Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to commend the outstanding service of the U.S. Navy Supply Corps, which is celebrating its bicentennial [[Page S 10901]] this month. The Supply Corps is charged with the responsibility of providing logistical support to all U.S. Navy ships. The Navy Supply Corps was created by Congress in the Naval Armament Act of 1794 and officially began its service to our Nation in 1795. The Supply Corps has seen many dramatic changes since the early days of its founding. During the late 1790's, each of our Navy ships was assigned a single warrant officer with the enormous responsibility of purchasing and providing all of the necessary equipment and provisions to maintain the ship's daily operations. A modern aircraft carrier serving with the U.S. Navy today may have as many as 15 supply officers aboard. The board variety of duties currently performed by supply officers require them to have detailed knowledge of accounting procedures, food service, foreign currency exchanges, and management of pay records. The Navy Supply Corps School currently trains about 3,800 students per year to become specialists in business, inventory management, financial data processing, transportation, storage procedures, petroleum handling, and purchasing. I am pleased to note that the Navy Supply Corps School has been located in Athens, GA, since January 15, 1954. Every supply officer serving with the U.S. Navy has been trained at the Supply Corps School in Athens. In addition the school is home to the foreign officer supply course [FOSCO]. Since the course began its operations in 1955, it has graduated more than 1,200 international students/officers from over 50 different countries. The foreign officer supply course serves the extremely important function of increasing the number of military contacts between the United States and other friendly governments. Such contacts enhance the level of understanding between nations and make significant contributions to the cause of peace. Recently, the Navy Supply Corps School received the prestigious ``E'' Award, which recognizes excellence in the field of training, from the Chief of Naval Education and Training. The outstanding relationship between the Navy Supply Corps School and the local Athens community should serve as a model for other military installations and host communities to follow. Many of the students and staff at the Navy Supply Corps School actively participate as tutors and mentors for local at-risk students in Athens area schools. While the students benefit from the interaction with much-needed positive role models, the participating service members receive a boost in morale that comes from the realization that they are making a recognizable improvement in the lives of their fellow citizens. Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to join me in congratulating the U.S. Navy Supply Corps for its 200 years of excellent service. We wish it continued success in the future.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, he may be right on that. I think we will have to wait and see how the events unfold.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I am not clear on that point. I do not know that there is a clear policy. Obviously, if you keep the road open, as those forces are pledged to do, that helps the humanitarian mission of getting the supplies through. Whether they would respond to artillery shelling of the city if it does not hit U.N. personnel, I do not have an answer to that. It seems to me, when you have a safe haven and that safe haven is being grossly violated, if it means anything at all it ought to be enforced. But I do not have the knowledge to speak to what their intention is at this point in time. Obviously, the United States does not have forces there and this would be a decision made by the United Nations and by our allies who have forces on the ground.

Mr. NUNN. That mission, as well as protecting the other safe areas as designated, as well as enforcing the other mandates that have thus far been rather ineffectively enforced; not solely that issue but including that issue.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to begin my remarks by briefly reviewing the history of the Bosnian debate that has taken place in the Senate not over the last 3 or 4 years, but over the last 12 months. As most Senators will recall, last July during the consideration of Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995, the Senate debated two competing amendments. One, sponsored by Senators Dole and Lieberman, would have unilaterally lifted the arms embargo upon the request of the Bosnian Government. The other, sponsored by Senator Mitchell and me, expressed the sense of Congress that there should be a multilateral lift of the arms embargo. I know it has been pointed out, but the Dole-Lieberman amendment we now have before us is not a lift-first-then-leave policy; it is a leave-first-and-then-lift policy, and that point needs to be emphasized. This is not the same Dole-Lieberman amendment we had last year. The Dole-Lieberman amendment last year failed on a 50 to 50 vote, and the Mitchell-Nunn amendment was adopted on a vote of 52-48. Later, on the Department of Defense appropriations bill, another vote was taken, and the Dole amendment was adopted and the Mitchell-Nunn amendment was adopted again. During the House-Senate conference on the authorization bill, with both of these amendments on the authorization bill, the House bill had a unilateral lift provision that passed by a significant margin in the House. The Senate bill had the Mitchell-Nunn provision I already described. The compromise provision, worked out during conference, stated as general United States policy that the United States should exercise leadership within the international community to cause the Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group proposal. It also called for such leadership to be taken on three separate, but complementary tracks, as follows, and these are important as background for this vote today: First, there was an international track policy that if the Bosnian Serbs did not accept the contact group's peace proposal by October 15, 1994, the President should formally introduce and support a resolution within the U.N. Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms embargo multilaterally. The provision was not mandatory because the President wrote to the conferees committing his administration to introduce and support such a resolution in the Security Council. The administration did as they committed they would do to the conferees, but they did not press the resolution to a vote because they determined that it would not pass. The second part of the provision in that authorization bill, a compromise between the House and Senate, was a unilateral U.S. policy track. It provided that if the U.N. Security Council did not lift the Bosnian arms embargo, then, first, no funds could be used to enforce the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government other than as required of all U.N. member states, and that has been the law since last year. We have not been enforcing the embargo according to the law. We have been respecting it, not enforcing it, with our money and with our forces. Second, the President shall submit a plan to and consult with the Congress on the manner in which U.S. Armed Forces and the forces of friendly states would provide training to the Bosnian army outside Bosnia. And, third, the President should submit a plan to consult with the Congress regarding the unilateral termination of the Bosnian arms embargo and the implications thereof. The third and final part of last year's authorization bill, which I think perhaps was its most relevant part to where we are now, was an interim policy track. It provided that if the Bosnian Serbs attacked any safe areas, the President should promptly, formally introduce and support in the U.N. Security Council a resolution that selectively lifts the Bosnian arms embargo in order to allow the provision of defensive weapons, such as antitank weapons, counter-battery radars and mortars, to enable the Bosnian Government to defend the safe areas. Mr. President, to my knowledge, the Clinton administration did not introduce a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to selectively lift the Bosnian arms embargo when the Bosnian Serbs attacked and overran the safe areas just recently. I consider it unconscionable for the United Nations protected safe areas to be overrun, with the Bosnian defenders being unable to defend because they are denied defensive weapons, and the United Nations is unwilling or unable to defend these safe areas. We declared that policy last year in the authorization bill. We gave the President congressional instructions, short of a mandate, but instructions as to what should be done. It has not been done. The United States, our allies, and the United Nations have reached the point in Bosnia of making a fundamental change in policy or beginning to withdraw. A continuation of the present policy is a prescription for continued tragedy on the ground in Bosnia and continued erosion of U.N., NATO, and United States credibility in Europe and throughout the world. The Clinton administration favors the continued presence of the U.N. forces in Bosnia, as well as a vigorous use of NATO air power to save the remaining safe areas. But a number of fundamental questions about this strategy remain unanswered. First, have our NATO allies truly signed on to a substantial and decisive use of air power, hitting lucrative targets, if Gorazde is attacked? Second, is NATO willing to continue its air attacks as required, even if hostages are taken or the Serbs begin killing substantial numbers of U.N. personnel? Third, are we protecting only Gorazde or are other safe areas included? If not, what does the term ``U.N. safe area'' mean at this point in time when two have fallen and only one is clearly designated as being protected? Will the United Nations divide safe areas into three classes--fallen safe areas, about-to-fall safe areas and safe- safe areas? It appears that is taking place. Fourth, does the so-called dual-key arrangement remain in effect? This morning's New York Times reports from Brussels that British and French officials in NATO really do not want the United Nations to give up its dual key. If accurate, this would directly