Devin Nunes

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Stewart).

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. In closing, I want to thank all of the members of our committee, and, again, thank the staff from both the minority and the majority side. As Mr. Quigley said, it would not be possible if it wasn't for the strong Member involvement and engagement that makes a bipartisan work product like this, gives it the ability to come to the House floor, and to be passed overwhelmingly on a bipartisan basis. So I want to thank all of the members on my committee from both sides for their active participation. As the ranking member said, we will continue to try to make this product better; we will work out our differences with the Senate; and hopefully by the end of the year, we will have a product that we can all be proud of. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I wish to announce to all Members of the House that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has ordered the bill H.R. 5077, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, reported favorably to the House today, and will file its report on the bill in the House in early May. Mr. Speaker, the classified schedules of authorizations and the classified annexes accompanying the bill are available for review by Members at the offices of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in room HVC-304 of the Capitol Visitor Center. The committee office will be open during regular business hours for the convenience of any Member who wishes to review this material prior to its consideration by the House. I recommend that Members wishing to review the classified annex contact the committee's director of security to arrange a time and date for that viewing. This will ensure the availability of the appropriately cleared committee staff to assist Members who desire assistance during their review of these classified materials. I urge interested Members to review these materials in order to better understand the committee's recommendations. The classified annexes to the committee's report contain the committee's recommendations on the intelligence budget for fiscal year 2017 and related classified information that cannot be disclosed publicly. It is important that Members keep in mind the requirements of clause 13 of House rule XXIII, which only permits access to classified information by those Members of the House who have signed the oath provided for in the rules. In addition, the committee's rules require that Members agree in writing to a nondisclosure agreement. The agreement indicates that the Member has been granted access to the classified annexes and that they are familiar with the rules of the House and the committee with respect to the classified nature of that information and the limitations on the disclosure of that information.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to congratulate Mary Rose McCaffrey on her retirement as the Director of Security for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). For the past thirty-one years, Ms. McCaffrey has held numerous security and managerial assignments throughout the CIA as well as rotational assignments to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, and National Reconnaissance Office. Prior to her appointment as Director of Security in 2011, Ms. McCaffrey served as Deputy Director of Security from 2008 to 2011 and was responsible for personnel security, facilities security, information security, policy, operations, and anti-terrorism/force protection. In addition, Ms. McCaffrey served in the ODNI at its inception as Director of the Special Security Center responsible for security policy, tools, and training collaboration among the Intelligence Community. Mr Speaker, on behalf of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I would like to wish Ms. McCaffrey happiness, success, and good health as she begins her retirement and to thank her for her service to both the CIA and the Intelligence Community. Mary Rose, best wishes on your retirement.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I will include my full statement in the Record to accompany Division M and Division N of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. I would also like to take the time to thank Ranking Member Schiff, Chairman Burr, Vice Chair Feinstein, Chairman Hal Rogers, and Ranking Member Nita Lowey, as well as all of the Appropriations and Intelligence Committee staff for their hard work and long hours over the last several months in getting this important legislation to the floor today and eventually to the President for his signature. I urge all Members to support the bill. Mr. Speaker, the following consists of the joint explanatory statement to accompany Division M, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. This joint explanatory statement reflects the status of negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter, ``the Agreement''). The joint explanatory statement shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference. The joint explanatory statement comprises three parts: an overview of the application of the annex to accompany this statement; unclassified congressional direction; and a section-by-section analysis of the legislative text. Part I: Application of the Classified Annex The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities prevents the congressional intelligence committees from publicly disclosing many details concerning the conclusions and recommendations of the Agreement. Therefore, a classified Schedule of Authorizations and a classified annex have been prepared to describe in detail the scope and intent of the congressional intelligence committees' actions. The Agreement authorizes the Intelligence Community to obligate and expend funds not altered or modified by the classified Schedule of Authorizations as requested in the President's budget, subject to modification under applicable reprogramming procedures. The classified annex is the result of negotiations between the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It reconciles the differences between the committees' respective versions of the bill for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Homeland Security Intelligence Program for Fiscal Year 2016. The Agreement also makes recommendations for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information Systems Security Program, consistent with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, and provides certain direction for these two programs. The Agreement supersedes the classified annexes to the reports accompanying H.R. 4127, as passed by the House on December 1, 2015, H.R. 2596, as passed by the House on June 16, 2015, and S. 1705, as reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 7, 2015. All references to the House-passed and Senate-reported annexes are solely to identify the heritage of specific provisions. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the bill pursuant to Section 102. It has the status of law. The classified annex supplements and adds detail to clarify the authorization levels found in the bill and the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified annex shall have the same legal force as the report to accompany the bill. Part II: Select Unclassified Congressional Direction Enhancing Geographic and Demographic Diversity The Agreement directs the Office of the Director for National Intelligence (ODNI) to conduct an awareness, outreach, and recruitment program to rural, under-represented colleges and universities that are not part of the IC Centers of Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program Further, the Agreement directs that ODNI shall increase and formally track the number of competitive candidates for IC employment or internships who studied at IC CAE schools and other scholarship programs supported by the IC. Additionally, the Agreement directs that ODNI, acting through the Executive Agent for the IC CAE program, the IC Chief Human Capital Officer, and the Chief, Office of IC Equal Opportunity & Diversity, as appropriate, shall: 1. Add a criterion to the IC CAE selection process that applicants must be part of a consortium or actively collaborate with under- resourced schools in their area; 2. Work with CAE schools to reach out to rural and under-resourced schools, including by inviting such schools to participate in the annual IC CAE colloquium and IC recruitment events; 3. Increase and formally track the number of competitive IC internship candidates from IC CAE schools, starting with Fiscal Year 2016 IC summer internships, and provide a report, within 180 days of the enactment of this Act, on its plan to do so; 4. Develop metrics to ascertain whether IC CAE, the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program, the Louis Stokes Educational Scholarship Program, and the Intelligence Officer Training Program reach a diverse demographic and serve as feeders to the IC workforce; 5. Include in the annual report on minority hiring and retention a breakdown of the students participating in these programs who serve as IC interns, applied for full-time IC employment, received offers of employment, and entered on duty in the IC; 6. Conduct a feasibility study with necessary funding levels regarding how the IC CAE could be better tailored to serve under- resourced schools, and provide such study to the congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of the enactment of this Act; 7. Publicize all IC elements' recruitment activities, including the new Applicant Gateway and the IC Virtual Career Fair, to rural schools, Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and other minority- serving institutions that have been contacted by IC recruiters; 8. Contact new groups with the objective of expanding the IC Heritage Community Liaison Council; and 9. Ensure that IC elements add such activities listed above that may be appropriate to their recruitment plans for Fiscal Year 2016. ODNI shall provide an interim update to the congressional intelligence committees on its efforts within 90 days of the enactment of this Act and include final results in its annual report on minority hiring and retention. Analytic Duplication & Improving Customer Impact The congressional intelligence committees are concerned about potential duplication in finished analytic products. Specifically, the congressional intelligence committees are concerned that contemporaneous publication of substantially similar intelligence products fosters confusion among intelligence customers (including those in Congress), impedes analytic coherence across the IC, and wastes time and effort. The congressional intelligence committees value competitive analysis, but believe there is room to reduce duplicative analytic activity and improve customer impact. Therefore, the Agreement directs ODNI to pilot a repeatable methodology to evaluate potential duplication in finished intelligence analytic products and to report the findings to the congressional intelligence committees within 60 days of the enactment of this Act. In addition, the Agreement directs ODNI to report to the congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of enactment of this Act on how it will revise analytic practice, tradecraft, and standards to ensure customers can clearly identify how products that are produced contemporaneously and cover similar topics differ from one another in their methodological, informational, or temporal aspects, and the significance of those differences. This report is not intended to cover operationally urgent analysis or current intelligence. Countering Violent Extremism and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant The Agreement directs ODNI, within 180 days of enactment of this Act and in consultation with appropriate interagency partners, to brief the congressional intelligence committees on how intelligence agencies are supporting both (1) the Administration's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program first detailed in the 2011 White House strategy Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, which was expanded following the January 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, and (2) the Administration's Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which was announced in September 2014. Analytic Health Reports The Agreement directs the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to provide Analytic Health Reports to the congressional intelligence committees on a quarterly basis, including an update on the specific effect of analytic modernization on the health of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) and its ability to reduce analytic risk. All-Source Analysis Standards The Agreement directs DIA to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's all-source analysis capability and production in Fiscal Year 2015. The evaluation should assess the analytic output of both NIP and MIP funded all-source analysts, separately and collectively, and apply the following four criteria identified in the ODNI Strategic Evaluation Report for all-source analysis: 1) integrated, 2) objective, 3) timely, and 4) value-added. The results of this evaluation shall be included as part of the Fiscal Year 2017 congressional budget justification book. Terrorism Investigations The Agreement directs the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, within 180 days of enactment of this Act, a report detailing how FBI has allocated resources between domestic and foreign terrorist threats based on numbers of investigations over the past 5 years. The report should be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. Investigations of Minors Involved in Radicalization The Agreement directs the FBI to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of enactment of this Act on investigations in which minors are encouraged to turn away from violent extremism rather than take actions that would lead to Federal terrorism indictments. This briefing should place these rates in the context of all investigations of minors for violent extremist activity and should describe any FBI engagement with minors' families, law enforcement, or other individuals or groups connected to the minor during or after investigations. Furthermore, the Agreement directs the FBI to include how often undercover agents pursue investigations based on a location of interest related to violent extremist activity compared to investigations of an individual or group believed to be engaged in such activity. Included should be the number of locations of interest associated with a religious group or entity. This briefing also should include trend analysis covering the last five years describing violent extremist activity in the U.S. Declassification Review of Video of the 2012 Benghazi Terrorist Attacks Numerous investigations have been conducted regarding the 2012 terrorist attack against U.S. facilities in Benghazi. