Member of Congress
Claiborne Pell
- Role
- Former Senator
- State
- RI
- Party
- Democrat
Speeches
FAMILY SELF-SUFFICIENCY ACT1995-09-06
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague. Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
TRIBUTE TO CLAIBORNE PELL1995-09-06
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague and friend for his kind words and appreciate them more than I can say.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19961995-09-05
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague very much.
RETIREMENT OF SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL1995-09-05
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, in the United States, we have 180 days a year school; in Sweden, there are 200; in the Soviet Union, 210; in Canada, 200; in Thailand, 220; in Japan, 240; in Italy, 213. We are way down the list. Thank you.
ANNOUNCEMENT OF RETIREMENT1995-09-05
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I wish to state that this morning in Providence I announced my decision not to seek reelection to the Senate next year. This afternoon, I wanted to formally make that decision known to my colleagues, and to share with you all the thoughts I conveyed to my Rhode Island constituents. This was not an easy decision for me. I regret that it is fashionable today to malign the Congress, to malign the Federal Government, and to malign those of us who serve the public in elective office. I, however, consider this U.S. Senate a marvelous institution full of talented and committed men and women who, contrary to public belief, are dedicated to serving our constituents and to improving the quality of our national life. And I continue to believe that government--and the Federal Government in particular--can, should, and does make a positive impact on the lives of most Americans. Federal programs and agencies do not always work perfectly, and many need reform. But they were conceived to help people, and I believe most continue to do so. When you believe as strongly as I do in the value of good government and see some of its virtues under attack, there is a great temptation to continue to serve and to fight for those values and those programs that we consider vital. As to my health, I have been assured that there is no medical barrier to my seeking reelection and serving another 6-year term. I feel strong and healthy and continue my 2-mile runs. However, I decided not to be a candidate for reelection. There is a natural time for all life's adventures to come to an end, and this period of 36 years would seem to me about the right time for my service in the Senate to end. I know I will miss more than anything else the people of Rhode Island which it has been my pleasure to serve these years. They are fine, caring people who put their trust in me all these years, tolerated my eccentricities, and gave me great affection. And I only pray that I repaid their trust and served them faithfully. And I will particularly miss this wonderful Senate and you, the men and women who serve here. Let me say again, almost without exception, each of us believes he or she can make a positive difference to our Nation's well-being. This Senate seat from my State has been held for six decades by a forward-thinking Democrat, first by Theodore Francis Green, and then by me. And I want to make it clear today that I am intent on doing all I can to ensure that another progressive Democrat is elected to fill this seat. And I also plan to do what I can to assist in the reelection of President Clinton, whom I consider a sadly underrated and really quite successful President. He has served our country with intelligence and vision and passion, and I firmly believe he deserves another term. Beyond that, I have no concrete plans. I will stay active, stay engaged in some kind of public service and will continue to cherish my association with Rhode Island and its wonderful people. I yield the floor. Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
A MESSAGE TO CROATIA1995-08-11
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I wish to encourage President Clinton to ensure that Croatia's recent military offensive in Krajina will not result in wide scale human rights violations or lead to a wider war. At first glance, it may appear counterintuitive to criticize Croatia for its victory over the Serbs, who it is generally agreed, were the original aggressors. ``Finally,'' it is natural to think, ``someone is willing to stand up to the Serbs.'' While I am in no way questioning Croatia's legitimate right to the nearly one third of its territory that had been controlled by the Serbs, I do believe we need to look a bit deeper. While I sympathize completely with Croatia's now fulfilled desire to recover its territory, I am deeply concerned and disappointed by Croatia's military foray into Krajina. Croatia eschewed diplomacy and pursued a military campaign instead of diplomatic negotiations which had a good chance of success. In so doing, the Croatian Army has apparently in some cases, abused civilians as well as U.N. personnel. This much is for certain: Croatia has unleashed the largest single refugee flow in the 4-year-old conflicts in former Yugoslavia. I am equally concerned about what comes next. What will happen to the tens of thousands of newly created refugees? How will Croatia treat the civilians left behind? How solid is Croatia's commitment to its Bosnian allies? What are Croatia's intentions with regard to an overall peaceful settlement? I believe that we should make clear to Croatia that we expect their actions in these areas to be transparent, forthcoming, and respectful of human rights. We do, after all, have significant leverage. Croatia's leaders want to integrate Croatia into the rest of Europe. They want to rebuild the parts of Croatia damaged by the war and to see Croatia thrive economically. That, of course, will require a good deal of international support. I believe that we should make it clear to Croatia's leaders that if they wish to achieve these goals, they will have to take on certain responsibilities. They will have to [[Page S 12345]] prove that Croatia is a country that respects the human rights of all people living in Croatia; that Croatia lives up to its international commitments, particularly the Washington Agreement of March 1994; and that Croatia is committed to a peaceful solution to both the Bosnian and Croatian conflicts. I agree with President Clinton that the Croatian victory could provide a window of opportunity to resolve the Bosnian and Croat conflicts diplomatically. Whether or not that occurs, however, will depend to a very large part on Croatia. Accordingly, we must let Croatia know what we expect.
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE TREATY [SPNFZ]1995-08-11
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I was gratified yesterday by the French announcement in support of a complete ban on nuclear testing next year. Unfortunately, at present, France intends to conduct a series of nuclear tests in the South Pacific during the remainder of this year and the first part of next year. The decision of the new French Government has brought about a storm of protest from Pacific nations who had fervently hoped that they would never see nuclear testing in their region. So far, the United States, Britain, and France have maintained a relatively united public position with regard to nuclear testing. This changed with the decision of the French to resume testing while Britain and the United States have placed a moratorium on their own nuclear testing. [[Page S 12360]] Mr. President, it is very important that the world understand that we were very serious about our commitment at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York this spring in negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. We must not lose sight of that goal. A good step in that direction now would be an affirmation to the nations of the South Pacific that we stand with them in their desire that there be no further nuclear testing in their region. Mr. President, today Senator Thomas and I sent a letter to the President to urge that he take the positive and important step of seeking Senate advise and consent to ratification of three protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. This treaty, known as the Treaty of Rarotonga, took effect in 1986. Parties include Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. Countries in the region are united in their opposition to the proposed French tests. The chairman of the South Pacific Forum, the Prime Minister of Australia, P.J. Keating, expressed the forum's ``unequivocal opposition of France's decision'' to resume testing. In a separate statement, Keating went on to say that the tests were viewed as ``an assault upon the rights of small nations by a large one.'' Papua New Guinean Prime Minister Julius Chan described France's decision as ``deplorable and unacceptable.'' He argued that the decision is ``not only counter-productive to the conduct of friendly relations between Metropolitan France and Island Governments, but must be condemned.'' Chan went on to say that ``France's total lack of sensitivity of the issue'' is a major problem for the entire region. Several countries in the region expressed concern that the French tests would set back nonproliferation efforts around the world. New Zealand Prime Minister Bolger cited the South Pacific's ``sense of outrage'' and argued that the tests run ``directly counter to the worldwide trend away from the development and use of nuclear weapons and puts at risk all that has been achieved in nuclear disarmament since the end of the cold war.'' Keating noted that ``France's very position as a responsible and leading power in the world means that each new test by France will give comfort to would-be proliferations, and each test will give pause to many of those countries whose support we will need to conclude the CTBT.'' The sentiment of the region was perhaps best expressed by Keating, who said that the overwhelming majority of countries in the region felt that ``if France must test these weapons, let her test them in metropolitan France.'' Mr. President, I hope very much that the administration will decide to show support for the desires and resolve of the inhabitants of the South Pacific with regard to nuclear testing. It will serve to reinforce our commitment at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to achievement in 1996 of a complete ban on nuclear testing. Moreover, Presidential action would demonstrate that we are willing to stand with those nations desiring to take strong positions with regard to nuclear nonproliferation.
