Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. This amendment has been cleared, and I urge its adoption.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of Mr. Johnston and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I yield to Mr. Wyden.

Mr. NUNN. I assure the Senator from Oregon that this is consistent with the provisions in this language to encourage the Air Force to resolve situations like the one at Kingsley Annex. I also assure the Senator that I will work with him to help resolve the problem at Kingsley Annex, and I encourage the Air Force to move ahead with this project under this new authority. abm multilateralization

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I wish to enter into a colloquy with the distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Thurmond. Today we are agreeing to a unanimous-consent agreement concerning a number of items, including the substitution of sense of the Senate language for the binding language in this bill relative to the multilateralization of the ABM Treaty. The issue of the treaty obligations of successor states to the former Soviet Union is of particular importance to the Senate because it concerns the Senate's unique constitutional responsibility to provide advice and consent to the ratification of treaties. The unanimous-consent agreement provides for hearings on this issue because it raises the question of whether the many treaties with the USSR, relative to arms control, trade and other matters, which are acceded to by components of the former Soviet Union, now successor states, need to be re-ratified by the United States Senate. This issue has important ramifications for our relations with Russia and the other successor states, and also for American security in many other important ways. While the bill, as amended by the unanimous-consent agreement, now states what the current sense of the Senate is, the Committee hearings provided for in the unanimous-consent agreement are important because they will assure the Senate's ability to fully and deliberately consider how we implement treaties with nations that split into separate sovereign states. Would the distinguished Chairman of the Committee agree with this assessment?

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chairman.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from New York be recognized for 3 minutes for a morning business statement, and that the Senator from Kansas, Mrs. Kassebaum, then be recognized for 5 minutes for a morning business statement, and that Senator Smith be able to interrupt when he gets a unanimous consent agreement ready, and immediately following the statement of the Senator from Kansas, the quorum call automatically recur.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from West Virginia. I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, what is the pending amendment?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Hatch be added as a cosponsor to the pending amendment.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we had a good debate last night after most Members had gone home and after all the votes had been cast for the day. But, nevertheless, I hope some of our colleagues and their staff-- and, indeed, the American people--heard some of that debate because, to me, this is an enormously important subject and a very important amendment. This amendment is sponsored by Senator Lugar, myself, Senator Domenici, Senator Biden, Senator Gramm, Senator Hatch, and others. It has three major thrusts. First, it recognizes that one of our most serious national security threats is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--not just nuclear weapons but also chemical and biological weapons. Just this week ``The Nuclear Black Market'' report came out by the Global Organized Crime Project, which is chaired by William Webster, former head of the FBI and CIA, with the project Director Arnaud de Borchgrave. That publication made it very clear in the findings of this very distinguished group of Americans with considerable national security experience. Quoting from that report: The most serious national security threat facing the United States, its allies, and its interests is the theft of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials from the former Soviet Union. The consequences of such a theft--measured in terms of politics, economics, diplomacy, military response, and public health and safety--would be catastrophic. Arnaud de Borchgrave said at the press conference: We have concluded that we're faced now with as big a threat as any we faced during the cold war, when the balance of terror kept the peace for almost half a century. We also have a quote that makes it clear that the foundation for this amendment is based on some of the findings in this report, as well as extensive hearings. We had reports from the Harvard group headed by Graham Allison; reports from the Monterey Institute, and others. So this is not the only report. This is the most recent and, I think, one of the more thorough reports that has been done on this subject. But this report says: A layered defense against nuclear trafficking is essential. Countermeasures must continue to emphasize securing warheads and materials at the source because there are few opportunities for detecting, interdicting, and neutralizing these materials once they are beyond the source site. . . . [A]ttention and resources must be directed toward post-theft measures as well. The magnitude of the problem, especially in Russia, remains enormous. The greatest need is for a sustained effort with sufficient resources and a clear, long-term vision of what needs to be accomplished. So, Mr. President, we are trying to have three thrusts forward with this amendment. One is to beef up the Nunn-Lugar legislation which already is helping contain these weapons of mass destruction at their