Jack Reed

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield the ranking member, the Senator from Michigan, 2 minutes.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Warner amendment and support of the underlying amendment which I proposed. I will make several points. First, the notion of low-yield nuclear weapons is something of a misnomer. Indeed, it is misleading. These are nuclear weapons with horrific blasts and radiation effects. As I said yesterday, it is probably more accurate to say not low yield but small Apocalypses because, when we use nuclear weapons, we go beyond--except for one occasion in the history of warfare--what most military people contemplate as the appropriate use of force. There is no military requirement for these weapons. Ambassador Brooks, the head of NNSA was asked, Is there a requirement? His answer succinctly and conclusively: No. Yet we are eliminating the ban on the research, development, production, and testing of these low-yield nuclear weapons. Once again, low yield is a misnomer. These weapons are 5 kilotons or less. The weapons used against Japan in World War II were 14 to 21 kilotons with devastating effects. These small weapons are a third that size--still horrendous weapons. Now, unless we act today, this approach will not simply result in research. It will result inevitably, inexorably, in the development and the testing and the fielding of these weapons. That is essentially what was said by Ambassador Brooks when he testified before the committee. His words: I have a bias in favor of something that is the minimum destruction. That means I have a bias in favor of that which might be usable. This is not just research. This is creating weapons that will be used. His comments were echoed with respect particularly to the robust nuclear earth penetrator when Fred Celec, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, is quoted: If we can develop a system that can crack through the rock and detonate a hydrogen weapon, in his words, it will ultimately get fielded. To field an atomic weapon it first must be tested. And we are walking down a path of testing and fielding that I think we will all regret. There is a presumption that arms control does not matter, it does not work. Why did three nations--Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--turn over voluntarily their nuclear weapon and join the nonproliferation regime? Why? Because there is an international norm that nuclear weapons should not be used. In fact, there should be efforts to eliminate their existence. These efforts and these norms are being undermined by the abolition of this ban. This ban is more powerful than simply saying that the Congress will approve it. Why believe a scientist will say: I won't work on research unless I can produce and blow something up, an atomic weapon. If those are the scientists we have working, then perhaps we should look around for some other scientists. They, more than many other people, understand the power and the devastating effect of these weapons. If we are really talking about research, let's make it research, not the back door to testing, development, and deployment. My amendment makes it much clearer that is what we are talking about. Indeed, my colleagues came to the floor yesterday and said this has nothing to do with deployment; it is all just science; we have to raise these issues; we have to ask these questions; intellectual curiosity and honesty must be respected in this realm as elsewhere. Indeed, yesterday, Secretary Rumsfeld was asked: Are you pursuing nuclear weapons? His response: To pursue? I think it is a study. It is not to develop--his words--it is not to deploy, it is not to use, it is to study. That is what the Reed amendment says. Essentially it says we will allow the scientists who operate in phase 1 through 2A of our well- defined process--research, development--but at the third phrase, that is where they stop. And similarly, if they are modifying a weapon rather than developing one from scratch, you would stop at phase 6.3. It is clearly defined. The Warner amendment suggests we eliminate all of these prohibitions and we simply say: If you are going over here, come back to us and ask for permission. Functionally, in both amendments the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense would have to come to us. But there is a much more powerful, much more forceful, much more effective symbol if this moratorium is retained. A few weeks ago, the Government of Pakistan offered to go nuclear free. They said: We would like to eliminate nuclear weapons on the subcontinent. The Indians would have to agree. That is a very interesting and very positive approach. The problem is, how do we reinforce that effort when we are not talking about going nuclear free? We are talking about new nuclear weapons, more sophisticated weapons that can be used. That will not encourage the Pakistanis to give up weapons, or the Indians. I think it will encourage their scientists to start looking at more and new technology. We can make a difference if we maintain this ban by allowing what everyone says. That is all we want. We just want the opportunity to research. The Reed amendment gives that opportunity. I yield the floor and I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. I believe you are.

Mr. REED. Essentially, the functional difference between my amendment and your second degree is, at this point, under my amendment the administration would have to come and lift the prohibition; under your amendment, they would have to come and get an authorization. I think that is the functional difference.

Mr. REED. I think I understand your second degree, but if I could, just for a moment--my amendment authorizes research activities in phases 1, 2, and 2-A, and 6.1, 6.2, and 6.2-A, and then prohibits the following phases. Your amendment would authorize work in these phases. I think the difference is that rather than a clear prohibition, which would require someone coming back to the Congress and seeking to repeal the prohibition, you would require them to come back and get an authorization to proceed. I think that is correct.

Mr. REED. Will the chairman yield for a question?