MEASURE WOULD FOSTER MARINE AQUACULTURE1995-08-11
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor of the Marine Aquaculture Act of 1995, a measure sponsored by the junior Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) to foster the growth of our marine aquaculture industry. Senator Kerry, the ranking member of the Commerce Committee Oceans and Fisheries Subcommittee, has done an excellent job in drafting this legislation to promote marine aquaculture research and the development of an environmentally sound marine aquaculture industry in the United States. The bill would create a coastal and marine aquaculture research and development program under the National Sea Grant College Program Act. As one of the fathers of the sea grant system, I am delighted that this new measure builds upon the sound and proven base of the sea grant. I know that this measure is designed to promote marine aquaculture, as distinct from other general aquaculture measures. This is an area that has been largely overlooked and underdeveloped in the United States, but that has become increasingly competitive in the international market. The United States cannot long afford to ignore the potential of marine aquaculture, because many of our fisheries already are overfished and nearing collapse. The groundfish stock off New England shores already has collapsed and the closures of our fisheries have hit hard. Marine aquaculture may not be a panacea, but it has the potential to provide both new employment opportunities and to bring some relief to our fisheries by developing alternate sources. I commend this measure to the attention of my colleagues and I congratulate Senator Kerry for his excellent work.
NATO ENLARGEMENT1995-08-10
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
DEFECTIONS FROM IRAQ1995-08-10
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, as many of my colleagues may have heard, there have been dramatic developments in the Middle East today. Two major Iraqi government figures--both members of Saddam Hussein's circle of power--have defected from Iraq and are now in Jordan. One of the defectors, Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan, was in charge of military industrialization in Iraq. The other, Lt. Col. Saddam Kamel Hassan, was in charge of Saddam Hussein's guards. Both--this is really the curious thing--coincidentally, are married to daughters of Saddam Hussein and are thus his sons-in-law. The development is significant for a number of reasons. Just last week, Ambassador Madeleine Albright testified to the Foreign Relations Committee that Saddam's base of support has been shrinking. Today's events illustrate that point in an extraordinary way. On a more fundamental level, the defections demonstrate the soundness of United States containment policy toward Iraq, which is designed in part to encourage internal change. It is still too early to assess how the defections will affect Saddam's grip on power; it is clear, however, that there is considerable turmoil in Baghdad's inner sanctum. As a final note, Mr. President, I would like to add a word of appreciation for Jordan's King Hussein. It is no small gesture for King Hussein to welcome the defectors and provide them safe haven. As unpredictable as Saddam Hussein can be, the King's actions could well provoke an Iraqi response. President Clinton has said that the United States stands ready to support the King, who by today's actions has shown true courage in defiance of Saddam. I support the President's statement and join him in expressing gratitude to King Hussein.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR APPROPRIATIONS, 19961995-08-09
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from Vermont for his very nice words and say it was just about 30 years ago that the Senator from New York, Mr. Javits, and I were able to get this legislation through. Those 30 years have gone very quickly. Many things have happened, but I think judgment, in connection with the arts and humanities, has been borne out. The debate reminds me of a story I know concerning Winston Churchill. In the darkest days of the Second World War when the outcome of the battle, the conflict, was still unknown, a young staff assistant on the Prime Minister's staff found, to his shock, that the Government was funding the British Arts Council throughout the war. He went dashing off to Mr. Churchill, informed him that he found more funds for the war effort and how extraordinary it was that scarce resources were going for such a purpose when the empire was in the midst of a life-and-death struggle. I am told Winston Churchill turned to the young man and replied, ``I remind you, sir, it is exactly this for which we are fighting.'' I think this thought should remain in our minds as we discuss this issue. I think we should also bear in our mind whether we, as a Nation, want to be remembered as Athens was or Sparta was. Athens was noted for its diversity of culture; Sparta noted for its armaments, weapons, and warmaking ability. I think we would prefer to be remembered as an Athens and it is exactly that for which this legislation needs us. Rather than being a subsidy for the rich, one of the primary missions of the NEA has been to encourage the spread of American culture beyond those individuals, communities, and regions rich enough to afford it. Uncharacteristically among Federal programs, endowment dollars multiply and foster national support for the arts. The early endowment grants drew matching grants of about $1.5 billion in private, State, and local patrons. It is true that without the NEA and the NEH we would still have our history, literature and art. But these things would be reserved for those who can afford it. I think it is unfair to our citizens and for some individuals to assert that only wealthy Americans are interested in the development of the arts. I know as one Senator, I believe and the evidence supports the fact that Americans from every walk of life, from every economic level, strongly desire to seek access to cultural events in their own home communities. From an economic viewpoint, the dollars sent by the arts endowment to communities around our Nation have been a very successful investment. For every dollar the endowment invests, there is created a tenfold return in jobs, services, and contracts. The arts, fostered by the national endowment, encourage national and international tourism, attract and retain businesses in our communities, stimulate real estate development, increase the production of exportable copyright materials and, most important, contribute to our tax base. Governors and mayors from around the Nation can attest to the manner in which the endowment-supported projects have breathed new life into the downtown areas of their towns and cities. New businesses and tourists congregate in those areas which have developed a cultural life. San Antonio, Cleveland, Greenville, Oklahoma City, and Birmingham are among the cities studies have shown the enormous economic contribution of the arts. Rather than being a subsidy for the rich, this has as its primary mission the encouragement of American culture beyond any small circle of those able to afford it. It is true that without the NEA and the NEH we would still have a history, literature, and art, but it would be reserved for those who could afford it. All told, I can think of no legislation that would, for less money, add more to the quality of life for our citizens and our communities. I hope that my colleagues will support this legislation, and that as the years go on we will have increased it and emphasized it. It has been 30 years since we started, 30 years since on the Senate floor some of us have advocated it. I hope that 30 years from now, down the road, we will continue to spend money on the arts and we will be known as not only a great Nation and a superpower, but known as the Athens of the world, the leader in the arts, humanities, literature, poetry, painting, and the like. I yield the floor.
