Jack Reed

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, due to the delay of my flight from Rhode Island, I was unavoidably absent for vote No. 273, the Brown amendment to create a new Federal Supplemental Loan program. Had I been present, I would have supported the Brown amendment No. 2376. We know that more and more students are taking out private loans with high interest rates. Senator Brown's amendment seeks to provide an alternative for those students who have exhausted their grant and Stafford loan aid and continue to need assistance in meeting their college cost of attendance. I have heard concern that such a program could provide a disincentive to States to provide additional grant aid, but I believe we must address the fact that too many moderate- and low- income students take out high interest private loans, which creates an unmanageable loan burden for these students and their families. The Brown amendment is an attempt to rectify this situation and although not perfect, it is worthy of inclusion in the committee's deliberation. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I wish to propound a unanimous consent request, but I would be remiss if I did not recognize Senator Hagel's leadership on this issue and his articulate vision and years ago his brave service as a soldier in our Army. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Finance Committee be permitted to meet today at 7 p.m. in 215 Dirksen Senate Office Building to consider an original bill entitled the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, which will provide health care for needy children.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for the kind words. And one of my first reactions was a bit of confusion. He referenced General Lamb, the British officer in Baghdad, expressing chagrin at the proposals to reduce the troop strength of the American forces. He must have been beside himself last February when Prime Minister Blair announced the reduction of British forces. In fact, Prime Minister Blair stated at that time that 7,100 troops would be drawn down to approximately 5,500. That is down from a level of 40,000. So at the time that the British are withdrawing troops, we are trying to surge troops. I think the general's peak or discomfort is somewhat misplaced with the United States. I think it should more properly be directed to Prime Minister Blair. But let me get on with issues that I want to address, and that is to try to clarify from my perspective some of the concepts and terms that have been talked about. One is a repeated reference to General Petraeus's plan. The President makes it, and my colleagues make it. This is the President's plan. General Petraeus was asked specifically in his confirmation hearing what role he played, and here was his answer. I met with the Secretary of Defense a couple days after he took office and before he left for his first trip to Iraq, and we discussed the situation there during that meeting. We subsequently talked after his trip. I also talked to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff several times in this period, noting that a population and security emphasis in Baghdad in particular was necessary to help the Iraqis gain the time and space for tough decisions. As the strategy was refined, I talked on several occasions to General Odierno. I relayed my support for those levels that General Odierno recommended to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I also supported the additional emphasis in the advisory effort. This is not a precise quote, but paraphrases his remarks. General Petraeus is not the author of this plan. He, like many officers, participated, was asked questions; he had great experience. He was the head and led the 101st Air Mobile Division in Iraq and was head of our training effort. But this is not his plan. Now, he has accepted this plan. He did that publicly. But this is the President's plan. And at the heart of the President's plan is the statement he made on January 10 when he announced it. I have made it clear to the prime minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people and lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The prime minister understands this. Well, apparently, the prime minister did not understand, because in the intervening months, exactly what the President feared has happened. There has been no adequate political progress in Iraq. That is key rationale for the increased forces in Iraq. And without this political decisiveness on the part of the Iraqis, our military efforts will not be decisive. And what has happened because of this failure to act is precisely as the President suggested? The American people have increasingly become critical of the policy in Iraq. Their support is eroding, and similarly the Iraqi people. So you have a situation now where the logic and the premise for the surge, for the troop levels we are maintaining in Iraq, was the fact there would be political progress. Since January, to date there has not been political progress. I daresay there is very few, if any, of my colleagues that will argue that between now and September 15 we will see remarkable progress by the Iraqi Government. Indeed, it is suspected, confirmed practically, that the Iraqi Assembly will adjourn in August for the month. So the reality is that on these critical issues of political will and decisiveness and political progress, we will know nothing in September that we do not know now. Given the incredibly complicated political system, the incredibly complicated institutional challenges facing the Iraqi Government, the notion that we will know more even at the end of this year or the beginning of next year is doubtful. Without this political progress, all our military efforts will not produce success. That is one reason I think we have to begin to change course. We have to begin to adjust our effort to protect our self-interests and our interests in the region, but no longer be the broker, if you will, for political progress in Iraq that does not materialize. My colleagues have been on the Senate floor and said time and time again that there have been deadlines imposed, in many cases by the Iraqis themselves, that have not been met. The latest report, just a few days ago, suggested these political benchmarks have not been issued. Without that, our efforts and the brave sacrifice of our soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors, and every man and woman who is out there, are not producing the results we want and need. So we have to look again at this strategy. But there is another factor, too, that I think is important to note. I was just in Iraq--as so many of my colleagues have traveled there, I have also--and I spoke with General Petraeus directly. He gave me every indication that he was not waiting for September; that he had been able to make an assessment over the several months he has been in command, and he is prepared to make a recommendation--unless I misunderstood him--before the end of August. Now, he might be overruled by the White House in Washington, but he has a pretty good sense of what is happening on the ground, and we should have that same sense in the Congress. The other factor that seems so critical when it is put next to the issue of no apparent progress by Iraqi political leaders is the fact that by April of next year, April 2008, our military forces will not be able to generate 160,000 troops on the ground in Iraq. The surge will come to an end regardless of what happens on the ground. Unless, of course, the President is prepared to make Draconian personnel changes, extend deployments to 18 months or even longer, calling up Reserve and National Guard units that are not scheduled to be called up, continuing to rely upon the stop-loss