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence produced one of the first declassified Congressional reports and continues to believe that the public should have access to information about the attacks, so long as it does not jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. The closed circuit television videos from the Temporary Mission Facility (TMF) captured some of the activity that took place at the State Department facility on September 11, 2012, and their release would contribute to the public's understanding of the event without compromising sources or methods. Therefore, the Agreement directs the Director of National Intelligence, or the appropriate federal official, to conduct a declassification review and to facilitate the release to the public of the declassified closed circuit television videos of the September 11, 2012, terrorist attack on the TMF in Benghazi, Libya, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, not later than 120 days after the enactment of this Act. Part III: Section-By-Section Analysis and Explanation of Legislative Text The following is a section-by-section analysis and explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. Title I--Intelligence Activities Section 101. Authorization of appropriations Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2016. Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel levels by program for Fiscal Year 2016 are contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility to the Director of National Intelligence in managing the civilian personnel of the Intelligence Community. Section 103 provides that the Director may authorize employment of civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2016 in excess of the number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding three percent of the total limit applicable to each Intelligence Community element under Section 102. The Director may do so only if necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions. Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence Community Management Account (ICMA) of the Director of National Intelligence and sets the authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA for Fiscal Year 2016. Section 105. Clarification regarding authority for flexible personnel management among elements of intelligence community Section 105 clarifies that certain Intelligence Community elements may make hiring decisions based on the excepted service designation. Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System Section 201. Authorization of appropriations Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of $514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2016 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund. Title III--General Provisions Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law. Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities Section 302 provides that the authorization of appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Section 303. Provision of information and assistance to Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to clarify the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community's authority to seek information and assistance from federal, state, and local agencies, or units thereof. Section 304. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence Community in Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Section 304 amends Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 to reflect the correct name of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. The section also clarifies that the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community is a member of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Section 305. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Section 305 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to clarify that nothing in the statute authorizing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board should be construed to allow that Board to gain access to information regarding an activity covered by section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947. Section 306. Enhancing government personnel security programs Section 306 directs the Director of National Intelligence to develop and implement a plan for eliminating the backlog of overdue periodic investigations, and further requires the Director to direct each agency to implement a program to provide enhanced security review to individuals determined eligible for access to classified information or eligible to hold a sensitive position. These enhanced personnel security programs will integrate information relevant and appropriate for determining an individual's suitability for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position; be conducted at least 2 times every 5 years; and commence not later than 5 years after the date of enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act, or the elimination of the backlog of overdue periodic investigations, whichever occurs first. Section 307. Notification of changes to retention of call detail record policies Section 307 requires the Director of National Intelligence to notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing not later than 15 days after learning that an electronic communication service provider that generates call detail records in the ordinary course of business has changed its policy on the retention of such call details records to result in a retention period of less than 18 months. Section 307 further requires the Director to submit to the congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of enactment a report identifying each electronic communication service provider (if any) that has a current policy in place to retain call detail records for 18 months or less. Section 308. Personnel information notification policy by the Director of National Intelligence Section 308 requires the Director of National Intelligence to establish a policy to ensure timely notification to the congressional intelligence committees of the identities of individuals occupying senior level positions within the Intelligence Community. Section 309. Designation of lead intelligence officer for tunnels Section 309 requires the Director of National Intelligence to designate an official to manage the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of tunnels by state and nonstate actors. Section 310. Reporting process for tracking country clearance requests Section 310 requires the Director of National Intelligence to establish a formal reporting process for tracking requests for country clearance submitted to overseas Director of National Intelligence representatives. Section 310 also requires the Director to brief the congressional intelligence committees on its progress. Section 311. Study on reduction of analytic duplication Section 311 requires the Director of National Intelligence to carry out a study to identify duplicative analytic products and the reasons for such duplication, ascertain the frequency and types of such duplication, and determine whether this review should be considered a part of the responsibilities assigned to the Analytic Integrity and Standards office inside the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Section 311 also requires the Director to provide a plan for revising analytic practice, tradecraft, and standards to ensure customers are able to readily identify how analytic products on similar topics that are produced contemporaneously differ from one another and what is the significance of those differences. Section 312. Strategy for comprehensive interagency review of the United States national security overhead satellite architecture Section 312 requires the Director of National Intelligence, in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy, with milestones and benchmarks, to ensure that there is a comprehensive interagency review of policies and practices for planning and acquiring national security satellite systems and architectures, including the capabilities of commercial systems and partner countries, consistent with the National Space Policy issued on June 28, 2010. Where applicable, this strategy shall account for the unique missions and authorities vested in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. Section 313. Cyber attack standards of measurement study Section 313 directs the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Defense, to carry out a study to determine the appropriate standards to measure the damage of cyber incidents. Title IV--Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community subtitle a--office of the director of national intelligence Section 401. Appointment and confirmation of the National Counterintelligence Executive Section 401 makes subject to Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, the executive branch position of National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), which was created by the 2002 Counterintelligence Enhancement Act. Effective December 2014, the NCIX was also dual-hatted as the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center. Section 402. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 5, United States Code Section 402 amends 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5102(a)(1) to expressly exclude the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) from the provisions of chapter 51 of title 5, relating to position classification, pay, and allowances for General Schedule employees, which does not apply to ODNI by virtue of the National Security Act. This proposal would have no substantive effect. Section 403. Analytic Objectivity Review The Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) office was established in response to the requirement in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) for the designation of an entity responsible for ensuring that the Intelligence Community's finished intelligence products are timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based upon all sources of available intelligence, and demonstrative of the standards of proper analytic tradecraft. Consistent with responsibilities prescribed under IRTPA, Section 403 requires the AIS Chief to conduct a review of finished intelligence products produced by the CIA to assess whether the reorganization of the Agency, announced publicly on March 6, 2015, has resulted in any loss of analytic objectivity. The report is due no later than March 6, 2017. subtitle b--central intelligence agency and other elements Section 411. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central Intelligence Agency Section 411 amends Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to consolidate the Inspector General's personnel authorities and to provide the Inspector General with the same authorities as other Inspectors General to request assistance and information from federal, state, and local agencies or units thereof. Section 412. Prior congressional notification of transfers of funds for certain intelligence activities Section 412 requires notification to the congressional intelligence committees before transferring funds from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund that are to be used for intelligence activities. Title V--Matters Relating to Foreign Countries subtitle a--matters relating to russia Section 501. Notice of deployment or transfer of Club-K container missile system by the Russian Federation Section 501 requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit written notice to the appropriate congressional committees if the Intelligence Community receives intelligence that the Russian Federation has deployed, or is about to deploy, the Club-K container missile system through the Russian military, or transferred or sold, or intends to transfer or sell, such system to another state or non-state actor. Section 502. Assessment on funding of political parties and nongovernmental organizations by the Russian Federation Section 502 requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit an Intelligence Community assessment to the appropriate congressional committees concerning the funding of political parties and nongovernmental organizations in the former Soviet States and Europe by the Russian Security Services since January 1, 2006, not later than 180 days after the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act. Section 503. Assessment on the use of political assassinations as a form of statecraft by the Russian Federation Section 503 requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit an Intelligence Community assessment concerning the use of political assassinations as a form of statecraft by the Russian Federation to the appropriate congressional committees, not later than 180 days after the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act. subtitle b--matters relating to other countries Section 511. Report of resources and collection posture with regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea Section 511 requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit to the appropriate congressional committees an Intelligence Community assessment on Intelligence Community resourcing and collection posture with regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea, not later than 180 days after the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act. Section 512. Use of locally employed staff serving at a United States diplomatic facility in Cuba Section 512 requires the Secretary of State, not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, to ensure that key supervisory positions at a United States diplomatic facility in Cuba are occupied by citizens of the United States who have passed a thorough background check. Further, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the provision requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with other appropriate government agencies, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to further reduce the reliance on locally employed staff in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba. The plan shall, at a minimum, include cost estimates, timelines, and numbers of employees to be replaced. Section 513. Inclusion of sensitive compartmented information facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba Section 513 requires that each United States diplomatic facility in Cuba--in which classified information will be processed or in which classified communications occur--that is constructed, or undergoes a construction upgrade, be constructed to include a sensitive compartmented information facility. Section 514. Report on use by Iran of funds made available through sanctions relief Section 514 requires the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the monetary value of any direct or indirect form of sanctions relief Iran has received since the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) entered into effect, and how Iran has used funds made available through such sanctions relief. This report shall be submitted every 180 days while the JPOA is in effect, and not later than 1 year after an agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program takes effect, and annually thereafter while that agreement remains in effect. Title VI--Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Section 601. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release of individual detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States Section 601 states that no amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the Intelligence Community may be used to transfer or release individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions. Section 602. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or modify facilities in the United States to house detainees transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Section 602 states that no amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the Intelligence Community may be used to construct or modify facilities in the United States, its territories, or possessions to house detainees transferred from Guantanamo Bay. Section 603. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release to certain countries of individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Section 603 states that no amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the Intelligence Community may be used to transfer or release an individual detained at Guantanamo Bay to the custody or control of any country, or any entity within such country, as follows: Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen. Title VII--Reports and Other Matters subtitle a--reports Section 701. Repeal of certain reporting requirements Section 701 repeals certain reporting requirements. Section 702. Reports on foreign fighters Section 702 requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report every 60 days for the three years following the enactment of this Act to the congressional intelligence committees on foreign fighter flows to and from Syria and Iraq. Section 702 requires information on the total number of foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria or Iraq, the total number of United States persons who have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq, the total number of foreign fighters in Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, the total number of foreign fighters who have been processed with biometrics, any programmatic updates to the foreign fighter report, and a worldwide graphic that describes foreign fighter flows to and from Syria. Section 703. Report on strategy, efforts, and resources to detect, deter, and degrade Islamic State revenue mechanisms Section 703 requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report on the strategy, efforts, and resources of the Intelligence Community that are necessary to detect, deter, and degrade the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic State. Section 704. Report on United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Islamic State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents Section 704 requires the President to submit to the appropriated congressional committees a comprehensive report on the counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Islamic State, al- Qa'ida, and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents. Section 705. Report on effects of data breach of Office of Personnel Management Section 705 requires the President to transmit to the congressional intelligence communities a report on the data breach of the Office of Personnel Management. Section 705 requires information on the impact of the breach on Intelligence Community operations abroad, in addition to an assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or countries may use data collected by the breach and what Federal Government agencies use best practices to protect sensitive data. Section 706. Report on hiring of graduates of Cyber Corps Scholarship Program by intelligence community Section 706 requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the employment by the Intelligence Community of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. Section 706 requires information on the number of graduates hired by each element of the Intelligence Community, the recruitment process for each element of the Intelligence Community, and the Director recommendations for improving the hiring process. Section 707. Report on use of certain business concerns Section 707 requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report of covered business concerns--including minority-owned, women-owned, small disadvantaged, service-enabled veteran-owned, and veteran-owned small businesses--among contractors that are awarded contracts by the Intelligence Community for goods, equipment, tools and services. subtitle b--other matters Section 711. Use of homeland security grant funds in conjunction with Department of Energy national laboratories Section 711 amends Section 2008 (a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to clarify that the Department of Energy's national laboratories may seek access to homeland security grant funds. Section 712. Inclusion of certain minority-serving institutions in grant program to enhance recruiting of intelligence community workforce Section 712 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to include certain minority-serving institutions in the intelligence officer training programs established under Section 1024 of the Act. The following consists of the joint explanatory statement to accompany Division N, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. This joint explanatory statement reflects the status of negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the House Committee on Homeland Security. The joint explanatory statement shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference. The joint explanatory statement comprises an overview of the bill's background and objectives, and a section-by-section analysis of the legislative text. Part I: Background and Need for Legislation Cybersecurity threats continue to affect our nation's security and its economy, as losses to consumers, businesses, and the government from cyber attacks, penetrations, and disruptions total billions of dollars. This legislation is designed to create a voluntary cybersecurity information sharing process that will encourage public and private sector entities to share cyber threat information, without legal barriers and the threat of unfounded litigation--while protecting private information. This in turn should foster greater cooperation and collaboration in the face of growing cybersecurity threats to national and economic security. This legislation also includes provisions to improve Federal network and information system security, provide assessments on the Federal cybersecurity workforce, and provide reporting and strategies on cybersecurity industry-related and criminal-related matters. The increased information sharing enabled by this bill is a critical step toward improving cybersecurity in America. Part II: Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Legislative Text The following is a section-by-section analysis and explanation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. Title I--Cybersecurity Information Sharing Section 101. Short title. Section 101 states that Title I may be cited as the ``Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.'' Section 102. Definitions. Section 102 defines for purposes of this title key terms such as ``cybersecurity purpose,'' ``cybersecurity threat,'' ``cyber threat indicator,'' ``defensive measure,'' and ``monitor.'' The definition of ``cybersecurity purpose'' is meant to include a broad range of activities taken to protect information and information systems from cybersecurity threats. The authorizations under this Act are tied to conduct undertaken for a ``cybersecurity purpose,'' which both clarifies their scope and ensures that the authorizations cover activities that can be performed in conjunction with one another. For instance, a private entity conducting monitoring activities to determine whether it should use an authorized ``defensive measure'' would be monitoring for a ``cybersecurity purpose.'' Significantly, the authorization for ``defensive measures'' does not include activities that are generally considered ``offensive'' in nature, such as unauthorized access of, or execution of computer code on, another entity's information systems, such as ``hacking back'' activities, or any actions that would substantially harm another private entity's information systems, such as violations of section 1030, of title 18, United States Code. Section 103. Sharing of information by the Federal Government. Section 103 requires the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General to jointly develop and issue procedures for the timely sharing of classified and unclassified cyber threat indicators and defensive measures (hereinafter referenced collectively in this joint explanatory statement as, ``cyber threat information'') with relevant entities. These procedures must also ensure the Federal Government maintains: a real-time sharing capability; a process for notifying entities that have received cyber threat information in error; protections against unauthorized access; and procedures to review and remove, prior to sharing cyber threat information, any information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat known at the time of sharing to be personal information of a specific individual or that identifies a specific individual, or to implement a technical capability to do the same. These procedures must be developed in consultation with appropriate Federal entities, including the Small Business Administration and the National Laboratories. Section 104. Authorizations for preventing, detecting, analyzing, and mitigating cybersecurity threats. Section 104 authorizes private entities to monitor their information systems, operate defensive measures, and share and receive cyber threat information. Private entities must, prior to sharing cyber threat information, review and remove any information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat known at the time of sharing to be personal information of a specific individual or that identifies a specific individual, or to implement and utilize a technical capability to do the same. Section 104 permits non-Federal entities to use cyber threat information for cybersecurity purposes, to monitor, or to operate defensive measures on their information systems or on those of another entity (upon written consent). Cyber threat information shared by an entity with a State, tribal, or local department or agency may be used for the purpose of preventing, investigating, or prosecuting any of the offenses described in Section 105, below. Cyber threat information is exempt from disclosure under any State, tribal, local, or freedom of information or similar law. Section 104 further provides that two or more private entities are not in violation of antitrust laws for exchanging or providing cyber threat information, or for assisting with the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of a cybersecurity threat. Section 105. Sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with the Federal Government. Section 105 directs the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security to jointly develop policies and procedures to govern how the Federal Government shares information about cyber threats, including via an automated real-time process that allows for information systems to exchange identified cyber threat information without manual efforts, subject to limited exceptions that must be agreed upon in advance. Section 105 also directs the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with heads of appropriate Federal entities and in consultation with certain privacy officials and relevant private entities, to jointly issue and make publicly available final privacy and civil liberties guidelines for Federal entity-based cyber information sharing. Section 105 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with heads of appropriate Federal entities, to develop, implement, and certify the capability and process through which the Federal Government receives cyber threat information shared by a non- Federal entity with the Federal Government. This section also provides the President with the authority to designate an appropriate Federal entity, other than the Department of Defense (including the National Security Agency), to develop and implement an additional capability and process following a certification and explanation to Congress, as described in this section. The capability and process at the Department of Homeland Security, or at any additional appropriate Federal entity designated by the President, does not prohibit otherwise lawful disclosures of information related to criminal activities, Federal investigations, or statutorily or contractually required disclosures. However, this section does not preclude the Department of Defense, including the National Security Agency from assisting in the development and implementation of a capability and process established consistent with this title. It also shall not be read to preclude any department or agency from requesting technical assistance or staffing a request for technical assistance. Section 105 further provides that cyber threat information shared with the Federal Government does not waive any privilege or protection, may be deemed proprietary information by the originating entity, and is exempt from certain disclosure laws. Cyber threat information may be used by the Federal government for: cybersecurity purposes; identifying a cybersecurity threat or vulnerability; responding to, preventing, or mitigating a specific threat of death, a specific threat of serious bodily harm, or a specific threat of serious economic harm, including a terrorist act or a use of a weapon of mass destruction; responding to, investigating, prosecuting, preventing, or mitigating a serious threat to a minor; or preventing, investigating, disrupting, or prosecuting an offense arising out of certain cyber-related criminal activities. Finally, Section 105 provides that cyber threat information shared with the Federal Government shall not be used by any Federal, State, tribal, or local government to regulate non-Federal entities' lawful activities. Section 106. Protection from liability. Section 106 provides liability protection for private entities that monitor, share, or receive cyber threat information in accordance with Title I, notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, local, or