TREASURY, POSTAL SERVICE, AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 19961995-08-05
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, as the Senate considers the Treasury, Postal, and General Government appropriations bill today, I wish to bring to the Senate's attention the often-overlooked good work that the local offices of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms [BATF] provide to our country. I do so partly because of the recent scrutiny directed at the BATF here in the Congress and partly in response to a letter I recently received from the U.S. attorney for Rhode Island, Sheldon Whitehouse, who wrote to me to indicate his concern over the need for adequately staffing the Providence, RI office of the BATF. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is charged with enforcing and administering Federal firearms and explosives laws, as well as those laws covering the production, use, and distribution of alcohol and tobacco products. Over the years, the Bureau has been an essential partner in our crime fighting efforts in these areas and, in particular, the BATF office in Providence, RI has distinguished itself in its work even given its small size. Indeed, to quote from the letter I received from U.S. Attorney Whitehouse, the Providence office-- Has been extremely effective for its size, particularly at fighting the kind of crime that presents the most violent threat to Rhode Islanders; guns, drugs, and gangs. Recent ATF investigations have led to the Federal arrests and convictions of some of the largest dealers of assault weapons and crack cocaine in Newport, and numerous Providence area armed career criminals. The problem, Mr. President, is that adequate staffing of the Providence office of the BATF is being seriously threatened. Only a year ago, the Providence operated with a small, tight crew of just six agents. Today, there are currently four agents and by the end of the year there will be just three agents. The danger is that without adequate appropriations, the office will not be able to replace the full complement of six agents. This would be a tragic loss to Federal law enforcement in Rhode Island and one that in our zeal to squeeze savings out of the Federal budget would be unwise and potentially dangerous. I highlight three recent cases handled by the Providence BATF to illustrate my point. Just recently, Tonomy Hill was a troubled housing project in Newport, RI. Following an undercover investigation by the BATF, an illicit drug trafficking and illegal firearms operation based at Tonomy Hill and involving two drug kingpins and 33 associates from as far away as Philadelphia and New York was exposed. In the end, the ring leaders and 33 associates were prosecuted and convicted on both State and Federal charges. In another case, in July 1993, Michael Sadd of Wakefield, RI was robbed at gunpoint and then murdered. Through joint cooperation with local law enforcement, ATF agents successfully completed an undercover operation whereby the suspected murderer was found, taken into custody, and currently is awaiting trial. Finally, in 1991, it was becoming increasingly apparent that Rhode Island's gun laws were being thwarted by the proliferation of illegal firearms on the streets. The ATF conducted an investigation and it was discovered that a local Rhode Islander was working with a purchaser in Arizona to provide a supply of illegal firearms to the local black market, smuggled into the State and registered under bogus serial numbers. The case ended with the Arizona purchaser in prison and pending charges against his accomplice in Rhode Island. These examples show that the ATF presence is much-needed in Rhode Island, especially as our State and local law enforcement agencies face cutbacks and budget shortfalls. In the troubled times facing our streets and neighborhoods, we must commit adequate resources at all levels to address the ever increasing menace of violent crime. I realize the difficult times our country faces in finding a way to solve our budget deficit. Nevertheless, in the establishment of priorities, I hope that adequate attention will be given to maintaining law enforcement. With regard to the legislation at hand, I hope that given the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms good work in Rhode Island that a requisite level of funding will be appropriated and insisted upon during a conference with the House of Representatives to assure that adequate field office staffing is maintained not only in Rhode Island but throughout the country. I welcome the opportunity to work with my colleagues to help achieve this result. Customs Port of Entry
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZA- TION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19961995-08-04
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I support the amendment being offered by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon], and am pleased to be a cosponsor. This amendment would remove from the Armed Services Committee bill the requirement that $50 million be spent in preparation for hydronuclear testing. In one respect, I believe the committee bill would set our Nation on an unfortunate course. It in effect would place the United States in a position of moving toward a new nuclear testing program. This would deflect us from the current strong administration effort to achieve a comprehensive test ban and it would send an unmistakable signal to other nations of the world that the United States is not serious and purposeful in its quest of a test ban. Those who joined with us in the decision this spring to extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty could come to no other conclusion than that the United States had acted in bad faith in order to secure approval of extension of the treaty. This would be an unfortunate effect of any such decision to go forward with a testing program that simply is not needed to safeguard our national security. Mr. President, I believe that this amendment will leave the way open to the successful completion of test ban negotiations in Geneva. That negotiation is in process now with the goal of achieving a comprehensive test ban next year. I would hope that such a ban can be in place by October 1, 1996, as envisaged in legislation over the last several years. Until that time, I would hope that the United States would continue to adhere to the present moratorium on nuclear testing. I believe that the President should be commended strongly for his steadfastness in this regard. Some years ago President John F. Kennedy reached a breakthrough agreement with the Soviet leadership that brought the first agreed limit on nuclear testing. That agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, forbade nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It allowed testing only underground and required that testing be done in such a way that the world be spared from radioactive poisoning from the debris of nuclear tests. Moving beyond that Limited Test Ban Treaty has been difficult and tortuous. President Nixon accomplished the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in 1974 and his successor, President Ford, negotiated the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. It took more than 10 years to get these treaties ratified and in place. [[Page S 11371]] Currently, the five nuclear powers are following different courses. We and the British, who must use our testing site, are adhering to a moratorium. The Russians are also adhering to a moratorium. The Chinese are following a nuclear testing program in anticipation that a test ban may be achieved. The French have just unleased a political firestorm in the Far East by announcing a series of tests in the South Pacific. Earlier this year the President of the United States made the very wise decision to abandon U.S. efforts to negotiate a treaty with a provision allowing an easy exit from the treaty at the 10-year mark. This provision could accommodated those who would like a comprehensive test ban to be effective and in force for only 10 years. Nonetheless it worried those nations who fear that the nuclear superpowers do not, in fact, intend to end nuclear testing for all time. The President understood these concerns and decided to negotiate a treaty without an easy exit. As is the case with most treaties, nations will be able to get out of the treaty if they find their supreme national interests are jeopardized. Unfortunately, there have been protracted discussions on whether to allow exceptions under the treaty and what kind of exceptions they should be. Some of the parties would like to see a reduced threshold for nuclear testing rather than elimination of testing. Some would like to see so-called peaceful nuclear explosions revived. Still others would like to see safety and reliability testing be permitted. In our own country, these discussions have led from the suggestion that detonations with explosive power of several pounds be permitted. This has led still further to advocacy by some in the defense community of flexibility in the treaty that would allow hydronuclear explosions of several tons, or even hundreds of tons of explosive power. Mr. President, we would delude ourselves if we believe that the nations of the world, having agreed to the permanent extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty this spring at our behest, would now agree to allow continued nuclear testing under any guise. We are committed to these nations to bring nuclear testing to a halt. We should not be dissuaded from pursuing that course. The authorization bill as written would require hydronuclear testing and essentially deflect us from our goal of a complete end to nuclear testing. The Exon amendment would get rid of this provision and allow the President to pursue the present course. I hope the Senate would have the wisdom to agree to the amendment.
AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S TESTIMONY ON IRAQ1995-08-04
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, yesterday the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs held two hearings on Iraq. The hearings, chaired by the distinguished subcommittee chairman, Senator Brown, focused on the importance of maintaining U.N. sanctions on Iraq and on the Iraqi atrocities against the Kurds. I thought both hearings made a significant contribution to the Senate's understanding of a critical foreign policy issue, and I commend Senator Brown for bringing the matter to the forefront of the subcommittee's agenda. At the start of the first hearing, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright made a compelling, irrefutable case for keeping U.N. sanctions in place against Iraq. Equally as important, her testimony underscored the superb job the United Nations is doing to dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, deter further Iraqi aggression, and to protect Iraq's minorities. At a time when the Congress is considering numerous proposals to condition or reduce U.S. support of the United Nations, Ambassador Albright's testimony serves to remind us of the tremendous contributions the United Nations makes to advance vital U.S. foreign policy interests. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Ambassador Albright's remarks be printed in the Record.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 19961995-08-03
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I strongly support the Senator from Michigan and my other colleagues in their effort to amend the missile defense sections of the defense authorization bill. The amendment would strike from the bill language that mandates action that would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The ABM Treaty, approved overwhelmingly by the Senate following extensive and thorough hearings by the Committee on Foreign Relations, has served in the intervening years as the centerpiece of modern arms control. The treaty has served to guarantee that neither side could threaten to neutralize the offensive forces of the other, with the result that we had years of strategic stability followed currently by major reductions in the strategic offensive arms of both sides. Various attacks have been made upon it over the years, largely by people who would prefer an unbridled strategic offensive arms race, but the treaty's benefits have been so clear that these assaults have been repelled. The present favorable strategic arms environment has been achieved under the umbrella of the ABM Treaty. It probably would have been impossible to reach the present situation in which we are moving away from heavy dependence on strategic defensive arms were it not for the ABM Treaty. The amendment also corrects an additional problem with the bill in that it [[Page S 11271]] unilaterally interprets the ABM Treaty's meaning for theater missile defenses. The bill would arbitrarily impose a demarcation line between theater and strategic missile defenses that would tie the President's hands as he is trying to negotiate this very matter with the Russians. It is those negotiations that should determine the outcome, not some arbitrary judgment in an authorization bill. Secretary of Defense Perry noted to Senator Nunn his strong opposition to these provisions. He said, ``Unless these provisions are eliminated or significantly modified they threaten to undermine fundamental national security interests of the United States.'' Secretary of State Christopher wrote me yesterday to point out that the provisions under discussion here ``raise serious constitutional foreign policy and national security concerns.'' The Secretary continued: Further, such actions would immediately call into question the U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty, and have a negative impact on U.S.-Russian relations, Russian implementation of the START I Treaty, and Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. This would leave thousands of warheads in place that otherwise would be removed from deployment under the two Treaties, including all MIRVed ICBMs such as the Russian heavy SS-18. There is no need now to take actions that would lead us to violate the Treaty and threaten the stabilizing reductions we would otherwise achieve--and place strategic stability at risk. We have established a treaty-compliant approach to theater missile defense that will enable us to meet threats we may face in the foreseeable future--and one that preserves all the benefits of the ABM, START and START II Treaties. Mr. President, the Missile Defense Act portion of the bill, sections 233-235 simply does not warrant approval by the U.S. Senate. The policy it sets forth is neither realistic nor wise. It gives a sense of urgency that is not justified by any known facts. There is no obvious danger from theater-range missiles that must be countered. As we all know, the Patriot missile system proved to be both highly effective and appropriate to the threat we faced in Desert Storm. An effort is now under way to upgrade the Patriot system over time to meet the threat in future years. It is quite easy to overstate the missile threat this country might conceivably face, but it is important to understand that the missile technology control regime [MTCR] has done much to reduce the potential threat we will face from ballistic missiles. At present there are very few nations who have even the potential to mount new missile threats against us that could not be handled by planned systems. The provision states the policy that the United States should deploy a missile system that is highly effective against ballistic missile attacks on the United States, to be augmented over time to provide a defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats. This proposal seems to me highly unrealistic. Few Members of this body can seriously believe that any deployed missile system could be highly effective against any limited missile attack, much less a larger attack. While it is true that, under certain circumstances, ballistic missile defenses could shoot down incoming ballistic missile warheads, I would not wish to place a wager that no warheads would get through to bring on havoc and destruction nor would I want to risk my family or any other American lives on the supposition that any reasonable level of spending for a multiple site national missile defense system would do much of anything other than squander major parts of the national treasure. The bill specifies that we should seek a cooperative transition to a regime that does not feature mutual assured destruction and the offense-only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability. This provision of the bill gives the impression that we do not understand what mutual assured destruction meant for our security during the cold war. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty essentially guarantees that neither side can develop the sort of ballistic missile defenses that would prevent the other side from effectively attacking in a nuclear confrontation. The fact of assured destruction of a mutual nature kept both sides at bay. Since the cold war has ended, the United States and Russia have embarked upon cooperative ventures that are moving us away from the confrontations of the past. We are working with them to dismantle their weapons, to ensure the safe storage of nuclear weapons material, and to implement such agreements as START I and, prospectively, START II. If, as envisioned in this bill, the United States were to violate or abrogate the ABM Treaty, the people on both sides rather than the treaty structure itself would be victimized. Moreover, such action could sabotage the current movement toward greater cooperation and throw us back to an era of confrontation as it jeopardized prospects for continued reductions in the START process and beyond. Under the provisions of this bill, the Secretary of Defense is directed to develop an affordable and operationally effective national defense system with an initial operational capability by the end of 2003. If all goes well, that time is just about when the major reduction of the American and former Soviet nuclear arsenals by two- thirds is to have been completed. I doubt that any Member can contemplate a situation in which the United States would go at top speed toward deployment of a national missile defense system and the Russian response would be passive acceptance. They might well match our system. They might well deploy a larger, more capable system. They might well bring to an end the reductions that are so clearly in our own national interests. They might well engage in other activities of a bellicose nature that we would find hard to bear. And that would require reactions on our part. It could well incite an action/reaction phase in our national defense activities that would be ruinously expensive and that would, in the end, increase the dangers to us rather than permitting the present continuous reduction in the strategic nuclear threat. To me it is important that we stop to think what it is we are doing if we follow this path. In response to an uncertain threat, a threat that has not yet materialized, and a threat that might well be handled through diplomatic efforts, we would be preparing to obligate tens of billions of dollars. We would do this in the mistaken belief that we would somehow be better protected. Whereas the truth of the matter is that, even if we were able to afford and to deploy an effective national defense structure, our potential adversaries would still have the option of sending nuclear weapons our way by air, by land, or by sea. At some point in the future if some despot were to contemplate attacking the United States with a nuclear weapon under the misbegotten notion that he would teach us a lesson, it is hard to imagine that he would be deterred if informed that we had a new national missile defense. Mr. President, this has been a rather difficult year in which many of us have tried to come to grips with the fact that our national deficits are alarming and must be curbed. We are required by the Constitution, to ``establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.'' If we lose sight of the several objectives that must be met, we risk the very well-being of our country. I remember well that a distinguished predecessor, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, was fond of pointing out to the committee that the key to a sound defense is a strong economy. A key to a sound government is a demonstrated ability to keep various activities in proper focus and proper order, so that the whole Nation, not just the defense industry, would benefit. It will not profit us if we sink further in educational quality, if we deny more of our young people the opportunity of a good education at the elementary and secondary levels and reduce the quality of our institutions of higher education, if we increase the misery of those who have no homes and who are hungry all in the interest of saving money, only to turn around and waste it on unnecessary defenses. It does not seem a wise idea to this Senator. It is easy to say that one is for strong defenses. All of us are pledged to support strong defenses and we will do so. But the United States will stand first among nations because it continues to be strong in all of its endeavors, keeps [[Page S 11272]] proper balances, and meets other standards of a great, modern nation. Mr. President, the strategic arms competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union has dwindled away. The ABM Treaty is serving as a very stabilizing force in this promising environment. Further reductions should be achievable. It would be extremely foolish to place all of this in jeopardy. It makes no sense to give the Russians cause to back away from their START commitments or to engage in a dangerous strategic defensive arms race. It makes no sense--when so many human needs are so obvious throughout our Nation--to jeopardize what has been achieved in controlling and reducing strategic arms and to spend billions for dubious purposes when there are so many other desperate calls upon our resources. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] for his initiative. I am happy to be a cosponsor of his amendment. I hope that the Senate will once again prove its wisdom with regard to the ABM issue and vote overwhelmingly in favor of this amendment. In conclusion, I am reminded of the question as to how we will be remembered in history, as succeeding generations look back at us, just as we often have looked back on ancient history from the floor of the Senate. I hope that we can be like Athens and not like Sparta--meaning put more emphasis on the civilian side of our economy, the economic side and the education side, and less on the military side. I yield the floor.
