Pat Roberts

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize and pay tribute to General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for his lifetime of service and unfaltering dedication to the United States Armed Forces and our country. As both a soldier and a leader, spanning 40 years of military service, General Myers contributions to our peace and security, and that of our children and grandchildren, are a remarkable hallmark in military history. During trying times, under sometimes harsh scrutiny, and with high national security stakes at hand, General Myers has repeatedly shown his Kansas common sense, leading our military through two wars and a host of other challenges with a steady hand. Dick Myers was well prepared for leadership. Born in Kansas City, MO, in 1942, General Myers graduated from Shawnee Mission North High School and attended Kansas State University, where he enrolled in the Air Force ROTC and was commissioned second lieutenant in 1965. After his commissioning, General Myers entered pilot training at Vance Air Force Base, Oklahoma. As a command pilot, he logged over 4,000 flying hours, including 600 combat hours over Vietnam and Laos. Serving in a wide variety of assignments over the next several decades, General Myers assumed the duties of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March 2000. On October 1, 2001, just weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks, General Myers was named the 15th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the first Vice Chairman to ascend to the office, General Myers served as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, and played a critical role in the planning and execution of the Global War on Terrorism, including the important Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. During General Myers tenure as the chairman, he was constantly faced with unique challenges and responsibilities with both frustrating and emotional circumstances, from the worst terrorist attacks on the United States in our proud history to fighting overseas wars against terrorists and the enemies of freedom and democracy. Yet, despite all of the challenges, General Myers maintained a positive, forward looking determination and attitude, and never faltered in his responsibility to our men and women serving in the armed forces today. General Myers' tenure and accomplishments were not limited to the Global War on Terrorism, including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under General Myers' leadership, the Joint Staff produced a far- reaching National Military Strategy, complemented by a National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, to guide the Armed Forces for the challenges of the 21st Century. This strategy serves as a template for the Global War on Terrorism, and was and will be truly instrumental in bringing freedom to the people of Iraq and Afghanistan. General Myers also oversaw the establishment of the United States Northern Command, or NORTHCOM, the first combatant command responsible for the homeland defense of the continental United States. As part of this effort, the chairman advocated joint war fighting among the services and called on the entire U.S. Government to expand the culture of jointness in the interagency and international communities. General Myers has truly shown great leadership in his efforts to transform and modernize the military. General Myers should also be recognized for his humanitarian role--a mission many times missing from the headlines. In late 2004, in response to the horrific events surrounding the Indian Ocean Tsunami, General Myers oversaw ``Operation Unified Assistance'', the largest coordinated and executed military humanitarian relief effort since the Berlin Air Lift. Designed to enable more than 15,000 Department of Defense personnel, 130 aircraft, and 20 United States Navy warships to distribute more than 400,000 gallons of water, 2,000 tons of food, and almost 3,000 tons of other supplies to those in need, the mission was a success. General Myers' impeccable service and brave leadership are also reflected in the awards and decorations he has received throughout his career. General Myers is the recipient of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguish Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, Air Medal with eighteen oak leaf clusters, Air Force Commendation Medal, Joint Meritorious Unit Award with four oak leaf clusters, and Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with ``V'' device with three oak leaf clusters. Mr. President, today I have mentioned but a few of General Richard Myers' numerous accomplishments. I not only consider General Myers a strong military leader, in times of both war and peace, and a critically important person in the defense of our great Nation, I am privileged to call him a friend and a colleague. I have often said that if I were in a gunfight on Front Street in Dodge City, KS, during our States' pioneer days, there is no person I would rather have by my side than Richard Myers. I know that a grateful Nation shares my appreciation for the general--a courageous and honorable man and a strong and steadfast military leader during a truly trying time, and I know my colleagues join me in paying tribute to him and his wife Mary Jo for the years they have dedicated to our country and to the betterment of the United States Armed Forces. General Myers, we wish you well.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for yielding. There is not another thing, basically, on any of these amendments that has not already been said or that will change anybody's vote. I don't intend to hold the Senate up, but I want to take a moment to comment on where we are in the legislative schedule and to make a personal request of my colleagues. I don't question the right of any Senator to be heard on the Senate floor. But I must say I do not understand the need to continue debating and discussing all of these amendments on the Friday afternoon before the start of a long month's recess. I ask, could we please cut down on the rhetoric so that we might be able to get along with the people's business and cast our votes. I know the manager wants that. I would probably determine that the minority would like that as well. I make this request not only as a Senator from Kansas but as the father of a young lady that I will be walking down the aisle tomorrow. Very early this week I informed our leaders in the Senate that I had every intention of being at her rehearsal, and that rehearsal and dinner starts at 5 o'clock. I will be there. So if we must continue on making these statements this afternoon and offering these amendments, I ask that the Record reflect that any votes I miss will be the result of me performing my duties as a dad and being with my daughter on the most important evening and day of her life. Thus, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Record reflect that should I miss votes in the afternoon, it would have been my intention to vote as follows on the Transportation bill, amendments to the gun liability bill, and the gun liability bill itself: ``Yea'' on the Transportation bill; ``nay'' on the Reed amendment No. 1642; ``yea'' on the Frist-Craig first-degree amendment to the Kennedy amendment No. 1615. Should the first-degree amendment not be accepted, I would vote ``nay'' on the Kennedy amendment. I would vote ``yea'' on the Frist-Craig first-degree amendment to the Corzine amendment No. 1619. Should the first-degree amendment not be accepted, it would have been my intention to vote ``nay'' on the Corzine amendment. It would be my intention to vote ``yea'' on the Frist-Craig first-degree amendment to the Lautenberg amendment No. 1620. Should the first-degree amendment not be accepted, it would be my intention to vote ``nay'' on the Lautenberg amendment. Finally, it would be my intention to vote ``yea'' on final passage of the gun liability bill. I respect and love you all. I admire you all. But while charm and looks and levity may woo us in the start, in the end it is brevity that will win my colleagues' hearts. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. No. I only have 2 minutes. But perhaps on down the road. That is why I think the suggestion of the Senator from Minnesota is a good one, that we ought to go into a quorum call to try to figure out what this means. Read the language in detail. Intentionally or unintentionally reveal classified information--I have news for you, we have people in the intelligence community who make mistakes, inadvertently make mistakes. This is going to end the career of many young people who will make mistakes down the road and lose their security clearance. Security clearances are an administrative process, not a statutory process. The Reid amendment strips all distinction from employees in regard to their home agency and in regard to any discretion. Mr. President, could I have one more minute?