practice, where individuals who are eligible to leave the service after honorable service are denied the opportunity to leave and in many cases are forced to deploy; picking reservists and people who are in the individual Ready Reserve, those are individuals who served their full active commitment, they have left, many of them have gone on with their lives and suddenly they are called up and told get back in uniform, you are going overseas. Without such draconian decisions, then by next April we will not be able to field 160,000 troops in Iraq as we are doing today. So the reality is this policy will change. The question is, will it change now or then and will it change in a way that strengthens the national security of the United States? Also, will it change in a way it will gain the support of the American people? One of the factors in a counterinsurgency is the fact that you need popular support. That is not something that is a special thing to have or a nice thing to have, it is essential to the strategy. We are losing--the President is losing--popular support with respect to these operations. Without that support, we will not be able to maintain our presence in Iraq. We are seeing already Americans across the political divide, across the geographical divide, demanding that this Congress act. They have, frankly, little confidence in the President's ability, after all these years, to get it right. That is one of the major reasons we are here today debating, and we will be tonight debating, because the American people are looking for a new direction in Iraq. The other factor that I think should be mentioned is that, while we have pursued a strategy of increasing our forces, our adversaries--and they are multiple in a complicated theater of operations--have reacted. First of all, they have taken the battle, if you will, the battle we tried to orchestrate in Baghdad, and they have spread it around the country. They have moved where there are fewer troops. This has caused us to spread our operations around. The surge, if you will, the additional approximately 30,000 troops, were initially intended to go into Baghdad. If you, as I did, listened closely to General Petraeus at his confirmation hearing, if you listened to the President in his January 10 speech, the concept was Baghdad was going to be locked down. It was going to be saturated with American and Iraqi forces. That has not happened because our tactical leaders have determined they must get out of Baghdad, they must go ahead and pursue some of these elements outside of Baghdad, and our adversaries have decided they would rather move on than take us in a head-to-head fight. Time, regretfully, is always on the side of the insurgent. If they can survive a day, then that is a day that is in their favor. As a result, even with these additional 30,000 troops, there is a question of whether they are an adequate number to take over this population protection mission the President has announced. The population of Iraq is significant. That is another factor I think we have to consider when we look at the adequacy of even the President's proposal today. The Levin-Reed proposal talks about doing what is not only necessary but frankly inevitable. We have to begin to redeploy our forces. We have to begin to reduce our forces. We cannot sustain this effort because of the structure of our military forces. The President had an opportunity several years ago, in the wake of our success in Afghanistan and in the wake of the operations in Iraq, to dramatically increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps. Senator Hagel and I came to the floor and we proposed an amendment, in 2003, to do that. This was opposed by the administration because, if you recall, back then this Iraq operation was basically all but over and they were getting out. Now it is very difficult to increase the size of the military forces. The Army has missed, for the last 2 months, its recruiting objectives. But even if we stayed on track recruiting, we are still in a situation where we cannot grow the Army fast enough, the Marine Corps fast enough, to maintain indefinitely these forces in Iraq. So the strategy must change. If the strategy is not only not supported by our end strength, it certainly must change in the light of the American people. I think the President made a significant mistake last January. After an election that sent a very strong signal all across this country that the American people wanted change, after the report of the Iraq Study Group, wise men and women on both sides of the aisle, with no particular special interest they were trying to protect or advance-- they were true patriots coming forward to give their best advice-- suggested that our strategy should be remarkably similar to what we are talking about today: the redeployment of the American forces; switching missions to training, force protection, counterterrorism; engaging in robust diplomatic activity in the region. Those recommendations were cast aside by the President. At that point, if not earlier, the American public began to seriously question the direction of his policy in Iraq. Without public support, you cannot conduct military operations effectively or for any length of time. So we face two realities in the United States. Ultimately, the inability to generate this force structure indefinitely and the fact that the American people are growing increasingly intolerant of our operations in Iraq--not our forces there, not those magnificent men and women who are fighting and sadly dying each day but our presence there and the lack each day, in their minds, of any real progress and the documented lack of political progress. It was documented a few days ago on the part of the Iraqi Government. So we have to change. The question then is what is the best way to do it? We can debate about this. But certainly this amendment, offered by myself and Senator Levin, represents a change. Not a hortatory request for further assessment, not a discussion of possibilities or reference to another study group but a plan of change. It begins by initiating a reduction of our forces 120 days after passage. That probably will be sometime toward the end of this year, given the nature of the legislative process. It doesn't specify any specific level of reductions. That is the President as Commander's prerogative. It doesn't specify a particular timetable when they can leave, who should go first. Again, that is his prerogative. But what it does suggest and, in fact, requires is that by April of next year, that we have transitioned to three missions--again, missions that were supported significantly by the Iraq Study Group: Force protection--we always have to protect our forces and facilities in the field; counterterrorism, because we never want to give up not only the option but the obligation to strike at terrorist cells wherever they may be, particularly in Iraq; and third, the continued training of the Iraqi security forces. These I think are missions that are not only critical but they advance our national security interests. Again, this fight against terror cannot be given up. We have to continue it. To the extent that we can create effective Iraqi security forces, mitigates against the real concerns that have been expressed on this floor of the aftermath of what I think is almost an inevitable reduction in our presence. We have to be concerned about that. One of the vexing things, though, about training the Iraqi security forces, is it is relatively easy to teach map reading and squad drills. It is relatively easy to teach calling for artillery fire. What is hard to teach, because you really can't teach it, is the political reliability, with a small ``p,'' the dedication to the country, the situation in which