Jack Reed

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask for regular order for No. 3352.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. I am here.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am just a bit taken aback by the claim of flexibility. The Warner amendment actually sets out a date certain when the tests will be conducted. Particularly, since it is a year away, particularly Mr. Christie is talking about it is premature because it is in the developmental stage. I thought his letter was quite specific. The ground-based midcourse defense element is currently at a material level which requires continued developmental testing with oversight and assistance from operational testing personnel conducting realistic testing in the near term. I guess the question is, What is ``in the near term''? I suggest it would be a year or more. It would be premature and not beneficial to the program. Let me reiterate that this is an extraordinary letter. It says basically this system is not mature enough to test, but we are going to deploy it. I think that is very unusual, particularly given the history of having other systems where, even though they had not completed their operational testing--like the Predator and JSTARS--the plan for operational testing had already been sketched out--not by the Secretary of Defense but by the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. I think the flexibility is in my central amendment. It talks about before you deploy a block or a spiral--the new terminology might be ``spiral,'' but what they are going to do essentially is what we do so often: build the system to a certain capability; then, through tests or experience or through actual field trials, develop new software, new technology, and new complements that can make it better. At a certain point, rather than just simply tweaking here and there, you go back in and you develop a new block. That is roughly to me what the spiral development is, minus the catchphrase. Before you do that, we should have operational testing. I think this is a very critical aspect. My amendment does not intend to stifle flexibility. It has no correlation with deployment. That is an issue that is going to be determined--and has been determined. We had votes on that, but somewhere along the line we need to do operational testing. I must say I would be much more impressed with the degree of commitment to this operational testing if at least we had a plan for operational tests, a plan prepared by Mr. Christie. We do not have that. At least that would signal that we are serious about operational testing. In fact, that should have been done. It says this system is so immature that we cannot even get to the point of developing a plan to test. Once again, the amendment is not only reasonable but it is compelling. This is what we do when we develop systems. Again, I suggest it is something we should do. There is another aspect of my amendment which is very important and that is the baseline. Again, we have to know how much is being spent, what are the cost goals, what are the capability goals with respect to the system. The GAO discovered--we did not discover this because of the way the books are kept--a $1 billion cost overrun. Rather than reporting it, making it obvious or tracking it, they simply changed the cost goals. In conjunction with that, we find that rather than having 10 interceptors, as they originally talked about in terms of cost goals, they now have 5 interceptors. The situation is that the costs have gone up by $1 billion and capability has gone down by half. Now we have a situation where we were unaware of it until the GAO discovered this. Call it spiral development, call it evolutionary development, that should not be. One would hope this sophisticated development process, this new form of development, would mean that costs are more transparent, more accurate, and the capability is more obvious. That does not seem to be the case. Along with the notion of developing operational testing is developing the baseline. None of that is in the Warner substitute to my amendment. I cannot see any discussion of establishing baselines, of making sure the costs are appropriate, of alerting Congress to overruns, rather than just changing goals. I hope my amendment would be adopted and could be adopted. I yield the floor, and ask at the conclusion we might think about whether it is appropriate to continue debating or to yield back time.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I rise to offer an amendment which would implement the recommendations of the General Accounting Office for missile defense testing and base alignment. Last month the GAO issued a report on missile defense entitled ``Missile Defense Actions Are Needed To Enhance Testing And Accountability.'' In its report, the GAO makes some commonsense recommendations to improve the testing of missile defense and to increase accountability of Congress for missile defense programming. The principal recommendation is that at some point there is developed and executed a plan for operational testing. That is a very critical point. As the GAO pointed out, they would recommend to the Missile Defense Agency that they prepare for and conduct, on an independent basis, not within the purview of the Missile Defense Agency but on an independent basis, operationally realistic tests of those missile defenses. This is the way we develop and deploy major weapons systems in the United States. We do initial testing. We prove out the technologies. But before we field them, we go ahead and do a test on their operational capacities. That is the basic approach. It is a good approach, a sound approach. The GAO recommendations would make the missile defense programs consistent in this regard with all other programs. The second aspect of the proposed amendment would be to require the Missile Defense Agency to require course baselines so that we know how much we are spending with respect to missile defense. We know what the course goals are. We know when they are exceeded or when they are constrained by good planning and good management. These are two fundamental aspects of any sound military procurement program. Missile defense is one of the most complicated programs we will ever attempt to field in the history of this country. I believe it is appropriate at this juncture to take a look at this missile defense system as it exists today. I think you will hopefully concur with me that we do need some realistic operational testing. First, this is the basic architecture of the system. The system we are deploying in Alaska is designed principally, if not exclusively, to counter one potential threat--the threat of a missile coming from North Korea. Now, the system is composed of several major elements. I will review them. First is the DSP early warning satellite. This is a defense system that has been flying since the 1970s. It is well proven, but essentially all this system does is spot the lift-off of an enemy missile, or potential adversary missile, coming out of North Korea or anyplace else. It was put up in the 1970s as part of the cold war to identify a Russian missile or Chinese missile being ignited. That is a rather established technology. It provides just the cue that an enemy missile has been launched. The next part of the proposed system is the Aegis ships. They have radar, but it was designed not to track ICBMs. Rather, it is to track cruise missiles and close-in aircraft. They are being essentially pushed into the role of trying to acquire the target after it lifts off and track it as far as it can. It really cannot track that far because of built-in limitations. Again, this version was not designed to track long-range ICBMs. Their radar doesn't seem to be powerful enough to protect and track accurately to places such as Hawaii. Also, these Aegis ships have never guided an interceptor to its target in a single intercept test. They have done preliminary activities but have not guided an interceptor to a target in a test. The operational tracking software of Aegis has never been tested in an integrated test. So you have one element that is still not quite up to the speed we would like it to be in terms of the Aegis system. The next part is the Cobra Dane radar system in Alaska. Cobra Dane is another 1970s version. It has been updated, but it has no real discrimination capability in terms of determining what a missile warhead would be or what a decoy would be. It is incapable of tracking a North Korean missile bound for Hawaii. So, again, we have a problem in terms of providing coverage. It has never been used in an intercept test, and there are no plans to do so because we do not have an ICBM target that can fly in Cobra Dane's field of view. Then we were going to have to replace Cobra Dane and x-band radar on Shemya Island. We don't have the x-based, land-based system. We are working on a sea- based x-band radar, not primarily for operational use but for test use, to be ready in fiscal year 2005. The final one is the interceptor with the kill vehicle on top. Both the interceptor and kill vehicle are brand-new, and neither have been tested together in an intercept test. The new version of the kill vehicle hasn't been flight tested at all. It is coming off of production. There are new systems within the kill vehicle. It is an improvement, we hope, over the previous prototypes but has not yet been flight tested. Problems with the kill vehicle are seen as delaying the next scheduled test. That is the IFT-13c. That test is being touted by the Missile Defense Agency as a fly-by. So the next test--the one before this system is declared deployable and deployed--is not designed to knock the missile down but to simply fly by it. If it does knock it down, I am sure the Missile Defense Agency will take great pleasure in it, with great claim. By declaring it just a fly-by, they will have wiggle room for saying the test succeeded and saying we didn't intend to knock it down either. Ask yourself, if we are deploying a missile system in a most recent test to fly by the missile, is that going to protect the U.S.? I don't think that is the case. My amendment would require that we do operational testing, which is something done on every major system. It is under the purview of Dr. Tom Christie in the Office of Test and Evaluation at the Department of Defense. He is charged by Congress