Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Mississippi, each of these other programs is going to involve billions and billions of dollars, also. We know we will not be able to afford them all. We know that.

Mr. NUNN. Yes. First, I appreciate all his good work on this bill. He has done a yeoman's job in helping the chairman and all of us on this legislation. I do not think the Senator from Mississippi was here when I mentioned we have a total of four systems that are in the bill. Of all of those, as the Senator noted, this one could cost a good bit of money before it is over. The allies hope to pay about half of it. But this is the only system that is designed to protect the front-line troops. The rest of these systems are in the theater support area. We have the Navy upper tier program, which is in this envelope. We have the THAAD intercept program, which is in this green envelope. We have the PAC-3 right in this envelope, and then a possibility of maybe a Navy lower tier in this envelope. So my point is, this system should not be canceled unless we can find one of these systems that could also cover this. Now, I believe the majority report indicated that perhaps the PAC-3 system could. I am perfectly willing to have that study. That is what the extra $5 million is for, is to see if that idea really will be proven to be workable. I would also be willing to have this study take place and hold back some of this money. I think that has been suggested by the staff of the Senator from Mississippi. We could work on some fencing amendment so we make sure we are getting the best program. I certainly share that, but I do not think we should cancel this program when it is the only one, until we get some affirmative answer, which we do not have now, on something that could take its place.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, very briefly, this adds back $35 million to what is the Corps SAM program. I know other people want to speak on the Kyl first-degree amendment. That is a good amendment. I support it. This amendment does not in any way strike or in any way change the first-degree amendment, but is directly relevant because this gives strong emphasis to the Corps SAM program, which is at the heart of our forward theater missile defense. I will explain this in more detail later. I know there are others who would like to speak, including the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have enjoyed the dialog on this subject. I think this is a good way to begin the defense debate. I inform all of my colleagues that the biggest challenges we have in this bill, in managing the bill--the chairman, Senator Thurmond and myself--is the whole theory of ballistic missile defense, theater missile defense, and the ABM Treaty. We are off on the subject that I think is going to be the toughest subject. It will take the most time for debate. I consider this a good dialog with which to begin the debate and get the views out on both sides of this issue. I am sure there will be other views as we go along. I would like to explain, in just a few minutes, the amendment I have offered, which is now the pending second-degree amendment to the Kyl first-degree amendment. This amendment is intended to restore funds for the program known as the Corps SAM program, which is also a cooperative program called MEADS. They are one and the same program, but the MEADS program is the name given for SAM that is designated as a cooperative program and supported by the Governments of Germany, France, and Italy, where they will be paying approximately 50 percent of the cost of the program, which is what we have been encouraging for the last several years in terms of allied participation. Corps SAM is a highly mobile theater missile defense system which is designed to defend our most vulnerable military forces, that is, our Marine and Army troops amassed at the very edge of the battle area. It is the only system under development that can meet this requirement. In addition to defending our forward troops from attack by short-range ballistic missiles, the Corps SAM/MEADS system will also replace the aging and outmoded and, in many cases, HAWK batteries that are now the Marines only defense against ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as enemy aircraft. Notwithstanding the importance of the requirement to defend these forward deployed troops, the committee bill before us, unless it is changed, will cancel the Corps SAM/MEADS program that was done during the committee markup. That is the provision of the bill now. The bill does not just zero funding in the report; it directs the Secretary of Defense, in permanent bill language, to terminate this international program. Mr. President, in my view, this is a shortsighted action and defies rational explanation. The Senate Armed Services Committee majority argued in their report accompanying our bill that 80 percent of the total ballistic missile defense funding goes to theater missile defense systems. And the majority of the report complains about both the number of the theater missile defense systems under development and their cost. This bill has shifted more funds to the national missile defense, which is the overall, rather than the theater defense. But what the majority report does not set forth, Mr. President, is the following set of important facts: First, the bill as it now exists, enshrines as the core theater missile defense program four programs to the exclusion of all the other programs. Second, the bill does not recognize that these four core theater missile defense programs provide overlapping coverage of the rear area in the theater but often no coverage for our front line troops. That is graphically shown on this chart, Mr. President. This is the forward battle area. These are various forms of attack coming from the enemy on a theoretical battlefield. This unprotected zone, this area right here in red, is the area where our forward troops are, usually Marine forces or Army forces. The white zone is the theater