Pat Roberts

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I say to the Senator, I would like to thank you for your very kind remarks. As the chairman knows, we have 22 professional staffers who were former analysts throughout the intelligence community. We would like to think we have expertise on this issue. As the chairman knows and the distinguished ranking member knows, we did produce a 511-page inquiry on WMD in regard to the inquiry on the prewar intelligence. I think it is the most thorough look at the intelligence community that has been conducted in the last 20 years. I am very proud of our staff. I think we have an outstanding staff. I would just like to say this: This is not going to be the best possible bill. This is going to be the best bill possible to achieve that delicate balance that the distinguished chairman has talked about. And that is not being untoward. That is not bad. This is a very comprehensive bill. This touches our entire intelligence community. So we are bound to have to take a good look at this, and we are also going to be bound in terms of our responsibilities in terms of oversight. I would imagine that with any bill you have what is called technical corrections. In this particular bill, we are going to have to take a hard look at not only technical corrections but monitor this bill as it evolves. But the important thing is that both Senators have been the primary movers of this bill in moving it forward in a comprehensive way. I credit them for their work. I can speak for all members of the Intelligence Committee: We are here, and we are here to help. I thank the Senator for her kind comments.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, these amendments contain clarifications to the authorities of the national intelligence director. I am told that our staffs have been working very diligently on these matters. I believe that they strengthen the bill, and I am hopeful they will be accepted by the managers of the bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these amendments now be set aside.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, will the distinguished chairman yield?

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, this amendment would provide the national intelligence director with certain specified authorities already provided to the Central Intelligence Agency. These provisions include flexible acquisition, spending, personnel, and management authorities. As I have indicated, the national intelligence director already has these authorities. In addition, the amendment permits the national intelligence director to delegate any of the specified authorities to the head of an element of the intelligence community for use by that element. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA has a range of authorities in matters such as acquisition, spending, personnel, and management that do not exist anywhere else in Government. These sorts of authorities are often required to effectively conduct intelligence operations in a very timely way. This amendment seeks to empower the national intelligence director by allowing him to exercise these authorities anywhere in the intelligence community that he sees fit, not just at the CIA. I am extremely hopeful that the managers can find a way to include this very important amendment in the bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the amendment.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up en bloc amendments Nos. 3740, 3741, 3744, and 3751, and I ask they be considered separately.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, this amendment would preserve the requirement in section 504 of the National Security Act that funds appropriated for an intelligence activity must also be specifically authorized. I am hopeful I can work with the managers of the bill and that we will be able to include this important amendment in the bill. It is absolutely essential. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be set aside.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendments be dispensed with.

Mr. ROBERTS. This amendment clarifies the role of the analytical review unit that the Collins and Lieberman bill creates within the Office of the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority. The amendment specifies that the unit will evaluate the quality of the analysis of our national intelligence agency and, where appropriate, issue nonbinding--and I underline ``nonbinding''--recommendations for present personnel actions to include additional training, commendations, and also any action that would be disciplinary. This quality control mechanism will help instill accountability--we have heard that word over and over again in regard to intelligence reform, independence, leadership, and accountability--in the intelligence community's analytical effort in an effort to guard against analytical failures such as prewar intelligence assessment concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs by providing regular quality control audits of the intelligence community's analysis. I am extremely hopeful the managers can find a way to include this important amendment in the bill. I ask unanimous consent to set aside the amendment at this time.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up en bloc amendments 3739 and 3750 and ask that they be considered separately.

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendments be dispensed with.

Mr. ROBERTS. This amendment clarifies that a primary mission of National Intelligence Authority is the elimination of barriers that impede any coordination of all intelligence activities, not merely counterterrorism activities. Three years after 9/11, information sharing still remains, unfortunately, a serious problem. As recently as last week--as recently as last week--the Senate Intelligence Committee received a disturbing briefing in closed session that clearly demonstrated that even on matters related to the current terrorist threat to our homeland, the intelligence agencies still stubbornly refuse to adequately share information. The National Security Act of 1947 clearly stipulates that a primary mission of the head of the intelligence community is to protect sources and methods. The current language of the Collins-Lieberman bill wisely balances this with the need to also ensure that intelligence concerning terrorism is certainly shared with those who need it. This amendment seeks to broaden that responsibility to include all intelligence threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, North Korea, and other intelligence threats, not just terrorism. Terrorism is a serious threat, but it is not the last threat that we will face. This amendment, which would build on the Collins-Lieberman bill and their already strong provisions for a ``trusted information network,'' also stipulates that the national intelligence director is responsible for ensuring that the information-sharing process be automated to allow intelligence analysts to ``pull'' information from databases rather than waiting for somebody to push it to them. Currently, much of the information sharing that does occur in the intelligence community happens only through phones and fax machines, which is very inefficient, and also it is unreliable. I am hopeful the managers can find a way to include this important amendment in the bill. I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be set aside.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 3747.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 3748 entitled ``The Analytic Review Unit,'' which probably should be entitled ``The Accountability Amendment.''

