Member of Congress

Jack Reed

Role
Current Senator
State
RI
Party
Democrat

Speeches

ENDLESS FRONTIER ACT--Resumed2021-05-25

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, for the reasons that I articulated last evening, I object.

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Unanimous Consent Request--S. 1520 (Executive Calendar)2021-05-24

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Madam President, my colleagues have expressed overwhelming confidence in this bill, and I don't think that confidence will be eroded through more careful consideration by the committee. I think, in fact, the committee process will allow us to incorporate, examine, accept some and reject other provisions and recommendations by the IRC. It also, I think, will empower or allow us to consider something that we really have considered as consistently as the issue of sexual assault, and that is the indications that racial bias is such that all felonies must be taken out of the hands of commanders, not just those related to individual sexual assault or sexual harassment cases or other related sexual conduct or misconduct--I should rightly advocate this. Again, I think if we want to go ahead and make a fundamental change, committee consideration can only assist that change by getting broad viewpoints of those who are in favor of it, those who may be opposed to, and those who may seek changes. And if the committee reports to the floor, there will be opportunity on the floor, once again, to engage in debate and comment. I think we will try our best to come to a solution that is the best solution. I say that with a commitment to try my best to do so. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED. I reserve my right to object, Mr. President.

Mr. REED. Just a point of clarification, my recollection of the ``don't ask, don't tell'' process was that it was, in fact, considered by the committee. The language that was ultimately adopted was the committee language; that because of objections to the issue, the NDAA was filibustered consistently and in order to try to break free, in terms of passing both pieces of legislation, the ``don't ask, don't tell'' was removed separately. That was after a complete committee process, as well as consideration of the NDAA on the floor. At that point, as Senator Gillibrand indicated, after two attempts, there were sufficient votes to pass ``don't ask, don't tell,'' but it was duly considered in the committee. Again, if the power of the ideas, the compelling data that they have is such, I don't know why they are concerned about allowing the full members of the committee, not just a subcommittee, to decide what should be in the final mark. In addition to that, I think in this process--and, in fact, I think you find it on every committee--ideas, perspectives, insights are gained that would otherwise be lost. What we are trying to do is follow the procedure of the Senate, which is to present to this floor a bill that has been carefully examined by people who have dedicated a great deal of their Senate service to the Armed Services Committee, and do so with the input of the Secretary of Defense because all of this has to be implemented by the Department of Defense. And at that point, if there are still difficulties and issues, then, the Senate floor is available for amendments. Again, I would suggest that we can make real progress in the committee. We can get legislation that is not only bipartisan but, hopefully, unanimous or nearly unanimous, and that would be a very powerful signal to our colleagues both in the House and to everyone else that this legislation will, in fact, become law. I yield the floor.

Mr. REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. President. I would like to first engage in a colloquy with Senator Inhofe, the ranking member of the committee, on the process we will use to consider all the ideas and amendments I expect will be offered by committee members to address the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault and related crimes under the UCMJ in the annual Defense bill. I believe that the committee must start from a base that reflected the broadest consensus possible among our members on how best to move forward on this matter and on the recommendations of Secretary Austin's 90-day Independent Review Commission, or IRC. I understand some members would prefer there be nothing in our bill on this topic, while others will feel that the IRC recommendations do not go far enough. This is the nature of compromise and why I intend to include the IRC recommendations on accountability in the base markup of the fiscal year 2022 Defense bill, subject to amendment. I believe we will have a robust debate, and I commit to ensuring that every idea and amendment brought by our committee members is given due consideration and receives a vote if that is what the member wants.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, let me also thank the ranking member for his comments. I agree that our committee has a long tradition of fulsome debate during committee markup of the annual Defense bill. It is a hallmark of our committee. It ensures that everyone's voice is heard, and it is, in my view, one of the reasons we have enacted the Defense Authorization Act for 60 consecutive years. But I also want to commend and thank Senator Gillibrand for her tireless advocacy for victims of sexual assault in the Armed Forces over the past 8 years, since she first introduced a version of this bill in 2013. As I announced this weekend, I agree with Senator Gillibrand that the time has come to reform how we investigate and prosecute sexual assault and other special victim crimes in the military. The best way to move forward on this issue is to ensure that all 26 members of the Armed Services Committee have their voices heard and to consider this legislation in the course of the markup of the fiscal year 2022 Defense bill scheduled for July. Not only will this allow committee members, comprising over a quarter of the Senate, to have their ideas and amendments considered, as is our tradition, but it allows the administration to provide its input as well, as the Independent Review Commission that President Biden directed provides us its recommendations on accountability in the military justice system for the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault and other special victim crimes. We must be able to analyze these recommendations collectively as a committee and then consider their value. With this in mind, as I said over the weekend, I intend to include in the chairman's mark of the fiscal year 2022 Defense bill, the IRC recommendations. It is my view that these recommendations provide the appropriate basis from which to consider the wide range of amendments and ideas I know our members will have. I want to stress that all amendments offered by Senators on the committee will be fully considered during the full committee markup. I intend to continue our tradition of following an open amendment process within the committee, and I know that is something the Presiding Officer is quite aware of since he participated in the committee in a very responsible way over many years. Further, while the first round of reform will focus on the issues of accountability, I hope and intend to incorporate the IRC's recommendations on prevention, climate and culture, and victim care and support into the bill as we move through the legislative year. I think these recommendations will be critically important to reducing the number of sexual assaults in the ranks. The focus of the legislation before us is adjudication. I think we all would prefer that prevention, command climate--all of these factors be such that adjudication is not necessary because the crimes, the incidents, the difficulties, the mental and physical anguish that victims incur have been avoided because we have taken the steps to prevent these actions from taking place in our military forces. With that, Mr. President, I would object

