Jack Reed

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Thomas Heibert, a fellow in my office, be granted the privileges of the floor for this debate.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to join my colleague Senator McCain in introducing the Gun Show Loophole Closing Act of 2003. We offer this legislation to strengthen our Nation's gun laws by closing a loophole that has allowed criminals to buy firearms at gun shows for far too long. I look forward to working with Senator McCain and our fellow cosponsors to offer this legislation to the first appropriate vehicle that comes before the Senate. In particular, it is our intention to offer this bill as an amendment to the gun industry immunity bill, S. 659. If the Senate is going to consider granting immunity from civil liability to the firearms industry--an industry that Congress already exempted from the consumer product safety laws that apply to virtually every other product sold in this country--it is critical that we protect the American people by improving law enforcement oversight of commerce in firearms. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms reported to Congress in 2000 that gun shows are a major gun trafficking channel responsible for more than 26,000 illegal firearms sales during the 18-month period ATF studied. The FBI and ATF tell us again and again that convicted felons, domestic abusers, and other prohibited purchasers are taking advantage of the gun show loophole. At least three suspected terrorists that we know of have also exploited this loophole to acquire firearms, including one suspected al Qaeda member. Under Federal law, Federal Firearms Licensees are required to maintain careful records of their sales, and under the Brady Act, to check a purchaser's background with the National Instant Criminal Background Check System before transferring any firearm. However, a person does not need a Federal firearms license--and the Brady Act does not apply--if the person is not ``engaged in the business'' of selling firearms pursuant to Federal law. These unlicensed sellers make up one quarter or more of the sellers of firearms at thousands of gun shows in America each year. Consequently, felons and other prohibited persons who want to avoid Brady Act checks and records of their purchases buy firearms at gun shows. Four years ago, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold killed 13 people at Columbine High School with weapons purchased from an unlicensed seller at a gun show. The woman who purchased those guns on behalf of Harris and Klebold testified to the Colorado legislature that she never would have purchased the weapons had she been required to undergo a background check. We have united behind this bipartisan legislation--which brings together provisions from several previous gun show bills--to make gun show transactions safer for all Americans. The bill would require Brady Law background checks on all firearms transactions at any event where 75 or more guns are offered for sale. Three years after enactment, States could apply to the Attorney General for certification for a 24- hour background check for unlicensed sellers at gun shows. In order to be eligible for 24-hour certification, a State would be required to have 95 percent of its disqualifying records automated and searchable under NICS, including 95 percent of all domestic violence misdemeanor and restraining order records dating back 30 years. Before certifying any State for 24-hour background checks, the Attorney General would be required to establish a toll-free telephone number to enable State and local courts to immediately notify the NICS system any time a domestic violence restraining order is filed, and courts within a certified State would be required to use the telephone number immediately upon the filing of such an order. The bill also directs the Attorney General to work with States to encourage the development of computer systems that would allow courts to provide electronic records to NICS immediately. The Bureau of Justice Statistics would conduct an annual review of all certified States to ensure they continue to meet the conditions for 24-hour background check certification. Some will say that this legislation is an attempt to end gun shows, but the experience of States that have closed the gun show loophole proves otherwise. California, for example, requires not only background checks at gun shows but a 10-day waiting period for all gun sales, yet gun shows continue to thrive there. No, we are not trying to end gun shows. What we are trying to end is the free pass we're giving to terrorists and convicted felons that allows them to simply walk into a gun show, find a private dealer, buy whatever weapons they want and walk out without a Brady background check. In overwhelming numbers, the American people believe that background checks should be required for all gun show sales. The people of Colorado confirmed this after the Columbine tragedy when they approved a ballot initiative to close the gun show loophole. I urge my colleagues to support the Gun Show Loophole Closing Act of 2003 so that we can finally close this loophole in every State and make sure that convicted felons, domestic abusers, and other prohibited persons do not use gun shows to purchase firearms without a Brady background check.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to join my colleague Senator McCain in introducing the Gun Show Loophole Closing Act of 2003. We offer this legislation to strengthen our Nation's gun laws by closing a loophole that has allowed criminals to buy firearms at gun shows for far too long. I look forward to working with Senator McCain and our fellow cosponsors to offer this legislation to the first appropriate vehicle that comes before the Senate. In particular, it is our intention to offer this bill as an amendment to the gun industry immunity bill, S. 659. If the Senate is going to consider granting immunity from civil liability to the firearms industry--an industry that Congress already exempted from the consumer product safety laws that apply to virtually every other product sold in this country--it is critical that we protect the American people by improving law enforcement oversight of commerce in firearms. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms reported to Congress in 2000 that gun shows are a major gun trafficking channel responsible for more than 26,000 illegal firearms sales during the 18-month period ATF studied. The FBI and ATF tell us again and again that convicted felons, domestic abusers, and other prohibited purchasers are taking advantage of the gun show loophole. At least three suspected terrorists that we know of have also exploited this loophole to acquire firearms, including one suspected al Qaeda member. Under Federal law, Federal Firearms Licensees are required to maintain careful records of their sales, and under the Brady Act, to check a purchaser's background with the National Instant Criminal Background Check System before transferring any firearm. However, a person does not need a Federal firearms license--and the Brady Act does not apply--if the person is not ``engaged in the business'' of selling firearms pursuant to Federal law. These unlicensed sellers make up one quarter or more of the sellers of firearms at thousands of gun shows in America each year. Consequently, felons and other prohibited persons who want to avoid Brady Act checks and records of their purchases buy firearms at gun shows. Four years ago, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold killed 13 people at Columbine High School with weapons purchased from an unlicensed seller at a gun show. The woman who purchased those guns on behalf of Harris and Klebold testified to the Colorado legislature that she never would have purchased the weapons had she been required to undergo a background check. We have united behind this bipartisan legislation--which brings together provisions from several previous gun show bills--to make gun show transactions safer for all Americans. The bill would require Brady Law background checks on all firearms transactions at any event where 75 or more guns are offered for sale. Three years after enactment, States could apply to the Attorney General for certification for a 24- hour background check for unlicensed sellers at gun shows. In order to be eligible for 24-hour certification, a State would be required to have 95 percent of its disqualifying records automated and searchable under NICS, including 95 percent of all domestic violence misdemeanor and restraining order records dating back 30 years. Before certifying any State for 24-hour background checks, the Attorney General would be required to establish a toll-free telephone number to enable State and local courts to immediately notify the NICS system any time a domestic violence restraining order is filed, and courts within a certified State would be required to use the telephone number immediately upon the filing of such an order. The bill also directs the Attorney General to work with States to encourage the development of computer systems that would allow courts to provide electronic records to NICS immediately. The Bureau of Justice Statistics would conduct an annual review of all certified States to ensure they continue to meet the conditions for 24-hour background check certification. Some will say that this legislation is an attempt to end gun shows, but the experience of States that have closed the gun show loophole proves otherwise. California, for example, requires not only background checks at gun shows but a 10-day waiting period for all gun sales, yet gun shows continue to thrive there. No, we are not trying to end gun shows. What we are trying to end is the free pass we're giving to terrorists and convicted felons that allows them to simply walk into a gun show, find a private dealer, buy whatever weapons they want and walk out without a Brady background check. In overwhelming numbers, the American people believe that background checks should be required for all gun show sales. The people of Colorado confirmed this after the Columbine tragedy when they approved a ballot initiative to close the gun show loophole. I urge my colleagues to support the Gun Show Loophole Closing Act of 2003 so that we can finally close this loophole in every State and make sure that convicted felons, domestic abusers, and other prohibited persons do not use gun shows to purchase firearms without a Brady background check.