and President Bush, successfully concluded the negotiations--one of them is now being implemented, START I, the other is pending in the Russian Duma and in the Senate. So we are going to put a provision in here that says to the Russians, ``We are going to go ahead anyway. And we are going to disregard the ABM Treaty. But you do what you choose.'' I think what they are going to choose to do is keep those missiles pointed at us. Now maybe 10 years from now we will be able to defend against them. 2003 is the date. But understand, we are only talking about a thin defense, a thin defense against a few missiles and a Third [[Page S 11306]] World country or an unauthorized launch or terrorist group that gets ahold of a ballistic missile or cruise missile. I want a defense against those. I am in favor of defense. I am in favor of amending the ABM Treaty, but I think we ought to do it through the procedure of international law and the procedure of American law, because a treaty is American law, and we are the ones who signed up for the ABM Treaty. It is our law now. It is the law of the land. A treaty is the law of the land. We are saying disregard it in the underlying bill. I do not understand the logic, Mr. President. I cannot understand the logic of taking a step in the name of defending the people of America that is likely to end up having thousands of warheads pointed toward us while we spend 10 years and billions of dollars to figure out how to defend against a threat that is not yet here. I do not understand that logic. Mr. President, I will vote for the Cohen amendment. It does not cure the underlying defects in the bill. I will have another amendment, in all likelihood. It depends on whether I have a chance to get it adopted. If I do not, then I will simply leave the bill as it is now and people can make their choice. But if I do have a chance to have it adopted, I will have an amendment that sets forth very clearly what our policy is. Succinctly what that would be is a policy, first of all, of coming forth with a defensive system in this country that protects against unauthorized launches, that protects against accidental launches, that protects against a third country defense, but that does so in compliance with the ABM Treaty. Second, we ask the President to try to amend the ABM Treaty with amendments that would allow us to deploy that kind of system. Third, if he fails to be able to amend it with the Russians--that is, if the Russians refuse--that we then consider our option of terminating our ABM obligations in accordance with article XV of the treaty itself, which says we can give 6 months' notice and terminate those obligations. Mr. President, to me, that is a sensible policy. In the meantime, we should not tie the hands of the President of the United States to negotiate. We ought to insist that anything that has the nature of a treaty come before us for approval. We should not let treaties be amended by the executive branch, but we should not prevent the President from negotiating. We should not prevent him from negotiating a demarcation point. I happen to agree with the demarcation point in the bill. I think it is perfectly reasonable. I do not mind putting it as a matter of findings. I do not mind saying this is the policy of the demarcation point. But I do not want the President to be prevented from saying to the Russians, ``This is what the Congress thinks and I would like for you to sign up to this.'' We preclude him from even doing that. He cannot negotiate anything. I do not believe that provision will stand, because I do not think it will become law. But if it does become law, I think it probably will be challenged on constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, that is where we are. I urge my colleagues to agree with the findings in the Cohen amendment, to vote for it, because I think the provisions make sense. I think they are a step in the right direction, but it does not cure what I consider to be fatal flaws of the underlying provisions. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN. I would suggest 30 minutes because most people on this side have not read the amendment.

Mr. NUNN. I did not hear the request.

Mr. NUNN. I will say to the majority leader, if he will yield, I would like to have a time agreement on this amendment no longer than an hour equally divided. I believe we would be better to put that unanimous-consent request after the minority leader makes his statement.

Mr. NUNN. I believe, if I may just add to the statement of my colleague from Arizona, that is the energy section of the bill that has been worked on for 2 or 3 days.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I would just like to point out to the Senator from Ohio-- and I appreciate his leadership in this area and his remarks--that there are a number of these projects that are family housing projects. There are a number of these projects that are barracks. That was one of the high priorities that was mentioned. That is one of the things we talked about. There are three of these projects that are day-care centers and fitness centers. We are talking about high-quality, priority projects. None of these have been drawn out of the air. As I understand it, all of them are on the 5-year priority list for the defense plan. I think people ought to understand, as we hear this talk about waste and so forth, that the reason the military construction add-ons are having to occur here is because the administration itself has requested a whole lot less money in military construction over the last couple of years because the BRAC process was going on. We now know what happened in BRAC. We did not know that, the administration did not know that, when they submitted their defense budget this year or last year. So that defense request, that is going to be the measurement. If anything is going to be labeled waste that goes over the administration request in military construction, I think that is really a misleading kind of portrayal, because the BRAC process was ongoing when the administration put the budget together. They did not request a number of projects that are now high-priority projects. An awful lot of this money is going to barracks and to housing and to daycare, and to quality-of-life projects. We have one project on here, for instance, in Joe Foss Field in South Dakota, a World War II facility, a vehicle maintenance and storage complex. It is of World War II vintage. And it does not meet the fire and safety standards. It is in violation. So I think people ought to be very careful and look at this on a project-by-project basis. I know the Senator from Ohio has done that, or will do that. But an awful lot of this effort here goes directly to the very areas that are a priority.

