Jack Reed

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. I will yield for a question.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Madam President, today the Senate will vote on a matter of utmost importance--enacting the remaining 9/11 Commission recommendations. Since their publication 2\1/2\ years ago, roughly half of the recommendations have been left unaddressed, while many that have been adopted into law have not been effectively implemented. S. 4, the Improving America's Security Act, is a critical step to ensuring our Nation's safety. This bill includes an important new interoperability grant program. Tragedies such as September 11, the Station Fire in my home State of Rhode Island, and Hurricane Katrina have demonstrated the need for interoperable communications equipment among first responders. More communities require access to funding to create interoperable communications networks, and I have long supported increasing accessibility for interoperability grants to local and state governments. I am also pleased that this bill includes a transit security program that I helped author as a member of the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee. The committee has been well aware of the need for this legislation since the tragic events of 9/11, spending significant time and effort to improve our Nation's transit security system. The Senate has passed transit security legislation in the last two Congresses, only to have them each stall prior to enactment. While our Nation acted quickly after 9/11 to secure airports and airplanes against terrorists, major vulnerabilities remain in surface transportation. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, ``opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface transportation'' as in commercial aviation. The time to act is now. Transit is vital to providing mobility for millions of Americans and offers tremendous economic benefits to our Nation. In the United States, people use public transportation over 32 million times each weekday compared to 2 million passengers who fly daily. Paradoxically, it is the very openness of the system that makes it vulnerable to terrorism. When one considers this and the fact that roughly $7 per passenger is invested in aviation security, but less than one cent is invested in the security of each transit passenger, the need for an authorized transit security program is clear. In addition, the bill provides important protections for Transportation Security Officers at the Transportation Security Administration that have been long absent, including whistleblower protections, the right to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and certain collective bargaining rights. Lastly, while Providence is now 1 of 39 urban areas eligible for the Urban Area Security Initiative grants, something that I have long sought, believing the city faces risks from terrorism, I was disappointed that Senator Leahy's amendment to restore the minimum allocation to 0.75 percent for States under the State Homeland Security Grant Program failed. With this funding, Rhode Island has been able to make critical improvements, but adequate funding is still needed, and it is my hope that the highest minimum funding level will prevail in conference with the House of Representatives. Implementing the final recommendations of the 9/11 Commission builds and improves on the work that has been done since the attacks of September 11, and I am pleased to support this bill.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I would like to acknowledge that today, March 6th, 2007, we celebrate the 17th annual National Sportsmanship Day. Created by the Institute for International Sport at the University of Rhode Island in 1991, this initiative seeks to promote and develop the highest ideals of sportsmanship and fair play among not only America's youth but also the international community. Over its 17 years, more than 13,500 schools and 80 million individuals across all 50 States and many countries around the world have participated in National Sportsmanship Day activities. On this day, in elementary schools, middle schools, high schools, and colleges, students, teachers, coaches, and parents will discuss issues regarding sportsmanship and fair play. This year, National Sportsmanship Day will focus on the themes ``Don't Punch Back, Play Harder'' and ``Defeat Gamesmanship.'' These themes will prompt participants to explore the practical values of ``competitive self-restraint'' and playing within the intended spirit of the rules. It is important for both our society and our culture that we instill these values in our youth. Additionally, the celebration will include the 14th annual USA Today National Sportsmanship Day Essay Contest. I am pleased to say that Rhode Island is home to the Institute for International Sport and National Sportsmanship Day. For 17 years, the institute and this initiative have enhanced the nature and health of competition among our Nation's youth. The efforts of Senator Claiborne Pell and his able staff member Barry Sklar, Senator John Chafee, founder Dan Doyle, and many others have contributed to the success of this endeavor. I know that this year's National Sportsmanship Day celebration will continue to promote fair play and in so doing ensure a sound foundation of sportsmanship for today and for the future.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, on behalf of the 29 members of the Northeast-Midwest Senate Coalition, I commend Richard Munson for his distinguished service as the director of the Northeast-Midwest Institute. For more than two decades through four Presidential administrations, 10 Congresses, and dramatic changes in our Nation's political landscape--Mr. Munson's leadership has kept the institute at the forefront of policy innovations to benefit our region. Formed in the mid-1970s, the institute works with the bipartisan Northeast-Midwest Senate and Congressional Coalitions to develop and implement policies that promote the economic vitality and environmental quality of the region's 18 States. As the institute's lead strategist, Mr. Munson has collaborated with the coalitions' leaders and task forces to identify the region's pressing concerns, deliver high quality research about policies to address them, and provide information that made a compelling case for legislation. Mr. Munson brought to the institute an unparalleled grasp of the internal workings of Congress. In 1993, he authored the Cardinals of Capitol Hill, a story about the men and women who control government spending which former House Budget Committee Chairman James Jones said ``should be required reading for those who want to understand our government.'' Mr. Munson also provided expertise in energy efficiency and utility regulation, demonstrated in his book, ``The Power Makers,'' and more recently, ``From Edison to Enron: The Business of Power and What It Means for the Future of Electricity.'' To complement his own skills and knowledge, Mr. Munson enlisted a staff of seasoned policy entrepreneurs, affording them the flexibility and latitude to launch groundbreaking initiatives from Great Lakes restoration to brownfields revitalization to community-based agriculture. Much of the institute's success has been rooted in Mr. Munson's conviction that economic progress and environmental enhancement are inextricably linked. His extensive legacy includes the institute's work to help craft the Nation's first pollution prevention law instituting the paradigm shift to acknowledge that waste generation not only pollutes the environment but also exacts economic costs. In 1991 the Institute held the first national conference on salvaging the Nation's abandoned and underused brownfield sites. The conference spurred a decade of research and education that paved the way for passage of the Brownfield Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act in 2002. Under Mr. Munson's leadership, the institute also concentrated relentlessly on Great Lakes restoration, leading to passage of the Great Lakes Legacy Act. He was instrumental in launching the Great Lakes Cities Initiative, enabling the region's mayors to share best practices and obtain a seat at the policymaking table. And in direct response to the critical threat of invasive species to the Great Lakes, the Institute created the Great Ships Initiative to engage ports, shipping companies, and shippers in combating the problem. With the 2002 farm bill, the institute began collaborating with states and policy partners to promote entrepreneurial agriculture, private lands conservation, and community-based approaches to reducing hunger and improving public health. The institute continues advancing these principles by facilitating the Farm and Food Policy Project, a collaborative effort working toward a more sustainable food and agricultural system for the United States. In addition to advancing policy initiatives, Mr. Munson has helped the coalitions resist pressure from other regions to cut funding for programs that are most important to the Northeast and Midwest--and oversaw the institute's hallmark reports that reveal the flow of Federal funds to States. His leadership in the perennial fight for the Low--Income Home Energy Assistance Program, LIHEAP, helped the coalitions sustain funding for the program and add an extra $1 billion for LIHEAP in 2006. Working with the coalitions and Senate and House manufacturing task forces, the institute helped rescue the Manufacturing Extension Partnership from elimination preserving a program that boosts manufacturing capacity throughout our region. Mr. Munson came to the institute from the Center for Renewable Resources and Solar Lobby, where he served as executive director from 1979 to 1983. With his departure from the institute, I wish him luck on his new endeavor as a cofounder of a new company--Recycled Energy Development--that seeks to bring to fruition many of the ideas that have been his passion for 30 years.