contradict the administration's understanding and explanation of the London conference. Fifth, if NATO and the United Nations really intend vigorous airstrikes, why are U.N. personnel not being moved out of harm's way, both as a protective measure and as an indication of the dead seriousness of NATO's new resolve? Sixth, if there is an allied diplomatic strategy to go along with its London policy, what is it? I have not seen it. Will the United States continue to insist on a just settlement--I put those words in quotes because they have been used so many times in both editorials and in debate--insist on a just settlement to the conflict, but also remain unwilling to commit American resources for a just settlement and remain unwilling to admit that there will never be a just settlement unless the United Nations and NATO are willing to impose it by force? That question is not simply for the administration, but for many in Congress, for many in the news media that keep talking about a just settlement but never, ever, complete the logic that it requires the use of force to impose it. Otherwise, it is not going to happen. And the use of force is most likely going to have to be outside force, including U.S. force. Mr. President, these open questions make it clear to me that the United Nations, the NATO policy, and the U.S. Government altogether have no coherent strategy regarding Bosnia. To many Members of Congress, the Dole-Lieberman proposal is more attractive than the current policy, primarily because it has not yet been tried and tested. This proposal also is far from complete or coherent. It has taken on a very large and, I believe, exaggerated significance, both by its supporters and by its critics, and many of its critics continue to describe it as it was last year without acknowledging it has changed. A number of key questions are not answered or even acknowledged by the Dole-Lieberman proposal that we will vote on this afternoon. I will add quickly, that both Senators Dole and Lieberman have addressed some of these policies in their oral statements. Most of these are not in any way part of this deliberation, because they are not going to be voted on. It is not in the proposal. First, there is a large question that must be answered by the supporters of the Dole-Lieberman proposal, which encourages U.N. withdrawal--and when we vote on it today, that is what we will be doing. We will not mandate. We will be encouraging it. We will be giving an incentive. Are the supporters prepared to back President Clinton's public commitment and private commitment to assist in the U.N. withdrawal with U.S. ground forces, if required? We are calling for the withdrawal. The President has said we will help the withdrawal, if it takes place, with ground forces, if necessary. But we ignore that question. We act like it does not exist. We act like that is not even part of the equation, if we can simply vote on the part we like here--lifting--but not face the implications of the part we do not like; that is, U.S. ground forces committed. The Dole- Lieberman proposal's silence on this point, I am afraid, speaks loudly to the world. Second, will the United States furnish equipment like artillery, tanks, and antitank weapons when the embargo is lifted? If we will not do it directly, will we help facilitate that delivery? Will the allies also lift the embargo? If they continue the embargo, will we forcibly break the embargo by delivering equipment? Will Russia unilaterally lift its embargo on Serbia, as it has said it will do over and over again? If that is the case, will there be a net gain for the Bosnian Government? Third, and perhaps more importantly, will the United States help train the Bosnian forces, or at least help facilitate the training? Training is needed more than equipment. Equipment is part of the equation, and an important part, but training is sadly lacking. It has to take place. Someone has to do it. When will it take place? Where will it take place? Who will do it? Will the United States help? Silence on this key set of questions is what we have, and what we will be voting on. Silence. Fourth, do the authors of the Dole-Lieberman amendment envision defensive or offensive equipment flowing to Bosnia, or both? Understandably but unfortunately, in order to secure votes for passage of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, it addresses these key questions-- training, supplies, equipment--it addresses these key questions only by silence, plus one paragraph. That is a negative paragraph on page 5, section 4(e) which states as follows: Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as authorization for deployment of United States forces in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any purpose, including training, support, or delivery of military equipment. That is what this says. We are not going to help them with training. We are not going to help them with equipment. We have no authorization. We will not let any American forces on the ground. All of this somehow wondrously is supposed to take place. Fifth, considering the implication of this paragraph, who will provide close air support to protect the few remaining safe areas when the U.N. forces begin pulling out, as envisioned by the Dole-Lieberman bill? Who will have the forward air observers on the ground to designate targets for our aircraft if the United States conducts airstrikes to protect against Bosnian Serb offensives? And as the United Nations starts pulling out--and it will take anywhere from 7 weeks to 22 weeks--and the Bosnian Serbs go on the offensive, and there are no close air observers there plugged in, with training, with NATO equipment, how are we going to have airstrikes that go after targets unless they are fixed targets? We can go after fixed targets, but what about the moving targets? Believe me, those on the attack will be moving. Will we ask for British and French to provide the protection while the United Nations is pulling out prior to the lifting of the embargo and the necessary weeks of training of the Bosnian forces? Again, these are unanswered questions. Mr. President, I feel the Senate is faced with a choice between two incoherent policies. In these circumstances, our Nation would be better off if we made impassioned speeches and avoided passing a law. The Dole-Lieberman amendment does not face up to the reality of the situation on the ground where the Bosnian Serbs occupy between 70 and 80 percent of the territory in Bosnia and have a decided advantage in heavy weapons. Mr. President, I pointed out many flaws with the current policy and with the Dole-Lieberman proposal. Even with these flaws, however, in the legislative proposal, the Dole-Lieberman bill is much improved over the earlier provisions. It has been mischaracterized by the administration, our allies, and the U.S. press. Yes, it requires a unilateral lifting of the Bosnian arms embargo, but it does so only after the U.N. forces are withdrawn from Bosnia. It does not mandate that UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia. It places a responsibility upon the Government of Bosnia to make the difficult choice of requesting that the United Nations withdraw its forces, with all the attendant consequences, including the loss of humanitarian relief supplies, of such a withdrawal. This is not going to be an easy decision for the Bosnian Government. The Rapid Reaction Force, consisting of our French, British, and Dutch allies, has deployed to the Sarajevo area with the intention of countering Bosnian Serb attacks on U.N. forces there, including those U.N. forces who are escorting humanitarian relief convoys. NATO is apparently determined to conduct robust air action to counter the Bosnian Serbs' attack on Gorazde, a determination that will hopefully be extended to other safe areas, Bihac and others, if necessary. If these actions are carried out successfully, and if this bill is ultimately enacted into law, the Bosnian Government will be faced with a very difficult decision, a difficult decision that I do not believe we can predict with certainty. One choice they will have is to keep the United Nations in Bosnia, which means a continuation of the effort to protect the flow of humanitarian relief supplies to the Bosnian people and some degree of protection for at least the safe area of Gorazde and perhaps Sarajevo. The other choice the Bosnian Government will face is to have the U.N. forces withdrawn and have the arms embargo lifted by the United States after the U.N. forces are out of Bosnia, which may --I say may--result in their acquiring more heavy arms and equipment and may result in a continuation of air defense and airstrikes by the United States or some other nation. Mr. President, there have been assertions over the last week or so that various actions will Americanize the conflict in Bosnia. I think those who say that about either the current policy or the Dole- Lieberman amendment are accurate. In my view, with either policy choice we are given today, there is a danger that the conflict will increasingly be Americanized. Mr. President, neither the current policy of the United Nations and NATO, nor the Dole-Lieberman approach, in my view, are coherent policies. The administration has worked diligently in the last few days to bring about change in the current policy in Bosnia. It has fallen short of the mark. Mr. President, the United States, our allies, and the United Nations have reached a critical juncture in Bosnia. I believe that the actions of UNPROFOR, particularly the actions of the Rapid Reaction Force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to the people of Sarajevo, and the actions of NATO to deter or, if necessary, repel attacks on Gorazde, and hopefully the other remaining safe areas, will in the final analysis, determine the outcome of the Dole-Lieberman amendment. Not only the outcome as to whether it becomes law, but what happens if it does become law, and what the Bosnian Government does when the ball is in its court. When this bill passes, it will probably be accepted by the House of Representatives and sent to the President in the next few days. The President will undoubtedly, as he said, veto the Dole-Lieberman bill, and Congress will vote whether to override the President's veto. Mr. President, in spite of its flaws, I will vote for the Dole- Lieberman bill today even with all of its defects, as a way of expressing my strong feeling on two key points: First, the current U.N.