Mr. REED. Madam President, I rise in support of the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment. First, we should explain the terminology better because there is a suggestion implicit in many of the comments today that a low-yield nuclear device is something akin to a big conventional weapon. Nuclear weapons are sui generis, the most horrific weapon that man has ever developed. Under this bill we remove a ban on the research and development, and therefore testing and deployment of so-called low- yield weapons, 5 kilotons or less. Let me put that in perspective. The weapon dropped on Hiroshima was 14 kilotons. The weapon dropped on Nagasaki was 21 kilotons. A 5- kiloton weapon, a 1-kiloton weapon, is a significant weapon causing significant damage. When we talk about low-yield nuclear weapons, it is almost like talking about a small apocalypse because nuclear weapons have apocalyptic qualities in their destruction and in their fear. As a result, for more than 50 years we have attempted to put them beyond use. This language in this bill lowers that threshold dramatically. It says we will begin after a 10-year prohibition not just research, but this bill takes away the prohibition on developing, engineering, testing, and deploying weapons. Low-yield weapons. But again, those low-yield weapons have fantastic power. I heard some of my colleagues talk about the fact if we had such weapons like this we surely would have gotten Saddam Hussein. Dropping a weapon, even a ``low-yield nuclear weapon,'' in an urban area will create incredible collateral damage. Not as much, of course, as a 400- kiloton weapon but the damage is huge. In fact, Sidney Drell, a physicist and arms control advocate, calculated that a 1-kiloton weapon penetrating at 40 feet, a penetrating type weapon, would create a crater larger than the impact area at the World Trade Center and put about 1 million cubic feet of radioactive material in the air. If we had dropped such a weapon on Baghdad, we would not be in Baghdad today. Our troops would be ringing the city waiting for the radiation to clear and trying to minister to the civilians. The notion we need these weapons for military purposes is unsubstantiated. There is no military requirement for a so-called low- yield nuclear weapon. In testimony before the Armed Services Committee on April 8, 2003, Ambassador Brooks, the head of NNSA, testified after a question from Bill Nelson: Well, is there a requirement in your opinion for a new low yield? Ambassador Brooks: No. Senator Bill Nelson. Is there a requirement for such a weapon under consideration or being developed? Ambassador Brooks: There is no requirement being developed. To the best of my knowledge there is no requirement under consideration. There is no military need for this weapon. That is the testimony of the administration. I am sure there are many people who would say yes, it is nice to study. There are lots of things that are nice to study. But without a military requirement for such a weapon, why are we abandoning a significant prohibition that has aided, I believe, our efforts in trying to tame or at least contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons? It seems to me counterintuitive that one could argue, as I think some of my colleagues do, the way to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to build more nuclear weapons. I don't think that makes sense. There is a suggestion also throughout the discussion this afternoon that this is just about research, nothing else. I was intrigued by this notion and I asked Ambassador Brooks about it at a hearing. His initial justification for the language requested by the administration was it would, in his words, ``remove the chilling effect on scientific inquiry that could hamper our ability to maintain and exercise our intellectual capabilities to respond to needs that one day might be articulated by the President.'' I asked a very obvious question. Why didn't the administration simply send up a modification to section 3136, the ban, simply to carve out language that will allow research but still would maintain the prohibition against engineering, development, testing, and deployment? I said: For example, the language could simply say: It shall be the policy of the United States not to produce a low-yield nuclear weapon, including precision low-yield nuclear weapon. Ambassador Brooks replied to my query: It is accurate that that would eliminate one of the concerns I have with the language, though the language now does have, we fear, a potentially chilling effect on R&D and, as you described a possible modification, it might not. So speaking narrowly from the prospect of trying to get a robust advanced concept program working, language like that might be entirely suitable. But that is not what this legislation includes. Not a limited exception to research, but a categorical elimination of the ban on research, engineering, development, testing, deployment of so-called low-yield nuclear weapons. It is pretty clear here we are really not talking about just research. In fact, I hope this amendment of Senator Kennedy and Senator Feinstein passes. I support it. If it fails, I am prepared to offer language that will, in fact, limit it just to research. Now, we also heard before the committee that one of the reasons we need this research project is so scientists can continue to work on it, maintain their skills. It turns out if that is the case, there are plenty of opportunities with existing weapons in the inventory to go ahead and hone those skills. Even if such opportunities were not readily available, to give up a significant and recognized prohibition on at least one class of nuclear weapons simply to satisfy technical training would at least suggest to me that other ways should be found to train our scientists, and other ways, I think, could be found to train the scientists. There is also a perception, I think inherent in the discussions here--and I have alluded to it in my initial comments--that the effect of one of these so-called low-yield weapons is that it will produce less collateral damage. That is true, but less than what? Less than the bomb at Hiroshima which, to my recollection, took over 100,000 lives. Are we willing to engage or use or tactically employ weapons that only take, in one fell swoop, 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 lives and claim they are low yield and therefore innocuous? There is nothing innocuous about the weapons we are talking about. I believe very strongly that it is incumbent upon this Senate to maintain the ban. I think it is wise policy. I think it is a policy that has given us advantages as we have urged other nations to refrain from the development of nuclear weapons. There are some discussions about whether arms control has succeeded or failed. I think many times we point to those cases in which countries acquire nuclear weapons, but we fail to recognize the many instances where countries have given up their nuclear weapons--such as several countries in the former Soviet Union like the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan. Because of the spirit of the nonproliferation treaty and because of the efforts of the United States and other countries urging that they become compliant with the nonproliferation treaty, these countries voluntarily gave up nuclear weapons. I do not know that today, if they were watching what we are doing here, they would be so eager to give up their nuclear weapons. So we lose a great deal more than simply this language in the bill. I think we lose a diplomatic advantage, in terms of the goal which I hope we are still pursuing, which is the elimination, I hope, or certainly the containment, of nuclear weapons. I urge all my colleagues to think very clearly and to recall several, for me, salient points. These are weapons of horrendous effect. Don't think low-yield, think small apocalypse. These are weapons that have no military requirement today. What we do here will be emulated by other countries. That is the nature of world leadership. We have a chance to preserve at least this aspect of arms control, which will give us the opportunity, I hope, to argue for even more, and more effective means of nonproliferation. I urge my colleagues to support the Feinstein-Kennedy