Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I apologize to my colleagues for my voice. Obviously, I am losing it, but I will do the best I can this afternoon. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk for immediate consideration.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment assures that the Nation's [[Page S 9621]] small business community will derive full benefit from the fundamental changes to the regulatory process proposed in S. 343. The amendment accomplishes this goal by establishing a direct statutory link between the existing requirement to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 [RFA] and the requirements of S. 343. Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, whenever a Federal agency proposes a rule that is expected to have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities, the agency is required to conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis, with opportunities for public participation, to minimize the expected burden. The Nunn-Coverdell amendment would, No. 1, require that a proposed rule, determined to be subject to the RFA, be considered to be a major rule for the purpose of cost-benefit analysis and periodic review. But we exclude the comprehensive risk assessment required under S. 343. No. 2, the amendment would require agencies to provide factual support for any determination that a proposed regulation would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small businesses and is exempt from the Regulatory Flexibility Act. No. 3, the amendment provides for prompt judicial review of an agency certification that the Regulatory Flexibility Act does not apply to a proposed rule. This is a bipartisan amendment. This amendment enjoys strong support within the small business community. I ask unanimous consent that copies of letters from some of those who are supporting this amendment in the small business community be printed in the Record.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, such a display of strong support for the Regulatory Flexibility Act has a very long history within the small business community, going back to the late 1970's. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 has been looked upon as the small business community's first line of defense with regard to the burdens of Federal regulations. Recognizing that the effective functioning of government certainly requires regulations, the Regulatory Flexibility Act was designed to compel agencies to analyze their proposed regulations, with opportunities for public participation, so that the final regulation imposes the least burden on small businesses. Mr. President, given my focus today on the needs of the small business community, my remarks may suggest to my colleagues that the Regulatory Flexibility Act offers protections only to small business. In fact, the act's protections are available to a fairly broad range of small entities in addition to small businesses, including small units of local government, educational institutions, and other not-for-profit organizations. My friend from Ohio, Mr. Glenn, was especially vigilant regarding the application of the Regulatory Flexibility Act to small units of local government during his tenure as chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. Enactment of the legislation that became the Regulatory Flexibility Act was a key recommendation of the 1980 [[Page S 9623]] White House Conference on Small Business. Last month, small business persons from across the Nation came together for the 1995 White House Conference on Small Business. It comes as no surprise that issues relating to regulatory relief were key topics of discussion among the delegates at the 1995 conference. They made clear their strong concerns regarding the current Federal regulatory process, from the way agencies design new regulations to how the agencies implement the regulations under their charge. Many of the key features of S.343, and other legislative proposals to provide greater discipline to the regulatory process, were endorsed in the recommendations voted upon by the White House Conference delegates. In particular, the White House Conference's recommendations on regulatory reform called for assessing more proposed regulations against rigorous cost-benefit standards. Similarly, the broader use of risk assessment, based on sound scientific principles and compared to real world risks, were included within a number of recommendations voted the top 60 recommendations from the 1995 conference. Other conference recommendations called for the periodic review of existing regulations to establish their continuing need and to determine if they could be modified, based upon experience, to make them less burdensome. Finally, Mr. President, the delegates to the 1995 White House Conference on Small Business adopted recommendations to strengthen the Regulatory Flexibility Act in many of the ways being done by the provisions of S. 343, and by the Nunn-Coverdell amendment. Action today to strengthen the Regulatory Flexibility Act may well be the most prompt congressional response to a recommendation from any White House Conference on Small Business. Mr. President, in addition to establishing a statutory link between the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the requirements for cost-benefit analysis under S. 343, my amendment takes other steps to enhance the effectiveness of the regulatory flexibility process. First, an agency certification that a proposed regulation would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small businesses would have to be backed up by facts. This is not the case today. Small business advocates complain about their being deprived of the act's protections by such unwarranted certifications of nonapplicability. Along the same lines, the Nunn-Coverdell amendment makes possible a judicial challenge of such unwarranted certifications early in the regulatory process. Abuse is prevented by requiring that the judicial challenge be brought within 60 days of the certification and in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Supporters of our amendment within the small business community