Mr. PELL. Five minutes.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise today in strong opposition to the amendment offered by my colleague from Arizona, Mr. McCain. The Fiscal Year 1992 Defense Authorization Act authorized a third Seawolf submarine, commonly referred to as SSN-23. In 1992, Public Law 102-298 appropriated $540.2 million for advance procurement of critical long-lead items for SSN-23. Subsequent to this action, roughly another $400 million has been appropriated and spent on SSN-23 thus far, for a total of $920 million. This amendment, which would deauthorize funding required for the completion of SSN-23, is opposed by the administration, is inconsistent with previous congressional action, and contradicts the findings of the Bottum-Up Review, the elaborate defense posture plan prepared by the Department of Defense as the blueprint for future weapon acquisition. In the Bottom-Up Review, the administration concluded that construction for the third Seawolf is the best, most cost-effective way to preserve the submarine industrial base. After much sober thought, numerous elaborate studies, and several thorough debates in this Chamber, the Department of Defense has concluded that completion of the third submarine would bridge the gap until we begin construction of the new attack submarine in fiscal year 1998. Sustained, low-rate production is the most effective way to preserve the technology, design, and unique skills necessary to maintain our submarine industrial base. If a production gap occurs, the Navy has determined, and many observers concur, that the highly specialized submarine vendor base, consisting of over 1,000 firms in more than 40 States, will be jeopardized. Mr. President, in addition to preserving unique skills and technology, completing the SSN-23 makes economic sense. In a recent letter to Chairman Thurmond, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, state: Completing SSN-23 is right for the taxpayer and right for our defense needs. The cost to complete SSN-23 is $1.5 billion. If SSN-23 were canceled, between $700 million to $1 billion in direct costs will still be incurred to existing contracts and to the New Attack Submarine program without acquiring a submarine. Thus, the net cost of building SSN-23 at this point in the program is approximately $500 million to $800 million. Moreover, completing the SSN-23 also makes sense from a security viewpoint. In the same letter mentioned above, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili state that ``cancellation would deprive our Armed Forces of a needed military capability to counter the growing number of deployed improved Akula class submarines which are quieter than our improved 688 attack submarines.'' Mr. President, SSN-23 is a necessary bridge for the entire submarine industry to be able to produce the more affordable and technologically advanced new attack submarine. The DOD's plan, as approved by the Armed Services Committee, is the only plan which will preserve this critical industrial base as well as permit long-term competition in the submarine industry. Furthermore, this plan will assist in our national strategy to maintain our margin of undersea superiority, a truly critical area. The Senate has, on several occasions, thoroughly debated and voted on this matter. And each year, the Senate decided to continue this program for the reasons I stated above. It would seem to me irrational and imprudent to cancel a program which would cost less to complete than to eliminate. It does not make sense from either a fiscal or national security viewpoint. The administration and the DOD strongly oppose this amendment, and I urge my colleagues to reject it. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter I mentioned above be printed in the Record.
OPPOSING CONSOLIDATION OF USIA1995-08-01
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Ambassador Nitze's letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
Mr. PELL. Madam President, the need for first-class arms control performance has not always been recognized. Accordingly, in the past 34 years, the agency has had its ups and downs, but it has been central to some successes, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT I Interim Agreement, Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, Senate agreement to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention now pending before the Senate. While ACDA was not in charge of START I or START II, it did the bulk of the backstopping work. It is worthy of note that ACDA has fought alone in some key matters. The State Department opposed negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to please NATO allies. ACDA persevered and won. When the State Department wanted to eviscerate the ABM Treaty in the early 1980's, ACDA fought for the traditional interpretation. Recently ACDA and the Energy Department have been supportive of the current nuclear testing moratorium and of a comprehensive test ban. The State and Defense Departments have been the foot draggers. Recent press reports allege that the administration sided with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff against ACDA and the Energy Secretary in its decision not to agree with the Russians to negotiate further strategic arms cuts beyond START II. In 1991, the Bush administration did not seem to hold ACDA in particular regard, and there was a general sense on the Hill that ACDA was both insignificant and ineffectual. Senator Simon proposed, and the committee and Senate agreed to, an amendment requiring that the State/ ACDA inspector general, Sherman Funk, investigate ACDA and report back with recommendations in December 1992. Mr. Funk ordered a very thorough study and analysis by an outside panel headed by Ambassador James Goodby. That panel explored all the options, including merger into State and concluded that ACDA should be kept independent and strengthened. The importance of the independence of ACDA can not be overemphasized. This was the same logic that President Kennedy used when he said it should be a statutory agency and it should be separate, and why he made the decision to have it set up by statute. Subsequently, I introduced legislation to strengthen and revitalize ACDA. At the same time, the new administration was considering a plan to merge ACDA into State. That subsequently rejected plan is the progenitor of the current majority plan to merge ACDA into State. After their review, the President, on the recommendation of Secretary Christopher, decided to retain ACDA and support the bill I had introduced as soon as some compromises were reached. That was done and the bill, with bipartisan support in both Houses was enacted last spring. These are the highlights of the revitalization legislation, which is now law. The bill enhanced the role of the ACDA in the areas of arms control and nonproliferation policy and negotiations in several ways: First, ACDA was given primary responsibility for all arms control negotiations and implementation fora, including negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban; second, positions for Presidential Special Representatives for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament were created and placed under the ACDA Director; and third, ACDA's role in nonproliferation was underscored by giving the Agency primary responsibility for managing U.S. participation in the 1995 review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and primary responsibility for other nonproliferation activities when so directed by the President. The bill improved ACDA's role regarding arms transfers and nonproliferation. ACDA was given mandatory prior consultation and review rights with respect to export licenses and other matters under both the Arms Export Control Act and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. The bill strengthened the functioning of the Agency by eliminating a number of outdated or redundant reporting requirements and by disbanding the General Advisory Committee, thereby permitting the Agency to reassign personnel to other substantive areas. The results of the strengthening and revitalization are beginning to be seen. Officials of ACDA are effectively involved in bringing an arms control perspective to executive branch decision-making at various levels. The Agency was in charge of the critically important and successful effort this spring to secure the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Agency is currently running the efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban in negotiations in Geneva. The Agency recently submitted a remarkably detailed and informative annual report to Congress that included a section dealing with the adherence of the United States to its arms control commitments and the compliance of other nations with their obligations under arms control agreements. Any Senator reading this compliance report, in either classified or unclassified form, would have to agree that ACDA is on top of various arms control problems and that it is willing to be open and forthright with the Congress regarding these matters and what can be done to deal with them. I am convinced that ACDA is on the right track now. Having decided to strengthen ACDA, it makes no sense now to abolish the agency and give its unique and specialized responsibilities to the Department of State. Within very real budgetary constraints, we need to stay the course and continue to strengthen ACDA. Our amendment would do just that. Mr. McGeorge Bundy also told the committee: Arms control--especially the limitation of nuclear danger-- is not easy. It requires agreement among sovereign states who often fear and mistrust each other. It can require limits on weapons that a military service may initially prefer not to limit. It requires technical understanding, political sagacity, and coordination from the White House. What I would emphasize in particular, from my own service with two Presidents who were deeply and directly engaged in the effort to limit nuclear danger, is that there must be a close and continuous relation between the President and his staff and the main center of arms control analysis and effort. The government's senior people on arms control should have easy access, as a matter of right and expectation, to the White House. The value of independent access to the President as cited by Mr. Bundy cannot be overestimated. Many arms control and nonproliferation matters should be considered at the interagency level and decided by the President. To put arms control at a lower level within the Department of State would mean that the arms control voice would be muffled and key questions could be dealt with inside the Department. Under the present and preferred arrangement, the Director is the principal adviser on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation matter to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State. Thus, the Agency can be actively engaged and effective at whatever level is appropriate. Much is made of the notion that abolishing agencies such as ACDA will