Member of Congress

Samuel Nunn

Role
Former Senator
State
GA
Party
Democrat

Speeches

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-27

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will have to object.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator withhold for a unanimous-consent request before we start? Mr. President, since Senators Cohen and McCain have been trying to get recognized and I had to interpose an objection before they were recognized, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of this vote, the 4 o'clock order be delayed by 8 minutes, with the Senator from Maine having control of that 8 minutes for the purpose of making a statement.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator. We enjoy very much the Senator being on the committee. I thank him very kindly.

View in Record
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-27

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I would be glad to work on that with my friend from Arizona and my friend from Colorado. The amendment is temporarily laid aside. I just ask this. I do not intend to have a second-degree amendment to it. I informed people that I was planning on doing that, and I wanted to accord other Senators a chance. I only ask that there not be a second-degree amendment while we have not laid it aside and are working in good faith on it.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I know there is a good-faith effort to now see if we can draft some additional language, or perhaps some substitute language for some of this amendment. I am certainly pleased to work with my friend from Arizona and others on that approach. I am a bit curious, though, how a vote on an amendment that is asking what it is going to cost to expand NATO and how much the American taxpayers are going to pay--that that information is tilted. I do not quite understand that logic. I really do not understand the logic that says that we do not want to know what the strategy is going to be as we expand the defense alliance that involves possible commitment of American forces and the possible--in fact, automatic, if there is an article V protection for full NATO members, an automatic basic nuclear umbrella being extended, meaning that we are willing to, in an extreme situation, use nuclear weapons, if we have to, to defend our allies. That is a serious undertaking. I am not sure why there is any reluctance to ask the President to tell us what the strategy is. Is that something we do not want to know? If he cannot give us the complete strategy, and if he says there are certain contingencies, fine, that is what he will answer. But why should we be afraid to ask the question? I am not sure why we would not want to ask the question of whether it is going to involve prepositioning American equipment and how much that is going to cost. Why would we not want to know the answer to that? I am not sure why we would not want to know the answer to whether air forces are going to be involved, or whether there is going to be forward stationing of ground forces. Are we really going to expand the alliance and not ask ourselves those questions? I am puzzled. I am not sure why we would not want to know the extent to which prospective new NATO members have achieved, or are expected to achieve, interoperability of their military equipment, air defense systems, and command, control, and communications systems and conformity of military doctrine with those of NATO. That is the purpose of the Partnership for Peace. That is what they have been doing for the last 3 years. Why are we reluctant to ask the question? I am not sure why we would not want to know the extent to which the new NATO members have established democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces, including parliamentary oversight of military affairs and appointment of civilians to senior defense position, and the rule of law. Is there reluctance to find out or get the assessment of the President of the United States sometime next year, giving him plenty of time? This is not something we are going to have answers to tomorrow or the next day. It is not going to come until January of next year. One of our colleagues said that, of course, the answers would vary as to whether Mr. Zyuganov is elected or Mr. Yeltsin is elected. Precisely. I would assume that any President would take that into account before they filed a report next January. If they did not, then I would be amazed. Certainly, the circumstances will make a difference. I do not know why we would not want to know the extent to which the prospective new NATO members are committed to protecting the rights of all of their citizens, including national minorities. Is there someone that does not want to ask that question? Is that a painful question to ask? I know the Senator from Connecticut made the statement--and I think he is right--that one advantage of NATO is to keep the countries from having armed conflict with each other. Certainly, that is the case, I think, in the case of two allies, Greece and Turkey. Their membership in NATO has helped prevent that--although the animosities are, unfortunately, still present. Why would we not want to know something about the treatment of national minorities? It seems to me that was a fundamental question that should have been asked by our allies and the United States of the newly emerging states in the former Yugoslavia before we recognized them. We should have asked the question about their treatment of minorities and their respect