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. REED. Madam President, I rise today to commemorate the life of Senator Paul Wellstone and to urge the Senate Republican leadership to pave the way for the expeditious passage of the Paul Wellstone Mental Health Parity Act. Earlier this week, I joined a number of my colleagues in sending a letter to the majority leader, urging him to set aside other business yesterday so we could take up and pass this very important legislation. I regret that could not be accomplished yesterday. This Saturday, October 25, marks the 1-year anniversary of the tragic death of our dear colleague, Paul Wellstone, his lovely wife Sheila, and six others: his daughter Marcia; Mary McEvoy of St. Paul, a professor of educational psychology at the University of Minnesota and also the associate chairwoman of the State Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party; Tom Lapic, of Eden Prairie--Tom was Senator Wellstone's deputy State director and long-time associate and aide, and William McLaughlin, a 23-year-old who was Senator Wellstone's personal assistant and driver. All of these individuals were dedicated, passionate public servants who shared Paul Wellstone's vision, his dedication and commitment to a better America, a place where opportunity was the heritage of all. For anyone who had the honor to serve with Paul and to see him here, his image and his memory still linger in this Chamber. To see him passionately and fearlessly fight for people--and not the wealthiest, but poorest, those who needed an opportunity to move ahead--that image of him stays with me and stays with so many of my colleagues. Many times we would not agree. Many times we would differ. But no one in this Chamber doubted his passion, his commitment, and his selfless dedication to this country. He challenged us. In fact, Paul probably challenged his colleagues more than any other Member. He would speak here when it was inopportune and inconvenient for him, but he would do it because he felt a commitment and a need to speak, to give voice to those who were voiceless in this country. He believed the Government had not only the obligation but also the ability to help people--not just to cradle them from birth through their lives but to give them opportunities and skills so they could use these skills to better themselves and better the Nation. He was enthusiastic about helping people lift themselves out of poverty, about bringing justice to those who had been victimized, and hope to those who were desperate. He cared about all the issues that are before us in the Senate. But one issue he cared so much about, for which he advocated so strenuously and which he articulated so passionately, was the fact that our mental health system needs additional improvement; that there is disparity between the treatment given to those with physical pain and treatments given to those individuals with mental anguish. He also was passionate in denouncing the stigma we attach to mental illness too often in this country. He fought effectively, and his efforts culminated in 1996 with the original Mental Health Parity Act. It was thought that this historic bill that would put mental health services on the same level as physical health services by essentially telling insurers whatever you do in terms of physical health problems you must also do in terms of mental health problems. However, it was discovered after passage of the Act that insurance companies and others were able to find ways to circumvent the law, so additional efforts would be necessary. He stood up, along with our colleague and our friend Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico, to lead the fight to make the parity law of 1996 even better, more effective, and stronger. Last summer it appeared we were on the verge of a breakthrough when President Bush indicated he supported this concept of a mental health parity standard. Yet we are still without effective action. I was very pleased to join Senator Domenici, Senator Kennedy, and others to sign on to the Paul Wellstone Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act in honor of our esteemed colleague. But today, despite having 66 cosponsors, this legislation has not been brought to the floor of the Senate. We are indeed seeing tremendous strains on our health care system, but this is one of the most critical problems. There are those who say it is going to cost too much if we address mental health parity seriously. My argument is the costs today are immense, and if we don't deal with these mental health issues, it will continue to grow. In my State of Rhode Island, we have a very active community mental health system. I suggest we probably have saved dollars over the course of the last couple of decades. But we can't do this unless we have a commitment to parity between physical health issues and mental health issues. The majority leader has indicated that his preference is to do this through the committee process. We have a markup scheduled for next Wednesday on health care issues. That would be the ideal opportunity to schedule the Paul Wellstone legislation and do our best to pass it. Working with the majority leader and the chairman of the HELP committee, I hope we can do that, or certainly at the earliest possible opportunity have committee action to take up the Paul Wellstone bill. There is one other area which Senator Wellstone was passionate about. In fact, I can hear him now. His desk was right behind me. He would prowl up and down the corridor, and go as far as the cord would let him go. He would speak out. One issue on which he spoke so eloquently was the issue of funding education--the No Child Left Behind Act. He was one of the few dissenters. He said prophetically this might be a good plan, but without resources it wouldn't work. Ironically, today we struggle to get those resources. He would say, we can't reform education on a tin cup. Unfortunately, we still seem to be passing around that tin cup rather than funding education robustly as we must. I hope we can move aggressively on the Paul Wellstone Mental Health Parity Act. I hope also we can find those resources to fund education and the No Child Left Behind Act. In doing that, we will pay tribute to a Senator who honored us and honored his country with his public service. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to thank my colleagues for designating the week of October 19-25, 2003 as National Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Week. S. Res. 243, the resolution making next week National Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Week, was cosponsored by 44 of my colleagues and passed the Senate last night by unanimous consent. The need to combat the severe threat of lead poisoning to our children's health has never been greater. It is estimated that 25 million homes nationwide have lead hazards. Many of those homes were built before 1950, when paint contained as much as 50 percent lead. Peeling chips and dust from deteriorating lead-based paint is one of the most common sources of childhood lead poisoning. According to the latest national health estimates, nearly one-half of a million children under the age of 6 suffer from lead poisoning, with these children 8 times more likely to come from low-income working families than wealthy families. Unfortunately, except for severely poisoned children, there is no medical treatment for this disease. Even then, treatment may only reduce the level of lead present in the body, not reverse the harm already caused. Research shows that children with elevated blood lead levels are seven times more likely to drop our of high school and 6 times more likely to have reading disabilities. And it costs an average of $10,000 more a year to educate a lead poisoned child. We need to find the will and the resources to eradicate childhood lead poisoning in this country. Designating the last full week in October as National Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Week will help shine a light on this terrible problem, energize the Federal Government into playing a more effective role, and improve local, State and Federal cooperation in the process. With concerted effort, we can eliminate the tragedy of childhood lead poisoning so that no family in our country has to live in unsafe housing. I am committed to addressing this crisis, and believe this resolution can encourage communities to focus on solving the problem.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. REED. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, my amendment would raise the end strength of the U.S. Army by 10,000 soldiers. It is fully paid for this year through the Iraqi freedom fund. In the process of rebuilding Iraq, we have to be very careful not to demolish our Army. It is stretched thin across the globe, with 320,000 soldiers in over 120 countries. They are serving us today. They will serve us tomorrow. They will do it with great distinction and fidelity to their service and to the country, but we have to make sure they have additional men and women to do the job. We are already beginning to see the cracks. In Iraq, there are 1 million tons of ammunition that are not fully secured. Thousands of air defense shoulder-fired missiles are unaccounted because we simply do not have the troops to cover all the places. If we want more forces in Iraq, then we have to have more forces in our end strength. Even if you do not want more forces in Iraq, we have to have an end strength that will support our deployment policy, and we do not right now. This stress will show up in training opportunities missed, in retention and recruitment objectives missed, and a lack of flexibility to respond. It will be particularly important to our National Guard and Reserves because if we do not increase the Active Forces, the burden will fall more and more on Reserve Forces, and that burden over time is unsustainable. I urge all of my colleagues to support this measure to help the soldiers. If we do not pass this measure, the next time you see your Guard men and women and reservists, you can tell them their bag better be packed because they will be going again and again. I ask unanimous consent to add Senator Biden and Senator Nelson of Florida as cosponsors.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, the Army has 501,000 soldiers serving on active duty. Not only is this above the authorized end strength of 480,000, it is also above the 3 percent variance rate. The Army desperately needs troops, and we can provide them these troops today. This is funded through the Iraqi freedom fund, a $1.9 billion unrestricted account that the Secretary of Defense has. In fact, as I understand it, the Secretary of Defense could turn around tomorrow and use this money for these troops. We can do it today. We should do it today. We cannot stand these stresses much longer. We can give General Schoomaker more time, but the troops that are today in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and around the globe need to know that we are going to send them the reinforcements they need through the active services. I yield my time.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the pending amendment, and I call up amendment No. 1834.