Mr. ROBERTS. So in your zeal to hang Karl Rove--and that is what this is about--you are going to put a stake in the careers of national security professionals from here on in. During the administrative procedure by that home agency or that person's superior officer, they can be counseled, they can be admonished, but they do not lose their security clearances. They do make mistakes. I don't know how many that is going to be, but that is going to be a bunch. That is going to send a chilling effect throughout our entire intelligence community. This is poorly written. We ought to go into a quorum call and work it together so we at least know what the outcome is going to be.

Mr. ROBERTS. I don't have any time. It is his time.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, for the record, my good friend, my colleague from California, does not have a security clearance. None of us do. We are deemed by the electorate to be cleared from the lowest to the highest. We do not have a security clearance to lose. So that is not accurate. And I don't court the venal part of this. In terms of the second-degree amendment, unless I was hearing something different and somebody raised the issue, as Congress included in this--the Senate--along with Federal employees who either intentionally or unintentionally reveal classified information, Senator Levin, Senator Durbin, Senator Reid said ``yes.'' So that is reflective of the second-degree amendment. If that is not the case, we have a double standard for Members of Congress or other public officials as opposed to Federal employees. We ought to get that straight, which is why I think the suggestion from the Senator from----

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I am still a little unclear in regard to the Reid amendment. I understand from three Senators--Senator Levin, Senator Durbin, Senator Reid--that this also applies to public employees, i.e., Senators. If that is the case, if Members are included, one of the things we have to determine is that `` . . . to a person not authorized to receive such information shall be permitted to hold a security clearance for access to such information''--well, we don't have security clearances. By our election, we are deemed to be cleared for all security, and so we are not losing anything. If in fact somebody unintentionally came to the floor and in a public statement basically said or disclosed or has disclosed classified information including the identity of a covert agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, the answer to this is meaningless because we don't have a security clearance. They don't exist for Members. We are deemed to have a total clearance. And so I don't know what the remedy is. Again, if you do it unintentionally, I can tell you that is a slippery slope. There have been Members basically inadvertently saying things in the Chamber and in the public that could match this amendment. I am not going to get into names, but I think that has happened in the past without question. I know it happened in the Intelligence Committee, probably the Armed Services Committee, probably many other committees. This is just not very clear, and what we have here is a Special Prosecutor with a lot of leaks; we have a reporter in jail for a story she did not write; we have a steady stream of leaks about every aspect of this case; we have the Washington press corps in full attack mode; and, finally, before we have all the facts known, we have my colleagues across the aisle calling for Karl Rove's resignation, if not incarceration. So much for the presumption of innocence. Don't get me wrong; we must protect the identities without any question, as my distinguished vice chairman of the committee, Senator Rockefeller, has said, but that obligation also extends to the Agency for which they work. I just think here we have a tempest, to characterize the newest revelations in the Valerie Plame case as a stunning turn of events demanding immediate action by the President, the special prosecutor, and now the Congress of the United States. I am not a big advocate of the ``shoot now, ask questions later'' approach. I certainly prefer to know the facts and then make a judgment. My preference notwithstanding, the judgment of the current deluge of media coverage seems to be based on the premise that the White House-- i.e., Karl Rove--was trying to discredit Ambassador Wilson for his much-publicized opposition to the war. It is important to remember that there is already a record on this point, and I urge Members to really pay attention to the record. More than a year ago, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued its unanimous report on prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq. We have a 511-page report explaining in detail how our intelligence agencies got it wrong. Now to the subject at hand, this so-called tempest. Included in that report was a recitation of the facts that surround the now infamous travels of the former Ambassador Joe Wilson, who can best be described as a bit player in the Iraq story, notwithstanding his substantial efforts to embellish the significance of his role. Mr. Wilson became quite a celebrity and questioned the President's veracity as he carefully crafted his public persona as a ``truthteller.'' He went on a media blitz, Mr. President. He appeared on more than 30 television shows including, ironically, ``The Daily Show,'' a fake news show. Time and time again, he told anybody who would listen that the President had lied to the American people, the Vice President had lied, and that he had debunked the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. However, the committee found not only did he not debunk the claim, he actually gave some intelligence analysts even more reason to believe it may be true. In an interview with committee staff, the same committee staff that interviewed over 250 analysts to prove that we had systemic problems in the intelligence community, he was asked how he knew some of the things he was stating publicly with such confidence. On at least two occasions, he admitted that he had no direct knowledge to support some of his claims and he was drawing on either unrelated past experiences or no information at all. For example, when asked how he knew that the intelligence community had rejected the possibility of a Niger-Iraq uranium deal as he wrote in his book, he told committee staff that his assertion may have involved ``a little literary flair.'' I urge my colleagues to read the 511-page report that was voted out 17 to nothing. The former Ambassador, either by design or through ignorance, gave the American people or, for that matter, the world, a version of events that was inaccurate, unsubstantiated, and misleading. What is more disturbing, he continues to do so today. Now that the Washington press corps is in a full-attack mode over the recent revelations in the Valerie Plame case, Ambassador Wilson is back on the circuit. He is continuing his self-proclaimed quest to have Karl Rove, in his words, ``frog marched in handcuffs'' out of the White House. And basically that is what we are trying to do with this amendment, if you follow the partisan line of thinking as put forth by Ambassador Joe Wilson. And before all the facts are known, he has been joined by a chorus of colleagues and liberal action groups calling for Karl Rove's resignation and in some cases even incarceration. So much for the presumption of innocence. Now, don't get me wrong. If someone willfully or knowingly outs an undercover intelligence officer, they should be punished. Senator Rockefeller is exactly right about that. Punishment should be reserved, however, for those who have actually committed a crime. The law requires knowledge. And if Mr. Rove didn't know and no one told him that Valerie Plame was undercover, then, pardon me, he did not break any laws. The mere fact that one works for the CIA is not in and of itself classified. As important, the law presumes the Government is taking ``affirmative measures to conceal'' the officer's intelligence relationship to the United States. I am just not convinced that a serious effort to conceal an undercover officer's intelligence relationship includes driving to CIA headquarters every day for work. The Intelligence Committee has examined with staff the issue of cover before and identified a number of serious problems, and we are