amendment. I yield my time to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, for over 50 years, the United States has been in the vanguard in both urging and acting to delegitimize the use of nuclear weapons. Today, the Bush administration is implementing a departure from this bipartisan policy of arms control by adopting measures that will lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Dissatisfaction with America's nuclear policy by conservatives was evident even before George W. Bush became President. One of the more dramatic examples of this was the rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by the Senate in 1999. A particularly revealing aspect of that vote was the opposition to a proposal to put the treaty aside rather than to formally defeat it. Deferral would have given a future President the ability to renegotiate aspects of the treaty, such as verification, that were specifically criticized. A combination of ideological and political motivations forced a vote that further weakened efforts at arms control. Indeed, today the defeat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty still lingers as something that I think is a serious erosion of arms control throughout the world and our ability to influence other nations to refrain from testing and developing. In a similar vein, Republicans in Congress enacted legislation that fixed the minimal number of launch vehicles and warheads in order to prevent the Clinton administration from initiating reductions through negotiations with the Russians. This legislation was quietly repealed when President George W. Bush announced his intention to conclude the Moscow treaty. The Moscow treaty seems to be the type of arms control treaty that conservatives can be comfortable with since it does not actually require the elimination or destruction of nuclear weapons by either side. I have heard today repeatedly discussions of how we are destroying nuclear weapons. In fact, under the Moscow treaty, we are simply redesignating nuclear weapons. We are calling them operational and nonoperational. We are not destroying nuclear weapons. The Bush administration not only accepted these precedents, but rapidly and deliberately built upon them. The President quickly announced the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty. Here again, there was scant attention paid to the possibility of negotiating changes with the Russians in order to pursue the development of an antimissile system without jettisoning the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty has been a long-time target of the right wing. President Bush's decision was as much about appeasing a powerful component of his political base as it was a reflection of strategic thinking. The President has made it clear that he will not pursue further negotiations under the START process with the Russians. He is content to let the Moscow treaty stand as the beginning and the end of his arms control initiatives. The most effective nonproliferation program, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, was greeted initially by the Bush administration with skepticism. The program was placed on hold for the first year of the administration while the program was under review. The program was delayed an additional year when the administration could not make the certifications necessary for the program to proceed. The program survived the review and the certification delay but 2 years was spent on justifying the program rather than aggressively eliminating weapons and weapons material. All of this was prelude to the publication of the Nuclear Posture Review in December of 2001. The review is classified and the administration provided only a cursory nonclassified briefing. Public comments by the administration suggest the major shifts in policy included in the review. For the first time, the Nuclear Policy Review indicates that the United States is prepared to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations that are not aligned with a nuclear power. Previously, the focus of our policy was to respond to the nuclear potential of other nuclear powers and their allies as a means of deterring the use of nuclear weapons. Today, the United States is contemplating the use of nuclear weapons against nations that do not possess nuclear weapons. In so doing, the NPR, the Nuclear Posture Review, blurs distinctions between conventional and nuclear weapons. Instead of trying to place nuclear weapons beyond use or at least severely restricting their use to the deterrence of an attack by a nuclear power, the NPR makes them just one more tool in our tool kit. In so doing, it mischaracterizes the horrific effects of nuclear weapons; trying to suggest that they are a little bit more than a conventional weapon, when they are of a dimension and scale that is beyond the contemplation of anyone who has used conventional weapons. The NPR maintains the current size of the stockpile of nuclear weapons. Despite the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a democratically elected government in Russia, the administration continues to maintain thousands of warheads in the stockpile. The NPR holds out the possibility of the resumption of nuclear testing, either to maintain the current stockpile or to develop new types of nuclear weapons. Budget requests to fund the production of hundreds of new plutonium pits per year, a necessary component of a nuclear weapon, are included in this budget. Requests to undertake the designs of new weapons if needed and to shorten the time necessary to initiate and conduct a nuclear test are included in the budget proposals, and all of them strongly suggest that testing could go well beyond the need to maintain the existing stockpile. Coupled with the rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NPR sent a disturbing signal that we would once again undertake a testing program. Such a program may very well be imitated by other nations, either through perceived need or as a means to maintain their prestige in the nuclear club. In any case, this, too, would further weaken the restraints against the use of nuclear weapons. In the context of these dramatic changes in policy, rejection of the comprehensive test ban treaty and a new nuclear policy review that blurs the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, the administration proposed last year to begin the design of a robust nuclear earth penetrator to use against hard and deeply buried targets. This weapons would modify an existing nuclear device. In essence, the kinetic package already in the stockpile would come out of inventory and the key work would involve the design of a casing that could penetrate the proper depth for the weapon. The first point to be made is that the existing weapons being considered are quite large, on the order of several hundred kilotons to over 1 megaton. For a frame of reference, the weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were in the range of 14 to 21 kilotons. Thus, the smaller of these bunker busters is roughly 25 times the size of the bombs dropped on Japan. These weapons will bust more than a bunker. The area of destruction will encompass an area the size of a city. They are really city breakers, not bunker busters. A further point is the fact that conventional munitions have substantially increased their precision. We have seen that in Iraq rapidly and effectively. Although they have not achieved the ability of flying through an open door and taking the elevator down to the bunker command center, increased precision means enhanced ability to target and destroy entrances and the communication network of a command center or other sensitive target. We have much better capacity today with conventional weapons, and many would argue these conventional weapons could effectively deal with many, if not all, of these potential targets. Finally, the recent fighting in Iraq presented our forces with just the type of targets that the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator is envisioned to engage; deeply buried command centers and possible storage areas for weapons of mass destruction. From preliminary reports and from casual observations, it does not appear in any way that our military efforts were inhibited by the lack of a