-NATO policy in Bosnia is a failure and, without dramatic change, will continue to erode the credibility of the NATO alliance and the United States worldwide; second, the ability of the Bosnian Serbs to overrun the so-called safe areas without the United Nations taking decisive steps to prevent that, and the commission of unlawful acts in capturing the safe areas and in mistreating innocent civilians by the thousands clearly demonstrate that the continuation of the arms embargo is both untenable, immoral and unjustified. Mr. President, this embargo should be lifted the way it was imposed-- multilaterally, and, in the final analysis, unilaterally, if absolutely necessary. It is my hope that the Nunn amendment, which will express that order of priorities, will pass when it is voted on in a few minutes, because it makes it clear that even though the odds are against the Security Council lifting the embargo multilaterally, we ought to at least try to get it lifted multilaterally before we do so unilaterally. Otherwise, we will truly meet ourselves coming back, in terms of our embargo on Iraq, Libya, and perhaps other places in the world as events unfold. Mr. President, I believe that, even after this bill passes and after it goes to the President and after it is vetoed, if it is, I believe that all of us--whichever side of this argument we are on or where we have been--need to carefully review the developments on the ground in Bosnia, and particularly the performance of the United Nations and NATO in the coming days. I will decide and I will cast my vote on the inevitable question of overriding the President's veto, based upon these events that will unfold. Mr. President, I yield back any remaining time.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I do not want to interrupt my friend from Connecticut. I do want to get started on my remarks. I understand I have 20 minutes.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will speak more to this resolution in my overall thoughts on the subject of the Dole-Lieberman amendment later this morning or shortly after noon after we meet with the President of South Korea. But this amendment, as indicated by the reading of the clerk, basically does two things. This amendment says, which is a fact, that the contact group composed of Britain, France, Germany, the United States, and Russia in 1994 made a statement that if the Bosnian Serbs did not agree to the contact group proposal, that the last resort would be the unavoidable lifting of the arms embargo in the U.N. Security Council. The second part of this amendment makes it clear that, without interfering with the Dole-Lieberman amendment's timetable, which does not require the lifting of the embargo until after the U.N. forces are removed from Bosnia, without altering that timetable on what would be the unilateral lift, this amendment sets up another effort. It sets up one final effort by the United States, having the President of the United States go to the Security Council and asking the Security Council to multilaterally, in accordance with the United Nations' and the Security Council's previous resolution, lift the embargo. I think this amendment is important. All of us know that the Security Council may not do that but in a month or two the situation may change. Some minds may change. And I would remind those countries, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, as well as the United States, that as part of the contact group, and those that are also on the Security Council, including Britain, France, and Russia, that this action, this multilateral lift that we will be seeking, if the U.N. forces withdraw, is in complete accord and consistent with statements that they signed on to as a part of the contact group in 1994. So it would be my hope that there would be some minds changed if the U.N. forces withdraw. Mr. President, I will make further remarks about both this amendment and my overall view of the Dole-Lieberman proposal before us and the administration policy sometime later in this debate. I would say, though, that I concur in what I heard my friend from Virginia and my friend from Connecticut just state about the reports in the paper this morning which indicate that there remains a dual key, that the United Nations is maintaining jurisdiction and that our allies in Great Britain and France, according to the New York Times report, notwithstanding the London meeting, have been proponents of retaining that dual key. That is contrary to what this Senator understood in reports from our administration's representatives when they returned from London. It is contrary to the initial reports that came out of NATO from London. And it points to the continuing inability of NATO to get its act together and of the United Nations to be able to delegate authority for military action, and the United Nations by all accounts is incapable of making those decisions. It also calls into question the crucial point about whether a bombing campaign envisions the possibility of hostage taking and whether the participants in the bombing campaign in response to an attack on Gorazde are willing to continue the required military action even if hostages are taken. Mr. President, it is absolutely essential that the NATO alliance not begin a strike campaign unless they are willing to hit meaningful targets and unless they are willing to continue that in the face of almost certain adversity, that is, hostage taking and perhaps even the killing of United Nations personnel. Mr. President, these remarks I will continue at a later point, but I did want to go on record that the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Connecticut are correct, in my view, that this report this morning I think greatly undercuts the position we hoped had come out of the London conference, which was to abolish the dual key at least as far as Gorazde is concerned. I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my amendment is at the desk, and I call that amendment up.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I wonder if the Senator from Virginia would let me give a 5- or 6-minute explanation of the amendment. I want to get the amendment on the floor.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from Virginia for yielding to me on this. I would like to discuss two amendments, one very briefly and the other amendment in detail. The first amendment that I had intended to propose to this Dole- Lieberman bill, Mr. President, would have made it very clear that the President of the United States is authorized to use United States military forces for the purpose of assisting in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina provided, No. 1, that the Secretary-General of NATO requests the participation of U.S. forces and certifies that such participation is necessary for the successful completion of the operation; No. 2, the withdrawal operation will be carried out under NATO operation control and using NATO rules of engagement; No. 3, participating NATO forces will not be unduly in danger to remove the military equipment of the UNPROFOR forces; and, No. 4, the North Atlantic Council decides to conduct the operation. That was one of the amendments I intended to introduce. I do not intend to introduce that amendment now. I think the amendment would enjoy substantial support on the floor. There would also be opposition without any doubt. The President has not sent up a request, and without a request or at least an expression from President Clinton and his administration that they would welcome this kind of authorization, I do not think it is really appropriate to ask our colleagues to vote on that kind of authorization at this time. I do add, though, Mr. President, that everyone should understand--and I hope the American public understands--that the amendment that we are debating, the Dole-Lieberman resolution, basically encourages the United Nations to withdraw from Bosnia. In encouraging the United Nations to withdraw from Bosnia, the enticement is very clear--the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo, as the amendment is currently drawn, if the United Nations withdraws after a request by the President of Bosnia. So that gives the President of Bosnia an incentive to make that request. Now, I think for the Senate, we need to understand that if the U.N. forces withdraw, President Clinton has clearly said publicly--I am not sure it has been focused on all over the country--but it is clear that the President of the United States has committed to send U.S. military forces if requested by NATO to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. and NATO forces. I happen to believe the President is correct on this. I believe that we do have an obligation if there is a withdrawal and if we are needed. If, of course, withdrawal can be accomplished in a peaceful way without U.S. forces, then that would suit all of us better. But if we are needed, we have had two Presidents, President Bush as well as President Clinton, who have encouraged our allies to go in there on the ground. The United States has not sent ground troops. But we have had President Clinton encourage, even to this day, the U.N. forces and the forces of our NATO allies to remain on the ground. And for them to get in difficulty on withdrawal and for the United States not to come to their assistance, as already expressed publicly and [[Page S 10632]] privately by the President of the United States, in my view, would deal a lethal blow to the alliance we have been part of since World War II. So I think no one should make any mistake about it here on the floor of the Senate. The Senate of the United States is going to have to face up to this question at some point if there is a withdrawal. And the Dole-Lieberman amendment anticipates, in fact encourages, withdrawal. I had hoped we would join this issue on the floor. I know that there are a number of Senators who agree with me on both sides of the aisle. I know that the Senator from Kansas, Senator Dole, and Senator Lieberman have both indicated that they would support this general type resolution. I am not talking about this specific wording. But there are Senators who would oppose it. But at this stage, without a request by the President, or without at least an expression by the President that he would encourage this kind of