source; Second, we want to beef up the Customs Department so that they can protect our borders better and also help the former Soviet states--not just Russia but all those states--protect their borders from this dangerous material and know-how leaking out; And, third, to make sure that we are prepared here at home. We are not prepared at home now. We need a major thrust forward to help our cities, to help our States to use certain National Guard units, to use the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense to train and equip over a period of time our State and local law enforcement officials so that we will be able to deal with this kind of crisis, if it occurs, and that we will be able to prevent it from occurring in the first place. So that is the essence of the amendment. I know that Senator Domenici and Senator Lugar will also want to speak on this. We have a very short period of time. I urge approval of the amendment. I reserve any time I have remaining. Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object--Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. I say to my colleagues, this is only for a speech, after which I will put the quorum call back in.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask, on behalf of Senator Harkin, that Kevin Ayelsworth be accorded the privilege of the floor during debate on this bill.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity, while we are in the process of trying to work matters out, so we do not waste the time of the Senate, to discuss the future of a facility that has long been a key component of our Nation's security, the Department of Energy Savannah River Site. I know my colleague, the chairman, the Senator from South Carolina, has been a devoted supporter of the work being done there for a long time. Located on the Savannah River in South Carolina along the Georgia/ South Carolina border and known locally as just Savannah River, this site is 16 miles from Augusta, GA, and 12 miles from Aiken, SC. The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, and I have worked together for over 23 years on issues related to Savannah River. He has really been the leader here. We have teamed together over the years to insure that the Savannah River complex meets the Nation's national security needs. Today, I want to address the future of that complex. The end of the cold war and the signing of two landmark strategic arms reduction treaties will produce dramatic reductions both in the future role of nuclear weapons in our Nation's national security planning, and in the size of our nuclear weapons stockpile. Moreover, the building momentum toward a comprehensive test ban treaty, if it occurs, could eliminate the design and production of new nuclear weapons with new military requirements. Thus, the Department of Energy has begun to reduce the size and complexity of its nuclear weapons production facilities. As part of this process, the Savannah River Site must adapt to the changing national security picture, and must broaden its long-standing focus beyond the production of nuclear weapons materials. At the close of World War II, the United States was the only nation in the world with the technological capability to design and build nuclear weapons--weapons which became an essential element of our national security and deterrent posture. In the early years of the Atomic Age, the technology was crude and the materials needed for these weapons were scarce. To remedy this situation, the United States embarked on a massive post-war effort to develop a nuclear weapons production complex that could design, test, build, modify, and disassemble nuclear weapons on an industrial scale, and that could produce all the necessary materials, such as plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, and tritium, in the quantities needed to support such a program. In the 1950's, the Atomic Energy Commission, built most of what we know today as the nuclear weapons production complex. This complex, scattered among 13 States and located on thousands of square miles, produced tens of thousands of nuclear warheads over the last half-century. These warheads were the very foundation of our deterrence strategy that, to date, has worked with no weapons being used--and thank God for that. One of the major facilities of the nuclear weapons production complex is the Savannah River Site. Savannah River consists of over 300 square miles on what was originally farmland in rural South Carolina. This land was acquired by the Atomic Energy Commission from over 1,600 individual owners. Once acquired, the land was taken over by an army of construction workers. Building the facilities was a tremendous task that included relocating a small town. Even today, the remains of house foundations, sidewalks, and streets can still be seen. Most of the original production facilities at the site were built in just 2 years. These included: five nuclear materials production reactors; two areas for reprocessing and recovering the materials produced in the reactors; facilities for heavy water production; reactor fuel and reactor target facilities; and a large number of support facilities. E.I. du Pont Co. was asked both to build and to run the facility. Du Pont accepted the challenge, and for the sum of $1 per year, du Pont constructed and then operated Savannah River for 40 years. Today, a subsidiary of Westinghouse runs Savannah River for the Department of Energy. Over the last half-century, Savannah River and its 20,000 employees have played a major role in winning the cold war. But that confrontation is now over. As a result, Savannah River, like so many other defense facilities, must find new roles and a new future. What is the future of the Savannah River and what new missions are possible? How can the Nation best utilize the Savannah River Sites--unique talents of its skilled work `force