zone that is the support area, not on the forward area. The only system that is being designed now to protect these forces in the forward battle area is the Corps SAM system, which has been canceled in this bill and which I am seeking to add back in this amendment. The programs that are left in the bill are all designed to protect in this zone. We have the Patriot intercept zone in white. The Patriot system is designed to protect in that area. We have the Navy upper tier--very difficult to read here--but it is the outlined pink area in the outline here. That is the upper tier engagement. We have the THAAD intercept zone, the light green zone here. Then we have the Navy lower tier, which is a possible program, which is below here. These are overlapping programs. We want some overlap. We did not know which programs will end up being the best programs. I am not complaining about the overlap. What I am complaining about is leaving this area completely--not only unprotected except for HAWK batteries, which are limited in their effectiveness--but we do not have any program, even with all this money that is being complained about that is being added, to protect the troops on the forward battle area. There is a reference in the majority report to making the PAC-3 mobile. There is no money to do that. We do not know whether that can be done. In my amendment, what I provide is $4.6 million to test that view. Can we make the PAC-3 program apply to this area? Right now the incoming missiles for this zone are only not protected now, if we have this bill without being changed, as it now exists, we will have no program being designed for that. We will cut out the only program that our international allies--at least three of them--have signed up for: Germany, France, and Italy. That is what our Congress has asked, for our allies to get involved in this. They finally get involved, it is the very beginning of the program, and what did we do? We cancel the program. I do not understand it. Perhaps someone can explain it. The third point I make is that the bill now makes the theater missile defense funding problem that is being complained about--that is, the majority report complains we are spending 80 percent of our money on overall defenses in the theater, but in this bill we add $215 million to the theater programs in this area while we cut out $30 million from the Corps SAM/MEADS program, which I seek to add back. If there is a problem--and I am happen to be one that believes theater missile defense should be the priority because that is where the immediate threat is and where we have a chance to get programs in the field in the next few years that can be effective--if there is a problem with 80 percent of the overall funding going to theater, what is done in this bill as it now stands, those programs are being added to what the program that goes to the heart of the forward battle area is cut out. The fourth point is that the bill argues that instead of pursuing Corps SAM, the ballistic missile defense office should begin development of a system based on making the Patriot PAC-3 technologies highly mobile to meet the Corps SAM requirement. I do not have a quarrel with that. Perhaps PAC-3 would be better than Corps SAM. We do not have money in the bill to test that. Right now it cannot protect in this area. It is not being worked on. I do not mind seeking an answer to that question, but no one knows the answer now. Why should we cancel the only program that is designed to protect this, and try the PAC-3, give them no money to try PAC-3, and in the meantime cancel the only program we have designed in that direction. I do not understand any logic in that. The fifth point, the bill right now, unless it is changed, rejects the cooperation with our allies on the MEADS program. That is the program that three of our allies have signed up for, saying they are willing to put some of their money into it. For the first time we have some of our allies willing to put money into these programs. They will pay 50 percent of the MEADS program. Now, that is puzzling to me, because every Congress--and I do not know of any objection we have ever had from this on either side of the aisle--has requested that the administration, the Bush administration and the Clinton administration, and even the Reagan administration in the early 1980's, push hard for greater involvement of our allies in missile defenses. The allies finally, after a lot of urging, have voluntarily--we did not tell them which program to get involved in; they voluntarily chose this program. What do we do? The first thing we do after years of urging, we say, OK, you have signed up for this program, we will cancel it. We want you to now look at other programs, I assume. I do not think that makes any sense. Mr. President, the bill's decision to terminate the Corps SAM/MEADS program leaves our forward-deployed Marine and Army troops virtually unprotected for the foreseeable future from attacks by short-range ballistic missiles. I want no one to misunderstand. We are not talking about what the dialog was a little while ago, when we have a threat in 10 years against the Holy Land, the United States, or whether we have a threat in 12 years or 8 years, or a present threat. This is a present threat. It is today's threat. It is one in which the next time we have a conflict, we may well have a chemical weapon dropped on our forward battle troops by a delivery system, that the Corps SAM--which has been canceled under this bill--is designed to protect against. I emphasize the point about today's threat. This is a Defense Daily report dated July 6, and it is reporting on the Roving Sands exercise, which the caption says ``Roving Sands Exercise Reinforced Need for Corps SAM, the Army Says.'' From the report, ``In a June paper, officials of the Army's Air Defense Artillery Center say that recently completed Roving Sands air defense exercise `reinforced the Army's need to field the Corps SAM [surface-to-air missile]'''--that is what SAM stands for, surface-to- air