Jack Reed

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. It is being reported right now.

Mr. REED. I have no objections. I understand Senator Sessions also-- --

Mr. REED. I call up amendment No. 3353.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, if you could interrupt in 10 minutes.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I think if I could have an hour on my side.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, first, I want to emphasize, again, that this amendment does not affect the deployment decisions that have been made with respect to the missile system. Again, also, we have all talked about operational testing, its importance, and that you have to do it. I would be much more confident if, in fact, there was at least a plan today for operational testing. Mr. Christie and the Department of Defense could have developed that over the last year or two. His letter said this system is so immature that I cannot even begin to think about operational testing. Once again, let me raise the obvious. If it is that immature, then what do we have up in Alaska? Is it going to be a deployed missile system or a test bed? Or is it going to be both? That is the real core of my amendment. The real core is that sometimes, unrelated to deployment, we have to have operational testing. I argue that my amendment provides even more flexibility to the Department of Defense because it doesn't set a date certain of October 1, 2005, when this test must be conducted. I don't think we can make that date, frankly. I think we will find ourselves back here on the next Defense authorization bill striking that, extending it, or pushing it out because, to me, that is an unrealistic, inflexible deadline. For that reason alone, I urge my colleagues to think particularly about the Warner amendment. There is a suggestion I would unduly hobble development. As I read Senator Warner's language, he directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that each block configuration of the ballistic missile system is consistent with the operational scheme, which is precisely what I am saying. But I am not dictating a specific time to do that. The real key difference between Senator Warner's proposal and mine is that he is reversing the customary and prudent way to do independent operational testing. He is taking away the independence. The independence, institutionally, is found in Mr. Christie's office, the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, not in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Everybody here has to recognize that there is no more political, ideological issue than missile defense in terms of the national security debate. It has been that way for 20 years. To suggest that the Secretary of Defense and members of the Cabinet are going to be as independent as someone whose job and career it has been to render objective judgments about weapons systems and deployability and effectiveness is, I think, defying logic. This is not rocket science, it is human behavior. Why are we going to build into the system all those objective judgments and objective pressures that any Secretary, regardless of party, regardless of administration, must feel when something this big is before him to decide? That is why we created a system 20 years ago where there is an independent Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, with a director appointed by the President and who is not directly subject to political whims, the whims of contractors, or the needs of contractors to make sure the funds keep flowing. That is the big distinction between our amendments. We want operational testing, but we want it to be independent. That is the GAO recommendation--independent, realistic operational testing. We are not specifying to do it next week. We are not saying you cannot deploy until you test. In fact, I am removing myself from the timing. As I said before, I think it is unrealistic to assume that there can be an accurate operational test by October 1 of next year. It is not going to slow down the deployment or development; I don't think so. It is going to make sure we learn from each step, each mistake, and each achievement. That is what good operational testing does. I feel very strongly that the Warner amendment is trying to talk about operational testing, but the heart of it is not. It is subjective evaluation that has been going on now for years with respect to this missile program. I think we have to get back to independent evaluation. We can do it with my amendment, and we can also ensure that we get baseline information about how much is being spent, and the MDA cannot, in 1 year, decide that they are a billion dollars off in the cost estimate so they change the cost estimate. That is another example documented by GAO of the temptation to funding programs when you are the tester and the testee. That is what the Warner amendment would do. So I hope, sincerely, that the Warner amendment can be defeated and that we can move on and adopt the Reed amendment. In the spirit of our prior comments, I will yield back my time.

Mr. REED. If I may respond, it would be appropriate if we took an hour debating both the Reed first degree and the Warner second degree. At the conclusion of a vote on the Warner second-degree amendment, then there would be no time agreement entered into. It would be my intention to offer----