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Introductory Statement on S. 14742021-04-29

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Today, I am joined by Senators Warren, Brown, Van Hollen, and Gillibrand to introduce legislation to ensure that at least one Federal Reserve Governor has demonstrated primary experience in supporting or protecting the rights of workers. Our legislation is not the first to require a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to have a particular area of expertise. Indeed, as part of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act, which passed the Senate by a vote of 93-4 and was signed into law on January 12, 2015, Congress amended the Federal Reserve Act to require at least one of the seven Federal Reserve Governors to be an individual ``with demonstrated primary experience working in or supervising community banks.'' Our legislation would ensure that workers get the very same representation that community bankers already have on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. As we all are aware, the Federal Reserve has a dual mandate of stable prices and maximum employment. Our bill is designed to better ensure that future Boards of Governors continue the current Board's focus on its full employment mandate as evidenced by its explicit acknowledgement last August in its revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy that ``maximum employment is a broad-based and inclusive goal.'' This reflects the Fed's ``appreciation for the benefits of a strong labor market, particularly for many in low-and moderate-income communities,'' with policy decisions to be informed by the Board's ``assessments of the shortfalls of employment from its maximum level'' rather than by ``deviations from its maximum level'' as in its previous statement. While this may not seem like a huge difference, it is reflective of the Board's ``view that a robust job market can be sustained without causing an outbreak of inflation.'' To put it more simply, this current Federal Reserve ``will remain highly focused on fostering as strong a labor market as possible for the benefit of all Americans,'' and our legislation seeks to ensure that future Federal Reserve Boards will continue to do the same. COVID-19 has shown us just how essential workers are to our economy and our physical well-being. We all know grocery store workers, nurses, firefighters, delivery workers, and other workers in both the public and private sectors who, despite the risk to their own health, have been literally holding together the fabric of our society and economy so that we can make it safely to the other side of this public health emergency. As such, they too deserve at least one member of the Board of Governors with demonstrated primary experience in supporting or protecting the rights of workers. I thank the AFL-CIO, Columbia University Professor and Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, MIT Professor and Former International Monetary Fund Chief Economist Simon Johnson, and Georgetown Law Professor Adam Levitin for their support. and urge our colleagues to join in pushing to enact this legislation.

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STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS2021-04-29

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Today, I am joined by Senators Warren, Brown, Van Hollen, and Gillibrand to introduce legislation to ensure that at least one Federal Reserve Governor has demonstrated primary experience in supporting or protecting the rights of workers. Our legislation is not the first to require a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to have a particular area of expertise. Indeed, as part of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act, which passed the Senate by a vote of 93-4 and was signed into law on January 12, 2015, Congress amended the Federal Reserve Act to require at least one of the seven Federal Reserve Governors to be an individual ``with demonstrated primary experience working in or supervising community banks.'' Our legislation would ensure that workers get the very same representation that community bankers already have on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. As we all are aware, the Federal Reserve has a dual mandate of stable prices and maximum employment. Our bill is designed to better ensure that future Boards of Governors continue the current Board's focus on its full employment mandate as evidenced by its explicit acknowledgement last August in its revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy that ``maximum employment is a broad-based and inclusive goal.'' This reflects the Fed's ``appreciation for the benefits of a strong labor market, particularly for many in low-and moderate-income communities,'' with policy decisions to be informed by the Board's ``assessments of the shortfalls of employment from its maximum level'' rather than by ``deviations from its maximum level'' as in its previous statement. While this may not seem like a huge difference, it is reflective of the Board's ``view that a robust job market can be sustained without causing an outbreak of inflation.'' To put it more simply, this current Federal Reserve ``will remain highly focused on fostering as strong a labor market as possible for the benefit of all Americans,'' and our legislation seeks to ensure that future Federal Reserve Boards will continue to do the same. COVID-19 has shown us just how essential workers are to our economy and our physical well-being. We all know grocery store workers, nurses, firefighters, delivery workers, and other workers in both the public and private sectors who, despite the risk to their own health, have been literally holding together the fabric of our society and economy so that we can make it safely to the other side of this public health emergency. As such, they too deserve at least one member of the Board of Governors with demonstrated primary experience in supporting or protecting the rights of workers. I thank the AFL-CIO, Columbia University Professor and Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, MIT Professor and Former International Monetary Fund Chief Economist Simon Johnson, and Georgetown Law Professor Adam Levitin for their support. and urge our colleagues to join in pushing to enact this legislation.

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STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION2021-04-22