missile--```to fill a void that exists as a result of emerging threats' from tactical ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles.'' ``During the Army's live Theater Missile Defense Advance Warfighting Experiment, which was conducted as a part of Roving Sands, SS-21 short- range missiles employed by enemy red forces presented a particular problem for the friendly blue forces.'' Mr. President, getting away from the quote, this is an exercise. We have enemy forces, we have friendly forces. They test the various enemy systems against our present capability. SS-21 has been produced by the Soviet Union for years and have been sold to numerous countries around the world. These are widely distributed missile systems that exist in many countries. ``The largest problem for the blue forces,'' that is, the friendly forces, ``came from the red Alpha Battery 1st Battalion, 914 SSM Brigade, which `successfully fired all missiles, many with chemical warheads, against some 20 Corps and Division targets.' The battery was not detected during a single mission, and they were not engaged by fixed wing aircraft, rotary aircraft,'' or the Army Tactical Missile System. In other words, they had 100 percent success rate in the shots that were postulated with existing technology against forward battle troops. Any one of those in a real battlefield would have contained chemical weapons. Continuing the quotation from this report: For the exercise, four Scud brigades--of which two were simulated and two combined live and simulated equipment--and one SS-21 brigade formed the theater ballistic missile threat. Surrogates for cruise missiles formed during Roving Sands ``also attacked Corps targets at will'' despite the deployment of blue forces of an advanced technology sensor to detect them. This inability to deal with the major elements of the emerging threat during Roving Sands highlights a deficiency in corps missile defense capabilities, air defense officials conclude in the paper. The Army must field the Corps SAM system to ensure protection of friendly forces and allow the corps commander to accomplish his mission. Mr. President, there is much more that can be said about those testings, but I think those paragraphs pretty much capture the essence of what we are faced with. I am not going to get into a detailed comparison of the programs which are funded versus this program which is not funded. Suffice it to say, though, in my opinion we are pouring money into programs that are going to take a long time to develop, that are speculative in terms of whether they will work or not. I think some of them are worth some money. Some of them are worth putting money in, to see whether they will work or not. I do not disagree with that. But we are pouring in large sums of money, above the requests in those areas, and we are canceling the very program that our allies are working on with us, finally, that is designed to protect the frontline troops against today's threat. That does not make sense. Finally, the termination of the Corps SAM program in this bill is bound to have a chilling effect on further cooperation with our NATO allies on all defense programs, not just missile defenses. The actions in this bill are a complete reversal of the previous policy of cooperation. The Congress has been urging cooperation by the allies. Frankly, we want them to put some of their money into these programs, too. We do not want to be the only ones who ever put any money up. We want them to put some money up, because we are going to be fighting, in most conflicts, certainly in the European theater, side by side with our allies. Quoting from the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994, and I give this as the exact quote from that bill--I know of no Senator or Congressman who opposed this provision in any way: Congress encourages Allies of the United States, and particularly those Allies that would benefit most from deployment of Theater Missile Defense systems, to participate in, or to increase participation in, cooperative Theater Missile Defense programs of the United States. We have urged them to get involved. They have finally gotten involved and we are canceling the program. We are talking about $35 million in this amendment and we are talking about, not an add-on to this bill, this amendment would shift the money from the big pot of money, over $3 billion that is provided in the overall missile defense area, and we leave it up to the Secretary of Defense, in this amendment, to determine how to shift those funds. But there is in my opinion sufficient funds for this purpose. Let me briefly summarize. My amendment restores the $30.4 million requested by the ballistic missile defense office for the Corps SAM/ MEADS program. We add another $4.6 million for the ballistic missile defense office to study the view of the majority that the PAC-3 system can also be made applicable to this. We say, ``OK, good idea. Take a look-see. But do not cancel this program while you are doing it because we do not know the answer.'' Thus, my amendment adds back a total of $35 million. Since the grand total of $770 million the majority has already added to the request for ballistic missile defense in my opinion is adequate, my amendment thus offsets the $35 million increase by an undistributed reduction of $35 million to the total BMD funding of $3.4 billion. We have $3.4 billion in this bill. Of that $3.4 billion, we would shift $35 million to restructure, repay, and reinsert this program. Mr. President, I should close by quoting from a number of letters of support for the restoration of the Corps SAM funding which I received both from the Pentagon and from our commanders in the field. The first letter is a letter from Secretary of Defense Bill Perry. I will just quote selectively from that. It is a 2\1/2\ page letter addressed to Senator Thurmond. Dear Mr. Chairman: As you continue your consideration of the Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Bill, I strongly urge you and your colleagues to