professional officers are truly professional. That is one of the nagging doubts that everyone has about the Iraqi security forces, particularly the Iraqi police, and to a less degree the Iraqi Army. There are many factors there, too, but we still have to, I think, press forward and try to train these forces. Our amendment represents the only real possibility of change today, of all those that might be discussed on the floor. It represents not a precipitous withdrawal. It is a phased reduction to missions that are important and are well within the capacity, I believe, of our military forces to sustain over time. They serve, I think, the much broader interests of the United States. All of this, of course, has to be complemented by robust political activity, diplomatic activity in Iraq and around the region, something the President has been woefully lacking in his pursuit of, over the many months we have been engaged. We have to make the case--it is difficult to make, but we have to make the case to the neighbors, particularly, that an Iraq that becomes this caldron of instability and chaos that some of my colleagues fear--and, frankly, that we have to at least anticipate, in terms of our diplomacy and some of our military preparation--that this situation would be detrimental to them as much, if not more, than to us. A chaotic, turbulent, anarchy on the border of any country spells serious problems for that country. That case should begin to be made immediately, not only by our diplomats but by the international community. We suggest, also, we have to try again to involve others in this effort; not just the United States and Great Britain but others, the international actors. They, too, I think have an interest in a stable region, a stable Iraq. It has been discussed on this floor that al-Qaida is sitting back and hoping we leave. It is an interesting concept because there is some contradictory evidence. Ayman Zawahiri, who is the second in command of al-Qaida, was quoted recently as suggesting that our departure would actually be something that would cause them some concern. Not because they don't wish us ill, they certainly do. Not because today they don't continue to try to attack us. But because they believe our presence in Iraq, in his words as translated, is a ``historic trap,'' that we are trapped there and that they can use their forces there--not the al- Qaida elements but all the sectarian groups, some of them operating against us because we are there--they can use these forces to attack our troops, diminish our presence, and effectively continue to apply pressure on us. I think there is a suggestion there that our departure might, in fact, help us in our overall strategy. It certainly will help us to counteract the image which the propagandists, the Zawahiris of the world present, that the United States is committed to destroying the Muslim community by imperialistically invading holy territory. We are in a battle of ideas ultimately, and we are not doing a very good job because what they are able to show throughout the entire Islamic world is our forces in Iraq and our forces in Afghanistan but particularly in Iraq and try to validate their claim, their propaganda, that is why they exist, to resist us. In the course of our strategy going forward, one should think at least about the efficacy of our presence there, not in terms of a bulwark of security in Iraq but as a way that we, in fact, are playing into the hands of many of these Iraqi terrorists, these international terrorists. One of the other aspects we face as a reality on the ground is the complex situation in Iraq. Too often I think the President and others try to simplify this as this battle for Iraq is the central front in our battle against al-Qaida. I would argue the central front in our battle against al-Qaida is somewhere in Pakistan. That is where bin Laden is, where Zarqawi is, that is where it is reported that hundreds of Iraqis and others, Europeans, Chechens, are training to be jihadist terrorists across the globe. But regardless of where the central front is, the issue I think we have to recognize and grasp is that our presence in Iraq is something we cannot sustain indefinitely. We have to focus, I think, on the other threats, focus more diligently on these other threats. Now, we have a situation in Iraq, a complicated situation of Kurds, Shia, and Sunni, together with criminals, together with terrorist elements, al-Qaida. Too often, as I said, we try to make the point it is just about al-Qaida. We have made progress in Anbar Province because in that Sunni region, the Sunni tribal leaders have united against al-Qaida. But that does not define the most decisive factor in Iraq, and that is the conflict between the Sunni community and the Shia community; a community on one hand, the Sunnis, who feel profound entitlement, and on the other hand, the Shia, who feel a profound sense of paranoia. I think we have to ask ourselves seriously, will that profound conflict between the two communities be resolved in 30 days, on September 15; will it be resolved in a week; more than that; October 1; will it be resolved 6 months from now? It has lasted for hundreds and hundreds of years. It is the fuel that is generating the conflict we see in Iraq today. Without the political steps of the Iraqi Government leaders at least to attempt to deal with this issue, our presence will not deal with--I think in the short term--the solution. Senator Levin and I have proposed what I believe is the most practical, feasible, realistic policy we can pursue today in Iraq; indeed, as I suggest, a policy which perhaps not in the same terms but in the same substance will inevitably be the policy of this country. I hope today, though, we can take decisive action to move to our bill, avoid a filibuster, to vote up or down and move forward with a new direction for Iraq, a new direction for our country. I note the presence of the senior Senator from West Virginia. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of the Higher Education Access Act of 2007, and I want to commend Senator Kennedy and Senator Enzi for their great leadership on this measure. This very important legislation, which I helped craft as a member of the Senate Education Committee, makes a substantial Federal investment in need-based grant aid for low-income students and helps middle-class students and families pay down and manage their loan debt. It will be a significant contribution to the overall welfare of American families, and it will be the critical key, I believe, to opportunity in America. Opportunity in America is a strong and direct function of education. Indeed, education is the engine that moves people forward. This legislation renews our commitment to ensuring that all Americans with the drive and talent to go to college are provided the financial means to do so. We understand how critical that is. A college education has now become increasingly necessary. In the generation of my parents, very few people went to college. It was seen as a special distinction, something that was, in some cases, unique. There was a society and an economy then that could accommodate people who graduated from high school who could then go on, with great dedication, diligence, and the skills they learned, to provide for their families and provide for their retirement. Today, that has all changed. College is a necessity not only for the Nation in terms of expanding our intellectual capital but for families in order to make their way, in order to provide for a decent living, in order to provide for their children and to provide for their retirement. College graduates, on average, earn 62 percent more than high school graduates. So college education pays off in the bottom line of American