believe that this provision and the enhanced judicial enforcement of the act already contained in the bill will make the agencies take more seriously their responsibilities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act. I know that during the debate on this provision concern will be expressed that the amendment will substantially overburden the regulatory staff within the various departments and agencies. They may cite figures drawn from the semiannual regulatory agenda which suggest that 500 or even 1,000 additional rules may be subject to cost-benefit analysis under the Nunn-Coverdell amendment. I believe these figures are inflated and inaccurate for the reasons that will, no doubt, be subsequently discussed. In contrast, I am confident that the actual number is substantially smaller, certainly less than 200. By the time you count those proposed regulations within a $50 million or $100 million threshold, a number will be double counted: The number of proposed regulations covered is probably somewhere around 150. Even that number may be inflated by proposed rules that are exempt under S. 343's definition of rule. My estimate, Mr. President--and I recognize that it is an estimate that is based upon 14 years of experience under the Regulatory Flexibility Act by the career staff of the Office of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy at the Small Business Administration, the office charged with monitoring agency compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act. It takes into consideration regulations for which regulatory flexibility analyses were done. It also takes into consideration those situations in which the Office of Advocacy believed the Act applied and the agency certified to the contrary. While I agree that we cannot give the agencies an impossible set of tasks in reviewing proposed and existing regulations, we must not loose sight of the regulated public. I believe that they have a right to demand that proposed regulations be thoroughly analyzed, and that they meet rigorous standards of cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment when appropriate, and regulatory flexibility for small entities, Similarly, the regulated public has a right to expect that existing regulations be reviewed for their continuing utility, and when possible, modified to reduce their burden. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. NUNN. Yes.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Louisiana that the answer is yes. I will certainly continue to discuss any modification of this amendment that makes sense from the small business perspective, and also from the point of view of regulatory overload. This is a difficult area. None of us knows precisely what the numbers of regulations that are going to be affected here. So we are dealing with an unknown. But I do think that when we are in doubt, we ought to tilt toward not having a regulatory burden overwhelming the small business community. That would be my perspective. But I will be glad to continue to try to work with him in this regard because I know he has the same goal. We will continue to discuss it even as we debate it here on the floor.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send a modification to the desk.

Mr. NUNN. I would like to work with the Senators on that.

Mr. NUNN. I do not think this is going to be the issue on which people are voting. I hope I am not the first Senator to say on the floor that an amendment is not perfect. It will require further work. This will require further work on that limited point. This is not the central point of the amendment. The central point is to have the small business community not be full beneficiaries of these very important changes to regulatory review process.

Mr. NUNN. That is my present intent. I am always persuaded by my friend's arguments, so we may have to think more on that.

Mr. NUNN. If I could say to my friend, there are two parts of this modification. One is to make it clear that risk assessment is not required under this amendment, only cost-benefit analysis. We talked about that earlier this afternoon. There was an omission from the draft. The modification relates to judicial review. You made the point that small businesses might need two bites at the apple. The way the amendment reads, there would be two bites at the apple. We intend to change that at a later point during the debate on this bill.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I thank my friend from Nebraska. I thank him for his leadership on this overall issue of budget deficit reduction. I also want to commend my good friend, Senator Pete Domenici, chairman of the Budget Committee, and his staff. I know how hard they have worked. I know my friend from New Mexico had to make many difficult decisions to reach a conference agreement on this bill. Mr. President, I will vote against this conference report reluctantly, because I voted for it in the Senate and I hoped to be able to vote for this overall conference report package. It is very important. The most significant improvement over past attempts to balance the budget is the inclusion of recommendations to restrain significantly the projected growth of Federal mandatory or entitlement spending, which now represents over 50 cents of every dollar the Federal Government spends and will continue to increase even with this resolution. Mr. President, I thought the Senate bill represented a credible approach to balancing the budget. I did not agree with all of it. But I did support it because I thought it was about as good as could be achieved in this climate this year and certainly an improvement over past years. In many areas this conference agreement is similar to the Senate bill, but in some areas it is significantly different. In one area, defense, it is stronger. And I applaud that. I think that the modest increases for defense in this conference report, as well as the firewalls for the first 3 years, are significant improvements. However, Mr. President, this conference report shares one similarity with previous attempts to balance the budget. I think it could be a fatal flaw. And that is, its inclusion of very large tax