currently examining the issue of cover once again because some of these problems do persist. While we should leave the criminal investigation to the Special Prosecutor, we will continue our work to ensure that those who are actually undercover get the protection they need and deserve. Again, as for the former Ambassador, no one needed to discredit him. He took care of that himself. Now, before I close, I would like to say something in response to the gray picture painted by the distinguished minority leader. Much has been said about the grave damage that was done to our Nation's security when Valerie Plame's name was revealed to the press. There has also been speculation that Ms. Plame, although nominally undercover, really wasn't undercover at all. So as part of the Intelligence Committee's ongoing oversight of the issue of cover, we will examine this case and see where the truth lies. Basically, I think we are on the wrong track here, and again I urge my colleagues, if you put in law that if anybody reveals classified information unintentionally, including the Members of this Senate, that is a slippery road we will go down where current Members who I see sitting in the Chamber would fit into that category, and it is unwarranted, unneeded. It is not the way to do it according to the act that was cited by my distinguished colleague from Minnesota. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to recognize Joan Piermarini, who is retiring after 20 years of service to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Joan has served the committee under seven chairmen--a testament to her dedication and loyalty. I thank Joan for her many tireless efforts and the significant contributions she has made to the committee. We congratulate her on a job well done and wish her many years of happiness with her family, especially her grandson Luke.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Presiding Officer. Mr. President, today I rise in support of the Central American and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement called CAFTA. I also want to state a word of caution in regards to an issue that is commensurate with this vote; and that is the waning support for free trade in this country, more especially in farm country. It was not long ago when the prospect of expanding our trading opportunities with our neighbors across the ocean--the 96 percent of the rest of the world in terms of trade--was met with great optimism and urgency. I do not know of anybody who made a farm speech who did not say: OK, point No. 2, point No. 3--in the laundry list of things they were trying to get done in Washington--without involving trade and expanding exports. Times have changed. Today I think we are suffering from what I call ``trade fatigue.'' That is to say, many times we oversell and we overestimate what is going to happen in regard to the expectations of a particular trade agreement. We oversell it. I know that many more times we overcriticize them. As a result, in farm country, I think our producers of food and fiber are a little weary and a little wary of this animal we let out of the chute called free trade. There have to be better examples, specific examples, in regard to how our producers basically benefit from free trade during very challenging times in farm country--a time when we see a lot of industry concentration going on and consolidation, not only in farm country but throughout our entire economy. Well, I am privileged to represent the State of Kansas where farm exports support over 47,000 jobs, both on the farm and in food processing and transportation. Farm exports from the State of Kansas are estimated at $3 billion, compromising one-third of all farm income. Our State is the Nation's top exporter of wheat and the second largest beef exporter, both of which rely heavily on increased market access. In short, an opportunity such as CAFTA is going to be essential for Kansas. But in my hometown of Dodge City, and in the rest of farm country, you hear the discussion of trade and exports, and there is some reservation, not expectation. I do not think it is isolationism. I do not think it is protectionism. Too many times farm organizations and commodity groups are looking out for their own commodity interest instead of the big picture, which involves opportunity for all American farmers and businesses. Perhaps more importantly, this is an issue of national security and stability, just south of our border as well. Let me touch on that. Our country has benefitted from trade agreements with Chile, Australia, Canada, and Mexico. Since NAFTA was signed--you do not get the specific instances of this in the press; you always get the instances of somebody who has suffered economically or seen their job outsourced or whatever--but basically, these Kansas exports to Canada and Mexico combined have increased by more than 120 percent. In the first year of the Chilean Free Trade Agreement, our Kansas exports to Chile actually grew by more than 9 percent. CAFTA will build on this trend by securing 44 million new consumers. Under the agreement, half of the current U.S. farm exports to CAFTA countries will become duty free immediately. This includes high-quality cuts of beef and cotton and wheat and soybeans--major commodities. Under the existing World Trade Organization commitments and tariff preferences, most exports under CAFTA countries already enter the U.S. duty free. However, U.S. exports could face potential tariffs of up to 250 percent in the case of beef. Despite these tariffs, why, our producers in Kansas exported to CAFTA countries a total of $23 million last year. Earlier this month, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that our Nation's international trade deficit measured $57 billion. That was a $4 billion increase from previous reporting. As we face the growing competition in global agriculture, it is more important than ever to secure duty-free rates in these countries. Now I want to touch on this business of security just south of our country. As chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I must stress this agreement is not only about expanding market access. We are talking about stability, stability within these countries, and our own national security. Specifically, I am talking about the big issues of immigration, drug trafficking, and energy. If you put in Mexico and Venezuela, for instance, albeit they are adjacent to the CAFTA countries, we are talking about 23 percent of our energy supply. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that without this trade agreement we run the risk of these countries falling prey to others who have far less interest in democracy and stability than in manipulation and power within these countries. I do not want to go back to the days of the 1980s. I do not want to go back to the Nicaraguan situation and Danny Ortega. That is not in the best interests of these countries in the region, and it certainly is not in the best interests of our national security. So given this reality, it is difficult to understand how the interests of one commodity--one commodity; and I am talking about sugar--has largely outweighed the potential for regional stability in CAFTA countries. In the past, whether in trade agreements or trade disputes, whether it be in farm bills or budget reconciliations, our commodity and producer groups sank or swam together. We either hung separately or we basically tried to hang together. But today that is not the case. And, I am not trying to pick on the sugar industry or the sugar representatives or the hard-pressed sugar producers in the United States. It is just that I am terribly concerned that instead of ``one for all and all for one,'' we have ``all for one and one for one.'' And that is not right in regards to how we approach this from the standpoint of the agriculture interests in this country. Sugar is already under one of the most protected U.S. agricultural programs. In fact, when compared to the rest of the world, our producers enjoy the highest world price for their product. I know about their cost inputs. I know about the difficulty, but my previous statement is correct. In recent years, we have journeyed down a dangerous road in our negotiations with the Australian Free Trade Agreement and now with CAFTA, by allowing the singular interests of one commodity to dictate the livelihood of a comprehensive