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I offer this amendment with Senator Hagel of Nebraska. It would increase the end strength of our Army so we can deal with the increasing turbulence throughout the world that we have been confronting since 9/11--indeed before then. Our military forces are without equal. They combine superb technology with bravery and devotion to the Nation. They are well led, particularly by extraordinary noncommissioned officers and junior officers. These qualities extend to both Active and Reserve components. History has never seen such a formidable force. However, history is replete with examples of superb military forces worn down because they were overextended. Today, that danger is approaching our Army as it copes with worldwide commitments and the difficult challenge of a violent insurgency in Iraq and a resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. This chart depicts the deployment of soldiers. There are 325,000 soldiers in 120 countries. In Iraq, there are about 120,000; in Kuwait, about 22,000; in Afghanistan, approximately 11,000. They are all across the globe performing missions that are important to us and our national security and our safety. This situation of an extended Army has been developing over many years. Since 1989, the Army's military end strength has been cut by more than 34 percent and civilian strength by 45 percent, while undergoing a 300-percent increase in mission rate. Fewer people, more demand. That has been the record since 1989 and before that even. This operational tempo certainly became acute after September 11 and the commencement of the global war on terrorism. A respected voice who devoted his life to serving the nation, GEN Frederick Kroesen, wrote in November 2002, before the initiation of operations in Iraq: It appears to this interested observer that we are expending the force and doing little to ensure its viability in the years to come, years we have been assured it will take to win the war on terrorism. The quality of our effort, high and commendable during the first year and showing no signs of deterioration, can in the long run only be sustained by preparing now for the force we will need then. Barring the unlikely scenario of an all-out war and full mobilization, soldiers now fighting the war on terrorism, with few exceptions, will not be available for fighting two years from now. Units and organizations of the reserve components, mobilized for the first year of war, will not be available for more of the same service off into the indefinite future. It might be prudent now to ask the managers who decreed the current second-year Reservists' extensions what they plan for the third year. The answer, of course, is to increase the size of the Army. On September 10, 2001, the Army was too small for the missions with which it was charged--a fact reported by both the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army in congressional testimony of that year. On September 11, Army mission requirements grew significantly; the Army did not. It instead begins the expending of it and establishes the need to begin planning for the replacement of that which is being used up. General Kroesen, a distinguished soldier, commanded the 82nd Airborne Division when I served as a young lieutenant. His insights are both profound and to me compelling. Again, these words from General Kroesen were written before Operation Iraqi Freedom and before we found ourselves in a prolonged and costly effort to defeat an insurgency and rebuild a nation. The added stress of Iraq has made the acute absolutely critical. James Kitfield of the National Journal wrote an insightful analysis of the stresses affecting the Army. He points out how this breakneck operational tempo is imposing great burdens throughout the Army. In his words: To understand why, shift the focus from individual soldiers to major units such as the 82nd Airborne Division. Traditionally America's quick reaction division, the 82nd currently has a brigade in Iraq and another in Afghanistan. The 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne, however, is the one that most concerns Army planners. After leaving Afghanistan earlier this year, the 3rd Brigade was home only about 6 months before being sent to help relieve the 3rd Infantry Division. Then there is the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division. Having returned recently from Germany from an extended peacekeeping deployment in the Balkans, the soldiers of the 3rd Brigade are becoming reacquainted with their families and relearning the kinds of high- intensity combat skills the Army put to such impressive use during the Iraq war. That training cycle itself requires weeks away from home. The 1st Infantry soldiers will not have much time before turning their focus to deployment preparations, however, because the 3rd Brigade is heading to Iraq next March to relieve elements of the 4th Infantry Division. What we are seeing every day is an increasing cycle of deployment and redeployment of brigades and divisions being shuffled about to cover all of these tremendous worldwide domains. This tempo and this stress is beginning to show in terms of our soldiers and in terms of the Army. Unless we provide additional soldiers for the Army, these stresses will be manifested in growing problems, such as difficulties in recruitment and retention and difficulties in adequately and thoroughly training the force. The Army has begun to cancel or postpone many exercises and training rotations. The Los Angeles Times recently reported that since October 1, 2002, the Pentagon has canceled or postponed 49 of the 182 training exercises scheduled for this fiscal year. The superb force that entered Iraq was forged through intensive training. Without such training, we will lose the edge in a world where there are other potential adversaries, such as North Korea whose army is more tenacious than the Iraqis under Saddam. The effects on recruitment and retention are likely to be seen first in the National Guard and Reserves. Indeed, unless we add more active component soldiers, we will continue to rely on the National Guard and Reserves to fill the gaps. Such a policy is unsustainable over an extended period. National Guard men and women and Reserve forces are dedicated patriots and skilled professionals, but they have lives outside the Army. If we continually force them to choose between service to the Nation and supporting their families, they will ultimately and invariably choose their families. Moreover, the stresses on the Guard and Reserves are not localized in a few communities. These stresses are transmitted to every corner of the country, and we will have great difficulty maintaining public support for an extended operation in Iraq if the public sees that operation through the prism of neighbors repeatedly called to service and sacrifice without relief. There has been much discussion about the adequacy of our force structure in Iraq, and I have become increasingly skeptical of the adequacy of the force structure in Iraq. You just have to pick up today's New York Times where there is an article that describes the fact that there is approximately 1 million tons of ammunition in Iraq, much of it unsecured because, frankly, we don't have enough troops there. We don't have enough American troops. We have not received our international reinforcements, and we have not yet effectively trained and deployed Iraqi troops. What is also frightening is the fact that apparently the Saddam Hussein regime stockpiled at least 5,000 shoulder-fired missiles, air defense missiles, capable of bringing down aircraft. Only about a third of these missiles are accounted for. There is the alarming possibility, because we are unable to secure these ammo dumps, that literally thousands of shoulder-fired air defense missiles are in Iraq or, even more alarming, have filtered outside the country to terrorist groups. So there is increasing evidence that the forces we have on the ground are not doing an essential job, which is to protect themselves from munitions going into the hands of terrorists and being used against our troops. Regardless of how one feels about the number of troops in Iraq, we simply will not be able to maintain even that level unless we increase the end strength of our Army. Increased reliance on Guard and Reserves is not a sensible long-term strategy, and the arrival of international reinforcements is problematic. The Army is trying to squeeze more boots on the ground from its current forces, but this improvisation is a quick fix, not a long-term solution. This amendment would authorize and would pay for an increase in the active duty Army end strength by 10,000 personnel and would focus on forces needed for constabulary duty, such as military police, civil affairs, light infantry, and special operations. The objective of end strength, meaning the number of personnel permitted to serve in the military, was succinctly summed up by retired GEN Gordon R. Sullivan: The objective is to have enough soldiers to execute Army missions at the right time and the right place, have enough in the total to have both tactical and operations flexibility and to have adequate depth in numbers to support leader development, required force structure manning and the requisite balance needed across the ranks. Indeed, the current numbers are not giving the flexibility and the redundancy we should have built in to our military. Each year in the Defense authorization bill, Congress authorizes the end strength of each branch of the military service. There is a separate end strength number for the Active and Reserve component, which includes the National Guard. Presently, the authorized active duty end strength for the Army is 480,000. The authorized end strength for the Army National Guard is 350,000, and the authorized end strength for the Army Reserve is 205,000. In addition, there is a variance, which means the Secretary of Defense is authorized to exceed the active duty end strength by 3 percent when necessary, and the Guard and Reserve end strength by 2 percent. I would argue that the present authorized end strength today, even with the allowed variance, does not provide enough Army personnel to provide the depth, the flexibility, and the balance it needs to carry out the missions of today and the future. This Army is stretched across the globe. The demands increase and the number of soldiers who are available is not able to give that needed flexibility, that adaptability, and that balance. Five years ago in the Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999, Congress lowered the authorized active duty end strength from 495,000 to its present 480,000. So there were at least 15,000 more soldiers several years ago before the war on terror, before the war in Iraq, before contingencies that have yet to present themselves to us. Soon after that, however, the discussions began when we lowered this end strength, focusing on the inadequacies of the number of people we had. During a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee in July 2001--again, before September 11--General Shinseki stated: Given today's mission profile, the Army is too small for the mission load it is carrying. At that time, both General Shinseki and Secretary White requested that end strength be increased to 520,000. Again, that was before 9/11 and before Iraq. Since 2001, the Association of the United States Army has been advocating for increasing end strength by 30,000 to 40,000 additional soldiers. Again, my amendment would only call for a 10,000 increase in the number of soldiers. However, despite the views of these professionals, end strength has not been increased. Yet none of the Army's missions from 2000 have ended, and with the advent of September 11, the war on