save large funds. The ACDA budget is currently about $55 million. ACDA's core spending would remain at about $45 million under my amendment. The Vice President has set about the task of making all feasible reductions throughout Government, and indications are now that significant cuts can be made. With regard to ACDA and the State Department overlap, it is clearly largely within the Department, and there can be reasonable savings in areas in which the Department duplicates ACDA pointlessly. Beyond that, it is hard to imagine cuts that would not simply mean the termination of important programs. I conclude that there could be some relatively insignificant savings realized from the merger of ACDA into State, but the results would not be an improvement. It would amount to dollars saved very foolishly--at an unfortunately high price. Too much is at stake. We should not take steps that could lead to risks to our national security. In a challenging and threatening international environment, reasonable amounts spent on ACDA can only be seen as a sound investment. Exhibit 1 The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, July 6, 1995. Hon. Claiborne Pell, Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Claiborne: As a long term observer of U.S. foreign and security policy, I write to you in opposition to the foreign affairs reorganization bill soon to be considered by the Senate. This reorganization I believe to be ill-advised; folding the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department seems to me to be unnecessary and unwise. In my experience as an arms control negotiator, I always found ACDA's input into the negotiating process to be expert, insightful, and uniquely helpful. That input could well be lost if the Agency does not remain independent. As recent events in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea show, nonproliferation and arms control are more important than ever. Eliminating ACDA from the diplomatic effort to protect our security would be like eliminating the Marine Corps from the military effort. While it will never replace its larger brethren on the foreign policy team, ACDA plays an essential role as a lean and flexible vanguard, always ready to aggressively counter the threat weapons of mass destruction pose to our national security. The global security environment has changed radically in recent years. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the increasing flow of materials and know-how from the former arsenals of communism are now the chief threats to our nation. ACDA has been the champion of nonproliferation within the U.S. Government for more than thirty years. Without the 1968 Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the number of aspiring nuclear powers confronting us today would be an order of magnitude greater. The NPT would never have been achieved without an independent ACDA balancing the bilateral interests promoted by the State Department. Just two months ago, ACDA led the interagency effort which made the NPT unconditionally permanent. Organizing consensus for indefinite extension among the nearly 180 parties to the NPT was a great diplomatic victory for the United States. An independent ACDA proved it could succeed in a post-cold war leadership role that would have been impossible for it to play as part of the State Department. The Soviet Union has collapsed under the weight of its own bankrupt ideology and the global threat of communist aggression has shattered. But the technology (and even the very weapons and materials) used by the communists to threaten our way of life continue to endanger our nation, only now the danger comes from many sources instead of one. The game has changed, but the stakes are at least as great; our national survival still hangs in the balance. We should be strengthening our nonproliferation team, not abolishing it. ACDA is a key part of the best team possible to face the real and growing threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. In this new era of opaque and unpredictable threats to our security, the vigilance that saw us through the Cold War should not be relaxed. Sincerely, Paul H. Nitze.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I intend at the appropriate time to offer amendment No. 1964 on behalf of Senators Hatfield, Glenn, Simon, and Biden, and myself that would amend S. 908 in order to retain the independence of ACDA from the Department of State. The State Department authorization bill, S. 908, would, as reported, make meaningless serious and comprehensive efforts in recent years to strengthen and revitalize ACDA. Moreover, it would have this unfortunate effect without any significant savings with respect to ACDA. As a result, its true price would be high. As an aside, commenting on the words of the Senator from Maine, I appreciated her kind words about the Foreign Service, being the only Foreign Service officer in the Senate. I think all of us recognize what the Foreign Service does, and I appreciate the comments of Senator Snowe. S. 908 as reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, would abolish ACDA and place the retained functions and personnel in a single bureau of the Department of State. That bureau would be one of five under the control of an undersecretary also responsible for international narcotics, law enforcement, political-military affairs, humanitarian assistance, refugees, and migration affairs. We believe that what can only be described as a jumbled reorganization would be in error that could prove very costly to our Nation, and to our arms control efforts, for several reasons. First, this major downgrading of the arms control apparatus at a time in which major threats to our security are becoming both more diverse and more challenging is a dangerously shortsighted action. Second, it would muffle, if not silence, the arms control voice at several major levels. Third, it would deny the Secretary of State and the President the benefit of an independent perspective and judgment on arms control and nonproliferation issues. For these and other reasons, it would be inevitable that our ability to identify and implement effective arms control and nonproliferation activities would be diminished to the detriment of our national security interests. The amendment would require a serious and comprehensive effort to eliminate duplication and overlap within and between the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, while preserving the agency's independence and authorizing the appropriation of necessary operating funds. In the course of committee markup of the legislation, I offered an alternative proposal--that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency be retained and strengthened. At that time, my proposal was supported only by my Democratic colleagues. The amendment I intend to offer is more modest in that it does not shift important non-proliferation responsibilities to ACDA. Rather, it preserves the present relationship, leaving the issue of the further strengthening of ACDA to be resolved later. It also authorizes appropriations of $45 million in fiscal year l996 and in fiscal year l997, which allows for spending at current levels. I hope that a number of Senators of both parties--not just one, but both parties--who understand arms control and nonproliferation issues and appreciate the value of ACDA as a specialized agency at the center of these issues will join in supporting the amendment. Arms control activities were handled within the Department of State until 1961, when it was decided that a separate agency would be a better approach. As the final decisions were being considered, I remember going to the White House with the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Humphrey, and the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Clark, to make the case that arms control was a matter of such central importance to the United States that it should be the responsibility of an agency created by and operating under statute. As I think we all can recall, when Senator Kennedy was running for President, he talked about it being a separate statutory agency. But when the time came and he was President, then the question came up whether he had the votes for it to be made a statutory agency or whether it should be set up by Executive order. The decision made, on the recommendation of Arthur Schlesinger, at that time to the President was that he stick to his guns and that we have it as a separate statutory agency. This was a decision that President Kennedy made at that time. I believe that decision really came out of the conversations Senators Clark, Humphrey, and I had with him then. McGeorge Bundy, who served both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as National Security Adviser, recalled the decisions on ACDA earlier this year in testimony on this bill. He spoke of ``the requirements for first-class executive branch performance in the field of arms control. These requirements are well met in the present executive arrangements; they could be met only by most improbable good luck if the proposal before you (S. 908) should be adopted.'' Mr. President, no American has left a greater mark on arms control in the modern era than Ambassador Paul H. Nitze. In a long and illustrious career, he has served Democratic and Republican administrations alike. He understands fully the value of ACDA within any executive branch. He wrote me on July 6 to say: ``This reorganization I believe to be ill- advised; folding the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department seems to me to be unnecessary and unwise.'' I think when a man of wisdom and experience and the depth of knowledge of arms control, as in the case of Paul Nitze, takes a view like this, we all should take his view seriously. Ambassador Nitze continues, In my experience as an arms control negotiator, I always found ACDA's input into the negotiating process to be expert, insightful, and uniquely helpful. That input could well be lost if the Agency does not remain independent. As recent events in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea show, nonproliferation and arms control are more important than ever. Eliminating ACDA from the diplomatic effort to protect our security would be like eliminating the Marine Corps from the military effort. While it will never replace its larger brethren on the foreign policy team, ACDA plays an essential role as a lean and flexible vanguard, always ready to aggressively counter the threat weapons of mass destruction pose to our national security. Paul Nitze concluded, The game has changed, but the stakes are at least as great; our national survival still hangs in the balance. We should be strenthening our nonproliferation team, not abolishing it. ACDA is a key part of the best team possible to face the real and growing threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. In this new era of opaque and unpredictable threats to our security, the vigilance that saw us through the Cold War should not be relaxed. (Ms. SNOWE assumed the chair.)
