Pat Roberts

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. May I inquire of the distinguished Senator, are we getting time limits now? I wanted to have a good colloquy with my dear friend and esteemed chairman of the Armed Services Committee who has a willing offer to make because I am not quite sure in regard to this issue what it will be, and if we put in an artificial time limit--I don't know.

Mr. ROBERTS. I haven't quite figured it out yet. I got wound up pretty good. I have one more page, and the Senator from Pennsylvania asked how long will that take? How about 2 minutes, 3 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I guess we started up a fuss by talking about this, which I can understand. Let me go back to sort of remind anyone that is listening that on- demand sequential referral, as referred to in the Bayh amendment, has had a chilling effect on the introduction of legislative initiatives by the Intelligence Committee. Why is that important? It is because the joint inquiry task force investigating September 11, it is because the 511-page report on WMD, intelligence on whether there were WMD in Iraq, and the 9/11 Commission's report had this unique idea, and the unique idea was that the Select Committee on Intelligence should be granted at least enabling power, be empowered to be the oversight committee that has independence and leadership and clout and that we do not today. One of the obstacles is this on-demand sequential referral. Every other committee in the Congress can ask for sequential referral, but they do it by unanimous consent or they ask the leadership. There is nothing wrong with that. But on-demand sequential referral from the very committees that we have two members on the Intelligence Committee representing--Judiciary, Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations? They are represented. And as I have indicated, legislative initiatives that we have end up on the cutting-room floor. It is a very fractionalized process, both from the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee. I have nothing but admiration for the distinguished Senator from Virginia and the distinguished Senator from Michigan and the work they do on behalf of our military, and for the appropriators and the work they do on behalf of our military. It is just that it is a fractionalized process. Sometimes we are in the room, sometimes we are not. Sometimes we don't know what ends up on the cutting-room floor, sometimes we do. That does not speak well for the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the Intelligence Committee. This process, which the members of the Intelligence Committee believe is unique to the Intelligence Committee, does not permit the committee priorities to reach the Senate floor for full debate. We cannot fully debate it because it is classified. Everybody else who wants sequential referral changes a bill. They come to the floor, argue the points, and then win or lose. We cannot because it is classified. This provision is a significant obstacle to the full realization of the Intelligence Committee oversight and should be repealed. I support the amendment. I encourage my colleagues to do likewise. I hope we are able to reach some accommodation. I thank the Presiding Officer and my colleagues and yield the floor. Amendment No. 3994

Mr. ROBERTS. I know in normal times this amount of noise is about the best you can get, but I hope people will pay attention to what Senator Bayh is trying to accomplish and, as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, which I support very strongly. It is a commonsense measure. Speaking of the Intelligence Committee, the very committee that the 9/11 Commission said should be enabled to do a better job instead of the way it is now when we are so fractionalized, it says we should be on the same level playing field as other standing committees in the Senate--just fair play, same level playing field in terms of sequential referral. A committee brings up a subject, they pass a bill, they make an inquiry, they publish it, and another committee says: You know, we are interested in that as well. We would like to have sequential referral. How do you do that? You do it by unanimous consent or you go to the leaders and you say: You know, we have a dog in this fight. We are interested in it. We have expertise, we have background, and we would like to take a look at it as well. Not on the Intelligence Committee. Virtually every other committee in the Congress now has on-demand--that means you finish a product, you finish your authorizing bill, and we will grab it by the throat and we will do whatever we want to with it. That is not right. That is not right with regard to what we are trying to do to empower--and by empower I don't mean to empower over and above other important committees--or enable us to do our job. Let me give you the classic example. We don't have, despite all of the rhetoric, all of the activity, all of the effort by Senator Collins and by Senator Lieberman and the intelligence reform bill, all of the effort by the Joint Inquiry Task Force on 9/11, all of the effort by the Intelligence Committee in regard to the WMD report--now the report by Mr. Duelfer and the Iraq Survey Group, and