families. And, indeed, over a lifetime, the difference in wages between those with a high school diploma versus those with a bachelor's or higher degree exceeds one million dollars. What we are seeing now in this society is troubling to me because we all understand the importance of an education. One of the key hallmarks in America is opportunity. We pride ourselves, going all the way back to Horatio Alger, as being a place where anyone with a little pluck and a little education can go a long way. It turns out that recent research is showing that this opportunity is decreasing. Prior to the 1990s, the correlation between a parents' income and their children's income was approximately 20 percent, which is good because it means if you come from modest circumstances you have an 80-percent chance you will rise above your parents' income to the next level of economic well-being in this country. Now that was before the 1990s. In the 1990s, the number rose to 40 percent. So the difference between your parents' income and your income was getting closer and closer. You weren't rising as far above your parents. Today, economists estimate that 60 percent of a son's income is determined by the level of the income of his father. So we are no longer a place in which you can far exceed your parents' income with a little pluck and a little education. The way we rectify that is to give more people the chance to obtain a higher education. As I have demonstrated with these statistics, that is the key to economic progress in this country. But it is also the key to social progress and maintaining the fabric of America. As an individual moves through school, we hope they are not just learning about technical skills and applying that to the economy, but that they are also learning to be a good citizen and learning the values of America, values we hope will one day inspire the whole world in a very positive way. To reverse this troubling trend, a trend in which opportunity is not as readily available in our society, we have to invest in education. I have the particular privilege of being the successor to Senator Claiborne Pell. He recognized in the 1960s that education was the key. We have named, and rightfully so, the Pell grant after Claiborne Pell. He understood profoundly that if you let Americans with drive and talent go on to college, and provide them with the financial resources to do so, they will do great things, and they will compel this country to do great things. I would say that a lot of the great breakthroughs which have been translated into today's robust economy stem from the fact that 30 years ago, beginning with my generation, young men and women with drive and talent had a chance to go on to college. There are so many people today who are captains of industry, there are so many people today who have invented new products, who have deployed these products into the commercial realm, and they have done so because they went to college and beyond. In another generation they might have had the talent but would have ended up doing something much less educationally advanced because they didn't have a college education. That is a huge insight and a huge contribution to this country. This legislation builds on Senator Pell's legacy and takes significant steps toward making college more affordable and ensuring that students with talent go forth and get a college degree. I am particularly pleased that under this legislation Rhode Island students will be eligible for an additional $10 million in need-based grant aid next year, and over $86 million in the next 5 years. That is a tremendous input of additional federal financial resources. The effect of this bill's investment in need-based grant aid is to increase the maximum grant for Pell-eligible students from $4,310 to $5,100 next year and to $5,400 by the year 2011. That increases the average grant in Rhode Island from $430 in 2008 to $2,870. I am also pleased, as has been discussed by my colleagues, that this legislation includes provisions from my Financial Aid Form Simplification and Access Act, or FAFSA Act, to significantly increase the number of students automatically eligible for the maximum Pell grant and to reduce the penalty faced by students when they work in order to pay for college. Specifically, the increase in the Auto-Zero Expected Family Contribution ensures that all students from families with incomes of $30,000 or less will receive a maximum Pell grant. Currently, only families making $20,000 or less automatically qualify for such grants. This provision not only increases the number of low-income students eligible for need-based aid, but also simplifies the financial aid process by providing such students with early information and assurances of financial aid for college. Additionally, the income protection allowance protects students who have to work during college so they can earn more without having it count against their financial aid. This legislation doubles the income protection allowance for dependent students from $3,000 to $6,000 over 4 years, and increases the income protection allowance for independent students, including adult learners, veterans, and those students in foster care, by 50 percent over 4 years. We should reward work, not penalize it. We should recognize that, in today's economy, the price of going to school and of getting to school is going up and up. Many students have to work. As such, these increases will help students and families better afford a college education by stemming the perverse income protection limits that punish students and parents who must work one, two, or more jobs to pay for college. I am also pleased that the legislation includes provisions to stem the increasing numbers of middle-class families falling further and further into debt to finance a college education. In Rhode Island, 61 percent of students graduating from 4-year institutions in the 2004- 2005 school year graduated with debt at an average of over $20,000 per student. The Higher Education Access Act will help students manage their debt by capping student loan payments at 15 percent of a borrower's discretionary income and forgiving all debt on such loans after 25 years. So as young people emerge from college with this debt, their payments will be capped, and at some point their loans will be discharged. I think that gives real incentives and real help to people coming out of school, middle-class students who had to borrow money to go to school, and now they can go ahead and discharge those payments over many years at a rate they can afford. It will also provide loan forgiveness for borrowers who continue in public service careers for 10 years. This is an important aspect. There are so many talented people who want to go into teaching or health care professions, but with all this debt they literally cannot afford to. This legislation gives them an opportunity not only to do what they want to do but to serve their community without being penalized because they have to borrow to get through their college education. It also helps our military members and families by expanding loan deferments for Active-Duty military service. Certainly there is no group of persons today who deserve that kind of consideration more than our military members and their families. I hope we build on this legislation by promptly taking up the long overdue reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, which passed the Education Committee unanimously last month and includes provisions I authored to simplify the financial aid process and forms; improve the Leveraging Education Assistance Partnership--or LEAP--Program and forge greater state investments in need based grant aid; strengthen college teacher preparation programs; and provide loan forgiveness for librarians. This is significant legislation. It is important for families in Rhode Island and across the Nation. Let me again commend Senator Kennedy and Senator Enzi for their excellent work on this bill. I look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure that this legislation becomes law. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to myself under Senator Kennedy's time.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, President Bush is fond of slogans over strategy. We have heard them--``bring them on,'' ``cut and run,'' ``as they stand up, we will stand down.'' As my colleague, Senator Snowe, and our cosponsors have pointed out, he is fond of placing hopes over reality. Well, the reality today is threefold. First, the precise steps must be taken by Iraq's political leaders, and they have not done that. Second, we cannot sustain this level of force past next spring because of the limits of our military structure. Third, the President has lost the confidence of the American people and the public support, and you cannot conduct a strategy without that. That is not a political comment, that is a strategic tactical comment. According to the Field Manual, and I quote: At the strategic level gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a tactical deployment is critical. We must change our strategy in Iraq. No strategy can be sustained, regardless of the slogan, without the necessary troops and strong public support, and in this case decisive action by the Iraqi political leadership. The longer we delay--the longer we delay--the more public support erodes and options to avoid a more chaotic redeployment disappear. To those who urge delay, to wait until September, to wait until next spring, I would ask them to ask several questions: First, after 4 years of observing the political process in Baghdad, political maneuvering without effect, do they believe 6 weeks, until September, 6 months, or even 6 years will fundamentally change the sectarian political dynamic in Baghdad, the violent struggle between Shia, who feel paranoid, and Sunnis, who feel entitled to rule? Even on a tactical level, will 6 weeks or 6 months or 6 years provide irreversible progress on the ground without the political progress necessary? The Levin-Reed amendment tries to recognize the reality on the ground both there and here and to shape our strategy to sustain an effort to serve the interest of this country, and we hope the region and the world, and I urge passage. Mr. President, I yield back.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Armed Services Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. Con. Res. 27 and that the Senate then proceed to its consideration.

Mr. REED. I ask unanimous consent that the amendment at the desk be considered and agreed to, the resolution, as amended, be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table en bloc, and that any statements relating thereto be printed in the Record.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Con. Res. 41 submitted earlier today.

Mr. REED. I ask unanimous consent that the concurrent resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating thereto be printed in the Record.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk.

Mr. REED. I object.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I believe the Republican leader will be here in approximately 5 minutes. I will, if the Senator from Virginia concurs, suggest the absence of a quorum and wait.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, today we are facing a critical juncture regarding our operations in Iraq. We can continue with a policy that is straining our military, putting excruciating strain on our military and their families, which is diminishing our standing in the international community and which is rapidly losing the support of the American public--in sum, a policy that cannot be sustained--or we can change, we can make a transition of this mission to focus on objectives that are feasible, to begin a reduction in our forces which will relieve the stress on our military and their families, to initiate complementary and comprehensive diplomatic, political, and economic efforts to engage Iraq's neighbors and the rest of the world in bringing a degree of stability to that country. I believe it is time for such a change. That is why I have joined many of my colleagues, particularly Senator Levin, to propose an amendment to do that. This amendment would first call for a beginning of a reduction of American military forces 120 days after the passage of the legislation. It would give the President the flexibility to pick the precise moment and the precise number of forces and to develop a timetable for their departure. Then it would call for the transition to specific missions by next spring, and those missions would include counterterrorism operations, since we can never give up in our attempts to preemptively attack and destroy terrorist cells--not just in Iraq but in, unfortunately, many other parts of the world. Second, it would allow the American forces to continue to train Iraqi security forces. Third, it would clearly state we will protect our forces wherever they are, particularly in Iraq. It also talks about a very comprehensive diplomatic effort. One of the dramatic failings of this administration has been a one-dimensional policy--military force alone, in most cases unilateral military force. That one-dimensional policy defies strategy, it defies the operational techniques of counterinsurgency, and effectively, I think, has led us, in large part, to Iraq today where we are in a very difficult situation. As all of our commanders have said persistently over the course of this entire conflict: Military operations alone will not lead to success. They will buy time, they might provide some political space, but they will not lead to success. They are merely a complement and a prelude to the economic, to the political, to the nonmilitary forces that are essential to prevail in a counterinsurgency, stabilize a country, and to ultimately prevail in the type of operation we are witnessing in Iraq. I believe the President had an opportunity last January to chart a new course. The American people spoke very clearly in the November elections. They wanted change. The Iraqi Study Group, a combination of some of the most gifted minds on both sides of the aisle with respect to foreign policy, gave a framework that talked about and hoped for a redeployment of American forces and significant engagement in diplomatic activities. All of this was at the hands of the President. He essentially said, no, we are going to do a lot more of the same--or a little more of the same. I think at that point, frankly, the American people understood the President wasn't listening or, if he was, it was not getting through. As a result, I think they began to become very much disenchanted with the course of action of this administration. I don't have to tell anyone in this Chamber or across the globe that this is a decisive turning point in their demands that we act, that this Senate and the House of Representatives take significant action. We are trying to respond to that legitimate concern of the American people by the Levin- Reed amendment that we have proposed. The President said the goals for the surge were to support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence, ensure territorial integrity and counter Iranian and Syrian activity, encourage strong democratic institutions, and foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation. The heart of it, as he suggested and others have, was to give the Iraqi leaders the ability to make tough political decisions which were essential to their future and to our continued engagement in Iraq. Principally