cuts up front. I regret the conference report does not reflect the Senate position on this issue when it rejected, by a vote of 69-31, the mandatory tax cut amendment offered by Senator Gramm. I certainly do not say this as a criticism of the floor manager, Senator Domenici. The leadership of the House made it abundantly clear there would be no conference agreement without a very large tax cut. So I am under no illusion that there was any real flexibility on this point on the part of the House. But the objection I have with this tax cut is that it is unsound from a fiscal standpoint and, most importantly, makes the spending cuts required to reach a balanced budget both larger and much less likely to be implemented as time passes. I will elaborate on that very briefly. A major difference between this bill and the Senate bill was, under the Senate bill, the tax cuts had to come in a separate bill after the deficit reduction was enacted, whereas in the conference agreement before us now, the tax cuts will be included in the same bill with the spending cuts so there will no longer be an opportunity to enact the spending cuts and reject or postpone the tax cuts until the spending cuts are implemented or until we are confident they will be implemented. Mr. President, the Senate budget resolution which we passed out of here made a tax cut possible. The conference report we vote on today makes a tax cut inevitable. I am not opposed to eating dessert after we have taken the caster oil. I am opposed to serving both on the same platter because I have been here awhile. I know what is likely to happen. The Congress is likely to eat the dessert, while pledging to swallow the caster oil at a later point. The problem is that most of the spending cuts, or what I call the caster oil, is in the final 2 or 3 years of the 7-year plan under the conference report while the tax cuts are up front, and as soon as they are made, any attempt to change that if spending cuts have to be rolled back will be viewed as a tax increase and will be vehemently opposed. The result of all that is that we are eating the dessert before we are taking the caster oil, and we are pledging to take the caster oil, but we may not be willing to take it when the time comes, which is really, in large measure, several years from now. This means that the tax cuts will become locked in and the spending cuts, while on the books, are likely to be rolled back in subsequent legislation as the pain begins to be felt. It also means that those of us who believe that tax cuts should be reserved until we make sure that the spending cuts stick, because we may have to modify some of those spending cuts, with this $170 billion now that will go into the tax cuts, we have no way of holding up the tax cuts as a contingency reserve should spending cuts be rolled back or moderated. I will close with these thoughts. I think most of us agree that such a dividend that we are now claiming for tax cuts, which I believe is $250 billion now, exists if we balance the budget. However, I still believe that the most appropriate use of this dividend would be to apply it to deficit reduction. And that is why I supported the Feingold amendment. If Congress is unwilling to apply this fiscal dividend to the deficit, then I would prefer to use the dividend to ease the most severe impacts of the spending reduction even if we waited for a while, kept it as a contingency fund and determined which are the most severe impacts, because projecting for 7 years and making these impacts before we even know how we are going to modify the health care program is high risk. And we have all been through that before. We went through it on the catastrophic bill and we saw how quickly that one was repealed when people started feeling the impact. This would make the spending cuts more likely to stick. I fear that Congress may enact the tax cuts and the spending cuts called for in this resolution and then later reverse itself on the spending cuts. Such action by Congress is not difficult to imagine--just recall Congress reversing itself on the Catastrophic health care bill. It was enacted and then terminated 18 months later--before it was even implemented. Mr. President, I will continue to fight to address these priorities as this process continues and we debate the specific details in the reconciliation legislation that will carry out the specifics of this plan. I also believe that tax expenditures should not be exempt from review. Balancing the budget requires shared sacrifice, and as we cut spending we should also review revenue-losing tax breaks which may not be justified. The general direction required to balance the budget is clear. If there was an easy way or a painless way to balance the budget without cutting spending on popular programs, we would have done it long ago. But that is simply not possible. To say it is, or to try and candy coat it with upfront tax cuts, only perpetuates such the myth that you can sustain the programs popular with the public, provide tax cuts, and simultaneously balance the budget. These numbers just do not add up. I recognize that this conference report will pass and I remain hopeful that fiscal responsibility and prudence will come to the forefront as we move on to the reconciliation process. We have no other choice, because we cannot afford to continue with the status quo. Many times when priorities are debated the public is led to believe that only deficit reduction is painful. But the status quo is not painless either, nor is it sustainable. We simply cannot continue to pile $200 to $300 billion in additional debt each year on our children and grandchildren. Again I commend my friend from Nebraska for his hard work and my friend from New Mexico for his diligent effort on this resolution. I hope I am wrong in my projection of what is likely to happen. But having been here awhile I have seen this caster oil/dessert business in the past and it is certainly a lot easier to eat the dessert than take the caster oil. And I am afraid that is what we are doing here today.