the group of intelligence not only of the United States globally and the importance that that has for the daily lives and pocketbooks not only of people in America but around the world, and all of this discussion about 9/11, we do not have the intelligence authorization bill passed. We had a vote yesterday 90 to 7 on my amendment--probably the first time I will ever do that--saying regardless of what happens in intelligence we ought to authorize first and then appropriate. There is a novel thought. But even at this late date, we don't have the intelligence authorization act passed. Why? It is because of this on- demand referral that no other committee has as a millstone around its neck. Senator Bayh is one of the committee's most serious, capable members, and he and I agree. We worried about this, along with other members on the Intelligence Committee, mostly made up of senior Members who know their job and who have attended. Their attendance record is outstanding. I can't get into that because it takes a decision by the chairman and vice chairman, and also perhaps a vote in committee to get into attendance records. I am not going to do that, simply to say these people have many other duties. They come there and work hard. We have had over 125 hearings in the Intelligence Committee, 60 percent more than at any other time in history, with regard to the WMD report, 521 pages long, which I think is the most thorough study any committee has ever done on the intelligence community. Senator Bayh's presence on this floor on the issue underlines its importance. It is bipartisan in nature and impacts on the committee's ability to do its work. What will the amendment of Senator Bayh do if it passes? It will mean that for the first time in history the legislative priorities of the Senate Intelligence Committee will reach the Senate floor without being automatically filtered through the lens of other Senate committees. I must admit that under resolution 400 we have the ability in the Intelligence Committee--if anybody mentions intelligence, there might be another committee which can ask for referral. We don't normally do that. I don't think we have to do that. As a matter of fact, I am trying to think of when we did that in the history of the committee. But certainly that is a lot different than on-demand sequential referral by every other committee. Interested committees under the Bayh amendment will still be able to request sequential referral to the Intelligence Committee legislation. But just as other authorizing legislation, those committees would have to do so through a unanimous consent agreement instead of a demand letter. All we want is to be treated as any other committee. My goodness. If we are the ones who are supposed to be empowered and stand up according to the 9/11 Commission and do a better job--and I think we have in the last few years--why on Earth would you force the Intelligence Committee to go through this on-demand sequential referral? An example of the problems associated with on-demand sequential referral of intelligence--I don't know what to call this. On-demand special referral sounds like a lot of gobbledygook outside the beltway, an arcane thing. It is sort of like cattle rustling; you sort of take that bill and rustle it away from that pasture on demand and the poor owner of that cowherd can't do a doggone thing about it. It is time to end it. At any rate, an example of problems associated with on-demand sequential referral, or the cattle rustling of Intelligence Committee legislation to the Armed Services Committee, is the fate of intelligence reforms proposed by former Intelligence Committee Chairman Senator Specter, who was on the floor a while back, and Vice Chairman Bob Kerrey, who did a splendid job as vice chairman--that was back in 1997 during the Intelligence authorization bill, the Intelligence Committee proposal, what we have debated here for the last 2 weeks-- this was back in 1997--direct appropriations of intelligence community funding by the Director of Central Intelligence is something which George Tenet and every other DCI has wanted for a long time. That appropriations would have funded the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office--what was then called the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The Armed Services Committee obtained sequential referral of the 1997 intelligence authorization bill. After 30 days of the Armed Services Committee being innovative and forward looking, the Specter-Kerrey reform measure became a computer system to track intelligence expenditures. It didn't have any authority. It became a computer center to track intelligence expenditures. On-demand sequential referral has had a chilling effect on the introduction of legislative initiatives by the Intelligence Committee. I see the distinguished former chairman, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, who had a reform measure back in 1997 which would have gone a long way toward intelligence reform that we have been considering on this floor for the last 3 days. I thank him for that effort. But he got sidetracked. His cattle got--well, they were sort of branded, sort of got into another pasture. I think that is unfortunate. A degree of self-policing