and well- intended agreement. I do not think it is right for one commodity to dictate in regard to their self-interests to the detriment of other interests in agriculture. I remember the whole-herd dairy buyout, which pretty well ruined the entire beef industry. I do not want to go down that road again. I think this is an example of that case. Under CAFTA, during the first year of the agreement, allowable sugar imports will amount to only a little more than one day's U.S. production--one day. The Secretary of Agriculture pulls out of his pocket two sugar packets and says that is what every consumer will have in extra supply in regard to the CAFTA agreement. Despite the nominal projected effect on the U.S. sugar prices and production, our domestic sugar industry has demanded that they go unharmed by this and, plausibly, by any other trade agreement. Despite efforts by the administration and others to try to reach some accommodation, many in this Congress support the sugar industry--and I have as well. As chairman of the House Agriculture Committee during 1996 and through six farm bills, I tried to be helpful to the sugar industry. Every time we have a reconciliation bill, every time we have an appropriations bill, every time we have any votes on a farm bill, we have tried to be of help to the sugar industry. Usually those votes are very close, by two votes, four votes, five votes in the House of Representatives, and the same happens in the Senate. So you stand up and say: OK, let's really try to stay together in regard to the agricultural lobby and be fair to our producers nationwide, nobody singled out. I am saying to the sugar industry, you may win this battle, but you may also lose the war. Sugar's insistence upon receiving special treatment makes it very likely that the rest of agriculture, which overwhelmingly supports CAFTA, may opt not to participate in sugar's defense the next time that program faces a WTO challenge, budget reconciliation measure, and the endless amendments to end sugar's support program during the next farm bill. Let that warning be heard. Some of my colleagues have expressed their concern--we just heard Senator Wyden, the distinguished Senator from Oregon--in regard to labor and human rights standards in the CAFTA countries, arguing the agreement does not set strict enough standards in these areas. I am concerned about the environmental concerns in these countries and the labor concerns in regard to these countries and the human rights standards, but trade agreements are not the appropriate forum for addressing these issues. Basically the country will say: Thank you very much. We are a sovereign country. We are not going to trade with the United States. We will trade with somebody else. We will address these problems on our own. It is a little bit impervious in regard to that concern. I don't think we can expect these countries to establish and value the same high labor standards we have overnight. Rather, we should encourage and facilitate the emergence of such standards. Today the most important question is not what happens if we approve CAFTA but, rather, what would happen if we don't pass this agreement. Only an ocean away, China is aggressively pursuing opportunities to compete in both the high tech and production agricultural sectors. We have only gotten a glimpse of the economic capability and resources of this country. Furthermore, we face additional and continued threats and allegations from the WTO in regards to our international food aid and export programs. I am talking about our food aid and export programs. The recent cotton case brought by Brazil is one of the most serious agriculture trade disputes we have ever faced. And farm country has not awakened to this challenge. The Senate has not awakened to it. The ramifications of this decision in this case are far-reaching and could potentially affect every section of our farm export programs. If we fail to approve CAFTA, we stand to lose credibility in these negotiations and, in turn, the ability to aptly protect the food aid programs and the development assistance that are essential in our war against terror and our efforts to prevent children in the Sudan from going hungry. We have not come this far to take one step forward in the WTO and, with our other bilateral trade negotiations, to take two steps backward by failing to approve CAFTA. If we do not approve CAFTA, I don't know what we do with the Free Trade in Americas Act. I don't know what we do as we go into the WTO negotiations facing the Brazil challenge. I don't know what we do in the next farm bill in regard to how we structure the farm bill if we do not rely on trade and exports, at least to the realistic degree that we should. What do you do? Do you write the farm bill and say: Go back to your domestic production and then pay a higher subsidy for which we do not have the budget dollars? I don't think so. I urge my colleagues to support this agreement. It is in the best interest of the United States, not only on behalf of agriculture and all the other business activities that will benefit from the agreement, but also from a security standpoint as well. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today in an attempt once again to resolve an intelligence-related issue with regard to the nomination of Under Secretary John Bolton to be the U.S. Representative to the United Nations. As my colleagues are probably aware, for some time I have been engaged in an effort to assist my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with some concerns they have with regard to Mr. Bolton and his request for U.S. person identities that are contained in certain intelligence reports. The last time I came to the floor of the Senate, I spoke at length about Mr. Bolton's requests. After reviewing the actual reports and examining the process whereby he was provided the information that he sought, it was apparent to me that Mr. Bolton's requests were not only appropriate but very routine. As far as I was concerned, that was the end of the matter, and I so indicated in my response to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar, in a letter. Based on statements by some of my colleagues, concerns about Mr. Bolton's requests for identities have apparently expanded to include whether the Under Secretary sought these identities to exert some form of retribution against certain Government officials. Although the Foreign Relations Committee's minority views and statements made by minority members seem to indicate that the universe of these officials, or their concerns about these officials, is very small, it is now very clear that this universe is indeed expanding, if not exploding. In fact, in a response I received from the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, and Senator Dodd, we have gone from the innermost planets in our solar system of their concern to include the entire Milky Way. I have informed my colleagues that I could not support such a request because it appears to be more of an effort to preserve this issue, this stalemate, this what some people call a filibuster, than an effort to resolve it. I also informed Senators Biden and Dodd, however, that I could recommend a more focused request that is consistent with their public statements in their minority views. I believe that such a request could be a basis for moving this process forward, a goal I hoped we all shared to get the process moving. In the interest of moving forward, I urged my colleagues to reconsider the scope of their request. The response quite frankly was, no, thank you. That is probably the nicest way I can put it. I believe their bottom line is now: Give us all of the names we have now put in play or no deal. As members of the legislative branch, we have all been in the position of requesting information from the executive branch and being told no. That is not pleasant. That is not what we would like to hear from the executive branch. But we do understand--I think, I hope--that there are limits to what we can demand and expect to receive. That is just a fact of life as we negotiate the separation of powers between the two branches of Government. My colleagues know full well that an absolutist will inevitably lead to a stalemate, and that is what has happened. That is why we tried to work in good faith to address our concerns while recognizing each branch's responsibility and