Mr. NUNN. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from New Mexico, I do not see any inconsistency there. As long as the Senator from New Mexico really agrees with the bottom paragraph, that it is the sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or limited ballistic missile attack, this Kyl amendment does not say how that should be done. It does not refer to the ABM Treaty. It does not set up any kind of anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. It does not say anything should be done in terms of deployment or testing that would violate the ABM Treaty. It simply states that we would like to protect Americans. So I do not see any inconsistency.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will say first to my friend from New Mexico, his question was, does the amendment breach the ABM Treaty. We are talking about the Kyl amendment now. As I outlined in my opening statement, I feel that the provisions of the underlying bill create what I would call a very high risk that it would be perceived as an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. That is the underlying bill. I do not think there is anything in the Kyl amendment, and the Senator from Arizona is not on the floor now, but I do not read anything in the Kyl amendment that would either breach the ABM Treaty or suggest breaching the ABM Treaty. The operative paragraph in the Kyl amendment is the one at the end that says: It is the sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or limited ballistic missile attack. Like the Senator from New Mexico, if I were drafting this, I would certainly add cruise missile in there, perhaps some other threats. I see nothing wrong with the way it is worded in terms of in any way creating the impression that the ABM Treaty would be breached by this amendment. I also note the paragraph just before the sense-of-the-Senate operative paragraph, paragraph 12, page 5 of this amendment says, explicitly: The United States and Russia have the opportunity to create a relationship based on trust rather than fear. So it seems to me there is nothing in this amendment that would in any way breach the ABM Treaty or that would in any way violate the conditions that the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Perry, has laid down in his letter. I made a lengthy statement about what my fears were about the course this bill takes, and we will have amendments dealing with that on the ABM Treaty. So I do have very similar concerns as the Senator from New Mexico on the underlying bill, but I do not have such concerns on this amendment. I will also say, if you look at the findings in paragraphs 1 through 12, I think the findings I generally agree with. Everyone will have to read them to see if they agree with them. But the findings I personally agree with. I say to my friend from Nebraska, he is correct. If my amendment, the second-degree amendment, were adopted and became part of this Kyl amendment, then if the Kyl amendment were defeated, it would take down the second-degree amendment. In that case, what I would do is propose it again, and I hope that will not happen. I really believe careful reading of the Kyl amendment will not have many people taking exception to it. Everyone will have to judge some of the findings.

Mr. NUNN. I knew the Senator would resent that statement. I said ``almost,'' not quite. Does the Senator mind repeating that, if he would?

Mr. NUNN. I am sorry. I must ask the Senator from Nebraska, and I apologize, if he will repeat that question. He has gotten to be such a good--almost like a lawyer since he has been here. I am sure he can reframe that question.