with independently evaluating these systems on behalf of the Defense Department. Some argue that we need to go ahead and deploy this system right away, that we have done it before, and that is fine. It turns out that we have deployed systems before in emergencies, such as the Predator in Kosovo in 1999. That system had already on the books operational testing plans. Indeed, when this emergency deployment was completed, that operational test was carried out the following year, 2000. This system is a rudimentary system with huge gaps in technology, which has never been fully tested on an integrated basis. None of these parts have been put together in one intercept test yet. This system has no plans for operational testing, which denies the obvious point of the custom and practice and the law in many cases. The JSTAR surveillance system is another one which individuals will say was put into the fray before it was operationally tested. That is also true. In 1991, JSTARs were deployed in Desert Storm. Following the deployment, even though the Senate Armed Services Committee was so impressed that they wanted to deploy it without testing, the Air Force insisted upon operational testing. They found defects because of the testing. They completed the operational testing in 1995, and this testing revealed problems with respect to the inability to operate at the right altitude and inadequate mission reliability. These were corrected, so the JSTAR system is much more reliable today than it would have been without operational testing. Once again, this system is untested in a systematic way, and it is not even scheduled for operational testing. The point of my amendment is not to delay or defer this deployment; it is simply to say at some point in time--some point when the Missile Defense Agency feels they are ready for operational testing--we should at least have operational testing. I believe that is absolutely critical. There are examples now, too, of the tests that have been conducted. These suggest that the tests are not up to the level of operational testing. For example, for the tests conducted so far on this system, all of the targets have had beacons on them, telling the National Missile Defense Agency and the shooters, if you will, the exact location of the missiles coming in. I don't think anybody believes that an adversary would put a beacon on the missile to warn us. Those are the types of rudimentary tests taking place today. They are important tests but not operational tests. Indeed, I asked the Director of the MDA in March when we would stop using beacons on our target vehicles. He simply said he didn't know. That is not exactly the kind of realistic testing the General Accounting Office called for. I mentioned Cobra Dane, which is the radar that is a critical piece. It will track this target for a long way, and it would hopefully be able to discriminate between decoys and the actual warheads. But we have, as I mentioned before, no plans to test this radar because we lack an appropriate testing vehicle, ICBM. The other point, which is very important--and it goes to the heart of realistic testing--is that every intelligence analyst who looks at this problem has suggested that if a nation is capable of putting a nuclear device on a long-range missile, and particularly if they are so motivated to use it against us, they are likely to be just as capable of having sophisticated decoys or even rudimentary decoys on the missile. We have never conducted tests against very sophisticated or even realistic decoys. As a result, we are prepared to deploy a system that has not been adequately tested. But more importantly, there are no plans to adequately test it. My amendment would simply ask the Department of Defense, through the normal procedures, through the Office of Test and Evaluation, to prepare such plans and conduct those tests when appropriate. These are just some of the examples I have given with respect to this particular system. There is a whole laundry list of what should be done to ensure that this system, when deployed, is appropriately ready for the challenge. This chart shows yes and no in terms of obvious parameters for a system that is about to be fielded. Most of the parameters have not been accomplished. In fact, the vast majority have not been accomplished. There is no full system operational test. There are no tests, to my mind, that have integrated every part of this system, from Cobra Dane, the Aegis warships, to the interceptor with the new-kill vehicle with the new booster attached and flying out and engaging a target. There is no full system operational test scheduled. We are not talking about a situation where we have to wait a few months or a year and there is an operational test planned for. By the way, these operational tests are not something that can be done on 2 or 3 days' notice. These takes months and months to prepare and plan and are extremely costly. I do not really know, because it is hard to figure out the budget for MDA, whether they have put aside money for operational testing. It is hard to tell. We are not even scheduling these tests. It has not been tested in bad weather. It has not been tested at night. Experts in the field indicate that is a very important aspect of ensuring the system will work. Again, I do not think there is any American who does not want to see a workable system in place, but we have to raise questions when we have not done the testing to assure the American public that this system will work and will work as it is designed to work. Tested three-stage booster and intercept test: This new package of the booster and kill vehicle has not been tested yet. Tested without interceptor knowing in advance warheads infrared and radar signature, I mentioned that before. All of the data of the enemy warhead is essentially given to the forces that are trying to engage it. That is not a realistic test. It has not been tested against a tumbling warhead, when the warhead detaches from the boost vehicle and spinning. That has not been tested. Tested against realistic decoys and countermeasures: Realistic decoys would be something that looked like a warhead; just one other body that looks like a warhead. We have not done that. The decoys that have been used to date have been large spheres that look completely unlike the warhead. It has not been tested against complex decoys. These are much more sophisticated decoys. We certainly have not done that. We have not reached the realistic level, let alone the complex level. It has not been tested against more than one warhead on a missile. Again, if there is a nation out there that is capable of producing a nuclear warhead and putting it on a missile, they are probably capable--it may take a little longer--of producing multiple warheads and putting them on a missile. It has not been tested against more than one incoming missile. If North Korea is going to attack us, why would they do something that would spell doom, first because of our overwhelming power to deter them, but second, what makes us think they will fire just one missile at us? I would assume they would fire multiple missiles, and we have not tested against that. Again I mention this, we have not tested this without a GPS system, a beacon on the adversary missile and warhead. Tests have been conducted by the contractors and managers. That is the first ``yes'' accomplished. Tests overseen by Pentagon's independent test office: No, and that is the core of our debate today, because looking at the chairman's amendment to my amendment, what they are essentially saying is: Listen, we do not want the independent tester to look at this; we want the Secretary of Defense to prescribe this. That is not the way to do this because it just invites all of the problems with individuals testing themselves. This is not as much a technical problem as a problem of human nature. You tend to pass every test you give yourself, particularly if it is important you pass the test. That is why we set up, in the eighties, this Office of Test and Evaluation with an individual who is appointed by the President, not the Secretary of Defense, to conduct these tests. SBIRS high early warning satellites: This will be the follow-on to the DSP satellites. SBIRS is not yet flying. The original plan was to have SBIRS in this system instead of the old DSP system. SSTS space tracking and surveillance system: This is another system not in place. Cobra Dane radar upgraded: Yes, it has been upgraded, but not the x- band radar contemplated for this system. It does not have the power of the x-band. Even with this upgrade, it is still not capable of the discrimination that you need to separate decoys from the warheads. The ground-based x-band radar I mentioned is not deployed. It has been essentially canceled. Sea-based x-band radar is being developed. It is not yet deployed. Question: Will it protect Hawaii? It is a question because of the coverage of the Cobra Dane, because the fact the Aegis system is providing an important part of the tracking system. Fly before you buy: We are certainly violating that. We are buying the system without flying. That is the fundamental problem we are facing today. Yet we are going to declare the system operational. We can argue about that, and we have. Senator Boxer had an amendment which talked to that specifically. My amendment is not about deploying the system. My amendment is about conducting operational tests at some juncture. I believe this operational testing scheme has hit a nerve because, as I saw the chairman's substitute to my amendment, he basically said yes, we will do operational--in fact, he specifies a date. I believe it is October of 2005. That is pretty ambitious since we are not planning for any tests yet. It is also pretty ambitious since we do not have a suitable missile target vehicle that could fly from the vicinity of North Korea and go through the space in which Cobra Dane operates. As a result, in a very short time, we would have to build a target missile, we would have to plan for the test, and we would have to integrate all these other pieces. Yet that is what the amendment offered by my colleague from Virginia would say. The problem with the amendment is that it takes out of the loop the one person who is there to guarantee the independence, the rigor, and the accuracy of this test, and that is the Director of the Office of Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon. That is something I think is critical. Again, given this list of items to be accomplished, it seems stunning to me that we are actually debating about whether we should just authorize and require at some point--and at this point, after deployment--operational testing, or at least to plan it. But that is the substance of the debate, and just as importantly, not just the operational testing, but the fact it is going to be conducted by an independent agency within the Pentagon, not by the people who are graded by whether they pass or fail. Again, not high tech but human nature. I think more people are comfortable with having someone objectively design the test and supervise the test than having the people who have everything to lose and everything to gain do that. There is one other aspect of my amendment I want to mention, which is important, and that is the notion of baselines. The GAO came back to us and said: No one seems to know how much the system is costing because there are no baselines. They pointed out, for example, that there was a $1 billion overrun of the cost goal of missile defense to be fielded starting in September, but the Department of Defense never explained to Congress this overrun. Instead, they simply changed the cost goal. How can we evaluate this system? How can we make difficult choices between investing in missile defense and increasing the end strength of our Army, if MDA suddenly says, well, our objective was X, but we found it cost us a billion dollars more, so now it is X plus one billion? We have to have a baseline. This is all designed to have appropriate control and appropriate notification to the Congress about the status of this very complex system. Additionally, this cost goal change was surprising because the GAO also noted that originally the system in Alaska to be deployed in September was to have 10 interceptors, and now it is 5. So not only did they change the cost goal by increasing the amount of money they are spending, but they lowered the number of interceptors and also, I think by fair inference, the capability of the system. High cost, lower capability, but yet it was not communicated to us. My amendment would ask them to prepare the baseline, to communicate to us when those baselines are exceeded. If we do not have that, then we will not have the ability to do our job, which is to supervise appropriately and oversee the activities of the Missile Defense Agency in the development of this very complicated system. There has been a great debate about whether we should deploy this system. I found it interesting to note that President Reagan was approached years ago by some Congressmen and Congresswomen who wanted to deploy then the existing system. This was in August of 1986. According to the Frances Fitzgerald's book about President Reagan ``Way Out There in the Blue,'' here is what he told those Congressmen: I know there are those who are getting a bit antsy [to deploy a missile defense] but to deploy systems of limited effectiveness now would divert limited funds and delay our main research. It could well erode support for the program before it's permitted to reach its potential. Once again, we are not debating today the deployment in this amendment. We have had that debate previously with Senator Boxer. We are not debating deployment. We are simply debating let us plan to do the operational testing. Let us get that operational testing done at some point because otherwise we are literally getting a system that is untried. No one wants the first time this system is fully operationally tested to be in the deplorable and horrific situation of a missile heading toward us. So I would hope that we could, in fact, adopt the Reed amendment, have operational testing planned for it, have baselines established to be able to monitor this system as we should and be able, I hope, to assure the American public that when we say it is in service, it will work. There is a difference between telling them it works and proving it in operational and realistic testing. I hope we can do that. I reserve the remainder of my time in response to my colleagues.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, how much time do I have?

Mr. REED. I would not attempt to simply fill the hour. I would yield back time if we have reached a point where we have sufficiently discussed it.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I have an amendment numbered 3352.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, it is my intention this evening to spend a few minutes to lay the amendment down and then I presume at the end of the evening, with unanimous consent, I will be given at least an hour of debate tomorrow which I will share with Senators McCain, Hagel, and others. That is my understanding. I ask the Senator from Virginia if that understanding is correct.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I understand from the chairman that he will offer a second-degree amendment at the appropriate time. At this juncture, I would like to briefly explain the amendment and then have the opportunity to discuss it in more detail tomorrow with my colleague.

Mr. REED. My amendment will increase the end strength of the Army to meet the incredible mission that has been thrust upon them in the wake of the war on terror and the operations in Afghanistan and the operations in Iraq. I believe it is incumbent that we formally increase the end strength of the Army and we incorporate within the Army budget the requirements for these additional soldiers. At this juncture, the Army is being increased on an emergency basis through supplemental appropriations. I think that is not the appropriate way to do it. I think we have to recognize that the struggles we are engaged in are long term; they are not temporary. We have to have an end strength within the authorization bill that reflects that long-term effort we are engaged in. I also believe we have to have within the Army budget the baseline established so that if a supplemental is delayed or is not sufficient to cover these additional troops, the Army does not have to go among its own programs and root about and find moneys to pay for these troops. These troops are necessary. It is expedient that we should in fact engage and correct this discrepancy between the missions and the men and women who are serving our Army so well. This is a quick glimpse of our soldiers who are committed throughout the world: 310,000 soldiers in 120 countries. The most significant, of course, are operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. There are 13,000 in Afghanistan and 126,000 in Iraq. There are soldiers all across the globe and I think we all understand the stresses of these operations are wearing our Army down rapidly. Some of the indications that we have too few troops can be cited very quickly. First, literally a few days ago the Army announced a stop-loss policy that would prevent soldiers from leaving the Army 90 days before their unit deploys into Iraq. We are essentially telling volunteers that they cannot leave at the end of their enlistment. That is an obvious indication we have too few troops. Second, we are withdrawing troops from Korea. There might be strategic reasons to pull troops out of Korea. There might be logistical reasons. Technology might be aiding them. But, frankly, this is an indication of, again, the shortage of troops within the Army, because we have huge risks in North Korea. This is a regime that has announced they have nuclear weapons. This is a regime that has been involved in on-and-off negotiations with us for a matter of many months to see if we can resolve the situation peacefully. The signal we are sending to the North Koreans, albeit unwittingly, is this is not a major priority; we are actually taking troops away. When troops are taken away, we may still have the ability to deter the North Koreans from attacking South Korea but, frankly, our mission over there is no longer just deterrence, it is disarmament, and that requires diplomacy backed up by force. We hope diplomacy works, but we are weakening our hand. One of the most interesting and insightful indications of the shortage of troops is we are actually beginning to take apart the training infrastructure of the U.S. Army. Recently it was announced that troops from our training centers, the 11th Army Cavalry Regiment, which serves as the op force, the enemy force, in training our units, is being notified for deployment overseas. In addition to that, the 1st Battalion of the 509th Infantry, which acts as the opposition force to train our troops at Fort Polk, LA, is also on notice. What can be more demonstrative of the shortage of troops than the fact we are, in a sense, dismantling our training structure? That in the long term is going to do great harm to the service. We need more troops. I am sure those who are opposed to the amendment will say we have authorized in this bill again access to emergency authorization and supplemental funding, but that is not doing it the right way, doing it up front, doing it in a straightforward manner, increasing end strength statutorily, and putting this into the regular budget process. I hope tomorrow we can debate this bill. I am unaware of the second- degree amendment. I will get with the chairman to see what his language is. I feel very strongly that this is the way to do it, and I am joined in that by my colleagues Senators McCain, Hagel, Corzine, Akaka, Biden, and many others who feel very strongly this is the way to do it and it should be done. I hope it will be done tomorrow. With the expectation and the understanding that we will have at least an hour tomorrow on my side to engage in debate on this issue, at this point I yield the floor.

Mr. REED. The Senator is correct.

Mr. REED. If I may respond to the chairman, he is quite right about the offset. I have some ideas from where the money could come. It is my feeling it should come from funds outside the Army. I think what we have done is we have increased it, but we haven't offset it by Army programs. So there is the possibility--I hope the likelihood--the offset would come from other programs.

Mr. REED. I have had an opportunity to read the amendment. It seems, in keeping with the Senator's commitment to be constructive and helpful, to be very constructive and very helpful, on first examination.