their prerogatives. In my experience, a middle ground is usually achievable. It may take time, but usually we can achieve it. In this case, I believe the administration was willing to meet my colleagues halfway. In other words, if they would provide a reasonable list of names based on actual findings by the committee, perhaps they could be assured that those names were not contained in the reports and their concerns would be simply allayed, while at the same time it would permit the executive to preserve its prerogative to control the dissemination of very sensitive information. Let me just say that signals intelligence and intercepts is in the highest compartmented criteria in regards to intelligence information. So this is very sensitive. Once again, I think that the middle ground, unfortunately, proved very elusive. I am sympathetic to my colleagues' desire to see information they deem necessary to their consideration of Mr. Bolton's nomination. I do not believe, however, that they should be imposing their standard on the entire Senate. The last cloture vote clearly demonstrated that a clear majority believes that the Senate does possess the sufficient information to vote on Mr. Bolton's nomination, and vote we should. With that said, I am prepared to go one step further, in one last good-faith effort, to try to alleviate the concerns expressed by my colleagues across the aisle. Because my colleagues would not share their list of names with me, I have taken what may be viewed as the somewhat unorthodox step of compiling a list of names that I believe do actually reflect the universe of individuals who fall within the parameters set by my colleagues' public statements and their minority views. I am not doing this with temerity. I am trying to make a good-faith effort, and I hope people appreciate my intent in the doing of this. I want my colleagues to know that I have done this in a sincere effort to move this process forward. I do not in any way wish to substitute my judgment for my colleagues', but I do hope we can reach some sort of an accommodation. So I have submitted my list of names to the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, and he has assured me that none of them are among the names requested by Under Secretary Bolton. The names I submitted included Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, his name is not in the intercepts; Christian Westermann of the INR, State Department intelligence branch, not in the intercepts; the individual known as Mr. Smith, not in the intercepts; Rexon Ryu, State Department official, not in the intercepts; Charles L. Pritchard, special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, not in the intercepts. There were two other individuals referenced in the minority views whose names have not been made public, and I will not do so now. However, I did submit their names, and they were not in the intercepts. I am more than willing to share the two names with my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee, but I will not discuss them publicly. Finally, the Foreign Relations Committee's minority views also referenced two other unnamed individuals. I understand, however, that the committee itself is not aware of who these people are, and therefore it is highly unlikely that those names would be part of anybody's list. They were certainly not on mine. I strongly believe this compromise represents the best middle ground and should more than satisfy the concerns of my colleagues. These are the names that were mentioned in the minority views. These are the names that were mentioned in regard to the people who were interviewed. These are the names that have been referred to in the press and the media over and over again. That is what this universe is about. I am very hopeful that this should more than satisfy the concerns of my colleagues, unless, of course, they are not interested in being satisfied, and if that is the case, there is really nothing further anybody can do to move this process forward. I believe it is high time that we vote on this nomination, up or down, whichever way the chips fall. I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to take the next step, whether they are in favor of Mr. Bolton's nomination or not, whether they are for him or they are opposed. We have made some strides recently, it seems to me, in moving nominations to a vote. It seems to me we should continue that trend with Mr. Bolton's nomination and get on with the business of the Senate. I hope I have been helpful. I hope people do not take my actions in the wrong way. I am acting in good faith in the very best way I know how to reach a compromise to alleviate the concerns of my friends across the aisle. I hope that has been the case in regards to my remarks this evening. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed as if in morning business.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize and pay tribute to Major General Thomas J. Romig, The Judge Advocate General of the Army, for his many years of exceptionally meritorious service to our country. General Romig will retire from the Army on September 30, 2005, having completed a distinguished 34-year career. We owe him a debt of gratitude for his many contributions to his Nation and the legal profession, particularly during operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. As The Judge Advocate General since October 1, 2001, General Romig served as the legal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff, as well as the military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant Secretaries. As such, he has been at the forefront of the most pressing issues affecting our Nation and the military today. General Romig's inventive and steady leadership is reflected every day in the superb legal services provided by each and every judge advocate, civilian attorney, legal administrator, paralegal, and legal specialist of The Judge Advocate General's Corps. His professional legal advice has demonstrated his abiding concern for the Army's mission and his sincere interest in the welfare of soldiers and their families. The Army and The Judge Advocate General's Corps have benefited immeasurably from his leadership. General Romig was born in 1948 at Manhattan, KS. He graduated from Manhattan High School in 1966 and attended Kansas State University where he received a Bachelor of Science degree in 1970. He was commissioned through the ROTC program and entered active duty in October 1971. After graduating from the Infantry Officer Basic and Airborne Courses, he served almost 6 years as a Military Intelligence Officer at Fort Bragg, NC, and Fort Huachuca, AZ. In 1977, General Romig was selected for the Funded Legal Education Program and attended the University of Santa Clara School of Law, Santa Clara, CA, where he graduated with honors in 1980. During his 25 years of distinguished service as a judge advocate, General Romig served in many positions of great responsibility, including service as a prosecutor with the 2d Armored Division; an instructor at The Judge Advocate General's School; the Staff Judge Advocate of the 32d Army Air Defense Command; the Chief of the Personnel, Plans, and Training Office; the Staff Judge Advocate of V Corps; the Assistant Judge Advocate General for Civil Law and Litigation; and the Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and Operations. He reached the top of his profession when he was appointed the 36th Judge Advocate General of the Army. General Romig is now completing his remarkable military career. I know all my colleagues join me in saluting Major General Thomas J. Romig and his wife Pamela for their many years of truly outstanding service to The Judge Advocate General's Corps, the U.S. Army, and our country.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Sure. Why not.

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senator for his comments.

Mr. ROBERTS. I am not referring to the Senator from Connecticut by name. OK?

Mr. ROBERTS. Pardon me?

Mr. ROBERTS. I only wish all Senators would have the same caution. I thank the Senator for his personal comments in my regard. I think he has made his point. As the farmer said as he crawled through the barbed-wire fence: One more point and we will be through. I suspect that you are through, and since I yielded back my time about 10 minutes ago, I yield it back one more time.