Mr. NUNN. Well, right now we have four programs that cover the same area, and they are fully beefed up and funded, while the only program that covers the forward battlefield is being canceled. So we have tremendous redundancy here. I do not mind some redundancy, because we do not know which of these programs is going to work and be the most cost-effective program. But we do not have any redundancy here and no coverage here. The problem is the majority suggestion about PAC-3 possibly covering this area. We need to get some funding into a study for that, if that is going to be done. Perhaps we can work on something while we are continuing the debate. Mr. President, I yield the floor at this time. Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. Madam President, as we begin debate on the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996, I first want to congratulate Senator Thurmond and his staff on reporting together the first defense authorization bill that has been reported with Senator Thurmond as committee chairman. Although he has been a stalwart for many years on the committee and has helped prepare the bills in the past, this is his first bill as the official chairman of the committee. The major themes of this bill reflect Senator Thurmond's longstanding and strong and effective support for our national security. It has been my great privilege and honor to have worked with Senator Thurmond in the Senate and on the Armed Services Committee for all of my 22 years, and for at least maybe slightly more than half of his time here in the U.S. Senate. His career--and his decorated service in World War II and unwavering support for strong national defense, and his devotion to the men and women of the Armed Forces--has served as a model and an inspiration to me, and to, I believe, his fellow members of the Armed Services Committee and the Senate. The 18 to 3 vote in favor of the bill in the Armed Services Committee reflects the fact that the bill continues many bipartisan efforts initiated by our committee in recent years, such as improvements in military pay and benefits, modernization of weapons systems, and protecting, as Senator Thurmond laid out, military readiness and personnel quality. This bipartisan support also reflects the actions taken by the committee to address concerns raised by Secretary of Defense Bill Perry about a number of the provisions in the House bill. In contrast to the action taken by the House, for example, our bill provides full funding for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the program that is aimed at trying to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons all over the globe. It also avoids micromanaging the Office of Secretary of Defense, as was done in the House bill, and we do not have unworkable restrictions on military operations as the Secretary of Defense specified very clearly he feared was being done in the House bill. The bill before us provides $264.7 billion in budget authority, the amount specified in the budget resolution. This amount, which is $7 billion above the budget request, will enable us to fund the types of initiatives that have received bipartisan support in the past. This includes personnel programs such as the 2.4-percent pay raise for members of the Armed Forces and modernization programs from fighter aircraft such as the F-22 to unglamorous but essential items such as Army trucks. Most of the programs authorized by the committee reflect the administration's priorities as set forth in the current year budget request or in the future years defense program which covers the next 5 years. Dr. Perry, in his discussions with the committee, urged us to focus any additions to the budget on acquisition programs that are in DOD's future years defense program. The bill before us largely follows this recommendation. And I believe as various Members may come to the floor and say that we do not now need this program or that program which is funded with the additional money that has been put in this bill that was provided in the budget resolution, I think it is very important for Members to keep in mind that these programs--most of them, not every, but most of them--that have been added are in the 5-year defense plan that Secretary Perry favors. And I think that is important for people to keep that in mind. That was the request that Dr. Perry made of this committee, and I think we have largely honored that request. Madam President, this bill contains important legislative initiatives such as the authority to use innovative programs to finance military housing and housing for unaccompanied troops. This was a strong request and initiative by Dr. Perry and the Defense Department. In addition, we establish a defense modernization account, which I sponsored and our committee supported, which for the first time that I have any knowledge about will provide incentives for savings in defense programs for use of those savings to modernize the equipment for our men and women in uniform. In other words, Madam President, if the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps can find savings, we will let them put those savings in a carefully monitored account that will have to be, of course, monitored by the Congress and will have to follow our normal procedures. But those savings will be able to be used for the most critical deficiencies we face in modernization. And modernization in the outyears, the years ahead, is the biggest challenge we face. I think everyone would acknowledge that we are, even with the increases in this budget, underfunding the outyear modernization. When our equipment starts to wear out, which much of it will toward the end of this century, we are not going to have sufficient funding even with the increases in this bill to cover that. So what we want to do in this defense modernization account--I know some Members will have some suggestions and concerns which we will certainly listen carefully to--but this account will be controlled by the Congress. It will be subject to the normal reprogramming and authorization and appropriation procedures which we have