among them was to jump start the reconciliation process, bring the Sunni community into government and the civic life of Iraq, to pass legislation to fairly distribute the proceeds of oil revenue, the major source of revenue in that country, and to take other steps-- including provincial elections. None of that has been effectively accomplished. So if the premise of the surge was to create tactical momentum for political progress, some tactical momentum may be there but very little, if any, political progress. That, I believe, is the reality. These goals, this effort was difficult for an extra 30,000 troops to accomplish. But it was made much more difficult because of a series of fundamental operational mistakes and strategic flaws that this administration has been engaged in since the beginning of their operations in Iraq. We know that soon after we arrived in Baghdad, after a very successful conventional attack, there were insufficient forces to occupy the country and chaos broke out. The Coalition Provisional Authority, the CPA, embarked on a debaathification program that denied employment and livelihood and, in a sense, hope to thousands of individuals--teachers, bureaucrats--who had been part of the prior regime, mostly because it was the only way they could hold their jobs, and left, particularly the Sunni community, in a situation where they questioned whether there was a place for them in the new, emerging government. The CPA disestablished the Army; 500,000 individuals with training suddenly found themselves without a future and very quickly many of them found themselves in the insurgency, for many reasons. The Government, the administration, failed to garner support from regional powers to help. Then the administration embarked on a series of elections. These elections demonstrated the procedure of democracy. But what they failed to grasp, the administration particularly, is that elections alone are insufficient unless there is a governmental capacity to translate those elections into an effective government that serves the needs of its citizens. So we have demonstrations of thousands of Iraqis, hundreds of thousands, millions going to the polls. But what happened is they didn't elect a functioning government. They became even more frustrated when they recognized that the Government in Baghdad today doesn't work for them. All of this was summed up, I think very accurately, by former Secretary of Defense William Perry, on January 25, before the Armed Services Committee, where he stated: We may never know whether our goal of achieving a democratic stable government in Iraq was in fact feasible, since the administration's attempts to do so were so burdened with strategic errors. So we start now in a real strategic deficit. Unfortunately, I think the President continues in that vein. The President announced the surge in January: 30,000, roughly, additional forces. It took them many months finally to get in place. The administration claims that since June 15 they have been in place. This was not a surge in the classic military sense of overwhelming force applied rapidly. It was a slow, gradual escalation of a limited force because our force structure limits what we could do. From the very beginning, the ability of this force, deployed in a slow manner, to decisively influence the action on the ground was highly questionable. I had the opportunity a few days ago to go to Iraq. Many of my colleagues have gone. I was able to travel not only into Baghdad but to get into the countryside to visit forward-operating bases, patrol bases, company-sized bases that are the new disposition of our forces. First, let me say, as always, I was impressed with the extraordinary professionalism and commitment of the soldiers and marines, the sailors and the airmen who serve us so well. They are doing a superb job. But my conclusion, after spending these 2 brief days in the field, was their tactical momentum, changing the nature of the battlefield, has not, as I said, translated into the political progress needed to truly bring security and stability to Iraq. And then something else too, the nonrebuttable fact that I see constantly; that is, this surge will come to an end later next spring, not because we have succeeded, not because we have achieved our objectives, but simply because we cannot continue to deploy 160,000 troops in that country. That is a function of our limited forces. Unless the President is prepared to adopt Draconian personnel policies, not 14- to 15-month tours but 18- to 20-month tours; unless he wants to continue to rely upon significant stop-loss, where individuals who are able to leave the service are prevented from doing so; unless he is prepared to do those things, then by next spring the surge ends. So I think it is appropriate, if we are seeing a situation where just months from now we are going to lower our forces, that we should start thinking right now of how we do it in a way which will enhance the security of the United States, which will represent to the American people a new direction which they are clamoring for, and which can be sustained, not only in terms of material and personnel but in terms of the support of the American people. In my opportunity to visit Iraq, I had a chance to sit down with General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. They have suggested that they consciously recognize the limitations of our overall infrastructure. They also indicated that they were ready, probably sooner than September, to make a declaration of their advice to the President. I do not think we should wait, either. I think this debate is timely, the legislation is timely, and we should move forward. Now, we received additional information just a few days ago in the nature of the interim report with respect to the status of the benchmarks. There is an appearance that the military situation in terms of the reliability of Iraqi Army units is encouraging to a degree. But there is still a great deal of work to do with the police force, which is a major component of any type of stable society. In addition, I think if you drill down below the superficial, there is still the nagging question of the reliability, the political reliability, the professional reliability, of these forces, particularly their leadership. That is something which I think is still in great doubt. But if you look at most of the political area, there is a string of unsatisfactory grades. The President's report found unsatisfactory progress of enacting and implementing legislation on debaathification reform. Essentially, what we are seeing is a huge conflict between the Sunni and Shia communities, and this conflict is not being abated by the wise action of the Government, a Shia government, to allow Sunnis fuller participation in the civic life and the political life of Iraq. We are seeing unsatisfactory progress on enacting and implementing major legislation to ensure equitable hydrocarbon resources, distribution of oil and petroleum proceeds. We are seeing unsatisfactory progress on establishing a provincial election law, establishing provincial council authority, and setting a date for provincial elections. One of the problems that has been nagging in the election process for the last several years in Iraq is that the Sunni community did not participate in significant elections, and therefore they are not adequately represented in certain areas. So, as a result, they haven't got this sense of participation of ownership that is so necessary. Until we have provincial elections, this will continue and further provide excuses, if not real reasons, for Sunnis not to participate fully and not to cooperate fully with the Government and with our forces in the field. The report also talked about unsatisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. commanders without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shia militias. Here is that very- difficult-to-measure factor about the subjective quality of these commanders and leaders--whether they can operate without political interference or whether they are wittingly or unwittingly extensions of the political party. Just today, if you saw the New York Times, there was an interesting article about how our American forces in Anbar Province were making progress with Sunni tribes, previously our enemies, our opponents, who now were rallying, not necessarily because they agree with us but because they recognize how ruthless and how much al-Qaida is targeting them in going after them. Now, that is progress we should recognize. But what is disconcerting is the report that the regular Iraqi brigade in that region, primarily Shia, is actually trying to interfere, even in some cases suggest an attack on those Sunnis tribespeople because they see this as a force that will threaten them as they go forward--another example of this Sunni-Shia divide, which is a very difficult political chasm to try to bridge in a short period of time, and that is what we face today in many parts of Iraq. We also saw unsatisfactory progress in ensuring the Iraqi security forces are providing evenhanded enforcement of the law and unsatisfactory progress as far as limiting militia control of local security. It is a very difficult situation in many respects. Now, military operations--our military operations are critically important, but here is another reality that I think escapes so many people. Ultimately, only the Iraqis can provide a solution to these political problems, to these sectarian divides. We can suggest what they should do, but unless they do it, these divides will continue to paralyze this country and continue to undermine our efforts to help them stabilize their own country. I don't think, given the fundamental nature of those issues, that the next 6 weeks until September 15 will make a profound difference. It has been suggested by many commentators that the ability of the Iraqi Government to function--even participate over the next several weeks is limited. So for those people, my colleagues, who call: Wait for September 15, I don't believe or hope that they are suggesting that those profound political problems will be somehow miraculously cured in the next 6 weeks. As I said before, the inescapable fact, to me, is that by next April, we won't be able to generate 160,000, that somehow our military, sooner rather than later, will have to declare that there is a new strategy that rests not on the surge but on a much smaller force or at least a smaller force, and that force has to deal with these problems or has to deal in a way which the American people will support their continued presence in Iraq. That signal is today for a change in policy, not in September, not next spring, but today. Now, I alluded to the lack of public support. Some would suggest, well, that is not important. You know, tough leaders have been in situations where the public did not support them. Well, the reality that I learned a long time ago, serving in the military, going to West Point, is that public support is a critical and necessary element of any national security strategy; you can only go so far and so long without it. We are reaching a point where the American public is clearly declaring that they are deeply concerned about what is going on, deeply distrustful of the President's policy, and my fear, frankly, is unless we take prudent action today, unless the President takes prudent action, that their tolerance for any significant engagement might erode completely by next spring, leaving us with fewer options then than we have today. A July 6 through 8 Gallup poll found 62 percent of Americans felt the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq. A July 11, 2007, Newsweek poll found that 68 percent of Americans disapproved of the way President Bush was handling the situation in Iraq. This is significant because I suggest it undercuts the necessary ingredient of public support for any major military strategic policy. As the President continues to be intransigent and as many of our colleagues give him the luxury of that intransigence, I fear that the American public becomes increasingly disheartened, increasingly desperate, and increasingly unwilling to listen to policies that will provide for a phased and orderly transition of our mission in Iraq. We also understand the huge cost of this war. We have appropriated $450 billion. As many of my colleagues point out, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that we are spending about $10 billion a month. That, too, is very difficult to sustain because most of this is being financed, if not all of it, through deficit spending, which means we are passing on to the next generation of Americans a huge bill. But, also, these are real opportunity costs. How are we going to reestablish, in a very narrow vein, our military, in terms of the personnel, their equipment, when the effort is essentially completed one way or the other? How are we going to provide for the next generation of military equipment, the next generation of military tactics and techniques and support personnel if our budget is in such disarray as it is now? I am not even beginning to comment on the huge costs that are unmet in this society in terms of health care, in terms of education, in terms of those forces and those ingredients of national power, broad national power that are so essential. As I said earlier, these operations are posing an excruciating stress and strain on military forces. The high operational tempo is really taking its toll on the troops and on their families. Since 2002, 1.4 million troops have served in Iraq or Afghanistan. Nearly every nondeployed combat brigade in the Active-Duty Army has reported that they are not ready to complete their assigned war mission. These are the troops who have come back from Iraq, from Afghanistan. They are not ready to perform their mission. We all can remember--I can, at least--Governor Bush talking up before a large crowd in his election campaign and criticizing the Clinton administration because two divisions, as he said, were not--if they were asked to report, they would say: Not ready for duty, sir, to the President. That pales in comparison to the lack of readiness we see today in our military forces. Nearly 9 out of every 10 Army National Guard forces that are not in Iraq or Afghanistan have less than half of the equipment needed to do their job. Their job now is to provide support for Governors in disasters, in problems that are related to their home States. As I said again and again, military planners do not see how we can sustain 160,000 troops beyond next April. We also recognize that our policies of go-it-alone, our policies of virtually unilateral action are increasingly alienating opinion throughout the world. Once again, to accomplish anything significant, to rally diplomatic forces, to rally all of the forces throughout the world to help us achieve our end, you have to start on the basis of at least understanding and support. We have seen that deteriorate. We have seen also the situation where, because of our concentration in Iraq, al-Qaida now is resurgent. That is the conclusion of the National Intelligence Estimate that was talked about in the press just last week. We are seeing a situation where Iran is increasing its strategic power. One major factor is the fact that we are tied down with 160,000 troops in Iraq. We are tied down in a way in which many of the individuals in the Iraqi Government whom we depend upon to do and take the actions where it is essential to our success