reconsider the termination of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program. The MEADS is a high priority advanced capability tactical ballistic missile defense system that merits your full support. Continuing to quote: The MEADS [program] represents an appropriate form of allied cooperation in the development of a missile defense system for which the United States and our allies share a valid military requirement. Continuing to quote: The outcome of the internationally structured MEADS program will be viewed on both sides of the Atlantic as one of the most important tests of future trans-Atlantic defense cooperation. At a time when both sides of the Atlantic are experiencing declining defense budgets and smaller procurements, we should welcome collaborative ventures where there are compatible requirements. Failure to follow through with this collaborative effort could significantly impact prospects for future defense cooperation within the alliance, jeopardize U.S. efforts to forge an alliance policy on theater missile defense, and may hamper the ability of U.S. defense industry to solicit joint programs with the allies in other areas. The Senate report language specifies the United States would be best served to work with the allies on theater missile defense systems that would provide wide areas of coverage, such as the Navy wide area or Army THAAD systems. While future cooperative efforts in those programs may have merit, I firmly believe that MEADS uniquely offers the best opportunity for allied cooperation at this time. In a future conflict, as in Operation Desert Storm, the United States and our allies will likely be operating together in a theater of operations as a coalition force. In this manner, our maneuver forces will be vulnerable to attack by tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other air-breathing threat. The MEADS would allow the United States, French, German and Italian forces operating the system to provide protection for all coalition partners. Mr. President, next I will read from a letter from Gen. George Joulwan who heads up our European command. Quoting from General Joulwan: The recent Senate Armed Services Committee mark-up concerning the MEADS/Corps SAM program directly impacts USEUCOM and NATO's ability to fight and win on the future battlefield. USEUCOM and NATO have a critical need for MEADS. Missile defense is one of my very top priorities. While the ``Core'' US Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems (PAC-III, Navy lower-tier and THAAD) play a central role in defending US interests and forces, they do not provide the mobility and force protection required to defend against emerging air and cruise missile threats. These limitations provide our potential enemies a window of opportunity to attack perceived vulnerabilities in protection of our forces and/or national interests. Core TMD programs alone simply do not provide sufficient operational capability to meet our security requirements. The MEADS/Corps SAM program will enable the US to protect its regional interests against a wide spectrum of threats. Excepting long range strategic missiles currently deployed by only a few countries, there is no direct missile threat to the continental United States today. Conversely, this theater faces a range of systems that could directly threaten US interests and US/Allied forces. Many nations in and around the European Theater (especially in our Southern Region) are developing and employing short range Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM), cruise missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to exploit perceived US and Allied vulnerabilities. In the European Theater, interoperability is absolutely vital. Further, NATO is the enabler for coalition operations elsewhere. The MEADS program improves both US and NATO operational capability through total interoperability. Having MEADS deployed with our allies would mean less reliance on strictly US assets to defend US and Allied forces and interests. Mr. President, next I would like to read a letter from General Luck, commander in chief, U.S. Army in Korea. This situation, especially on the Korean peninsula, requires that we develop and field TMD systems that are highly flexible, extremely mobile, capable of 360 degree coverage and able to counter the full threat spectrum. Though there is no system that can currently do this job for us, I strongly believe the US Army has clearly articulated the need for such a system through the Corps SAM program. I understand that recent action by the HNSC and the SASC have essentially terminated the Corps SAM program. I would think that the demise of that program should not be mistakenly linked to the vital Corps SAM requirement. The capability provided by Corps SAM represents one of our more important needs in protecting the force on the peninsula today and in the future. Mr. President, he goes on to say: While we do have Patriot PAC-2 assets in theater, we remain at risk given the growing and rapidly improving nature of the threat. The termination of Corps SAM continues and increases that risk. I would strongly recommend that Congress reconsider the Corps SAM requirement and restore appropriate funding to protect our forces. Mr. President, I also would like to read a letter from Gen. Dennis Reimer, head of the U.S. Army: The predominant threats to Army and Marine Corps maneuver forces are very short/short range tactical ballistic missiles (VS/SRTBMs), cruise missiles (CMs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Defense against these threats well forward of our forces is clearly one of the greatest concerns facing our Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). The Corps SAM Operational Requirements Document (ORD) specifies countering these threats with a strategically deployable, tactically mobile system providing 360 degree coverage. Existing/proposed system configurations (PAC-3, THAAD, Navy Upper/Lower tier) fail to provide the required protection due to deployability and