James Oberstar

Mr. OBERSTAR

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentlewoman for her splendid management of the bill, for her work in the subcommittee and holding the hearings and crafting the legislation. I want to just point out that our committee's role was to ensure that while the Department of Homeland Security will set the standards, it will be the EPA and publicly owned treatment works, locally owned, operated, and managed will carry them out. It will not be done by Homeland Security. I heard just a fragment of my good friend and colleague from Iowa raising his concerns about the effect on agriculture. I want to emphasize, and while this is not directly our committee's jurisdiction, we made it very clear that the Department of Homeland Security has definitely, completely, exempted all end users of chemicals in agriculture. That means, farms, ranches, crops, feed and livestock facilities from the chemical security program. It does not add agricultural facilities. We were very clear about that. We wanted to be sure in our discussions with the Committee on Homeland Security that we did not have any spillover of unintended consequences. Only the largest terminals, manufacturers, wholesale distributors of agricultural chemicals remain in the chemical security program, not farmers, not ranchers, not crop, feed, or livestock facilities. The EPA administrator has authority only to regulate security at wastewater and drinking water facilities, not on farms, not on ranches, not to any of the chemicals that they use. The legislation ensures that EPA will appropriately balance clean water, wastewater treatment with security needs of the Nation as set in standards set by the Department of Homeland Security. It does not give EPA any authority over chemical facilities now regulated under other provisions or by DHS. Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2868, the ``Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009''. At the outset, let me also thank the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson), Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, and the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman), Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for their efforts on this legislation and their willingness to include the text of the ``Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2009'' as title III of the bill under consideration today. In June of 2009, I joined with the Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, Eddie Bernice Johnson, in introducing H.R. 2883, the ``Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2009,'' to address the security needs of wastewater treatment facilities under the auspices of the Clean Water Act. That legislation, as amended, is incorporated as title III of H.R. 2868. Enactment of the ``Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act,'' in concert with the underlying language produced by the Committees on Homeland Security and Energy and Commerce, will preserve the historical relationship between wastewater utility operators and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in meeting both the security measures called for in this legislation, as well as the goals and purposes of the Clean Water Act. Mr. Chair, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the identification and protection of critical infrastructure, including the Nation's system of wastewater infrastructure, has become a national priority. EPA has worked with state and local governments to enhance wastewater security since 2001, and the majority of wastewater treatment works have conducted vulnerability assessments and implemented emergency response planning procedures. However, wastewater treatment works have undertaken these activities, with guidance from EPA, on a voluntary basis, as nothing in current law requires wastewater treatment works to carry out specific security measures. H.R. 2868 closes this significant security gap and enacts mandatory security standards applicable to treatment works. EPA will establish security regulations and oversee their implementation to appropriately balance water quality and security goals. Our Nation's wastewater treatment capacity consists of approximately 16,000 publicly owned wastewater treatment plants, 100,000 major pumping stations, 600,000 miles of sanitary sewers and another 200,000 miles of storm sewers, with a total value of more than $2 trillion. Taken together, the sanitary and storm sewers form an extensive network that runs near or beneath key buildings and roads, the heart of business and financial districts, and the downtown areas of major cities, and is contiguous to many communication and transportation networks. Publicly owned treatment works also serve more than 200 million people, or about 70 percent of the Nation's total population, as well as approximately 27,000 commercial or industrial facilities, that rely on the treatment works to treat their wastewater. Significant damage to the Nation's wastewater facilities or collection systems could result in loss of life, catastrophic environmental damage to rivers, lakes, and wetlands, contamination of drinking water supplies, long-term public health impacts, destruction of fish and shellfish production, and disruption to commerce, the economy, and our Nation's normal way of life. In the same light, certain wastewater treatment works throughout the United States utilize chemicals in their disinfectant processes, such as gaseous chlorine, that may pose a threat to public health or the