FOREIGN RELATIONS REVITALIZATION ACT1995-07-31
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise to support the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Louisiana. I think that Harry Wu has been treated in a dreadful manner. We all agree with that. Of even greater importance is the relationship with China. I am reminded of the fact that the War of Jenkins' Ear, the 7-year war, started after such an incident. This could be such an incident. The important thing is that we get on with our relationship with China and normalize our relations there.
AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEE TO MEET1995-07-31
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Finance be permitted to meet Monday, July 31, 1995, beginning at 9:30 a.m. in room SD-215, to conduct a hearing on Medicare fraud and abuse.
FOREIGN RELATIONS REVITALIZATION ACT1995-07-31
Mr. PELL
Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague. Mr. President, the Senate now turns to S. 908, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995. In prior years this legislation has been called the Foreign Relations Authorization Act and has authorized funding for the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency [USIA], and international broadcasting activities. I want to acknowledge at the outset, Mr. President, the earnestness which with the Foreign Relations Committee Republicans--under the leadership of Chairman Helms--have tackled this legislative effort. In this bill, Senator Helms has made a serious--if controversial--effort to examine and adapt the U.S. foreign policy structure to the exigencies of the post-cold-war world. I think it is important to note the contributions that the senior Senator from North Carolina has made in this regard. I also wish to underscore that in this era of budget stringency, I well understand the imperative of consolidation and the elimination of duplication in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. I therefore can appreciate Senator Helms' intent in moving this legislation. During my tenure on the Foreign Relations Committee, I always have tried to work cooperatively and in good faith with Senator Helms. I have appreciated his unmistakable candor, as well as the courtesy he extended me when I was chairman. When we have disagreed, we both have attempted to do so in an agreeable manner. One of my main reasons for doing so, above and beyond the regard I have for Senator Helms, is the importance that I attach to bipartisanship in foreign policy. I regret to note that, for the first time in my memory, this bill was reported by the committee on a straight, party-line vote. I also must point out the administration's strenuous opposition to this bill. Secretary of State Warren Christopher outlined the administration's views in a July 25, 1995 letter to me. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks, and from which I now will quote.
Mr. PELL. Christopher writes: At a time when our nation's security and prosperity demand sustained American engagement in the world, this bill mandates drastic resource reductions for international affairs and undermines the President's constitutional authority to conduct our foreign policy. If S.908 is presented to the President in its current form, I will have no choice but to recommend a veto. In a July 26 statement, the President said that S. 908 would attack his constitutional authority to conduct America's foreign policy, and that, ``if this legislation comes to my desk in its present form, I will veto it.'' I ask unanimous consent that the President's veto statement be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
Mr. PELL. Why, Mr. President, has this bill has become so controversial that the Secretary would recommend and the President would threaten a veto? The answer lies in the number of proposals that collectively would restrict the President's ability to conduct foreign policy. The most troublesome of these is the plan, outlined in title I of the bill, to reorganize entirely our country's foreign policy agencies. Specifically, the proposal mandates the elimination of the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA], and USIA, and transfers some of their responsibilities to the State Department. I believe the plan is fraught with problems, and I will address these shortly. In addition to the reorganization plan, there are a number of other disturbing provisions of this bill--particularly with regard to the United Nations. Having just returned from the 50th anniversary celebration of the founding of the United Nations, I am freshly reminded that U.S. interests are well served by our active participation in the United Nations. I continue to support a vigorous and active U.S. involvement in the U.N. system. Titles II and III of this bill, however, contain what might best be described as an assault on the U.N. system. Not only does the bill authorize drastic [[Page S 10932]] cuts in funding levels for U.S. assessed contributions to the United Nations in section 201, it also places extreme new restrictions on U.S. participation in and involvement with the United Nations. As Secretary Christopher noted in his letter to me, ``the funding cuts this bill proposes in U.N. accounts and the onerous restrictions it would place on our ability to support U.N. peacekeeping would reduce our ability to achieve meaningful reform.'' The President added further that, ``the legislation would handcuff our ability to take part in and lead United Nations operations, limiting our choice each time a crisis arose to acting alone--or not at all.'' Section 205, for instance, would withhold large percentages of the U.S. contributions to the United Nations until an annual certification is made regarding the Office of the U.N. Inspector General. The section lays out criteria that are arbitrary and impossible to certify, which will mean substantial and unnecessary cuts in our contributions to the United Nations. This section will, as a result, do little to advance U.N. reform and will only undercut U.S. leadership at the United Nations. I hope very much it can be modified. Other sections pertaining to the United Nations in title II are equally problematic. In particular, I am concerned about various provisions in sections 203, 217, and 220, as well as other sections, and I intend to address these during the course of debate on this bill. Moving beyond the U.N. provisions, Mr. President, I want to focus for a moment on the reorganization plan and its impact. As many of my colleagues know, the plan is largely the result of the efforts of the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms. As I said earlier, Chairman Helms has taken a serious initiative, and already he has made an important contribution to the debate over the conduct of foreign affairs in the post-cold-war era. That being said, I am opposed to Congress deciding--on its own--how to restructure the way in which the President conducts American foreign policy. Moreover, it is far from clear that this plan represents the best way to adapt our foreign policy structure to our times. That being the case, I do not think it would be prudent for Congress to insist that this President--or any President, for that matter--implement the plan. The proponents of this reorganization plan have emphasized cuts, consolidation, and elimination, but in my opinion have not paid sufficient attention to the consequences. Nearly everything in this plan suggests that the United States should retrench from its global commitments and responsibilities. If taken to its logical conclusion, the plan could well lead the United States on the path toward isolationism and withdrawal. As we proceed, I intend to support a Democratic alternative to the restructuring plan. The alternative proposal mandates a reduction in the number of foreign affairs agencies--USAID, ACDA, and USIA, and in fact would allow the elimination of all three of them. Where it differs from the Republican plan is in giving the President--in whom the Constitution vests primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations--some flexibility to determine how best to organize the foreign affairs agencies. Our proposal leaves it to the President to decide which agencies should be eliminated, and how their responsibilities should be restructured. I hope the Senate will give careful consideration to our proposal, as it embraces the goals Chairman Helms has set forth during the committee's consideration of the bill, but goes about achieving them in what I believe is a more reasonable and practical manner. During the Foreign Relations Committee markup of S. 908, a number of Democratic amendments were offered to try to improve the reorganization plan and other portions of the bill. I offered an amendment to preserve an independent ACDA, which regrettably was defeated as were similar amendments on USIA and USAID. That being the case, I expect there will a great many amendments offered in order to improve this bill, including amendments to save each of the independent foreign affairs agencies. Senator Hatfield and I, for example, intend to offer an amendment on ACDA similar to that offered in committee. In an era when threats to U.S. security are becoming more diverse and challenging, it defies reason that the Congress would want to dismantle the sole independent voice for nonproliferation within the U.S. Government. I hope very much that the rest of the Senate will concur. Mr. President, as we approach the onset of the 21st century, it is evident that the United States must redefine its place in global affairs. To do so, our Presidents must have at their disposal the proper tools to develop and implement foreign policies that reflect