tribal law. Section 106 further clarifies that nothing in Title I creates a duty to share cyber threat information or a duty to warn or act based on receiving cyber threat information. At the same time, nothing in Title I broadens, narrows, or otherwise affects any existing duties that might be imposed by other law; Title I also does not limit any common law or statutory defenses. Section 107. Oversight of Government activities. Section 107 requires reports and recommendations on implementation, compliance, and privacy assessments by agency heads, Inspectors General, and the Comptroller General of the United States, to ensure that cyber threat information is properly received, handled, and shared by the Federal Government. Section 108. Construction and preemption. Section 108 contains Title I construction provisions regarding lawful disclosures; whistleblower protections; protection of sources and methods; relationship to other laws; prohibited conduct, such as anti- competitive activities; information sharing relationships; preservation of contractual rights and obligations; anti-tasking restrictions, including conditions on cyber threat information sharing; information use and retention; Federal preemption of State laws that restrict or regulate Title I activities, excluding those concerning the use of authorized law enforcement practices and procedures; regulatory authorities; the Secretary of Defense's authorities to conduct certain cyber operations; and Constitutional protections in criminal prosecutions. Section 109. Report on cybersecurity threats. Section 109 requires the Director of National Intelligence, with the heads of other appropriate Intelligence Community elements, to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees on cybersecurity threats, including cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches. Section 110 Exception to limitation on authority of Secretary of Defense to disseminate certain information. Section 110 clarifies that, notwithstanding Section 393(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense may authorize the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures pursuant to the policies, procedures, and guidelines developed or issued under this title. Section 111. Effective period. Section 111 establishes Title I and the amendments therein are effective during the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2025. The provisions of Title I will remain in effect however, for action authorized by Title I or information obtained pursuant to action authorized by Title I, prior to September 30, 2025. Title II--National Cybersecurity Advancement subtitle a--national cybersecurity and communications integration center Section 201. Short title. Section 201 establishes that Title II, Subtitle A may be cited as the ``National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015''. Section 202. Definitions. Section 202 defines for purposes of Title II, Subtitle A, the terms ``appropriate congressional committees,'' ``cybersecurity risk,'' ``incident,'' ``cyber threat indicator,'' ``defensive measure,'' ``Department,'' and ``Secretary.'' Section 203. Information sharing structure and processes. Section 203 enhances the functions of the Department of Homeland Security's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, established in section 227 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (redesignated by this Act). It designates the Center as a Federal civilian interface for multi-directional and cross-sector information sharing related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, analysis and warnings for Federal and non-Federal entities, including the implementation of Title I of this Act. This section requires the Center to engage with international partners; conduct information sharing with Federal and non-Federal entities; participate in national exercises; and assess and evaluate consequence, vulnerability and threat information regarding cyber incidents to public safety communications. Additionally, this section requires the Center to collaborate with state and local governments on cybersecurity risks and incidents. The Center will comply with all policies, regulations, and laws that protect the privacy and civil liberties of United States persons, including by working with the Privacy Officer to ensure the Center follows the privacy policies and procedures established by title I of this Act. Section 203 requires the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with industry and other stakeholders, to develop an automated capability for the timely sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. It is critical for the Department to develop an automated system and supporting processes for the Center to disseminate cyber threat indicators and defensive measures in a timely manner. This section permits the Center to enter into voluntary information sharing relationships with any consenting non-Federal entity for the sharing of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and information for cybersecurity purposes. This section is intended to provide the Department of Homeland Security additional options to enter into streamlined voluntary information sharing agreements. This section allows the Center to utilize standard and negotiated agreements as the types of agreements that non-Federal entities may enter into with the Center. However, it makes clear that agreements are not limited to just these types, and preexisting agreements between the Center and the non- Federal entity will be in compliance with this section. Section 203 requires the Director of the Center to report directly to the Secretary for significant cybersecurity risks and incidents. This section requires the Secretary to submit to Congress a report on the range of efforts underway to bolster cybersecurity collaboration with international partners. Section 203 allows the Secretary to develop and adhere to Department policies and procedures for coordinating vulnerability disclosures. Section 204. Information sharing and analysis organizations. Section 204 amends Section 212 of the Homeland Security Act to clarify the functions of Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISA0s) to include cybersecurity risk and incident information beyond that pertaining to critical infrastructure. ISA0s, including Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) have an important role to play in facilitating information sharing going forward and has clarified their functions as defined in the Homeland Security Act. Section 205. National response framework Section 205 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, with proper coordination, to regularly update the Cyber Incident Annex to the National Response Framework of the Department of Homeland Security. Section 206 Report on reducing cybersecurity risks in DHS data centers. Section 206 requires the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act on the feasibility of using compartmentalization between systems to create conditions conducive to reduced cybersecurity risks in data centers. Section 207. Assessment. Section 207 requires the Comptroller General of the United States not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act to submit a report on the implementation of Title II, including increases in the sharing of cyber threat indicators at the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center and throughout the United States. Section 208. Multiple simultaneous cyber incidents at critical infrastructure. Section 208 requires the appropriate Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary to draft and submit to Congress not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act a report on the feasibility of producing a risk-informed plan to address the risks of multiple simultaneous cyber incidents affecting critical infrastructure as well as cascade effects. Section 209. Report on cybersecurity vulnerabilities of United States ports. Section 209 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act to submit to Congress a report on the vulnerability of United States ports to cybersecurity incidents, as well as potential mitigations. Section 210. Prohibition on new regulatory authority. Section 210 clarifies that the Secretary of Homeland Security does not gain any additional regulatory authorities in this subtitle. Section 211. Termination of reporting requirements. Section 211 adds a 7-year sunset on the reporting requirements in Title II, Subtitle A. subtitle b--federal cyberseccrity enhancement Section 221. Short title. Section 221 establishes that Title II, Subtitle B may be cited as the ``Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015''. Section 222. Definitions. Section 222 defines for purposes of Title II, Subtitle B, the terms ``agency,'' ``agency information system,'' ``appropriate congressional committees,'' ``cybersecurity risk,'' ``information system,'' ``Director,'' ``intelligence community,'' ``national security system,'' and ``Secretary.'' Section 223. Improved Federal network security. Section 223 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by amending Section 228, as redesignated, to require an intrusion assessment plan for Federal agencies and adding a Section 230 to authorize a federal intrusion detection and prevention capabilities'' for Federal agencies. Section 230 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by Section 223(a) of the bill, authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to employ the Department's intrusion detection and intrusion prevention capabilities, operationally implemented under the ``EINSTEIN'' programs, to scan agencies' network traffic for malicious activity and block it. The Secretary and agencies with sensitive data are expected to confer regarding the sensitivity of, and statutory protections otherwise applicable to, information on agency information systems. The Secretary is expected to ensure that the policies and procedures developed under section 230 appropriately restrict and limit Department access, use, retention, and handling of such information to protect the privacy and confidentiality of such information, including ensuring that the Department protects such sensitive data from disclosure, and trains appropriate staff accordingly. Section 223(b) mandates that agencies deploy and adopt those capabilities within one year for all network traffic traveling to or from each information system owned or operated by the agency, or two months after the capabilities are first made available to the agency, whichever is later. The subsection also requires that agencies adopt improvements added to the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities six months after they are made available. Improvements is intended to be read broadly to describe expansion of the capabilities, new systems, and added technologies, for example: non-signature based detection systems such as heuristic- and behavior-based detection, new countermeasures to block malicious traffic beyond e-mail filtering and Domain Name System (DNS)-sinkholing,\1\ and scanning techniques that allow scanning of encrypted traffic. Section 224. Advanced internal defenses. Section 224 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to add advanced network security tools to the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program; develop and implement a plan to ensure agency use of advanced network security tools; and, with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, prioritize advanced security tools and update metrics used to measure security under the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. Section 225. Federal cybersecurity requirements. Section 225 adds a statutory requirement for the head of each agency not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act to implement several standards on their networks to include identification of sensitive and mission critical data, use of encryption, and multi- factor authentication. Section 226. Assessment; reports. Section 226 includes a requirement for a Government Accountability Office study to be conducted on the effectiveness of this approach and strategy. It also requires reports from the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Chief Information Officer, and the Office of Management and Budget. Required reporting includes an annual report from the Department of Homeland Security on the effectiveness and privacy controls of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities; information on adoption of the intrusion detection and capabilities at agencies in the Office of Management and Budget's annual Federal Information Security Management Act report; an assessment by the Federal Chief Information Officer within two years of enactment as to continued value of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities; and a Government Accountability report in three years on the effectiveness of Federal agencies' approach to securing agency information systems. Section 227. Termination. Section 227 creates a 7-year sunset for the authorization of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities in Section 230 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by Section 223(a). Section 228. Identification of information systems relating to national security. Section 228 requires the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Management, in coordination with other agencies, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act to identify unclassified information systems that could reveal classified information, and submit a report assessing the risks associated with a breach of such systems and the costs and impact to designate such systems as national security systems. Section 229. Direction to agencies. Section 229 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to issue an emergency directive to the head of an agency to take any lawful action with respect to the operation of an information system for the purpose of protecting such system from an information security threat. In situations in which the Secretary has determined there is an imminent threat to an agency, the Secretary may authorize the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities in accordance with established procedures, including notice to the affected agency. Title III--Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Section 301. Short title. Section 301 establishes Title III may be cited as the ``Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015''. Section 302. Definitions. Section 302 defines for purposes of Title III the terms ``appropriate congressional committees,'' ``Director,'' ``National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education,'' and ``work roles.'' Section 303. National cybersecurity workforce measurement initiative. Section 303 requires the head of each Federal agency to