Mr. ROBERTS. Reclaiming my time, I think I addressed the Senator's personal concern. The Senator knows me well enough to know that when I say I am not accusing him personally of anything that would be inappropriate, I have stated I am talking about open discussion of intelligence information, quite frankly, not only in this nomination process but in the Intelligence Authorization Act in regard to a whole series of other subjects I will not go into, that many people have spoken to on the floor, many people have talked to the press about, and I do not think it is appropriate. I will say again, I am not accusing the Senator of anything inappropriate. I think from the whole standpoint of this body, subjects such as this should be done in executive session. I think that because of all the problems we have had in regard to leaks and in regard to information that is not helpful to our national security. That is about as far as I will go with it. I could go through quite a laundry list of concerns I have of things that have been made public and what has happened in regard to our adversaries, what has happened in regard to our intelligence capability, and I worry about it. So my concern was basically the continued open discussion of things of this nature, not the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. ROBERTS. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senator for his clarification.

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Chair. I certainly thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia. This is sort of a quandary for me in that sitting in my office listening to the debate, I was having a hard time putting two and two together with my understanding of what the Intelligence Committee determined--not the committee but the vice chairman and myself. And in listening to the statements, they just didn't jibe. It is not my intent to perjure the intent of the distinguished vice chairman, but I sure have a different take on this. I think it is supported by facts. I am rising in the hope of providing some clarification surrounding one of the issues related to the nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. ambassador to the U.N. On April 28, the vice chairman and I, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, received a letter from the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar. In that letter, the chairman asked the Senate Intelligence Committee to look into all information surrounding the process by which Mr. Bolton, between the years 2001 and 2004, requested the names of U.S. persons that had been redacted from various intelligence products. The Intelligence Committee was asked to solicit all information regarding the process by which Mr. Bolton's requests were handled, the contents of the responses, and the process by which they were communicated, as well as any conclusions reached by the appropriate intelligence agencies or elements thereto as to any violations of procedures or directives or regulations or law by those with knowledge of Mr. Bolton's requests. That was a pretty clear letter. That sets out some pretty clear questions. It is my understanding that the vice chairman of the committee, the distinguished vice chairman and a person whom I respect, Senator Rockefeller, sent his own letter to Senator Biden with a different interpretation of the issues than I have described. I also understand that Senator Biden read that letter on the floor this afternoon. I regret that a meeting in the Intelligence Committee did prevent me from responding at that particular time, but since the distinguished vice chairman has made his remarks and his interpretation, perhaps this timing is even better. But what I don't understand is why the distinguished Senator from Delaware read only one of the letters from the vice chairman when he had both in his possession. Nevertheless, in his letter of April 28, Senator Lugar asked the Intelligence Committee to assist the Foreign Relations Committee in ascertaining the facts. This is what I attempted to do, and I think my letter certainly speaks for itself. Unfortunately, I believe that the vice chairman's account did omit some important facts which I believe give a much clearer picture of what actually took place. This morning, I sent a letter back to Senator Lugar detailing my findings and conclusions. This letter, which was also provided to Senator Biden, provides the rest of the story. With your indulgence, I will read my letter into the Record, as addressed to the Honorable Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. It reads: Dear Mr. Chairman: I write in response to your April 28, 2005 letter asking this committee to examine a number of intelligence-related issues that have been raised during the Committee on Foreign Relations' consideration of the nomination of Under Secretary John Bolton to be the United States Representative to the United Nations. My hope was to respond jointly with Vice Chairman Rockefeller. While we both agreed there was nothing within the contents of the intelligence reports in question that caused us any concern, we were unable to agree on a final text in response. This was not for lack of trying. One day, 2 days, 3 days, a week, I think it was 10 days, trying to work out a joint letter. It just didn't happen. So we have two versions. I don't quite understand why, but especially since we both met with General Hayden, who is the Director of National Intelligence and who was the head of the NSA and, as such, is the head of intercepts and signals intelligence. I might say right now that I really do not like this business of coming to the floor of the Senate and talking about signals intelligence and intercepts. That causes me great concern. It is of the highest classification. I continued to Senator Lugar: Nevertheless, I am going to convey to you my findings and conclusions. After completing an examination of these issues I have found no evidence that there was anything improper about any aspect of Mr. Bolton's requests for minimized identities of U.S. persons. I further found no violations of procedures, directives, regulations or law by Mr. Bolton. Moreover, I am not aware that anyone involved in handling these requests had any concerns regarding these requests at any point in the process. State Department records indicate that Under Secretary Bolton's office did request the minimized identities of U.S. persons that are contained in the National Security Agency signals intelligence products on ten separate occasions. Every request was processed by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The acronym for that is INR. In each case, INR personnel followed standard procedure by preparing a written request which included a justification for the request. INR sought the identities on behalf of Secretary Bolton's office in each instance to better understand or assess the foreign intelligence value of the information that was contained in these documents. Senior INR officials were then responsible for determining whether the requests were reasonably related to Under Secretary Bolton's area of responsibility. Continuing my response to Senator Lugar: In every instance, they were so determined and electronically transmitted to the NSA for approval. The NSA approved all ten of Mr. Bolton's requests and transmitted its responses to [the State Department and the] INR. INR officials then notified Mr. Bolton's staff that they had received the responses and made them available. Committee staff interviewed INR analysts and NSA officials responsible for processing the requests for the identities of U.S. persons contained in signals intelligence products. None of the individuals interviewed indicated that there was anything improper or inappropriate about Mr. Bolton's request. We were also briefed by General Michael Hayden, former Director of the NSA and current Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence-- He is a man who I think gives the best briefing of anybody in the intelligence community, and who was approved in regard to his nomination to that position by unanimous consent by this body. He also stated that Under Secretary Bolton's requests were not only appropriate, but routine. In fact, INR records indicate that since May 2001, INR submitted 489 other requests for minimized identities. John Bolton requested 10. Finally, the Vice Chairman and I reviewed all ten documents-- We reviewed the intercepts. That is what we are supposed to do. That is the job of the Intelligence Committee. It is limited to only us two, and for darn good reason, because of the classified nature of the subject at hand. --containing the references to U.S. persons that generated Under Secretary Bolton's requests. The documents we received did