environment if improperly released into the surrounding environment. While proper storage of and security for such chemicals on-site may reduce the potential risk of improper release, similar security-related issues in the shipment and use of potentially harmful chemicals must also be considered in relation to the overall security of the wastewater treatment works. The ``Wastewater Treatment Security Works Act'' ensures that all large- and medium-sized wastewater treatment facilities--those that treat at least 2.5 million gallons of sewage per day--perform a nationally-consistent, threshold security assessment, and take proactive steps to reduce their overall vulnerability. For those facilities that possess sufficient quantities of potentially-dangerous chemicals, this legislation requires an assessment of whether ``inherently safer technologies'' can be implemented to reduce the overall risk posed by the facility; while enabling the facility to continue meeting its water quality obligations under the Clean Water Act. Finally, this legislation authorizes $1 billion over 5 years in grants to publicly owned treatment works to carry out vulnerability assessments, site security and emergency response plans, and to implement measures to improve the overall security of the wastewater treatment facilities, as well as provide emergency response training to first responders and firefighters who may be called upon in the event of a terrorist act. This legislation has been endorsed by the Nation's leading wastewater utility organizations, including the National Association of Clean Water Agencies, the California Association of Sanitation Agencies, and the American Public Works Association. Mr. Chair, I would like to discuss certain sections of title III of the bill. Section 301. Short title This section designates this title as the ``Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2009''. Sec. 302. Wastewater Treatment Works Security This section amends the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 to add a new section 222 to address the security of wastewater treatment works (hereinafter ``treatment works'') under the authority of the Administrator of EPA. Section 222(a). Assessment of Treatment Works Vulnerability and Implementation of Site Security and Emergency Response Plans Section 222(a) defines the new security-related obligations for treatment works required under this subsection, as well as the terms ``vulnerability assessment'', and ``site security plan''. Under section 222(a)(1), any treatment works with a treatment capacity of at least 2.5 million gallons per day (estimated by EPA to be a treatment works that serves a population of 25,000 or greater), or in the discretion of the Administrator, presents a security risk, is required to: (1) conduct a vulnerability assessment; (2) develop and implement a site security plan; and (3) develop an emergency response plan for the treatment works. Section 222(b). Rulemaking and Guidance Documents Section 222(b) directs the Administrator to conduct a rulemaking, to be completed no later than December 31, 2010, to: (1) establish risk- based performance standards for the security of a treatment works covered by this section; and (2) establish requirements and deadlines for each owner and operator of a treatment works to conduct (and periodically update) a vulnerability assessment, to develop (and periodically update) and implement a site security plan, to develop (and periodically revise) an emergency response plan, and to provide annual training for employees of the treatment works. Section 222(b)(2) directs the Administrator, in carrying out the rulemaking under section 222(b), to provide for four risk-based tiers for treatment works (with tier one representing the highest degree of security risk), and to establish ``risk-based performance standards for site security plans and emergency response plans'' required under section 222(a). Under subsection (b)(2)(B), the Administrator is directed to assign (and reassign, when appropriate) treatment works into one of the four designated risk-based tiers, based on consideration of the size of the treatment works, the proximity of the treatment works to large population centers, the adverse impacts of an intentional act on the operations of the treatment works, critical infrastructure, public health, safety or the environment, and any other factor determined appropriate by the Administrator. Section 222(b)(2)(B)(iii) provides the Administrator authority to request information from the owner or operator of a treatment works necessary to determine the appropriate risk-based tier, and section 222(b)(2)(B)(iv) directs the Administrator to provide the treatment works with the reasons for the tier assignment. Section 222(b)(2)(C) requires the Administrator to ensure that risk- based performance standards are consistent with the level of risk associated with the risk-based assignment for the treatment works, and take into account the risk-based performance standards outlined in the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) of the DHS, contained in section 27.230 of title 6, Code of Federal Regulations. Section 222(b)(3) directs the Administrator, in carrying out the rulemaking under section 222(b), to require any treatment works that ``possesses or plans to possess'' a designated amount of a substance of concern (as determined by the Administrator under section 222(c)) to include within its site security plan an assessment of ``methods to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an