proposal at this time, then, in my view, it is not appropriate to present it for a vote at this time. But it cannot be avoided. At some point we are going to have to face up to it. And I hope the Congress of the United States will understand what is at stake here. Far more than the question of Bosnia, what is at stake is U.S. leadership, United States commitment, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself were we to choose not to support the President's commitment here and not to help our allies. Mr. President, I do intend to send another amendment to the desk. We made a few changes in it. I have talked to the Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner. I ask that Senator Graham, the Senator from Florida, be added as a cosponsor of this amendment. This amendment I will describe briefly and when it is retyped with a couple of small changes, technical but important changes, then I will send it to the desk as called for in the unanimous consent order. Mr. President, this amendment that I will send to the desk in a few minutes has two aspects. First, it adds a new finding that reiterates the position of the contact group that was first expressed in July 1994 and maintained ever since. And that is that the U.N. Security Council termination of the Bosnian arms embargo would be unavoidable as a last resort if the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject the contact group's proposal. Mr. President, the contact group is composed of Britain, France, Germany, the United States, and Russia. This is a statement they issued in July of 1994. And I want to repeat that the contact group itself said that the termination of a Bosnian arms embargo would be unavoidable as a last resort if the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject the contact group's proposal. Of course, we all know the contact group's proposal has continued to be rejected by the Bosnian Serbs. Second, this amendment adds a new provision that would require the President, President Clinton, to immediately introduce and to press to a vote in the U.N. Security Council a resolution offered by the United States to terminate the Bosnian arms embargo on a multilateral basis if the Bosnian Government requests the withdrawal of the U.N. forces or if the troop-contributing countries or the Security Council decides to withdraw the U.N. forces from Bosnia. The resolution would provide that the Bosnian arms embargo would be terminated no later than the completion of the withdrawal of the U.N. forces from Bosnia. Mr. President, I believe that it is important to set up a mechanism as a part of this bill to ensure that the Clinton administration seeks to achieve a multilateral lift of the Bosnian arms embargo if the events stipulated in the Dole-Lieberman bill for triggering the embargo should occur. In other words, the Dole-Lieberman bill now visualizes a unilateral lift of the embargo if these events are triggered. What this amendment would do is insert that, before that unilateral embargo was lifted unilaterally, the President would go to the United Nations Security Council and seek a multilateral lift. I emphasize, this amendment would not delay the Dole-Lieberman unilateral lift, because that is now not going to occur until after the U.N. forces have been removed from Bosnia, pursuant to either their own decision or pursuant to a request from the President of Bosnia to the Security Council. Mr. President, if the Dole-Lieberman amendment is enacted into law, it would result, as it now stands without this amendment, in the unilateral lifting of the Bosnian arms embargo upon the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR in Bosnia. That might happen even if my amendment were adopted. I will make that clear, also. But we would at least first seek a U.N. multilateral lift, which I think most people in this body prefer as the first choice. This arms embargo was established with the concurring vote of the United States during the Bush administration. It has been complied with throughout by the Clinton administration. Mr. President, I think it would be an unfortunate precedent if the United States, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, a member who has been the strongest supporter of various arms and economic embargoes on countries such as Iraq and Libya, which continue to this day, was to lift the embargo unilaterally on Bosnia without at least first going to the Security Council and asking for a multilateral lift before we take unilateral action. Mr. President, it seems to me that if the decision is made to withdraw the U.N. forces from Bosnia, then the Security Council should be receptive to a lifting of the Bosnian arms embargo on a multilateral basis. And I repeat, the contact group, composed of Britain and France and Germany and the United States and Russia, have issued a statement last year saying as a last resort they believe the United Nations Security Council should lift the embargo. That indicates at least implicitly some support in that group when we get down to the last resort. Mr. President, if we are not close to the last resort in Bosnia, we are very, very close to it. I think we are close to it if we are not already there. Our allies who have troops on the ground in Bosnia and who have resisted the termination of the arms embargo because it would endanger their troops, should be willing to vote for such a resolution once their troops are out of Bosnia. If we can get a multilateral lift in the Security Council, it would be a much better, much improved situation for the United States because we would not meet ourselves coming back on such critical embargoes as Iraq where there is strong sentiment by some members of the Security Council to lift that embargo and where we resist lifting that embargo. Mr. President, I hope that we will support this amendment. The contact group has been on record for more than a year that the arms embargo should be lifted by the Security Council if the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject the contact group's proposal. As I said, that is what they have done. Surely, the continued rejection by the Bosnian Serbs, coupled with their repeated violations of the humanitarian laws of war, merits a positive vote by all members of the contact group for such a resolution and, I also believe, for the Security Council to make this same decision. I realize there is no assurance that such a resolution would be adopted by the U.N. Security Council. I also realize that it is possible that Russia, or one of the other permanent members, would be in a position of vetoing this resolution. But I do believe that even if it is vetoed, there is no reason we should continue to avoid a vote. We ought to at least have the Security Council vote, and we ought to make at least some effort to have a multilateral lift before we strike out on our own. I would have preferred that the administration would have pressed for a vote on the resolution it submitted and supported last year, and that resolution was submitted by the Clinton administration pursuant to the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, which called for a multilateral lift of the Bosnian arms embargo. The President committed to us in conference last year that he would introduce and support such a multilateral lift effort in the Security Council. However, the administration did not ask for a vote. They did introduce a resolution and they did support it, but they did not ask for a vote. So there still has not been a vote at our request on this key issue. I realize that diplomats like to avoid unpleasant confrontations. I realize the United States does not like to be on [[Page S 10633]] the losing side of a U.N. vote in the Security Council, but I believe in this instance, it is imperative that we press this resolution for a multilateral lift to a vote and at least find out where every member of the Security Council stands. And if a member of the contact group who is also on the Security Council objects to this resolution, if it is introduced by the Clinton administration pursuant to this amendment, if this amendment is adopted, or if the member of the Security Council who is also on the contact group vetoes the resolution, then they should answer the question, What did you mean when you agreed to the contact group statement that in the event of continued rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the contact group's proposal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision in the United States Security Council to lift the embargo as a last resort would be unavoidable? If there is a veto, then at least we would hopefully get some explanation as to what that contact group statement meant when it was issued last year. Finally, Mr. President, I emphasize that this amendment does not interfere in any way with the operation of the Dole-Lieberman bill. The Dole-Lieberman bill requires that the Bosnian arms embargo be terminated upon the withdrawal of the U.N. forces from Bosnia. That withdrawal will take some time. We received various estimates from our military ranging from 7 to 22 weeks for the completion of a withdrawal operation. Best case, about 7 weeks; hopefully, worst case about 22 weeks. That leaves ample time, even under the 7-week estimate, for the Security Council to carefully consider and vote on a United States resolution to multilaterally lift the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. President, I certainly welcome support on this amendment. Again, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Florida, Senator Graham, be added as a cosponsor. I hope there will be other cosponsors as the debate continues. I yield the floor and, again, I thank my friend from Virginia.