Mr. REED. Yes. Myself, Senator Hagel, and Senator McCain wish to speak.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce bipartisan legislation to expand access to college. I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators Collins, Kennedy, and Murray. In a year in which we are slated to reauthorize the Higher Education Act, we have had only a few hearings on the reauthorization in the HELP Committee. In these hearings and the discussions ongoing in the other body, there has been scant mention of our insufficient investment in need-based financial aid. Instead, the discussions have been dominated by proposals that will hurt, rather than help, the neediest students. This is troubling, particularly as more and more students are being priced out of college, which shortchanges their future and that of our nation. Economic security is a necessity not just for the wealthy, but for every American. And the key to economic security is education. An individual's climb up the economic ladder is directly related to the amount of education he or she receives. Given the strong correlation among educational attainment, employment, and wages, the cost of not going to college is just too high. Almost a third of the growth in employment over the next decade is expected to occur in occupations that require at least a bachelor's degree. College graduates, on average, earn 60 percent more than high school graduates, while an individual with a professional degree earns almost four times what a high school graduate earns. And yet, too many college students are under-prepared, underfinanced, and overworked. Those who make it through are saddled by nearly insurmountable loan debt. But many more cannot afford the cost of college at all. Even though there have been gains due to the Higher Education Act, the current approach to student aid isn't alleviating the gaps between our lowest and highest income students nor is it addressing the gaps between the aid low-income students receive and the actual cost of attendance. 7 times as many students from high-income families 48 percent graduate from college by age 24 as students from low-income families 7 percent. Low-income, college-qualified high school graduates have an annual ``unmet need'' of nearly $4,000 in college expenses. Without drastic increases in need-based aid, over the next decade, according to a report by the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, 4.4 million low- and moderate-income college qualified high school graduates will not be able to pursue a four year degree full time and 2 million will not go to college at all. A combination of factors has arisen to create this unfortunate situation, chief among them a decline in the purchasing power of the Pell Grant and sharp increases in the cost of college. My predecessor, Senator Claiborne Pell, established what is now known as the Pell Grant in order to ensure higher education wasn't an ``unachievable dream.'' Almost one quarter of undergraduate students from colleges and universities nationwide receive a Pell Grant. It is the single largest source of grant aid for higher education funded by the Federal government. Unfortunately, the Pell Grant's purchasing power has plummeted due to the slow growth in funding and the rapid rise of college prices. In the late 70s, the maximum grant covered 77 percent of costs at a public four-year institution. Today, the maximum Pell Grant of $4,050 covers only 41 percent. On top of that, an estimated 60 percent of student aid is now in the form of loans and 40 percent in grants, a reversal of the distribution 20 years ago. Indeed, the average graduate has a student loan debt of $17,000. Pell Grant recipients, who represent the lowest income sectors of students, graduate with an average of $20,000 in student loan debt. Over the last ten years, public and private 4-year college costs, tuition and fees, rose 47 percent and 42 percent, respectively, after adjusting for inflation, which is a more rapid growth rate than consumer prices. Over the last three years, since President Bush entered office, tuition has increased by 28 percent on average, even after inflation. Students have felt the bite as states have drastically cut funding for public colleges. There is a further convergence of economic and demographic factors. In 2008, the largest number of students in our history will graduate from high school. A high percentage of these students will be from low- income, minority families, who will need student aid. At the same time, our Nation will need replacement workers as aging, college-educated baby boomers begin to retire in increasing numbers. This crisis calls out for action. It should be a national imperative to ensure an educated citizenry and a world class workforce. Our Nation cannot afford to lose out on the countless returns from a robust education investment. The legislation we introduce today, the ACCESS, Accessing College through Comprehensive Early outreach, State partnerships, and Simplification, Act, seeks to set our Nation back on the course that Senator Pell sought when he authored the grants later named after him in 1972. The ACCESS Act revitalizes the Leveraging Educational Assistance Partnership (LEAP) program, which was established over thirty years ago to encourage States to play a role in helping low-income students go to college. Without this important, although extremely modest, Federal incentive, many States would never have established need-based grant programs and many States would not continue to maintain such programs. Recognizing that LEAP can do even more to address the barriers to college access and persistence, the ACCESS Act forges a new Federal incentive for states--via higher levels of Federal match--to spur greater investments by states, colleges, businesses, and philanthropies in need-based grants for low-income students. At a time when public higher education is bearing the brunt of the fiscal crises confronting our States, we need to do more to encourage States to help low-income students attend college. We want States to focus their energies on enhancing coordination and cohesion among Federal, State, and local programs and efforts of colleges, philanthropies, and businesses, with the goal of generating new investments in need-based aid sufficient to provide low-income students with an access and persistence grant to fill the gap in aid they face. All too often successful middle school students give up the dream of college because they think there is no way they can ever afford college. The ACCESS Act also requires States to notify low- income students beginning in middle school of their potential eligibility for student financial aid and encourages increased participation in early intervention, mentoring, and outreach programs. The legislation is modeled after initiatives like the Rhode Island Children's Crusade in my home state and Indiana's 21st Century Scholars Program. A Lumina Foundation evaluation found that 21st Century Scholars--low-income students who receive an early notification of assistance, early intervention and support, and scholarships equivalent to the cost of in-state college tuition--were nearly 5 times more likely than non-participants to enroll in college. Indeed, successful college access programs are those that offer early intervention and mentoring services coupled with early information about estimated financial aid awards and adequate grant funding to make the dream of higher education a reality. Students participating in such programs are more financially and academically prepared, and thus more likely to enroll in college and persist to degree completion. Our legislation also simplifies the financial aid process for low- income students. It allows more students to qualify for an Automatic- Zero Expected Family Contribution, aligning its eligibility with the standards for other Federal means-tested programs, like free school lunch, SSI, and Food Stamps. Students and families should not have to prove over and over again that they are low-income, and asking students to fill out lengthy forms when they already meet the eligibility level for Pell Grants is a burden we should ease. In a similar vein, the legislation establishes a short, paper FAFSA- EZ application form for students qualifying for the auto-zero along with a tailored web-based system and a free telefile system for students without Internet access. The ACCESS Act also expands college access for low-income students, in part by prohibiting a qualified education benefit, like education savings plans, from being considered as a student asset and by reducing the work penalty. The current income protection allowance levels are unrealistically low, creating a disincentive for students who work in order to pay college costs. I look forward to receiving further information on this and other problems addressed in the legislation when the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance completes work on the congressionally mandated financial aid simplification study later this year. We must act on this legislation and others to make sure that every student who works hard and plays by the rules gets the opportunity to live the American Dream. I was pleased to work with the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, and a host of other higher education organizations and charitable foundations, including Scholarship America, on this legislation. I am also pleased that this legislation has the support of a range of higher education and student groups, including the American Association of Community Colleges, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, the American Council on Education, the Association of American Universities, the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities, the Center for Law and Social Policy, the Council for Opportunity in Education, National Association for College Admission Counseling, the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs, the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators, the United Negro College Fund, and the United States Student Association. I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this important legislation and work for its inclusion in the upcoming reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. I ask unanimous consent that the text of this legislation be printed in the Record.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce bipartisan legislation to expand access to college. I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators Collins, Kennedy, and Murray. In a year in which we are slated to reauthorize the Higher Education Act, we have had only a few hearings on the reauthorization in the HELP Committee. In these hearings and the discussions ongoing in the other body, there has been scant mention of our insufficient investment in need-based financial aid. Instead, the discussions have been dominated by proposals that will hurt, rather than help, the neediest students. This is troubling, particularly as more and more students are being priced out of college, which shortchanges their future and that of our nation. Economic security is a necessity not just for the wealthy, but for every American. And the key to economic security is education. An individual's climb up the economic ladder is directly related to the amount of education he or she receives. Given the strong correlation among educational attainment, employment, and wages, the cost of not going to college is just too high. Almost a third of the growth in employment over the next decade is expected to occur in occupations that require at least a bachelor's degree. College graduates, on average, earn 60 percent more than high school graduates, while an individual with a professional degree earns almost four times what a high school graduate earns. And yet, too many college students are under-prepared, underfinanced, and overworked. Those who make it through are saddled by nearly insurmountable loan debt. But many more cannot afford the cost of college at all. Even though there have been gains due to the Higher Education Act, the current approach to student aid isn't alleviating the gaps between our lowest and highest income students nor is it addressing the gaps between the aid low-income students receive and the actual cost of attendance. 