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleagues, Senator Coleman, and Representatives Eshoo and Ramstad, in reintroducing the Consortium on the Impact of Technology in Health Services Act. We face a challenging and exciting time in the evolution of America's health care system. Today, roughly 45 million men and women are over age 65. A full doubling of the elderly population is predicted to occur by the year 2030--with the first of the baby boom generation turning 65 in the year 2011--only four years from now. Nowhere is the aging of the population more apparent than in my home State of Rhode Island. We exceed the national average in terms of citizens over the age of 65 as well as those over the age of 85. In a State of slightly more than a million people, almost 15 percent of the population is over the age of 65 today. According to Census Bureau estimates, the number of elderly is expected to increase to 18.8 percent of Rhode Island's population by 2025. Dramatic increases in life expectancy over the last century can be attributed to tremendous advances in health and medical research. These demographic changes also pose new challenges to our health care system that require creative and innovative solutions. In addition to Americans living longer, keeping up with advancements in medical science poses unique burdens and challenges for our health care system. We are facing shortages in a number of critical health care fields--nurses, primary care physicians, and geriatricians--to name a few. These workforce issues further hinder our ability to keep up with the health care needs of aging Americans. Greater use of technology has the potential to enhance the quality of care to our aging population and enable seniors to remain healthy and live independently longer. The overwhelming majority of seniors in my State and across the Nation want to ``age in place''--in their homes--close to their loved ones. Indeed, a growing number of the baby boom generation support funding aging services technology research, and believe technology will allow them to live longer and more independently. The application of technology in the aging health care services field would also help mitigate the burden on providers, by allowing physicians, home health care workers, and family members to keep in regular contact with patients and loved ones. Better monitoring of elderly patients would also serve to identify changes in their health condition before a serious problem arises. The bill we are introducing today would build on groundbreaking research and public-private partnerships to find evidence-based approaches to behavioral assessment and non-intrusive health monitoring. Improving in-home monitoring technologies and remote diagnostics will provide seniors and their caregivers with greater independence and flexibility. A recent study found that Americans, particularly those with chronic conditions, are already utilizing the Internet and online tools to better manage their health. Using technology to enhance health care professionals ability to access vital health information will not only improve diagnosis and treatment, but it will also inform the health decisions of seniors and their families. Smarter applications of technology in caring for the aged could also address some of the growing concerns with skyrocketing budget deficits. As we grapple with Medicare and Medicaid taking up a growing proportion of overall federal spending, we need to carefully balance health care expenditures while also improving the quality of care. We need to use precious health care dollars wisely and prudently as we seek creative ways to continue to provide quality health services to the elderly. The Consortium on the Impact of Technology in Health Services Act will bring together experts from the medical, aging, and technology fields to build a vision and a framework for the development and implementation of a 21st century health care system able to meet the needs of our burgeoning aging population. We need to change the way we think about health care for our Nation's seniors. We need a model that is oriented toward health promotion and disease prevention. This legislation gives us a jumpstart on developing and implementing the tools and strategies to serve the senior population of America more effectively and with greater cost savings. I am pleased to join with my colleagues in introducing this important initiative and hope the Senate will give it careful consideration.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleagues, Senator Coleman, and Representatives Eshoo and Ramstad, in reintroducing the Consortium on the Impact of Technology in Health Services Act. We face a challenging and exciting time in the evolution of America's health care system. Today, roughly 45 million men and women are over age 65. A full doubling of the elderly population is predicted to occur by the year 2030--with the first of the baby boom generation turning 65 in the year 2011--only four years from now. Nowhere is the aging of the population more apparent than in my home State of Rhode Island. We exceed the national average in terms of citizens over the age of 65 as well as those over the age of 85. In a State of slightly more than a million people, almost 15 percent of the population is over the age of 65 today. According to Census Bureau estimates, the number of elderly is expected to increase to 18.8 percent of Rhode Island's population by 2025. Dramatic increases in life expectancy over the last century can be attributed to tremendous advances in health and medical research. These demographic changes also pose new challenges to our health care system that require creative and innovative solutions. In addition to Americans living longer, keeping up with advancements in medical science poses unique burdens and challenges for our health care system. We are facing shortages in a number of critical health care fields--nurses, primary care physicians, and geriatricians--to name a few. These workforce issues further hinder our ability to keep up with the health care needs of aging Americans. Greater use of technology has the potential to enhance the quality of care to our aging population and enable seniors to remain healthy and live independently longer. The overwhelming majority of seniors in my State and across the Nation want to ``age in place''--in their homes--close to their loved ones. Indeed, a growing number of the baby boom generation support funding aging services technology research, and believe technology will allow them to live longer and more independently. The application of technology in the aging health care services field would also help mitigate the burden on providers, by allowing physicians, home health care workers, and family members to keep in regular contact with patients and loved ones. Better monitoring of elderly patients would also serve to identify changes in their health condition before a serious problem arises. The bill we are introducing today would build on groundbreaking research and public-private partnerships to find evidence-based approaches to behavioral assessment and non-intrusive health monitoring. Improving in-home monitoring technologies and remote diagnostics will provide seniors and their caregivers with greater independence and flexibility. A recent study found that Americans, particularly those with chronic conditions, are already utilizing the Internet and online tools to better manage their health. Using technology to enhance health care professionals ability to access vital health information will not only improve diagnosis and treatment, but it will also inform the health decisions of seniors and their families. Smarter applications of technology in caring for the aged could also address some of the growing concerns with skyrocketing budget deficits. As we grapple with Medicare and Medicaid taking up a growing proportion of overall federal spending, we need to carefully balance health care expenditures while also improving the quality of care. We need to use precious health care dollars wisely and prudently as we seek creative ways to continue to provide quality health services to the elderly. The Consortium on the Impact of Technology in Health Services Act will bring together experts from the medical, aging, and technology fields to build a vision and a framework for the development and implementation of a 21st century health care system able to meet the needs of our burgeoning aging population. We need to change the way we think about health care for our Nation's seniors. We need a model that is oriented toward health promotion and disease prevention. This legislation gives us a jumpstart on developing and implementing the tools and strategies to serve the senior population of America more effectively and with greater cost savings. I am pleased to join with my colleagues in introducing this important initiative and hope the Senate will give it careful consideration.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, Senator Roberts, along with Senators Kennedy, Burr, Murray, Clinton, Brown, Bingaman, Collins, Isakson, and Biden in introducing the Trauma Care Systems Planning and Development Act. Our Nation's emergency medical system is a system on the brink. We need to support and strengthen this essential component of our health care system. The Trauma Care Systems Planning and Development Act is an important building block to achieving an improved national network of care across the country. Unintentional injury is the leading cause of death among people between the ages of 1 to 44 and in 2002, injuries were responsible for 161,000 deaths. In 2004, about 29.6 million people were treated for an injury in U.S. hospital emergency departments, of which nearly 2 million injuries were severe enough to require hospitalization. Yet, between 20,000 and 25,000 trauma deaths are preventable each year. A trauma system is an organized, coordinated effort in a specific area that delivers the full range of care to all injured patients. It provides resources, supporting equipment, and personnel along a continuum of care including pre-hospital, hospital, and rehabilitation services. Trauma systems have been proven to reduce mortality rates and provide efficient, cost-effective, and timely care. Since 1990, the Federal Government, through Title XII of the Public Health Service Act, has helped States and territories develop and implement regional and statewide trauma care systems. The legislation I am introducing today along with my colleagues will reauthorize and reaffirm the Federal Government's commitment to trauma care systems. It will also authorize additional resources for systems planning and development, as well as improved data collection and analysis and the inclusion of an Institute of Medicine study on the state of trauma care and trauma research. Trauma care is not only critical to providing timely access to lifesaving interventions for persons suffering from serious unintentional injuries, it is central to our national security and disaster preparedness. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 and Hurricanes Rita and Katrina serve as stark reminders of the potential intentional and natural disasters that threaten our Nation. Trauma care systems are an important element of our security and response efforts. I look forward to working with my colleagues toward expeditious passage of this legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Trauma Care Systems Planning and Development Act be printed in the Record.