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 3742.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. If the Senator will yield, may I ask if the 21 amendments I have drafted, amendments that would improve the nature of the bill, are they included in that list?

Mr. ROBERTS. Certainly, I would be more than happy, in the middle of shining the light of truth into darkness, to yield for a unanimous consent request.

Mr. ROBERTS. What I heard in the Senate yesterday in regard to comments on this debate represents an age-old tension that has existed since the intelligence community was created. Members heard numerous quotes from statutes such as title 10, title 50. The heart of this debate, however, is whether we will give an individual unambiguous control of intelligence activities in the United States. We can quote from the United States Code all day. The point is the laws could be changed. That is what we do in the Congress. The debate today is about what the law should be, not what the law is. Arguing the status quo is convenient, but it is not always correct. This bill gives the new national intelligence director one very good tool. It is called budget authority. It does not give him control. The Specter amendment gives the national intelligence director control, which means accountability and real reform. As we have debated this issue, I have heard many Members cite the words and reported opinions of the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission has done a great service to this country, but the Commissioners themselves have made it clear they do not have all the answers. The 9/11 Commission did produce an excellent study of the failures leading up to the attacks of September 11. The Governmental Affairs Committee bill is faithful to the lessons the Commission drew from its work. It is an excellent report. But I remind my colleagues that the Commission's report was based on a single case study--the period leading up to the attacks of September 11. However, a broader historical examination of our intelligence community leads many-- including this Senator--to the important conclusion that over the last 50 years, the intelligence community has drifted due to the lack of or absence of a clear chain of command and the lack of accountability that a clear chain of command can bring. That clear chain of command requires giving the national intelligence director the authority to direct, to control, and to supervise our national collection agencies. Our job is not to take the work of the 9/11 Commission as a sacred text which is not to be questioned or altered; our job is to take their work and integrate it with the lessons learned over the 50-plus years of history of our intelligence community and nearly 30 years of congressional oversight by the Intelligence Committee. As the Senator from Pennsylvania has pointed out, his amendment incorporates many of those lessons. Yesterday, I also heard Members argue that the Specter amendment would create confusing chains of command for the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence collection elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency. I respectfully disagree. In addition to providing the national intelligence director with the authority to direct, supervise, and control these agencies, the Specter amendment clarifies other provisions of law to specifically address this concern. It amends title 10 and title 50, adds two new provisions to the law to specifically clarify that the Directors, again, of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence collection elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency report directly to the national intelligence director. While this amendment gives the national intelligence director direct control over these agencies, they remain ``combat support agencies''-- nobody quarrels with that--and the Secretary of Defense will still have influence over them. That is by design. No one is trying to change that. I think it is much better than the bill's current language in which the Secretary of Defense has direct control of these agencies, and the NID only has influence and persuasion. I can tell you from past history, influence and persuasion do not get you very far at the Pentagon. Some have argued that only the Secretary of Defense can manage the combat support agencies. Some argue that only if the Secretary of Defense manages the Pentagon's national intelligence collection agencies will the warfighter receive adequate support. This is a fallacy. As I said earlier, there is no reason to believe the Defense Department will not receive the support it needs if the Pentagon's national intelligence collection agencies report to the national intelligence director. The amendment provides the Secretary of Defense with important feedback mechanisms to make sure the Department is getting the national intelligence support it needs. First, the Secretary of Defense is required to provide the national intelligence director with some performance appraisals for the directors of the national intelligence collection agencies. Second, the national intelligence director will receive recommendations from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff based upon a biannual review of the combat support plans for the National Security Agency; again, the National Reconnaissance Office; again, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency; and the DIA, again, the Defense Intelligence Agency. Working with the Secretary of Defense through these feedback mechanisms, the national intelligence director will ensure that the Defense Department's intelligence needs are met. Clearly, this amendment recognizes the important support role these agencies play to the Department of Defense in its role as an intelligence consumer. Now, I also heard the argument yesterday that giving the national intelligence director direction, supervision, and control of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is a bad idea because that agency is responsible for making maps. I point out that this agency used to be named the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, but they changed its name to signal a change in the manner in which it would perform its mission. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the NGA, uses intelligence data acquired by satellites and other means and melds that data into the maps that our entire Government uses. This is what is now called geospatial intelligence. The maps we use have the full benefit of the intelligence data we gather all around the world. Mapmaking is not inconsistent with the national intelligence director's mission. Another argument heard yesterday against the Specter amendment was that the 9/11 Commission had considered granting the NID direction, supervision, and control authorities but rejected the idea on the grounds that the duties of managing these agencies would overload the national intelligence director. However, I note that the Secretary of Defense controls the military services, the Reserves, the unified commands, the defense agencies, field activities, literally millions of uniformed and civilian personnel, and those who mow the yard outside the Pentagon. So if I understand correctly, in order not to overburden the national intelligence director, we will leave the national intelligence collection agencies under the control of an already extremely busy and, I might add, effective Secretary of Defense. This logic escapes me. I also heard an argument that the 9/11 Commission had rejected granting the national intelligence director greater authorities because the Commissioners preferred what was described on the Senate floor as a ``lean, mean modern corporate structure.'' I ask my colleagues, What successful modern corporation would not give its chairman and CEO the authority to direct, supervise, and control every component of the organization for which he or she was held accountable by the shareholders? We should not confuse direction, supervision, and control with micromanagement. I also heard the argument that the Specter amendment would promote group-think within the intelligence community. Well, I can tell you that the Senate Intelligence Committee wrote the book on the occurrence of group-think in its report on the prewar assessments on Iraq's WMD programs. It is a problem that we on the committee watch very carefully every week, almost every day. I do not believe the Specter amendment will promote any kind of group-think. I would be concerned about the risk of group-think if we were proposing to grant the national intelligence director the authority to direct, supervise, and control the analytical content of our national analytical agencies. That is not what Senator Specter's amendment proposes. It proposes direction, supervision, and control over the Department of Defense's national intelligence collection agencies. Additionally, as was seen in the committee's examination of the prewar assessments--as I say, it took us over a year, 22 professional staff members; we interviewed over 220 analysts--the creation of a strong national intelligence director will prevent group-think in the intelligence community. A strong director will ensure a level playing field in which the analysis of all agencies will be given full consideration and equal consideration based upon the quality of the analysis when intelligence community assessments are being developed. If anyone has studied the committee's Iraq report--and I encourage Senators to read it, 511 pages--they know that the lack of a level playing field was a major problem. Mr. President, with that I am going to conclude my remarks. I urge Members to support the Specter amendment. The Specter amendment has been described as a ``bridge too far.'' This well-known term is a product of the tragic Battle of Arnhem, Holland, in 1944. Many historians see the tragedy of Arnhem as a combination of errors, i.e., the undertaking, for some political reasons, of an ill-advised military campaign opposed by American commanders; i.e., and a massive intelligence gap that failed to detect a large concentration of German armor in the area. Mr. President, the ``bridge too far'' analogy is apt, but it cuts in favor of the Specter amendment. We must not, for political reasons, fail to make the hard decisions that are necessary to ensure a strong, in-charge national intelligence director. These decisions are difficult. They are hard. But these decisions are critically needed. The changes we make today have one overarching goal: to prevent another intelligence failure on the order of Arnhem and September 11. Because of those failures, the allies suffered 17,000 casualties and, obviously, on September 11, 3,000 died. Failure to approve the Specter amendment may be seen by historians as a tragic half-measure that led to another Arnhem or another September 11. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Specter amendment. Before I begin, I would like to commend the managers of the bill, Senators Collins and Lieberman, for their extraordinary patience and their hard work as we continue working through this process. Senators Collins and Lieberman are very prominent and hard-working Senators. They have been given a very tough assignment and a limited timeframe in which to complete it. Nevertheless, they have produced a bill which is a step in the right direction. As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I look forward to working with the Senators who serve on the committee of assignment by the leadership as the Senate attempts to make intelligence reform a reality. Simply put, the Specter amendment would give the national intelligence director, or what we call now the NID, the authority to direct and supervise and control our national intelligence collection agencies. In doing so, it will create a clear chain of command that will leave no doubt in anybody's mind that the national intelligence director is in charge and is accountable. There is no rush to judgment on this issue. The debate in which we are currently engaged is the same debate that has been going on for decades, centered on how to grant