robust nuclear earth penetrator. Last year Senate Democrats were able to delay spending money on a robust nuclear earth penetrator by requiring a report identifying the types of targets this weapon is designed to hold at risk and the employment policy for the robust nuclear earth penetrator. The classified report has been submitted and the administration is forging ahead. Equally unsettling as the robust nuclear earth penetrator is the proposal by the administration to repeal the 1993 statutory ban on the research, development, testing, and production of low-yield nuclear weapons. Current law prohibits work on weapons with yields equal to or less than 5 kilotons. In attempting to justify this proposal, Ambassador Linton Brooks, Acting Director of the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee, that ``we are seeking to free ourselves from intellectual prohibitions against exploring a full range of technical options.'' Importantly, he did not justify this proposed work as a current military requirement. At present, there is no military requirement for a low-yield nuclear weapon. As I said before, really, low-yield nuclear weapon is a misnomer. These are still horrendous, horrific weapons. They might better be referred to as small apocalypses, not low-yield weapons. More illustrative of the motivation behind the efforts is a subsequent statement of Ambassador Brooks at the hearing. The Ambassador declared: I have a bias in favor of the lowest usable yield because I have the bias in favor of something that is the minimum destruction . . . I have a bias in favor of things that might be usable. Let me commend the Ambassador for his candor and his responsiveness to the question because I think he has laid it out very accurately and very precisely and very well. No longer are we being motivated by a sincere and intense and consistent desire to try to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. We are trying to design weapons and produce weapons that we fully anticipate can be used. That is an extraordinary sea change in our policy. And it is a sea change that I think will reverberate around the world to our disadvantage, not to our security. At the heart of the debate over these so-called low-yield nuclear weapons lies the observation, if not the fact, that the ability to limit collateral damage makes a weapon more likely to be used. The advent of precision-guided munitions makes attacks on urban areas more acceptable to leaders. Would we have dropped a dumb bomb on Saddam Hussein's suspected hideouts in the crowded neighborhoods of Baghdad? It would have been a much tougher call. In a similar fashion, as suggested by Ambassador Brooks' comments, developing low-yield nuclear weapons, small apocalyptic weapons, tilts the scales for use, not for restraint. That is a balance I think will again jeopardize our situation, not enhance it. Proponents of this new policy with its bias in favor of things that are usable, in the Ambassador's terms, attempt to justify their position on several grounds. They argue arms control and nonproliferation have failed. We heard the arguments on the floor of the Senate all day long. They cite a litany of states that acquired nuclear weapons since the adoption of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968: India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, and apparently North Korea. But this litany must be placed in context. Forty years ago when the original nuclear powers--the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China--had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, it was routinely assumed that proliferation would be rapid and irreversible. President Kennedy predicted in the early 1960s that an additional 25 countries might develop nuclear weapons within 10 years. This dire prediction did not come true because of efforts at arms control exemplified by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Recently, this point was reiterated by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage who stated: Instead of the 25 or so countries that President Kennedy once predicted, only a handful of nations possess nuclear weapons. Of course, we suspect many more countries have chemical or biological weapons, but still short of the scores that have been predicted in the past. We have reached this state of affairs in no small part through the concerted efforts of many nations, agreements such as the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty and Chemical Weapons Convention, organizations such as the IAEA and nuclear supply groups--these constitute a global security architecture that have served us satisfactorily and kept us safe. Moreover, of the five states that have acquired nuclear weapons since 1968, three--Israel, India, and Pakistan--never signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In retrospect, many look back and wish we could have urged them, convinced them, persuaded them, to sign on because it would have made their ascendency to the nuclear ranks that much more difficult. South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons and joined the regime as a nonpossessor. That leaves the very special case of North Korea which joined the NPT in 1985 and has been caught on at least two occasions violating this obligation before its recent announced repudiation of the treaty. Critics of the nonproliferation regime frequently fail to acknowledge that Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan ceased their suspected nuclear program in part because of the international law norm represented by the nonproliferation treaty. Similarly, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine found themselves in possession of nuclear weapons. All of them voluntarily relinquished their weapons in favor of joining the NPT. Their decision, at the urging of the United States and others, reaffirmed the norms of nonproliferation. Indeed, as recently as May, 2000, the United States reaffirmed this norm by joining the four other original nuclear powers in declaring their commitment to the ``unequivocal undertaking'' to eliminate nuclear arsenals. That affirmation is in stark contrast to the legislation before us that seeks to expand and enhance our nuclear arsenal. Today, nonproliferation is being advocated by the United States as ``do what I say,'' not ``do what I do.'' Unfortunately, the United States is more often imitated than obeyed. Last Saturday, Vladimir Putin's annual address was reported in the American media. According to one report: [Putin] appeared to be responding to the Bush administration's new nuclear strategy, announced last year, when he said that Russia, too, was considering developing new variants of nuclear weapons. President Putin declared, in his words: I can inform you that at present the work to create new types of Russian weapons, weapons of the new generation, including those regarded by specialists as strategic weapons, is in the stage of practical implementation. As the newspaper report further indicated: [A]nalysts said he [Putin] appeared to be referring to Russia's efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal and to develop low yield nuclear weapons. At this point in the speech, the press reported that the ``remark was greeted by applause.'' I don't know how comfortable we all feel with the Russian Duma applauding the statement that Russia is considering modernizing their nuclear forces, potentially developing low-yield nuclear weapons. Indeed, it seems terribly ironic to me that as we urge support and help for the Russians to destroy their nuclear arsenal, they are simultaneously taking the path we are in trying to create and build a new, more modern arsenal. Acknowledging the important role of the nonproliferation treaty, as I have over many decades, should not be equated with assuming the arms control regime is without shortcomings. A structure that was designed primarily to moderate the superpower confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union cannot be expected to adapt to the new threats and new technologies of the post-cold-war world without conscious and committed efforts led by the United States to deal with these new circumstances. Thus, it is incumbent on ourselves, the United States, not simply to walk away from this regime