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. I am joined by Senator Van Hollen in reintroducing the Consumer Credit Control Act, which gives consumers greater control over when and how their consumer reports are shared by consumer reporting agencies. Our current consumer reporting system is backwards. Consumer reporting agencies collect massive amounts of personal information on consumers, often without their knowledge, in order to compile consumer reports. These reports are then shared with financial institutions and others, often without consent. Following Equifax's failure in 2017 to secure troves of valuable personally identifiable information it collected on approximately 147 million Americans, it remains clear that this system needs to change. Indeed, the National Consumer Law Center's Chi Chi Wu stated in her October 2017 testimony before the House Financial Services Committee that the Equifax breach ``means half of the US population and nearly three-quarters of the consumers with active credit reports are now at risk of identity theft due to one of the worst--if not the worst-- breaches of consumer data in American history. These Americans are at risk of having false new credit accounts, phony tax returns, and even spurious medical bills incurred in their good names.'' To make matters worse, the risks of identity fraud may only increase with time. As Ed Mierzwinski, U.S. PIRG's federal Consumer Program Director, explains ``unlike credit card numbers, your Social Security Number and Date of Birth don't change and may even grow more valuable over time, like gold in a bank vault. Much worse, they are the keys to `new account identity theft.' '' The Consumer Credit Control Act aims to address these concerns and fix the current upside down system. Our legislation, at no cost to the consumer, seeks to give Americans greater control over when and how their consumer reports are released when applying for new credit, a loan, or insurance. It also requires consumer reporting agencies to verify a consumer's identity and secure the consumer's permission before releasing consumer reports in instances that are particularly susceptible to identity theft and fraud. Additionally, our legislation requires every consumer reporting agency to take appropriate steps to prevent unauthorized access to the consumer reports and personal information they maintain. These changes are intended to make it tougher for criminals to open new fraudulent credit or insurance accounts in other people's names. I urge our colleagues to cosponsor the Consumer Credit Control Act, and I thank Senator Van Hollen, the National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low-income clients), U.S. PIRG, Americans for Financial Reform, the Center for Digital Democracy, Consumer Action, the Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Reports, Demos, the NAACP, the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Fair Housing Alliance, Public Citizen, Tennessee Citizen Action, and the Woodstock Institute for their support.

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MOTION TO DISCHARGE2021-04-21

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. REED. Madam President, I would yield back all time.

Mr. REED. I ask for the yeas and nays.

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Afghanistan (Executive Session)2021-04-15