identify all positions within the agency that require the performance of cybersecurity or other cyber-related functions, and report the percentage of personnel in such positions holding the appropriate certifications, the level of preparedness of personnel without certifications to take certification exams, and a strategy for mitigating any identified certification and training gaps. Section 304. Identification of cyber-related work roles of critical need. Section 304 requires the head of each Federal agency to identify information technology, cybersecurity, or other cyber-related roles of critical need in the agency's workforce, and substantiate as such in a report to the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. Section 304 also requires the Director of the Office of Personnel Management to submit a subsequent report not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, on critical needs for information technology, cybersecurity, or other cyber-related workforce across all Federal agencies, and the implementation of this section. Section 305. Government Accountability Office status reports. Section 305 requires the Comptroller General of the United States to analyze and monitor the implementation of sections 303 and 304 and not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act submit a report on the status of such implementation. Title IV--Other Cyber Matters Section 401. Study on mobile device security. Section 401 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act to conduct a study on threats relating to the security of the mobile devices used by the Federal Government, and submit a report detailing the findings and recommendations arising from such study. Section 402. Department of State international cyberspace policy strategy. Section 402 requires the Secretary of State not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act to produce a comprehensive strategy relating to United States international policy with regard to cyberspace, to include a review of actions taken by the Secretary of State in support of the President's International Strategy for Cyberspace and a description of threats to United States national security in cyberspace. Section 403. Apprehension and prosecution of international cyber criminals. Section 403 requires the Secretary of State, or a designee, to consult with countries in which international cyber criminals are physically present and extradition to the United States is unlikely, to determine what efforts the foreign country has taken to apprehend, prosecute, or otherwise prevent the carrying out of cybercrimes against United States persons or interests. Section 403 further requires an annual report that includes statistics and extradition status about such international cyber criminals. Section 404. Enhancement of emergency services. Section 404 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act to establish a process by which a Statewide Interoperability Coordinator may report data on any cybersecurity risk or incident involving any information system or network used by emergency response providers within the state. Reported data will be analyzed and used in developing information and recommendations on security and resilience on measures for information systems and networks used by state emergency response providers. Section 405. Improving cybersecurity in the health care industry. Section 405 requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a task force and not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of the task force to submit a report on the Department of Health and Human Services and the health care industry's preparedness to respond to cybersecurity threats. In support of the report, the Secretary of Health and Human Services will convene health care industry stakeholders, cybersecurity experts, and other appropriate entities, to establish a task force for analyzing and disseminating information on industry-specific cybersecurity challenges and solutions. Consistent with subsection (e), it is Congress's intention to allow Health and Human Services the flexibility to leverage and incorporate ongoing activities as of the day before the date of enactment of this act to accomplish the goals set forth for this task force. Section 406. Federal computer security. Section 406 requires the Inspector General of any agency operating a national security system, or a Federal computer system that provides access to personally identifiable information, not later than 240 days after the date of enactment of this Act to submit a report regarding the federal computer systems of such agency, to include information on the standards and processes for granting or denying specific requests to obtain and use information and related information processing services, and a description of the data security management practices used by the agency. Section 407. Stopping the fraudulent sale offinancial information of people of the United States. Section 407 amends 18 U.S. Code Sec. 1029 by enabling the Federal Government to prosecute overseas criminals who profit from financial information that has been stolen from Americans. endnote \1\ Use of a DNS server configured to direct attackers away from network infrastructure.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 4127) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 4127.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, when Ranking Member Schiff and I assumed the helm of the Intelligence Committee, we committed to carrying on the practice of passing annual intelligence authorization bills, which is the most important tool Congress can use to control the intelligence activities of the United States Government. Today, building on the legacy of Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger, we are bringing the sixth consecutive intelligence authorization bill to the floor. Earlier this year the House passed its version of the bill with a strong vote. Since then, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported out its version of the bill by a unanimous consent vote. I commend Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Feinstein for their leadership on the bill, and I look forward to working with them in future years. The current bill contains text agreed to by both the House and the Senate committees. It preserves key House initiatives while adding several important provisions from the Senate. None of these provisions are considered controversial. As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, the bulk of the direction is found in the bill's classified annex, which has been available in HVC-304 for all Members to review since yesterday. At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex is consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. It reduces the President's request by less than 1 percent while still providing an increase above last year's level. The agreed text preserves key committee and House funding initiatives that are vital to national security. These initiatives are offset by reductions to unnecessary programs and increased efficiencies. The agreement also provides substantial intelligence resources to help defeat ISIS and other terrorist groups. Mr. Speaker, today the threat facing America is higher than at any time since 9/11. ISIS has established a safe haven across Iraq and Syria, and the group hopes to create a state stretching from Lebanon to Iraq, including Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The goal of our counterterrorism strategy should be to deny safe havens from which terrorists can plot attacks against the United States and our allies. Regrettably, we have not prevented ISIS from establishing a safe haven and the group has become skilled at hiding from western intelligence services. ISIS members have used that breathing room to plan attacks in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, and they are undoubtedly planning attacks against the United States. We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policymakers with the best and most timely information possible on the threats we face. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train, plan, and fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that steal American jobs. We ask them to track nuclear missile threats. We demand that they get it right every time. This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our intelligence community have the funding, authorities, and support they need to carry out their mission and to keep us safe. Before closing, I want to take a moment to thank the men and women of this country who serve in our intelligence community. I am honored to get to know so many of them in the course of our oversight work. I would also like to thank all the staff of the committee, both majority and minority, for their hard work on the bill and for their daily oversight of the intelligence community. I would especially like to thank Jeff Shockey, Shannon Stuart, Andy Peterson, Jake Crisp, and Michael Ellis for all the long hours they put in to get this bill across the finish line. From the minority staff, I would like to thank Michael Bahar, Tim Bergreen, Carly Blake, and Wells Bennett for their work on the bill. Finally, thank you to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff). It has been a pleasure to work with him on this bill, and I look forward to continuing the committee's oversight work with him over the next year. I would also like to recognize one member of the committee staff, Bill Flanigan. Bill is undergoing surgery today. We wish him all the best in his recovery. I urge passage of H.R. 4127. I reserve the balance of my time. Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 The following consists of the joint explanatory statement to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. This joint explanatory statement reflects the status of negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter, ``the Agreement''). The joint explanatory statement shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference. The joint explanatory statement comprises three parts: first, an overview of the application of the annex to accompany this statement; second, select unclassified congressional direction; and third, a section-by-section analysis of the unclassified legislative text.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I insert in the Record at this point the second part of the joint explanatory statement.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, before I close, I want to reiterate that the bill is the most effective way for Congress to carry out oversight of intelligence activities. This bill forces the executive branch to remain responsive to congressional direction and priorities. As the recent terrorist attacks in Paris show, our enemies are rapidly improving their ability to launch deadly strikes against the United States and our allies. Given these elevated threat levels, it is crucial that our intelligence professionals receive the resources they need to keep Americans safe. This bill will authorize those resources while ensuring full congressional oversight of the intelligence community. I urge my colleagues to vote for the bill. In closing, Mr. Speaker, I want to again thank Mr. Schiff for his congeniality and all of his staff's work and our staff's work on our side. Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of the bill. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that proceedings by which the motion to reconsider was laid upon the table and by which the motion that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 4127) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, was adopted be vacated to the end that the Chair put the question de novo.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I rise today alongside my colleagues, Representative Costa and Representative Valadao, to recognize the life and valued service of Dr. Charles ``Charlie'' Allen Waters, Jr., a distinguished military veteran and community advocate who passed away on September 3, 2015 in Fresno, California. Dr. Waters was born on September 17, 1932 in Norfolk, Virginia. He was the son of Naval Officer Charles Allen Waters, Sr. Charlie served in the United States Marine Corps (USMC) from 1951 to 1958 and fought in the Korean War from 1951 to 1952. Charlie received many medals and awards for his honorable service in Korea, most recently the Korean Ambassador for Peace Medal. For the past few decades, Charlie made an immeasurable impact in Fresno and the greater San Joaquin Valley by serving on numerous boards, commissions, and foundations supporting veterans, and the community as a whole. The opening of the Fresno Veterans Home was due in large part to his invaluable and tireless efforts. Dr. Waters served as President of the Central California Veterans Home Support Foundation (CCVHSF), was Past Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps League Detachment 14, and Commander of American Legion Post 4, in addition to his many unofficial contributions to other local organizations. A diligent champion of Fresno veterans, Dr. Waters once said, ``I have a great affinity for anyone who would go into service and volunteer their life. So, whatever I can do for my comrades, I do.'' These words speak to his deep commitment to service and his inexhaustible altruism. Mr. Speaker, it is with great respect that we ask our colleagues in the House of Representatives to honor the life of Dr. Charlie Waters. He will always be remembered as a man of great service and dedication. It is our hope that his memory will live on through his family, the veterans groups he guided and supported and we trust that his legacy will live on for years to come.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, Tuesday, September 29th marks the 25th anniversary of the last covert U.S. airborne reconnaissance mission flown into Berlin, Germany, by the U.S. Air Force aircrews affectionately known as the ``Berlin for Lunch Bunch.'' From the beginning of the Cold War, these aircrews flew combat reconnaissance missions within the Russian-controlled airspace of the Berlin access corridors and the Berlin Control Zone. From 1946 to 1990, these Airmen conducted over fifteen thousand unarmed reconnaissance flights, monitoring the massed forces of the Group Soviet Forces in Germany and the East German military. The highly modified aircraft flew low and slow over the many Soviet and East German military facilities, collecting photographic and other intelligence that provided NATO the indications and warning information necessary to prepare for a Central European war. Their accomplishments are truly part of our proud American and allied intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance history, and it is my honor to acknowledge their sacrifices for all of us. Thank you, and well done ``Berlin for Lunch Bunch!''