now. There is a limit on how much can be accumulated. But for the first time we will be saying to each of the services, ``You will now have an incentive. If you figure out how to save money, it can go into an account. We are not going to grab that money and take it away from you as your punishment for saving it. We are going to let you spend it subject to the congressional oversight as outlined on the critical programs you need in the future.'' I believe this kind of initiative has real potential and promise in terms of giving people throughout the military services a real incentive to try to save money. We all know the horror stories of what we have heard for years, not just in the military but in all areas of Government where, when you get down toward the last couple of months of the fiscal year, there is money that has not been spent, and the people involved in those decisions decide that if the money is not spent, not only will it lapse but also they will have the budget cut the next year. So there is almost a perverse incentive throughout Government now to take whatever is not spent and spend it so that you do not have your budget cut the next year. We want to reverse that psychology. This is at least a beginning along that line. My outline of the bill's highlights should not, however, be viewed as representing unqualified support for all the provisions of this bill. The numerous rollcall votes during our committee markup reflect the serious concerns of many Members about inadequate funding of important programs as well as questions about some of the priorities reflected in this bill. There is much in this bill that I support, and I do support the overall bill. But I do have serious reservations about those aspects of the bill that appear to head back without very much thought given to the period of the cold war. For example, the proposed new Missile Defense Act of 1995 sets forth a commitment to the deployment of missile defenses without regard, without any regard for the legal requirements of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which we are a party to and which we signed and which is an international obligation of the United States of America, until changed or until we withdraw from the treaty under the terms of the treaty. That is our obligation. That is a law. That is a treaty. It is binding. The same provision contains legally binding timetables in our bill for deployment of missile defense systems. For example, section 235 requires a multiple site national defense system to reach the initial operational capacity in 2003. These timetables are though exempt from adequate testing. I hope we can have a system by then. I hope we can have one that really works, and I hope it will be calibrated to meet the threat that we may have in those outyears. But since the applicable missile testing statutes that were in previous laws are repealed in this National Defense Act we have before us, what we have is a timetable for actual deployment stated as a part of the law and repealing the testing that would be required to determine if the systems are ready to deploy or whether they are going to be effective when they are deployed. I do not think that is a good combination. Finally, there is an arbitrary--and possibly unconstitutional--restriction on the obligation of funds by the executive branch to enforce the terms of the ABM Treaty. I invite all of our colleagues to look at those aspects where there is a demarcation definition between the theater ballistic missile and the national missile defense that is precluded except under certain conditions in the ABM Treaty. I have no quarrel with those definitions. I think they are sensible definitions, and I think we do have to have a demarcation point because clearly theater missile defenses are not intended to be covered under the ABM Treaty. They never were covered. They should not be covered now. The problem is once this definition is set forth, the executive branch is barred from doing anything at all regarding the ABM Treaty in terms of its own negotiations, and I think that that goes way too far. In fact, the wording of the proposal we have before us is so broad that any Federal official including Members of Congress would be precluded, as that statute now would read, from doing anything contrary to that definition. I think that goes too far, and I do not think that is what we want. I hope we can work in a cooperative way to iron out some of those difficulties, which I believe can be done, while continuing the strong goal and endorsement of moving forward with defenses without doing so in a way that is counterproductive. The Department of Energy portions of the bill contain provisions that direct the creation of new capabilities for the remanufacture of nuclear weapons. Madam President, I have serious questions about whether this is a premature judgment at this time. The Department of Energy ``Stockpile Stewardship'' plan is only now under review by the Department of Defense. I know that Mr. Domenici, the Senator from New Mexico, and others have been in discussion with Senator Thurmond and his staff and Senator Lott and his staff, Senator Kempthorne, on these energy questions, and I hope we can work something out here that makes sense, that moves us in the right direction without making premature judgments that are not ripe for decision. Madam President, these are important issues for discussion and debate. There are questions about the potential international implications of a number of these provisions. For instance, the Russian leadership and their Parliament have stressed repeatedly, both to this administration and to various Members of the Senate and House, both parties, the importance they attach to continued compliance with the ABM Treaty. They have indicated that should they judge the United States no longer intends to adhere to that treaty, then they would abandon their efforts to ratify the START II Treaty, which is now pending in the Russian Duma. Further, they warned that they would stop further compliance with other existing treaties including the drawdowns mandated by START I. In