and its large and easily accessible physical plant? How can Savannah River draw on its history, its skills, and lessons learned to make a substantial contribution to our national security for the next 50 years? These questions are important to the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the communities in Georgia and South Carolina affected by the Savannah River complex, and, of course, those dedicated employees who work in that facility. I believe that there are at least three new and challenging missions for Savannah River: a cleanup technologies mission; an energy and environmental research mission; and a new national security mission. First, the Cleanup Mission. Over the past 50 years of operation, the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons production complex has generated enormous amounts of waste materials. This has led to extensive environmental contamination of the 17 facilities in 13 States that make up the complex. The challenges facing the Department of Energy as it moves to clean up this complex are enormous. Neither the exact cost nor the timetable for this cleanup is known, but most estimates have been in the hundreds of billions of dollars range, over decades of activity. Today, cleanup is complicated by the absence of agreed, legally- binding cleanup standards. No one knows for sure what clean really means, or how much cleanup is enough. Identification of the extent of the contamination is difficult, and most technologies for cleanup are either time-consuming, expensive, and not terribly efficient, or not yet invented, or some combination of the above. The Department of Energy has set a 30-year goal to complete the cleanup, but the former Office of Technology Assessment [OTA] suggested that that goal was unreachable. The OTA also found that, quote: The current regulatory process is not sufficient to identify effectively urgent health-based remediation needs or to comprehensively identify public health impacts. Thus, it is virtually impossible to make a reasoned assessment as to what should be cleaned up immediately and what can wait. In the absence of agreed cleanup standards, the political process tends to set priorities for cleanup funding--and this is not simply at Savannah River but throughout the whole Energy Department; it is one of our biggest problems--according to the squeaky wheel principle, rather than based on scientific and immediate needs. The success of Savannah River as one of DOE's production sites has not been without its costs. Like most industrial sites, and the other sites in the nuclear weapons production complex, Savannah River generated many waste streams from its operations, including large amounts of toxic, hazardous, and radioactive wastes in a variety of forms. Some of these materials were stored on-site, and some were disposed of at the site. Other wastes were simply discharged into the on-site environment. In some instances, the practices employed were fully acceptable at the time; in other instances, the urgency of production to meet cold war threats meant that little thought was given to the long-term consequences of certain production, storage, and disposal practices. Over time, huge amounts of hazardous wastes were generated and stored because there was no known method either to treat or to dispose of the waste. Unfortunately, when existing storage sites were filled, the usual practice was to build more waste storage areas. Little thought and less money went to identify ways to treat or dispose of the waste and to reduce the amounts of waste in storage. Thus, wastes continued to accumulate over the years. Today, Savannah River stores, in underground tanks, more than 34 million gallons of liquid, highly radioactive waste--enough to cover nearly 120 football fields 1 foot deep. The good news is that, earlier this year, DOE achieved startup of the Defense Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah River site. This new plant takes those highly radioactive liquid wastes from the tanks, mixes the waste with melted glass, and molds the cooled waste in glass cylinders glass logs. Although the glass logs are also highly radioactive, they are easier to handle, and ultimately transport to a high-level waste storage facility. The added advantage is that compared to the tanks, they will not leak. This process is known as ``vitrification.'' I am pleased that this new plant has finally started operation; it is a badly needed addition to cleanup technology. In this year's defense authorization bill, we have authorized an additional $15 million to accelerate the rate of production of the glass logs at this plant. At DOE's proposed long-term funding levels and planned operating rate, it would take until the year 2028--that is over 30 years--to vitrify just the liquid wastes stored in the tanks today. In my judgment, that is too long to have to rely on storage in underground tanks. It is my hope that future Congresses will fund this plant for operation at its maximum design rate, in which case, the storage tanks could be emptied about a decade sooner. Another of the potential cleanup missions for the Savannah River site has come into focus with the recent brief run of the H-canyon reprocessing facility. The H-canyon was restarted in order to reprocess an accumulation of surplus materials left throughout the plant complex when operations were suspended, supposedly temporarily. This brief operation of the H-canyon has removed radioactive and hazardous materials from numerous areas across the site and consolidated it with already stored waste. This has reduced hazards across the complex, improving worker health and safety in many plant locations. Last year, the Secretary of Energy announced that the Savannah River site had been designated to receive shipments of highly radioactive spent fuel from a number of foreign research reactors to which we had provided