7 times as many students from high-income families 48 percent graduate from college by age 24 as students from low-income families 7 percent. Low-income, college-qualified high school graduates have an annual ``unmet need'' of nearly $4,000 in college expenses. Without drastic increases in need-based aid, over the next decade, according to a report by the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, 4.4 million low- and moderate-income college qualified high school graduates will not be able to pursue a four year degree full time and 2 million will not go to college at all. A combination of factors has arisen to create this unfortunate situation, chief among them a decline in the purchasing power of the Pell Grant and sharp increases in the cost of college. My predecessor, Senator Claiborne Pell, established what is now known as the Pell Grant in order to ensure higher education wasn't an ``unachievable dream.'' Almost one quarter of undergraduate students from colleges and universities nationwide receive a Pell Grant. It is the single largest source of grant aid for higher education funded by the Federal government. Unfortunately, the Pell Grant's purchasing power has plummeted due to the slow growth in funding and the rapid rise of college prices. In the late 70s, the maximum grant covered 77 percent of costs at a public four-year institution. Today, the maximum Pell Grant of $4,050 covers only 41 percent. On top of that, an estimated 60 percent of student aid is now in the form of loans and 40 percent in grants, a reversal of the distribution 20 years ago. Indeed, the average graduate has a student loan debt of $17,000. Pell Grant recipients, who represent the lowest income sectors of students, graduate with an average of $20,000 in student loan debt. Over the last ten years, public and private 4-year college costs, tuition and fees, rose 47 percent and 42 percent, respectively, after adjusting for inflation, which is a more rapid growth rate than consumer prices. Over the last three years, since President Bush entered office, tuition has increased by 28 percent on average, even after inflation. Students have felt the bite as states have drastically cut funding for public colleges. There is a further convergence of economic and demographic factors. In 2008, the largest number of students in our history will graduate from high school. A high percentage of these students will be from low- income, minority families, who will need student aid. At the same time, our Nation will need replacement workers as aging, college-educated baby boomers begin to retire in increasing numbers. This crisis calls out for action. It should be a national imperative to ensure an educated citizenry and a world class workforce. Our Nation cannot afford to lose out on the countless returns from a robust education investment. The legislation we introduce today, the ACCESS, Accessing College through Comprehensive Early outreach, State partnerships, and Simplification, Act, seeks to set our Nation back on the course that Senator Pell sought when he authored the grants later named after him in 1972. The ACCESS Act revitalizes the Leveraging Educational Assistance Partnership (LEAP) program, which was established over thirty years ago to encourage States to play a role in helping low-income students go to college. Without this important, although extremely modest, Federal incentive, many States would never have established need-based grant programs and many States would not continue to maintain such programs. Recognizing that LEAP can do even more to address the barriers to college access and persistence, the ACCESS Act forges a new Federal incentive for states--via higher levels of Federal match--to spur greater investments by states, colleges, businesses, and philanthropies in need-based grants for low-income students. At a time when public higher education is bearing the brunt of the fiscal crises confronting our States, we need to do more to encourage States to help low-income students attend college. We want States to focus their energies on enhancing coordination and cohesion among Federal, State, and local programs and efforts of colleges, philanthropies, and businesses, with the goal of generating new investments in need-based aid sufficient to provide low-income students with an access and persistence grant to fill the gap in aid they face. All too often successful middle school students give up the dream of college because they think there is no way they can ever afford college. The ACCESS Act also requires States to notify low- income students beginning in middle school of their potential eligibility for student financial aid and encourages increased participation in early intervention, mentoring, and outreach programs. The legislation is modeled after initiatives like the Rhode Island Children's Crusade in my home state and Indiana's 21st Century Scholars Program. A Lumina Foundation evaluation found that 21st Century Scholars--low-income students who receive an early notification of assistance, early intervention and support, and scholarships equivalent to the cost of in-state college tuition--were nearly 5 times more likely than non-participants to enroll in college. Indeed, successful college access programs are those that offer early intervention and mentoring services coupled with early information about estimated financial aid awards and adequate grant funding to make the dream of higher education a reality. Students participating in such programs are more financially and academically prepared, and thus more likely to enroll in college and persist to degree completion. Our legislation also simplifies the financial aid process for low- income students. It allows more students to qualify for an Automatic- Zero Expected Family Contribution, aligning its eligibility with the standards for other Federal means-tested programs, like free school lunch, SSI, and Food Stamps. Students and families should not have to prove over and over again that they are low-income, and asking students to fill out lengthy forms when they already meet the eligibility level for Pell Grants is a burden we should ease. In a similar vein, the legislation establishes a short, paper FAFSA- EZ application form for students qualifying for the auto-zero along with a tailored web-based system and a free telefile system for students without Internet access. The ACCESS Act also expands college access for low-income students, in part by prohibiting a qualified education benefit, like education savings plans, from being considered as a student asset and by reducing the work penalty. The current income protection allowance levels are unrealistically low, creating a disincentive for students who work in order to pay college costs. I look forward to receiving further information on this and other problems addressed in the legislation when the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance completes work on the congressionally mandated financial aid simplification study later this year. We must act on this legislation and others to make sure that every student who works hard and plays by the rules gets the opportunity to live the American Dream. I was pleased to work with the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, and a host of other higher education organizations and charitable foundations, including Scholarship America, on this legislation. I am also pleased that this legislation has the support of a range of higher education and student groups, including the American Association of Community Colleges, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, the American Council on Education, the Association of American Universities, the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities, the Center for Law and Social Policy, the Council for Opportunity in Education, National Association for College Admission Counseling, the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs, the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators, the United Negro College Fund, and the United States Student Association. I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this important legislation and work for its inclusion in the upcoming reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. I ask unanimous consent that the text of this legislation be printed in the Record.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise in strong support and as a cosponsor of the Harkin-Hagel amendment to provide mandatory full funding for the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, IDEA. This amendment will provide mandatory increases in funding of $2.2 billion per year for the next 6 years and help us meet the needs of the approximately 6.5 million children served under IDEA. Without full funding, we cannot realize the true promise of this law--a free, appropriate public education for all children with disabilities. Living up to this commitment is not just an important goal; it is a necessity if we are to ensure that all children have an opportunity to succeed. Likewise, we must provide schools with the resources they need to make this happen. When IDEA was first adopted in 1975, Congress committed to paying 40 percent of the cost of providing special education services. Sadly, after 28 years, we are only at 19 percent. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget fails to fully fund IDEA, proposing to increase IDEA by only $1 billion--an amount that falls far short of our commitment. Across this country, there is growing frustration over the lack of education resources. The No Child Left Behind Act has only exacerbated such frustrations. Our school districts are striving to provide a high quality education for all children but don't have the adequate resources to do the job. As a result, parents of children with disabilities, who only want to ensure their child gets the education they deserve and need, are forced to fight for the very programs and services to make that possible. For too long, we have forced school districts and schools to pit children against children. For too long, we have forced parents of children with disabilities to battle principals, schools districts, and other parents for limited educational resources. Schools urgently need the resources to fulfill the promise of IDEA, and they deserve better than this. Our schools--and the students with disabilities that they teach--also deserve highly qualified and skilled educators. For special educators, regular educators, principals, and others who provide education and related services to students with disabilities the need for action is clear: 47 percent of students with disabilities, ages 6-21, spend 79 percent or more of their time in regular classes. 98 percent of school districts report meeting the growing demand for special education teachers as a top priority. An estimated 600,000 special education students are taught by unqualified or underqualified teachers nationwide. Each year about one-third of special education program faculty openings are unfilled. The Personnel Excellence for Students with Disabilities Act, which I introduced last year, seeks to address this critical area of need-- ensuring that all students with disabilities are served by highly qualified and skilled teachers, education personnel and related service providers. I am pleased that many of the provisions of my bill have been incorporated into S. 1248. Together, we can ensure that children with disabilities have access to a high-quality, free, appropriate public education, and that the law truly reflects the needs of parents, teachers, principals, and related personnel. Governors, State legislators, superintendents, principals, teachers, and parents are all unified in support of mandatory full funding of IDEA. Now, instead of the empty votes and broken promises of the past, another opportunity to meet our commitment is upon us. I urge my colleagues to vote for the Harkin-Hagel amendment.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed an additional 5 minutes and that the other side be given an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, considering all of this, it is alarming to see the inattention that the administration is paying to homeland security. What is also very disconcerting about the administration's view is that they see al-Qaida as an institution rather than an ideology. It is an ideology, and it is an ideology that is spreading in the Islamic world despite our huge efforts in Iraq, some might say even because of our efforts in Iraq. This ideological battle will not be won by military means alone. It will be won by providing Muslim populations around the world with a compelling alternative to the jihad as a means of enhancing their sense of empowerment and defusing their sense of frustration. Education and economic development spring to mind as ways to begin to counter the appeal of the jihad. Once again, our choice of massive military involvement in Iraq has constrained the resources that we can deploy throughout the Muslim world to directly challenge the ideology of al-Qaida through education and economic development. Here also is another example of where an international approach would have given us much more credibility and, potentially, more resources to advance this agenda of education and economic development. The administration entered Iraq with illusions, and they struggle today in Iraq because of these illusions. The unfolding crisis in Iraq can no longer tolerate illusion. It demands a realistic assessment of the risks and resources, and a pragmatic plan to prevail. The administration must develop a true plan for the war's financing with realistic numbers in a timely manner. The administration must commit more soldiers to the struggle in Iraq. This means increasing the overall end strength of the Army through the regular budget process. The administration must recognize that the struggle in Iraq is separate from the war on terrorism and that the war on terrorism requires more robust funding at home to protect America. The administration must recognize and admit that we are committed to a long and dangerous struggle in Iraq that will cover many years and cost many billions of dollars. The administration must seek to truly institutionalize our efforts in Iraq. A government that deceives its people may sustain itself for a while. Lincoln reminded us that ``you can fool some of the people some of the time,'' but a government that deceives itself is doomed to failure, and its policies are doomed to failure. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that in addition to my time, I receive 10 minutes from Senator Harkin.

Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, we are currently engaged in a fierce battle to salvage something, anything, from the administration's effort at regime change and reconstruction in Iraq. Each day, the costs in lives and dollars accumulate, as the Iraqi people become more restive and impatient. International and regional support for our efforts is eroding at a time when an international effort, as distinct from the administration's unilateral approach, may be the only effective way to change the political dynamic and allow us to avoid being trapped in a long, bloody, and uncertain conflict. Many Americans are asking how we came to this point. Some are asking why we must remain. The President has responded with a slogan: ``We must not waiver.'' What we need is a plan, a plan based on reality, not on ideology. The administration launched the preemptive attack on Iraq to counter, according to their claims, the overwhelming danger of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and alleged ties between Saddam Hussein and terrorists. In the last year, no weapons of mass destruction have been found, and no strong link has been established between Saddam and terrorists. Ironically, today, there is no shortage of terrorists in Iraq. They have been drawn there not by Saddam but by his demise. Now, the administration returns to the subtext of its justification for preemptive action in the fall of 2002, the unalloyed evil of Saddam. That, of course, is a point beyond debate; indeed, a point that was acknowledged by all sides during the debate in the fall of 2002. When Secretary Wolfowitz testified recently before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he continually reiterated the depravity of Saddam stressing, in his words, the ``density of evil'' that gripped Iraq under Saddam. Looking backward at Saddam will not help us find a way ahead today. Today, more relevant than the ``density of evil'' that gripped Iraq is the ``density of illusion'' that continues to grip the administration and the Pentagon. The administration and the Pentagon stubbornly cling to illusions about the situation in Iraq. Let me suggest some of the most salient. For months, they have attempted to convince the world--and, perhaps, themselves--that Iraqi security forces were capable of making a significant contribution to establish order and to defeat the insurgency. No such capability exists at this time, and it may take years to train a competent and cohesive force that can assume the security role in Iraq that currently falls primarily upon the United States. For months, the Pentagon regaled us with charts showing the astronomical and rapid growth of Iraqi security forces from mere handfuls to hundreds of thousands. They repeatedly stressed the proportional decrease of the American presence as a sign of progress. All this was wishful thinking and political spinning. The last few weeks have revealed the fact that a significant number of Iraqi security forces are ill prepared, ill equipped, and unmotivated. A Washington Post article pointed out that on April 5, a new Iraqi battalion of several hundred Iraqi soldiers refused to join U.S. Marines in the offensive in Fallujah. In the south, police units as well as members of the Iraqi Civilian Defense Corps, equivalent to the National Guard of the United States, refused to engage Sadr's forces. MG Martin Dempsey, commander of the 1st Armored Division in Iraq, estimated that one in 10 members of the Iraqi security forces actually worked against the U.S. forces and 40 percent simply walked away from their post because of intimidation during the recent violence in Fallujah and in the south of Iraq. The Pentagon likely had indications of problems with these forces. Several months ago MG Karl Eikenberry was dispatched to Iraq to conduct a survey of Iraqi security forces. General Eikenberry is an extremely competent and experienced officer who played a key role in establishing the new national army in Afghanistan after Operation Enduring Freedom. For many weeks, I have been attempting to obtain this report to become informed and to inform my colleagues about the state of readiness of the Iraqi security forces. The Pentagon has been completely uncooperative. This lack of cooperation and respect for the responsibilities of Congress to perform oversight over the Department of Defense has been characteristic of this administration's approach throughout the conduct of operations in Iraq, and it has contributed to the predicament we find ourselves in today. Too often a small group of civilians in the Pentagon has displaced normal planning functions and instead, insulated from appropriate congressional oversight, has hatched plans for the occupation in Iraq that have proven to be misguided and inept. The formation of credible and effective Iraqi security forces is imperative, but not just because it reduces the burden and the threat to our forces. It is imperative we establish these forces because today our goals for Iraq are being thwarted by a climate of violence that affects every Iraqi and saps their willingness to commit to the reform of their country. We often see the violence in Iraq as those attacks against our forces. When we do, we miss the pervasive and disturbing violence that touches the lives of every Iraqi and, in a cruel irony, has many Iraqis comparing the order under Saddam with the chronic disorder under the United States. The following is an article, translated from Arabic, in the April 25th edition of Al Manar, a newspaper from Baghdad: The Iraqi society has never known or, even in U.S. gang movies, seen such acts of looting, robbery, and murder as the current crimes taking place in Iraq today, which cause newborn's hair to turn gray. The crimes have become so common that hardly an hour passes without hearing that some people are being plundered or a number of cars are being stolen. The drivers of the new and expensive cars have become a target for the thieves and burglars. Someone may think that such crimes occur in other places at night; however, the strange thing is that in Iraq, they take place during the day for everyone to see. In addition, the numbers of these looting gangs have become very well known to the ordinary citizens of Baghdad. A few days ago, my relative's car was stolen at gun point in Baghdad, but he managed to escape without being physically harmed or injured in the incident. Having recovered from the shock a few days later, his friends advised him to meet with a former gang leader who enjoyed considerable status and reputation among the members of the other criminal gangs. Having no other option, my relative went to see the guy who promised to take him to the gangs operating in the zone where his car was stolen. As promised, the man secretly took my relative to meet well known gangsters where one of them congratulated him [my relative] for his good luck because his car was stolen by a gang ``that only steals cars but does not kill the owners; otherwise, you would have been killed if it was another gang.'' The strange thing is that most of the gangsters are young boys between the age of 15 and 20 years. After several terrifying trips, my relative found his car when tough negotiations began. He was asked to pay $500, a special offer out of honor and respect for their repentant comrade who brought him to get his car back. This true story is an example of dozens of other similar robbery, looting, and murder crimes taking place in Baghdad where stealing and murdering gangs have dramatically increased. Unless we are able to protect the people of Iraq from criminal gangs and from situations as illustrated in these comments in the newspaper, we will fail in our mission because we have a situation where the basic elements of order, the basic sense of safety and security have been completely eviscerated for a vast number of Iraqis. These are off the TV screens. But this is one of the constant drumbeats that is turning the people of Iraq to become resentful of our presence. The administration has also, together with the Pentagon, consistently underestimated the number of troops necessary for the successful occupation of Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks adroitly planned the air and ground campaign that shattered the Iraqi army in a matter of days. They correctly judged our overwhelming technological advantages, together with the extraordinary courage and skill of our fighting forces, would quickly overwhelm the much larger Iraqi forces. But winning a swift victory over a conventional military force is not the same as successfully occupying a large country with a population of 25 million. From the beginning, our forces, including international allies, were insufficient to physically and psychologically dominate the scene. The absence or limited presence of coalition forces in many parts of Iraq gave the insurgents opportunities to organize and the perception they could initiate hostile actions against our forces. One of the first clues I had suggesting a lack of adequate forces was the briefing I received last July from the 4th Infantry Division in Kirkuk on my first trip to Iraq. I was taken aback, frankly, to learn there were hundreds, if not thousands, of Iraqi ammo dumps. Many of them were totally unsecured while others had some security barriers but were not secured by military personnel. This was the case all over the country. Today munitions in these ammo dumps are being used