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, as the U.S. Army undergoes a change in its top military leadership, I would like to recognize the outstanding service of the Army's 32d Chief of Staff, Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan. Throughout his tenure as the Army Chief of Staff, General Sullivan has worked closely with the Congress and we have found his professional military advice invaluable. He is retiring from the Army after more than 35 years of service to our Nation. General Sullivan has had the unenviable task of leading the Army through its largest downsizing in 50 years, while simultaneously preparing the Army for the new challenges of the next century. As a testament to the success of his efforts, General Sullivan is leaving an Army that is trained, disciplined, and proud. His focus on taking care of soldiers and their families, on education, and on promoting both [[Page S 9189]] realistic field exercises and increasing the use of simulation has made the Army ready for what the 21st century may bring. General Sullivan has put forth a vision of the Army for the 21st century that will be both the guidepost for years to come. He can take great pride in both the Army's past accomplishments and future preparedness. General Sullivan has essentially led the Army into the 21st century. Throughout his career, General Sullivan has distinguished himself in numerous command and staff positions with U.S. forces stationed both overseas and in the Continental United States. In Asia, he served a tour of duty in Korea and two tours of duty in Vietnam. In Europe, his assignments included 3d Armored Division's Chief of Staff and the VII Corps operations officer. From July 1985 to March 1987 General Sullivan served on the NATO staff as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Support of Central Army Group in Germany. General Sullivan's stateside assignments included serving as the assistant commandant of the Armor School at Fort Knox, KY, and deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. In addition, he served as the commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division, ``The Big Red One,'' at Fort Riley, KS. Since June 1991, General Sullivan has served in his present assignment as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to join me in thanking General Sullivan for his honorable service to the people and Army of the United States. We wish him and his family Godspeed and all the best in the future.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I can clarify what I said. I hesitate to try and clarify what was said at that hearing, because I think there was at least implied conflict between what the Secretary of Defense was saying and perhaps what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said, although I thought later in the hearing Secretary Perry made it much clearer as to what the administration had in mind. I must say, in announcing that new dimension of possible U.S. ground force involvement, which occurred about a week prior to that, I did not think the administration ever made it clear as to what they intended. I can only give you my view, therefore, and that is I hope the United States will not have to put in any ground forces at all, but we clearly are pledged by the President of the United States to put forces in to help with the withdrawal. If there are emergencies related to that withdrawal, we would be, I am sure, part of any effort to come to the relief of our allies. But assuming, before there is a withdrawal, there is some dire emergency, that our allies get into an extreme situation--and I hope that is not going to happen--with jeopardy to the lives of perhaps a number of people that are basically under a U.N. mandate, under those dire circumstances where there is no other force available, I personally would favor the President of the United States having that authority and he probably would assert that under his Commander in Chief authority, whatever we do in the Senate, he is able to come to the aid of our allies in that situation. I just do not think you can have a successful alliance, if your allies get into an extremely dangerous situation, which you voted for and encouraged, and you leave them at their own peril to die in a situation where you could have taken steps to help alleviate that danger. So those are clearly my views. I do not say I speak for anyone else on that subject.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I understand his position on this. I think it is an area where I hope we do not have to get involved. Of course, in an emergency situation we already are involved. We are flying flights over Bosnia. I think the situation the Senator is directing his comments to is ground forces as opposed to air forces. We have been participating for a year or two. The fact is that we lost a plane and, fortunately, thankfully, we rescued the pilot. I would call that an emergency situation. In that situation, we put air forces in--helicopters--and were prepared to put ground forces in at that time, and possibly had some on the ground at that time, to rescue a pilot. I hope if we needed the French to rescue that American pilot they would have been there. I would think if a French pilot went down tomorrow and they needed us and there was no other way, we would go in there and help that pilot. That is what an alliance is all about.