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, today I join Senator Isakson in introducing the Tanning Accountability and Notification (TAN) Act. Approximately 1 in 5 Americans will develop skin cancer in their lifetime. While the decline in cancer deaths reported earlier this year is an indication that we are starting to turn the corner on our fight against cancer, approximately 1 million people will be diagnosed with skin cancer and 10,850 are expected to die in 2007 alone. There are many factors that contribute to these startling figures. In recent years efforts have been undertaken by various organizations to better inform the public about the risk of sun exposure and ways to decrease the chance of developing skin cancer. One area, however, where better information is sorely needed is on the use of indoor tanning salons. Every day approximately 1 million people visit a tanning salon. It is a practice particularly popular among teens, the group that seems most at risk from the effects of indoor tanning. The American Academy of Dermatology, the Food and Drug Administration, FDA, the National Institutes of Health, NIH, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC, and the World Health Organization, WHO, all discourage the use of indoor tanning equipment. This message and the current information about the risks of indoor tanning I fear are not being adequately passed on to consumers. The FDA has not updated its warnings on tanning beds since 1979. Regular users of indoor tanning beds deserve to be fully informed. The TAN Act calls upon the FDA to revisit the current label on indoor tanning beds and determine through a process of public hearings and consumer testing what kind of labeling requirements would convey important information on the risks of indoor tanning. This legislation is not about introducing new regulations but ensuring that the current FDA regulations remain effective in communicating accurate, current, and clear information to consumers about indoor tanning salons. I look forward to working with my colleagues toward passage of this bipartisan legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, today I join Senator Isakson in introducing the Tanning Accountability and Notification (TAN) Act. Approximately 1 in 5 Americans will develop skin cancer in their lifetime. While the decline in cancer deaths reported earlier this year is an indication that we are starting to turn the corner on our fight against cancer, approximately 1 million people will be diagnosed with skin cancer and 10,850 are expected to die in 2007 alone. There are many factors that contribute to these startling figures. In recent years efforts have been undertaken by various organizations to better inform the public about the risk of sun exposure and ways to decrease the chance of developing skin cancer. One area, however, where better information is sorely needed is on the use of indoor tanning salons. Every day approximately 1 million people visit a tanning salon. It is a practice particularly popular among teens, the group that seems most at risk from the effects of indoor tanning. The American Academy of Dermatology, the Food and Drug Administration, FDA, the National Institutes of Health, NIH, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC, and the World Health Organization, WHO, all discourage the use of indoor tanning equipment. This message and the current information about the risks of indoor tanning I fear are not being adequately passed on to consumers. The FDA has not updated its warnings on tanning beds since 1979. Regular users of indoor tanning beds deserve to be fully informed. The TAN Act calls upon the FDA to revisit the current label on indoor tanning beds and determine through a process of public hearings and consumer testing what kind of labeling requirements would convey important information on the risks of indoor tanning. This legislation is not about introducing new regulations but ensuring that the current FDA regulations remain effective in communicating accurate, current, and clear information to consumers about indoor tanning salons. I look forward to working with my colleagues toward passage of this bipartisan legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, Senator Roberts, along with Senators Kennedy, Burr, Murray, Clinton, Brown, Bingaman, Collins, Isakson, and Biden in introducing the Trauma Care Systems Planning and Development Act. Our Nation's emergency medical system is a system on the brink. We need to support and strengthen this essential component of our health care system. The Trauma Care Systems Planning and Development Act is an important building block to achieving an improved national network of care across the country. Unintentional injury is the leading cause of death among people between the ages of 1 to 44 and in 2002, injuries were responsible for 161,000 deaths. In 2004, about 29.6 million people were treated for an injury in U.S. hospital emergency departments, of which nearly 2 million injuries were severe enough to require hospitalization. Yet, between 20,000 and 25,000 trauma deaths are preventable each year. A trauma system is an organized, coordinated effort in a specific area that delivers the full range of care to all injured patients. It provides resources, supporting equipment, and personnel along a continuum of care including pre-hospital, hospital, and rehabilitation services. Trauma systems have been proven to reduce mortality rates and provide efficient, cost-effective, and timely care. Since 1990, the Federal Government, through Title XII of the Public Health Service Act, has helped States and territories develop and implement regional and statewide trauma care systems. The legislation I am introducing today along with my colleagues will reauthorize and reaffirm the Federal Government's commitment to trauma care systems. It will also authorize additional resources for systems planning and development, as well as improved data collection and analysis and the inclusion of an Institute of Medicine study on the state of trauma care and trauma research. Trauma care is not only critical to providing timely access to lifesaving interventions for persons suffering from serious unintentional injuries, it is central to our national security and disaster preparedness. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 and Hurricanes Rita and Katrina serve as stark reminders of the potential intentional and natural disasters that threaten our Nation. Trauma care systems are an important element of our security and response efforts. I look forward to working with my colleagues toward expeditious passage of this legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Trauma Care Systems Planning and Development Act be printed in the Record.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague, Senator Burr, to introduce the Services for Ending Long-Term Homelessness Act (SELHA). It is estimated that two to three million Americans experience a period of homelessness in a given year. While the majority of these individuals find themselves homeless for a brief period of time, a growing segment are experiencing prolonged periods of homelessness. Roughly 200,000 to 250,000 Americans fall under the category of chronically homeless. In March 2003, former Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson issued a report that defined the issues and challenges facing the chronically homeless and developed a comprehensive approach to bringing the appropriate services and treatments to this population of individuals who typically fall outside of mainstream support programs. Similarly, the President's New Freedom Commission on Mental Health recommended the development of a comprehensive plan to facilitate access to permanent supportive housing for individuals and families who are chronically homeless. However, affordable housing, alone, is not enough for many chronically homeless to achieve stability. This population also needs flexible, mobile, and individualized support services to sustain them in housing. The legislation we are introducing today is critical to the development and implementation of more effective strategies to combat chronic homelessness through improved service delivery and coordination across Federal agencies serving this population. It directs the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration to coordinate their efforts not only with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but with other Federal departments as well as with various agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services that provide supportive services. Mr. President, SELHA is an important bipartisan measure designed to help improve coordination and ensure access to the range of supportive services that the growing number of chronically homeless Americans need to get back on their feet. Our bill brings together permanent supportive housing and services, the essential tools to enable these individuals to begin to take the steps necessary to become productive and active members of our communities again. I look forward to working with my colleagues toward expeditious passage of this legislation.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Madam President, I want to speak very briefly about the resolution pending, H.J. Res. 20, the resolution that is funding the Government for the remainder of the fiscal year. I particularly want to talk about the veterans health care issues in this continuing resolution. This is not a perfect solution to the problem of funding our Government going forward. Nevertheless, it is, I believe, an equitable and fiscally responsible approach, particularly since we are trying to address the failure of the leadership in the last Congress to pass all the appropriations bills. We are in a very difficult position where this continuing resolution will get us through this fiscal year and allow us to begin to work on the following year 2008 fiscal year appropriations bills and budget so we can take all of those in regular order and hopefully pass them all by the end of this fiscal year, which would be September 30. The continuing resolution we are discussing today freezes the level of spending at most agencies at fiscal year 2006 levels, while at the same time increasing funding for priorities such as caring for our Nation's veterans. This is one of the key priorities Senator Byrd and others insisted upon. Frankly, I want to commend Senator Byrd for his leadership, as well as other members of the Appropriations Committee, for bringing this continuing resolution to the floor. The resolution before the Senate would make veterans funding a priority by adding $3.6 billion above the fiscal year 2006 appropriated levels for the VA health care system. This is one of the few areas where there is a substantial growth in spending, and it is appropriate. If we do not take care of our veterans, then we are breaking a trust that they established by serving valiantly in the uniform of the United States, and we are sending a very bad signal to those young men and women who serve today. We honor their sacrifice by taking care of today's veterans, and certainly giving them the confidence that they will be taken care of in the future. The VA estimates it will treat 219,000 more patients in fiscal year 2007 than it did in fiscal year 2006. So obviously they need the increased resources. The VA estimates it will have 4.2 million more outpatient visits this year than it did in fiscal year 2006, and the Veterans' Administration estimates it will treat almost 26,000 more patients on an inpatient basis this year than it did last year. For medical services and administration not provided, this increase would mean that the VA would be short more than $250 million a month--not total but $250 million a month--in funding for critical medical services, leaving the VA with little choice but to push out waiting times, defer maintenance, and put off purchasing new equipment. Included in this $3.6 billion increase is an additional $271 million for medical facilities. First-rate medical facilities are essential to deliver first-rate health care services to our veterans. The additional funding will ensure that leaky roofs and broken pipes will be fixed in a timely fashion. It also means there will be no disruption in food and dietetic services for veterans seeking inpatient care at any of our VA medical centers throughout the Nation. These are not designed to scare veterans or the American people, that the VA was close to facing some of these maintenance problems and some of these basic problems of feeding veterans at hospitals. That is the reality unless we act today. That is why it is so essential that we not only increase this funding for the Veterans' Administration but we also pass this continuing resolution in a timely fashion. We don't need to look too far back in history to see what shortchanges at the VA would mean. This Senate stood united on both sides of the aisle a year and a half ago when the administration's poor actuarial modeling and budget created a shortfall of almost $3 billion. It was the Congress that responded. If we do not pass this resolution, which includes the needed additional funding for the Veterans' Administration health care system, we will have no one to blame but ourselves for this shortfall. I don't think we can face veterans and active soldiers and say we did not pass this budget, this continuing resolution. That is why the resolution made veterans the No. 1 priority. They have defended this country bravely, honorably, and at a minimum we owe them this increase. I thank Chairman Byrd for his leadership. I urge my colleagues to swiftly pass this measure so we can continue to serve those veterans who have served this country so well. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, we have come to a critical crossroads with respect to our operations in Iraq. After the Iraq Study Group spent months considering the issue of the best policy going forward, suggesting a phased redeployment along with other measures, diplomatic measures that would enhance the security of the United States and protect our soldiers there in Iraq, the President had the opportunity to accept those recommendations. It was a bipartisan panel of eminent Americans--James Baker and Lee Hamilton and so many others. The President specifically rejected them, not just in substance but in tone. In his speech a few weeks ago, he declared that he had learned very little from the Iraq Study Group, that he was not committed to a phased redeployment, he was committed to an escalation of approximately 20,000 troops and a change in tactics in Baghdad. I think he had the opportunity at that moment to do several things. First, he could have accepted the wisdom of the Iraq Study Group. But, more important, he could have communicated to the American public that his policy was based on the reality in Iraq, that he had learned from a series of mistakes he and his administration had made, and that he could have sustained a way forward in Iraq. He didn't do that, and I think the American people reacted as they should have reacted, with declining confidence in his leadership and, frankly, posing the fundamental question of, How does one sustain any policy when 70 percent of the U.S. population considers it to be erroneous and not in the best interests of this country going forward? I believe the President squandered the last opportunity he had to rally people behind his policy. Now we are in the midst of a debate, we hope, about that policy. We are being stymied in terms of bringing this to the floor in a clear and clarion vote that tells the American people where we stand as individual Senators with respect to the President's plan for escalation. We are being frustrated in the sense that there is an attempt to present other issues and not the issue of the moment, the issue under debate. There is no debate about our support for American soldiers around the globe and marines and sailors and airmen and airwomen. We support them. We think their mission should be changed to protect them and to advance the interests of our country, but there is no stinting in our support of these valiant young Americans. The issue which divides this Senate and the issue which captures the feelings and the passions of the American public is whether we will stand in approval or disapproval of the President's proposal to escalate forces in Iraq. I believe that vote should come. That vote should be clear. The vote should stand by itself, not shrouded by other measures that are designed not to address the concerns of American people but simply to give the President additional cover. What has happened since the last 3-plus years, from the invasion of Iraq--indeed, preceding the invasion of Iraq, in this Senate, under the control of the Republicans, has not done a good job at all of oversight, of investigation, of asking critical questions. Where was the Republican leadership, in the fall of 2002 and early 2003, when they should have been asking a simple question: What if we win the conventional battle? What about the occupation? Where is the plan? Where are the resources? How many Americans will it take to secure a large country with a population of about 26 million people, with a history of intersectarian tensions, with a history of a colonial past under the British that has established, some would say artificially, the boundaries of this nation? Those questions were not asked seriously and consistently and, as a result, this administration made huge mistakes when it came to the issue of how to successfully translate a conventional victory against the Iraqi military forces into a successful transition to a stable country. Now we see Iraq enthralled in doubt and violence that seems to be unable to be quenched. Our American forces are in the middle of that. It is interesting, when we come to this point, to look seriously at the National Intelligence Estimate. One of the grave deficiencies we recognize today--some of us recognized it in October of 2002--is that the intelligence being used to sell this operation was flawed. Now I think we have a much more precise and carefully adjusted view of what is happening in Iraq today. If you look at the NIE, it presents to us some profound contradictions. First, and I agree with this assessment, is that the violence today is principally the result of sectarian conflict. The accelerators that raise the tempo of this violence can be found in the insurgent groups, al-Qaida in Iraq, some of these Shia militias, but the underlying battles today are between sectarian groups. The NIE describes this as a winner-take-all approach, as an existential battle between Shias--who feel a sense of insecurity given the history, particularly the last decade, of total oppression by a Sunni minority--and Sunnis, who feel a sense of entitlement that is going to be frustrated by the new, emerging order in Iraq. These existential battles, as the NIE indicates, are in a sense self-sustaining. But here is where the confusion, the conflict, the contradiction comes about. Most of the remedies we are all talking about involve reconciliation--political sectarian reconciliation. The issue--and one which will be decided in the next months and weeks in Iraq--is, can any existential conflict ever be reconciled? Has this conflict reached a point where it is truly self-sustaining and our forces in the middle of it are unable to be a moderating force at all? My view and the view of so many others is that when you look at this situation on the ground and you consider what can be done, the decisive actions must be those of the Iraqi Government. They are political actions; that the presence of our military forces is important but not decisive. Certainly the size of our military forces is probably not as decisive as actions that must be undertaken by the Maliki government reining in the militias, truly trying to reach out beyond this huge sectarian chasm for reconciliation. These political, economic, and social decisions are not going to be made simply because we have increased our presence in Baghdad by 20 percent or we have changed the tactics. Another aspect of this debate is the concentration, almost exclusively, on the military aspects of the President's plan. That, frankly, has been one of the great shortcomings and faults of the administration--and of this and previous Congresses, I should say--in terms of our approach in Iraq. Any military commander on the ground will tell you that they are buying time and that time has to be used for economic progress and political progress. The component in the President's plan that I heard stresses an increase of 20,000 soldiers, but where is the progress in terms of not only Iraqi decisionmakers making tough decisions but American advisers--State Department officials, USAID officials, Justice Department officials--going over there to help start the other side, the other part of the process, the economic progress, the social progress, the political mentoring? That has never been the case. As a result, our strategy has failed consistently. Unless this plan has complementary and reinforcing elements-- military, political, and economic--it, too, will fail. I do not see, frankly, the complementary political and economic support necessary to carry off this plan. What we have is 20,000 troops. If you look at the doctrine--and it is interesting because General Petraeus, the designated commander, is one of the principal authors of this new doctrine--that doctrine today would call for 120,000 troops in Baghdad based upon the size in Baghdad. We are sending an additional 20,000, which means our presence, American presence, is about 30,000 troops. The Iraqis have committed to roughly 55,000 troops, which brings us to a total of 85,000, but that still is roughly 35,000 troops short of the doctrine. In addition, I don't think anyone considers that the Iraqi forces can truly muster 55,000 effective troops. We have already seen the reports come in that brigades, Iraqi brigades, are showing up at 50 percent strength, and of those, one has to ask seriously how many are effective fighters. Where are the shortcomings? If it is half a brigade and they are all privates and corporals, that is not an effective fighting force, or if it is half a fighting brigade and they are all majors and lieutenant colonels, that is not an effective fighting force. So we are seeing a situation, even in military terms, where this surge is probably lacking significantly in terms of the size of the force. In addition, we all understand that there is a divided command. One of the key issues in any military operation is unity of command. There is an Iraqi commander who is selected probably for his political reliability more than his tactical or technical skill. There is also a situation in that our new tactics require significantly more enablers. These enablers are the translators, the civil affairs officers, the combat service support officers to supply these outposts now in each neighborhood. In fact, the Government Accountability Office has done a report indicating that if a 21,000 increment is made, it might turn out to be closer to 50,000 if you truly have all the support troops you need to get the job done. There are so many shortcomings in just the political and military aspects of this plan. So I believe, again, this is an opportunity, a moment we have to address this plan, this proposal of the President's, in a very serious way and take a stand on it one way or the other. I hope we can do that. I hope we can do that in the intervening days, certainly before the end of this month, or the end of, I hope, this week. Now, I think there are other aspects that are important to consider when we talk about the situation as we go forward. I will go back to the point I think hindered us consistently throughout our