have close personal and political ties to the Iranians. They talk to them on a weekly basis. They take certain directions from them. We are in a situation where our position in Iraq--unwittingly, perhaps--has strengthened the Iranians. We cannot effectively talk about another major military operation when we are having a very difficult time supplying and supporting this operation. We have effectively taken out two of their traditional opponents in the region, and most difficult and dangerous opponent, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. They now have strategic space. They are using it. They are using it to encourage Hezbollah and Hamas. They are using it to try to achieve nuclear fuel cycles and, on many days we all feel, perhaps, even a nuclear weapon. So what we have seen also is that as these developments take place, the world's opinion is rapidly turning against us. We are seeing disturbing events in Pakistan and elsewhere where there is a concentration of al-Qaida leadership. I, like so many of my colleagues, was most disturbed a few weeks ago when American news broadcasters were showing films of a graduation ceremony of hundreds of individuals somewhere in Pakistan who were leaving to go off and pursue their jihadist terrorist activities around the world. That is a frightening but real situation. As a result, Senator Levin and I have worked with our colleagues and have proposed an amendment that responds to these different issues and different threats and also the reality of the situation at home and in Iraq. I am pleased we are supported in our efforts by so many, including our colleagues, Senators Hagel, Smith, and Senator Snowe. This is a bipartisan amendment. It recognizes what the American people are demanding, a change in direction, and what the status on the ground and the status of the military require also, a change in direction. It calls for protecting U.S. and coalition forces, continuing our fight against terrorism, and training Iraqi security forces to step up and discharge their responsibilities. It calls for a beginning of a phased reduction of forces, 120 days after enactment of the legislation. It also calls upon us to begin to take up the issue of real proactive, complimentary diplomatic, and political action that is so necessary to stability in the operation. One of the factors the President talked about last January, and was alluded to by the Secretary of State and others, was the civilian surge to match the military surge--a surge in advisers, technicians, those people who can help the Iraqis organize their political processes at the city level, the provincial level, and their economic processes. That is not taking place as rapidly as necessary. We are at a critical moment, a moment not to delay but to take appropriate action, a moment to change the direction in Iraq, not simply to wait and wait and wait until events dictate we have to draw down forces. I hope we can prevail our colleagues to support our efforts. I will have more to say. I believe many of my colleagues will have much more to say tomorrow. I urge passage of the Levin-Reed amendment.

Mr. REED. That is my understanding. I have no knowledge of any.

Mr. REED. I had the opportunity this morning to listen to the majority leader, Harry Reid, as I presided. He made it clear that he would be perfectly willing to allow a 50-vote majority vote on both the Levin-Reed amendment and the Cornyn amendment or the proposed McConnell amendment. I think if there is any attempt to obstruct the will of the Senate, it is by those who are suggesting that we must have a 60-vote threshold. I think Senator Reid made it clear that he would be happy to entertain a limited debate and a majority vote on the Levin-Reed amendment, the Kyl amendment, or other amendments that may be appropriate on the policy in Iraq. I also understand at this moment, under the pending unanimous consent, the Senator from Illinois is to be recognized.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, if there is no further business today, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand adjourned under the previous order.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand adjourned until 10 a.m., Tuesday, July 17; that on Tuesday, following the prayer and pledge, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, and the time for the two leaders reserved for their use later in the day; that there then be a period of morning business for 60 minutes, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each, with the first half under the control of the Republicans and the second half under the control of the majority; that following morning business, the Senate resume consideration of H.R. 1585; that on Tuesday, the Senate recess from 12:30 p.m. to 2:15 p.m. for the respective conference work periods; further that the mandatory quorum required under rule XXII with respect to the cloture motions filed today be waived.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period of morning business with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, today with my colleagues in the Senate, I celebrate the anniversary of Cape Verde's independence on behalf of all America. This small African country of 400,000 deserves our recognition, particularly as it one of democracy's few success stories in the African continent. The existence of Cape Verde's islands was first acknowledged by the Romans. But it was not until 1456 that the uninhabited islands were rediscovered by the Portuguese under the command of Henry the Navigator. Six years later, Cape Verde was inhabited and incorporated as a colony of the Portuguese Empire. Its prosperity during the height of European colonialism was so great as to be the object of looting pirates, such as the infamous Sir Francis Drake. However, because of recurring droughts and the decline of the slave trade near the end of the 18th century, many Cape Verdeans emigrated from the islands to New England, many becoming productive members of America's whaling commerce. In the 20th century, Cape Verde was affected by growing nationalism, fomented by disastrous economic circumstances during the Second World War. The tiny nation was subsequently suppressed by the authoritarian Portuguese regime. But in 1974 the Carnation Revolution in Portugal not only brought about the world's third wave of democracy but also meant independence for Cape Verde. On July 5, 1975, Cape Verde received its independence from Portugal. Cape Verde's road to full democracy has been gradual, but nevertheless Cape Verde can now boast a prolific and fair government that received a perfect score in the Freedom House ratings for both political rights and civil liberties, the only African country with such an honor. I urge my colleagues in the Senate to join me in wishing the 350,000 Cape Verdean-Americans a happy Independence Day this Fifth of July.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, first let me associate myself with the comments of Senator Durbin about Lady Bird Johnson. I had the privilege and pleasure for many years of knowing a dear friend of their family, my dear friend, Warrie Price and her family. She was there in Austin for the services. Also, I had the privilege of serving with Senator Chuck Robb and knowing Lynda. I thank the Senator for recognizing those comments by Bill Moyers. When I spoke to my friend, Warrie Price, she said she had never heard anything as moving and as evocative and as fitting as the tribute by Bill Moyers. I thank the Senator for including that in the Record for the American people to consider.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment dispensed with.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the desk.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.