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I today join my colleague Senator Jeffords, the distinguished junior Senator from Vermont, in introducing legislation designed to address certain problems in the area of employer-sponsored health plans. Although the regulation of health insurance companies has been a matter historically left to the States, the provision of health benefits to employees through employer- sponsored health plans was subjected to Federal regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [ERISA]. Unfortunately, this concurrent system of State regulation of health insurers and Federal regulation of employer-sponsored health plans has led to a great deal of ambiguity when it comes to attempts to provide legislative protection to the participants in employer health plans, particularly those in self-funded plans. This ambiguity has left many participants in these plans without certain basic insurance safeguards and has, in some instances, left employers and employees alike at the mercy of unscrupulous promoters of fraudulent insurance schemes. The legislation Senator Jeffords and I are introducing today, the Employer Group Purchasing Reform Act of 1995, attempts to resolve some of these problems by amending ERISA to: (1) enhance plan notification, disclosure, and termination requirements for all ERISA health plans; (2) clarify the authority of States to regulate certain multiple employer health plan arrangements known as MEWA's; and (3) encourage the purchase of fully-insured health insurance products through the formation of employer health plan purchasing coalitions. I am pleased to note that this legislation draws in part upon work done by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations from 1990 to 1992. In hearings which I had the privilege of chairing in 1990, and in a subsequent report, the Subcommittee revealed how the promoters of fraudulent insurance plans have been able to use the MEWA provisions of ERISA as a shield with which to repel the legitimate efforts of State insurance regulators to protect consumers. As a result, unsuspecting employers and employees have been bilked of millions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of working men and women have been left with worthless insurance policies, unpaid medical bills and, in some instances, an inability to obtain future health care coverage. The idea behind MEWA's is a laudable one. Small employers who otherwise might not be able to afford health insurance coverage for their employees group together in an arrangement which allows them to leverage their purchasing power in order to obtain coverage at reasonable rates. Unfortunately, the laudable idea has been subverted by greed. Preying upon the legitimate desires of small businessmen, the promoters of fraudulent MEWA schemes have lured employers into enrolling their employees in what appear to be attractive health benefits plans at low premium rates. In reality, however, many of these plans are actuarially unsound, maintain little or no reserves, and are constantly subjected to exorbitant fees, commissions, and in some cases, outright looting. Much to the chagrin of Congress and the States, these promoters have been able to use the provisions of the ERISA statute to further their schemes. In the first instance, they know that ERISA effectively prohibits States from applying their insurance laws to employee benefit plans, including those plans which offer health insurance. At the same time, they also know that ERISA provides little, if any, substantive Federal regulation of these plans. For example, ERISA contains no standards as to minimum reserve levels, contribution levels, or the establishment of a guaranty fund, all of which are standard features of State insurance regulations. By claiming status as an employee benefit plan, the promoters of fraudulent MEWAs are thus able to evade the regulatory requirements of State law without having imposed upon them any comparable requirements under Federal law. In 1992, I introduced legislation to correct this situation. That legislation, the Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangement Reform Act of 1992, sought to make clear that MEWAs may be subjected to State insurance regulation regardless of their status as an employee benefit plan under ERISA. Although my legislation was not enacted in 1992, I am pleased to join with Senator Jeffords today to once again attempt to resolve this issue. The legislation which we are introducing today will clarify the authority of the States to regulate MEWAs. Quite frankly, it is inconceivable to me that Congress could ever have intended that a product that walks like insurance, talks like insurance, and acts like insurance could somehow, by invoking the name of ERISA, avoid the safety and soundness protections of State insurance law. The legislation also, for the first time, provides substantive regulatory requirements for all ERISA health benefit plans in the areas of plan disclosure, notification, and termination. One of the major problems the permanent subcommittee found in investigating MEWA fraud was that employers and employees alike really had little understanding of the nature of the plans in which they had enrolled. In particular, they often had no idea that most of these plans were self-funded and that there was no guarantee that claims would be paid. This legislation will finally ensure that employees are provided with that basic information. Finally, our legislation attempts to encourage the laudable idea which attracted employers to MEWAs in the first instance. By providing for the creation of health plan purchasing coalitions, our legislation recognizes the difficulty many small employers have in obtaining affordable health care coverage for their employees. This legislation thus seeks to encourage employers to group together in order to leverage their purchasing power by providing a limited preemption of certain State insurance laws for such groups. At the same time, we want to make sure that these coalitions are not subverted by the same types of unscrupulous promoters who peddle fraudulent MEWA plans. The legislation therefore makes it clear that health plan purchasing coalitions may not assume any financial risk with respect to any health plan and may not provide anything other than fully-insured health plans to their members. I believe that these provisions will go a long way toward providing the millions of Americans who receive their health benefits through their place of employment with certain basic protections that will ensure that the health benefits they are promised will be there when they need them. I am pleased to join with Senator Jeffords in this effort, and I look forward to working with him and my other colleagues in the Senate in addressing this important issue.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I too want to discuss the subject which the Senator from South Carolina has just addressed. Mr. President, I believe that the continued presence of the ineffectual U.N. Protection Forces in Bosnia is eroding the credibility of the United Nations, of NATO, and of the United States. I agree with the points that Senator Thurmond just made. In particular, I agree that the executive branch and the Congress must work together and reach a consensus as soon as possible. This situation is bad enough without the President and the Congress being in a big fight here. So we need to find a way to work together. The second point that I agree with that Senator Thurmond made is that now is the time for the Congress to show leadership and to make it clear [[Page S 10179]] that the United States will assist in extracting our allies from Bosnia. Congress cannot duck this question. The third point that he made that I specifically agree with: The withdrawal operation must be totally under NATO command. There can be no ``dual-key'' arrangement. There must be robust rules of engagement. And the scope and the duration of the mission must be limited. And, finally, I think the key point he made related to what the United States' role must be in the withdrawal; that is, the honor and credibility of our Nation are essential components, not only to our national security, not only to Bosnia, but to deterrence throughout the world. That is essential. Honor and credibility are essential parts of national security, and of deterrence. I completely agree with the Senator from South Carolina on that excellent point. Mr. President, I will leave to another day the discussion of mistakes leading to the current human tragedy in Bosnia. The Bosnian-Serbs have overrun the U.N.-declared safe area of Srebenica, and they can take Zepa at any time of their choosing. The United Nations Security Council has passed another meaningless resolution calling upon Secretary General Boutros Ghali to restore Srebrenica to its safe area status. Of course, none of the Security Council members has told the beleaguered Secretary General how to perform that task. The French have declared their readiness to fight for Gorazde if the British will join them and if the Americans will supply tactical airlift. The French are clearly paving the way for their withdrawal from Bosnia unless there is a determined U.N. stand with British and American assistance. The British have raised serious reservations about the French proposals and the French approach, both publicly and privately. General Shalikashvili has met with his counterparts from Britain and France for the purpose of preparing immediate options for the national leaders to consider, and I assume that consideration will be made in the next few days. Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher will be meeting with their counterparts later this week. The Clinton administration is urging our allies to remain in Bosnia, refusing to commit United States forces on the ground, continuing to distance itself from any ``unjust settlement'' and pledging to help extract our allies from Bosnia if they withdraw. This week the Senate will plunge into this morass by legislating on Bosnia. I believe that Congress has an important role to play in foreign policy matters. I always have felt that. At the same time, I do not believe Congress as a rule should attempt to legislate the details of United States foreign policy. But if we do choose to legislate on Bosnia: We must not remove the President's flexibility to react to unpredictable situations in which American lives are at stake; We should not force our allies and our other U.N. forces to withdraw--advocating withdrawal is one thing, forcing it by legislation is another thing entirely. We need to distinguish between speeches and legislation; and We should not and must not avoid the hard questions which will inevitably flow from congressional actions. There are hard questions that have not yet fully been considered by either the House or the Senate in my view. Mr. President, many of our colleagues want to--I use these terms in shorthand--``lift and leave.'' By that I mean lift the embargo and leave the Bosnians to fend for themselves. The House of Representatives passed this type of legislation. We in the Senate debated this type legislation and passed it on one occasion last year. This school of thought seems to believe that a simple repeal of the American export prohibition will automatically equalize the conflict. It glosses over the questions of who will pay for the weapons; who will deliver them; how will they be delivered; and who will help train the Bosnian troops. To be fair, there are those, including the majority leader, Senator Dole, Senator Lieberman, Senator Biden, and others, who have advocated unilaterally lifting the arms embargo but who would also support the supply of United States equipment and United States training to Bosnian Government forces. But many of those whose votes are needed to pass the Dole-Lieberman bill are unwilling to make such a commitment, and the Dole-Lieberman approach leaves these questions unanswered. This is a large gap. Mr. President, another view in the Senate which heretofore has been a minority view--and this has been a view that I have had--is that the embargo should be lifted but only after U.N. forces have left Bosnia. There are also those in the Senate who have a third view, who agree with the administration that the U.N. forces should remain in Bosnia. In my view, this is a distinctly minority view. Mr. President, the overwhelming majority of the Senate in my view support either the lift-and-leave approach or the leave-then-lift alternative approach. The Dole-Lieberman proposed legislation now seems to have moved substantially toward the leave-then-lift approach. That is important. They are moving in their resolution toward the position of leave first, then lift the embargo. That is a key distinction, and that is a distinction that has separated those of us on the two sides of this issue in the Senate for the last 12 months. Mr. President, this is a very significant change in the Dole- Lieberman proposal that has been overlooked by most people in the press corps, many critics of the bill, and even many supporters of the bill. The latest version of the Dole-Lieberman bill is a major improvement in my view in that it takes into account and into consideration some concerns of our NATO allies who have forces on the ground in Bosnia by delaying the implementation of the termination of the Bosnian embargo until the U.N. forces withdraw. That is a key difference from the approach that was taken in past resolutions. Additionally--and I think very importantly--the new Dole-Lieberman proposal puts the onus or responsibility on the Government of Bosnia and the troop contributing countries to decide if the U.N. forces should stay in Bosnia. It does this by terminating the embargo based on either of two conditions: Condition 1: a Bosnian Government request that the U.N. forces withdraw from Bosnia; or Condition 2: a decision by the U.N. Security Council or the UNPROFOR troop-contributing countries to withdraw the U.N. forces. As I understand the Dole-Lieberman proposal, if condition 1 is met, implementation of the termination of the embargo would be delayed until 12 weeks after the Bosnian Government requests that the United Nations be withdrawn. If, on the other hand, condition 2 is met--that is, the troops of the contributing countries decide to leave without a request from the Bosnian Government--termination of the embargo would be delayed until such time as the U.N. forces have been withdrawn from Bosnia. This is in my view a much different proposal than what we have debated in the past. It is much different from what has passed the House of Representatives. It is a much more responsible approach than the original proposal which lifted the embargo unilaterally without regard for the continued U.N. troop presence in Bosnia. Mr. President, I say all of that on the positive side of the Dole- Lieberman amendment. The key missing ingredient, however, of the new Dole-Lieberman amendment is any mention of what should be obvious to all and what must be obvious during the debate on this proposal to those of us in the Senate, and I hope to the country; namely, that the President of the United States has publicly pledged to deploy up to 25,000 United States troops on the ground, if necessary, in Bosnia to help extract the U.N. forces. Mr. President, Congress cannot responsibly legislate on Bosnia and ignore this fact. If Congress wants to prevent United States ground forces from assisting our allies in withdrawing from Bosnia, we should make that clear. If Congress wants the allies and the United Nations to withdraw from Bosnia and is willing to support President Clinton's commitment, Congress should make that clear. Congress cannot responsibly advocate a course of [[Page S 10180]] action and pretend to ignore the inevitable and certain consequences of that action. If the United Nations withdraws from Bosnia, United States participation to assist our allies to withdraw from Bosnia would be required and has been publicly committed by the President of the United States. The Dole-Lieberman bill, at this time, is silent on this crucial point. If this legislation is passed as written, in my view, it will send a loud signal by its silence. It will send a loud signal that Congress is prepared to advocate a course of action but is not prepared to back it up. Over the last 3 years, we have witnessed a lowest common denominator approach in the United Nations, in NATO, among our allies, and in United States policymaking regarding Bosnia. Every policy decision on Bosnia seems to be reduced to what Winston Churchill, if he were with us today, would certainly describe as ``mush, gush, and slush.'' We see this in the so-called mandates of the U.N. Security Council. We see this in the U.N.-NATO dual key command structure. We see this in the statements of the members of the U.N. Security Council who have voted for every Security Council resolution for the last 4 years but who act as though the United Nations is some outer space alien of which they never heard. Mr. President, we see this in the position of many in this administration, in this Congress, and in the news media who for the last 2 years have decried any ``unjust solution'' but who have been unwilling to commit American resources for a just solution, and unwilling to admit that there never will be a just solution in Bosnia unless the United Nations and NATO are willing to impose it by force. Mr. President, that is reality. There will never be a just solution in Bosnia unless the United Nations and NATO are willing to impose it by force. I hope, as the Senate debates the Dole-Lieberman bill this week, that we will not continue and even add to the lowest-common-denominator approach that has been so evident in all the Bosnia decisions by international and by other bodies. There is no good solution to the Bosnian tragedy. There is no easy solution. There is no solution that anyone can guarantee is going to work. Some approaches, in my view, are worse than others, but all have unwelcome consequences. The American people are entitled to understand the possible consequences as we debate this issue. What would be the consequences if the U.N. forces withdraw? NATO has been putting together a plan to withdraw the U.N. forces. This plan calls for deployment of up to 82,000 troops, some 25,000 of whom would be American military personnel based on the commitment of the President of the United States pursuant to his pledge to our NATO allies. This is a sizable force but, in my view, it is a necessary force, given the topography of Bosnia and the history of that conflict and the history of that region. This large force may be deemed by some to be a worst-case force, but it makes a worst case much less likely to occur. Our military leaders have been candid in telling us, both in testimony and in private discussions, that this withdrawal operation could be very dangerous. I think they are right. There is also a possibility, however, that the withdrawal could be relatively unimpeded by both sides. It could proceed rapidly; it could proceed effectively. No one knows or pretends to know how dangerous this will be, but prudence and careful planning are absolutely essential. Mr. President, we should note that the NATO plan makes no provision for the withdrawal of refugees. Everyone should understand that. There is no provision in that NATO plan for withdrawal of refugees. Our military commanders, in fact, concede that one of the most difficult aspects of a withdrawal operation will be dealing with Bosnian civilians. They may attempt to keep the U.N. forces and the NATO forces from leaving Bosnia out of fear that they will be prey to the attacking Serbs once the restraining presence of UNPROFOR is removed. They may do this regardless of what their Government may say publicly or privately. We also must consider what will happen to the civilian population once the extensive humanitarian relief effort is no longer functioning there. A humanitarian tragedy is likely, and we should understand that as we debate this serious issue. Both the Government of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb leaders have publicly stated that they would assist the U.N. forces in withdrawing if the United Nations makes a decision to withdraw. But NATO military commanders, understandably, express concern about the following possibilities: First, the sincerity and durability of these statements by leaders whose word in the past has been questioned; second, whether the warring parties will try to gain control of the tons of U.N. military equipment and supplies presently located in Bosnia; third, whether the Bosnian Serbs will be cooperative as they realize that the completion of the U.N. withdrawal will likely result in the lifting of the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia; and fourth, the narrow and winding roads that make up much of Bosnia's transportation system. It will take little effort by a determined foe to destroy the numerous bridges and tunnels that are often the only ingress and egress to the numerous Bosnian towns and to Bosnia itself where the U.N. personnel are located. The Bosnian Serbs control much of the high ground around these roads and these towns. From those who continue to advocate immediate and unilateral lift of the embargo, an intellectually honest approach requires facing up to the arming and training of the Bosnian Government forces. This course will likely require air support, assuming