my judgment, there is a real danger that the provisions of the Missile Defense Act will be considered by the Russians as what is known as ``anticipatory breach'' of the ABM Treaty. Madam President, if this bill leads to that outcome, it will not enhance our national security. It will be adverse to our national security. Under START I and START II, the arms control treaties which have been entered into by Republican Presidents and adhered to by Democratic Presidents, the Russians are obliged under the terms of these treaties to remove more than 6,000 ballistic missile warheads from atop their arsenal of ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This includes the very formidable MIRV'd SS-18 ICBM's, the very ones that threaten our land-based Minuteman and MX missiles with first-strike possibilities. These are not insignificant treaties, Madam President. They basically remove much of the first-strike capability that we spent 10, 15 years being concerned about and spending hundreds of billions of dollars trying to defend against. They will also have to remove all of their MIRV'd SS-24 missiles and completely refit their ICBM force with single warhead missiles. These are goals that were worked on in a bipartisan fashion for several decades by both Democrats and Republicans with a lot of the leadership coming from Republican Presidents in the White House. This removal of 6,000 warheads by treaty is a far more cost effective form of missile defense than any ABM system that the SDI Program has ever envisioned. I am not one of those who believes we ought to be so locked into every provision of the ABM Treaty that we do not believe it is a document that has to be improved, that has to be amended. I think it does. I do not think it is completely up to date. I think we need to take another look at it. I think we need to review it. I think there are changes that can be made and should be made in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. Yet, this bill, if enacted, would create a very high risk of throwing away both the START II reductions which have not yet taken place, and the START I reductions which are taking place now. Because this bill, No. 1, acts as if the ABM Treaty does not exist; it does not even really acknowledge that there are any concerns. No. 2, it ignores the opportunity to negotiate sensible amendments with the Russians. And I think it is premature to believe that that effort cannot succeed. I do not think we have even started real serious efforts, and I think that those efforts at least have a strong possibility of success. And No. 3, this bill does not acknowledge that we can get out of that treaty. We can exit the treaty under its own terms if our national security is threatened. If we are going to get out from under the ABM Treaty, if we are going to basically decide it no longer is in our national security interests, then we ought to get out of the treaty the way the treaty itself provides, which is our obligation under international law and our obligation under the treaty itself. We can serve 6 months' notice and exit the treaty if the Russians are not willing to make changes which we believe are necessary for our national security. That is the way to get out of the treaty. We should not get out of the treaty by anticipatory breach with provisions of the law that we have not carefully thought through. Indeed, Madam President, in this respect the actions proposed in the bill could be self-fulfilling. They could provoke Russia to stop its adherence to the START Treaties which would leave a huge arsenal of Russian missiles in place and we would then have to move from a thin missile defense to protect against accidental launch or to protect some kind of small nation, radical nation, or terrorist group launch, we would then have to start worrying about the SS-18's again. Now, do we really want to do that? Do we want a self-fulfilling circle? We take action without regard to the ABM Treaty in this bill. The Russians react by not basically going through with START II. Then they decide they are not going to comply with START I. Then they decide they are not going to comply with the conventional forces reduction in Europe causing all sorts of problems there. Then, of course, we have to increase our defense. We have to go from the kind of system that President Bush wanted, which is an accidental launch type thin system that does not cost hundreds of billions of dollars, is achievable, that we can do. We could go to a much different kind of system. We are back in a spiral of action and reaction between the United States and Russia. I do not think we really want to go back into that atmosphere. That is one of the accomplishments we have had in the last 10 years. I do not think that is what the authors of these provisions in the bill really intend. But I think it has got to be thought about because those are the implications of where this bill will head. Madam President, this leads me to pose several questions. Are we as a nation better off if the START I and START II treaties are abandoned than if they remain in force? If somebody thinks we ought to abandon them and we are better off without them, why do we not say so? Why do we not say so? We have got to stop legislating as if there are no consequences to what we legislate. Other people in the world react. I think that is the way we have legislated too many times on foreign policy. I see it increasingly taking place. We act as if we can take part of a cake, legislate, forget the consequences, and not even own up to what is likely to happen based on what we ourselves are doing. The second question. Are we and our NATO allies better off if the Russians decline to be bound by the limits on deployments of conventional forces contained in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty? We have already drawn down our forces to 100,000. The allies are reducing significantly, in many cases more than we are. We are drawing down based on the CFE Treaty and based on the Russians' behavior because they have indeed dramatically reduced their forces. Do we really want to reverse