intentional act'' at the treatment works. Section 222(b)(3)(A) defines such an assessment as one that reduces or eliminates the potential consequences of a release of a substance of concern from an intentional act, including: (1) the elimination or reduction of such substances through the use of alternate substance, formulations, or processes; (2) the modification of operations at the treatment works; and (3) the reduction or elimination of onsite handling of such substances through improvement of inventory control or chemical use efficiency. Section 222(b)(3)(B) requires each treatment works that possesses or plans to possess a designated amount of a substance of concern to consider, in carrying out such an assessment, the potential impact of any method to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an intentional act on the responsibilities of the treatment works to meet its effluent discharge requirements under the Clean Water Act, and to include relevant information on any proposed method, such as how implementation of the method could reduce the risks to human health or the environment, whether the method is feasible (as such term is defined by the Administrator), and the potential costs (both expenditures and savings) from implementation of the method. Section 222(b)(3)(C) provides for mandatory implementation of a method to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an intentional act for a treatment works that is assigned to one of the two highest risk-based tiers, and possesses or plans to possess a designated amount of a substance of concern. Section 222(b)(3)(C)(ii) authorizes the Administrator, or a State, in the case of a State with an approved program under section 402 of the Clean Water Act, to require the owner or operator of the treatment works to implement such a method, and includes a series of factors for the Administrator or State to consider in making such a determination. Section 222(b)(3)(D) provides a formal opportunity for the owner or operator of a treatment works to appeal the decision of the Administrator or a State that requires the implementation of such a method. Section 222(b)(3)(E) authorizes the Administrator to address incomplete or late assessments of methods to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an intentional act at the treatment works by an owner or operator of a treatment works. Section 222(b)(3)(F) authorizes the Administrator to take action, in a State with an approved program under section 402 of the Clean Water Act, to determine whether a treatment works should be required to implement a method to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an intentional act, and to compel the treatment works to implement such methods through an enforcement action, in the absence of State action. Section 222(b)(4) and (5) directs the Administrator to consult with the States (with approved programs), the Secretary of Homeland Security and, as appropriate, other persons, in developing regulations under this subsection. Section 222(b)(6) requires the Administrator to ensure that regulations developed under this subsection are consistent with the goals and requirements of the Clean Water Act. Section 222(c). Substances of Concern Section 222(c) authorizes the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to designate any chemical substance as a substance of concern, and to establish, by rulemaking, a threshold quantity of such substance that, as a result of a release, is known to cause death, injury, or serious adverse impacts to human health or the environment. In carrying out this authority, the Administrator is required to take into account the list of ``Chemicals of Interest'', developed by the DHS, and published in appendix A to part 27 of title 6, Code of Federal Regulations. Section 222(d). Review of Vulnerability Assessment and Site Security Plan Section 222(d) requires an owner or operator of a treatment works covered by this section to submit a vulnerability assessment and site security plan to the Administrator for review in accordance with deadlines established by the Administrator. Section 222(d)(2) and (3) direct the Administrator to review such assessments and plans, and to either approve or disapprove such assessments and plans. Section 222(d)(3) and (4) establish criteria for the disapproval of a vulnerability assessment or site security plan, and requires the Administrator to provide the owner or operator of a treatment works with a written notification of any deficiency in the vulnerability assessment or site security plan, including guidance for correcting such deficiency and a timeline for resubmission of the assessment or plan. Section 222(e). Emergency Response Plan Section 222(e) establishes the requirements for an owner or operator of a treatment works to develop and, as appropriate, revise an emergency response plan that incorporates the results of the current vulnerability assessment and site security plan for the treatment works. Section 222(e)(2) requires the owner or operator to certify to the Administrator that an emergency response plan meeting the requirements of this section has been completed, and is appropriately updated. Section 222(e)(4) requires the owner or operator of a treatment works to provide appropriate information to any local emergency planning committee, local law enforcement, and local emergency response providers. Section 222(f). Role of Employees Section 222(f)(1) requires that a site security plan and emergency response plan identify the appropriate roles or