occurs about what legislative provisions realistically can survive automatic referral through other committees. As a result, many provisions are dropped or diluted to make the bill as unobjectionable as possible. Senator Collins of Maine said we had a delicate balance. We had a discussion yesterday of the national intelligence director. The thought was that director should be able to move positions, but then we had a compromise. We could move positions and we couldn't move people. What the heck is that? I know that in compromise when you refer to other committees, you make it less objectionable, but sometimes you leave the cutting edge of reform with a very dull knife. This deterrent effect, I will tell you as chairman of the committee, begins prior to the committee markup. I know whatever we do in terms of authorization must go over to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I serve on that committee. I have the utmost respect for the chairman of that committee. It is a privilege to serve on that committee. I am chairman of something called Emerging Threat and Capabilities. I have enjoyed my service on the Armed Services Committee. But we know even before markup that we are going to have to go to the Armed Services Committee, and we could on demand referral have the same thing happen on Foreign Relations, on Appropriations, on Armed Services, and Judiciary because those are the members who now serve on the committee to make sure there are two people on that committee so it is widely represented. But I know, and everybody on the committee knows, that before we even do the authorization, we have to go through this Byzantine kind of machination before we get our product on the floor even to pass it. Again, where is the intelligence authorization bill for this year? I don't know. We have tried to hotline it. We have had objections. After all this year of reform we cannot even pass an intelligence authorization bill? Do we want to continue that? This deterrent effect, as I said, begins right at the start. We have 22 professional staffers who have backgrounds, analysts with the DIA, CIA throughout the intelligence community. They are the people who put together the 521- page report on the WMD. We let the chips fall where they may. Senator Rockefeller and I worked together, both sides, and we had a bipartisan vote, 17 to 0. It was tough. Can we do the job? You darn bet you, and we have 22 staffers who can do that job. I daresay none of the other committees that have on-demand sequential referral have this kind of staff. Yet we end up on the cutting-room floor. Sometimes we do not even get in the room where we end up on the cutting-room floor. I don't think that is right.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I wish all of my colleagues could have been on the floor to hear the remarks from the distinguished Senator from Indiana, who is a very valued member of the Intelligence Committee. We have some very good members on both sides of the aisle. Senator Bayh always asks incisive questions. He gets to the bottom of the very comprehensive and complex issues we discuss. I thank him for being a valued member of the Intelligence Committee. I want to thank him for offering this amendment, which, outside the beltway and I suppose on the floor of the Senate and for anybody listening or watching, is pretty mundane, or arcane: What on Earth is he talking about, ``on-demand sequential referral of legislation, reporting from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence''? Were it not for the fact that Senator Bayh is an excellent speaker and a highly appreciated Member of this body, probably nobody would be even understanding this, or paying any attention. I know this Senate wants to get this bill done. I know we want to go to conference on intelligence reform. I know we have the tax bill. I know we have the omnibus bill. I know people want to leave for the weekend. People are tired, and Lord knows we have been wrestling with this issue on how we reorganize the Intelligence Committee to make it more effective, in line with what the 9/11 Commission has recommended, what every commission has recommended down the years--the Bremer Commission, the Gilmore Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the CIS Study, all these commissions, not to mention the 24 times we have tried reform of the Intelligence Committee since Dwight David Eisenhower and failed in each and every case. I know the fatigue factor, the high- glaze factor has set in in this body, as evidenced by the membership, as evidenced by my dear colleagues and friends across the aisle now talking about something else, even though I could probably talk as loud as the Senator from Massachusetts. But, having said that, let me try to tell Members what this is about. His amendment would eliminate the current practice, again, of on- demand sequential referral of legislation reported from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This very common sense measure--Mr. President, may I have order?

Mr. ROBERTS. I would be delighted. Maybe my blood pressure would come down. I would be delighted to suspend on behalf of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, as a fan of the Louisville Cardinals.