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, President Biden has decided to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. I believe this decision was one of the hardest President Biden will ever make. As Washington Post columnist David Ignatius pointed out, ``Biden's military and intelligence advisers had presented him with three unpleasant alternatives: leave May 1 as previously agreed, even though this would probably mean the fall of the Kabul government and a return to civil war; stay for a limited period, perhaps negotiated with the Taliban, which would delay its eventual takeover; or stay for an undefined period, which could mean a long continuation of what is already the United States longest war.'' In effect, there were no good choices. The President exercised his best judgment to endorse a path that is most likely to protect the national security interests of the United States. I believe there were several factors over 20 years of conflict in Afghanistan that shaped the President's decision. The most critical miscalculation over the past 20 years was the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq. We took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan at a crucial time and instead pursued a war of choice in Iraq. The attacks by al-Qaida on September 11 galvanized the world. The authorization for use of military force passed the Senate 98 to nothing, while the French newspaper Le Monde proclaimed, ``We are all Americans.'' Most notably, for the first time, NATO invoked article 5 of its charter, which calls upon its members to take action on behalf of any member nation which is attacked. The world was with us. But before we could really gain momentum in Afghanistan, the United States diverted to an unnecessary war of choice in Iraq. As journalist Steve Coll wrote in his definitive history of the war in Afghanistan, months after 9/11, ``On November 21, 2001, then Central Commander Tommy Franks, who was planning our operations against Tora Bora, took a call from Donald Rumsfeld, who ordered him to start working on the plan for the invasion of Iraq. Rumsfeld told him to have something ready within a week.'' As a consequence, General Franks' attention was being forced elsewhere. As journalist Susan Glasser wrote in the Washington Post, in the Battle of Tora Bora, ``corrupt warlords allowed bin Laden to escape, while special forces pleaded with the Pentagon to let them get in the fight.'' As we now know, Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaida and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, was not captured for another decade. This decision wasted a period when the Taliban was routed and the Afghan population was welcoming. More recently, President Biden inherited a flawed agreement from the Trump administration. Known as the Doha agreement, it required the United States, its allies, and coalition partners to withdraw all military forces by May 1, 2021. Nondiplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, and advisers were also required to leave. In effect, the entire international presence that has been the foundation for almost two decades of the Afghanistan effort was to disappear on May 1. In exchange, the Taliban agreed not to attack the United States or its allies and promised not to allow ``other individuals or groups, including al-Qaida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.'' The only really verifiable condition on the Taliban of the Trump agreement was that the Taliban would not attack the United States or its allies. The remaining conditions were unenforceable and very, very difficult to certify. As General McKenzie, the commander of Central Command, testified to the Armed Services Committee just a few weeks after the agreement was concluded: ``We don't need to trust them; we don't need to like them; we don't need to believe anything they say. We need to observe what they do.'' What we have observed is alarming. While the Taliban may have adhered to one aspect of the deal by not attacking U.S. forces, they have violated the spirit of the agreement, as overall violence is on the rise. The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction assessed that enemy attacks against Afghan security forces and civilians increased by 50 percent in the third quarter of 2020. Former Acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Laurel Miller described ``an uptick in targeted assassinations [which] has sent shock waves through urban areas.'' In mid-March, Secretary of Defense Austin noted that, after meeting with Afghan President Ghani, ``It's obvious that the level of violence remains pretty high in the country.'' Additionally, a United Nations report from last fall concluded that the relationship between al-Qaida and the Taliban had not been substantially changed by the February 2020 agreement between the Taliban and the United States. The U.N. assessment noted, alarmingly, that ``al-Qaida has been operating covertly in Afghanistan while still maintaining close relations with the Taliban'' and that the group is, in their words, ``quietly gaining strength in Afghanistan while continuing to operate with the Taliban under their protection.'' Beyond the substance of the Trump agreement, the manner in which it was concluded was also deeply flawed. To begin with, the Trump administration concluded a deal with the Taliban, a fundamentalist group using the name ``Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.'' Even though the agreement states that the United States does not recognize such a state, its very formulation is a propaganda boon for the Taliban. As former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani noted: ``Allowing the Taliban to refer to themselves as the Islamic Emirate, even in parentheses, allows them to build the narrative that they forced the U.S. to negotiate an exit from Afghanistan just as the mujahideen had forced the Soviets out. If the administration is eager to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, it would have done better to announce a no-deal exit than allowing the Taliban such a huge propaganda victory.'' Additionally, the Trump agreement was completed exclusively between the Trump administration and the Taliban. There was no involvement of the Afghan Government, reversing the longstanding position of the United States, which prioritized an ``Afghan-led, Afghan-owned reconciliation process.'' Further, there was no visible involvement of our NATO allies who went into Afghanistan after we were attacked on September 11, 2001, when article 5 of the NATO charter was invoked for the first time. As the Afghan Study Group noted, the group led ably by General Dunford and our previous colleague Senator Ayotte: ``Our NATO allies in particular have been steadfast in their support and have shared the sacrifice; over 1,000 coalition troops have been killed since 2001.'' The Trump administration negotiated their exit without their say, without their involvement. There was no involvement either by regional partners despite potentially significant consequences for security in the region. As the Afghan Study Group further noted: ``An unstable Afghanistan risks destabilizing the region through continued trade in illicit drugs, the attraction of extremist ideologies and the possible exacerbation of the rivalry between India and Pakistan, two nuclear- armed powers.'' Trump's go-it-alone, rush-to-the-exits mentality led to a deal where the Taliban emerged as the key benefactor. The United States, its allies, and partners won very little from the Trump deal. Now, we are approaching 20 years of warfare in Afghanistan, spanning over three different Presidential administrations or, perhaps more accurately, 1 year of warfare repeated 20 times as we rotated troops in and out of Afghanistan. In addition to the disastrous pivot to Iraq and the flawed agreement with the Taliban, despite all our efforts over multiple administrations, we have been unable to build an effective fighting force that could defeat the Taliban and hold territory. Afghan soldiers have fought bravely despite continuing pressure and massive casualties, and several components have emerged as particularly capable, such as the Afghan special security forces, but after 20 years, this is not sufficient progress. As the Afghan Study Group assessed: ``The ongoing lack of capacity and inefficiency of the [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces or] ANDSF limit its strategic options against the Taliban. As a result, the ANDSF is generally on the defensive to provide security for much of the population.'' We were never able to change the ``checkpoint mentality'' of the Afghan forces. Their focus on static positions, as much for appearance as for tactical advantage, still persists today, making them extremely vulnerable to a more agile Taliban. Moreover, two decades later, the Afghan forces still have no organic logistical capabilities. An assessment by the Department of Defense from last June noted: ``All components of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces will . . . continue to rely over the long term on contracted logistic support and on the United States for the vast majority of the funding needed to sustain combat operations.'' As I recall the agreement that the Trump administration negotiated, it requires the withdrawal of all contracted logistical support, and as Napoleon once commented, ``An army moves on its stomach.'' Without a logistical capability and without a tactically capable army, with few exceptions, the ability of the Government of Afghanistan and the military of Afghanistan to resist the Taliban is highly questionable. We should be looking seriously at ourselves because, for 20 years of efforts and billions of dollars, I would have hoped that we would have seen a credible, decisive, effective Afghan force. Another crucial factor contributing immensely to the Taliban's success has been the inability of the United States to eliminate the sanctuary the Taliban was granted in Pakistan. Center for Strategic and International Studies terrorism expert Seth Jones wrote in 2018: ``The Taliban['s] . . . sanctuary in Pakistan and state support from organizations like [Inter-Services Intelligence or] ISI have been essential to their war effort, and the U.S. failure to undermine this safe haven may be Washington's most significant mistake [of the war].'' As the Afghan Study Group notes, these ``sanctuaries are essential to the viability of the insurgency.'' Additionally, Pakistan's ISI aided and abetted the Taliban while opportunistically cooperating with the United States. As Brookings scholar Vanda Felbab-Brown assessed in 2018: ``Pakistan provided direct military and intelligence aid . . . resulting in the deaths of U.S. soldiers, Afghan security personnel, and civilians, plus significant destabilization of Afghanistan.'' This support to the Taliban runs counter to Pakistani cooperation with the United States, including, as they have, allowing the use of airspace and other infrastructure for which the United States provided significant funding. As the Afghan Study Group noted: ``Pakistan has played both sides of the field.'' These dynamics further play out against a complex environment in Pakistan, which has implications for the national security of the United States, its allies, and partners. Pakistan is simultaneously fragile and armed with nuclear weapons, making its vulnerability particularly dangerous. To add to