to craft the improvised explosive devices that bedevil our forces. This is one example indicating additional troops could have been used effectively. Another indication of the insufficient number of coalition military forces is the proliferation of private security forces. Why is it necessary to have 20,000 armed private security guards in Iraq performing essential military duties? The answer is simple. We did not deploy sufficient military forces. These private security forces are generally highly trained professionals, typically veterans of our special operations forces. But their presence raises numerous questions. How, for example, do they coordinate with our military forces? What rules of engagement may they use? What is their legal status, particularly after June 30, when limited sovereignty is transferred to some Iraqi authority? I am still awaiting the answer to these questions from the Pentagon. Once again, my request has not been responded to promptly with detailed information or any information. Last September, Senator Hagel and I proposed an amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill to increase the size of our Army by 10,000 soldiers. That is a necessary initial step to provide the manpower to continue to commit further forces to Iraq and to continue to meet the worldwide demands upon our Army. The Senate supported that amendment. Unfortunately, the administration vociferously opposed it. They claimed Iraq was just a spike and that in the months ahead, the Army could begin to withdraw forces. In January, they suddenly reversed this position and announced they would take steps to increase the Army by 30,000 soldiers by tapping into the supplemental appropriations bill. I am pleased the Pentagon is finally convinced we need more forces for our Army, but they still maintain this is a temporary emergency condition that is best funded through the supplemental appropriations process. The reality is, this condition is not temporary. If we are serious about succeeding in Iraq and meeting other demands throughout the world, we must admit this is a task that will take many years and a larger army for many years. We must provide for increases in end strength for our Army in the regular budget process, not the supplemental, by directing more resources to the Army from the other services or by increasing the overall defense budget. The administration and the Pentagon continually insist that we are being opposed by a small group of unrepentant holdouts from the former Baathist regime and an even smaller cadre of terrorists who have flocked to Iraq after the defeat of Saddam. This view dangerously misconstrues the growing resentment of the Iraq population to our presence and the very real possibility that many Iraqis will sympathize with the insurgents not because they agree with their political or religious views but because they see them as fellow Iraqis resisting a foreign occupation. Anthony Cordesman, a very prescient analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, pointed out that ``it is important to note that an ABC poll in February found a large core of hostility to the Coalition before the tensions unleashed by current fighting, and that core involved many Shi'ites as well as Sunnis.'' And, as reported in a new USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup poll, ``only a third of the Iraqi people now believe that the American-led occupation of their country is doing more good than harm, and a solid majority support an immediate pullout even though they fear that could put them in greater danger . . .'' Although half the Iraqis who responded to the poll said that they and their families were better off now then under Saddam, 71 percent of the respondents when asked to classify the Americans as ``liberators'' or ``occupiers'' chose ``occupier.'' The figure increases to 81 percent if you exclude respondents from the semi-autonomous Kurdish region. More startling is the fact that more than half the respondents outside of the Kurdish region ``say killing U.S. troops can be justified in at least some cases.'' What might have begun as the desperate acts of diehards from Saddam's regime has rapidly morphed into a widespread resentment of the United States as ``occupiers.'' The insurgents have touched a nationalistic nerve that vastly complicates our efforts. Popular support is the critical element in political warfare, and the administration is squandering that support. The latest revelations of gross abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison have further fanned the flames of resentment and anger. It is an aberration in the conduct of American soldiers, but its occurrence has confirmed in a very suspicious population the worst lies spread by our adversaries. In addition, these actions have poisoned our already strained relations with many countries and their citizens around the world. For months now, the Coalition Provisional Authority has been in power, and the administration touted that as an example of our reconstruction efforts. Frankly, I believe it has been dysfunctional from the beginning. The President vested the Department of Defense with extraordinary powers in the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. Even before the initiation of military operations, the decision was made to exclude experts from the State Department from planning for the reconstruction and administration of Iraq. The task was given to a small group of ideologues in the Department of Defense. They relied on the self- serving declarations of Chalabi and the exile crowd to assume away most of the problems that we later encountered in Iraq. Problems such as a dilapidated infrastructure an ancient rivalries between religious and ethnic factions were conveniently ignored as the ``neocons'' predicted that we would be welcomed with open arms in a country that was economically and culturally ready for a rapid transition to democracy. The institutional responsibilities for the transformation of Iraq were given to Ambassador Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, the ``CPA''. And, in this regard, the record is one of confusion and ineptness. The decision to disband the Iraqi army threw thousands of desperate and dangerous individuals onto the streets of Iraq. Many of these individuals formed the heart of the insurgency that continues to attack our troops. The decision to eliminate the Baath party from the civic life of Iraq was quite correct in principle, but carried to such extremes that it alienated the Sunni community and provided additional fuel for the growing fires of resistance. To add insult to injury, the process of debaathification was placed under the control of Chalabi, a figure of immense distrust and dislike in Iraq. I first heard these complaints from our military commanders last November during one of my trips to Iraq. They complained that thousands of teachers were being excluded from schools at a time when there was a concerted effort to reopen schools throughout the country. These officers explained that membership in the Baath Party was obligatory for anyone who hoped to obtain a job like teaching in Iraq. Most of these individuals were motivated not by political impulses but by economic and career goals. Nevertheless, they were categorically excluded subject to the discretion of Chalabi. It was a situation that further antagonized the Sunni community. The policy has been belatedly amended but not after doing great damage. This episode also illustrates the gap between the CPA and the military commanders that actually were doing the work of rebuilding Iraq. The CPA existed in a security bubble in Baghdad disconnected from the field where Army division commanders and their staffs were taking pragmatic actions to restore services, rebuild communities and instill hope in the people of Iraq. The CPA added little to these actions except indecision that simply complicated the action of commanders on the ground. In the past few days, a revealing memorandum by someone who served in the CPA has surfaced that provided additional details illustrating the incompetence of the CPA. The anonymous author of the memo is a fan of Chalabi and is hopeful for success in Iraq. This makes his criticism even more telling. He describes the CPA as handling ``an issue like six-year-olds play soccer: Someone kicks the ball and one hundred people chase after it hoping to be noticed, without a care as to what happens on the field.'' My view is that the CPA quickly became a 30-day summer camp for ``neocons.'' Subject-matter experts were displaced by ideological true believers who rotated in and out at a dizzying rate. The CPA installed the Iraqi Governing Council composed of representatives from the major factions and then allowed the Governing Council to pick ministers to run the major ministries, like Oil and Public Works. The result was nepotism and corruption. As the memo points out, ``both for political and organizational reasons, the decision to allow the Governing Council to pick 25 ministers did the greatest damage. Not only did we endorse nepotism, with men choosing their sons and brothers-in-law; but we also failed to use our prerogative to shape a system that would work . . . our failure to promote accountability has hurt us. I met with a member of the Iraqi Governing Council on March 17 in Baghdad. He explained to me the importance of the June 30 date. As Chalabi explained it to him, it is important because on that