operations in Iraq, and that is despite the extraordinary valor and technical skill of our military forces, they have never been truly complemented by non- Department of Defense personnel, by the State Department officials, by the Agriculture officials. I can recall visiting Fallujah twice in the middle of Anbar Province. Those marines are doing a magnificent job along with many Army units that are there. There is one State Department official in Fallujah who is charged with mentoring, with advice, with reconstruction, with all of these things. That is not adequate, and I don't see any indication in the President's proposal that is going to change. This is all about, again, trying to take a military solution to what is a complicated military, political, and economic problem. It hasn't worked for 3 years, it is not likely to work, and I think we have to take a stand on that proposal. One of the other consequences I think that is ensuing from this focus on a purely military approach is we are losing out in terms of diplomatic leverage in the region. Just this week, the Saudis are meeting with delegates from Hamas and Fatah and the Palestinian Authority because the American leadership has been so lacking. We have to, I think, have a diplomatic policy to complement anything we do within Iraq. We haven't done that and it does not appear to be part of the President's agenda. We have a situation which is grievous and which I think requires something more than simply more of the same, and that is just about what the President is offering. This is not a brand new diplomatic initiative; this is not a large-scale economic push to complement military action; this is a modest increase of forces, although I think this increase is not justified, together with new tactics in Baghdad. But again, I don't think that is going to be sufficient action. We have to start looking beyond the next several weeks and down the next several months and, indeed, the next several years. The strategy that I think is inevitable is a phased redeployment of our forces and renewed diplomatic activity. It represents a focus on missions that are more central to the defense of the United States. The first is continue to aggressively go after those international terrorists, the al-Qaida units. We have done that. We continue, as the military indicates, to obtrude them very successfully. In fact, there are similarities of that mission to the recently conducted operations in Somalia where we sent in aircraft with some liaison from local Ethiopian forces on the ground to go out and take out identified terrorists there. That mission should continue in Iraq and frankly in Somalia and many other places where we can identify and find international terrorists. Second, we have a continuing obligation, I think, to strengthen the Iraqi security forces. Ultimately it is their battle. We have made some progress with the Army, but we have to make more progress. That is a mission we should undertake and continue. Third, there is the obligation, I think, to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq, to make sure the locals do not take advantage of what is a tumultuous situation within Iraq. That, too, I think, is a valid mission, and it can be performed much differently than we are proposing to conduct this mission in Baghdad, by redeploying forces within Iraq. In fact, it was interesting yesterday before the Armed Services Committee when Secretary Gates was asked, and I think it was by Senator Warner: Is this the last chance? If this fails, then all is lost? I think he quite authoritatively and thoughtfully said: No, of course, we have to have contingencies. Of course, there are other approaches we can take. Of course, there are other missions that can be assigned. One of the dangers and one of the persistent aspects of the President's rhetoric has been always summoning up the false dichotomy. Recall, back in October 2002, what was the choice the President proposed? Invade Iraq or do nothing and let Saddam and the terrorists win. We recall the rhetoric. It seems hollow now when we think back to it. What was left out of the equation, of course, was what was already being done: international inspectors of the United Nations on the ground in Iraq looking for weapons of mass destruction, supposedly the source of our great conflict with the Iraq regime. There are other things that could have been done, too, much short of an invasion. There were, in fact, reports of terrorist activities. Zarqawi was in the Kurdish region. What would have prevented the United States from launching a very discrete military operation against Zarqawi in the fall of 2002 in the Kurdish area, an area we were helping to protect by our overflights of aircraft? Nothing, except, I believe, the administration didn't want to give up a good rhetorical device: this supposed terrorist presence in a part of Iraq that Saddam did not control. Again, here now, it is back to the false choices: Surge 20,000 troops or watch the country collapse as we leave precipitously next week. That is not the choice. The choice is missions that are more effectively aligned with our national security interests: going after terrorists, training Iraqi security forces, protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq, complemented with active diplomatic actions, complemented with, we hope, progress by the Iraqis themselves in political decisionmaking. That, I think, is the way to go. We have, again, I think a very difficult situation before us. It requires not only debate, but I think it requires at this moment a decision by the Senate on a very simple proposal: where we stand with respect to the President's proposal for escalation. Now, others have come to the floor and pointed out past statements that have been made with respect to increasing American forces. I have been open to these arguments. Frankly, at this juncture I don't feel persuaded. In the past, when someone had asked me: Would you increase the size of forces in Iraq, certainly in those first few days after the invasion, and after July of 2003 when I visited Iraq and found there were thousands of weapons dumps that were not being protected, I came back here and I think, along with Senator Hagel, was one of the first to call for an increased size of our Army so we could deploy more forces to Iraq. But that window has closed very dramatically and nothing, frankly, was done by the administration to respond to those concerns. I have said publicly that if a commander in the field came to me and said: We need additional forces, I would look at that proposal very carefully. In fact, in a press conference I was asked: So in no way would you be on board with the McCain plan to surge in with, you know, 50,000 strong additional forces on the ground, you would not be in favor of that? My response: I think I responded to the question before, that if the military commanders in Iraq said we need for X number of months 20 plus, 25,000 troops to do this mission and within reasonable certainty was assessed, I would have to listen to that proposal, sir. Well, I have listened to that proposal and I find it wanting. I find it wanting, based on the doctrine of the U.S. Army as it has evolved today. I find it wanting because of the lack of complementary and civilian support for that proposal. I find it wanting because of the lack of any serious indication that the Government of Iraq will make those tough political decisions. So I have considered it as I said I would, but I don't think it is the right way to proceed. Not at all. Now, I am not alone, and I don't think it would be a shock to anyone to suggest this issue of escalation has prompted criticism from a wide group of individuals. GEN Colin L. Powell, former Secretary of State, said in December: I am not persuaded that another surge of troops into Baghdad for the purposes of suppressing this sectarian violence, this civil war, will work. Again, I think General Powell's insights and experience are very critical at this moment. The Joint Chiefs indicated, at least as reported in the Washington Post in December, using anonymous White House sources, that they were opposed, that White House officials are aggressively promoting the concept over the unanimous disagreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is in December. Time Magazine reported that General Abizaid said he opposes more troops because it would discourage Iraqis from taking responsibility for their own security. Here is a general, an officer who has served for decades, the most knowledgeable individual when it comes to Middle East military-political issues within the United States Army, within the Department of Defense, and that is his opinion. Robert Gates--before he became Secretary of Defense, or before he was confirmed, according to two administration officials asking not to be named--Robert Gates expressed his skepticism about a troop surge in Iraq on his first day on the job--excuse me; he was Secretary of Defense--at a Pentagon meeting overseeing the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines. We are not alone. There have been some perhaps eleventh-hour conversions for this surge, but I think there are a number of individuals with significant experience and insight, unquestioned patriots, who question this proposal.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to comment on the nomination of George Casey to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. I have had the occasion, as so many others have had, to visit Iraq on numerous occasions to talk to General Casey. I knew of him before his appointment to Iraq. I think you have to first begin assessing his tenure in Iraq by understanding the situation as he arrived. He arrived after the CPA--the Coalition Provisional Authority--under Mr. Bremer had made systematic and fundamental mistakes with respect to the occupation. He arrived, in fact, after our national command authority entered a country and attempted an occupation without a plan. That, I think, can be attributed to many people but not to George Casey. Without this plan, they were improvising constantly, both on the military side and on the civilian side. The chief master of improvisation was Ambassador Jerry Bremer. He and his colleagues decided to disband the Iraqi Army without any alternative approach to retaining individuals, paying them, or directing them into useful services. He also embarked on a very elaborate debaathification program. In this time it became increasingly more obvious that our forces, because of the misguided and poor decisions by the President and the Secretary of Defense, were engaging in an occupation without sufficient resources. This became most obvious in Abu Ghraib, an incident that shocked the conscience of the world, shocked America particularly. Again, this all preceded George Casey. When he arrived on the ground he had a situation of chaos, both administratively and also a situation in which the leadership of this Nation--not the officers but the civilian leadership--had grossly miscalculated in terms of successfully stabilizing this country. Over the intervening months, General Casey established some degree of administrative routine, some degree of planning. He, along with colleagues such as General Petraeus, started an Iraqi training program. Once again, to understand what he saw when he came in, I