of arms control but to adapt it to the new contingencies, the new threats, the new environment of this new strategic world. The consequences of the detonation of a weapon of mass destruction are so devastating that reliance on military means alone to deter or preempt such an event is shortsighted. Abandoning serious efforts at arms control will weaken, not strengthen, our efforts to protect the Nation. We must engage, again, I believe, in a concerted effort to strengthen these norms of nonproliferation, of nonuse--not weaken them, as this legislation suggests. A second argument used by proponents of these policies is that it is just about research; no one would ever deploy these weapons. These advocates have not been paying attention to the Bush administration. These are the words of Fred Celec, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, in an interview with the San Jose Mercury News, talking in the context of the development of a ``hydrogen bomb that can be successfully designed to survive a crash through the hard rock or concrete and still explode,'' which is an earth penetrator. Mr. Celec concludes, in his words, if we can do it, ``it will ultimately get fielded.' So this is not about hypothetical research; it is not about a big science project, or training scientists. In the view of a very influential member of the Department of Defense, it is about getting weapons we can put in the field. I can't think of any weapon that we would field, that we would place in the hands of American military personnel, that we wouldn't test first. So we are also talking about testing. These are grave--not just possibilities, but if you listen to the spokesman of the administration, these are right over the horizon. I think it is very disturbing. That is why I think we have to act here to exercise our judgment and our responsibility to ensure that our policy is consistent with the best interests of this country. I hope, through consideration of this amendment, we will do that. A third point that seems implicit in many of the arguments that are made on behalf of these weapons is the notion that nuclear weapons can be designed so their use is, if not relatively benign, then at least tolerable. As previously discussed, the proposed modification of existing weapons to create a robust nuclear earth penetrator is anything but benign or tolerable. It will pack an explosive punch at least 25 times that of Nagasaki or Hiroshima, and even if technology and the Congress allows for a smaller yield robust nuclear earth penetrator, its use will be devastating. Sidney Drell, a noted physicist and arms control advocate, pointed out that even a 1-kiloton weapon, penetrating to 40 feet, would create a crater larger than the impact area at the World Trade Center and put about 1 million cubic feet of radioactive material in the air. Such radioactivity could last for many years and would likely be spread over a fairly large area by the prevailing winds. That is not a small, discrete weapon that plows into the ground with a little puff of smoke emanating. That is a devastating weapon. A fourth rationale raised by proponents is that permission to develop low-yield nuclear weapons is necessary to train the next generation of nuclear scientists. This argument ignores the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons that are available for training purposes. The ban on low-yield nuclear weapons applies only to the fabrication of new weapons, not the dismantling and study of existing ones. Moreover, the idea that decades of arms control efforts would be cast aside simply to provide a training exercise should cause a more exhaustive search for other training opportunities rather than the creation of a new class of nuclear weapons. Or, at a minimum, it should prompt a careful exemption from the ban for the purpose of research, and not the wholesale repeal of the ban that is included in this legislation before us. A fifth rationale advanced by supporters is the possible use of a low-yield nuclear device to attack a facility that contains biological or chemical agents. The theory is that the radiation can destroy the biological or chemical agents in addition to destroying the facility. But this rationale begs two questions. What will destroy the radiation emitted by the nuclear blast and why are precision-guided missiles not as suitable a response? Once again, this is the very specialized threat that may be dealt with by other means and is an attempt to deal with the possibility of chemical and biological exposure through the release of a definite radiological exposure. It is not a compelling reason to abandon the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons. A final justification for the development of low-yield nuclear weapons is that it will act as a deterrent. Proponents argue that our existing nuclear weapons are so large that we are self-deterred from using them and our adversaries know this. But with new, low-yield weapons, our adversaries will have renewed concern that we will employ nuclear weapons. Several points are in order. First, in the war on terror, our adversaries are unlikely to be deterred by any size nuclear weapon, due to their fanaticism and the practical problem of targeting them. In a confrontation with rogue states, the targeting problem is easier, but the use of nuclear weapons of any size presents difficult tactical problems. Our doctrine of air superiority, information dominance, precision weapons, and speed makes the use of nuclear weapons less attractive on military grounds since we plan for and anticipate the rapid destruction of enemy forces and the swift seizure of key political objectives. The use of nuclear weapons will likely slow us down and increase the cost, both short run and long run, of our operations. In Iraq, we were confronted by a rogue state. We heard before the hostilities of the existence of deep underground facilities. We were told there were significant weapons of mass destruction throughout the country. Yet, I don't think any military commanders would have even contemplated the use of low-yield nuclear weapons, or any type of nuclear weapon. For one reason, if we had, we would still be miles away from Baghdad, because we could not occupy a place that was radiating plutonium. We would have caused significant civilian casualties. We would have caused a political firestorm that could never be contained in that part of the world and passed across the globe. These are the practical considerations that deter us--not the fact that we do not have a low-yield weapon. In addition, the ``deterrent effect'' may have the opposite effect on these rogue nations, as we think we are going to deter them. Indeed, as Michael May, the former head of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, suggested, the emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons ``increases the motivation of 'targeted states' to improve and extend their own nuclear force, or to get one if they don't have it.'' The behavior of North Korea and Iran, although clearly unjustified, might be prompted by such considerations. The amendment I offer today is designed to do what I heard practically all of my colleagues say was the intent of this proposal by the administration--to allow scientists to do research but clearly to prevent the development, the testing, the fielding, and the use of nuclear weapons, particularly low-yield nuclear weapons. The amendment I offer today would amend the current Spratt-Furse law so that research is allowed. Work beyond research would, however, remain prohibited. Since 1953, the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense have worked in a very formalized weapons development process. In the DOE nuclear weapons development process there are a series of numbered phases of development. They are pictured in this chart. The top chart represents the development of a new weapon. There are eight phases as indicated in the chart. The bottom array is the development of or modification of an existing weapon such as the case would be with the robust nuclear earth penetrator. It is coming out of the stockpile, but it is still subject to the same clearly defined phases that have been defined now for almost 50 years, concept assessment, feasibility, all the way through