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to speak just a few moments about the situation in Bosnia today and share with my colleagues some of my thoughts on the subject. The Senate Armed Services Committee, under the leadership of Senator Thurmond, the chairman of the committee, has had a series of four hearings on the subject of Bosnia. We heard from a number of, I think, very well-informed witnesses. We heard from, of course, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Bill Perry, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Al Haig, and former President of the United States, President Carter, and another former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Gen. Jack Galvin, now retired, [[Page S 8603]] former Secretary of Defense, Jim Schlesinger, former top official in the State Department, Richard Armitage, and retired Col. Harry Summers, a frequent writer on this and many other national security subjects. Mr. President, I would like to express my disappointment--unrelated to the hearings but which took place simultaneously with our hearings last week--with the actions of the Clinton administration when they last week first delayed a vote in the U.N. Security Council, and then voted for the deployment of the French, British, and Dutch rapid reaction force to Bosnia which they at first opposed, but then deferring a decision on the financial cost for that force. I understand this action on the part of Clinton administration was taken primarily because of a letter from Senate Majority Leader Dole and House Speaker Gingrich objecting to U.S. financing of the rapid reaction force. I believe this is a serious mistake on the part of the Clinton administration, and on the part of the congressional leadership. I believe we will pay a price for this combined Presidential and congressional position in the years ahead with our allies. Mr. President, the United States during the administrations of both President Bush and President Clinton voted for every U.N. Security Council resolution on Bosnia, and endorsed and supported the efforts of our NATO allies who are participating on the ground in Bosnia as a part of the U.N. Protection Force or UNPROFOR. I myself disagreed with numerous actions that have been taken in Bosnia by both the United Nations and by NATO. Yet, we voted for it. Both Presidents--President Bush and President Clinton--voted in the Security Council for every one of these resolutions. Now we have our allies in difficulty. They are in difficulty on the ground. And that difficulty could intensify with the rapid reaction force that is now being inserted by our allies--not by America, but by our allies--which will be an integral part of UNPROFOR, and the cost should be underwritten to the same extent and in the same manner as all U.N. peacekeeping forces. We will have another day and another time to determine how much the United States should pay for U.N. peacekeeping assessments. But that is a long-term challenge. The question now is whether or not we are going to support in any way financially a crucial force that is being put in to protect the U.N. peacekeepers and the NATO peacekeepers that we ourselves voted to put in Bosnia. It is the ultimate irony for our congressional leadership and for the Clinton administration to not fully support a much stronger NATO-U.N. rapid reaction force. Mr. President, if the U.N. forces withdraw from Bosnia, the President of the United States has declared that he is going to help them with United States forces. The United States forces that would be placed there to help with this withdrawal would be working with this rapid deployment force. I think it is very important for us to understand the consequences of our not being willing to help pay for a rapid reaction force. That force, deployed by our allies and working with the United States forces assisting in the withdrawal, would help alleviate some of the responsibility for the United States forces in that situation and make it possible for a lot less United States forces to be placed in Bosnia to help with the withdrawal, and finally, greatly reduce the danger to United States forces that may be interjected there if and when the withdrawal comes about. So I find it ironic that we have congressional leadership as well as--at least at the beginning of last week--the administration leadership opposing the force that would help reduce the forces which the United States has to put in to help with withdrawal and also would certainly reduce the danger of U.S. forces being placed in that situation. I find that ironic. I hope that both the leadership in the Congress and in the administration will reconsider their position on this because I think we will pay a severe price for this--if not in Bosnia, then in other parts of the world where we ask our allies to help us. Alliances are not simply for good times and for when things are going smoothly. Alliances and allies have to stick together when things are not going well and certainly when things are getting to the dangerous stage as they certainly are in Bosnia. Mr. President, I would like to explain to my colleagues my views as to the policy that should be followed with respect to Bosnia. I would first state--and my friend from Virginia, who yielded the floor, participated in every one of the hearings and he certainly, I know, would agree with this statement--that every single witness we had before our committee for 4 days opposed the United States unilateral lifting of the embargo while our allies remain on the ground in Bosnia. Every single witness--not one supported the unilateral lifting of the embargo; 4 days of hearings in the Armed Services Committee, and not one single witness favored the unilateral lifting of the embargo while our allies are still in harm's way on the ground in Bosnia. Mr. President, my own views about where we go from here--and there are no good answers here--my views are heavily influenced by my support for NATO and my observation of NATO over the last four decades where it has been the strongest alliance in the history of the world. NATO has helped bring about the end of the cold war on peaceful terms without an explosion, and it has helped bring about the freeing of millions of people behind the Iron Curtain without huge bloodshed, which could have easily happened. So my views are influenced by both the history of NATO and also what we are going to need NATO to do in the future. I also believe that we should do everything in our power to prevent Bosnia from further eroding the NATO alliance, any further than has already occurred. Make no mistake about it. It is entirely possible for us to erode NATO's credibility and viability without saving Bosnia. I start with the view that there is no good answer in Bosnia. A number of mistakes have been made which I will not recount here. And we have to deal with the situation as it presently exists where we have peacekeepers on the ground with no peace to keep, and with the warring parties apparently not wanting peace. One side views the peacekeepers as shields from which to launch an