new fuel many years ago. This decision means that Savannah River will become a so-called temporary storage site for additional quantities of spent fuel. On nonproliferation policy grounds, this administration has refused to reprocess either this returning research reactor fuel or the large accumulation of spent fuel from the old reactors on site. Yet, I do not believe that we can allow the Savannah River site to continue to accumulate spent fuel while we wait--and wait--and wait--for some ultimate long-term spent- fuel storage plan to emerge. There are other options, and those options need to be addressed. Obviously, one option would be to begin reprocessing of spent fuel stored at Savannah River, followed by vitrification of the resulting liquid waste streams at a second Defense waste processing facility. A second facility would be a necessity. Even at full capacity, the DWPF plant that just opened will take too long, in my judgment, to rid the site of the already stored liquid wastes, with all their hazards of leakage and accident. We dare not add to those risks by reprocessing spent fuel, and then storing new liquid wastes in the old tanks being emptied. I believe DOE will soon have to consider seriously this reprocessing option. The administration will also have to carefully weigh the impact of reprocessing on U.S. nonproliferation policy against the growing reluctance of States and their citizens to be burdened with additional radioactive and hazardous wastes, particularly when brought from abroad, and this is certainly true in Georgia, and I think also in South Carolina. Savannah River faces a massive cleanup challenge, apart from the liquid storage challenge. In just the last 2 years, the Energy Department has spent over a billion dollars at Savannah River on environmental restoration and waste management activities. Between 1991 and 1997, it will have spent between $3.5 and $4.5 billion for cleanup activities at Savannah River. Unfortunately, much of this money will be spent on managing the storage of the accumulated wastes, not on cleaning up waste sites. These funds are just the tip of a total cleanup iceberg at Savannah River that will probably take decades--and additional billions of dollars--to complete. In carrying out this long-term cleanup, we need to focus on more than the ultimate goal of restoring the land and water at Savannah River to a more acceptable condition. We also must focus on developing more cost-effective technologies with which to carry out the cleanup in future years. This is enormously important. If we do not develop new technologies, there will not be enough money in the Treasury to clean up all this, plus the other sites all over the country. From the perspective of cleanup technologies, Savannah River is already ahead of many of the other Department of Energy facilities. For that reason, Savannah River has the potential to make positive contributions, not only to ongoing cleanup activities at other sites, but also to new waste treatment technologies that will allow us to avoid a repeat of the experiences of the last 50 years. For example, horizontal drilling methods, borrowed from the oil drilling industry and used at Savannah River, have succeeded for the first time in removing volatile contaminants from soils. This project was so successful that the Department of Energy was able to remove the contaminants 11 times more quickly than by previous cleanup methods. Much of the hazardous material contaminating Savannah River is not radioactive. The nonradioactive hazardous materials are for the most part solvents and other materials commonly used in industrial operations. Savannah River has been, and should continue to be, a test bed for new, innovative cleanup and waste treatment methodologies. Industry does not have the same ability and latitude as Savannah River to develop and test innovative cleanup and waste treatment technologies. This unique Savannah River capability should be fully utilized. The requirement to clean up the water and the land at Savannah River also presents the opportunity to develop new, environmentally sound, manufacturing and waste treatment technologies. The development of an environmental restoration and waste management research center at Savannah River would contribute significantly to increased efficiency in remediation technologies. Development of environmental technologies like these would greatly assist the United States in restoring its reputation as the world's environmental leader. The Environmental and Energy Research Mission When Savannah River was under construction in the 1950's, the AEC was concerned about the safety of the surrounding population, particularly in the event of an accident. As a result, the reactors and other production facilities are located in the center of the site, and occupy only 5 percent of the total site area. Surrounding these production facilities is a large, relatively untouched natural area. This buffer zone, designed to protect the public, has also protected a broad array of wildlife, including five currently endangered species. The seeds of change to support an environmental and energy research mission were planted back in 1972 when, to protect this rich buffer zone, the AEC designated the Savannah River site as the Nation's first national environmental research park. Today, Savannah River is home to the Savannah River Ecology Laboratory, a major environmental research center operated by the University of Georgia. The laboratory should serve as one foundation for this major new and positive mission for Savannah River. The physical attributes of the site, coupled with the unique expertise of the Savannah Ecology Laboratory, make Savannah River an ideal choice for energy and ecology research. Mr. President, development of environmentally sound energy sources is one important key to the ability of the United States to remain