terror, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq, the burden has increased exponentially. Today, as this chart shows, the Army has 325,200 soldiers deployed and forward stationed in 120 countries. While some of these deployment numbers may vary in the future, there will not be any significant changes. No one, I think, reasonably expects that we will be withdrawing within a year or two a major force from Iraq or forces from Afghanistan or forces from even Kosovo, Bosnia, and Hungary. These commitments are there, and they must be met. Retired LTG Jay Garner, the first director of Iraqi reconstruction, told the National Journal that the active duty Army ``has already been burned out'' by trying to do too much with too few, and the ``reserves are going to be burned out'' by repeated activations. General Garner argues that the Army needs to expand by two light infantry divisions, about 20,000. The U.S. Army's Center of Military History has looked at the numbers and experiences of forces needed to remain in country after the conventional battle has ended--occupation forces, in other words. The center notes that you can look at historical examples, but you must also consider contemporary analyses and current capabilities. With this three-pronged analysis, the Army's Center of Military History posited that if ``we and our allies were to directly and effectively steer the course of events,'' 300,000 troops would be required in Afghanistan for a generation and 100,000 troops would be needed in Iraq for a number of years,'' assuming a modernized society and robust infrastructure. Without these numbers of military personnel, we may have influence but not control. I think we are seeing today in Iraq that we have influence and not control, certainly not in Baghdad. We have influence in Afghanistan, but not control. It is important to note that providing insufficient troops to both Afghanistan and Iraq not only has consequences now but well into the future. Today, the Army presently has 501,000 soldiers serving on active duty. Not only is this above the authorized end strength of 480,000, but it is also above the 3 percent variance rate. Indeed, the Army is so stretched at the moment, they are actually breaking the law on end strength. Isn't that enough evidence to suggest we need to raise the level? I also note that even when the Army is well over the authorized end strength, they are having an extraordinarily difficult time implementing a rotation policy for Iraq and other areas around the globe. This means that tours are being extended. More Guard and Reserve forces are being called up and our soldiers are getting tired by the daily stress they are enduring and frustrated by the lack of certainty of when they may return home. Currently more than 130,000 Guard and Reserve soldiers are deployed. Approximately 29,000 National Guard soldiers, infantry, signal transportation, military police are serving in Iraq and Kuwait. Among those are the 115th and 119th military police companies from Rhode Island, and the 118th military police battalion from Rhode Island. They are doing a magnificent job, but they are feeling the stress of this deployment. More than 10,000 Reserve soldiers are in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq. At this time, there are still requirements for National Guard soldiers in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai. In fact, the National Guard has taken command relationships in these countries--Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai. This is a development that I think many National Guard soldiers did not anticipate when they joined the Guard several years ago, certainly if they joined the Guard 10 or 15 years ago. Since September 11, the Guard has mobilized 210,000 of its 350,000 soldiers at one time or another. The Reserve has mobilized 85,000 of its 205,000 in that same time period. In addition, the activation of the Reserve component has a different effect than the deployment of an active-duty soldier. For active-duty personnel, the military is their primary employer and their families are prepared for the sacrifices required when their loved one is absent from home for a long period of time performing dangerous duty. With reservists, it is a different story. While slightly more than 50 percent of the active-component Army is married, 74 percent of reservists have at least 1 dependent. About one-half of these soldiers work for employers with 1,000 or fewer employees and 15 percent work for companies with less than 50 employees, where their absence is sorely felt. While these soldiers are fighting for our country for at least a year, employers are understaffed and spouses are struggling as single parents, often under financial duress, since some soldiers take a pay cut when they give up their civilian salary for an Army wage. Goldman Sachs recently conducted a survey of Reserve component soldiers and their employers and found these disturbing results: Virtually all the reservists felt that the activation was having a less than favorable impact on their civilian careers. Nearly one-third of the reservists were not sure their jobs would be waiting for them when they came off active duty, and half believed there would be a negative effect on pay and promotion. Indeed, there is a dire need to expand the number of active-duty military personnel to avoid a future crisis in recruitment and retention in the military, specifically in the Reserve and National Guard units. With numbers like this reported by the Goldman Sachs survey, with the stress of a year deployment, with the additional burdens on spouses and children, I believe when these National Guards men and women and reservists return home the likelihood they would eagerly extend their careers in the Guard and Reserve is diminished significantly. Our soldiers need a break. They deserve better. We can help them and we should. Now some may oppose this amendment by stating that senior officials from the administration and the Army have repeatedly stated that if they needed more troops they would ask for them, and they do not need more troops. I argue the administration is ignoring the facts I have just cited, and the simple and the obvious point that our Army is overworked and the work continues. I think they are ignoring these facts for several reasons. First, increasing end strength admits that we need more troops to create a reasonable rotation policy, which means we are going to be in Iraq for a long time. The only other country where we have a one-year rotation policy for troops is Korea, where we have been ensconced now for almost 50 years. This administration simply must admit that a U.S. military presence in Iraq will be necessary for a very long time. Last Saturday's edition of the Washington Post quotes GEN Jim Jones, the U.S. European commander and NATO supreme allied commander, as saying U.S. soldiers may pull out of Bosnia in 2004--may. That is 8 years after they went in and were also going to stay for just 1 year. I argue that Iraq is likely a more difficult undertaking than Bosnia. Also, the only reason the U.S. is able to leave Bosnia is because troops from other nations are remaining, a luxury we unfortunately do not have in Iraq today. Once again, the United States Army Center of Military History has noted: Occupations have required not only manpower but also time to achieve success. In the Philippines, for example, the officers and NCOs of the Philippine constabulary were virtually all continental Americans in 1902. Yet, by 1935, 30 years later, everyone was a Filipino. The Philippines was a challenging proposition with respect to both manpower and time, and it took a generation to achieve a satisfactory outcome. Germany and Japan transitioned from being occupied to being allies in about a decade. So looking at history, challenging countries take at least a generation to stabilize, less demanding countries perhaps a decade. We are in Iraq for at least 10 years, and we have to have a force structure that will support that deployment. The Army must grow so they can rotate troops and avoid sending the units again and again to Iraq and Afghanistan. The second reason the administration is reluctant to increase end strength is that as the New York Times noted in July, . . . the concept on increasing troop numbers and its costs contradicts a basic tenet of Secretary Rumsfeld's goal for military transformation, which is to rely on new technology and rewrite doctrine to allow smaller forces to attack with greater speed and deadliness. I argue that Secretary Rumsfeld was able to test his theories of transformation during the period of conventional war in Iraq, and they were a success. But he risks losing that victory by refusing to see a war of this sort also requires nation building, and nation building requires many more boots on the ground to ensure security and stability. Retired LTG Walter Ulmer--and General Ulmer was one of the key leaders in the Army who analyzed and predicted the hollow Army of the 1970s--stated recently: One of the lessons we learned in the past, and we're relearning in dramatic fashion in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that the U.S. military may be able to fight a war with slim forces, but it takes a lot more troops to secure an unruly nation with many diverse interest groups and antagonists. Ulmer argues the Army is short 40,000 to 50,000 troops. He said: The Army is a very elastic institution with a can-do culture, and that's a wonderful attribute, but it is not infinitely elastic and its can-do ethos makes it possible for the Army to practically respond itself to death. Another senior Army official stated: Essentially, we fought a just-in-time war. A unit would arrive, get a bullet, the enemy would pop his head up and we'd fire the bullet. That puts a lot of stress on a commander who is simultaneously trying to execute the forward battle, carefully balance his resources, pull a company from here to plug a gap over there, all the while looking back over his shoulder at very exposed logistical lines. He asked: Why fight a war like that when we could have deployed overwhelming combat forces in a way that would reduce risks and possibly protect lives? We've also seen in Iraq that while lean forces can be successful in combat by focusing on an enemy's finite centers of gravity, in [postwar] stability operations, there are no decisive centers of gravity. You have to spread your forces throughout each city, and that takes more of them. If we accept the need to increase the size of the Active Duty Army, we need to then focus on what types of forces would be most beneficial. The U.S. Army is the best in the world when it comes to skills and equipment needed to win on the battlefield, but the conventional battle in Iraq is over. Now I argue we need an occupation force, those who must remain to accomplish the U.S. objective once the conventional battle is finished. These forces must have different skills because they have different missions: defending against an insurgency, enforcing law and order, providing humanitarian relief, and reconstruction of infrastructure. They need the skills required for nation building. So my amendment directs