that? Of course, someone can say, well, the Russians cannot afford it now. They are not going to be able to build up. That is probably true. I think for the next 5 to 6 to 7 years, they will not be able to afford a conventional buildup. What they can do is start relying on their early use of nuclear weapons very quickly, like tomorrow morning. If they are going to decide they are going to give their battlefield commanders tactical nuclear weapons again, we are going to go right back to a hair trigger situation. That is what they can do. That is cheap. That is the cheap way. I do not think that is what we want. I do not think that is what the Russian leadership wants at this stage. But are we thinking about what we are doing? Next question. What will be the effect on Russian cooperation with us in forums such as the U.N. Security Council if arms control agreements are abandoned, even if it is an inadvertent abandonment on our part? Fourth question. What is the ballistic missile threat to U.S. territory that requires us to abandon compliance with the ABM Treaty and to abandon the pursuit of possible amendments to that treaty even when there is nothing whatsoever in that treaty that prevents us from taking every step we would otherwise take in the next fiscal year? Why are we doing this at this point in time? I think that is the question. If we were at a point where we had to make a decision, then I could understand some of the pressure in this regard. But there is nothing, according to all the testimony, there is nothing whatsoever in the ABM Treaty, even as now interpreted, that prevents us from taking every step we need to take in the next fiscal year. So why are we doing this? I do not have an answer to that. Finally, what is the nature of the theater missile threat? And that is what I believe everyone would acknowledge is the greatest priority, the greatest threat we have now. It is not a future threat. It is a present threat, theater ballistic missiles. We already face those. As Senator Thurmond outlined in his opening statement, we faced those in the Persian Gulf war. What is the change that has taken place? That basically would have us, as we are doing in this bill, have the money for developing and deploying no less than four overlapping-coverage missile defense systems to protect the rear area of the theater while leaving our U.S. forward-deployed ground troops totally unprotected from attack by existing enemy short-range missiles. Madam President, I will have an amendment later in this process that will add back in the only program we have to protect our frontline troops from short-range missiles. Those are the threats we face right now. We have a program called Corps SAM that is aimed at making those systems that can protect frontline troops. That system has been totally zeroed out in this bill; $35 million has been taken out. I assume that was part of the money that went into the beef-up of $300 million for national missile defense. I think that is a reverse priority. We ought the deal with the most imminent threats first. The most imminent threat we face now is the theater ballistic missile threat, particularly the frontline effect on our troops from short-range missiles. So I will have an amendment that I hope we can get some attention to in adding back that program at a later point in this debate. Madam President, I have a number of other concerns about the bill. First, our ability to monitor and control treaty-mandated strategic weapons reductions could be affected by the failure of the bill to fully fund the Department of Energy's arms control and nonproliferation activities. I am not certain whether that provision is part of the negotiation that is ongoing now with the Senator from New Mexico, Senator Domenici, and Senator Bingaman who has taken a great lead in this, but I am sure that will be the subject of some debate here on the floor. The other provisions, I think there are questionable priorities, as mentioned for the missile defense programs. While the bill provides an additional $300 million in funding for the national defense program and $470 million for other missile defense programs which were not requested by the administration, the Corps SAM missile defense system, which is strongly supported by the war-fighting commanders. That program is terminating. We will have a letter from our war-fighting commanders showing that is one of their top priorities. It makes no sense to provide vast increases for long-range speculative programs that will require billions in expenditure before their validity can be assessed while denying funds for specific theater missile defense initiatives designed to protect our frontline troops which we have the possibility of securing in the very short-range distant future--in the very next few years. Madam President, also, I am concerned that the bill fails to fund certain ongoing Department of Defense programs on the theory that the programs should be funded by other agencies, even though neither the budget resolution nor the committee bill makes any provision for any other agency to assume DOD's responsibilities. These include programs that have received bipartisan support for many years, such as humanitarian assistance, which was initiated by our former colleague, Republican Senator Gordon Humphrey; foreign disaster relief, which was initiated by another former colleague, Republican Senator Jeremiah Denton; and the civil-military cooperative action program, which was developed on a completely bipartisan basis by the Armed Services Committee. Madam President, there are many good features in this bill, but there are a number of key areas where this bill can be improved during the consideration by the Senate. I look forward to working with Senator Thurmond, the other members of the committee, and the Senate in a cooperative fashion to move this bill along so we can complete our work in a timely fashion, and so that we can come out with a solid bill that will move our national security in the right direction. Madam President, I yield the floor. Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the desk.