increased authority to the Director of Central Intelligence, or a new national intelligence director, while leaving undisturbed the intelligence community's structural status quo. Time and time again, those who have struggled with this conundrum have found we simply can't get there from here under that context. In other words, I believe it takes significant organizational change to overcome the inherent conflicts in the current structure of our national intelligence community. True empowerment requires a national intelligence director with both budget authority and the authority to direct and control the activities of the intelligence collection agencies. One without the other will once again leave us with an intelligence head who can neither succeed nor be held fully accountable. Let me state that the bill reported by the Governmental Affairs Committee does address the question of budget authority very effectively. It is significant and well contained. The bill leaves unaddressed, however, the issue of the national intelligence director's authority to direct, to supervise, and control the activities of our national intelligence collection agencies. In short, the bill, in my opinion, preserves divided loyalties inherent in the current structure. Why is it so difficult to give this new NID direct control over all of the intelligence community agencies? It is no secret. The issue centers on the fact that the National Reconnaissance Office, which designs and acquires our spy satellites, the National Security Agency, which collects our signal intelligence, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, which processes and disseminates our satellite imagery, all fall under the direct control of the Secretary of Defense. These agencies, while essential to the collection of national intelligence, have also been deemed essential to the Pentagon's ability to fight and to win wars. In essence, these agencies serve two masters: The head of the intelligence community and the Secretary of Defense. This tension has existed for decades, and it continues today. As long as the Secretary of Defense directs the day-to-day activities of these agencies, the new national intelligence director will continue to struggle with a structure that undermines his ability to succeed as the head of the intelligence community. It appears to me that under today's bill the national intelligence director's authority concerning collection will be about the same as the DCI's has been for over 50 years. I do not mean to be a pessimist, but history has shown in practice that these authorities to ``establish requirements,'' ``manage the collection task,'' and ``resolve the conflicts'' have limited ability when an agency works with the Secretary of Defense and not for the head of the intelligence community. Why has it been so difficult to streamline the chain of command in the intelligence community? Because when the Defense Department comes up on the radar screen and announces to Congress and the media that its ability to defend America will be undermined if it loses direct control over its intelligence agencies, Members of Congress rightfully pause and they certainly take note. This is especially true today when American forces are engaged in combat. This, however, should not lead to what we call paralysis. During this debate, we have heard a great deal about support to our dedicated, brave men and women in uniform, i.e., the warfighters. Many of my colleagues have argued and will continue to argue that the national intelligence director must not be allowed to direct and supervise the control of activities of our national intelligence collection agencies. In their view, granting such an authority would undermine the Secretary of Defense's ability to fight and win wars. For this to be true, the national intelligence director would have to deny our military commanders the information they need to wage war. I cannot conceive of any circumstance where that would be the case. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee. I am a former Marine officer. I would not sanction any legislation that I thought would limit the ability of our troops to fight and to win wars. I recognize the special requirements of the Department of Defense. As chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I also know that the Department of Defense is only one of the major consumers of intelligence. Important, yes; major, yes; but one. I often hear people referring to the Department of Defense as the principal consumer of intelligence. While the Department is a significant and important consumer of intelligence, we need to remember one thing: The principal consumers of intelligence are the President of the United States, the Congress, and the National Security Council. They are the principal consumers. The Department of Defense is a major consumer. In time, the Department of Homeland Security is likely to become a voracious consumer of intelligence, perhaps on a par with the Department of Defense. I do not believe the defense of the homeland is any less important than prosecuting the war. Consequently it does not make sense to have 80 percent of our intelligence collection apparatus controlled by one consumer, and that is the Department of Defense. If we give the national intelligence director the authority to manage all of the national collection agencies, that will ensure one office is responsible and accountable for meeting the intelligence requirements of all consumers including, of course, that of the Department of Defense. If any Cabinet member believes their intelligence requirements are not being met, he or she can address the issues to the national intelligence director. If a Cabinet member does not agree with NID's decision, they can take it up with the President of the United States. I also note that in testimony before Congress, the directors of two of the Pentagon's intelligence collection agencies--the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency--stated that having their agencies transferred to the control of a national intelligence director