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I was very interested in hearing about the letter from Mr. Christie. I have not seen it. I am getting a copy of it. But as I heard my colleague from Colorado, Mr. Christie seems to be saying that this system is not ready for operational testing yet, that it was premature to operationally test it. But it is ready for deployment in September? I think the notion of deployment is this thing is ready to operate; certainly it is at least ready to begin the threshold operation for testing. So I can't think of anything else that more strongly emphasizes the need for operational testing. We have all heard the terminology, evolutionary spiral development, new techniques, et cetera, but the basic question here is: Does it work? No evolutionary spiral jargon avoids that question. Related to the question, does it work, is: What can it do? What do we expect this system to do? And then, of course, you validate that by testing under realistic conditions. None of this is taking place. None of this is planned. I believe my colleagues when they say they want to see this operational testing. But there is no plan to operationally test now. I find interesting the notion that Mr. Christie says it is premature to test, yet in the amendment to my amendment offered by Senator Warner there is a specific deadline of October 1, 2005, that a test will be completed. My amendment doesn't do that because I do recognize the fact that these are very difficult technological issues, that there is great concern about getting the system up and running. There are multiple pieces from space-based radar to ships at sea to land-based radar to booster rockets and kill vehicles. Yet interestingly enough, the Warner amendment would lock in a date of October 1, 2005, to test the ballistic missile system. Yet Mr. Christie is talking about it is too premature, et cetera. I think the approach I have taken is simply saying at some time in the future we need operational testing. Please lay out a plan--a plan, of course, can be modified--and before these new steps in the process are put into effect, let's have the operational testing. I think it makes a great deal more sense. Also, there is a question about limiting developmental testing and operational testing by saying, when you do operational testing, you can't do developmental testing. Actually both can be conducted in virtually the same test. I think one of the major differences between developmental testing and operational testing is that developmental testing is designed by the proponent agency and the contractors and they are supervised by the proponent agencies and contractors. Operational testing is designed by Dr. Christie's office, the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, and supervised and conducted by those individuals from that particular office. It is quite appropriate. It is done frequently. The Patriot was an example of a system that had both operational and developmental testing taking place. Indeed, the Patriot is another good example of the need for operational testing. The upgrade PAC-3 missile defense system had a very good record when it was in its developmental phase. It was just doing extremely well. Then they started the operational combat, realistic test phase, and the Patriot PAC-3 failed each of these operational tests. It had four consecutive operational test failures. What did that suggest to you about this system? This system might pass all these tests, as some have argued watered down as they are, but it could pass all of them. Well, the PAC-3 system passed all the development tests and then had four consecutive failures in a row in an operational test. If we have four consecutive failures in a real operational test of this system, I think the American people will be quite shocked, given the fact we are not planning any operational test, yet we are deploying the system. Luckily, with the PAC-3, there was time to fix the problem. These operational tests were not only conducted, but the problems were fixed. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the system was deployed. It worked very well when it engaged missiles. But again, there are still some difficulties. At least one friendly aircraft was engaged and destroyed by a PAC-3 system. Two were destroyed, suggesting that all the problems with the system in terms of target identification, in terms of proper response and enemy versus friendly targets in the air have not been fully resolved. It is a complex system. This system is much more complex and complicated. But the PAC-3 is a very good example of what we should be doing here--that is, operational testing, learning from those tests, fix the system, and keep doing it continuously. Again, I think it is an interesting notion about this spiral development and everything else. There has to be consistent, constant testing because that is how you learn so you can make the changes. Yet, again, we don't have an operational test planned for this particular system. I believe we have to have something like that. Again, the national missile system is very complex. We have to have this system. Part of the Warner amendment to my amendment takes out the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and lets the Secretary of Defense prescribe the criteria. Let me suggest that in the last several years, Dr. Christie has been advising and consulting. But nothing has happened in terms of operational testing. Each year, he reports to his superiors and to the public at large. In each one of those reports, he calls for more realistic testing. Apparently he is consulting and is not particularly effective. But that is exactly what the Warner amendment to my amendment would do--simply make him a consultant. The reality is, as a consultant, his voice would be no more prominent than it is today. We don't have an operational testing plan. We have not conducted operational testing yet, and yet we are deploying the system. It seems to me that the Warner amendment waters down further the operational testing. He calls it operational testing, but then it takes out the operational testing, giving it to the Secretary of Defense. We have seen that this Secretary of Defense is committed to getting this program into the ground by September of this year regardless. That doesn't give me and I don't think it should give the public the confidence that a rigorous realistic testing scheme will be developed. But then the amendment goes on to say within a year we are going to have that, we are going to mandate the test. It seems to be slightly schizophrenic. We don't want the normal procedures, we don't want the Director of Test and Evaluation to be doing it, we want the Secretary of Defense to do it, but he is going to do it by October 1 of 2005. Again, I don't think the amendment really responds to the problem and the issue. The issue and the problem is developing, as we have done for every other system. PAC-3 is an excellent example of operational testing and planning, and then ensuring that the operational tests take place--not just calling for operational tests but having the independent operational testing agency within the Pentagon designing and conducting the test. That is what my amendment does. It doesn't call for any specific deadline. If the conclusion of Mr. Christie were to be that it couldn't be feasible for 18 months or 2 years, at least we have gotten an operational test plan, and we will conduct the test. That, to me, would be a vast improvement over the current situation. I hope my colleagues will not favorably respond to Senator Warner's amendment and give me a chance to have this amendment agreed to. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. REED. Six minutes.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, how much time remains on each side?

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. REED. I think I will speak for about 5 minutes, and at that point we can call for a vote.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3354.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. I thank the Senator.

Mr. REED. If the Senator will yield, I believe we were waiting for Senator Hagel, another cosponsor.