the Bosnian Serbs move in for the kill before the arming of the Bosnian forces is complete, which will, at best, take several weeks or months. It also requires recognition that our allies will pull out of Bosnia and hold the United States responsible for the Bosnian tragedy which may unfold if we unilaterally lift the embargo before the U.N. forces are out. From those who advocate either immediate and unilateral lift of the embargo or, on the other hand, U.N. withdrawal followed by a lift of the arms embargo, in either event, under either course of action, intellectual honesty requires a congressional authorization or at least a congressional acknowledgment that U.S. forces will be used to help evacuate our NATO allies and the other U.N. forces. Mr. President, from those who advocate keeping the U.N. forces in Bosnia, intellectual honesty requires the acknowledgment that these forces must be beefed up, probably with considerable United States help; that clear authority for military decisions must be delegated by the United Nations to NATO and the dual-key approach must be ended; and that exposed U.N. personnel all over Bosnia must be brought to more defensible positions so they are not simply hostages for one side. Each of these actions moves further and further away from the humanitarian mission, and each of these actions moves closer toward direct involvement in the conflict, and all should recognize that is what staying the course means. If the embargo is lifted multilaterally after UNPROFOR departs, allied air support will be demanded by the Government of Bosnia. We already know that, those of us who have listened to them when they have been here or heard their public statements. They are going to demand that we owe them air support. That is going to be their demand. If the embargo is lifted unilaterally before or after the date the U.N. forces depart, Congress and the American people must recognize that this burden will fall primarily on the United States because our allies, if we lift the embargo unilaterally, are not going to be anxious to participate. In either case, there is no assurance that the Bosnian Government will be able to defend their territory, even with air support. Mr. President, as I have stated, there are no good solutions in Bosnia. I have my own views as to the approach the United Nations and the United States and our allies should follow in Bosnia. First, there should be a final intense diplomatic effort to negotiate an end of the conflict in Bosnia. I am under no illusion that a diplomatic effort will be successful. It is not likely to be successful, but at least it should be tried, because all the other alternatives have tremendous downside consequences. [[Page S 10181]] Second, the United Nations should serve notice on all parties that if a negotiated settlement is not reached within a specified period of time, the U.N. forces will be withdrawn from Bosnia. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have urged our allies to commit their forces and to remain on the ground in Bosnia. When these forces are withdrawn, I believe the United States has a moral obligation to assist in their withdrawal. In our effort to save Bosnia, we must not destroy NATO. Third, once the U.N. forces have been withdrawn, the Bosnian arms embargo should be lifted multilaterally, if possible, unilaterally if that is the only course. The United States and our allies should assist in arming and training the Bosnian Government forces, and that is going to cost some money and it is going to take some time. We all need to understand that. Fourth, the allies and the contact group must devise a ``containment policy'' and make it clear to the government in Belgrade that it will be held fully responsible if this conflict spreads across other borders. Mr. President, to sum up, legislating on Bosnia is fraught with danger. But if we are to legislate--and it appears that we are--we must understand the full consequences of our legislation. We must be willing to go on record as supporting or disapproving the commitment that President Clinton has made to our allies to help them withdraw from Bosnia. To do otherwise would be adding more ``mush, gush, and slush.'' I thank the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am not trying to control time here, but I have a little time left, and I will be glad to yield to the Senator from Nebraska 3 minutes.

Mr. NUNN. I will yield whatever I have left to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. NUNN. I will yield that to the Senator from Texas, and whatever she does not use, I will yield back.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am disappointed that the Senate Armed Services Committee did not include funding for additional B-2 bombers in the National Defense authorization bill that was filed yesterday. In my view, this was a short-sighted decision, one which I hope can be reversed. Today, Mr. President, I want to enter into the Record two recent editorials and a letter, all of which, I believe, help Members to understand the importance of continuing the B-2 program. The first editorial comment was authorized by Paul Wolfowitz, and appeared in the June 12 edition of the Wall Street Journal. Mr. Wolfowitz points out that the DOD-IDA bomber study had assumed enough warning time for over 500 U.S. tactical aircraft and many other assets to arrive before the war started. He notes, and I quote, ``Not surprisingly, the contribution of additional B-2's would not be cost- effective in those hypothetical circumstances.'' Mr. Wolfowitz goes on posit the importance of the B-2 bomber in less favorable scenarios and circumstances, noting its independence from foreign bases; its value in possible East Asian scenarios, where neither land-based nor carrier air have the needed range; and its ability both to deter and to retaliate while placing few Americans in harm's way. After noting the advantages of stealth, Mr. Wolfowitz goes on to note, and I quote: With more than 30 wings of traditional fighter aircraft and only one wing of B-2's and two wings of F-117's it could hardly be said that the U.S. is overemphasizing stealthy attack capability. The second editorial comment is by Charles Krauthammer, and is in today's Washington Post. Mr. Krauthammer notes that, and I quote: There are three simple, glaringly obvious facts about this new era: (1) America is coming home; (2) America cannot endure casualties; (3) America's next war will be a surprise. * * * He goes on to note that the B-2 is not a partisan project, that today it is supported by, Seven Secretaries of Defense representing every administration going back to 1969. They support it because it is the perfect weapon for the post-cold war world. Mr. Krauthammer goes on to note that the so-called Republican cheap hawks, concerned about high costs, hold the future of the program in their hands. He notes, and I quote, But the dollar cost of a weapon is too narrow a calculation of its utility. The more important calculation is cost in American lives. The reasons are not sentimental, but practical. Weapons cheap in dollars but costly in lives are, in the current and coming environment, useless. A country that so values the life of every Captain O'Grady is a country that cannot keep blindly relying on nonstealthy aircraft over enemy territory. My third submission, Mr. President, is a letter to me from recently retired Air Force Gen. Chuck Horner, who was the overall air commander during Operation Desert Storm. He begins by noting that his career was spent in operations and that in his entire career, he had never advocated buying any specific weapons system. Having said that, General Horner begins by saying, and I quote: As the former commander of Operation Desert Storm, I feel a duty to put the B-2 debate in perspective, and sound a warning on any recommendation to stop production of this aircraft. To put it bluntly, halting this Nation's B-2 production capability is dangerously short-sighted, and would lead ultimately to the extinction of the long-range bomber force, at the very time when bombers are emerging as America's most critical 21st Century military asset. General Horner goes on to note that the B-2 program and America's bomber production capability are one and the same, and that starting a new bomber program a few years hence would require 10 to 15 years to field, and cost countless billions to develop. He further notes that even if a new bomber were started a few years hence, most of our nonstealthy bombers would be obsolete. He then writes, and I quote: The next Desert Storm Air Commander could be sending Americans into war aboard a 70-year-old bomber, an act I find unconscionable. General Horner goes on to discuss the value of the combination of long-range, large-payload, precision weapons, and stealth, and concludes by stating, and I quote: It is important to understand the long-term national and international security ramifications of the quantum leap in military capabilities offered by the B-2. If we don't, it may disappear when we need it most, and can buy it most cheaply. Make no mistake about this: the B-2 is designed to extend America's defense capabilities into the next century. Can we afford to do less? Mr. President, I ask that these three items be printed in the Record. I commend the substance of all three of these thoughtful pieces to my colleagues. I yield the floor. The material follows: [From the Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1995] A Bomber for Uncertain Times (By Paul Wolfowitz) It has been nearly 30 years since Robert McNamara left the Pentagon. Yet, from what has been made public about the systems analysis behind the decision to halt production of the B-2 bomber, one can only conclude that Mr. McNamara's influence lingers. As Congress deliberates the question of whether to halt production of the B-2 bomber, it needs to have a healthy respect for the fundamental uncertainty of the world of the next century. Just one year before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Adm. William Crowe, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had proposed eliminating the Persian Gulf from U.S. Military planning on the grounds that the Soviet threat to the region had gone away. In the end, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell overruled the Joint Staff and directed the military to begin planning instead for an Iraqi threat to the