retirement. The amendment I offer today would prohibit ``development engineering,'' which is phase 3, or phase 6.3. Again, these are clearly identified phases. There will be no confusion in the Department of Energy or in the Department of Defense as to what is prohibited, what is allowed, and what is allowed as ``reasonable.'' That is what I have heard consistently my colleagues say, that the whole purpose of this proposal by the administration and the development phases are well understood. They have been in use for 50 years. The phases were developed jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission, the predecessor to the DOE, and the Department of Defense in a memorandum of understanding signed in 1953. Again, my amendment is very clear. It allows phase 1, phase 2, and phase 2-A activity for a new weapon. The red line comes at phase 3. It would allow phase 6.1, 6.2, and 6.2-A. The red line phase comes at 6.3 for the modification of existing weapons. Research is allowed, and everything else is prohibited. The amendment is designed to allow what, as I said, the Bush administration claims is a primary reason to seek the repeal of the Spratt-Furse law--the need to ``train the next generation of nuclear weapons scientists and engineers.'' I and many of my colleagues do not support providing an open-ended authority to this or any other administration to develop, test, produce, and deploy new nuclear weapons. Unless we adopt this amendment or some variance of the amendment, that is precisely what we will be giving the administration. The amendment would address the primary concern of ADM Ellis, Commander of Strategic Command, the command responsible for nuclear weapons. In a letter to the Armed Services Committee, ADM Ellis stated that the ``U.S. Strategic Command is interested in conducting rigorous studies of all new technologies and examining the merits of precision, increased penetration, and reduced yield for our nuclear weapons.'' Nowhere is there a suggestion that he would like the permission to develop the test in the field of new weapons. Again, if we are serious about arms control, and if we recognize the request for less stability in research, this amendment will be adopted. I hope it is. I would prefer, frankly, the restoration completely of the Spratt-Furse amendment. But this will, I think, do what must be done--prevent development, testing, and fielding of new nuclear weapons of the low-yield type. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED. Let me say, if I may, again, we are united in the notion of allowing the research in these first three phases. We choose a different way to control government access in the succeeding phases. But the effect, I hope, at the end of the deliberations is that the development, engineering, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons of low-yield will be subject to congressional authority.

Mr. REED. If the chairman will yield, that is why I have this chart, which is quite obvious, and it absolutely could explain your amendment, too. I will lend it to you.

Mr. REED. It reads ``03.857'' on the upper left hand.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I have no opposition to taking some time prior to coming forward to see if we can reach an agreement, if we can't ask for a vote. I have absolutely no opposition to setting aside and working it to try to come up with something with which we feel comfortable.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be laid aside.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 711.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. REED. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, there is a very simple, but important, premise underlying this amendment. I believe Congress should know the capabilities of any missile defense system that is deployed, and that these capabilities should be subject to rigorous testing. I understand this information may very well be classified, and we would receive it on a classified basis, but it is essential for us, as we make decisions about a huge program, not only in terms of dollars, but in terms of consequences to our security, that we know how capable this program is. My amendment would request and require the Department of Defense develop measurable performance criteria for missile defense systems and an operational test plan for those systems, and an estimate of when operational testing would be done to verify the performance criteria are met. The performance criteria would include the characteristics of the threat missiles that each missile defense system is being designed to counter. The amendment would require the Secretary of Defense to submit the performance criteria and operational test plan to the Congress each year. The amendment would also require the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to provide an annual assessment of the progress being made to verify, through operational testing, whether the systems are meeting their established performance criteria. Both the performance criteria and test plans could be revised as necessary by the Department of Defense, but I do believe we need to have an idea at least of the capabilities of these systems and also, again, these capabilities must be established by operational testing. The Patriot PAC-3 system, the only currently deployed ballistic missile defense system, conducted operational testing to prove it met established performance criteria prior to being deployed. This is the right way to develop a missile defense system; indeed, all defense programs. This amendment would model other missile defense programs on the very successful PAC-3 program in terms of performance criteria, operational testing, and then deployment. There are a number of important things this amendment will not do. This amendment does not reduce funding for any missile defense system. It would not prevent the administration from fielding missile defense by 2004, although, hopefully, we will have an idea of exactly what they field in 2004, and, frankly, I do not think this Congress has such an idea at this moment. It would not dictate what performance any missile defense system should have, nor does it establish any dates for when certain performance must be attained. It would, however, enable Congress to understand what missile defense capabilities are being bought for the $9.1 billion provided in the defense bill for missile defense. I think that is a threshold issue our constituents expect us to know. If we are investing $9.1 billion, we have to know, and the American people should feel confident we know, what are we buying, how much will it protect us against what type of threat. I believe also it would improve the chances of developing effective missile defenses by establishing clear standards of performance. Currently, none of the missile defense programs under development, under the Missile Defense Agency, have established performance criteria, meaning essentially there are no standards for when a system reaches any particular milestone or has completed its development. These standards did exist under the Clinton administration but were removed by the current administration. The administration claims it cannot develop performance criteria for missile defense because the systems are too complex and difficult, and no one can predict how they will perform. However, despite this seeming quandary about not knowing what will happen, the administration plans to field both ground- and sea-based missile defenses in 2004 and possibly an airborne missile defense by 2005. Frankly, a system that is ready to be fielded is presumably far enough along to be able to tell its performance, or one can only assume a system is being fielded without any knowledge of how it actually will work. That to me would not be a very prudent or a very wise deployment. Other defense programs are also complex and difficult, yet they have measurable performance criteria against which they are tested. The F/A- 22 aircraft program is a very complex and difficult system, as is the V-22 Osprey program. Yet both of these programs have well-established performance criteria. In fact, all major military programs, except missile defense, have performance criteria or requirements which were approved relatively early in a system's