Mr. ROBERTS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTS. No.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator from Delaware, whom I admire for his expertise on foreign policy, I think all of us have an obligation to learn from, to ask, to seek guidance, to seek expertise from other Members, and I hope it is in that spirit that we are able to do this. As Chairman of the Emerging Threats Capabilities Subcommittee on Armed Services, I work very closely with Senator Lugar on the Counterthreat Reduction Program. I do not think I can do the job without talking to Senator Lugar. Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar put that together, the Nunn-Lugar program. I talk with Senator Lugar a lot in regard to his perspectives on foreign policy. I have not taken the opportunity that I probably should have to talk with the Senator from Delaware at great length--we talk about some things but certainly not enough. I welcome the Senator to come to the Intelligence Committee in regard to any desire he might have to go over or to review any of the intelligence material that pertains to foreign policy. All of that does, as a matter of fact. It was the State Department that pretty much got it right in the WMD review in regard to possible WMD in Iraq, and we know that and we respect that. We made a special effort to invite the State Department in, and we will be happy to visit with the Senator from Delaware about that. I yield the remaining time I have to a member of the Foreign Relations Committee who is always telling me about the need to tie in the relationship with regard to foreign relations and intelligence. He is the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. We work together in a bipartisan way. We have gone through pretty tough times. We achieved a 17-to-0 vote in regard to the WMD inquiry. We are not trying to deny information to anybody. We want to share it. We want to learn, especially from people such as Senator Biden. I yield my remaining time to Senator Rockefeller.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I have two amendments to offer. I wish to offer them in sequence, taking 2 minutes at most for each one. I propose to only give a very brief description of each amendment. Amendment No. 4019 To Amendment No. 3981 Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside, and I call up amendment No. 4019.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise to support Senator McCain and his amendment to the McConnell-Reid measure amending S. Res. 445. First, I pay tribute to the former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Mr. Graham. I thank him for his service to our country. He is retiring, although that certainly does not describe the Senator, but I thank him for his leadership and his suggestions as we go through this very difficult task of reforming how we do our oversight responsibilities in reference to our intelligence obligations. Back to Senator McCain and his amendment, if we approve the McCain amendment, Senators will implement what is the most important recommendation of the 9/11 Commission for improvement of congressional oversight of intelligence activities--most important by the 9/11 Commission. Now, why is John McCain getting in the middle of what would have to be termed a sheep and cattle war, if one goes back to the history of Arizona, and taking on the challenge of suggesting that the Intelligence Committee, or any authorizing committee, have appropriations power? That is tough. I mean, that really is tough. I think everybody knows there is more than one way to skin a cat that is sticking his head in a bootjack than simply pulling on his tail. That is hard work. That is where nobody wants to reach their hand into, but there again that is John McCain. John is from Arizona. I used to reside in Arizona. There is a lot of cactus in Arizona. One does not have to sit on each and every one of them. Sometimes people think that Senator McCain does that. Why is he doing this? Why is he fighting this sometimes lonely battle? Well, on page 420 of the 9/11 report, the Commissioners wrote this: Under the terms of existing rules and resolutions the House and Senate intelligence committees lack the power, influence and sustained capability to meet this challenge. He is right. He is dead on. He is pulling that cat by the tail in the bootjack. And in terms of being right, there are times that one can take on tough measures and sort of let them go and slide or one can do the right thing. The truth of it is that I can tell my colleagues, as chairman of the Intelligence Committee and an 8-year veteran of that committee--and it has been a privilege--we are fractionalized when we talk to Lee Hamilton, Governor Kean, Bob Kerrey, the former Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, and others. They came to visit before the Intelligence Committee with Senator Rockefeller and myself, Senator Rockefeller being the distinguished vice chairman and my bipartisan partner in trying to do what is right on behalf of our national security--and we think we have done a good job, by the way, backed up by 22 professional staffers, the most of any committee. So, consequently, what happens to us is that when we do our work as quoted by the 9/11 Commission--and after the visit by the 9/11 Commission to the Committee, they agreed with us that we are fractionalized, that our job is pretty tough, that in terms of being an authorizing committee we probably are expected to have the most obligation, independence, leadership, clout in regards to