not contain the actual identities of the minimized U.S. persons. After reviewing the content of each report, however, it was apparent to us both-- This is my recollection of the meeting, and I cannot conceive of any other recollection that is accurate. --that it was not necessary to know the actual names to determine whether the requests were proper. Ultimately, I found no basis to question the justification for, or the appropriateness of, Mr. Bolton's requests for the identities of U.S. persons contained therein. I continue in my letter to Senator Lugar: Further, General Hayden informed us that it is not uncommon for senior government officials above the rank of Assistant Secretary to make such requests. It is worth noting that Mr. Bolton did not request the identity of every U.S. person referenced in the documents which would have been his prerogative. I can remember the distinguished vice chairman's comments indicating they didn't even ask for all of them. While I found that Mr. Bolton's conduct was entirely appropriate and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, I did find that there are significant deficiencies in the process by which U.S. person identities are provided to requesters of such information. We have had a lot of discussion about questioners. As your committee has now learned, a request for a U.S. person identity is a routine occurrence in the intelligence process. The incidental collection of U.S. person identities is a fact of life in the signals intelligence business. Because U.S. persons are not the targets of foreign intelligence collection, their identities are, as a matter of policy, redacted or minimized to protect their privacy. When an intelligence analyst or policymaker determines that a U.S. person identity is necessary to better understand and assess the intelligence value of the information, they are permitted to request that identity. The NSA evaluates that request and either grants it or denies it. As already discussed, all of Mr. Bolton's requests were reviewed by both the INR and NSA and were granted. In the course of our review, we found that the Assistant Secretary for INR requested the identities so that they could be passed to Under Secretary Bolton. The NSA provided the U.S. person identities to the INR in the form of Information Memoranda addressed to the Assistant Secretary for INR. We were provided a copy of one of the memoranda, dated 20 February, 2003. This document included a paragraph which stated: ``You may disseminate the information as requested, provided it retains the classification as stated in paragraph two above. Request no further action be taken on this information without prior approval of NSA.'' Now, that is important--``request no further action be taken on this information without prior approval of NSA.'' The NSA confirmed that it uses standard dissemination guidance language in response to customer requests for release of identities. We were also told that Mr. Bolton was not provided the 20 February 2003 Information Memorandum containing this language. Upon further inquiry, we learned INR does not provide the NSA transmittal sheets containing the U.S. person information, or the handling information contained therein, to the requesters of the identities, nor does it specifically instruct the requester on the handling of such information. The INR passes U.S. person identities verbally, without any further guidance. The NSA expects the INR to provide specific handling instructions at the time INR provides the identity to the requester. Not only did INR not provide such instructions to Mr. Bolton, it does not provide them to anyone. Also, it has never established any formal procedures to train or educate requesters Department-wide on the appropriate handling of U.S. person identities. This came as somewhat of a shock to me, and it is something we have to review in the Intelligence Committee. In fact, in the case of the 20 February 2003 memorandum, the INR did not pass the identity directly to Under Secretary Bolton, but rather passed it to an individual within his office, an action which violated the express dissemination guidance contained in the Information Memorandum. The Assistant Secretary at the time of this violation was Carl Ford. The NSA did not in this particular instance, and does not as a matter of course, do anything to ensure that its dissemination guidance is actually followed by the Assistant Secretary for INR or any official in any other Department government-wide. The NSA depends upon the recipient to provide specific handling instructions to the requester and to handle the information appropriately and in accordance with instructions. It appears that Assistant Secretary Carl Ford did neither in this case. The INR's failure to instruct the recipients of U.S. person identities on their proper handling has left the State Department officials essentially to fend for themselves. During the course of this review, we learned that Mr. Bolton, in the absence of any guidance from INR or the NSA, discussed the U.S. person identity contained in the 20 February 2003 Information Memorandum with one other individual. This has been pointed out as a big deal by the vice chairman and my good friends across the aisle. This particular individual was the person referenced in the report. This person worked directly for Under Secretary Bolton, possessed the necessary security clearances, received and read the same intelligence report in the course of his duties, and understood that he was the U.S. person referred to therein. I don't see what the problem is in that regard. Is this the big problem here that somebody is alleging illegal activities? By the way, the first time I learned about that was reading about it in the New York Times, as opposed to reading the letter disseminated by Senator Rockefeller to the distinguished vice chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The NSA request that recipients of information about specific identities of U.S. persons take ``no further action'' with regard to the information provided is driven by concerns about the privacy rights of named individuals. These privacy concerns do derive from Attorney General-approved minimization procedures which regulate the collection, processing, retention, and dissemination of information to, from, or about any U.S. persons. The request is also prompted by concerns about protecting intelligence sources and methods. Not to mention the chilling effect it would have in regards to all intelligence analysts. Mr. Bolton's actions in this instance would not implicate any of these concerns. He discussed the identity with the actual named person who was not only fully cleared to receive the information, but already possessed the same information. It is also important to note that the NSA's guidance is formulated as a ``request,'' not a mandate. When asked why the NSA ``requests'' rather than requires, that ``no further action'' be taken with a U.S. person identifies without prior approval, the NSA responded by stating that the language is now ``currently under review.'' So it is a pretty nebulous standard we are referring to in terms of any alleged misconduct. I intend to work closely with the Director of National Intelligence to ensure that our intelligence agencies and elements are doing everything they can to assist and educate the requesters of U.S. person identities in the proper handling and protection of this information. We must do everything we can to not only protect the privacy of our citizens, but to protect and preserve intelligence sources and methods. I do not think you will find any quarrel among anyone on the Intelligence Committee or the vice chairman or myself on that. It is for this reason that I was a bit surprised and dismayed when a member of your committee-- Again, this is the letter that I sent to Senator Lugar-- broached this issue in the course of your public confirmation hearings. Normally, intelligence sources and methods are discussed in closed session to protect our continuing ability to collect the intelligence we all agree is so vital to our Nation's security. As is often the case, some individuals, who are not familiar with intelligence issues, perceive that something is unusual and concerning when, as in this instance, it is actually very routine. That is why the U.S. Senate created the Intelligence Committee to deal with these issues in an informed, responsible, and secure manner. It is my hope, in the future, intelligence issues will be discussed in executive session so that we can protect what are vital national security assets. I appreciate your recognition of our unique ability to assist with intelligence-related issues as you consider this very important nomination. We take