development and revised as necessary as the program matures. I do not think it is incompatible to have a flexible system that can be adapted, yet still have performance criteria, but it seems in our discussion of missile defense these two notions are completely separated: Flexibility, innovation, seizing technological breakthroughs, and simple performance criteria. They should be part and parcel of any program we undertake. For example, all unmanned aerial vehicle programs, such as the Predator, have requirements stating how long they need to stay aloft, how high they should fly, and how well their sensors can see. Yet this has not interfered with their innovation, their development, and their deployment. The administration has claimed because it has adopted the new spiral development, capabilities-based acquisition approach, that establishing actual performance criteria and operational test plans is not appropriate because we just do not know for sure what missile defense capabilities will ultimately emerge. But there are a number of other spiral development programs in the Department of Defense, and all of them, except missile defense, have performance criteria and operational test plans. For example, the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, which saw service in Afghanistan and Iraq, is a spiral development program. Yet it has well-established performance requirements and a documented operational test plan. There is absolutely no reason that missile defense should not have the same sort of yardsticks for measuring progress. Ballistic missile programs used to have performance criteria, such as how many incoming missiles they should be able to engage, and how much area a system should defend. This enabled Congress to understand the characteristics of missile defense programs that were being funded and why they were necessary. Such criteria have been removed, and Congress does not know, for example, how many incoming missiles each missile defense system is being designed to defend against or how much area the system is being designed to defend. Without such information, Congress is essentially writing an $8 billion to $9 billion blank check each year to the administration for missile defense. Over the previous 2 years, Congress has tried and tried again to get the administration to provide the most basic information on its missile defense programs. Time and again, the administration has refused to provide it. In fiscal year 2002, Congress directed the Department of Defense to provide its most basic cost, schedule and performance goals for missile defense. We also asked the General Accounting Office to assess the progress being made towards achieving these goals. As late as the end of fiscal year 2002, when the first GAO assessment was due, the Department had still not established a single meaningful goal for its missile defense programs. GAO was forced to write to Congress saying that it could not complete its assess because there were no goals to measure missile defense programs. Lately, in response to continued Congressional pressure, the administration has begun to establish a few very broad, very near-term goals. But even these goals are misleading. Secretary Aldridge, the Pentagon's acquisition chief, recently testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he thought the administration's 2004 missile defense would have a 90 percent chance of hitting an incoming warhead from North Korea. Whether this is a firmly established goal or simply the individual opinion of a very sophisticated observer but nevertheless an individual opinion, it is hard to tell. Indeed, one can raise many questions about whether this 90-percent figure as a goal is being achieved and can be achieved by 2004. Secretary Rumsfeld has said in public that the 2004 system is rudimentary. Does that mean a 90-percent goal will be achieved or does it mean something less? Indeed, if we look at the system closely, there are many issues that emerge which would suggest that this is such a situation in which there are no goals. For example, the booster for the system that is designed to be deployed in 2004 has yet to be flown in an actual intercept. So there is the question of making it work with the actual kill vehicle in an operationally feasible mode. That is a pretty significant issue when it comes to whether this system will have a certain degree of reliability. The radar for the system was never designed for missile defense and can never be actually tested in an actual intercept attempt. The Pentagon's chief tester has told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the 2004 missile defense, in his words, has not yet demonstrated operational capability. Yet it seems clear that, regardless, there is an intention to field this system in 2004. All of these issues raise real questions as to the capability of this system. If we accept, in fact, that it might be 90 percent, is it 90 percent of hitting a missile with defense decoys or 90 percent of hitting a missile without a decoy? These are important points that I think can be answered and should be answered by the Department of Defense as we go forward to invest something on the order of $9 billion a year in missile defense. The administration also claims that the missile defense system it plans to field in 2004 will protect all 50 States, but if we look at the details such a defense is only possible if we have Navy ships constantly patrolling the waters of North Korea using their radars to pick up any ICBM launches headed towards Hawaii. Initially, in the Clinton proposal there was a plan to build a very large radar designed particularly for ballistic missile defense that was intended to and had established criteria that would include protecting and covering all 50 States. This new approach may in fact be effective, but, once again, we are not sure--the Congress is not officially on record in either an unclassified or a classified sense--of what is the standard. Is it all 50 States? Is it 50 States assuming that the Navy will have ships constantly patrolling the waters off North Korea? Indeed, it is not quite sure whether those ships can constantly be patrolling the waters off of North Korea given the numerous missions in the war on terror, given the numerous military operations. That, too, has to be looked at and examined based upon some clear criteria. Another point is that the radar on these ships is being adapted, but it was not originally designed to identify and track ICBM-type targets. There is a question of whether the radar would be accurate enough to perform this mission. If the Navy ships are not there, if the radar truly does not work as they hope it works or it is not modified quickly enough, there is a real question about the coverage of the system. All of these points are being made to say in order to assess what we are buying, it helps to have these performance goals, to have them clearly delineated, to have the assumption laid out, and to have all of this operationally tested, so when we deploy a system we can say with great confidence to the American people that it will provide this level of protection. I do not think we can say that at this point. This amendment in no way inhibits the administration from fielding a system, any type of system, in 2004, but what it will give us is an opportunity to measure that system. How effective is that system? What threats will this system engage? That type of knowledge is very important for us as we make our decisions. It is also incumbent upon the administration to provide such knowledge. Again, I emphasize it can be done either on a classified or unclassified basis because I understand there is a utility sometimes to have a system which our adversaries might assume is 100-percent effective. But at least the Congress must know this information. The other fact of this lack of clarity and goals is it inhibits operational testing. Administrative witnesses have testified as to the need for operational testing. We have passed laws establishing operational testing. This is the traditional routine way in which we verify whether a system works and also, as we improve the system, how effective the modifications and improvements are. Every major defense program I can think of, except missile defense, has established