oversight in reference to intelligence and national security of any committee in the Congress, but we have the least. Why is that? It is because we are fractionalized in terms of sequential referral on demand. I am not going to get into that speech again because I think we are trying to work it out. I think we have a compromise, or I hope we have a compromise, and I thank Senator Rockefeller for being a leader in this instance. Whatever we do, we know that we have to then first go to the Armed Services Committee and then, of course, we have to go to the Appropriations Committee. Now, that is not a bad thing because we have many fine people serving on the Appropriations Committee. I do not mean to perjure the Appropriations Committee. Far from it. They have many obligations. They have their constitutional authority to do this. But what happens? The intelligence community comes before us during the long session of 6 months, 8 months, 9 months when we do our authorization and make priority changes and make recommended changes and make reform changes, some of which have been very dramatic. And I think they understand that, obviously, then we are going to have to go to the Armed Services Committee and then, obviously, we are going to have to go to the Subcommittee on Defense of the Appropriations Committee where they have done, I might add, a splendid job of doing their very best in terms of their obligations to meet our national security obligations vis-a-vis the intelligence community. Now, what would someone do if they were a member of the intelligence community? They would appear before the authorizing committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee--and I am not saying it was wink them, blink them, and nod to a committee that has no authority, but one can sort of make that case--and I do not perjure anybody who has come before the committee because they are great people. They are laying their lives on the line. They are dedicated people. That is not my point. What they do, however, is go to the Senate Armed Services Committee and then they also go to two primary members of this Senate whom I personally call friends and admire and respect, and there have been no two people in the Congress of the United States, perhaps in the history of the United States, who have done more for the military and done more during those times where we were stretched thin and hollow and addressing the tremendous problems we have today. I am talking about the distinguished Senator from Alaska, who is chairman of the committee, Ted Stevens and his counterpart, the Senator from Hawaii, Dan Inouye. I do not know who has been the stagecoach driver and who has ridden shotgun. During these particular years, they both worked equally well. But what happens to them is that time demands come in and the intelligence community comes in and says: Wow, we have a problem. We have just had an ``Oh, my God'' hearing before the Intelligence Committee. Oh, my God, how did this happen? Khobar Towers, embassy bombings, USS Cole, the lack of really trying to figure out what happened when we missed the India nuclear explosion, 9/11, Somalia--do you know what. It was all tied together. So the Appropriations Committee is faced with this urgent need, and they respond. And the intelligence community pretty well gets what they want. That is not all bad, especially when we are facing some kind of emergency, but it basically cuts out the Intelligence Committee's authorization process to some degree. It cuts out what the Armed Services Committee does as well. It is time based. The 9/11 Commission took a look at this and said: Congressional oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism is now dysfunctional. Congress should address this problem. We have considered various alternatives. The primary suggestion: a single committee in each House of Congress combining authorizing and appropriating authorities. The McCain amendment will accomplish this alternative. The McCain amendment will accomplish this by giving appropriations authority to the Senate Intelligence Committee. The distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, a man whom I admire, a man who has been a great friend, basically cited the example between 1865 and 1885 that when they took away powers from the Appropriations Committee, storm clouds arrived, lightning struck, and it was doom and gloom time until they restored that authority. Let me suggest another number. It is called 9/11. Let me suggest all the hearings we have held in the Intelligence Committee--I call them ``Oh, my God'' hearings: Oh, my God, how did this happen?--indicated the systemic failure of the global intelligence community in regard to WMD and the situation in Iraq--not just the United States, everyone, including the United Nations. The chairman of the Appropriations Committee and his counterpart, the ranking member--when he says there is no turf battle, I believe him. I don't know of any two Members who would put turf over conscience and turf over performance and the obligations of what they have already done. I know the chairman has mentioned that he and the members and the qualified staff of the Appropriations Committee have gone the world over, and they have. I know. I have been with them on many occasions, looking at intelligence and looking to see how the money is spent on the ground, taking a hard look. I understand that. But we have 22 staffers, 22 professional staffers who have background and experience in regard to being an analyst at the DIA, being an analyst at the CIA with