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, although the Obama administration has pitched the Iran nuclear accord as a way to prevent the Ayatollahs from developing nuclear weapons, the agreement lifts the key restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities after 10 to 15 years. Many of my fellow Members wonder how the administration can be so naive as to pave the way for an Iranian bomb in the course of trying to prevent an Iranian bomb. Well, the answer is clear to me. The President is gambling. He is betting that the very act of engaging with Iran will moderate the regime's behavior so that, in a decade or so from now, we won't have to worry about it anymore. He has called his engagement with Iran a calculated risk. Indeed, it is a risk. As I said, the President is placing a bet; but why would anyone bet on the moderation of the Iranian regime? It has not changed one iota since the Ayatollahs seized power in 1979. Thirty-six years later, Iran is the world's biggest state sponsor of terrorism. It is also responsible for the deaths of thousands of U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Obama has spoken of the Ayatollah Khamenei as possibly seeking to rejoin the community of nations. This is a thin reed to justify giving Iran a path to the bomb in the near future. With their ritual ``death to America'' chants, I don't know how the Iranians could make it any more clear that they do not want to rejoin the community of nations. They want to blow up the community of nations. Soon after the Iranian agreement was signed, Khamenei himself tweeted a silhouette image of President Obama holding a gun to his head. I just don't understand what is more clear that this regime could do to make its intentions clearer to the American people, but our President sees things differently. As he told The New York Times, if the nuclear agreement is signed, ``Who knows? Iran may change.'' Well, consider this: if you are rolling the dice at a casino, who knows? You may roll a 7. If you are at the roulette wheel, who knows? It may land on your number. When you are gambling, one thing is for sure; in the long run, the casino always wins. Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, this is not about a casino, nor is it about a gambler losing money. This is about gambling on human lives, U.S. lives and our Western allies' lives.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, for 7 or 8 years, continually, the Republicans have offered solutions and, continually, nearly all of the Democrats have voted ``no.'' This isn't about solutions, because the real solution the left wants is to idle over a million acres of farm ground in the San Joaquin Valley. This is why the forefathers of our State built a system that would withstand a drought of 5 years. Look, we need additional storage, but everyone in this body--anyone who knows anything about water--knows that, if you don't fix the plumbing in the delta, if you don't deal with the San Joaquin River settlement and if you don't build a few new storage projects, over a million acres of farm ground are going to go idle. Those are the facts. Conveniently, most of my friends who are up here speaking on the left live in the coastal areas and get their water-- they steal their water--from our area to give themselves pristine drinking water. That is what they do. Now we are going to be left with the chaos that has developed from over a million acres of farm ground coming out of production unless the Senate can take and act on this legislation quickly. Mr. Chair, in the summer of 2002, shortly before I was elected to Congress, I sat through an eye-opening meeting with representatives from the Natural Resources Defense Council and several local environmental activist groups. Hoping to convince me to support various water restrictions, they argued that San Joaquin Valley farmers should stop growing alfalfa and cotton in order to save water--though they allowed that the planting of high-value crops such as almonds could continue. Then, as our discussion turned to the groups' overall vision for the San Joaquin Valley, they told me something astonishing: Their goal was to remove 1.3 million acres of farmland from production. They showed me maps that laid out their whole plan: From Merced all the way down to Bakersfield, and on the entire west side of the Valley as well as part of the east side, productive agriculture would end and the land would return to some ideal state of nature. I was stunned by the vicious audacity of their goal--and I quickly learned how dedicated they were to realizing it. How to Steal Water and get away with it For decades, extreme environmentalists have pursued this goal in California with relentless determination. The method they have used to depopulate the targeted land--water deprivation--has been ruthless and effective. Much of the media and many politicians blame the San Joaquin Valley's water shortage on drought, but that is merely an aggravating factor. From my experience representing California's agricultural heartland, I know that our water crisis is not an unfortunate natural occurrence; it is the intended result of a long-term campaign waged by radical environmentalists who resorted to political pressure as well as profuse lawsuits. Working in cooperation with sympathetic judges and friendly federal and state officials, environmental groups have gone to extreme lengths to deprive the San Joaquin Valley, the heart of much of the U.S. agricultural production, of much-needed water. Consider the following actions they took: The Central Valley Project Improvement Act: Backed by the NRDC, Sierra Club and other extreme environmental groups, large Democratic majorities in Congress passed the CVPIA in 1992 after attaching it to a must-pass public lands bill. The act stipulated that 800,000 acre-feet of water--or 260 billion gallons--on the Valley's west side had to be diverted annually to environmental causes, with an additional 400,000 acre-feet later being diverted annually to wildlife refuges. Smelt and salmon biological opinions: Lawsuits filed by the NRDC and similar organizations forced the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service to issue, respectively, biological opinions on smelt (in 2008) and on salmon (in 2009). These opinions virtually ended operation of the Jones and Banks pumping plants--the two major pumping stations that move San Joaquin River Delta water--and resulted in massive diversions of water for environmental purposes. The San Joaquin River Settlement: After nearly two decades of litigation related to a lawsuit filed in 1988 by the National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club and other environmental groups, San Joaquin Valley agriculture organizations agreed to a settlement in 2006, later approved by a Democratic Congress and signed into law by President Obama. The settlement created the San Joaquin River Restoration Program. The program, which aims to create salmon runs along the San Joaquin River, required major new water diversions from Valley communities. Despite warnings from me and other California Republicans, agriculture groups naively approved the settlement based on false promises by the settlement's supporters that Valley water supplies would eventually be restored at some future, unspecified date. Groundwater regulation: In September 2014, California Gov. Jerry Brown approved regulations requiring that water basins implement plans to achieve ``groundwater sustainability''--essentially limiting how much water locals can use from underground storage supplies. But these pumping restrictions, slated to take effect over the next decade, will reduce access to what has become the final water source for many Valley communities, which have increasingly turned to groundwater pumping as their surface water supplies were drastically cut. A Litany Of Hypocrisy As radical groups have pursued this campaign to dry up the San Joaquin Valley, it's worth noting some of their stunning contradictions, hypocrisies, fallacies and failures: ``There's not enough water in California'': Environmentalists often claim that the California water crisis stems from the state not having enough water to satisfy its rapidly growing population, especially during a drought. However, the state in fact has abundant water flowing into the Delta, which is the heart of California's irrigation structure. Water that originates in the snowpack of the Sierra Nevada Mountains runs off into the Delta, which has two pumping stations that help distribute the water throughout the state. But on average, due to environmental regulations as well as a lack of water storage capacity (attributable, in large part, to activist groups' opposition to new storage projects), 70% of the water that enters the Delta is simply flushed into the ocean. California's water infrastructure was designed to withstand five years of drought, so the current crisis, which began about three years ago, should not be a crisis at all. During those three years, the state has flushed more than 2 million acre-feet of water--or 652 billion gallons--into the ocean due to the aforementioned biological opinions, which have prevented the irrigation infrastructure from operating at full capacity. ``Farmers use 80% of California's water'': Having deliberately reduced the California water supply through decades of litigation, the radicals now need a scapegoat for the resulting crisis. So they blame farmers (``big agriculture,'' as they call them) for using 80% of the state's water. This statistic, widely parroted by the media and some politicians, is a gross distortion. Of the water that is captured for use, farmers get 40%, cities get 10% and a full 50% goes to environmental purposes--that is, it gets flushed into the ocean. By arbitrarily excluding the huge environmental water diversion from their calculations--as if it is somehow irrelevant to the water crisis--environmentalists deceptively double the farmers' usage from 40% to 80%. If at first you don't succeed, do the exact same thing: Many of the Delta water cuts stem from the radicals' litigation meant to protect salmon and smelt. Yet after decades of water reductions, the salmon population fluctuates wildly, while the smelt population has fallen to historic lows. The radicals' solution, however, is always to dump even more water from the Delta into the ocean, even though this approach has failed time and again. The striped bass absurdity: If the radicals really want to protect salmon and the Delta smelt, its a bit of a mystery why they also champion protections for the striped bass, a non-native species that eats both salmon and smelt. Hetch Hetchy hypocrites: The San Francisco Bay Area provides a primary support base for many environmental groups. Lucky for them, their supporters don't have to endure the kinds of hardships these organizations have foisted on San Joaquin Valley communities. While the radicals push for ever-harsher water restrictions in the Valley, their Bay Area supporters enjoy an unimpeded water supply piped in across the state from the Hetch Hetchy reservoir in Yosemite National Park. This water is diverted around the Delta, meaning it does not contribute to the Delta's water quality standards. Environmental groups have conveniently decided not to subject Hetch Hetchy water to any sort of litigation that would cut the supply to the Bay Area. We're from the government, and we're here to help: Government agencies that catch smelt as part of scientific population measurements actually kill more of the fish than are destroyed in the supposedly killer water pumps. Hitchhiking salmon: The San Joaquin River Settlement is estimated already to have cost taxpayers $1.2 billion--and it's clear to me that the total price tag will likely exceed $2 billion--in a disastrous effort to restore salmon runs to the San Joaquin River. Moreover, the settlement legislation defines success as reintroducing 500 salmon to the river, which means spending $4 million per fish. The salmon, which have not been in the river for more than half a century, have proved so incapable of sustaining themselves that agents have resorted to plucking them out of the water and