that the Army should seek 10,000 soldiers who have the skills that are the highest demand in Iraq: military police, special forces, civil affairs officers, and light infantry. These forces travel lighter, so they are less expensive to transport and maintain. These forces will provide maximum effectiveness at minimal cost. In January, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, released a report called ``A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy For Post-Conflict Iraq.'' The first recommendation in the report is to: . . . create a transitional security force that is effectively prepared, mandated and able to handle post- conflict security needs. The report states that: The United States must immediately identify and train a core force of U.S. military troops to perform constabulary duties in Iraq. Working with its coalition partners, the U.S. must also identify and ready other constabulary forces--such as the Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie--to assure their timely arrival in theater. We have yet to see the arrival of the French Gendarmerie and the Italian Carabinieri. There are Italian forces that are assisting there, but the French have not yet arrived. But the need the CSIS identified before the war ever began is clearly there, and the U.S. Army is struggling to meet it. Presently, the Active-Duty Army has 19,432 authorized positions for military policemen and there are currently 22,476 MPs serving, well over authorized capacity. There are 22,608 Reserve slots for military police and they are presently at 95 percent capacity. Clearly, there is a need for more military police. This amendment assures we start meeting this need. In addition, my amendment gives the Army the flexibility to either move Reserve slots to active duty or recruit new soldiers. I should make it clear that the positions move, not necessarily the people. No reservist can be forced to become an active-duty soldier. Most of the Army's military police are in Reserve units--12,800 are in the Active Force while 22,800 are in the Reserves. Most Civil Affairs Units, those soldiers who provide a link between the military and civilian population in an area of operations, are also in Reserves. Clearly, there needs to be a redistribution, given the demands on today's Army. In addition, if the Army has the flexibility to move reservists and guardsmen into the Active Force, these soldiers will be ready for deployment much more quickly than new recruits. The informal CBO cost of 10,000 additional soldiers is $409 million. That number includes military personnel and operational and maintenance costs of 10,000 additional troops for fiscal year 2004. I believe this is the most worthwhile expenditure. This amendment offsets this cost with funding from the Iraqi Freedom Fund. As we all know, the Iraq Freedom Fund was established in the fiscal year 2003 supplemental we passed in March. At that time, $15 billion was set aside for Secretary Rumsfeld to use on emergency expenses for military personnel, operation and maintenance, procurement, or humanitarian assistance. Most of that funding has been expended. Therefore, an additional $1.9 billion for the Iraqi Freedom Fund is included in this supplemental for exigencies. I believe the exigency is here and we should pay for these troops now. Many would argue that while the costs are $409 million the first year, these troops will have to continue to be maintained in future years, and the actual cradle-to-grave costs are much higher. I would counter that this cost is minimal compared to what it will take if, in just a short time--2 or 3 years--the U.S. Army does not have the fighting force it needs to perform its mission because we squandered its strength. Let me show another chart, which again contrasts the Army in August of 2000, when some were criticizing it as being unprepared, and the Army in August of 2003. There were 144,000 soldiers deployed in 2000; in 2003, about 370,000--over 370,000; 7 brigades in 2000, 30 brigades in 2003. No National Guard divisions deployed; 3 years later, 2 National Guard divisions deployed. In 2000, fewer than 25,000 National Guard and Reserve troops on active duty; today, 126,498 troops. This has an impact. These are the scenarios that are used as a template to plan our military forces, the ``two major theater wars'' scenario: MTW east, Iraq; MTW west, hypothetically Korea. This is the required order of battle that has been devised after careful study: six divisions here and four divisions for MTW west. The units available in August of 2000, again at a time when our Army was being criticized as not being up to the task of defending the Nation--six divisions and one armored cavalry regiment ready, four divisions at MTW west and one armored cavalry division. Today, only four divisions here for the east scenario and only three divisions here. There is an impact in terms of our capability to do what we planned for decades to do. We have to ensure that our Army is ready for any mission, and we have to ensure it today. In his farewell speech, when he was retiring as Army Chief of Staff, GEN Eric Shinseki said: We must ensure the Army has the capabilities to match the strategic environment in which we operate, a force sized correctly to meet the strategy set forth in the documents that guide us. . . . beware the 12-division strategy for a 10-division Army. We are rapidly approaching a 12-division strategy with a 10-division Army. Our Army is fighting on many fronts for us right now. They are doing a magnificent job, as well as the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard--all of our Defense Department personnel and related personnel. We are extraordinarily proud of them. But they are overtaxed, particularly so in the Army because of the nature of the Army. It is not only the combat arm of decision but also is the combat arm of duration. It is the Army that typically is charged with the aftermath of the battle as well as the battle. We have to help them. My amendment will provide a modicum of relief. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment. As a final point, ultimately we all respond, not just to our colleagues, not just to institutional pressures, but to our constituents. I would find it very difficult, this month or 6 months from now, to go back and to meet my neighbors, who are in the National Guard and the Reserve, and explain to them that we could not increase the size of our Army, that they are being deployed once again, after repeated deployments, because we couldn't find the way or the will to increase the size of our Army. I think we should. I think we must. And I hope we do. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Levin be added as a cosponsor of this amendment.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Kennedy be added as a cosponsor.

Mr. REED. I will go last.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 1812 and send a modification to the desk.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment to ensure that our troops in Iraq and other dangerous areas throughout the world, many of whom are Reservists and members of the National Guard, have the equipment they need to protect themselves. In particular, I would like to discuss the uparmored Humvees which soldiers need to protect themselves from the threat of RPGs and mines and weapons that are inflicting casualties today as we speak in Iraq. To effectively carry out the mission, Army officials have said that they need more Humvees, uparmored Humvees. I believe them. The administration in this bill failed to fully meet that request. My amendment is designed to meet the needs of the Army today as they face these numerous threats around the globe. The amendment is cosponsored by Senators Bayh and Kennedy. It would add funding to this supplemental request to buy additional uparmored Humvees and would also direct the Army to reevaluate its requirements for the armored security vehicle. The HMMWV, or high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle, better known as the Humvee, is the workhorse of the United States. It is being used around the globe today in conflicts from Afghanistan to Iraq to the Balkans. The uparmored Humvee is a variation of the basic vehicle. It was designed to offer increased protection to troops from small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and blasts from mines. It was designed primarily for military police and special operations personnel, exactly the type of soldiers being called upon to do very dangerous missions in Iraq today. The armored security vehicle, or the ASV, is also a vehicle in the Army inventory. It is designed to complement the uparmored Humvee. There are very few of them, but it is a requirement that I believe the Army should study again. In July, I visited Iraq and had the opportunity to meet with my constituents from the Rhode Island National Guard, the 115th Military Police Company, and 119th Military Police Company, the 118th Military Police Battalion. It was on the tarmac at Baghdad International Airport. I got off the aircraft with my colleagues. I rushed over to the formation of these military police men and women. I began to speak with them. The first request that I got was repeated several times over: We need uparmored Humvees. We are in a dangerous situation. We are patrolling the roads of Iraq. We see other units with these vehicles. We need them. When I came back to the United States, I was convinced that we needed more uparmored Humvees. In the intervening weeks, the Rhode Island National Guard, 115th Military Police Company, has lost three soldiers. Two were killed when an improvised explosive device, a 155-millimeter shell, exploded underneath their regular Humvee. No one can determine whether or not an uparmored Humvee would have saved the lives of these two soldiers, Staff Sergeant Joseph Camara and Sergeant Charles Caldwell. I know having such a vehicle would add to the confidence and security of the troops. A few days ago Specialist Michael Andrade of the 115th Military Police was killed, again in a Humvee in an accident involving a convoy operation in which a tanker truck crashed into his vehicle. Last Monday evening I was there in Rhode Island when they brought Specialist Andrade's body home to his family. This Saturday he will be buried in Rhode Island. I know you can't determine whether or not this type of vehicle would have saved this young soldier's life. But I can tell you, if they had a choice, all of our military police, all of our soldiers in Iraq would prefer to be in an uparmored Humvee than a Humvee without the armor, and their families would make that choice, also. It is clear that we need more. This bill contains more vehicles. I commend the President for that proposal. I believe we need more than even what is included in this bill. When I returned from Iraq, I wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld. I also called the Army. At that time I was verbally told by the Army that the requirement for additional Humvees was about 500. But then as the summer wore on, several things became apparent. This insurgency was extremely serious and extremely lethal. Also that the requirement for