Mr. REED. I thank the Senator from Alabama for his kind words also. We are all in agreement that there is tremendous stress on our Army. Let me suggest this chart shows the deployments in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom projected not just over the next several months but actually into 2007. The dark green demonstrates the actual planned deployment today, the projection of February 2004. On July 19, 2003, last year, these are the force projected, brigades equivalents. It was projected for July of 2004 we would be roughly at about 8 brigade equivalents. Today in Iraq and Afghanistan there are 18 brigades, more than twice as many soldiers, or about 130,000-plus soldiers in these two operations. This is not just a spike. This is, as you can see on the chart, a plateau. We are expected, under the projections today, to have 17 brigades all the way out to the end of 2005, the beginning of January of 2006. They come down a little bit if things stabilize a bit in March of 2006, to around 13 or 14 brigades. This is a long way out to project. So far, if we look at the projections, we have ended up with more troops needed than what we thought we could entertain. My point is that this is not a temporary spike in requirements for soldiers in the U.S. Army. This stretches out to 2007, 3 years from now. It is entirely appropriate we put this number into the Defense bill, that we do not simply give some emergency powers to the Secretary of Defense. The challenge we have going forward--we have met the challenge this year by tapping into that emergency fund, but the challenge going forward is giving the Army the resources in succeeding budgets in their own bottom line so they can continue to field these forces. That is what we are projecting today. It is not as if in 6 months we will be fine, Iraq will be resolved, Afghanistan will be resolved, we will be back to a low level of participation. Our planners' best thoughts today are for 17 brigades for a long time. So that is what is at the heart of the amendment I have proposed, along with Senator McCain, Senator Hagel, Senator Corzine, Senator Akaka, and Senator Biden. I believe we are taking a very important step by putting the end strength number in our authorization bill, not as an emergency but as a reality, as a near- and medium-term reality. That is what this chart says. Three years from now we are going to have to still find troops to put in about 14 or 15 brigades in these 2 operations. But the issue that is still outstanding--not this year because we have bridged it with the emergency funding--is, how do we build up the resources within the Army budget to carry these soldiers forward 2 and 3 years hence? We will be working on that, obviously, over the next few weeks into conference and beyond. I know there are other colleagues--Senator McCain, Senator Hagel, and others--who might want to talk. We have made arrangements prior to the vote for 10 minutes, which I would gladly offer to them for their comments. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time I have?

Mr. REED. I announce that the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) is necessarily absent.

Mr. REED. I thank the chairman for his constructive participation in this process and also to emphasize what he has emphasized and that is the extraordinary stress our Army is withstanding at this point. They are doing it magnificently, performing with great skill and professionalism. We have 126,000 soldiers in Iraq; we have 13,000 soldiers in Afghanistan; we have soldiers still in the Balkans, 2,500; we have forces in Kuwait, about 17,000; we still have our mission in the Sinai; we have 1,700 soldiers in Guantanamo maintaining the detention facilities there; we have 16,000 soldiers, Noble Eagle, which is the heart of our defense of our homeland; we have soldiers in the Philippines; 31,600 soldiers in South Korea. We have them all over the world doing an extraordinary task and job for our company. Frankly, they need more help and that is the heart of the Reed amendment. In addition to that, we have seen troubling signs that this operational tempo is putting great stress and duress on our soldiers. Recently, there was a stop-loss order announced by the G-1 of the U.S. Army that said essentially any soldier who is scheduled to depart within 90 days for deployment cannot leave the service, even if that soldier's time in service has expired. Essentially what they have said is: You can't get out of the service. The Volunteer Army is no longer completely volunteer. That is just one example. We are withdrawing troops from Korea at a time when there is a huge crisis on the peninsula. The North Koreans indicated they have plutonium; they are intending to process it. They may have already constructed eight nuclear devices. We don't know for sure. Yet at this time when we need maximum military force to complement our diplomacy, we are withdrawing troops, which is perhaps sending a signal to the North Koreans that they can wait us out or that we are not able or ready to match our diplomacy appropriately with military force. That is another prime example, I believe. In fact, frankly, I think that if North Korea 2 or 3 years ago brazenly declared they had nuclear weapons, our response would not have been to withdraw troops. The calls in this Chamber would have been for more troops in Korea. But now because of Iraq that is difficult; we are pulling them out to send them to Iraq. Then we have a situation in our training centers, the infrastructure of the Army. This is one of the major reasons why we have such extraordinarily skilled soldiers. First, they are men and women of courage and character, but second they received the greatest, most realistic training in the world. They are individuals who can and will do any job, but they do that so well because they are the best trained. We are taking soldiers from our training centers--those trainers who are preparing the troops to go overseas--and we are deploying them. As a result, these are indications that we have a military force which is significantly stretched. That is why it is so important to raise the number of troops that we have entering the Army. Today, the Army has 495,374 soldiers serving on active duty. The end strength has to increase. The Reed amendment increases it by 20,000 troops. There are those who have predicted we would get in this predicament. General Shalikashvili's predictions and other predictions are coming true. Our responsibility is now to give the military, particularly the Army, sufficient resources and sufficient personnel to do the job which we are asking them to do. Last December, in 2003, the Army's Strategic Studies Institute published a report which stated that the ground force requirements in Iraq have forced the U.S. Army to the breaking point. We have to prevent that breaking point from being reached, and that means putting more troops into the force structure. Last year, during the appropriations debate, Senator Hagel and I sponsored an amendment that would have raised the end strength by 10,000 in the supplemental appropriations. It passed the Senate. I thank my colleagues on both sides who were very supportive of that. But, unfortunately, at that point the administration thought it was unnecessary and they were able to successfully defeat that proposal in conference. At least now they recognize the need for additional troops. But what they are still adhering to is this notion that the emergency is temporary. I hope by putting the actual number of the end strength increase in this bill we are sending a signal to everyone that we will, in fact, stay the course--not just rhetorically but with actual resources and actual troops. Senator Warner explained the funding mechanism was one where some of us would have preferred, frankly, if we could have, to increase just the bottom line of the Army. But given these other demands on resources and this authorization bill, it was his suggestion that we, once again, use emergency funding to fund this now authorized end strength. That gets us through this year. But the concern I have and the concern others have is that we will reach a point within a year or two where the Army is going to have these troops in uniform but their baseline is not going to be sufficient if a supplemental or emergency funding is not made readily available. That is a real crisis and we have to start thinking about that now. Senator Levin has been very thoughtful on this topic. He has language in the bill that says any increases in the next fiscal year of the end strength have to be budgeted through regular budget processes. Again, I hope that takes place. But that means giving more resources to our Army, and we will work--I think I can speak for Senator Warner--to make sure the Army has those resources. I am very pleased we are able to make this adjustment--overdue adjustment--in the end strength of the U.S. Army. I retain the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.

Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. President. I reserve the remainder of my time and yield the floor.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield such time as remained.

Mr. REED. I want to thank the chairman for his instructive work on this amendment. He recognizes, as I recognize, along with my colleagues and principal cosponsors Senators Hagel, McCain, Corzine, Akaka, and Biden, that our Army is stretched very thin across the globe with numerous missions, and in order to fulfill these missions we have to raise the end strength of the Army. The amendment before us today would put within the authorized end strength a 20,000 increase in the number of soldiers in the U.S. Army. These are the number of troops the Army has indicated that they can absorb this year, and that they can train and utilize this year. It represents the recognition that we cannot simply depend upon emergency powers through supplementals to increase the end strength of the Army. We have to, as we do in this amendment, put in the actual end strength number to reflect a larger Army and also to reflect the fact that this is not a temporary occurrence. Our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the globe are going to require a substantially larger Army for an indefinite period of time. As a result, working together with the chairman, we have placed in the Defense authorization bill the precise number of soldiers, this precise increase of 20,000 troops. What the chairman has added, though, is the fact that these troops have to be paid for. There is a strong argument that we should pay for them in terms of regular budget authority, but he has suggested that we again go the emergency supplemental route to pay for these troops, which are now fully authorized in law. What I wanted to accomplish in the amendment first is to make sure we do incorporate a suitable end strength number. That has been accomplished. Second, I wanted to avoid a situation where the Army had to go within its existing programs to search high and low for dollars to pay for these extra troops. That has been accomplished by the chairman's suggestion that we move some funds already identified in the emergency supplemental and designate those to pay for these additional troops. So we have avoided a situation where the Army this year is going to be forced to come up with funds by going through and ransacking their existing programs, and we have set it in the authorization bill, the appropriate forum for such a decision. We have set in the precise number of end strength that is appropriate this year for the U.S. Army. The question still arises, What happens in succeeding years? The argument myself, Senator McCain, Senator Hagel, and others have made is we cannot continue to depend upon supplemental and emergency funding. This is not an emergency. This is a fact of life in the world today. We need a larger Army. We are accomplishing our objectives today for this fiscal year in this authorization, but I think the chairman and we all recognize we will eventually confront a situation where we have to raise the bottom line of the Army in terms of the funds they have. We do not want to see a situation a year from now or 2 years from now when the supplementals are inadequate but the needs of these troops are still persistent. Senator Levin has language in this authorization bill that indicates in succeeding years, after this fiscal year and after this authorization bill, any increase in end strength will have to be put in the Army budget. I think that is an appropriate response. I think the Reed amendment as modified by Senator Warner will, in effect, accomplish that. This is the thrust of the amendment. I have had an opportunity to explain it. At this point I reserve the remainder of my time to allow the Senator from Virginia to comment.

Mr. REED. That is correct.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I understand that Senator Warner has a second-degree amendment which I will accept.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Gabrielle Chapin and Dr. Harsh Trivedi, fellows in my office, be granted floor privileges during the debate on S. 2400.