mobility limitations, lack of 360 degree coverage, and lack of growth potential to meet these essential requirements. This is a compelling requirement. Army and Marine Corps forces are currently at risk, and will remain at risk with no defense against VS/SRTBMs and only limited capability against CM attacks. Mr. President, finally a letter from Robin Beard. Many of you know Robin Beard. He was a Congressman from Tennessee, a Republican Congressman, and now is the Assistant Secretary General, NATO. He writes the following letter. This letter is addressed to Senator Ted Stevens: Dear Senator Stevens: I am writing to express extreme concern with the Senate Armed Services Committee's decision to terminate the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program and to urge you and your colleagues to support the President's budget request of $30.4 million for MEADS in the FY 1996 Defense Appropriations Bill. While others have spoken to the U.S. military requirements for MEADS/Corps SAM, I would like to offer a broader NATO perspective on the matter. Canceling MEADS would send a horrible message to the Allies. It would confirm their worst fears regarding the lack of U.S. interest in cooperative armaments projects and would seriously jeopardize on-going efforts to develop a cooperative approach for meeting the challenges posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Mr. President, continuing to quote from Robin Beard who is now the Assistant Secretary General, NATO: In addition to the political track, NATO Military Authorities have prepared a draft Military Operational Requirement for Theater Missile Defense that calls for the protection of NATO territory, forces and populations against ballistic missiles. And efforts are also underway under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Director (CNAD)--where NATO's material development is focused--to define future opportunities and mentors of collaboration in the area of TMD. All of these efforts will lead, in the next couple of years, to the development of an Alliance policy framework on TMD cooperation endorsed by the North Atlantic Council. The termination of MEADS, the first significant TMD collaborative efforts, would be a serious setback for U.S. leadership in this area. Mr. President, I also have a letter from General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But I think I have probably given enough so that my colleagues have gotten the drift of the priorities for this program. I hope that the Senate will consider this carefully. I hope that this amendment could possibly be accepted. But, if it is not accepted, I urge my colleagues to vote for it. I think this is a very important program. A lot is at stake here. The lives of the battlefield troops at the front line are at stake, and the future of cooperative efforts in our alliance in terms of theater missile defense I think also will be very significantly affected by how we handle this matter. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all of the complete letters that I have read excerpts from be printed in the Record.

Mr. NUNN. Reserving the right to object, I will ask the leadership to respond. I propose that we vote on both of those. I would like to accommodate the Senator. I have received word, so I will not object. I ask for the yeas and nays on the second degree amendment.

Mr. NUNN. Assuming the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from South Carolina concurs, I will send a modification of my amendment to the desk.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have asked the staff to check with the leadership. I recommend that we go ahead with the modification and have a rollcall vote on the second-degree and on the first-degree amendment. I have talked to the Senators from Mississippi and South Carolina about modifying the pending second-degree amendment which is related to Corps SAM. I will soon send a modification of the amendment to the desk. It basically says that we will defer $10 million of the $35 million until such time as we have the report referred to in subsection (c)(2). That is the report, as I explained in my remarks, to determine whether the PAC-3 system could basically also cover that unprotected forward area that the Corps SAM system is designed to. This is acceptable to me.

Mr. NUNN. As I read it--I will not pretend to the Senator from New Mexico that I have made a detailed sentence-by-sentence analysis of this amendment--I read it hastily, I read it again, my staff has read it. I see nothing in here that would contravene--in fact, the basic premise of this amendment is also the basic premise on which the 1991 Missile Defense Act passed, which I coauthored. I see nothing inconsistent in that. Most of the findings in the Kyl amendment reference various statements Secretary Perry has made or that various military witnesses have made or simply statements that, for instance, the head of CIA has made and the statements that have been adopted, some in conference between the President of the United States and the President of Russia. I do not see that it contradicts.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I think that we should not compromise on accountability in this area. If the Senate confirmation is going to be changed in the three- and four-star area, then I think we must make sure that the waivers are not granted when, at any point, it would undermine accountability of the officer in question. I therefore think it is a good amendment, and I urge its approval.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I want to make sure that I understand the amendment. I believe I do. The Senator from Iowa can check me on this. This basically would preclude the waiver by the President of time in grade requirements that exist in the law for three-star and four-star retirements if there is an investigation or disciplinary action pending at that time?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the amendment makes sense. I urge our colleagues to accept it on this side.