very seriously our oversight responsibilities and our obligation to protect highly sensitive intelligence information. Your consideration of our duty to protect intelligence sources and methods is greatly appreciated. Sincerely Pat Roberts, Chairman. With a copy showing to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Mr. President, I said I beg your indulgence in the reading of that entire letter on the floor of the Senate. That is the text of the letter I did send back to Senator Lugar and obviously copied to Senator Biden as of this morning. Why my colleagues chose to give you only part of the story is a question only they can answer. I have my thinking about that, but I am not going to go into that on the floor of the Senate. I also would like to add a bit of texture to some of the statements that have been made here today in regards to Mr. Carl Ford of ``kiss up and kick down fame.'' That has been quoted a lot. Mr. Ford has made a number of other statements that I think are relevant to these issues raised by my friends in opposition to Bolton's nomination. For example, on page 276 of the Senate Intelligence Committee's Iraq WMD report, Mr. Ford addressed the issue of whether it was appropriate for policymakers to view intelligence assessments with skepticism. I will just tell you that every member of the Intelligence Committee now, after our WMD report, does not take anything at face value, and I think that has helped. We just had a hearing today in which we had a response that I think was certainly more candid: Tell me what you know; tell me what you don't know; tell me what you think. I think there has been a historic change in the intelligence community as a result of our report and the WMD Commission, appointed by the President and the 9/11 Commission, in the interest of all Senators. Mr. Ford said if a policymaker ``believed everything that the intelligence community told him, including what INR tells him, he'd be a fool. You should know better than anybody that a lot of the stuff we turn out is''--well, I am going to change the name. I am not going to say what is here. I am going to say it is a lot of what we have in our Dodge City feedlots--``and that a policymaker who sticks to that intelligence, I don't even want to be in the same room with. They've got to know the stuff isn't that good. So the notion that they sometimes disagree with us I find fine.'' That is a little slightly different take on what we have been hearing so far. I guess what Mr. Ford meant to say--and he has been before the committee many times; he is a fine man--is that it is fine to disagree with intelligence analysts as long as you are not John Bolton. I only highlight some of the things to emphasize that there seems to be a double standard for this particular nominee. With the indulgence of my colleagues, I would also like to address some additional misperceptions about the intelligence community that were published as minority views in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on Mr. Bolton's nomination. The minority claims that policymakers should be restricted from making public statements that ``defame U.S. intelligence agencies.'' I find this to be a rather absurd concept. I do not know how one ``defames'' an entire Government agency, but I do know that criticism played a vital role in our collective effort to reform the intelligence community and demand change for failure. I am not aware of any special status that insulates members of the intelligence community from criticism, nor should there be. That should be a slam dunk. I am also unaware of any special status that prevents intelligence analysts from having their views or actions challenged by policymakers. Intelligence analysis is not an exact science. Intelligence analysts are not infallible and their assessments are not unassailable. While the intelligence community has had many successes in the past few years for which it should, and can, be proud--there are many good things they have done in protecting the homeland and providing real-time intelligence to the warfighters--astounding failures, such as 9/11 and Iraq, should make it clear that the intelligence community does make mistakes. I often lament that policymakers did not ask enough tough questions about Iraq's suspected WMD programs prior to the war. Let me just say that persistent questioning to an analyst is not viewed by the analysts, in the 250 analysts we interviewed, as being pressured. If anything, we should be asking more questions. If anything, several members of the Intelligence Committee, whom I admire and respect and am very proud to be their chairman, ask more repetitive questions of witnesses every time we have a hearing than people are complaining about in this particular case. Perhaps, if we all had been more diligent, the intelligence community would have been more attuned to the gaps in its information and more accurate in its judgment. I, for one, now make it a point to repeatedly and persistently question analysts who come before our committee to ensure that I understand their judgments, understand the information upon which they base those judgments, and form my own opinions about gaps in their logic. The vice chairman and I have agreed on that, to look at every capability we have in regard to national security threats. Do we have the intelligence capability? Do we have the collection? Do we have the analysis? Is there a consensus threat analysis that makes sense? Are there gaps? We do not want to repeat past mistakes. I am not going to go down the laundry list, starting with Khobar Towers and ending up with 9/11 or the Madrid bombing or whatever it is we are talking about, or the USS Cole. We have to put that one in. So basically I resent any suggestion that this performance of my duty is somehow improper. I do not think that is right. Intelligence is a serious business, dealing with life-and-death issues. In my experience, our intelligence analysts understand this. They know that defending their views is vital to the process and are fully capable of doing so. These are individuals who work every day to defeat terror and defend our national security. They are tough and they are good. They are not delicate, hothouse flowers unable to defend their views or take criticism. They are, however, humans involved in a fundamentally human process. Intelligence analysts can make mistakes and their judgments are not immune from their own biases. Intelligence assessments should inform policy, not dictate it. Ultimately, as policymakers we need to understand that intelligence is merely a tool that at times can have great value as well as serious limitations. If we are going to make an informed judgment of Mr. Bolton's fitness for this position, please, I implore my colleagues, let us do it based upon all the facts known to us, not just the facts we like or pick out. In conclusion, I have looked at the intercept issue and allegations surrounding Mr. Bolton's management style. I have found nothing which would give me pause in voting for his confirmation. I support the Bolton nomination. I urge my colleagues to do the same. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS. It was only Senator Rockefeller and myself who were briefed by General Hayden, and that was a very good meeting. We went over virtually every intercept, as it should be. That was my point. That is what the Intelligence Committee does. It is accepted practice for the full committee, which many members of the full committee have trouble understanding, that only the vice chairman and the chairman have access to this kind of highly compartmented material. So when this kind of thing is bandied about on the floor in a generic way, it causes me great concern.

Mr. ROBERTS. I would never raise the question about my colleague and friend about acting inappropriately, especially in regard to intent. I am concerned about us talking about intercepts and all of this that I went through in the letter on the Senate floor. I am concerned about many things that have been talked about publicly, quite frankly, leaks that appeared in the press that I find out about later as chairman and have to address. I cannot speak to them because they are classified. It is the classic case of Catch-22, where something appears in the press or perhaps somebody says something on the floor inadvertently--if it is done on purpose, that is another matter. That can be referred to the Ethics Committee--and that certainly is not the case in terms of my distinguished colleague. Then comes sort of a feeding frenzy and we end up with things that should not be in the public discourse that are highly classified, highly compartmented. Signals intelligence is one of the highest compartmented topics we deal with.