for human rights and their rule of law. Is there really a sentiment in the Senate that we do not want to know the answer to that question, or we do not even want to ask it? Is that tilting? It does not seem to me that it is. Is there somebody who does not want to ask the question whether the prospective new NATO members are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area? Is that a painful question? Is this some kind of inside-the-beltway steamroller that is going so strong with people, having taken positions about NATO expansion and not asking these questions, that we cannot ask them now? What is going on? Are the American people not entitled to know what it is going to cost? Are they entitled to know whether we are going to forward deploy our forces? Are they entitled to know whether we are going to preposition our equipment? Or are they at least entitled to have the President tell the Congress what we are going to do in terms of strategy? Some of it may be classified. Is that something that we are going to do, put blinders on and say, let us charge out and see who can take the strongest stance and expand NATO the quickest, without asking questions? Is that what our colleagues are concerned about? I know that there are people who have taken the position we should expand NATO. I think there is a case that we should. I, myself, believe we should expand NATO. I believe that the logical step, though, as the Senator from New Jersey said so well, is to make sure that countries which are not now under military threat secure their economy and their political system. I really find it a little puzzling that some of our European colleagues could say it is too difficult to expand the European Community. They need access to trade. What they need is markets. It is too difficult to decide whether we are going to let new countries in that grow vegetables and they might ship them across the border. It is easier for the US. to extend a nuclear guarantee. I mean, we can be the country that decides that question, but we do not want to ask the question. I mean, is it really harder to open up markets and let countries that are newly emerging and need the markets--is it harder to give them access than it is to extend a nuclear guarantee, saying that if there is a war, we would go even to the extent, in extreme situations, of using nuclear weapons? Are we basically saying that politicians cannot deal with economic issues; let us all turn it over to the military? I favor a logical sequence of expansion of NATO. I think it makes all sorts of sense as the European Community expands to take those new members, and, if they meet NATO standards to give them serious consideration for membership, then I think in most cases they would be eligible for membership. I also think if there is a threat that we ought to be willing to respond to that threat where it makes sense militarily and where we can be effective militarily. If the Russians elect an extremist or nationalist who decides they are going to rebuild the threat against Central Europe, of course, we ought to be alert to that. The difference now though is that--in the cold war we may have had 15 days of warning time or we may have had 3 months warning time of any kind of attack-- now all of our intelligence and military people would tell us we have years of warning time; years of warning time before any kind of threat to certainly some of the countries that we are talking about taking in. Does anyone really not want to ask the question, and ask the President to think before we agree to immediate expansion of NATO, of the effect on Ukraine? If you look at the map, Ukraine geographically may be the most vulnerable and may be the most important country to retain its sovereignty. But if they are not going to be in the first tier, not going to be part of NATO but we expand NATO and nationalism kicks up in Russia in response to it and they start basically putting pressure on Ukraine, are we ready to deal with that, or do we not want to ask that question? Is that one that is too hard to ask? Should we restrain ourselves and not ask it because it might be a hard question? What about the Baltics? What about the countries that have been suppressed for years and years by the former Soviet Union that are now not only building their own sovereignty but are doing pretty well in democracy, and in their economy? If they get left out of the NATO expansion in the first round, are they likely to come under real pressure from a nationalistic kind of response in Russia? Is this something we do not want to think about? Do we want to just say let us not think about it? Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to work out language. I think there are some questions that can be added to this. Certainly it seems to me that every question in here is relevant, and every question in here I would be appalled if I did not think the President of the United States leading our country as Commander in Chief had thought through these questions before we make the final decisions. I would be appalled if I did not think NATO had thought through them. I know they have not all been thought through now. I understand that. But by the time NATO makes these decisions, if they do not ask themselves these questions, and if our leadership in the Congress does not ask these questions, and if the President does not ask these questions, then we are not fulfilling our constitutional obligation to the American people. Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to work with people on this amendment. I find it a little bit puzzling that the argument is being made that this amendment asking the questions might place some adverse effect on the Russian elections when we are asking the questions but a NATO expansion amendment that pushes forward with it that is put on the Foreign Relations appropriations bill today has no bearing. One amendment--this one--asks the questions. How could that have an adverse effect on the Russian elections when NATO let us expand quickly and let us pick out the members by a legislative fiat amendment, basically which is put on the Foreign Relations Committee bill the same day? I find that also puzzling. Mr. President, these are all questions that need to be asked. I will not be here when this debate takes place next year, or whenever it takes place, on the NATO expansion. But I will be watching the debate as will other people all over this country, and I will certainly hope that all of these questions would have not only been asked but also to the best extent possible been answered. You cannot forecast every scenario and every possible type of conflict. But that does not mean you do not have a strategy. Is the NATO strategy something we cannot talk about? For 45 years we have had a strategy in NATO. The first report out of the U.S. Senate was on NATO's strategy; a critique of it. It was not classified. We had a strategy. We had a strategy of forward defense. America has had a strategy for years not only of conventional deterrence in NATO that was avowed, but we had a declared open strategy of being willing to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack. That was not a secret. Maybe somebody did not know it. But we had that as a strategy. That was part of our strategy. If the NATO alliance were overwhelmed with conventional weapons, we reserved the right by declaration of being the first ones to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to that. That was our strategy; an open declared strategy. Now are we going to expand NATO and not have a strategy? Is that what we are being told? If so, then I dissent. NATO has to have a strategy. That is why when the politicians start telling the military, ``OK. Folks, it is too hard to talk about economic expansion. It is too hard to talk about access to markets. Those are tough questions. But you go out and you expand and give these military guarantees, and we are not going to ask any hard questions about how you are going to do it.'' Well, if we ever have to do it, if there is ever a threat and we have to respond, we will demand that our military have thought through that strategy, and any of them who have not in leadership positions would be properly criticized. They would not have fulfilled their duty, and they know that. That is why they are busy scratching their heads with these questions, and basically trying to figure some of them out when we may be reluctant to even ask them to think about it. Mr. President, I find it puzzling. But I am sure that we can continue to work and perhaps work out some language on this. I can assure my colleagues, if we do not work out language now, we will be revisiting this issue this year because at least I am determined that we have a framework--a kind of framework that the American people have every right to expect of us where the Congress of the United States will be called on to ratify this treaty, this expansion of the NATO alliance. We will be called on to ratify it, and I think our constituents--the American people--have every right to expect that we will be asking these questions and that President Clinton, or President Dole, or whoever is President, when this decision is made will have asked and have a projection of the answers to these kinds of questions. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. Yes, we are waiting on amendments. There is an amendment pending, a NATO amendment, my amendment, but it is temporarily laid aside so if anyone wants to bring a defense-related amendment in we would welcome it. In the meantime, we will all be fascinated with the Senator's remarks.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator very much. I look forward to working with him. As I mentioned, I have not spoken on this subject yet. But as I talked to the Senator from Colorado and the Senator from Arizona, it is my intent in this amendment, and the intent of all of us, not to tilt this amendment one way or the other, but, rather, to ask the questions that need to be asked before we make this very important decision about expanding an alliance where we extend article V protection. And article V protection includes nuclear protection. That is a very serious matter. I think we have not started nor has the administration thought through nor has NATO thought through some of the tough questions here. We all have an obligation to do that. This could be a matter before the Senate for ratification of the expansion of the treaty next year. So it is my intent to have questions that are tough questions, the hard questions, but also fair questions, on both sides. I invite my colleagues that may perceive that this is a tilt, one way or the other, to work on the language. And I would certainly be amenable to taking a look at their suggestions. So Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be temporarily laid aside. We will continue to work on it. So we are open for amendment. I know Senator Thurmond and I, as managers of this bill, encourage people to come down with relevant amendments on the defense matter.