Mr. NUNN. As I understand it, Mr. President, the waiver in this amendment would actually--by the President--would not happen on very many occasions, but if it does not happen, it should not happen when there is an investigation or disciplinary action pending. That is what the Senator is trying to accomplish. This would nail it down and make sure that does not happen.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. NUNN. I urge approval of the amendment. THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment is supported by the Department of Navy. I have a letter dated July 28 from the principal deputy of the Department of Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary, and I ask it be printed in the Record.

Mr. NUNN. If the Senator will yield, I thank my friend from Nevada for his leadership in this military construction area and for his remarks on the floor, and also my friend from Montana, chairman of that subcommittee. They have done a splendid job, and we have enjoyed working with them.

Mr. NUNN. Yes.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this is a military construction amendment which we have discussed. This amendment has been worked carefully on both sides of the aisle, with Senator Thurmond's staff and my staff and the staff of other members of the committee, and I am in favor of this amendment and certainly hope it will pass. It is my understanding that each of these projects meet the committee criteria. Those criteria are that it has to be a part of the 5-year defense plan of the Department of Defense. So these are high-priority projects. They must be the highest priority in the State or the base in question. Each one of the projects must be executable in fiscal year 1996. It must be consistent with the BRAC process and they must be mission essential. So this is a list of projects for which the appropriators have already appropriated the money. It fits within the 602(b) funding allocation, and this would make the authorization committee and the Appropriations Committee in sync as I understand it. So I think that this amendment should be accepted. I hope it will be accepted. Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. I have learned over the years that the Senator from Kansas does not necessarily need to listen to any of my speeches in order to come to the right conclusion.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I want to commend the Senator from Kansas for her remarks. And I made remarks this morning and went over most of the same items and expressed many--not all but many--of the same concerns, particularly in relationship between what I call an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty which is in this bill, and the relationship between that and the START treaties which are pending. But not only that; the START I Treaty which has not completely been implemented. I think it would be the height of folly if we end up increasing the threat that would otherwise be aimed at the United States by doing something in a bill that prevents the deep reductions that are taking place in both START I and START II. So I share the views of the Senator from Kansas on this. I think she is on point. I also share the concerns she has expressed about prematurely going back into manufacturing of nuclear weapons where we have not had decisions made yet by DOE on that point. I believe in prodding DOE to make sure we have nuclear safety and security. But I think we are making decisions in this bill that go too far at this time. It is my hope that we will be able to have amendments that will iron out each of these problems as we go through this bill. And on the ABM question, the question that the Senator from Kansas raised, we will have at least two or three amendments tomorrow--early, I hope--on those key questions because she has identified I think the major concerns with this bill.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask it be reported.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. NUNN. This amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 provides, in the event neither the director or deputy director of Central Intelligence is a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces appointed to the position of associate director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, while serving in such position, shall not be counted against the numbers and percentages of commissioned officers of the rank and grade of such officers authorized for the Armed Force of which such officer is a member. Mr. President, the law now provides that a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces appointed as either the Director or Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall not be counted against the numbers and percentages of commissioned officers of the rank and grade of such officer authorized for the Armed Force of which such officer is a member. At the present time, neither the Director nor Deputy Director of the CIA is a commissioned officer. At the same time, an important new position of Associate Director of the CIA for Military Support is being created. The incumbent of the new position, who will be a three-star admiral, will serve as the principal advisor to the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA on military issues, with particular emphasis on Intelligence Community support for military forces and operations. This will include serving as liaison between the Intelligence Community and senior military officers of the Joint Staff and the unified combatant commands; evaluating the adequacy of intelligence support for all military purposes, including operations, training, and weapons acquisition; reviewing intelligence resources in the light of military needs; representing the Director of Central Intelligence on various boards and interagency groups established for crises and issues that potentially involve the deployment of U.S. military forces; and serving as the Director's principal liaison with foreign military organizations. This new position will be of critical importance under the circumstances when, as now, neither the Director nor Deputy Director of CIA are commissioned officers. However, because of Congressionally mandated grade limitations, the Navy, which will be providing the 3- star officer for this position, does not have a 3-star number available and has had to borrow a number from the Army. The Army will need that number in a couple of months. This amendment, by enabling the assignment of a three-star officer without counting against that officer's Armed Force, would facilitate the performance of this critically important function at times when, as at present, neither the Director nor Deputy Director of CIA is a commissioned officer. What this amendment does, since there is no military officer either as director or deputy director, it simply shifts over and allows this exemption on counting against the officers in the military services to apply to the new position, which is the associate director for military matters. This is a new position. It will carry out the spirit of what we had done in the past with this exemption. I believe this amendment is acceptable to both sides. I hope it would be supported.