uparmored Humvees was going up. Indeed, I believe--I have said this before--that we could be involved and will likely be involved in Iraq for years, not months, stretching perhaps to 10 years. These are the types of vehicles that are crucial to effective operation in an occupation force as we have in Iraq. Now, my initial response from the Army was that they need 500 more. By September 8, the Army sent a formal response indicating that the requirement now is 1,723 uparmored Humvees and 1,461 will be sent immediately to the theater. I commend the Army because they have tried their best to move as many available vehicles into the theater of Iraq as possible. Now, 619 vehicles were coming off the assembly line and being sent directly to Iraq; 430 were being pulled from units in the United States and Europe; another 412 were pulled out of the Balkans. So we are trying to meet the need in Iraq, but we are doing it by taking these vehicles from other potentially dangerous areas, such as the Balkans. Also, vehicles were taken from the units in the United States--we hope they are training on these vehicles in preparation to go overseas. I believe indeed that this requirement will increase, and in fact what we have seen throughout the course of the last several months is the Army and the Department of Defense seriously reevaluating the need for uparmored Humvees. They have concluded that these uparmored Humvees are indeed necessary. We have received information that the Army in fact has a requirement in excess of 3,400 vehicles. Again, just a few weeks ago, the requirement was 1,700; now the requirement is 3,400 vehicles. They say the best way to accommodate future funding for increased production would be to use the Iraqi Freedom Fund. I propose to do that. In fact, OSD has concurred with this approach. The Secretary of Defense has concurred. What we are waiting on is a validation of how many of these vehicles can be produced at the assembly point. So my amendment is straightforward. It requests additional money in the amount of approximately $191 million from the Iraqi Freedom Fund to buy 800 additional vehicles, or so many as may be acquired with that money. In fact, I hope we can, in the next year, buy even more. The analysis by myself and my staff suggests this money would be sufficient to fully operate the production line and get all the vehicles possible that we need. The Iraqi Freedom Fund in this bill contains $1.9 billion, so there are sufficient resources. I believe we should do this and we should do it promptly. The indication from the Army is that they need the vehicles, and also if we act in this appropriations bill, we can speed those vehicles to Iraq. As I said earlier, there is another aspect of this, and that is the armored security vehicle. We are asking the Army to look back at this requirement and reevaluate it. I will conclude by taking the advice of Secretary Rumsfeld that it is not necessary to listen to the media but listen to the soldiers. I have a letter from a young lieutenant in Afghanistan. Here is what he writes: I am the leader of one platoon of many here trained Stateside for dismounted missions and handed uparmored Humvees upon arrival at our firebases. My strong NCO's have adapted and worked hard to train on this different platform. I feel it is criminal, however, to have sent so many units here without Stateside training on either the . . . uparmored Humvee or its complementary weapon, the MK-19 auto grenade launcher and M2 .50 caliber machine gun. He goes on to say: Our mechanics, for example, have no experience with the uparmored Humvees and are too few to fix vehicles which have been driven hard for at least 18 months on the awful ``roads'' here. Without vehicles, we have no mobility. Without mobility, we cannot either protect the reconstruction teams or interdict terrorists/criminals intent on rocketing our bases and mining the roads. That is the viewpoint of one of these magnificent young soldiers in Afghanistan working with the vehicles. He appreciates the value of the vehicles. I think every soldier, every squad that has missions like this, whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, should have these vehicles, and that is the intent of this amendment. Further, I will add that one of the suggestions to me in his letter is: Purchase new uparmored Humvees for Afghanistan to replace the ones about to die or send qualified mechanics with the requisite parts to fix them. That could be written by any soldier in Afghanistan or Iraq, and indeed there are many in Iraq, particularly, that do not even have access to uparmored Humvees. I will conclude by thanking the chairman and the staff for their assistance on this amendment. I also thank the chairman sincerely not only for this effort but for almost $900 million of additional funding for the Army, for vests, for a host of equipment. I also understand from our discussion that he feels as strongly as I do about this issue and will do his best in conference to ensure these additional Humvees are provided. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, the Biden amendment is very straightforward. It says we will pay for the $87 billion by repealing the tax advantages for those who have the upper 1 percent in income in the United States. In my view, this is not an issue of taxes or payments; this is a simple issue of responsibility. It is irresponsible for us to borrow money from Social Security, borrow money from Medicare, borrow money from education spending, borrow money from the Veterans' Administration to give to the Iraqi people. We can, in fact, pay for it. We can pay for it by supporting the Biden amendment. My colleague from Maryland spoke about the sacrifice of these soldiers, sailors, airmen, airwomen, and marines who are over in Iraq. Just ask yourself: What happens 5 years from now when those young Americans go to the Veterans' Administration and they are told they cannot be accommodated because we do not have enough money, that we borrowed so much money that our economy is in disarray, and that our programs that support American people have been devastated? We have a situation in which our deficits are growing out of proportion, the national debt is rising. In January of 2001, the CBO estimated that the national debt in 2008 would be $36 billion. In fact, the President at that time was talking about paying off all of our debt, and now, in August of 2003, CBO projects a debt of $6.2 trillion in 2008. Deficits are expanding dramatically. Again and again they go up and up and up. Now we are talking about a $535 billion deficit. This has an effect. It is not free money. The effect is in many dimensions. One dimension is that ultimately it will drive up interest rates. That is not my view. That is the view of Alan Greenspan, in his words: There is no question that as deficits go up, contrary to what some have said, it does affect long-term interest rates. It does have a negative impact on the economy, unless attended. This is one way we can attend to the deficit. Or the words of the CBO Director: To the extent that going forward we run large sustained deficits in the face of full employment, it will in fact crowd out capital accumulation and otherwise slow economic growth. We are today, by spending and not raising the revenues to support that spending, contributing to this out-of-control deficit spiral that will affect our economy. There is another consequence that goes to responsibility. How can we be a world leader, how can we sustain our efforts in Iraq, in Afghanistan, across the globe, if our economy becomes unraveled, as it is becoming? Of course, there is an immediate issue. We are losing employment left and right, particularly manufacturing employment. How do we sustain manufacturing in the United States? What happens when their interest rates go up, when they have to pay more money to borrow? That is another invitation to take their work and send it overseas. What happens when their health care costs go up? And they will, unless we do more to support the Medicare system, the Medicaid system, and general health insurance throughout the United States, another pressure. This is all irresponsible. We have huge problems. We have much to do to deal with those problems. But we can begin today and simply say, rather than giving the Iraqi people $87 billion from Social Security, from health care, from education, we can ask the top 1 percent of Americans, who have done extraordinarily well, to forgo a tax break so that we can pay for this. It is responsible. This vote today is not about taxes. It is not about our approach to Iraq. It is not about supporting the troops. It is about whether we will be responsible today and in the future. I urge that we go forth and be responsible. My colleague from Maryland also pointed out the sacrifice. We all know our forces are doing a magnificent job. They are truly sacrificing, and we are going to support them. But their sacrifice must be met not only with our sacrifice but with some wisdom, the ability to look ahead, the ability to see what is coming. What is coming is an economic deterioration of this country unless we can get our hands on this deficit. This is the first step. It is a modest step, but it is a first step. What better rationale, to ask the people of America to contribute their hard-earned dollars and support our troops, support our foreign policy, support an effort to root out dangers to this country? In fact, in times of war, the American people have always responded, and other Congresses and other administrations have responded when we have asked them for increased sacrifices and increased taxes. None of the Biden proposal will affect the middle class, the working class. It is responsible. To vote against this amendment would be irresponsible. I urge its passage.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. I will make a statement and also concur with the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. REED. I will use about 20 minutes.