this toxic mix, Pakistan is in a longstanding struggle with its neighbor, India, which is also armed with nuclear weapons. As Seth Jones described: ``Pakistan and India have long been involved in a balance-of-power struggle in South Asia. Both lay claim to the Kashmir region, and have fought three wars over Kashmir since 1947. Afghanistan is not the ultimate objective of either country but rather an arena for competition in what has long been called the `great game.''' While bogged down politically and militarily in daily crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States, over multiple administrations, has been unable to focus the necessary attention on Pakistan. Therefore, these problems have only gotten worse. Another factor shaping the President's decision is that the United States and its coalition partners were never able to develop an Afghan Government that could gain the confidence of the people, especially beyond the cities, and provide basic services, including security, education, healthcare, and justice. A study by the World Bank in late 2019 found that 55 percent of Afghans were living below the poverty line, with even basic civilian services underfunded. The lack of the government's ability to meet such needs erodes the people's support for the government. Afghanistan has also been undermined by profound corruption. The Afghan Study Group assessed that corruption has ``delegitimized the existing government and created grievances that are exploited by the Taliban to gain support and, at times, legitimacy.'' Corruption is a national security concern that further erodes the ability of the government to build faith and trust. Additionally, the leadership of the Afghan Government is seen as being removed from the populace. This makes it harder to understand the needs of the people and to govern effectively. A prime example of this conundrum is the current President, Ashraf Ghani. Ghani was reelected after a 5-month delay in the polling results and following a longstanding dispute with his political rival. While Ghani is a serious scholar and technocrat who literally wrote a book on fixing failed states, he appears unable to fix his own state. As the New York Times reported just last week, ``From most advantage points, Mr. Ghani--well qualified for his job and deeply credentialed, with Johns Hopkins, Berkeley, Columbia, the World Bank, and the United Nations in his background--is thoroughly isolated. A serious author with a first class intellect, he is dependent on the counsel of a handful, unwilling to even watch television news, those who know him say, and losing allies fast.'' But even if President Ghani was a strong leader, it would likely not be enough. The instability of the central government, which has been fueled by rival factions seeking power resulting in inconclusive elections, has led to unwieldy power sharing arrangements. Beyond challenges between those political officials and technocrats who want to serve the government and may have competing visions, there is the fundamental tension between those trying to achieve the complex task of governing Afghanistan in Kabul and the Taliban, who have a single focus: ejecting foreign forces. There also appears to be a lack of willingness by the government to seriously negotiate with the Taliban and make tough choices that could have obtained, perhaps, a lasting peace deal. The Afghan Government also remains unable to generate revenue to fund its operations. Instead, it relies almost solely on foreign contributions. This includes an average of $5 billion in security assistance, along with $3.5 billion in civilian assistance from the United States and the international donors each year. The World Bank assessed in late 2019 that even if there was a peace agreement between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, Afghanistan would still need as much as $7 billion a year from foreign forces to sustain its most basic spending. With all of these complex dynamics at play, it underscores a further, albeit profoundly unsatisfactory conclusion facing the President. The alternative to withdrawal was not the status quo. More U.S. and NATO forces would have been required for self defense and especially if there was another attempt to ``surge'' forces to degrade the Taliban. It appears that the President concluded that more troops might buy more time and casualties, but more time would not create a government that could defeat the Taliban and effectively govern Afghanistan. As the old Afghan saying goes: ``You have all the watches; we have all the time.'' It is important to emphasize, though, that the President's decision should be seen as a transition, not closure. We still have vital security interests in the region. Afghanistan is not in the rearview mirror. Pakistan is not in the rearview mirror. There is a high probability that without NATO and U.S. support, the Afghan security forces will degrade and collapse, which will ultimately cause the Afghan Government to collapse. The Trump administration's agreement with the Taliban included the departure of all security personnel, logisticians, and contractors, which means that when the United States leaves, the international presence that, again, is the foundation for Afghan resistance is removed. The intelligence community's Annual Threat Assessment for 2021 noted: ``The Afghan government will struggle to hold the Taliban at bay if the coalition withdraws support.'' And according to the New York Times, American intelligence agencies assessed that if U.S. troops leave before a peace deal is reached between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, Afghanistan ``could fall largely under the control of the Taliban within two or three years after the withdrawal of international forces.'' We have already seen evidence of this trend even prior to the full withdrawal. The International Crisis Group assessed that ``as U.S. force levels have fallen, battlefield dynamics have steadily shifted in the insurgents' favor.'' Dexter Filkins described: ``Since 2001, the main arena of conflict in Afghanistan has been the countryside: the government held the cities, while the Taliban fought to control the villages and the towns, particularly in the south, their heartland. But by early this year, the paradigm had begun to fall apart. The Taliban were entrenched across the north; their shadow government had begun to creep into the cities.'' Another possibility, either in the interim or a permanent fact, is that the country could fracture with local warlords and the Taliban controlling different territory. This would further intensify conflict, increase instability, and create second order effects, such as the flow of internationally displaced persons and refugees. The International Crisis Group noted that the likelihood of fracture increases ``if U.S. and other funding declines'' and that it has the possibility of pulling Afghanistan's neighbors and other regional powers into backing proxies in a multisided struggle. Again, the Afghan Study Group warned: ``Any scenario in which the state collapses, as it did in 1992, will make it considerably more difficult for the United States to ensure its fundamental national security interests.'' If the Taliban reestablishes its emirate in Afghanistan, it would likely result in erasing all the progress that has been made toward building democracy and particularly the rights of women and girls. As Seth Jones, again, wrote in a recent article published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, ``The Taliban is in many ways a different organization from the one that governed Afghanistan in the 1990s. Yet most of their leaders are nevertheless committed to an extreme interpretation of Islam that is not shared by many Afghans, an autocratic political system that eschews democracy, and the persistence of relations with terrorist groups like al-Qa`ida.'' If NATO and the United States depart, another consequence is increasing pressure to limit or end international aid. Afghanistan cannot fund itself and, even under the best case scenario, would require $7 billion from international donors annually. It will be extremely difficult to administer programs and provide aid on the ground without oversight, and that, too, would very well lead to smaller international donations. Furthermore, the entire budget of the Afghan Ministry of Defense is paid for by international contributions. If soldiers are not getting paid, it would have a profound impact on national security. Another likely consequence of withdrawal, which has been previously discussed, is the creation of a vacuum that allows the resurgence of terrorist groups, including al-Qaida and ISIS of the Khorasan Province. As the Afghan Study Group also pointed out, these groups are ``for now limited by the military presence of the United States and its allies, which allows the threat to be monitored and, when necessary, disrupted, while also enabling Afghan Security Forces to continue to put pressure on these groups.'' However, the group warned: ``During its deliberations, the Study Group was advised that a complete U.S. withdrawal without a peace agreement would allow these groups to gradually rebuild their capabilities in the Afghanistan Pakistan region such that they might be able to attack the U.S. homeland within eighteen to thirty six months.'' This timeline is short, alarming, and has direct implications for our national security. Also, an immediate concern as the United States begins to withdraw is an increase in attacks from Afghan forces against the United States and coalition forces, commonly referred to as ``green on blue attacks.'' Finally, we must anticipate a flood of refugees as Afghans flee the chaos. In addition, we must do our part to aid those Afghans who have aided us. Given these facts and given the President's difficult decision to leave Afghanistan, I believe we must take serious actions to mitigate these threats. The withdrawal of U.S. forces should not mean an end to our counterterrorism efforts. Most importantly, we must ensure that Afghanistan will not be a source of planning, plotting, or projection of terrorist attacks around the globe, including against our homeland. Instead, we must transition to a new type of presence leaving the country but staying in the region in a meaningful capacity. We must build an anti terrorism infrastructure on the periphery of Afghanistan. We must continue to direct the proper level of attention, intelligence, and resources to evaluate the evolving terrorist threat in the region. This also includes closer cooperation with our allies and partners. We must continue to engage regional powers diplomatically, and the Biden administration has already begun to reinvigorate that process. We must use the power of our alliances and particularly those in the region who would endure severe consequences and instability from sharing a border with a failed Afghanistan. Working in cooperation, the United States and its allies and regional partners must be a check on potential instability. President Biden is committed to ensuring that this is not a forever war. But he has also made it clear he won't allow Afghanistan to become a safe haven for terrorism. Our mission to protect the homeland remains. Our duty to do so remains. As we go forward, this is a moment of transition, not of closure; this is a moment to do all we can to protect this country and hopefully ensure a safer region I yield the floor.