date they get to ``write the checks.'' I am sure there are competent and patriotic Iraqis involved in the Governing Council, but I am deeply skeptical of many, like Chalabi, who seem interested only in self- promotion based on deceit and deception. Despite the institutional failings of the CPA, it has acquired some hard- won experience. That experience disappears on July 1 as our new Embassy replaces the CPA. I fear that we will witness once again a lack of coordination and direction as a new team tries to organize itself in the complicated and unforgiving environment of Iraq. I was hoping to hear Ambassador Negroponte describe in detail the organization and policies that will guide the new Embassy. I didn't hear much. There are numerous questions. What is the status of contracts with the CPA, particularly contracts with security firms? Will American civilian contractors in Iraq be subject to Iraq law or United States jurisdiction? How will the Embassy be organized to avoid being ``captive'' in the Green Zone in Baghdad? How will responsibilities be divided between the Department of State and the Department of Defense? I'm still waiting for good answers. We are in danger of repeating the mistakes we made a year ago. Once again, we are approaching a critical juncture without a plan, just a new set of players. And the clock is ticking. The administration is pinning most of its hopes for political progress in Iraq on the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi entity on June 30. In doing so, they confuse the difference between sovereignty and legitimacy. The new Iraqi entity--yet to be devised or to be fleshed out with Iraqis--may have some formal powers that may qualify it as a sovereign for the purposes of international law, but I doubt that the vast majority of Iraqi citizens will see it as a legitimate government. This new entity lacks the key components that people ascribe to legitimate governments. Legitimate governments are created by internal political forces, preferably by elections, and legitimate governments control their territory. This new entity will be a creation of the United States with the belated and uncertain participation of the United Nations, and this new government will exist because American military forces control the territory of Iraq. In a sense, the administration has already made June 30 both irreversible and irrelevant. Having held out the prospect of a transition to Iraqi rule on June 30, it is impossible to turn back. But on July 1, a prevailing sentiment in Iraq is likely to be disappointment and a sense that the United States has, once again, failed to carry out its word. This will further aggravate tensions, not diminish them. We can hope the participation of the United Nations will give us a reprieve from this fate, but the administration's disdain for and distrust of the United Nations suggests to me that the current arrangement of necessity will not be sufficient to truly give a sense of legitimacy despite recent efforts. The surest route to legitimacy is through elections, but we are far from that day. Indeed, that day may continue to recede. Recent polling in Iraq underlines a disturbing fact: Seventy-five percent of the Iraqis polled--that's the largest percentage of people agreeing on virtually any issue--say they would never join a political party and oppose the existence of a political party. If that is the case, the likelihood of a democratic Iraq is many years away. The administration's gravest illusion has been and continues to be that the United States can do it alone. Recent events show the necessity for significant international involvement, not unilateral action. The administration has made overtures to the United Nations, but, as I have suggested, these overtures smack more of political expediency than a new realization of the value of broad-based collective action. The monetary cost alone to the United States is staggering. We have spent $100 billion on the effort in Iraq with no end in sight. More importantly, we have lost 767 men and women of our Armed Forces. Indeed, according to an article in today's Washington Post, Yale economist William D. Nordhaus has estimated that the additional $25 billion just requested for the war in Iraq will make it more costly than the inflation-adjusted expenditures of the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American war, the Spanish-American War, and the Persian Gulf war combined. These monetary costs are just a fraction of what we will end up paying. Each day we are accruing significant costs to recapitalize the equipment and materiel we are using up at alarming rates. The aircraft and the tactical and logistical vehicles will require massive overhauls and replacement. None of these costs are being adequately addressed in or outside the supplemental budgetary process or the regular budgetary process. Without broad-based international support, we will be unable to accomplish our political goals, and we will be hard pressed to sustain the billions of dollars necessary to sustain our effort in Iraq. As long as we dominate the military and political forces deployed to Iraq, we will be seen as occupiers serving our self-interest rather than a force to advance the interests of the Iraqi people. The administration has long maintained that Iraq is the ``central front'' in the war on terrorism. They are badly mistaken. The ``central front'' in the war on terrorism is the United States. The ultimate objective of our terrorist adversaries is to once again inflict a catastrophic attack against the United States. They are not distracted in this objective by Iraq. We should not be either. Today, al-Qaida and sympathetic terrorist cells throughout the world continue to plot to conduct an attack against the United States or the homelands of our allies. The insurgents that we are engaging in Iraq may hate us with the same intensity as an al-Qaida operative, but they have chosen a different path--a path of guerrilla war against our military forces and the citizens of Iraq. The majority are Iraqis motivated by specific grievances involving our presence in Iraq. The ``foreign fighters'' who are in Iraq are drawn by the desire to fight the infidel. They are temperamentally and technically much different than the plotters who attacked us on September 11. In contrast, there are still many al-Qaida and associated operatives who continue to plan stealthy attacks against Americans rather than seek out a guerilla war against our military forces. To assume we will lure these terrorists into Iraq and destroy them there is a dangerous misperception. Once again, the value of a truly international approach to the war on terror becomes more evident. The key element in this struggle is intelligence, not simply military might. This intelligence is not the province of one country, even a country with the resources of the United States. It is the sum of the collective efforts of many countries. To the extent we have alienated other countries or made their intelligence contributions more difficult, then we have diminished the key element in defeating those who continue to plot to strike our homeland.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today with my colleagues, my fellow Rhode Islanders, and our Armenian American community to observe the 89th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. At this time, it is fitting that we reflect on this tragic event in order to ensure that future generations remember and learn from the pain and suffering of those who came before us. The Armenian Genocide was a demonstration of evil. From its genesis on April 24, 1915, through the end of 1923, nearly one and a half million Armenians were killed and over a half a million survivors exiled. All the while, the United States Government, too busy trying to defeat the Austro-German alliance and attempting to stay out of a war in Europe, ignored these atrocities. The United States Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, Sr., attempted to bring the tragic string of events to a climax, pleading with both President Wilson and Secretary of State Robert Lansing to get involved. Former President Theodore Roosevelt, frustrated by a lack of response from his own government, petitioned President Wilson on 24 November 1915, saying ``Until we put honor and duty first, and are willing to risk something in order to achieve righteousness both for ourselves and for others, we shall accomplish nothing; and we shall earn and deserve the contempt of the strong nations of mankind.'' Unfortunately, the Armenian genocide was only the first of several 20th century tragedies--the Nazi extermination of the Jews and others during the Second World War; Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge's slaughter of nearly two million Cambodians in the mid-1970s; the Hutu massacre of the Tutsis in Rwanda in the summer of 1993; and, at the same time, the Serbian annihilation of Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia from 1993 to 1995. Thus, as we reflect on this atrocity, let us call for our own country to recognize the Armenian Genocide, just as my own State of Rhode Island has done, and as the parliaments of Belgium, Canada, Cypress, France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Russia, and Sweden have done over the past 6 years. Let us also pledge never to ignore atrocities by those who claim the legitimacy of government. We must never ignore and we will never forget.