Mr. REED. I rise to indicate my support for the approach adopted by the Senator from West Virginia. It is clear to everyone in this chamber and to the American public that we will fund our forces in the field. In fact, I am prepared in the next day or so to bring forth amendments to increase the resources going to our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is absolutely essential. It is also essential we are given the time and the opportunity to look carefully at the reconstruction funds. The Senator from West Virginia has an amendment that allows that. I concur with his amendment. I will take a broader view at this time of the process before the Senate. As we debate the administration's request for a supplemental appropriation of $87 billion for operations in Iraq, a salient fact emerges. We are committing ourselves to a long-term, expensive involvement in Iraq. We should realistically assume that significant military forces will be committed to Iraq for at least 10 years. The cost of maintaining the forces will not become negligible. Indeed, they are likely to spike even higher at times based on the level of violence and instability. This reality should also shape our views on force structure. The nature of this insurgency places significant demands on the Army. Without the contribution of additional international forces, the strain on our military forces, but particularly the Army, will be serious. These strains will be reflected in unsustainable operations tempo and heightened demands for military police rather than conventional combat forces. Ultimately, these stresses could seriously erode recruitment and retention. The administration is increasingly aware of these problems. Last week, Secretary Rumsfeld indicated the Pentagon was preparing for the callup of a large number of Army Reserves and National Guard. This is only a short-term solution at best. Today, the Rhode Island National Guard is in the thick of a fight in the Sunni triangle. The 115th military police company, the 119th military police company, and the 118th police battalion have performed with distinction and sadly have already sustained three soldiers killed in action along with several wounded in action. These are proud and patriotic soldiers who will continue to do their duty. However, in the face of the probability of repeated callups over the next several years, I am concerned many of these soldiers will leave the Guard rather than face the prospects of repeatedly leaving their families. Given the escalating costs in both lives and national resources, it is incumbent upon us to ask whether we have blundered into a strategic mistake of the first magnitude. The first principle of war is: ``Objective.'' In the words of the Army field manual: direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The evolving rationale for a preemptive attack began with the assertion that the Saddam Hussein regime had weapons of mass destruction of immediate concern to the United States. In addition, the administration consistently implied and, at times, overtly asserted that there was a ``terrorist link'' with Iraq. The larger implication was this ``terrorist link'' was tied directly to al- Qaida. Both of these assertions have been proven to be exaggerated. Now the administration claims we must stay and rebuild Iraq because to withdraw would be a grievous blow to our power and prestige. This point has merit. But the kaleidoscope of rationales for our operations are anything but ``clearly defined.'' Secondly, our actions should be focused on a decisive outcome. The greatest danger facing the United States is another terrorist attack on our homeland with weapons of mass destruction. One must ask whether our actions in Iraq are decisive in blunting this threat. Contrary to the President's assertion, Iraq is not the center of the war on terrorism. Indeed, one of the vexing aspects of the war on terror is the lack of a clearly defined center. The al-Qaida threat is international. But, if one were to look for a more lucrative place to strike at al-Qaida, it would be the Afghan-Pakistan border where bin Laden dwells, not Iraq under Saddam Hussein. When Secretary Wolfowitz testified before the Armed Services Committee, he displayed for the cameras entry documents for jihadists killed in Iraq. He was, once again, trying to make the terrorist connection. However, all of these documents showed that the individuals entered Iraq after March 19, the date hostilities commenced. Now a new rationale may be emerging from the administration: Our operations in Iraq are a giant trap to lure in Islamic terrorists so that they can be destroyed. But this logic misses the point. The jihadists racing to engage us in Iraq are not necessarily the same people who are plotting to strike us here at home. In fact, our actions may have fermented new legions of jihadists with ready access to Iraq. I posed the following question to General Abizaid when he appeared before the Armed Services Committee last week: If there is another terrorist attack against the United States, is it more likely to emanate from Baghdad or from the Afghan-Pakistan border? His answer is instructive: Senator, if there is another attack on the United States, it would be organized, planned, and executed through a worldwide network of connections that are borderless. It would be difficult to say where its geographic center would be. There are certainly places on the Afghan/Pakistan border that are semi-havens for terrorists, in the Waziristan area, that the Pakistanis are working to clean up. There are other ungoverned spaces where this is also possible. It is possible that a terrorist group working in Baghdad, or New York for that matter, could organize the attack, so there is no geographic center that I would point to other than to say we've got a lot of cells in a lot of locations that require careful, difficult work to uncover and destroy. We are in the midst of a global war, but we are disproportionately concentrating our effort in Iraq. Now, I do understand there are significant resources here for Afghanistan, and that is appropriate, because Afghanistan today is in a very precarious position. But a disproportionate concentration of resources are being directed in Iraq when the real existential threat to the United States--a threat that could mean a catastrophic attack upon the United States--is worldwide, diffuse, and disbursed. And one has to question that logic. While we focus on Iraq, both the North Koreans and the Iranians are marching toward nuclear futures. If these nations obtain nuclear weapons, then the barriers against proliferation will slip even further. Once again, if the greatest threat facing us is nuclear armed terrorists, is our strategic fixation with Iraq justified? A third aspect of proper military objective is that the outcome must be ascertainable. The administration's stated goal today is to transform Iraq into a market economy and constitutional democracy. Some doubt whether this goal can ever be achieved. It certainly cannot be achieved quickly and at low cost. The administration has placed us in a predicament where we cannot afford to lose, but winning may have a negligible effect on the existential threat to the Nation, an event with a catastrophic impact on the United States. This could be a textbook definition of poor strategy. Now the administration comes before us promoting this appropriations bill as a Marshall plan for Iraq. Many of my colleagues have pointed out that this is revisionist history, a term that is frequently used in Washington today. The Marshall plan was not whisked through Congress in a few weeks. It was subject to what the Congressional Research Service described as ``perhaps the most thorough examination prior to launching of any program.'' The CRS added that President Truman ``closely consulted with Congress.'' The authorization was for 1 year, allowing the Congress, again, as described by CRS: ample opportunity to oversee the Plan's implementation and consider additional funding. Three more times during the life of the Plan, Congress would be required to authorize and appropriate funds. In each year, Congress held hearings, debated, and further amended the legislation. I think this comment is in the spirit of the Byrd amendment because the Byrd amendment will allow us at least a small opportunity for that implementation, that oversight, that review that was so present in the Marshall plan. The Marshall plan differed in significant details from the proposal we have before us. The Marshall plan required a dollar-per-dollar match by the recipient. It was not an unconditional grant from the Treasury of the United States. About 10 percent of the aid was in the form of loans that required repayment. The Marshall plan was based on transparency, not secret contracts to companies favored by the administration. But it is not just revisionist history; it is highly selective history. If a Marshall plan is the proper economic tonic for Iraq, why aren't our occupation policies after World War II the right security policy? Former Ambassador James Dobbins and his associates at Rand conducted a careful review of nation-building efforts since World War II. Ambassador Dobbins was President Bush's special envoy to Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taliban. Prior to that service, he oversaw postwar efforts in Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia. This report points out: On V-E day, General Dwight D. Eisenhower had 61 U.S. divisions (1,622,000 men) in Germany out of a total of 3,077,000 men in Europe. These soldiers became the occupation force for the U.S. sector. They manned border crossings, maintained checkpoints at road junctions, and conducted patrols throughout the sector. The occupation was comprehensive and demonstrated the scope of the German defeat. Our occupation in Iraq is anything but comprehensive and has yet to demonstrate to significant sectors in Iraq the scope of the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime. Pressures in 1945 to shift forces to the Pacific theater and to ``bring the boys home'' led to a reduction of our forces in Germany. Nevertheless, we maintained a robust military presence in Germany compared to our current deployment in Iraq. This chart is illustrative of the comparison of what our forces would look like if we adopted the same policies in terms of troops to population that we did in 1945. This chart projects the experience in several different nation- building scenarios on the present situation in Iraq. In other words, it takes the ratio of the troops we used then versus population to the current population of Iraq. And it is instructive. The first blue bar shows the kind of forces we would have if we were adopting anything close to the German approach after World War II. It is literally off the charts. This shown here is the 600,000 troop level. Our troop level is here--this red line--about 142,000 troops. The next column, in the red, is Japan. It is slightly less than the present troop level in Iraq, but there was a unique feature in Japan. Rather than changing the regime in Japan, as we have in Iraq, we basically co-opted the regime, keeping Hirohito in power, and his presence was a decisive factor in limiting the troops we needed. The next column is the Somalia level. Again, this is a situation in which many would argue insufficient troops caused a tactical defeat on the ground and a strategic retreat which was embarrassing for the United States. It is certainly not the model for peacekeeping. The next column is Haiti, a situation in which our entry into the country was unopposed. There was very little violence. It was a small country, even though it had a significant population for its size. We turned over our efforts to the United Nations within 2 years. Instructive are the next two columns: Bosnia and Kosovo. In these two countries, under the Clinton administration, we went in with robust forces. As a result, there was none of the violence that we anticipated. We have actually made progress, limited I would add, to ensure that there is at least a growing economy and a growing civic culture in these countries--a remarkable difference between the force levels relative to those we have in Iraq. The final column is Afghanistan, another situation in which the administration has deliberately kept our forces low. Again, we are reaping