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Nomination of Vanita Gupta (Executive Session)2021-04-15

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be allowed to talk as in morning business for up to 15 minutes.

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Introductory Statement on S. 11262021-04-14

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the bipartisan Strengthening Research in Adult Education Act with my colleague, Senator Young. We are in urgent need of identifying and disseminating innovative and effective methods for supporting adult learners. Our legislation will ensure that there is a strong research base to improve the teaching provided for, and the learning of, adults seeking to advance their literacy, numeracy, and digital literacy skills. The most recent data from the Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies show an urgent need for action in adult education with an estimated 19 percent of adults ages 16-65 in the United States performing at the lowest levels of literacy; twenty- nine percent at the lowest levels of numeracy; and 24 percent at the lowest levels of digital problem solving. This is a dire situation. These are essential skills for postsecondary education and the workplace. Beyond their value in the labor market, these skills are also correlated with health and civic participation, making adult education critically important to the health and well-being of our people, our economy, and our democracy. In Rhode Island, it is estimated that nearly 82,000 working age adults have less than a high school education. Over 55,000 have limited English proficiency. Yet, we are reaching just over 5,000 through the current adult education program. Clearly, we need more resources and innovative, research-based ways to reach more people. The Strengthening Research in Adult Education Act will support the key reforms to adult education in the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act by ensuring that adult education is included in our national education research priorities. Specifically, the Strengthening Research in Adult Education Act will amend the Education Sciences Reform Act to require the Institute for Education Sciences and the National Center for Education Statistics to collect data and carry out research on: successful State and local adult education and literacy activities, the characteristics and academic achievement of adult learners, and access to and opportunity for adult education, including digital literacy skills development, in communities across the Nation. It will also ensure that the Institute of Education Sciences draws on the expertise of adult educators when developing policies and priorities. Finally, the legislation would require that at least one research center would focus on adult education. These straightforward amendments to the Education Sciences Reform Act will go a long way to strengthening the research base that will support the improvement of adult education across the country. I was pleased to work with the adult education community, and particularly, the Coalition of Adult Basic Educators and the National Coalition for Literacy in developing this legislation. I urge my colleagues to support the Strengthening Research in Adult Education Act and to work with me to ensure that its provisions are included in the reauthorization of the Education Sciences Reform Act.

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STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS2021-04-14