competitive in manufacturing. Greater energy independence is also critically important to our national security interests. Environmentally sound, renewable energy production can simultaneously reduce the Nation's dependence on foreign oil and ensure that we need not risk exploring for oil in environmentally sensitive coastal and offshore areas. Savannah River's size and location make it a unique site in the southeastern United States for development of solar energy research, for clean coal research, and as a possible research park for nuclear power and the next generation of nuclear power reactors. The Ecology Laboratory is a leader in the study of radiation and its effects on the environment, and thus is a natural player in the quest to identify environmentally sound energy sources. This special capability, coupled with the exceptional technical skills of the Savannah River work force, presents a rare opportunity for environmentally sound energy research. The National Security Missions The third mission, of course, is the national security mission. In the search for new missions, Savannah River must not lose sight of its traditional national security mission, which will continue for the foreseeable future. But this mission must be carried out in an environmentally sound manner. The continuing national security mission for Savannah River is built around tritium. Tritium is a key ingredient in U.S. nuclear weapons. Tritium gas decays over time, and, thus, the tritium in our nuclear weapons must be replaced at regular intervals. Tritium formerly was produced in reactors at Savannah River, but tritium production ended with the shutdown of those reactors in the late 1980's. Since the number of U.S. nuclear weapons has been declining as a result of START agreements, Savannah River has been able to recover and recycle the tritium from retired nuclear weapons. This recovered tritium has then been reused in the weapons remaining in the stockpile. These efforts have allowed the United States to postpone new production for some time. But that time will run out in the next few years. New production of tritium will be needed early in the next decade, possibly as early as 2005. That means that a source of new tritium production must be identified in the next year or two. As a Nation, we must ensure that, once the current excess inventory of tritium is depleted, we have in place a new, safe, and highly reliable source of tritium. With its special tritium-handling capacity, newly constructed tritium handling facilities and longstanding expertise, Savannah River will remain a key player in preserving our nuclear arsenal. Location of an accelerator for new tritium production capacity at Savannah River would be a natural and logical complement to the existing tritium handling and loading capacity already located there. Another feasible, and probably more cost-effective, option would be to produce tritium in an existing commercial reactor, either through purchase of irradiation services or through purchase by DOE of an existing commercial reactor, to be operated by a contractor. In this option, the tritium targets would be shipped to Savannah River, where it would be recovered and made ready for the inventory. If this option were selected, Plant Vogtle, owned by the Georgia Power Co. and located directly across the Savannah River from the Savannah River site, would be a leading candidate. DOE will select the technology for new tritium production at the end of 1998. All of these options have to be weighed both to their advantages and disadvantages. In the meantime, the DOE has to develop a nearer term contingency capability in the event of a national emergency. This contingency capability will be provided through the use of commercial reactors. Expanded tritium extraction capability will have to be constructed at Savannah River to support this contingency capability. The Defense Authorization bill reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee contains funding to begin the design process for this new tritium extraction facility. In the years to come, whatever technology is selected in 1998 by the Department of Energy, Savannah River will continue to play the lead role in ensuring that all nuclear weapons remaining in the United States inventory have an assured supply of tritium. Savannah River should also play a new role in an emerging area of national security. The end of the cold war and the negotiations of new arms control agreements means that both this country and the Russian Federation are about to embark on the most massive drawdown and dismantlement of nuclear weapons in history. This process introduces new problems for the weapons complex. As nuclear weapons are dismantled, the fissionable materials remaining--plutonium and uranium--must be safely and reliably accounted for and stored pending permanent disposal. Long-term storage of these materials raises a number of environmental, proliferation, as well as, of course, political issues. Of course, these issues are extremely difficult. New, innovative, peaceful uses for these fissile materials, particularly plutonium, must be developed. Savannah River, long a production site for plutonium, has the specialized skills to help identify methods to account for, to use for nonweapons purposes, or to destroy plutonium. Savannah River should play a key role in the dismantlement process through the identification, development, and demonstration of reuse and/or destruction technologies for plutonium. This is quite a challenge, but the challenge must be met. Next Steps Savannah River's new course must emerge over the coming years. A new course for the Savannah River site can only be successful with the participation and support of the communities surrounding the site, the States of Georgia and South Carolina, the Department of Energy and its operating contractor, the environmental and regulatory communities, and the Congress. I have outlined this morning a number of suggestions for the future of the Savannah River site, and I look forward to working with all of these important players, and particularly with the chairman of this committee, Senator Thurmond, who is an expert and really understands the challenges there, in defining, shaping, and implementing the future missions of the Savannah River site--``The second 50 years.'' Mr. President, that completes my remarks. In accordance with my agreement, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. NUNN. I have not studied the amendment, and I would like to look at it more. I suggest, and I believe the Senator may have said this, if this applies to the authorization committee, it certainly should also apply to the appropriation committee.