the changing nature of American interests. If we adopt this bill in its present form, I fear the Congress will--unnecessarily and unwisely--do grave damage to our country's future ability to function as a world power. To quote once again the Secretary of State, this bill ``deliberately gouges our resources and micromanages the funds that remain. * * * S. 908, as currently drafted, will have a destructive effect on the conduct and character of American foreign policy for years to come.'' Mr. President, unless there are dramatic and wholesale changes to this bill, I intend to vote against it. If I happen to lose that vote and the Congress enacts this bill, it appears that the President will veto. It distresses me very much that our foreign policy is being cast in such partisan terms. I do not believe such an approach serves the interests of our Nation or its people. Exhibit 1 The Secretary of State, Washington, July 25, 1995. Hon. Claiborne Pell, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. Dear Senator Pell: The Senate will soon consider S. 908, the ``Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995.'' At a time when our nation's security and prosperity demand sustained American engagement in the world, this bill mandates drastic resource reductions for international affairs and undermines the President's constitutional authority to conduct our foreign policy. If S. 908 is presented to the President in its current form, I will have no choice but to recommend a veto. This bill's attack on Presidential authority is unprecedented in scope and severity. It interferes with the President's responsibility to structure America's foreign policy apparatus by abolishing three agencies of government and merging their functions into the Department of State. And it slashes the numbers of foreign affairs professionals who are so essential to meet the threats and seize the opportunities of the turbulent post-Cold War world. This bill takes no account of the serious and successful efforts this Administration is taking to streamline the foreign affairs agencies and to consolidate functions among them. The State Department, ACDA, AID, and USIA are all vigorously cutting costs and employment, realigning resources to better match policy priorities, and modernizing communications and information systems. Eliminating these latter three agencies, as the bill proposes, would undermine our effectiveness--not enhance it. While S. 908 contains a number of management authorities sought by the Department of State, the cumulative weight of its restrictions, requirements and prohibitions would obstruct the President's ability to conduct America's foreign policy and cripple America's ability to lead. The bill purports to prohibit any U.S. diplomatic activity in North Korea, thus impeding our ability to implement the North Korea Framework Accord that is helping to put an end to a nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. It also interferes with our delicate relations with China, and forces a change in our migration policy that could pose a serious threat to America's borders. We also oppose the provision requiring the Treasury Department to issue licenses permitting letter of credit payments from blocked Iraqi funds where no U.S. bank has a payment obligation, thus favoring certain corporate claimants in a manner not compelled by the law of letters of credit, to the detriment of other U.S. claimants against Iraq, including injured U.S. military personnel. With respect to the United Nations, we share the Congress' concern about the need for reform. In Halifax and in San Francisco, the President directed the world's attention toward this important issue. There is growing support for our reform agenda and a commitment to follow-up on the progress made in Halifax. However, the funding cuts this bill proposes in UN accounts and the onerous restrictions it would place on our ability to support UN peacekeeping would reduce our ability to achieve meaningful reform. We are especially concerned about restrictions on intelligence sharing, and certification requirements related to UNPROFOR in Bosnia and the oversight function in the UN that will be impossible to meet. As the President [[Page S 10933]] noted in his speech on the UN's 50th Anniversary, turning our back on the UN would increase the economic, political and military burden on the American people. We recognize in this bill the desire of the Congress for a better foreign affairs consultation process, particularly on peacekeeping issues. We believe this can better be achieved through closer cooperation, rather than through legislation that would unduly restrict the ability of this and future Presidents to provide for the nation's security. Finally, this bill's overall cuts in the International Affairs (150) function compromise the safety and well-being of our nation. The tiny fraction of federal spending we devote to international affairs--a mere 1.3 percent of the budget, of which only a third is included in this bill--helps us strengthen American security by fighting the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. It helps us protect American lives by combating terrorists, drug traffickers, and international criminals. It helps us create American jobs by opening foreign markets and promoting U.S. exports. And, it gives force to American principles by bolstering peace, human rights and democracy around the world. Moreover, the preventive diplomacy that the International Affairs budget funds is our first and least costly line of defense. Compare the cost of arms control and diplomatic action to stem proliferation to the price we would pay if rogue states obtained nuclear weapons. Compare the cost of promoting development to the price of coping with famine and refugees. Compare the cost of successful government-to- government and public diplomacy to the cost of military involvement. If we gut our diplomatic activities today, we will face much greater crises with concomitant costs and crises in the future. The Administration cannot support a bill that deliberately gouges our resources and micromanages the funds that remain. We oppose this bill and will also oppose any amendments to this bill that further restrict or restrain the President's ability to safeguard America's interests. We will firmly resist efforts that would have America abdicate its leadership role in global affairs. I firmly believe that S. 908, as currently drafted, will have a destructive effect on the conduct and character of American foreign policy for years to come. Sincerely, Warren Christopher. Exhibit 2 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 26, 1995. Statement by the President--The Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995 (S. 908) Congress is now considering legislation--S. 908, ``The Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995''--that would undermine the President's authority to conduct our nation's foreign policy and deny us the resources we need to lead in the world. If this legislation comes to my desk in its present form, I will veto it. S. 908 attacks the President's constitutional authority to conduct America's foreign policy. No President--Democrat or Republican--could accept these restrictions because they threaten the President's ability to protect and promote American interests around the world. The legislation would ban or severely restrict diplomatic relations with key countries. Indeed, had it been in effect a few months ago, it would have prevented us from concluding the agreement with North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program. The legislation would handcuff our ability to take part in and lead United Nations operations, limiting our choice each time a crisis arose to acting alone--or not at all. The legislation would abolish three important agencies-- the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency. Each is already making serious and successful efforts to streamline its operations, as part of my administration's Reinventing Government program. Eliminating them entirely would undermine our effectiveness, not enhance it. In short, the legislation would put Congress in the business of micro-managing our nation's foreign policy--a business it should not be in. This legislation combined with S. 961, ``the Foreign Aid Reduction Act of 1995'', would also slash our international affairs budget--which already is only a little over 1.3 percent of our total federal budget. We use these funds to fight the spread of nuclear weapons and technology, to combat terrorists, drug traffickers and international criminals; to create American jobs by opening new markets for our exports; and to support the forces of peace, democracy and human rights around the world who look to America for leadership. The proposed cuts in the international affairs budget are dangerous and shortsighted. We know from experience that it is a lot less costly--in terms of money spent and lives lost--to rely on development aid and diplomacy now than it is to send in our troops later. There is a price to be paid for American leadership. But the return on our investment--in terms of increased security and greater prosperity for the American people--more than makes up for the cost. What America cannot afford are the foreign affairs budget cuts proposed in these bills. As I have made clear before, I want to work with Congress to get an international affairs bill I can sign--a bill that protects the President's authority to conduct foreign policy, maintains vital resources and reflects a bipartisan spirit that serves America's interests. The legislation Congress is considering fails each of those tests. If it is sent to me as it now stands, I will veto it.