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the bipartisan Strengthening Research in Adult Education Act with my colleague, Senator Young. We are in urgent need of identifying and disseminating innovative and effective methods for supporting adult learners. Our legislation will ensure that there is a strong research base to improve the teaching provided for, and the learning of, adults seeking to advance their literacy, numeracy, and digital literacy skills. The most recent data from the Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies show an urgent need for action in adult education with an estimated 19 percent of adults ages 16-65 in the United States performing at the lowest levels of literacy; twenty- nine percent at the lowest levels of numeracy; and 24 percent at the lowest levels of digital problem solving. This is a dire situation. These are essential skills for postsecondary education and the workplace. Beyond their value in the labor market, these skills are also correlated with health and civic participation, making adult education critically important to the health and well-being of our people, our economy, and our democracy. In Rhode Island, it is estimated that nearly 82,000 working age adults have less than a high school education. Over 55,000 have limited English proficiency. Yet, we are reaching just over 5,000 through the current adult education program. Clearly, we need more resources and innovative, research-based ways to reach more people. The Strengthening Research in Adult Education Act will support the key reforms to adult education in the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act by ensuring that adult education is included in our national education research priorities. Specifically, the Strengthening Research in Adult Education Act will amend the Education Sciences Reform Act to require the Institute for Education Sciences and the National Center for Education Statistics to collect data and carry out research on: successful State and local adult education and literacy activities, the characteristics and academic achievement of adult learners, and access to and opportunity for adult education, including digital literacy skills development, in communities across the Nation. It will also ensure that the Institute of Education Sciences draws on the expertise of adult educators when developing policies and priorities. Finally, the legislation would require that at least one research center would focus on adult education. These straightforward amendments to the Education Sciences Reform Act will go a long way to strengthening the research base that will support the improvement of adult education across the country. I was pleased to work with the adult education community, and particularly, the Coalition of Adult Basic Educators and the National Coalition for Literacy in developing this legislation. I urge my colleagues to support the Strengthening Research in Adult Education Act and to work with me to ensure that its provisions are included in the reauthorization of the Education Sciences Reform Act.

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NOTICE OF A TIE VOTE, UNDER S. RES. 272021-03-24

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print the following letter in the Congressional Record.

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EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEE2021-03-23

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, for the Committee on Armed Services I report favorably the following nomination lists which were printed in the Records on the dates indicated, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar that these nominations lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators.

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STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION2021-03-23

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, today I am reintroducing the Rhode Island Fishermen's Fairness Act along with my colleague Senator Whitehouse. This legislation seeks to address a longstanding inequity in our nation's fisheries management system that denies Rhode Island a voice in the management of many stocks that our fishing industry relies on. Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Rhode Island has voting membership on the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) since NEFMC-managed stocks represent a significant percentage of landings and revenue for our state. However, Rhode Island has an even larger stake in Mid- Atlantic fisheries. Yet, it does not have voting representation on the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (MAFMC), which currently consists of representatives from New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. According to data provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), between 2015 and 2019, Rhode Island accounted for approximately a quarter of the commercial landings from stocks under MAFMC's sole jurisdiction, both by weight and value. The significance of commercial landings from stocks managed by MAFMC is growing every year for Rhode Island, accounting for 58% of Rhode Island's federally managed commercial fisheries landings in 2019. After making an appearance during last summer's Democratic National Convention, Rhode Island calamari quickly became a social media sensation, and for good reason. Calamari (or squid) is by far the most important commercial species in the Ocean State. In 2019 alone, Rhode Island landed over 5.5 million more pounds of squid than any other state on the East Coast. But, Rhode Island does not have a formal say in how this species is managed because it does not have representation on the MAFMC. The legislation we are introducing offers a simple solution with a sound precedent. North Carolina was added to the MAFMC as part of the Sustainable Fisheries Act in 1996. Like Rhode Island, a significant portion of North Carolina's landed fish species were managed by the MAFMC, yet the state was not represented on the council. Just like the 1996 law that added North Carolina, the Rhode Island Fishermen's Fairness Act would create two seats for our state on the MAFMC. One seat would be appointed by the Secretary of Commerce based on recommendations from the Governor of Rhode Island, and a second seat would be filled by Rhode Island's principal state official with marine fishery management responsibility. To accommodate these new members, the bill would increase the MAFMC from 21 to 23 voting members. This would guarantee Rhode Island the same minimum representation as other states currently on the council, without altering their status. With mounting economic, ecological, and regulatory challenges, it is more important than ever that Rhode Island fishermen have a voice in the management of the fisheries they depend on. I urge our colleagues to join us in supporting this commonsense legislation.

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Introductory Statement on S. 8082021-03-17

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, today I am reintroducing the Cybersecurity Disclosure Act along with three members of the Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Warner and Senators Collins and Wyden, in addition to Senators Cortez Masto and Cramer, who serve with me on the Senate Banking Committee. In response to serious data breaches of various companies, our legislation asks each publicly traded company to include--in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosures to investors--information on whether any member of the Board of Directors is a cybersecurity expert, and if not, why having this expertise on the Board of Directors is not necessary because of other cybersecurity steps taken by the publicly traded company. To be clear, the legislation does not require companies to take any actions other than to provide this disclosure to its investors. As EY, also known as Ernst & Young, noted in an August 2020 publication, ``Public disclosures can help build trust by providing transparency and assurance around how boards are fulfilling their cybersecurity risk oversight responsibilities.'' Investors and customers deserve a clear understanding of whether publicly traded companies are prioritizing cybersecurity and have the capacity to protect investors and customers from cyber related attacks. Our legislation aims to provide a better understanding of these issues through improved SEC disclosures. While this legislation is a matter for consideration by the Banking Committee, of which I am a member, this bill is also informed by my service on the Armed Services Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence. Through this Banking-Armed Services-Intelligence perspective, I see that our economic security is indeed a matter of our national security, and this is particularly the case as the pandemic has forced many of us to be ever more dependent on technology and the Internet. Indeed, General Darren W. McDew, the former Commander of U.S. Transportation Command, which is charged with moving our military assets to meet our national security objectives in partnership with the private sector, offered several sobering assessments during an April 10, 2018 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He stated that ``cyber is the number one threat to U.S. Transportation Command, but I believe it is the number one threat to the Nation . . . in our headquarters, cyber is the commander's business, but not everywhere across our Country is cyber a CEO's business . . . in our cyber roundtables, which is one of the things we are doing to raise our level of awareness, some of the CEO's chief security officers cannot even get to see the board, they cannot even . . . see the CEO. So that is a problem.'' With growing cyber threats that have resulted in serious breaches, we all need to be more proactive in ensuring our Nation's cybersecurity. This legislation seeks to take one step towards that goal by encouraging publicly traded companies to be more transparent to their investors and customers on whether and how their Boards of Directors and senior management are prioritizing cybersecurity. I thank the bill's supporters, including the North American Securities Administrators Association, the Council of Institutional Investors, the National Association of State Treasurers, the California Public Employees' Retirement System, the Bipartisan Policy Center, MIT Professor Simon Johnson, Columbia Law Professor Jack Coffee, the Consumer Federation of America, and Rhode Island General Treasurer Seth Magaziner, and I urge our colleagues to join in supporting this legislation.