responsibilities for employees and contractor employees of treatments works in carrying out the plans. Section 222(f)(2) requires the owner or operator of a treatment works to provide sufficient training, as determined by the Administrator, to employees and contractor employees in carrying out site security plans and emergency response plans. Section 222(g). Maintenance of Records Section 222(g) requires that an owner or operator of a treatment works maintain an updated copy of its vulnerability assessment, site security plan, and emergency response plan on the premises of the treatment works. Section 222(h). Audit; Inspection Section 222(h) directs the Administrator to audit and inspect treatment works, as necessary, to determine compliance with this section, and authorizes access by the Administrator to the owners, operators, employees, contract employees, and, as applicable, employee representatives, to carry out this subsection. Section 222(i). Protection of Information Section 222(i) establishes requirements for the prohibition of public disclosure of protected information, as defined by this subsection, and authorizes the Administrator to prescribe by regulation or issue orders, as necessary, to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of such information. Section 222(i)(2)(B) provides authority to facilitate the appropriate sharing of protected information with and among Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities, first responders, law enforcement officials, and appropriate treatment works personnel or employee representatives. Section 222(i)(4), (5) and (6) ensure that the requirements of this subsection not affect the implementation of other laws or the oversight authorities of Congressional committees. Section 222(i)(7) defines the term ``protected information''. Section 222(j). Violations Section 222(j) provides criminal, civil, and administrative penalties for the violation of any requirement of this section, including any regulations promulgated pursuant to this section, consistent with the criminal, civil, and administrative penalties contained in section 309 of the Clean Water Act. Section 222(k). Report to Congress Section 222(k) directs the Administrator to report to Congress within three years of the date of enactment of the Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2009, and every three years thereafter, on progress in achieving compliance with this section. Section 222(k)(3) provides that such reports be made publicly available. Section 222(l). Grants for Vulnerability Assessments, Security Enhancements, and Worker Training Section 222(l) authorizes Federal grants for the conduct of vulnerability assessments and the implementation of security enhancements and publicly-owned treatment works, and for security related training of employees or contractor employees of a treatment works and training of first responders and emergency response providers. Section 222(l)(2)(C) provides that grants made available under this Act not be used for personnel cost or operation or maintenance of facilities, equipment, or systems. Section 222(l)(2)(D) provides for a maximum 75 percent Federal share for grants made available under this Act. Section 222(m). Preemption Section 222(m) provides that nothing in this section precludes or denies the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce any regulation, requirement, or standard of performance with respect to a treatment works that is more stringent than a regulation, requirement, or standard of performance under this section. Section 222(n). Authorization of Appropriations Section 222(n) authorizes to be appropriated to the Administrator $200 million for each of fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for making grants under section 222(l). Section 222(o). Relation to Chemical Facility Security Requirements Section 222(o) provides that the requirements of Title XXI of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, and the Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009, (and any regulations promulgated thereunder), do not apply to a treatment works, as such term is defined in section 212 of the Clean Water Act. Legislative History In the 107th Congress, on October 10, 2001, the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment held a hearing on the security of infrastructure within the Subcommittee's jurisdiction, including issues related to the nation's network of wastewater infrastructure. On July 22, 2002, then-Chairman Don Young introduced H.R. 5169, the ``Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2002''. On July 24, 2002, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure met in open session and ordered the bill reported favorably to the House by voice vote. H. Rept. 107-645. On October 7, 2002, the House passed H.R. 5169 by voice vote. No further action was taken on this legislation. In the 108th Congress, on February 13, 2003, then-Chairman Don Young introduced H.R. 866, the ``Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2003''. On February 26, 2003, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure met in open session and ordered the bill reported favorably to the House by voice vote. H. Rept. 108-33. On May 7, 2003, the House passed H.R. 5169 by a rollcall vote of 413-2. No further action was taken on this legislation. In the 111th Congress, on June 16, 2009, Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee Chairwoman Eddie Bernice Johnson introduced H.R. 2883, the ``Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2009''.