would not degrade their level of support to the military. Let me repeat that. The directors of two of the Pentagon's intelligence collection agencies--the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency--stated that having their agencies transferred to the control of a national intelligence director would not degrade their level of support to the military. Additionally, some have argued that giving the national intelligence director line control of agencies with uniformed military personnel would be complicated. There will certainly be some issues to be resolved, to be sure. But the Department of Defense regularly details military personnel to agencies and offices outside of the Department of Defense. We would not be breaking new ground here. We have had civilian control of the military since the founding of this Nation, and I don't see how civilian control by a national intelligence director is qualitatively different than civilian control by the Secretary of Defense. They both work for the President. There has been a lot of talk about that fact in regard to meetings we have had with people in uniform and the Secretary of Defense and a certain Senator asking, How would you feel if your budget was controlled by somebody who didn't wear a uniform? Well, the Secretary of Defense doesn't wear a uniform. When the military appears before the Congress, they don't wear a uniform. Neither does the Secretary of Army, Navy, or Air Force wear a uniform. Let me detail a few examples to illustrate why direct control is so important to the success of the national intelligence director. As recently as last week--I would like for Members to pay attention to this--as recently as last week, the Senate Intelligence Committee received a very troubling briefing in closed session that clearly demonstrated that even on matters relating to the terrorist threat to our homeland, today, now, the terrorist threat that we face, the intelligence agencies still stubbornly refuse to adequately share information. Why are these agencies still not sharing? Some progress has been made. But why are they still not sharing? Is it because the DCI doesn't have adequate budget authority? No. They don't share it because they work for 15 different bosses and no one holds them accountable for information sharing. The national intelligence director can cajole, he can plead, he can consult all he wants; he can promulgate policies and guidelines all day long. He can create grand, trusted information networks. But without a national intelligence director with direct control, there will be no one to force adequate information sharing within the intelligence community. Let us take another example. We have all heard former DCI Tenet's now famous declaration of war against al-Qaida in 1998. Mr. Tenet ordered that no resource was to be spared in this critical effort. He declared war as a result of Osama bin Laden issuing fatwas to kill Americans. What happened as a result of this bold order? Not much. The National Security Agency went its own way, saying: Thank you, Mr. DCI, for your interest in national security, but we are going to retool for a threat that has nothing to do with terrorism. What would have happened if Mr. Tenet had the authorities granted to the national intelligence director under the Collins-Lieberman bill when he made his 1998 declaration? He might have said: We are at war, and the NSA will see that reflected in the budget you will receive in the next year or so, assuming Congress does not make any changes to it. That is budget authority. That is the crowbar he would use in terms of influence. However, with the authorities to direct, supervise, and control, which are provided in the Specter amendment, Mr. Tenet would have been able to order the NSA to stop retooling for the other threat, get to work that day, focus their efforts on al-Qaida. In the 21st century, threats evolve too quickly to wait a year or so for the national intelligence director's budget change to have any effect. The NID must have direct control in order to make immediate changes. The bill before the Senate today is a significant step in the right direction. Credit goes to Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman. There are many good provisions in the bill which should improve the intelligence community, but it is missing something very important--a clear chain of command and accountability. As the examples I have cited demonstrate, a clear chain of command and accountability that comes with it are essential to real and lasting reform. If we do not make the hard choices now, I fear after yet another series of intelligence failures--and Lord knows I do not want to sit as chairman of the Intelligence Committee and have any more ``Oh my God'' hearings in regard to past tragedies from Khobar Towers to embassy bombings to the Khartoum chemical plant to the failure to even try to come as close as possible to predicting the India nuclear blast, Somalia, the USS Cole, and obviously September 11. We do not want to go back down that road. I fear the Senate Intelligence Committee will be right back in its hearing room listening to the newly minted national intelligence director testify while he enjoys a great deal of budget authority he still lacks the real authority to perform the day-to-day operations of our intelligence agencies and therefore lacks ability to lead as we expect and as he must. I urge my colleagues to support the Specter amendment so there is no doubt in anyone's mind that the national intelligence director is in charge and is accountable. I will take a few more moments to comment on some of the debate I have heard concerning this amendment. This is not a new debate. What I heard in the Senate yesterday and today represents an age-old tension that has existed since the intelligence community was created.

Mr. ROBERTS. I thought the agreement was 30.

Mr. ROBERTS. If the distinguished chairman will yield, I am not sure of the timeframe. I think my remarks will be approximately 30 minutes. I hope they will not go over 30 minutes. But that would be my goal.