can recall, as can many of my colleagues, going up and being briefed by Secretary Rumsfeld and others about the 200,000 Iraqi security forces. In fact, they usually pulled out a big pie chart which each week was designed to show the slice of American forces as growing smaller and smaller. That was a total fiction. These people could not be found. When they were found, they were not trained. Again, that is what George Casey inherited. If people are trying to lay blame and accountability on someone, George Casey is somewhere in the middle or the end of the line. It begins at the top, with the President of the United States whose policies were flawed, with implementation that was incompetent. A large part of the burden should be shared by Secretary Rumsfeld whose personality, whose temperament added further to the chaos that we saw in Iraq. I think we could also include Secretary Wolfowitz and other civilians--Doug Feith, Steve Cambone all of them misguided and impervious to the reality of the ground in Iraq. Yet just a few weeks ago, as Secretary Rumsfeld left, he was lauded by the President of the United States and the Vice President as the greatest Secretary of Defense we have ever had. That is really accountability. This nomination is difficult in some respects because in that chaotic and difficult and challenging assignment, General Casey would be the first to admit that his performance was not without flaws. That is one of the appealing aspects of General Casey. He has a certain candor and honesty that he has generated throughout his entire career. Today, we are debating his nomination. I will support that nomination. I will support it not because he succeeded in every endeavor but because he gave his last ounce of effort and energy to a very difficult and challenging role. He made progress, but that progress today is hampered--but hampered not by his role, certainly, alone--but by strategic decisions that were made by the President, by the Secretary of Defense, and by many others. Interestingly enough, too, this nomination is not strictly the result of the President's work, but it is also that of Bob Gates who, I think, is an individual of competence and character who has already created a new tone and a good tone in the Department of Defense. Secretary Gates thought long and hard about this, and in some respects to suggest that Casey is the wrong person for this job is to question the judgment of Bob Gates. At this point, I am not quite ready to do that. I will support General Casey's nomination. He has an important role to play in the Army, an Army that because of this administration has been severely strained. All of the nondeployed units in the United States are not combat ready. There is a huge personnel turmoil caused by extended deployments overseas. The ability of the Army to modernize is sincerely compromised by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has to face all these problems. There is something else he has to face, too--and, again, it goes right back to the top. It is the selective realism of this President and his Cabinet and his civilian leadership. I was amazed to look at the budget released yesterday, the budget that General Casey will have to operate with, to find out that this administration is estimating the cost of operations in Iraq--not in this fiscal year but the following one, starting October 1, 2008--at a mere $50 billion. Yes, I say a mere $50 billion because this year we will spend about $240 billion; yet next year it will remarkably be brought to $50 billion, although General Pace told me in my questioning that they operate with the assumption at the Pentagon they will spend at least $84 billion. Where is this $200 billion, or $34 billion, disappearing? It is disappearing into the fiction that this administration is trying to project, not just about Iraq but the deficit reduction, their tax cut plans--all of these things. And General Casey will have to work with that budget. And there are those in the Senate demanding we vote not to cut off funds for troops. We are not going to cut off funds. But I tell you what. If the President's budget is to be believed, come October 1 of 2008 there will be a huge reduction in funds for those troops in Iraq-- but, then again, do we believe the President on this or many other issues? I will vote for General Casey. I think he should be criticized for shortcomings that he admits readily, but he should not be condemned because he was carrying out a strategy and a policy that was seriously flawed when he arrived on the ground in Iraq. He has done his best to do the job he was given. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, might I suggest that while I speak an order be established, and at the conclusion of my remarks I would again make the unanimous consent for that order.

Mr. REED. If the Chair is ready, I ask that at the conclusion of the 5 minutes of Senator Nelson, I be recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Florida, Mr. Nelson, be recognized after the Senator from Texas.

Mr. REED. Parliamentary inquiry: Is the Chair establishing an order for speaking?

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I believe, again, the Senator suggested we would alternate from side to side, and at the conclusion of--in fact, if I may, I have a unanimous consent stating that after Senator Specter, I would suggest that from our side the order be Senator Nelson, 5 minutes; Senator Biden, 10 minutes; Senator Levin, 10 minutes; and Senator Schumer, 5 minutes; and they would be alternating between the Republican side and the Democratic side, and the Republican side would be----

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I commend Senator Warner, Senator Nelson, Senator Levin and others who have worked so hard on this resolution. I do believe, like my colleagues, that this measure and an alternative measure deserve an up-or-down vote by the Senate. That is what the American people want, and that is what they should receive. We embarked on this effort in Iraq more than 4 years ago. From the very beginning I thought this was not a response to an imminent threat to the United States or even to the region. It was based upon highly speculative and, it turns out in many cases, flat wrong intelligence. It represents, in my view, a flawed strategy because the approach the President has taken in Iraq fails to recognize that the major regional threat was not Iraq but Iran and failed to recognize the huge amounts of resources that will be necessary to successfully occupy and stabilize a country the size of Iraq with the cultural and historical issues that are inherent in that country. The strategy, as I said, I think was flawed. Strategy, to me, means having a clear objective and putting forth the resources necessary to achieve that objective. The objective in Iraq shifted from the WMD allegations, to terrorist connections allegations, to creating a transformative oasis of democracy and free enterprise in a country that has not seen that in many years. And the resources were never adequate for the task. One of the most important resources in a strategy is public support. I think one of the major problems with the President's last address a few days ago when he talked about Iraq and his so-called new strategy is that, I believe, he squandered significantly the willingness of the American public to support any proposal made. Without that public support, it will be very difficult to sustain our activities in Iraq. I think the proof of this failed strategy is evident. Today Iran is in an enhanced strategic position vis-a-vis the United States and is being much more difficult to deal with, with respect to the region and to its aspirations of nuclear technology. We have compromised our efforts in Afghanistan and in Pakistan where real significant threats exist to the world and to the United States. We have diverted our attention from North Korea and from the Iranian aspirations for nuclear technology. According to many experts such as Hank Crumpton, who is leaving as the Assistant Secretary of State for Counterterrorism: We have made it more likely this country will be struck by terrorists, not less likely. Of course, we can talk at length about the incompetent execution of these policies in Iraq, but I want to go right to the heart of what the President is talking about. He suggests that we have a changed strategy. I would suggest that perhaps we are changing our tactics; we are taking American units and putting them in the heart of Baghdad. But it seems that this surge is more of the same, more of the clear hold and build, more of involvement in the existing conflicts of the Iraqi people and not essential to our national security, which would be to protect ourselves from terrorists there, to stabilize the country so it doesn't disintegrate, and also to go ahead and to train, continually train the Iraqi security forces. Many have criticized this surge on purely military grounds. Too few troops. The doctrine calls for more than 120,000 troops to cover the city of Baghdad. We will be lucky to muster 50,000 to 60,000 to 70,000. Including Iraqi security forces. There is a lack of unity of command. There is uncertain leadership by the Iraqis. Their commanding general is a virtual unknown who has been plucked by Maliki to lead this effort, probably more for political reliability than for tactical skill. And the rolling start, the gradual buildup has already led many Iraqis in Baghdad to suggest that our efforts have further compromised their security, as evidenced by the bombing just a few days ago of a marketplace in a Shia neighborhood in Baghdad. The strategy we have to pursue is a complementary and reinforcing strategy involving military, political, and economic steps, together with regional and international diplomacy. It rests fundamentally on the capacity of Iraq and non-DOD, nonuniform military advisers to carry the day. Frankly, the Iraqi Government is in too many cases dysfunctional and incompetent, and elements outside of our uniformed military personnel--our State Department officials, our Agriculture officials, our Justice officials, our AID officials--have not been in Iraq in sufficient numbers and in sufficient quality to deal decisively with these issues. There is nothing in this plan which suggests that situation will change. I think we are also at a point where we have been informed by the National Intelligence Estimate of the true nature of the struggle in Iraq. It is a sectarian battle between Shia and Sunni, with insurgents who, according to the NIE, accelerate the violence between these two sectarian groups. It is an existential battle where the Shias feel insecure because they have labored for many years under the yoke of the Saddam Hussein regime, and they don't want to go back there. It is existential from the Sunni position because they see themselves entitled to rule. I think our best course is outlined in the Warner resolution, clearly stating our disapproval and disagreement with the augmentation as the resolution describes, and focusing ourselves on reconciliation, on both military efforts, but scaled back, and also concentrating on diplomacy and economic activities. I would hope that at least we could get a vote on it and, frankly, I think it will pass. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I thank Senator Wyden for arranging for my time. I rise to address my strong support for the increase in the minimum wage that we are debating today in this Chamber. Minimum wage workers deserve this long overdue raise. The minimum wage, which today stands at $5.15 per hour under Federal law, hasn't increased since 1997. Since then, inflation has entirely eroded that pay raise. In the meantime, the pay of CEOs of large corporations has increased to an average of $10.5 billion per year, about 369 times the average wages of a worker and 821 times the average wage of a minimum wage worker. That discrepancy, that disparity, that growing bifurcation between the very well compensated and struggling families in America cannot be tolerated any longer. This legislation would raise the minimum wage to $7.25 over the next 2 years. This measure is important because workers have been left out of the economic growth that we have seen so far in this limited recovery that we are experiencing. Strong productivity growth has translated into higher profits for businesses, not more take-home pay for workers. And this is not just the low, entry-level workers. This is very far up the income range for working Americans. The stagnation of earnings in the face of soaring prices for health care, education, and food is squeezing the ability of families to meet their demands, of providing opportunities for the children. In fact, for the first time in my lifetime, I am beginning to sense that so many people are worried whether their children will be able to enjoy the same level of progress of income, of housing that they have, a fact that they took for granted. No one who works full time should have to live in poverty, but the current minimum wage is not enough to bring even a single parent with one child over the poverty line, even if the parent works full time 52 weeks a year. That should never be the case in this country. Five million more Americans have fallen into poverty since President Bush took office; 37 million Americans are now living in poverty, including 13 million children. And we know what the effects of poverty on children are. It impedes their ability to succeed in school. It deprives them of some of the experiences that we think are essential for their progress. Ultimately, it impairs their ability to contribute to this country as workers but, more importantly, as citizens, to fully participate, to bear the responsibilities of this great country. An unacceptably low minimum wage is a key factor in the problem of poverty in our country. This measure would go right to that problem in a very efficient way. People who are working deserve to be rewarded for their work, deserve to be out of poverty. Congress is failing to catch up with reality. Many States have taken it upon themselves to raise their minimum wage. During the election this past November, six States passed ballot initiatives--not just a legislative effort but the voice of the people of those States--to raise the minimum wage. Today 29 States and the District of Columbia have minimum wages above the Federal level, anywhere from $6.15 per hour to $7.93 per hour. In addition, the States of Washington, Oregon, Vermont, and Florida have gone so far as to index the minimum wage to the rate of inflation, allowing workers to share in the benefits of a growing economy. Raising the minimum wage will make a real difference for working families, putting an additional $4,400 per year in their pockets. Almost two-thirds of those who would benefit are adult workers, more than a third of whom are the sole breadwinners for their families. More than 6 million children would benefit from this raise that their parents would receive. One of the fundamental principles of our country and our economy is that people should be able to support their families by their efforts, by their labors, by their works. That is when the economy is working well. That is the reality. Here we have a situation where there are people working two jobs sometimes, working 40 and 50 hours a week, who still don't have sufficient income to meet the demands of the family. Here in this country we should at least be able to guarantee to someone that if they are working that hard, they should at least be able to support their family out of poverty. That is at the core of what we are trying to do today. While the minimum wage has remained stagnant--because it is not just a question of how much a family earns; it is also a question of how much they must pay to support the basic demands of life--we have seen, for example, health insurance premiums increase 87 percent since 2000 alone. How does one afford health care if your wages don't go up? These premiums now average roughly $11,000 per year, and that is more than the annual wages of a full-time minimum wage worker. Clearly, they are not going to be buying health insurance policies. And, by the way, I don't think they are going to be able to take advantage of the President's proposal for a tax deduction because, simply, they are not able to buy the health insurance in the first place, nor are they able to wait a year to get a tax deduction on a tax liability that is probably close to zero, if not, in fact, zero. Additionally, if you look at college tuition, another aspect of family life which is part of the American dream, the notion, again, that you can go ahead and ensure or help at least your children to do better, to go to college, one of the things that recent economic studies have shown is that because we do not have the full access and affordability of college, the class structure is becoming more rigid. Back in the 1950s and 1960s, if you were predicting the income of a son based on his father's income, the correlation was somewhere at 20, 30, 40 percent. Today it is 60 percent. If you are a wealthy parent, you will probably have wealthy children. But the reverse is also true; if you are a low-income worker, the chances of your son or daughter rising to the top in this economy are much less than they were 40 and 50 years ago. Horatio Alger is not alive and well in America today as he once was. This economy has to be more representative of giving people a chance to move up. The key to that, or one of the significant keys, is access to higher education. We have to do more. One thing at least we can do, if the prices of higher education are rising so much, is certainly to at least raise wages and raise the minimum wage. Every day the minimum wage is not increased it continues to leave workers behind because inflation continues unabated at levels that are modest in terms of historical comparisons, but it still is eating away at that existing minimum wage. Today the real value of the minimum wage is more than $4 below what it was in 1968. Think of that. In 1968, we could afford to pay much higher wages to those people engaged in minimum wage work, and it didn't upset our economy. To have the purchasing power that it had in 1968, the minimum wage would have to be more than $9.37 an hour, not $5.15 as it is today, or even $7.25. If we could do it in 1968, why can't we do it today? History also suggests that raising the minimum wage does not have a negative impact on jobs. You will hear a lot of people say this is going to distort the employment numbers, and it is going to inhibit employment. In the 4 years after the last minimum wage increase passed in 1997, the economy experienced the strongest growth in over three decades. We have not seen that kind of growth since the late nineties or during this administration. But following the last increase, nearly 12 million new jobs were added, at a pace of about 248,000 a month. In contrast, in the most recent 4-year period, the minimum wage has remained stagnant and only a small fraction of that number of jobs has been created. Because of the increase in productivity, because of the fact that workers are more effective, they should be able to be compensated more. That is not happening as it should. Working families are struggling to meet their most basic needs, and a fair increase in the wage floor is the right direction to take for this Congress. I am disappointed that our most recent efforts to clearly and simply raise the minimum wage are being linked to other provisions. American families deserve the much needed boost that this raise will provide. They deserve to hear a clear signal from this Senate that we are on their side, they are not an afterthought to be added to other provisions. Mr. President, this is long overdue. I urge my colleagues to work as quickly as possible to pass the minimum wage increase. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, last evening President Bush spoke about Iraq. His speech represented perhaps a change in tone but not a fundamental change in strategy, and the American people were looking for a fundamental change in strategy. They were particularly looking for this change based upon the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. These are distinguished Americans who have dedicated themselves to public service, bipartisan individuals who thoughtfully and carefully looked at the situation in Iraq and made a series of proposals, most of which the President apparently ignored. The American people are deeply concerned about the course of our operations in Iraq. They are incredibly supportive, as we all must be, of the soldiers, the marines, the sailors, the airmen and airwomen who are carrying out this policy, but they are deeply concerned. One of the things that has characterized the President's approach to Iraq for so many years has been the discussion of what I would describe as false dichotomy--false choices. You can recall, in the runup to the conflict in Iraq, the President said we have two choices--invade the country, occupy it indefinitely, or do nothing. Of course, those were not all the choices. We had the ability to interject U.N. inspectors to do the things which we thought were important, which is to identify the true status of weapons of mass destruction--and that was rejected out of hand. We had diplomatic options. We had limited military options. If, as was suggested, there were terrorists lurking in the Kurdish areas, we could have used the same approach as we used a few days ago in Somalia, a preemptive targeted strike, targeted on those whom we had identified as terrorists. All of that was rejected. Then the President undertook a strategy which I think was deeply flawed, which has led us to a situation now where the emerging threat of Iran is much more serious. Iran has seen its strategic position enhanced by the Bush strategy. Of course, we know now the incompetence of the occupation of Iraq, the decisions made in Washington about debaathification, about dismantling the Iraqi Army, about spending so many months in denial of the spreading insurgency have led us to this day. After all of that, the American people were looking for something more than a so-called surge. I say so-called because this is not a surge. This is a gradual increase in troops--20,000 troops approximately in the Baghdad area, and additional Marine forces in Al Anbar Province. It is gradual because our Army and Marine Corps are so stretched that they could not generate an overwhelming force in a short period of time. In fact, due to the policies of this administration, we lack an adequate strategic reserve. Our Army Forces who are