Mr. OBERSTAR

Mr. OBERSTAR. Madam Speaker, today I introduce legislation to reauthorize the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) hazardous materials safety program. The authorization for the program expired on September 30, 2008. According to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), the agency within DOT that is tasked with the safe movement of nearly 1.2 million daily shipments of hazardous materials in the United States, over the past decade, there have been 170,527 incidents involving the transportation of hazardous materials, resulting in 137 fatalities and 2,857 injuries. However, according to an internal analysis conducted by PHMSA, dated May 11, 2007, 60 to 90 percent of all incidents involving the transportation of hazardous materials that occurred from 2004 through 2006 were not reported by regulated entities to PHMSA. PHMSA, however, has done nothing to address the under-reporting of incidents. When Congress created PHMSA in 2004, the law included, at my request, a mandate that the agency shall consider the assignment and maintenance of safety as the highest priority. Unfortunately, PHMSA has lost sight of its safety mission. Over the past several months, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure has conducted an in-depth investigation of PHMSA's hazardous materials safety program. Our preliminary findings, which were released on September 10, 2009, coupled with the preliminary findings of the DOT Office of Inspector General, which also conducted an audit of PHMSA's hazardous materials safety program, revealed some alarming problems. We uncovered significant problems with PHMSA's special permits and approvals programs, which exempt regulated entities from hazardous materials regulations. PHMSA routinely grants these exemptions without making the findings required by its own regulations. We also found that PHMSA has virtually no process for data collection, analysis, and reporting. Most of PHMSA's database is incomplete or contains errors. If PHMSA cannot read its own data, how can it determine what its priorities should be? In addition, PHMSA has failed time and time again to address significant safety concerns that have been raised by its own enforcement personnel, the DOT Office of Inspector General, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB has issued safety recommendation after safety recommendation to ensure the safety of transporting lithium cells and batteries on board aircraft. The NTSB has also issued safety recommendations on eliminating the transportation of hazardous materials in external product piping of loading lines underneath cargo tank motor vehicles, known as wet lines. Yet, PHMSA has failed to address these important safety recommendations. The safe transportation of lithium cells and batteries is an important issue and a rapidly increasing safety risk, as more and more technology relies on the use of various types of lithium cells and batteries. The batteries are widely used in personal electronic devices, such as cell phones and laptops. In 2008, more than 3.3 billion lithium cells and batteries were transported worldwide, representing an 83 percent increase since 2005. Since 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the NTSB have identified more than 100 incidents involving lithium and other batteries on board aircraft where batteries have overheated, caught-fire, or exploded. Since 1999, the NTSB has had concerns with the unacceptable risks posed by lithium batteries. This legislation requires the Administrator of PHMSA, in coordination with the FAA, to issue a regulation for the safe transportation of lithium cells and batteries. This regulation will include, among other things, requirements for: proper identification of lithium cells and batteries on board aircraft, packaging performance requirements, and other safety measures. The legislation also mandates implementation of an NTSB recommendation first issued over 10 years ago regarding wet lines. Currently, 30 to 50 gallons of flammable materials, such as fuel, can be transported in unprotected loading lines beneath cargo tank trucks. Over the past 10 years, there have been 184 incidents in which these wet lines were damaged or ruptured. H.R. 4016 prohibits the transportation of certain flammable liquids in the external product piping of cargo tank motor vehicles on newly manufactured vehicles within two years of the date of enactment, and for all existing vehicles beginning in 2021. H.R. 4016 also includes several requirements to strengthen emergency response capabilities. The ability of first responders to adequately identify and respond to a hazardous material substance release is critical. The bill enhances training for emergency responders and requires that responders are provided a higher level of training, known as Operations Level training. The bill also requires the Secretary of Transportation to develop minimum standards for those who provide hazardous materials emergency response information services. This provision will guarantee that these services are staffed on a 24-hour basis to ensure that, day and night, our emergency response capability is not jeopardized. The legislation makes significant safety enhancements to the ``special permits and approvals'' process. H.R. 4016 requires that, prior to granting any special permit or approval, the Secretary shall make a determination that a person is fit, willing, and able to conduct the authorized activity. In part, this provision requires PHMSA to perform a fitness review of any person who requests an exemption from regulation to ensure that the applicant's safety record, accident and incident history are reviewed before any special permit is authorized. Currently, PHMSA reviews thousands of applications for special permits and approvals each year, with no review of an applicant's safety record. The bill will ensure that any person requesting an exemption from the regulations have a safe record, a compliant record, and a good reason for needing an exemption from the regulations. PHMSA is tasked with an enormous safety mission, yet it currently has only 35 investigators (plus seven supervisors) for the entire nation. H.R. 4016, authorizes 30 new inspectors for the program--almost doubling the number of inspectors. This bill also strengthens the inspection program by requiring the Secretary to carry out a new hazardous material enforcement program to develop uniform standards for inspectors and investigators; to train hazardous materials inspectors and investigators on how to collect, analyze, and publish findings from accidents and incidents; and to train hazardous materials inspectors on how to identify noncompliance with hazmat regulations and take the appropriate kind of enforcement action. The safe transport of hazardous materials is critical and affects the entire nation. H.R. 4016, the ``Hazardous Material Transportation Safety Act of 2009,'' will increase the hazardous materials safety program, strengthen emergency response capabilities, and increase enforcement of hazardous materials laws and regulations. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 4016, the ``Hazardous Material Transportation Safety Act of 2009.''