attack, and the other side that is taking most of the territory views NATO and U.N. forces as hostages for leverage and protection. I favor one final round of diplomacy to ascertain if there is any possibility for a negotiated peace as called for last week in testimony before our committee by former President Carter, former NATO commander, General Galvin, and former Secretary of Defense, Jim Schlesinger. They all testified that we ought to have one more vigorous round of diplomacy. All of them had different emphases, but that was one common denominator of those three witnesses. I also strongly agree with Dr. Schlesinger's comments that this peacekeeping mission cannot continue under present circumstances and that both NATO and the United Nations should acknowledge that, absent a near-term diplomatic breakthrough, it is time to withdraw the U.N. and NATO peacekeepers from Bosnia. If after a reasonable period of time--and I favor setting a finite date for progress on the negotiated peace--if after that period of time there is no substantial progress, the U.N. forces should be withdrawn in an orderly manner. That is not going to be an easy task. U.S. forces should participate, in my view, in a NATO-led operation, as pledged by President Clinton, to assist in the U.N. withdrawal, and U.S. forces should come to the rescue of the forces of our allies if there is an emergency and if they come under an attack and there is no other capability available to rescue them. In other words, in a last-resort emergency situation, I would certainly favor supporting our allies on the ground when they are in extreme need. Once the U.N. forces have been withdrawn from Bosnia, the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia should be lifted, multilaterally if at all possible. While this is all taking place, we should join with our NATO allies in a concrete plan of action to contain the conflict from spreading any further. Secretary of Defense Bill Perry made it clear in our committee that the spread of that conflict would be against [[Page S 8604]] America's ``vital" interests. He used that term carefully. ``Vital'' means interests that are so important we are willing to go into conflict in order to protect them. The spread of the conflict would engage both U.S. and NATO interests in a very important way. And I think we ought to make it abundantly clear, while we are making one last effort for a diplomatic solution and while we are preparing for an orderly withdrawal of U.N. forces-- and I hope our allies will come to that view--we should make it absolutely clear that we intend as an alliance to prevent that conflict from spreading and to hold Serbia--by this I mean Belgrade, Serbia-- responsible for any breach of borders beyond what has already occurred in that region. Finally, those calling for withdrawal should realize that there will be a high price to be paid once the U.N. forces are withdrawn from Bosnia. This is no free ride here. This is going to involve some real consequences in all likelihood. Once the U.N. forces have been withdrawn, there is a high potential for atrocities, particularly in and around the eastern enclaves. Even recognizing what may occur, it is, in my view, however, past time to face the reality on the ground. The international community has failed to restore peace. That failure must be acknowledged. Unless there is a near-term diplomatic breakthrough, the warring parties must be left to fight it out until one party prevails or until they are exhausted and ready at last at some point in the future to negotiate a peace agreement. Mr. President, I repeat, there are no easy answers in Bosnia, and I hope that we will not search for easy answers but, rather, for a course of action that will do whatever we can to alleviate the suffering there, within reason, but to acknowledge, first and foremost, that the NATO alliance is an important alliance and we should not further erode that alliance. I repeat, Mr. President, I hope that the congressional leadership, as well as the Clinton administration, will review the position that they have taken, with lukewarm support and no financial support, for a rapid reaction force now being deployed there by our allies. That will alleviate some of the responsibility the U.S. forces might otherwise have, and that will certainly reduce the danger of any kind of harm to U.S. forces that may have to be injected into that country to help with a withdrawal of U.N. and NATO personnel. I find it supreme irony that we would not be willing to pay our part for other people deploying troops that will be to our direct benefit and an activity that has been voted for by both President Bush's and President Clinton's administrations at every single turn in the U.N. Security Council. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I read some of that in the newspaper, but I got a contrary impression. I always hesitate to quote a foreign leader in a private meeting, but I must say my impression was not consistent in the meeting we had, which was at the French Embassy, was not consistent with the reported statements of the President of France at the meeting with the congressional leadership that took place on the Hill. I did not hear anything like that in the private meeting that I had. He also made it clear, I believe, that he hoped that the U.N. forces would be able to remain. But I did not hear any statement that would indicate that those rapid reaction forces would not be used if and when there was a withdrawal. As a matter of fact, those forces would provide the very first protection if U.S. forces had to go in to help in the withdrawal. This is the first time the United Nations has put a much more heavily prepared force in there, which has been one of the problems all along. When you have a lightly armed force, as the Senator from Virginia well knows, they are nothing but hostage invitations and that is what has happened. So I know that probably the leadership of some of our allied countries would prefer not to withdraw, but I believe that all of them would acknowledge if withdrawal is necessary, this rapid deployment force will be the key ingredient in the early stages of withdrawal.