trucking them wherever they are supposed to go. It is a badly kept secret among both environmentalists and federal officials that this project has already failed. A man-made state of nature: The radicals claim they want to reverse human depredations in the Delta and restore fish to their natural habitat. Yet the entire Delta system is not natural at all. It's a man- made network of islands that functions only thanks to upstream water storage projects. In fact, without man-made storage projects, canals and dams, in dry years such as this the rivers would quickly run dry, meaning there would be no water and no fish. A Three-Step Solution The radicals have pursued their plan methodically and successfully; between the CVPIA, the biological opinions, and the San Joaquin River Settlement, around a million acres of farmland have been idled. What's left of the water supply is inadequate for sustaining Valley farming communities: South of the Delta, we now face an annual water supply deficit of approximately 2.5 million acre-feet, or 815 billion gallons. In fact, with the state groundwater regulations announced last year, the radicals are poised to achieve their goal. The depletion of groundwater is a direct effect--and indeed, was an intended result--of the radicals' assault on our surface water. (After all, if farmers, churches, schools and communities can't get surface water, they'll predictably resort to ground water.) But the radicals have perversely cited the groundwater depletion they themselves engineered to justify regulating the groundwater supply. This is the final step in their program, since many farmers will not be able to keep growing food if they continue to receive zero water allocations and are restricted from tapping enough ground water. The Valley cannot endure this situation much longer, but the good news is that it's not too late to save our communities. Led by the Valley's Republican delegation, the U.S. House has passed legislation twice that would bring a long-term end to the water crisis. The solution comprises these three simple measures: Return Delta pumping to normal operations at federal and state pumps. Because normal pumping levels are already paid for, this measure would cost taxpayers zero dollars. Fix the San Joaquin River Settlement. Instead of continuing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on an unworkable scheme to recreate salmon runs, we should turn the San Joaquin River into a year-round flowing river with recirculated water This approach would be good for the warm-water fish habitat and for recreation, and it would save taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars that will otherwise go down the salmon-run rat hole. Expedite and approve construction of major new water projects. This should include building the Temperance Flat dam along the San Joaquin River, raising Shasta dam to increase its reservoir capacity, expanding the San Luis Reservoir and approving construction of the Sites Reservoir in the Sacramento Valley. Because water users themselves should rightfully pay for these projects, they would cost federal taxpayers zero dollars. These measures would not only end the water crisis, they would improve the environment for fish and wildlife--all while saving taxpayer dollars. The Price Of Inaction I warned of the likely outcome of the radicals' campaign in my testimony to a House committee back in 2009: ``Failure to act, and it's over. You will witness the collapse of modern civilization in the San Joaquin Valley.'' That is indeed the grim future facing the Valley if we don't change our present trajectory. The solution passed twice by the U.S. House, however, was blocked by Senate Democrats, who were supported by the administration of Gov. Brown as well as the Obama administration. These Democrats need to begin speaking frankly and honestly with San Joaquin Valley communities, and with Californians more broadly, about the effects of idling 1.3 million acres of farmland. This will ruin not only Valley farming operations, but will wipe out entire swathes of associated local businesses and industries. The damage is not limited to the Valley. Although residents of coastal areas such as Los Angeles, the Bay Area and San Diego have been led to believe they are being subject to water restrictions due to the drought, that's not actually true. As in the Valley, these areas and many others ultimately depend on the Delta pumps for their water supply. If the pumps had been functioning normally for the past decade, none of these cities would be undergoing a water crisis today. And it's a safe bet that Brown's mandatory water reductions will not alleviate the crisis, leading to a drastic increase in restrictions in the not-too-distant future. Watering your lawn, washing your car and countless other everyday activities will be banned up and down California. In their mania to attack Central Valley farming, the radicals are inadvertently running the entire state out of water. Endgame Many organizations representing California agriculture, including water districts and--shockingly--even some San Joaquin Valley cities and counties, became part of the problem instead of the solution, having lent no support to the House-passed water bills. Suffering from a strange kind of Stockholm Syndrome, many of these groups and agencies hope that if they meekly accept their fate, their overlords will magnanimously bestow a few drops of water on them. This mousy strategy, which willfully ignores what the radicals are really trying to achieve, hasn't worked out well for growers of almonds and other high-value crops. Although the radicals had been promising them a free pass back when the groups met with me in 2002, these growers have CS now become the radicals' primary scapegoat for the water crisis. This condemnation is reflected in articles such as The Atlantic's ``The Dark Side of Almond Use,'' The Guardian's ``Alarm as Almond Farms Consume California's Water,'' and Bloomberg View's ``Amid a Drought, Cue the Almond Shaming.'' Sadly, the end is near for communities whose land will be forced out of production. One hopes the affected families will eventually find a more welcome home in some other state where those who wield power appreciate folks who grow our food instead of demonize them. But for now, the pitiless, decades-long assault to deprive them of their livelihoods is hurtling toward its apex. Meanwhile, many of those capable of advancing a solution are content to wring their hands, blame global warming and continue whistling past the graveyard. Agriculture groups, water districts and municipalities that refuse to support the two House-passed bills owe their constituents an alternative solution that will resolve our water shortfall. Water bureaucrats who ignore or oppose the most prominent, viable solutions while offering no alternative are, in effect, complicit in the radicals' long struggle. They should publicly declare which land ought to come out of production and which Valley industries should be eliminated since they have no proposals to steer us away from that outcome. The Valley's critical situation today demands unity around constructive solutions. To paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, we must all hang together, or we will surely all hang separately.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the fine gentleman from Washington from the Committee on Rules and, of course, Chairman Sessions for, again, bringing a water bill to the floor of the House. Five years ago, we passed a water bill very similar to this. It was in a year where we had abundant rainfall. Unfortunately, that rain was not captured. The water flowed right out to the ocean and was wasted. We have continued to dump water out to the ocean over the last 4 years. Even today, we are continuing to dump water out to the ocean. When I hear my colleagues talk about drought, yes, we are in the third year of a drought, a very bad drought; but, in fact, the founding fathers of our State built the water systems to withstand 5 years of drought. Back from 1987 to 1992--it is a drought that I still remember and many of my constituents remember--we really didn't have harsh problems until that fifth year of the drought. Since that time, places down in Los Angeles have built big water storage projects--in our area, no new water storage projects, only taking water away. You go to 1992; they pass the Central Valley Project Improvement Act that took a million acre feet away and dumped it out to the ocean. In 2009, the San Joaquin River Act took another 250,000 acre feet and wasted it. In addition to that, you have had lawsuits brought forth by the Endangered Species Act by radical environmental groups that have taken the rest of the water away. The reason we don't have any water is not because of drought; it is because we didn't hold the water when we had a chance to hold the water and keep the water and use it and spread it throughout the State of California. In fact, it is unfortunate to say because I don't wish ill on the people in San Francisco or the Silicon Valley, but they get their water from our area that they actually pipe over, instead of contributing to the environment. Now, I don't want the people of San Francisco to lose their water, but at the same time, the people of San Francisco shouldn't be willing to forfeit and give up our water that we rightfully own while they are taking some of ours and not contributing to the fish populations that, no matter how much water we put down, down the river and out to the ocean, the fish continue to die. At some point, you would think that people would step back and say: Well, if flushing water out to the ocean doesn't work and hasn't helped the fish populations, then we should stop doing that.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to congratulate Simon Lowes, of California's 11th District, upon the occasion of his retirement from Chevron. After graduating with a Bachelor's Degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of Birmingham in England, Simon began his 48-year career at Chevron in 1967 working as a process engineer at the Richmond Chevron Refinery. After subsequently earning a Master's Degree in Finance at the University of Pennsylvania, Simon continued to build an impressive resume, holding over 15 challenging positions over the next four decades in Indonesia, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Among Simon's most noted accomplishments was his leadership in developing Chevron's Angola Partnership Initiative. Following a 27-year civil war that ravaged Angola's economy, Simon helped to design a social investment initiative to rebuild local capacity and stimulate economic recovery. Due in large part to his efforts, in partnership with the U.S. Agency for International Development, Chevron's unprecedented $25 million commitment to this effort helped over 2 million people re-establish food security. Simon was also instrumental in launching the Chevron Aceh Recovery Initiative, which assisted victims of the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia. Through a series of micro-finance programs and the establishment of a polytechnic institute, this program provided job training and livelihoods to thousands of distressed Indonesians. In recent years, Simon has drawn on his extensive overseas experience to help lead Chevron's Corporate Social Responsibility strategy. As a result of this project and his many other endeavors, Simon's colleagues within Chevron and the development community have come to know him as a passionate innovator, a trusted and loyal mentor and, above all, an eternal optimist. Simon leaves Chevron with the respect, admiration and gratitude of those who have had the pleasure of working with him, and the knowledge that he has positively impacted not only Chevron, but thousands of people around the world. I would also like to recognize Simon's devoted wife, Shirley, and their three accomplished children, Aubrey, Chris and Ashley. Together, they built a family-focused life filled with new adventures, embracing each opportunity with curiosity and enthusiasm. We extend our appreciation for a job well done, and wish Simon a well-deserved retirement.