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, over the course of recent weeks, there has been growing interest and excitement in the 1996 Atlanta Olympic games. This has been highlighted by the Olympic torch relay across the country and here at the U.S. Capitol last week. It was further enhanced by the electrifying record-breaking runs at the Olympic trials held this past weekend. The Centennial Olympic games begin in less than 4 weeks and will be held principally in Atlanta. However, additional venues are scattered throughout the State of Georgia as well as Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, and the District of Columbia. All in all, more than 10,000 athletes and 2 million spectators from around the world will participate in the games, making this event the largest peacetime gathering in history. By comparison, the Atlanta games will be approximately twice the size of the Los Angeles Olympics in terms of the number of participants and spectators. In addition, Atlanta will host athletes from 197 countries around the globe. That is an additional 57 countries from those 140 which participated in the 1984 games. To give my colleagues a point of reference, particularly for the football fans among them, the Atlanta Olympic games will be the equivalent of one city hosting six Super Bowl games each day for 17 days straight. So it is a Super Bowl times six each day for 17 days. That is quite an undertaking. Not surprisingly, such an event as the centennial games is too big for any single municipal or State government to take care of the safety and security without appropriate help from the Federal Government. Those who won the selection of Atlanta as the Olympic venue understood at the beginning that they would be responsible for providing the cost of putting on the games, and they are spending about $1.5 billion to do so. They should not and did not, however, plan to pay the bill to guarantee the security of millions of visitors from all over the world and all of the athletes in an era of terrorism. In the era of modern terrorism, safety for an event of this type simply cannot be guaranteed without help from the Federal Government. So if you remove the Federal Government from the scene, there would be no venue in America, in my opinion, that could host international games, certainly not of this magnitude. Mr. President, I support appropriate Department of Defense assistance for the Atlanta Olympics. My friend, Senator Coverdell, and I have supported this funding, and we have done so vigorously, and many of our colleagues, in fact a vast majority on the floor of the Senate and in the House, have joined us. This is not simply because it is Atlanta. I supported similar funding and support for the Olympic games at Lake Placid in 1980 and Los Angeles in 1994, the PanAmerican games in Indianapolis in 1987 and the Special Olympics in New Haven in 1995, as well as other international contests hosted by the United States. It simply has to be done. It is one of those elements of national security that is very, very important, and it must be defined as national security because no city or State can possibly deal with the kind of threats of terrorism we have in the world today. For events of such magnitude, the Congress has long authorized the use of military personnel and equipment--in carefully prescribed circumstances--to be used in support of these events. In some cases, this support requires full reimbursement, and in some cases--such as security activities--there is no reimbursement requirement. For the Atlanta games, Federal support for the Olympics and Paralympics has been a bipartisan effort from day one under the Bush administration. This bipartisan effort has continued through the years as the Congress has provided the appropriate authorization and appropriation to support the games in both Republican and Democratic administrations, both Republican and Democratic Congresses. Unfortunately, there have been a number of glaringly inaccurate or misleading reports about support provided to the Atlanta Olympics. I think it is important, before we have an Olympic amendment which we are going to have which hopefully will be worked out, it is important to have some background here because our friends in Utah, Senator Hatch and Senator Bennett, are going to be faced with the same kind of challenges in terms of security in the years ahead as they prepare for the Winter Olympics which has already been awarded to that State and to our country. Some of these accounts have questioned in particular the appropriateness of Department of Defense personnel and equipment being used to provide security and security-related support for the Atlanta Olympic games. I realize that an important part of our democracy is public scrutiny of government actions. Elected officials and others in government must be held accountable for their actions. It is entirely appropriate for the public, the news media, and Members of Congress to ask the tough questions about stewardship of public funds and resources. However, the media and the