Mr. NUNN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in the interest of time, while we are waiting on an amendment to be presented, I will go ahead and make my remarks on the amendment which was pending and which has been temporarily laid aside. This amendment has been offered on behalf of myself, Senator Hutchison, Senator Bradley, Senator Kassebaum, and Senator Cohen. I note at the outset this amendment is not intended to prejudice the case for or against NATO enlargement or even the pace at which NATO might enlarge. The amendment requires the President to submit a report on NATO enlargement to the Senate Armed Services Committee and their counterpart committee in the House at the same time that the President submits the budget request for fiscal year 1998 to the Congress. This amendment is designed to provide the information that will stimulate a comprehensive and informed discussion in the Congress on this important matter. If there are questions that are not in this amendment that people on the other side of the aisle or this side think should be added, I certainly would be receptive to that. Mr. President, there have been a number of editorials and op-ed pieces favoring a rapid pace for NATO enlargement. These pieces generally focus on two aspects. First, on the positive side, the need for greater security for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic so they can continue on the road toward democratization and free market economies. On the second side is the need to ensure that Russia does not have a veto over the process by which NATO decides to enlarge. There have also been a number of editorials and op-ed pieces opposing NATO enlargement. These opposition pieces tend to focus on the potential that NATO enlargement would have to produce the very thing that we are trying to prevent; namely, a Russian military threat to European security and also the impact it would have on Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia if those nations were not included in the first stage of NATO enlargement. What is missing, however, are a number of other issues that are directly involved in NATO enlargement that have not been discussed in the various commentary on either side of the issue and that need to be carefully considered. This amendment provides for the President's report to comprehensively discuss a host of issues. In the interest of time, I will mention only a few of the issues for purposes of illustration. What would the cost be for NATO enlargement and who would pay these costs? Certainly that is a question the American people are entitled to have us debate and actually examine and present. There ought to be at least some projection of that by the administration and by NATO. Incidentally, the Congressional Budget Office has concluded a study on the cost of defending the Visegrad countries--that is Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland--over the 15-year period from 1996 through 2010. That study concludes that the cost would range from $61 billion to $125 billion. Whatever part of that range you choose, this is a substantial amount of money. It seems to me the Senate of the United States is not performing its duty if we do not tell the administration we want an answer to this question, at least their best projection, before they make a commitment committing this country, which, of course, would have to then be ratified by the Senate. A second question: Since article V of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for a NATO member nation to treat an attack on one as an attack on all, what is the general strategy that NATO would adopt to defend the potential new member nations, including defense against a possible nuclear threat? Do we deploy forces? If so, are our allies prepared to join us in that deployment? Would it be American troops in those host countries without allies, or will allies join? Which allies are willing to join? These are questions that have to be answered. The third question: The North Atlantic Council recently decided to create more deployable headquarters and more mobile forces to mount non-article V operations, as well as traditional collective defense missions and to develop a European defense identity within the alliance. The question is whether the enlargement of NATO should proceed prior to NATO's reorganization of its military command structure and the completion of the other actions required to carry out these decisions. How is the enlargement going to impact these kinds of fundamental changes in NATO beginning to prepare itself to operate out of an area, and vice versa? The next question is whether an enlarged NATO can continue to function on a consensus; that is, a basis of unanimous consent, before major decisions are made. Here on the Senate floor we operate by unanimous consent. We know sometimes that is difficult. If we expand NATO, will we have a two-thirds rule, three-fourths rule, or say any nation, including one of the new nations