Mr. OBERSTAR

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the chairman for yielding. Madam Speaker, it is intriguing to me that the gentleman from California is so concerned about the Great Lakes. I welcome his interest, and I welcome his support for an increase in funding for the removal of bottom sediments that contain toxins, which are getting into the fish and into the food chain. We desperately need the funding. It has been neglected for at least 15 years. The provision in this bill deals with an EPA emissions rule that was announced in the Federal Register to deal with exhaust emission standards for the largest marine diesel engines used for propulsion on ocean-going vessels. Never in the discussion in the Federal Register nor in the hearings EPA held on the saltwater coasts did they ever mention the Great Lakes. At the end of the rulemaking process, Madam Speaker, I would say to the gentleman, at the end of the rulemaking process, EPA threw the Great Lakes in. Now, there are 13 vessels, that range in age of construction from 1906 to 1959, the most recent vessels built on the Great Lakes, that burn this bunker fuel. The combined horsepower of those 13 vessels is less than that of the Regina Maersk, a 6,600 container carrying vessel that plies the saltwater and puts in on east coast ports. Those vessels, those modern vessels, burn bunker fuel at sea, but when they are within the 200-mile economic zone of the United States where they are subject to emissions requirements, they can switch to low sulfur diesel fuel. The older vessels on the Great Lakes do not have that capability. Never once were our ports, were our lake carriers, consulted in the process of the rulemaking. What the language does in this bill is simply to give our industry time to evaluate various emissions control mechanisms, such as re-engining, such as new shafts, drive shafts, for the vessels. There is a worldwide shortage of drive shaft production. It would take 2 years to build drive shafts for a 1906 vessel, even for the Anderson, which was built in 1952. And we also need time to consider other means of low sulfur, biodiesel fuel.

Mr. OBERSTAR. But never once did EPA come and knock on the door and say, you have a problem.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman on the limited time I have.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, there is no hue and cry from any of the ports on the Great Lakes. There isn't any effect on residents in the Great Lakes. EPA never raised this issue in any appropriate fashion for ship owners to offer suggestions or negotiate terms and conditions under which they could undertake the conversion. It was just dropped in their lap.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The International Maritime Organization negotiations which have been going on for some time will affect oceangoing vessels. These are landlocked vessels. These vessels operate exclusively within the Great Lakes. There is no fuel capability for these old steamers, and we just need time to see if there is a way of converting or maybe retiring those vessels.

Mr. OBERSTAR. If the gentleman would further yield, the rule promulgated by EPA, and which is being negotiated in international maritime councils, applies to oceangoing vessels. These vessels will never set anchor in saltwater. Never.

Mr. OBERSTAR

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition, though I do not intend to oppose the gentleman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I want to compliment the House's own version of Survivor Man, not only on surviving on a desert island and doing so very skillfully and astutely. Most of the time when Members of our body wind up with a story in The Washington Post, it's for some misdeed or misappropriation of funds. This was a remarkable story of personal strength and courage that I suspect derives from the gentleman's own upbringing and mission abroad for the church, and for his ability to survive under difficult conditions. He's also been a survivor on his campaign, Mr. Chairman, to limit earmarks. And this is one case in which our committee agrees with the gentleman. On Page 177, Lines 4 and 5, the bill reads: the Secretary shall award grants under this subsection on a competitive basis. But also, as the gentleman has pointed out, notwithstanding such language in other bills, there have been deviations from the programmatic language, often by the other body, but also, on occasion, in this body. We feel that these grants ought to be awarded competitively and, for that reason, very specifically wrote this language into the bill. I suspect that after the vigorous hearings that Chairman Cummings has held over the past 2\1/2\ years, exposing failures of the Coast Guard contracting program, that this language will be honored and will be adhered to. As to the reason for the training grants, this is the deadliest industry by a great many measures. In fact, there is a program on television on fishing entitled ``The Deadliest Catch,'' and it tracks those who put out to sea to earn their living in dangerous circumstances. The safety training grants will deal with those and other similar situations. So on the policy side, I simply want to defend the provision. But I concur with the gentleman on his concern, and we will accept the amendment. At this point, I would yield to the gentleman from Maryland, Chair of the subcommittee.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I rise to claim time in opposition, though I do not oppose the amendment

Mr. OBERSTAR. The language of this provision is similar to the previous: to establish a Fishing Safety Research Grant program for academia, members of nonprofit organizations, businesses involved in fishing and maritime, to conduct research on methods of improving the safety of commercial fishing industry, vessel design, survival equipment. The gentleman ought to be very concerned about survival equipment. He's a survivor himself. Vessel monitoring systems, de-icing technology and severe weather detection, the gentleman had none of those on the island. He didn't have any equipment to detect severe weather or absence of water. He didn't have a water finder; he had to create his own water using the sun. So he's the antithesis of this language. But the issue is not the underlying policy. The issue really is competitive basis award of grants. I think the gentleman's language will reinforce the purpose of the committee. Does the gentleman from Maryland wish to be heard?