not deployed to Iraq are, in so many cases, unready principally because of equipment problems, to rapidly deploy. That I think is a stunning indictment of this administration. But this gradual escalation is not, I think, going to accomplish the goal and objective that the President talked about. One of the critical aspects of this is that even though 20,000 troops will represent billions of dollars of additional expense and put a huge strain on the Army and Marine Corps, it is probably inadequate to the task of a counterinsurgency operation in a city such as Baghdad, a city of roughly 6 million people. Lieutenant General David Petraeus who has been nominated to take over the operations in Iraq, replacing General Casey, spent the last several months coauthoring a new field manual on counter-insurgency, and one point they make in this field manual is that counterinsurgency operations require a great deal of manpower. At a minimum, the manual suggests 20 combat troops for every 1,000 inhabitants. That would mean Baghdad, with roughly a population of 6 million people, would require, according to the manual, 120,000 combat troops. The additional 20,000 troops the President is suggesting will hardly make that total of 120,000 combat forces. I know there will be Iraqi forces there, but those forces have proven to date to be less than reliable. They are motivated, not so much by a military agenda but by sectarian agendas. They are often overruled by their political masters in the Iraqi Government. So as a result, the increase of forces is probably inadequate to accomplish the mission the President wants. That is not according to some subjective view; it is based upon the best thinking of the best minds in the Army and the Marine Corps. For that reason alone, the President, I think, has to ask himself after the speech, Why am I doing it? The other huge cost is not just in terms of money, in terms of stress on the regular Army and Marine Corps, but inevitably we are going to have to reach out, once again, to our National Guard, those men and women who have served so well, the citizen soldiers we call upon, again. They will receive an additional burden to bear. Again, probably not in sufficient numbers with a 20,000 deployment to achieve and guarantee success. The other factor here, too, is it will literally take the pressure off Iraqi forces and Iraqi political leaders to do the job that they must do. The issues in Iraq, the issues of counterinsurgency are fundamentally more political than they are military. That is what we are seeing today in Iraq. It requires political will. It requires political competence to succeed. That will and confidence must be the Iraqis' primarily, not that of the United States. What I think is happening in Iraq today is this Government is essentially a Shia government. They feel they are winning. They are accomplishing the goals they won't articulate but that seem to be obvious from the pattern of their behaviors: to marginalize the Sunnis so they never again will be in a position of dominating Iraq, consolidating Shia power in the south of Iraq, using probably the model of the Kurds in the north. If you go to Iraq, the area which is the most successful, prospering, is the Kurdish area. If you look at it and ask why, they have their own militia, they have their own virtual autonomy, they have access to oil, and they are doing quite well. Again, that is what the Shia intend for themselves. That, of course, leaves the Sunnis in an area where they face an existential conflict. If things continue as they are today, they will be absolutely and totally marginalized in Iraqi society. The Shia, still harboring fears after years and years of domination and horrific tyranny by Sunni leaders, are unwilling to compromise. Unless we can forge some type of reasoned compromise, it is very likely the future of Iraq is one of political fragmentation, if not formal disintegration. I think the best and perhaps the only leverage we have as a nation is to suggest to Shia leaders that we are not going to give them an open-ended commitment. I was pleased last evening to hear for the first time the President say something my colleague Carl Levin has been stressing for almost 2 years now, a simple statement by the President to the effect that there is not a blank check to the Iraqi Government. I fear those perhaps are just words because in the same speech he is talking about increasing our military forces there, increasing our support to the Iraqi security forces. That is where we have our leverage. I don't think the President is quite yet willing to use that leverage. More importantly, until we do exert that leverage, the milestones the President talked about--the milestones which were announced months ago by the Iraqis and still are unfulfilled--will remain unfulfilled. The political issues have not yet been resolved by the President. Without political cooperation and political commitment by the Iraqi Government, the number of forces we have in the country is a secondary matter. What I think the Iraqi political leaders--the Shia government and the Maliki government, with Hakim and the Badr organization and Moqtada al Sadr and Maahdi army, all part of this government--what they would be quite willing to do is to have us conduct operations in Sunni neighborhoods in Anbar Province, but what will be left undone is confronting, in a serious way, the Shia militias which are also part of the problem. If you go to Iraq, as many of my colleagues have, as I have, and you talk to the Prime Minister or the Minister of the Interior, they recognize there is an insurgency. It is a Sunni insurgency. They would be very happy for us to conduct operations against the Sunnis. But they are very unwilling to take the steps that are necessary to provide a check on Shia militias and Shia operations in that country. There is another long-term consequence of the President's speech which may be, in the longer term, the most important. Any strategy of the United States--increasing troops, redeploying troops, training Iraqi forces--requires as an essential element, public support of the people of the United States. The people spoke last November and in a very convincing way said they need to see a change in course in Iraq. They continue to speak--not just in the formal polls, but go out to the coffee shops, walk the streets of this country, all across this country, and you will discover the great concern and disquiet the American public has about the President's policy in Iraq. Nothing changed last evening, fundamentally. In fact, the President actually predicted that this increase in troops is likely to create more chaos in Baghdad, more casualties. That is the nature of committing more troops to intense combat operations in an urban area. The American public will have a very difficult time squaring that with the assertion this is the way forward. I fear they might abandon support for any type of significant commitment to the region. This is a very dangerous precedent that could be emerging today. The President, in disregarding popular opinion, is running the risk of alienating that opinion in a way in which we cannot conduct serious operations there for limited missions in Iraq and elsewhere. We have a very difficult situation. We have a situation in which we have to begin to manage the consequences of the administration's failures. This is not a question of winning or losing. This is a situation of managing a situation that is deteriorating rapidly and, some fear, irreversibly. In doing that, we have to adopt a strategy that is consistent with our resources--our military personnel, our diplomatic resources, our economic resources, and the political support of the American people. That strategy rests in the context of a phased withdrawal of our forces from Iraq, a refocusing of our mission to specific areas which is more consistent with our national interests than trying to arbitrate and settle the sectarian civil war. These missions would be training Iraqi security forces so the country does not collapse because of chaos and anarchy; focusing attention on those small elements of international terrorists who are there, many of whom came after the fall of Saddam--not before; of indicating to the regional powers that we would not tolerate gross violations of the borders of Iraq or gross intervention in the political affairs of Iraq. These are missions that can and should be done, and they don't require an increase of troops. In fact, I would suggest they require a redeployment of our troops. The real challenge is--and the President alluded to it without indicating to the American public confidently and surely that these milestones are being accomplished--that the Iraqi Government, the Maliki government, must undertake serious reconciliation. I think the temper of that Government at the moment is not to do that because they feel they do not have to. Second, they have to begin to spend their own money. I was aware of the significant money--upwards of $13 billion that the Iraqi Government is sitting on--they are not spending. I hope the American people were paying attention when the President announced the Iraqis are promising to spend $10 billion for their own benefit. We have been pouring billions of dollars into Iraq for reconstruction and economic revitalization and the Iraqis have been sitting on billions of dollars when their survival and the integrity of the country is at stake. Something is wrong. They have suggested they will spend the money, but only time will tell because so far they have been extremely reluctant to spend resources unless they benefited their own sectarian community. If that continues, this will be another idle promise. There is one issue, too, that the President did not talk about which is essential to progress in Iraq. It is not democracy and freedom--all the buzzwords--because, frankly, what democracy means in Iraq to the Shia is Shia control. What democracy means to the Sunni is Sunni control. That is one of the reasons they are having sectarian struggle. What we need now more than democracy and freedom and elections is governmental capacity, ministries that actually can serve the people of Iraq so they feel they have a stake in their Government and the Government can respond to their basic needs. They have ministers in Iraq today who are political operatives. The Minister of Health is a devotee of Moqtada al Sadr and the Maahdi army and will refuse to adequately supply hospitals in Sunni areas. We have repeated examples where the ministries of Iraq are not only nonfunctional but deliberately so. Until they help them, or someone helps them, there won't be a government to rally around for the Iraqi people because the Government provides nothing to them. This is a long list of items that has to be accomplished. I am not confident, after the President's speech, that any of this will be done by the Iraqi Government, nor am I confident at all that an additional 20,000 troops in Baghdad will make a decisive military difference. I believe the President has to go back to the drawing board to craft a truly changed strategy that will be consistent with our strategic objectives in the region, consistent with our resources, and consistent with the will and desires of the American people. I hope he does that. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.