at least 10 years' experience. We have the staffers who put together the 521-page WMD report, where the chips fell where they may. Guess what happened. The intelligence was wrong. Some people try to put that at the foot of the President. He made very declarative and aggressive comments. Others in this Congress received the same intelligence and made the same statements. Now, of course, a lot of that has changed because it is an even-numbered year, and you know what kind of situation we are in. But I am trying to say your Intelligence Committee stands ready to do a professional job in regard to budget authority, should we be granted that privilege, with 22 professional staffers. We have done that. There have been occasions where we have been granted access. I don't mean that in a cynical way because the Appropriations Committee usually is in a big hurry with what they have to do, meeting obligations that are emergencies--where we have made our suggestions. Some of them, not all of them--as a matter of fact, not very many of them--were accepted by the Appropriations Committee or, for that matter, the Armed Services Committee. Some of them, a lot of them, ended up on the cutting-room floor. In some cases we were not granted access because of the time equation, and wouldn't you know that many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and many of the problems we have experienced that nobody wants to see that we have had hearings on are the same kinds of things we have tried to fix in the Intelligence Committee and maybe could have had we not had this fractionalized process that the 9/11 Commission has talked about. I have talked about what a hard job this is. I talked about the courage Senator McCain has had to approach this topic. It is a tough topic. Really, this is not hard. Members have a choice. They have a choice to make. A vote for the McCain amendment enhances the congressional oversight by addressing the findings of the 9/11 Commission, period. The amendment will enhance the power, influence, and sustained capability of the Senate Intelligence Committee; that is, to conduct oversight of this Nation's intelligence activities. It couldn't be any more simple. Members, you should vote for the measure if you want to enhance the Senate Intelligence Committee's ability to conduct congressional oversight as recommended by the 9/11 Commission and, by the way, virtually every other commission that has studied this. So the McCain amendment is in harmony with the 9/11 Commission's major recommendation for improving congressional oversight and intelligence activities. I am not saying the appropriators or the Armed Services Committee has done anything wrong, egregious, dysfunctional, whatever. They have done a great job under the circumstances with the setup of the Congress as it has been. But we stand ready with 22 professional staffers to do the job. I believe we can do the job. I am voting for the McCain amendment. In behalf of our national security, I urge my colleagues to do the same. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized after the distinguished Senator from Florida.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, this amendment simply clarifies language in the McConnell-Reid amendment regarding the staffing of the Intelligence Committee. The amendment ensures that the professional staff of the Intelligence Committee and the personal staff now designated by Members to serve on the committee will be provided similar access to committee resources and information as determined by the chairman and vice chairman. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I thank Senator Kyl for his assistance. It provides modest but important clarity to the proposals of Senator McConnell and Senator Reid. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 3742, with a modification.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman for working with me to include this provision in the act. It preserves an important requirement from section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947. It is very simple: That funds appropriated for an intelligence activity must be specifically authorized. I appreciate your cooperation on this matter. It is a very simple amendment. I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senators for their assistance.

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment, and I call up amendment No. 3740 with a modification which I send to the desk.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and ranking member for crafting an amendment with me that embodies several technical and clarifying modifications to their bill. If, in fact, the distinguished Senator and the distinguished ranking member at this time would accept the amendment, it would be highly desirable on the part of this Senator.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, this amendment ensures that the analytic review unit will be able to perform an important quality control and accountability mechanism for the analytic product of the intelligence community. This is an important function that has not been performed by the intelligence community as well as it should have. I thank the chairman and ranking member for working with me to ensure that this important amendment is adopted. I yield to the distinguished chairman.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment, and call up amendment No. 3748, as modified, which I send to the desk.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw from consideration amendment Nos. 3741, 3744, and 3751.