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STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS2021-03-17

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, today I am reintroducing the Cybersecurity Disclosure Act along with three members of the Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Warner and Senators Collins and Wyden, in addition to Senators Cortez Masto and Cramer, who serve with me on the Senate Banking Committee. In response to serious data breaches of various companies, our legislation asks each publicly traded company to include--in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosures to investors--information on whether any member of the Board of Directors is a cybersecurity expert, and if not, why having this expertise on the Board of Directors is not necessary because of other cybersecurity steps taken by the publicly traded company. To be clear, the legislation does not require companies to take any actions other than to provide this disclosure to its investors. As EY, also known as Ernst & Young, noted in an August 2020 publication, ``Public disclosures can help build trust by providing transparency and assurance around how boards are fulfilling their cybersecurity risk oversight responsibilities.'' Investors and customers deserve a clear understanding of whether publicly traded companies are prioritizing cybersecurity and have the capacity to protect investors and customers from cyber related attacks. Our legislation aims to provide a better understanding of these issues through improved SEC disclosures. While this legislation is a matter for consideration by the Banking Committee, of which I am a member, this bill is also informed by my service on the Armed Services Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence. Through this Banking-Armed Services-Intelligence perspective, I see that our economic security is indeed a matter of our national security, and this is particularly the case as the pandemic has forced many of us to be ever more dependent on technology and the Internet. Indeed, General Darren W. McDew, the former Commander of U.S. Transportation Command, which is charged with moving our military assets to meet our national security objectives in partnership with the private sector, offered several sobering assessments during an April 10, 2018 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He stated that ``cyber is the number one threat to U.S. Transportation Command, but I believe it is the number one threat to the Nation . . . in our headquarters, cyber is the commander's business, but not everywhere across our Country is cyber a CEO's business . . . in our cyber roundtables, which is one of the things we are doing to raise our level of awareness, some of the CEO's chief security officers cannot even get to see the board, they cannot even . . . see the CEO. So that is a problem.'' With growing cyber threats that have resulted in serious breaches, we all need to be more proactive in ensuring our Nation's cybersecurity. This legislation seeks to take one step towards that goal by encouraging publicly traded companies to be more transparent to their investors and customers on whether and how their Boards of Directors and senior management are prioritizing cybersecurity. I thank the bill's supporters, including the North American Securities Administrators Association, the Council of Institutional Investors, the National Association of State Treasurers, the California Public Employees' Retirement System, the Bipartisan Policy Center, MIT Professor Simon Johnson, Columbia Law Professor Jack Coffee, the Consumer Federation of America, and Rhode Island General Treasurer Seth Magaziner, and I urge our colleagues to join in supporting this legislation.

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IMPEACHMENT2021-03-01

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have my opinion memorandum in the impeachment trial of President Donald J. Trump be printed in the Record.

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SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES RULES OF PROCEDURE2021-02-24

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, pursuant to rule XXVI, paragraph 2, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, on behalf of myself and Senator Inhofe, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the committee rules governing the procedure of the Committee on Armed Services be printed in the Record. These Rules were adopted by committee by voice vote on February 11, 2021.

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EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEE2021-02-23

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Mr. President, for the Committee on Armed Services I report favorably the following nomination lists which were printed in the Records on the dates indicated, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar that these nominations lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators.

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TRIBUTE TO COLONEL RAY RENOLA2021-02-08

Mr. REED

Mr. REED. Madam President, today I pay tribute to a very special Rhode Islander, COL Ray Renola, USA (Ret.), who holds a unique distinction among all Americans. Mr. Renola, at 104 years old, is the oldest living graduate of my alma mater, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. A member of the class of 1940, Mr. Renola stands at the head of the Long Grey Line of West Pointers who have served the Nation since 1802. As described in a recent column by Mark Patinkin in the Providence Journal, Ray was the son of Italian immigrants and one of eight children raised on the West End of Providence. He was a graduate of Classical High School in Providence and then entered Brown University, but in 1936, he made the decision to serve his country and restart and complete his college education at West Point. Like many of our World War II veterans, Ray did not talk much about his service on the western front as a lieutenant colonel and commanding officer of the 375th Field Artillery Battalion. In short, he deployed his battalion and led them against fierce enemy resistance, unpredictable weather, harsh terrain, and austere conditions. And he led them as they made great contributions to Allied forces during the push toward Berlin in 1944-1945. After the war, Ray continued his service to our country with postings from Belgium to the Pentagon, before retiring from the military after 20 years of service. He had a similarly successful career in the private sector, working for Bulova and GTE. He found the love of his life with Lucille, to whom he was married for 30 years, until her passing in 2010. They shared an active life of sport and travel. He remains the loved and revered patriarch of the larger, extended Renola family. Ray embodies what it means to live an extraordinary life: love for his country; love for his family; a life of duty, honor, and country.

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