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman for pointing that out, that the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) has been a vigorous advocate for his fishing community, which is largely a Portuguese immigrant community of long ancestry; and he really has been a strong advocate, along with Mr. Young of Alaska. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. OBERSTAR. Even as we discussed this amendment, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted a self-propelled semi-submersible vessel in the Eastern Pacific with a multi-ton load of narcotics on board. Smuggling using submersible and semi-submersibles have become a part of the increasingly sophisticated smuggling operation. We accept the gentlewoman's amendment.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OBERSTAR. I compliment the gentleman on this amendment. As Mr. LoBiondo said just a moment ago, there are serious needs, a $1 billion backlog in the Coast Guard's shore construction program, and the gentleman's amendment is right on point, and I commend him for offering it. And if the gentleman would yield to the Chair of the subcommittee, I'd appreciate it.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chair, I support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Nye) for the following reasons: The amendment specifies that the marine safety provisions in H.R. 3619 shall not impair the authority of the Coast Guard to carry out its homeland security missions. The Coast Guard constantly monitors maritime transit zones and the Service's law enforcement authority enables it to apprehend foreign fishing vessels engaged in poaching and interdict vessels carrying illegal drugs, firearms and undocumented migrants. The Committee has held several hearings regarding the Coast Guard's marine safety program over the past three years. Commandant Thad Allen was very concerned about the condition of the marine safety program, so he asked retired Admiral Jim Card to conduct a thorough analysis of the program. Admiral Card confirmed all of the problems that had been raised by industry and mariners during these hearings. H.R. 3619 addresses these programmatic shortfalls in the marine safety program. The Coast Guard is a multi-mission agency and it is important that it carries out all of its missions in an effective manner--from marine safety and search and rescue, to homeland security. Therefore, I support the gentleman's amendment that clarifies that nothing in the marine safety portions of H.R. 3619 will affect the Coast Guard's legal authority to execute its homeland security mission. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this amendment.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I rise as the designee of Mr. Stupak to offer the amendment on his behalf.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, the Presque Isle Lighthouse at Presque Isle Township on the Upper Peninsula of Michigan is very important, has served a very important navigational purpose over many, many years on those stormy waters of Lake Superior. Those are treacherous waters. Unlike the ocean where waves have a long distance, hundreds of miles to play themselves out, the waters of the Great Lakes, and particularly of Lake Superior, even with a surface of 33,000 square miles, are short and choppy and harsh and brutal in the coming months of November, December, January, February. The Presque Isle Lighthouse has saved many a mariner. It continues to operate, but its light has been replaced by one of more modern quality and capability with much greater candle power, much greater visibility, and longer distance than the Fresnel lens that the Coast Guard has used for probably 150 years; not only the Coast Guard, but other marine navigation services. Fresnel lenses are treasured historical pieces, but they are not navigational pieces any longer. The gentleman's amendment would require the Coast Guard to do a study of the feasibility of reinstalling the Fresnel lens in the lighthouse in a condition so that it can provide safe navigation to commercial vessels on Lake Huron or at the juncture point of the upper waters and also serve as a supplement to the existing light. I support the gentleman's amendment. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.