plans for operational testing. Without these criteria for performance and operational testing, I do not know if we can, in fact, create and deploy a system of which we can be confident. As we reestablish these performance criteria for missile defense programs and require a plan for operational testing, Congress will regain an important tool to understand how well our missile defense program is succeeding, how our money is being spent--not our money, frankly, but the American people's money. Without such criteria and operational testing, none of that clarity will be available to us. I think something else will be very important. It will require the Department of Defense to face squarely these tough issues: What type of threats can we defeat? How wide is the coverage of our system? What additional resources must we bring to bear to make it effective? Is this investment cost effective and cost efficient in terms of protecting the American people? Right now all of that is very amorphous, very nebulous because there is no standard to measure it, even a general standard, these general goals I talked about. I hope this amendment could be accepted because it builds on provisions in the law that were adopted by the committee. I commend Senator Allen for his efforts to include more cost data, more lifetime cycles of the cost, what it will cost to field this system. This is an attempt to build on that foundation. I hope my colleagues will see it as such, agree to this amendment, and provide the kind of goals, operational testing and clarity that are needed so we can assure the American public that when we deploy a missile defense system, it will live up at least to the standards that are disclosed to the U.S. Congress. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED. I listened to Chairman Allard and I commend him for his leadership on the committee's subcommittee. The committee addressed a series of issues and in this legislation they have made progress on trying to do something we are all committed to do. I point out in terms of reporting requirements, the legislation itself includes additional reporting requirements. For each ballistic missile defense element, the production rate capabilities, the potential data availability, the expected cost, et cetera, the notion of having more reporting requirements has already found its way into the legislation. My point is that we are not, as yet, asking effectively--we have asked before but ineffectively--for some simple language about what are the goals, and also how are we going to validate these goals through operational testing. I do know the value of a capabilities approach but you have to ask a more detailed question: The capability to defeat what? The Missile Defense Agency can answer what they know they are not going to defeat. They have absolutely no plans at this point to be able to engage a sophisticated MIRVed weapon with multiple decoys. They tell you that flat, that is not 2004. What they will not tell us is what they prepare to engage, what they can engage. I think, if they clearly understand they are not attempting a capability to defeat one or multiple missiles launched from a significant power, such as Russia or China, they can tell us what precisely they are engaged in trying to defeat. So the notion about capabilities cannot be divorced from threats. That is not possible in any type of military concept. The notion they have to have a capabilities base does not excuse them from that because they defined already their capability. It is a limited capability. So I guess I would ask the question: What are the limits to that capability? What I am proposing is not inconsistent with the notion of capabilities in an evolving system. This amendment clearly lets them revise these criteria daily, if they like. But at least it insists that there be some criteria, some goals. The reluctance to provide us this information has, perhaps, many reasons. One possibility is they don't know. But if they don't know this, that is even more shocking. We are spending $9 billion a year and they don't know, in the Missile Defense Agency, what type of threat they are trying to defeat with this deployment in 2004? The alternative is they know but they will not tell us, and that is equally disturbing. Frankly, I think this amendment makes sense. It does not restrict deployment. It does not restrict funding. Every major weapons development system has goals, has operational testing plans, except for the Missile Defense Program. I, again, urge my colleagues to accept or adopt or support this amendment because it answers a very fundamental question, a question I think every Member of this body and every American wants answered: What are we buying for $9 billion each year? How will it protect us? From what will it protect us? I think the people of my State--capability--threats--they want to know what this system will be valuable to do. I am happy to yield to the chairman.

Mr. REED. If there are procedural oppositions to the bill, that is one thing. But I think the substance is compelling enough to respond, and I think everyone here is capable to respond in substance. Either you are going to let the system continue to operate, which I think either because of--whatever number of reasons, it has not clearly identified goals and objectives, has not conducted robust testing that I think we all believe should be concomitant with the defense program. I am trying to remedy those issues. I think this is a perfectly appropriate place to introduce such an amendment, to have the committee engaged. All our colleagues are here. The staff is here. The arguments can be made here, and I hope they will be. I think it is an important issue. I am prepared to submit it to a vote. That is my understanding of the procedure.

Mr. REED. If I may reclaim my time, first, I do not assume--just on a procedural basis--that is a requirement. I think by law every Member of the Senate can offer amendments on any bill when it comes to the floor, whether you are on the committee or not. Being on the committee does not prevent you from offering an amendment if you did not offer it before.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I want to clarify. We are putting this aside for a period of time to work on this. But if we can't reach--and I hope we can--an understanding, we will have a vote, I presume, early in the evening. I think that is correct.

Mr. REED. I will endeavor to reach an understanding, and hopefully we can.

Mr. REED. I will be happy to respond to the chairman. First, this is an issue I think is not only important but at a level where it is not just a detail of reporting. I think it goes to the heart of the accountability, not just for our committee but for the whole Senate. Frankly, all of our colleagues have to be able to answer the question to their constituents: How much protection are we getting for these resources? I understand the Missile Defense Agency, as so many Department of Defense organizations, is required to submit reports. But they certainly have the resources to do these reports. What I find striking--again, it is a reflection, too, of the previous years--we have in the past tried to get this information. We required goal setting and a GAO assessment. I was, frankly, amazed--and this amazement came about in the preparation, not only for the committee markup but also coming to the floor--that the GAO simply sort of threw up its hands because the Missile Defense Agency says we really don't have any goals; we can't tell you; they are too imprecise. So I think this is an issue that should be engaged by the entire Senate. There was no intention on my part to undermine the procedures on the committee, the Armed Services Committee or the subcommittee. I was not aware in order to bring a matter to the floor one had to offer it first in subcommittee or full committee. I think this is an issue that is of a magnitude and of a degree of clarity that Members of the entire Senate can make a judgment and should make a judgment. That is my response.

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, on behalf of Senator Mikulski, that Michael Hadley, a defense fellow in her office, be granted the privilege of the floor for the duration of consideration of the Defense authorization bill.