that may come into NATO, would be able to veto any decision of NATO? That is a fundamental question that NATO, it seems to me, has to answer. Another question regards the relationship of prospective new NATO members to the European Union and what the impact that gaining NATO membership would have on the possibility and timing of such nations gaining associate and then full membership in the European Union. What is the plan of the European Union? My impression of some of the countries is the main thing they need now is not a military protective shield but rather an economic expansion, economic trade opportunity and the ability to trade with the European nations and with other nations in the world. What are the Europeans going to do about opening the European Community to these nations? I know the administration is going to have to give their best estimate on this. Certainly we cannot speak for the Europeans. But at least it is something we ought to consider very strongly. There is another very important part of this expansion that has not been talked about. What about the Conventional Forces Treaty? If we expand NATO enlargement, do we have to really do that treaty over? Because basically, the CFE Treaty allocated forces and tanks and artillery based on the two alliances that then existed. If part of that alliance now is on the other side, what does that do to the CFE Treaty? Of course, we hope at some point we will be able to say there are no sides in Europe, that they are all basically working together in peace, but I am not sure we have arrived at that point at this point in time. The next question: The anticipated impact of NATO enlargement on Russian foreign and defense policies, including the emphasis Russia would place on defense planning on nuclear weapons. This at least has to be contemplated. Are we going to basically be prepared to respond if the Russians decide that they are going to go back to deploying tactical nuclear weapons because they do not have conventional defenses and if they perceive this enlargement as being a threat? I am hoping they will not have that perception as we move forward in this regard, but it has to be carefully considered because it will affect tremendously our response and the cost and the question of deploying American forces. All of these are important questions that need answers. Another question: The impact a NATO enlargement would have on the political, economic, and security well-being of the nations, such as Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, if they are not included in the first stage of NATO enlargement. Mr. President, this is a sampling of the issues that the President would report on. I stress once again that this amendment was not drafted and is not designed to prejudice the case either for or against NATO enlargement or the pace of NATO enlargement, but it does require the administration to begin to think through important issues and questions, tough questions in my view, and lay them out on the table. They need to be on the table so that the Congress and the American people can start to consider the matter of NATO enlargement in a comprehensive and informed manner. If there are other questions that need to be added to this amendment that some Members are concerned about, I would be pleased to consider that language and to work with my colleagues on that. Finally, I would note that the ultimate question that the Senate will have to address with respect to the ratification of any agreement to enlarge NATO, and that both the Senate and House will have to address with respect to the funding of the costs associated with NATO enlargement, is the question of extending our nuclear umbrella over any new NATO members. Mr. President, this is an extraordinarily serious decision, and I hope that a comprehensive report by the President, which is called for in this amendment, would provide much of the information needed for the debate on that question, and, most important, I hope it will stimulate the kind of in-depth thinking that we need to have on this issue. Mr. President, I know that my colleagues who have cosponsored this-- Senators Hutchison, Bradley, Kassebaum and Cohen--would like to speak on this subject at some point as we consider it. At this point in time, I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. If the Senator will yield, I want to ask something on another subject. I have a meeting to try to move this bill along back here in the other room. It is one of those things that happens to all of us. I need to be in two places at one time. But I know the Senator from South Carolina would like for me to give my first priority to working out some agreements to move the bill along. I would like to thank the Senator for yielding and say that I support the Harkin amendment. He will bring that up when he gets the floor. That has been cleared on both sides, I believe. I will be available to Senator Thurmond in Senator Daschle's office, if I am needed.