Congress have a responsibility to provide the public with facts--not half-truths, innuendo, and unsubstantiated opinion without factual foundation. Given the numerous inaccuracies contained in many of the media and congressional statements regarding the Olympics, I rise today to provide what the news commentator Paul Harvey called the rest of the story. In 1991, Congress authorized the Department of Defense to provide personnel and logistics support for the Centennial Olympic games as well as the Paralympics--the inspiring competition of some 4,000 disabled athletes from 102 counties who have overcome a handicap to become a world-class athlete. Believe me, these are, indeed, world class athletics. The Paralympics take place 11 days after the conclusion of the Olympics, although they are not under the direction or direct auspices of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games [ACOG]. In other words, they are not under ACOG, but it will take place in many of the same venues and will be in the Atlanta vicinity. Taxpayer-funded DOD support for the Olympics is provided for functions to protect the safety of participants and spectators in four States and the District of Columbia. Requests for DOD services have been jointly compiled over a 4-year period of study by security personnel and others representing over 50 local, State, and Federal Government agencies. The DOD and the military services reviewed these requests and accepted only those they considered appropriate for security and security-related support. DOD can provide non-security support for special events on a reimbursable basis--and, DOD is doing so for the Atlanta Olympic and Paralympic games. Where DOD has a unique capability not readily available elsewhere they have been providing some of the support on a reimbursable basis. This is not a comprehensive list of everything that has been said, but it is my best effort to deal with some of the more egregious accounts or distortions that I have come across about the Olympics and the Paralympics and the facts that respond to these allegations which have been, in some cases, misleading and in other cases completely false. This is an up-to-date list as of today, but I must say the critics of the Atlanta Committee on the Olympic games seem to come up with new allegations as fast as old ones are refuted. Let me just deal with a few of them today because I think it is important for the record to be straight. I certainly think it is important as we consider a later amendment, and also as Senator Hatch and Senator Bennett deal with the security requests that will be forthcoming for the games that will be held in Utah. Misleading report No. 1: DOD has acceded to all requests from ACOG and State and local law enforcement groups without making measured judgments of what type of military-related assistance is justified and appropriate. That is the charge. Fact: DOD received numerous requests for assistance from ACOG and law enforcement agencies which DOD considered inappropriate for military personnel to execute and these were denied. For example, request for DOD to: operate magnetometers at entry points--request denied; guard local communications and power infrastructure--request denied; provide security support at the International Press Center, Centennial Park, International Olympic Committee Headquarters, and VIP hotels--request denied. Neither I nor DOD would contend that these requests were frivolous. It is simply that within the scope of available resources and the best analysis of the type of security threat that requires U.S. military help, careful judgments were made from the perspective of stewardship of resources and the proper use of military personnel. Misleading report No. 2: That $13,325 spent by DOD was wasted on what a May 7, 1996 Washington Post article described, ``something called aviation planning and landing zones.'' That is the charge. Fact: DOD spent this sum for aerial surveys to determine the best locations to bring in military or law enforcement helicopters in an emergency. We must remember that the majority of the Olympic events will occur within a 3-mile area in downtown Atlanta, which has restricted airspace and will be flooded with Olympic participants and spectators. Route planning for emergency airlift situations is a critical security function and does not require the DOD to be reimbursed. It is my great hope that medical teams, hostage rescue forces or explosive ordnance or chemical/biological teams will not be called upon to fly into an event area. However, if they are, this prudent planning will save time and perhaps precious lives in an emergency. Misleading report No. 3: Military personnel will be used to drive buses and vans to transport spectators to the Olympic Games. Fact: Military personnel will not drive spectator buses and vans. Military personnel will be used to transport athletes and law enforcement officials moving between the Olympic Village and event venues. This has been a part of the security plan since its inception. Of the 1,058 military drivers provided to support the Olympics, 419 will remain in Atlanta after the Olympics to provide support to the Paralympic athletes. The Justice Department and the FBI subsequently determined that this function is a valid and essential part of the comprehensive security plan. This was the recommendation of our top law enforcement officials as to what was needed for security. While some may want to second-guess or Monday morning quarterback this decision, I certainly am not one of those. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Assistant Attorney General of the United States concerning the use of military drivers at the Olympics be printed in the Record.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Reserving the right to object, I was off the floor. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. NUNN. I object.