Mr. NUNES

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. The Intelligence Authorization Act is the annual blueprint for the work of the intelligence community and America's military intelligence efforts. The bill sets priorities for our critical intelligence efforts and the legal framework of guidance and oversight for those efforts. As you may recall, the House has passed intelligence authorization bills with strong bipartisan support in the past several Congresses. The ranking member, Mr. Schiff, and I worked in a bipartisan manner to draft this legislation in front of you today. Passing annual intelligence authorization legislation is the most effective way for Congress to exercise oversight over the executive branch and helps ensure that the country's intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities necessary to keep Americans safe. This legislation passed unanimously out of our committee. As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, the bulk of the committee's recommendations each year are found in the classified annex of the bill, which has been available for Members to review since June 4. Among other initiatives, the bill provides authorization for critical national security functions, including fighting terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, funding efforts to recover from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities, and investing in the resiliency of our national security space architecture. At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for fiscal year 2016 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget request level. Its funding levels are in line with the House-passed Defense Appropriations bill for the National Intelligence Program and with the National Defense Authorization Act for the Military Intelligence Program. Overall, this bill sustains today's intelligence capabilities and provides for future capabilities while staying within the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act and the budget resolution. Mr. Chair, we are currently facing one of the most challenging global environments in our Nation's history. Nearly 14 years after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. continues to hunt al Qaeda and its affiliates. We have taken the fight to the enemy and achieved tremendous success. But despite various strategies employed by two administrations to prevent the spread of radical Islam, that threat remains. The Arab Spring civil war in Syria and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in places such as north Africa highlight only a few of the many events in the past several years that now define U.S. policy failures in the Middle East. In just over a year, ISIL has exploded from a largely localized force in Iraq to seriously challenge al Qaeda as the vanguard of global jihad. Moreover, nation-states like Russia and China continue to expand their spheres of influence and diminish U.S. clout worldwide. Russia has taken advantage of indecisiveness in Europe and exploited uneven leadership in the U.S. to pressure Ukraine and its neighbors on core Russian interests. China bullies its neighbors in the South and East China Sea and, if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control over maritime trade in its perceived territorial waters in the next decade. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue to pose significant proliferation risks and remain strategic threats to the U.S. and its allies. State actors can bring a tremendous amount of resources to counter U.S. policy, placing an immense burden on the intelligence community to collect information on and to assess these activities carefully and accurately. Perhaps more troubling, state and nonstate actors alike are developing new ways to project power, particularly in cyberspace. Cyber attacks are becoming so pervasive that network defenders are overwhelmed. Attackers seem to gain access to sensitive systems at will. The most recent attacks on the Office of Personnel Management servers, possibly one of the most significant national security incidents in the past decade, highlight the continued threat to our Nation's infrastructure. Mr. Chair, in this year's intelligence authorization bill, the committee has taken a great deal of care in addressing the wide range of issues described above. This bill is an essential tool in supporting our Nation's efforts to tackle today's challenges while also directing the intelligence community to make strategic investments in the future. In particular, I believe that the bill goes a long way toward encouraging the intelligence community to make much-needed investments, such as recovering from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities. Additionally, this year's authorization bill comes on the heels of the committee's recent bipartisan successes on key national security issues, like reauthorizing important provisions related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and overwhelmingly passing bipartisan legislation on cyber threat sharing information. I applaud Ranking Member Schiff for his help on these issues, and I look forward to working together in the future. Finally, I want to thank all the Intelligence Committee staff on both sides of the aisle for their support drafting this bill. The committee staff spent countless hours assisting Members and finalizing the legislation. In particular, I would like to recognize our Sandia National Labs fellow, Mr. Randy Smith. He has been with the committee for almost 2 years and will be leaving us soon to return to Sandia. He has been a tremendous asset to this committee, and I would like to thank him for all his hard work. I would also like to thank the men and women of the intelligence community for all their efforts to continue to protect this Nation. I look forward to passing this legislation. Mr. Chair, the intelligence authorization act is the annual blueprint for the work of the intelligence community and America's military intelligence efforts. The bill sets the priorities for our critical intelligence efforts, and the legal framework of guidance and oversight for those efforts. As you may recall, the House has passed intelligence authorization bills with strong bipartisan support in the past several Congresses. The Ranking Member, Mr. Schiff, and I worked in a bipartisan manner to draft the legislation in front of you today. Passing annual intelligence authorization legislation is the most effective way for Congress to exercise oversight over the executive branch and helps ensure that the country's intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities necessary to keep Americans safe. This legislation passed unanimously out of our Committee. As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, the bulk of the Committee's recommendations each year are found in the classified annex to the bill, which has been available for Members to review since June 4th. Among other initiatives, the bill provides authorization for critical national security functions, including: fighting terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, funding efforts to recover from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities, and investing in the resiliency of our national security space architecture. At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for Fiscal Year 2016 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget request level. Its funding levels are in line with the House-passed Defense Appropriations bill for the National Intelligence Program and with the National Defense Authorization Act for the Military Intelligence Program. Overall, this bill sustains today's intelligence capabilities and provides for future capabilities while staying within the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act and the Budget Resolution. Mr. Chair, we are currently facing one of the most challenging global environments in our nation's history. Nearly 14 years after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. continues to hunt al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. We have taken the fight to the enemy and achieved tremendous success, but despite various strategies employed by two administrations to prevent the spread of radical Islam, the threat remains. The Arab Spring, civil war in Syria, and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in places such as Northern Africa highlight only a few of the many events in the past several years that now define U.S. policy failures in the Middle East. In just over a year, ISIL has exploded from a largely localized force in Iraq to seriously challenge al-Qa'ida as the vanguard of the global jihad. Moreover, nation states like Russia and China continue to expand their spheres of influence and diminish U.S. clout worldwide. Russia has taken advantage of indecisiveness in Europe and exploited uneven leadership in the U.S. to pressure Ukraine and its neighbors on core Russian interests. China bullies its neighbors in the South and East China Sea, and if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control over maritime trade in its perceived territorial waters in the next decade. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue to pose significant proliferation risks and remain strategic threats to the U.S. and its allies. State actors can bring a tremendous amount of resources to counter U.S. policy, placing an immense burden on the Intelligence Community to collect information on, and assess, these activities carefully and accurately. Perhaps more troubling, state and non-state actors alike are developing new ways to project power, particularly in cyberspace. Cyber attacks are becoming so pervasive that network defenders are overwhelmed; attackers seem to gain access to sensitive systems at will. The most recent attacks on the Office of Personnel Management servers--possibly one of the most significant national security incidents in the past decade--highlight the continued threat to our nation's infrastructure. Mr. Chair, in this year's intelligence authorization bill, this Committee has taken a great deal of care in addressing the wide range of issues described above. This bill is an essential tool in supporting our nation's efforts to tackle today's challenges, while also directing the Intelligence Community to make strategic investments in the future. In particular, I believe that this bill goes a long way toward encouraging the Intelligence Community to make much-needed investments, such as recovering from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities. Additionally, this year's authorization bill comes on the heels of the Committee's recent bipartisan successes on key national security issues, including reauthorizing important provisions related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and overwhelmingly passing bipartisan legislation on cyber threat information sharing. I applaud Ranking Member Schiff for his help on these issues and look forward to working together in the future. Finally, I want to thank all the Intelligence Committee staff on both sides of the aisle for their support drafting this bill. The Committee staff spent countless hours assisting Members and finalizing the legislation. In particular, I would like to recognize our Sandia National Labs fellow, Randy Smith. He has been with the Committee for almost two years and will be leaving us soon to return to Sandia. He has been a tremendous asset to this Committee and I thank him for all his hard work. I would also like to thank the men and women of the Intelligence Community for all their efforts protecting this nation. I look forward to passing this legislation. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, at this time I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pittenger).

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, Mr. Holding was just here, but unfortunately, he got called away to another meeting because I know he worked closely with Mr. Crowley and others as chair of the India Caucus, and he wanted me to express his strong support for this amendment. I also urge my colleagues to support the amendment. I yield back the balance of my time.