some of those costs today as we see heightened terror, a rebounding Taliban, the largest increase in production of opium and heroin in the world, at least getting to those proportions, and that is another example. We can see throughout the course of the next 3 years projected forward where these troops sizes are significant. It raises the question: If the economic policy is the right policy, if this is a Marshall plan, where is the Marshall-like support in terms of troops on the ground? The administration repeatedly makes the point that stability and reconstruction go hand in hand. They have seized on the Marshall plan to justify this request for billions of dollars but ignore the reality that stability is hard to come by with insufficient forces. For example, the New York Times reported just yesterday ``that as much as 650,000 tons of ammunition remains at thousands of sites used by the former Iraqi security forces and that much of it has not been secured and will take years to destroy. Meanwhile, insurgents are obtaining huge amounts of weapons and explosives to attack our troops each day. While we wait for international forces or Iraqi security forces, these attacks go on. Indeed, in the same article, General Abizaid sounded a cautionary note about reliance on Iraqi security. He said: There's probably places where we have put Iraqi guards that may be vulnerable to people that would come in and bribe the guards. There are respected voices that say we do not need more American troops. They say we need better intelligence and international reinforcements to change the appearance of the occupation. But while we wait for our intelligence apparatus to mature and for the arrival of international reinforcements, who will secure the ammunition dumps and the pipelines? Efforts to train Iraqis are underway, but the availability and reliability of these troops is today uncertain. The administration is quick to brandish the Marshall plan to justify this appropriation. But it is not a Marshall Plan, it is a belated attempt to provide resources for a thinly stretched occupation force while throwing huge amounts of money at reconstruction with the hope that some of it will stick. And this appropriation is the second payment. Congress has already appropriated $74.8 billion in emergency funds for Iraq this year. The demands in Iraq will be significant and persistent. There are more payments to come. The real question before us is not whether this legislation will pass. The real question is whether the United States can sustain this effort in Iraq over many years. The United States must set a defined, decisive, and obtainable objective in Iraq. Then we must sustain the effort to achieve that objective. To sustain such an objective and such an effort, we must move more aggressively and quickly to secure international support, both military and financial support. This means giving the United Nations a meaningful role in Iraq without ceding our leadership. Without such a development, our attempt to obtain significant military and financial assistance from the world community will be futile. To sustain such an effort, we must expand our military forces, particularly our Army, so that we can guarantee a predictable rotation of our troops into and out of Iraq and so that we can lessen our reliance on Reserve and National Guard troops. The strain on our ground forces is severe. And because of our reliance on Reserve and National Guard, this strain is transmitted to every town in America. The support of the American people will be continually tested as they see their neighbors serve and sacrifice without relief and with uncertain results. To sustain such an effort, we must pay for it. It is simply irresponsible to run huge deficits to pay for the operation in Iraq. The cost to our economy in the inevitable rise of interest rates and the dampening of growth and the cost to our society in the deterioration of social investment will not go unnoticed and will be particularly resented if scarce American resources are strengthening the Iraqi economy and improving the quality of life of the Iraqi people. If we fail in these tasks, money alone, the money in this bill, will not allow us to stay the course. Finally, we must place the objective and effort in Iraq in context. We must recognize that the existential threats to America are not in Iraq. They are worldwide. Al-Qaida has global reach, and we have not yet finished hunting down and destroying their operatives. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a worldwide problem with both Iran and North Korea on the precipice. We have yet to develop an effective strategy to counter their nuclear ambitions. The protection of our homeland is an ongoing challenge. The title of a recent report of the Council on Foreign Relations actively conveyed these challenges: ``Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared.'' The bill for these dangers still must be paid regardless of what we do with this legislation. We must be mindful of this as we go forward, and we must be honest and candid with the American people. To sustain this effort, we must follow through on the tasks I have suggested. This bill is just part of that effort. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I was unable to participate in last evening's vote on the nomination of Carlos Bea to be a U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit due to my participation in a memorial service for Rhode Island National Guardsmen killed while serving in Iraq.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Rhode Island Fishermen's Fairness Act of 2003. This legislation would address a serious flaw in our Nation's regional fisheries management system by adding Rhode Island to the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (MAFMC), which currently consists of representatives from New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. The MAFMC manages the following 13 species, all of which are landed in Rhode Island: Illex squid, loligo squid, Atlantic mackerel, black sea bass, bluefish, butterfish, monkfish, scup, spiny dogfish, summer flounder, surfclam, ocean quahog, and tilefish. In 2001, the most recent year for which final data are available, Rhode Island fishermen brought in over 21 percent of MAFMC landings by weight--more than any of the MAFMC member States except New Jersey, which is responsible for about 56 percent of total MAFMC landings. In fact, with the exception of New Jersey, Rhode Island's total 2001 MAFMC landings, 44.1 million pounds, nearly equaled those of all other MAFMC member States combined, 45.9 million pounds. If Rhode Island fishermen are responsible for a large percentage of overall MAFMC landings, these species make up an even larger proportion of landings within Rhode Island every year. Between 1995 and 2002, MAFMC species represented between 29 percent and 58 percent of all finfish landed in Rhode Island annually, for an average of 43 percent of total landings by weight. In eight of the years between 1990 and 2002, squid, Illex and loligo, was the number one finfish landed in Rhode Island, with a value of between $13 million and $20 million annually. Yet Rhode Island has no voice in the management of these species. Following council tradition and Federal fisheries law, the Rhode Island Fishermen's Fairness Act would create two seats on the MAFMC for Rhode Island: one seat nominated by the Governor of Rhode Island and appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, and a second seat filled by Rhode Island's principal State official with marine fishery management responsibility. The MAFMC would increase in size from 21 voting members to 23. There is a precedent for this proposed legislation. In 1996, North Carolina's representatives in Congress succeeded in adding that State to the MAFMC through an amendment to the Sustainable Fisheries Act. Like Rhode Island, a significant proportion of North Carolina's landed fish species were managed by the MAFMC, yet the State had no vote on the council. Today, Rhode Island's share of total landings for species managed by the MAFMC is more than six times greater than that of North Carolina. I look forward to working with my colleagues to restore a measure of equity to the fisheries management process by passing the Rhode Island Fishermen's Fairness Act. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Rhode Island Fishermen's Fairness Act of 2003. This legislation would address a serious flaw in our Nation's regional fisheries management system by adding Rhode Island to the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (MAFMC), which currently consists of representatives from New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. The MAFMC manages the following 13 species, all of which are landed in Rhode Island: Illex squid, loligo squid, Atlantic mackerel, black sea bass, bluefish, butterfish, monkfish, scup, spiny dogfish, summer flounder, surfclam, ocean quahog, and tilefish. In 2001, the most recent year for which final data are available, Rhode Island fishermen brought in over 21 percent of MAFMC landings by weight--more than any of the MAFMC member States except New Jersey, which is responsible for about 56 percent of total MAFMC landings. In fact, with the exception of New Jersey, Rhode Island's total 2001 MAFMC landings, 44.1 million pounds, nearly equaled those of all other MAFMC member States combined, 45.9 million pounds. If Rhode Island fishermen are responsible for a large percentage of overall MAFMC landings, these species make up an even larger proportion of landings within Rhode Island every year. Between 1995 and 2002, MAFMC species represented between 29 percent and 58 percent of all finfish landed in Rhode Island annually, for an average of 43 percent of total landings by weight. In eight of the years between 1990 and 2002, squid, Illex and loligo, was the number one finfish landed in Rhode Island, with a value of between $13 million and $20 million annually. Yet Rhode Island has no voice in the management of these species. Following council tradition and Federal fisheries law, the Rhode Island Fishermen's Fairness Act would create two seats on the MAFMC for Rhode Island: one seat nominated by the Governor of Rhode Island and appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, and a second seat filled by Rhode Island's principal State official with marine fishery management responsibility. The MAFMC would increase in size from 21 voting members to 23. There is a precedent for this proposed legislation. In 1996, North Carolina's representatives in Congress succeeded in adding that State to the MAFMC through an amendment to the Sustainable Fisheries Act. Like Rhode Island, a significant proportion of North Carolina's landed fish species were managed by the MAFMC, yet the State had no vote on the council. Today, Rhode Island's share of total landings for species managed by the MAFMC is more than six times greater than that of North Carolina. I look forward to working with my colleagues to restore a measure of equity to the fisheries management process by passing the Rhode Island Fishermen's Fairness Act. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record.