Arabian Peninsula. Yet no one expected such a threat to materialize as quickly as it did. In fact, none of the major threats we have faced in this century were foreseen even five years before they appeared. None of the smaller wars we have fought for the past 50 years were foreseen clearly even one year before. Certainly no one would have dreamed of suggesting in 1945 that five years later we would almost be driven off the Korean Peninsula by a third- or fourth-ranked military power. a mcnamara technique In an old joke, a befuddled drunk searches for his keys under the street light even though he knows he dropped them somewhere else, because ``that's where the light is.'' So it is with the Pentagon's decision to stop production of the B- 2, which can deliver precise conventional weapons with great accuracy at extraordinary distances, with surprise, and with unprecedented safety for its crew of two pilots. In an apparent inability to take account of uncertainty, the Defense Department justifies its decision based on a systems analysis of a hypothetical future war with Iraq. Systems analysis--a technique that Mr. McNamara so proudly introduced to the Pentagon and which I, myself, have had many occasions to use--is a powerful tool for certain limited purposes but useless for others. Sometimes, like a bright light in a murky room, its very power leads analysts to focus on those questions that the technique can illuminate, whether or not they are the right ones. According to congressional testimony, the Defense Department analysis assumes that there would be enough warning, and sufficient bases made available in the region, to enable the U.S. to deploy 500 tactical aircraft before the war begins and before our bases come under attack. Not surprisingly, the contribution of additional B-2s would not be cost-effective in those hypothetical circumstances. Not only are the analysts refighting the last war, but they are making assumptions about warning time and the availability of bases that did not apply in the Gulf five years ago and may no longer be valid five years from now. Worst of all, those assumptions may bear little relation to the much broader range of unpredictable circumstances that could confront us in a post-Cold War world--contingencies in which the B-2 would be uniquely valuable: The B-2's exceptionally long range makes it much less dependent on access to overseas bases. Even after Iraq invaded Kuwait, it took the Saudis several days to decide to permit American use of their bases--and they agreed only because of their high level of confidence in President Bush. A future president may need to act unilaterally. In fact, we are more likely to get multilateral cooperation if we have that ability--a paradox still poorly understood by many in Washington. The B-2 can attack nuclear and other high-value targets. In an era of nuclear proliferation, this capability appears particularly important. In a letter to President Clinton, seven former secretaries of defense--of both Democratic and Republican administrations--urged the continuation of low- rate production of the B-2, calling it ``the most cost- effective means of rapidly projecting forces over great distances,'' able ``to reach any point on earth'' within hours, ``to destroy numerous time-sensitive targets in a single sortie,'' and do so ``without fear of interception.'' The B-2's range would be invaluable in large regions, such as East Asia, where the potential distances are far greater than the effective range of conventional fighter aircraft. Though it is hard at the moment to envision an Asian scenario (outside of Korea) requiring long-range conventional strike capability, the point is that by the time such requirements become clear, it would almost certainly be too late to acquire the capabilities. The B-2 is effective for deterrence and retaliation. Forces may be used not only to defend but, for example, to punish or deter acts of state terrorism against the U.S. or its citizens. The B-2's range and stealth characteristics make it a particularly useful instrument of deterrence. The B-2 can operate from secure bases. Future aggressors may draw a lesson from the Gulf War and attack nearby bases from the outset, perhaps even using ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. In those circumstances, additional B-2 bombers, operating from bases beyond the reach of enemy missiles or aircraft, would be far more valuable than they were in the Pentagon study. No systems analysis can assess the value of the B-2's enormous flexibility. Nor can a systems analysis assess the importance of the B-2 for maintaining the U.S. lead in a revolutionary new technology. Being the first country to develop stealth technology does not guarantee continued American leadership. In the further development of both tactics and technology, of counter-measures and counter- counter-measures, the U.S. needs to capitalize on its lead in stealth development. With more than 30 wings of traditional fighter aircraft and only one wing of B-2s planned (in addition to two wings of the shorter-range, first generation F-117s), it could hardly be said that the U.S. is overemphasizing stealthy attack capability. It is difficult to imagine any other country, having developed an advanced capability like the B-2, halting production after just 20 aircraft because of an unwillingness to allocate 1% of its defense budget or 5% of its combat aircraft budget for the next few years. It is a system that excels in two dimensions that are hard or impossible to evaluate in a systems analysis, but that are of central importance for defense planning in the post-Cold War world: flexibility to deal with a world that has become even more unpredictable; and innovation to deal with the consequences of revolutionary technological change. congressional intervention Only through congressional intervention was Adm. Hyman Rickover able to build the nuclear submarine program that eventually became the pride of the Navy. At a later time, when the military was more interested in the development of manned aircraft, congressional pressure kept U.S. conventional cruise missile options from being given away in arms-control negotiations, thus protecting the extraordinary capability for accurate long-range conventional delivery that the Tomahawk cruise missile demonstrated during the Gulf War. And, were it not for the intervention of Sen. Sam Nunn and the House and Senate Armed Service committees, the U.S. would have had only one squadron of F-117 bombers in that war, rather than two. Let us hope that Congress intervenes again. As the seven former defense secretaries said: ``It is already apparent that the end of the Cold War was neither the end of history nor the end of danger. We hope it will also not be the end of the B-2.''

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my remarks are not related to this legislation, if the managers need to interrupt my remarks. My remarks will not last long. But I do want to make them today in person.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, a number of us on the floor of the Senate paid tribute to our former colleague, John Stennis, shortly after his death on April 23 of this year. From the days when he was the youngest judge in Mississippi, through his time as President pro tempore of this body, when he was third in the line of Presidential succession, John Stennis was a man of integrity, honor, judicious temperament, and great personal kindness. A robber took the Phi Beta Kappa key he had worn since his graduation from the University of Virginia Law School--and almost took his life-- but no one could ever take away the courage, kindness, and humility of this giant who served in this body for more than 41 years. He married a young home demonstration agent who had come to his county to help farm families improve their lives, and together he and Miss Coy demonstrated for 55 years what a happy, loving home could be. He loved his family, his country, and his State, and his great affection for the people of Mississippi was returned in equal measure. A large delegation of both Democrats and Republicans, led by Senators Cochran and Lott, journeyed to Senator Stennis' hometown, DeKalb, MS, for his graveside service on April 26. The service beautifully symbolized the life of John Stennis. It was simple, but powerful and inspiring, reflecting the quiet dignity, wisdom and humility that characterized the man. Today I would like to enter into the Record the remarks made at Senator Stennis' funeral on April 26, 1995, at Pine Crest Cemetery in DeKalb, MS, by his son, John Hampton Stennis, and his minister, the Reverend Jerry Allan McBride, as well as the tribute sent by President Clinton, and a number of other tributes. I ask unanimous consent that those tributes be printed in the Record.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, John C. Stennis devoted his long life to public service. He encouraged, taught, and inspired many Senators and Senate staffer members, and was the model for many young people who have entered public service, not only in Mississippi but throughout this country. The John C. Stennis Center for Public Service at Mississippi State University continues that work with programs for young people and for current public servants at the local, State, and Federal level. Starting with the 103d Congress, the center began conducting leadership workshops for senior congressional staff members. Senator Stennis' strong commitment to honorable public service will live on through the work of the Stennis Center, and through the countless lives he influenced. I thank the Chair.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. This whole issue of judicial review will require more work. As the Senator knows, it is complicated, and for me, is not fixed at this point. We are going to have to work on it more.

Mr. NUNN. There is no way to divide it at this point.

Mr. NUNN. I believe we ought to go ahead and vote. This judicial review issue has to be addressed on the overall bill. So we are going to have to work on this issue more, within the overall bill. I would like to vote on this amendment.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield for 10 seconds?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Bill Montalto, of the House Committee on Small Business, be permitted floor privileges for the purpose of working on my amendment when it comes up.