Mr. NUNN. I think the Senator makes a good point. I hope that kind of a situation would not develop. It may very well be that if we have some resolution on the floor, that we ought to leave that point without specific authority, perhaps, but leaving it up to the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief with consultation with Congress. It is hard to authorize that situation specifically, but to me it would be a fundamental error to preclude it, to block the resolution here. The Senator just acknowledged, if there was a British or French pilot that went down, we would want to help.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I share his feeling on this subject. I do not know what the President of France said in the meeting that I did not attend. I would not try to have any conjecture on that. But I do know that common sense tells us--I have met with the Ministry of Defense in Britain, I have met with the JCS staff here, the joint staff--I know that the withdrawal of those U.N.-NATO forces is going to be extremely complicated and complex. But one thing the people in the eastern enclaves may feel is that it puts them in great jeopardy of being in harm's way after those forces leave. It may be very difficult to disentangle from those eastern enclaves. So it is going to be a very difficult situation. I know something like this rapid reaction force will be essential--it has to be augmented--but it is an essential first step if there is to be a withdrawal. That is basic common sense. For us to be in a position of having pledged to come in and help with the withdrawal and urging withdrawal--and I think there are an increasing number of people urging withdrawal--and then not helping, or at least to even look like we are negative on the first step, which is for the allies to protect themselves, it seems to me that is contrary to our own best interest.

Mr. NUNN. The Senator is entirely correct.

Mr. NUNN. I thank my colleagues for letting me continue.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, before I speak briefly on another subject, I would like to congratulate my friends from Virginia and New York on their leadership in this important area, and I think that they have indeed worked together very carefully and prudently in the Nation's interest. I congratulate them for that.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have recently been contacted by Mr. David Stovall, a constituent from Cornelia, GA. In addition to his professional work at Habersham Bank and his community service with the chamber of commerce and the Georgia Mountains Private Industry and Local Coordinating Committee, Mr. Stovall serves in the Habersham County Rotary Club and as governor of Rotary District 6910. It is in his capacity as a Rotary District Governor that Mr. Stovall brought to my attention a recent ``Rotary Peace Program'' put on by the Rotary Foundation of Rotary International. Entitled ``Population and Development: A Global Perspective for Rotary Service,'' the event brought together Rotarians from District 9100, which includes Rotary clubs in 15 West African nations, and Rotarians from District 6910, which includes 57 Rotary clubs from throughout North Georgia. At the Dakar Peace Program, the Rotarians were examining an issue of concern to many Americans--that is, the population growth in a number of countries in the world which are incapable of meeting the agricultural, the environmental, the medical, and the economic challenges that accompany such high races of growth. Mr. President, these Rotarians, meeting in Dakar, Senegal, serve as an example of how nonprofit service organizations can take actions which contribute to the public debate and help to further policy objectives. To this end, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks the resolution adopted at the Dakar Peace Forum. I also want to recognize other Georgia Rotarians who participated in the Dakar Peace Forum. They include Buck Lindsay of Lawrenceville, David Roper of Martinez, James Lyle of Augusta, and Dr. Ruby Cheves of Union Point.