View in Record
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-27

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

View in Record
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-27

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I find it ironic that these recent press accounts would make light of this security mission. We need look no further than the bombings in Egypt, Israel and the recent one in Saudi Arabia as well as other nations to realize that buses and other transportation hubs are frequent targets of terrorists. It would be unthinkable for security personnel to ignore this prospect in Atlanta. The use of military personnel in driving the buses has many advantages. These include the fact that the danger of infiltration of the driver pool is virtually eliminated in comparison to the danger of using volunteer or commercial drivers. In addition, military personnel are both disciplined and reliable--all personnel are specially trained in varying degrees for performance in combat or other difficult circumstances. Once again, prudent planning and precaution in this security arena may make the difference between life and death, and here I, for one, will defer to the experts in security who felt this was an essential security need. Misleading report No. 4: DOD personnel will be assigned to wash the Olympic buses. Fact: DOD personnel will not be washing buses. In fact, ACOG has established and paid for a vehicle wash and transportation staging facility located at Fort Gillem in Atlanta. ACOG employees and Olympic volunteers will operate the facility to wash the Olympic buses. At the conclusion of the Olympic and Paralympic games, this facility and improvements, valued at $108,000, will be donated to the U.S. Army--providing a continuous benefit to activities and personnel at Fort Gillem. Misleading report No. 5, and this one has popped up over and over again. It almost seems to be one that cannot be put to rest. The State of Georgia has charged DOD over $100,000 for military personnel to obtain State-issued commercial drivers licenses. Fact: The State of Georgia has not charged DOD anything for the testing and licensing of the military drivers. The military determined that for its own requirements--liability, interstate travel, etc.--it would be prudent to obtain commercial licenses for their personnel. General Tilelli of U.S. Army Forces Command [FORSCOM] stated for the record before the Armed Services Committee on July 11, 1996, ``the Georgia Department of Safety is providing testing and licenses for military drivers stationed in Georgia and supporting the Olympics at no cost to DOD.'' GAO confirmed this information in a June 14 report which stated that the 358 DOD drivers from bases in Georgia will obtain Georgia-issued commercial drivers licenses at no cost to DOD as agreed to in a Memorandum of Agreement of May 14, 1996 between the Department of the Army and the Georgia Department of Public Safety. Earlier disinformation contending that Georgia was charging for commercial licenses may have given the impression that the State of Georgia is nickel and diming the Federal Government to death over the Olympics. In fact, the State is leaning over backward to accommodate the military, as well they should. I also would like to point out that the State of Georgia is spending more than $72 million of its own funds on Olympic security, including the salaries of law officers who will be assigned to full-time Olympic security duties. Not counting state prison guards, some 73 percent of all State of Georgia employees who have law enforcement credentials will be assigned to the Olympics. This is not just Atlanta, but the whole State. So almost 75 percent of all credentialed law enforcement officials will be used by Georgia in the Olympics. Misleading report No. 6: DOD personnel will be watering the Olympic field hockey fields. That is the charge. Fact: DOD personnel will not be watering Olympic playing fields. Media accounts have led the public to believe that DOD personnel engaged in this activity, conjuring an image of teams of soldiers acting as laborers with garden hoses. In fact, one television news reader asked, ``doesn't the military know that water won't make artificial turf grow?'' This claim is simply not true. This watering equipment was requested for use during the games because local water department officials and the Atlanta fire chief feared that water pressure in their municipal water system would fall to dangerous levels under the known demand to dispense 4,500 gallons of water over a field in a 7 minute period twice during each competition. DOD will provide four 50,000 gallon water bladders, two 20,000 gallon water bladders, and six water pumps which will be used to water three Olympic field hockey fields. As GAO noted in its June 14 letter to Senator McCain that military personnel will operate the bladders and ``ACOG personnel will operate the above ground watering systems distributing water on the fields . . . in accordance with Field Hockey International Federation rules.'' The military uses this equipment to store and distribute water to its personnel in extreme environments, and similar equipment was used in Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. As a matter of fact, similar equipment was used when we had the huge floods in Georgia and we had whole cities that could not be supplied with water, where people literally had no water to drink. DOD came in that emergency and helped, as they have with other floods around the country. A similar DOD bladder system was tested for the Olympics in 1995 at a cost of $11,884 for setting up and operating the system. The important thing here, as with other nonsecurity activities, expenses to the military are reimbursed. ACOG reimbursed the costs in 1995 and will reimburse all associated costs for the water system when it is used during the games. Any diligent reporter could have ascertained these facts before printing the misleading information. Misleading report No. 7: The Navy has contributed $39,750 worth of barges to support the Olympic yachting competion. Fact: The Navy has provided three barges for use at Olympic yachting competitions outside of Savannah, but not at taxpayer expense. ACOG reimbursed the DOD $39,750 in 1995 for the costs associated with the use of these barges. Again, a fact that could have been ascertained before the misleading reports were printed. Also ignored in the media reports was the fact that the yachting competition will take place in waters surrounding environmentally sensitive barrier islands. In total, 25 barges--3 from the Navy--will be used as spectator platforms in an effort to protect the sensitive coastal areas from irreparable damage. I am advised that the three Navy barges are over 45 years old, were in storage until they were brought up to a usable condition--at ACOG's expense--and were moved to Savannah by the Army's 7th Transportation Group at Fort Eustis, VA. The DOD Office of Special Events determined that movement of the barges by the Army was a non reimbursable expense. All other costs associated with the barges were deemed reimbursable by the Office of Special Events and were reimbursed by ACOG. Misleading report No. 8: DOD purchased ice chests for the Atlanta Police Department. Fact: DOD is not purchasing new ice chests for the police as the public has been led to believe. DOD will provide 35 chests from current DOD stock inventory on a use and return basis. Once again, General Tilelli's responses to questions at the June 11 Committee hearing confirmed that DOD will loan the stock coolers to the police. This is the stock of material that is retained by the Office of Special Events for just such use. Misleading report No. 9: DOD has provided nonsecurity support for the Atlanta Olympic games, but it has not been reimbursed. Fact: For the non security items that have been provided to date, ACOG has reimbursed DOD in full and will reimburse when any future nonsecurity support is provided. To date, ACOG and associated Olympic organizing committees have reimbursed DOD almost $600,000. Future reimbursements are expected to exceed $100,000. Misleading report No. 10: DOD constructed a new dining facility for athletes use during the Olympic games. Fact: DOD provided a relocatable facility at the Paralympic Athletes Village in support of the Paralympic games. After its use at the games, this relocatable facility will be transported to Blount Island, FL, to support maintenance activities for active duty Marines stationed at this facility. Personally, I am proud that our military is able to assist the Paralympics in this fashion. If anyone objects to this, let it be criticized in the effect of it being the Paralympics, not the Olympics. I believe our soldiers take great pride in participating in a project that assists athletes of such astounding, astounding great courage. Members of our military sadly are no strangers to the impact of injury or illness that some define as ``incapacitating.'' But the Paralympic athletes have proved by their own performance and their tremendous courage that the definition of ``incapacitated" needs reexamination by our society. Mr. President, I imagine there are other inaccurate accounts that have been publicly disseminated but have not come to my attention. I do not pretend that I am answering everything that has been in the media. I have not read it all. Unfortunately, it seems that many members of the media in this area have not taken the time to check the facts. I simply urge, when these other reports or charges come up, that someone check with the Department of Defense, check with the ACOG committee before they write these kinds of articles. Hopefully, in the weeks ahead, the critics will check some of the cynicism at the door and focus on the many good and positive stories associated with the aspirations and preparations involved with the Olympics and the Paralympics, a very special part of our modern history. Mr. President, I have previously asked that the attachment from the deputy attorney general that I alluded to be printed in the Record. Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.

View in Record
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-27

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

View in Record
CONDEMNATION OF TERROR ATTACKS IN SAUDI ARABIA1996-06-27

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I object.

View in Record
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19971996-06-26

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared. I would like to note for the Record that Mr. Effron, who has worked on a number of these amendments, recused himself from any consideration of this amendment since his name has been sent up as a member of the Court of Military Appeals, if approved by the Senate. So, Mr. Effron played no part in this amendment whatsoever, and it was cleared by other staff members. I think that should be noted for the Record.

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4321 (Purpose: To prohibit the collection and release of detailed satellite imagery with respect to Israel and other countries and areas)

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared, and I urge its adoption.

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4322 (Purpose: To make funds available for research, development, test, and evaluation activities relating to humanitarian demining technologies)

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of Senator Leahy.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. NUNN. I urge the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 4306 (Purpose: To clarify the applicability of section 1102, relating to the retention of civilian employee positions at military training bases transferred to the National Guard)

View in Record