Pat Roberts

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I am ready to proceed.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Regular order.

Mr. ROBERTS. I object.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. About 20 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their very learned colloquy to make sure all Senators have an opportunity to speak on this extremely important issue. As we debate whether to authorize the President, basically, to use military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to neutralize his emerging weapons of mass destruction capability, I would like to offer several observations. The first is that the United Nations, as an institution, has completely and unequivocally failed to disarm Iraq consistent with its own resolutions--the resolutions agreed to also by Saddam Hussein-- following the Persian Gulf war of 1991. The key word here is to ``disarm.'' During debate on this very crucial issue, I think we have concentrated too much on the concept of ``inspections'' and the possibility of trying to really somehow initiate a new inspections regime. As a matter of fact, if you read all of the newspaper accounts on this issue, and if you pay attention to the television, the radio, and the debate, it seems to me ``inspections'' becomes the key word. I don't think that is the case. The key issue is not inspections. The key issue is disarmament. Again, both Iraq, under the heavy hand of Saddam Hussein, and the United Nations, have failed in the agreed-upon mandate to follow or take action consistent with resolutions following the Persian Gulf war over a decade ago. And we are talking about actual, transparent, real-- real--disarmament. The second observation I would like to make is that one of the crucial reasons both Houses of Congress should support the Warner and the Lieberman resolution, on behalf of the President, as opposed to, I guess, 13 amendments we are going to be considering--and I do not challenge or wish to impugn any intent on the part of any Member who has an amendment on this important issue--but basically one of the crucial reasons we should really do our business and support this resolution is that it will, I think, strengthen the hand of Secretary of State Powell--he told that to us as of this week, both sides of the body--in his efforts to convince the U.N. Security Council to adopt new resolutions, resolutions whose goal would be to produce tangible-- again, not inspections--but inspections that would lead to disarmament. There is always that hope, and, obviously, that would be the preferred outcome as opposed to military action. So it seems to me that is the goal of the resolution we are now considering. In that regard, let me stress that we should act prior--prior--to the U.N. deliberations. We should act first. We should act in concert. To tie the hands of this President, or any future President with regard to matters of vital national security interests where war or peace hang in the balance, to subject him to U.N. approval or action, will constrain the freedom of action on the part of the United States by the very countries that are now responsible for a decade of U.N.--U.N.--inaction and almost irrelevance. Let us be realistic. Let us be realistic. Saddam Hussein has demonstrated ad nauseam over the last 10 years that he will never permit the removal or destruction of his weapons of mass destruction capability. Here is my personal view on this. He cannot, and he will not. Now, why? They are the very source of his authority in Iraq as well as the Persian Gulf. All of his ambitions--I perceive that he perceives himself as perhaps the heir apparent or maybe even the reincarnation of King Nebbuchadnezzar, Pan-Arabia. He has demonstrated a willingness to use weapons of mass destruction both against his own countrymen and against other nations. He is a student and protege and follows the example of Stalin. And he rules by fear. So wishful thinking aside--and I have wishful thinking--but wishful thinking aside, I do not believe he is ever going to give up and disarm--ever. Third, any notion that the United States itself is off limits to a massive attack by groups that are cooperating with or supported by Baghdad should now be gone. It is called sanctuary for further terrorist attacks against our homeland. We are not off limits. We are now terrorist targets, as proved by 9/11 and previous attacks. Fourth, any notion that we have time left to coast along as governments in Iraq, Iran, or elsewhere continue to pursue their weapons of mass destruction programs with the possibility, if not intent, to distribute these technologies to fundamentalist terrorist cells should be gone as well. I know, while ``hard evidence'' of an Iraqi role in the attacks of 9/ 11 may be hard to prove--the so-called smoking gun--I do not think we can afford to be naive. Particularly in the Middle East, terror groups and states work together when and where their interests are common. And their intent is the destruction of the United States, the murder of our citizens, and the elimination of our influence, real and perceived. Just yesterday, in the continuing investigation of the September 11 attack, in an unclassified--let me stress, unclassified--and public hearing, I asked the panel of witnesses--the expert witnesses--what, after 9/11, still kept them up at night. And I asked them what policy drum they could or would beat to bring about a change in policy to safeguard our own country. The answer was to take away the terrorists' sanctuary; that we mistakenly think that if we can only bring bin Laden to justice, render the al-Qaida harmless, then we can somehow go back to business as usual. That simply is not the case. I think an error is being made in the debate on this most important topic when we say, now, on one hand, if we do not take action in regard to Iraq we can then continue the war against terrorism. The action against Iraq is to prevent further sanctuary for terrorism. It is inseparable. The stark fact of the matter is that danger of another terrorist attack on this country is still not a matter of if, it is a matter of when. The distinguished then-chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, remembers full well creating a subcommittee called the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats. Three years ago we predicted this would happen, citing past attacks. It is not a matter of if, but when. That condition still exists today. It is transnational in terms of the threat. It involves many terrorist organizations and cells. And, yes, it is ongoing. Yesterday, under the heading of lessons learned from past terrorist attacks, the Intelligence Committee once again heard from experts citing a common thread of transnational, interconnected terrorism. At our peril, difficult connect-the-dots intelligence analyses did not meet the threshold of a threat warning and were ignored. We were risk averse. The terrorists who conducted past attacks attacked again. There were warnings. They were not heeded. They did not meet the criterion of a threshold of a threat warning, and we suffered the consequences. They attacked at the 1993 World Trade Center, Khobar Towers, our embassies, the thwarted--thank goodness--attack in regard to the Millennium, and, finally, the U.S.S. Cole. The attacks are a microcosm of the challenge we face. If Iraq and, indeed, other regimes are left unchallenged, my colleagues, it is only a matter of time before they transfer the capability for weapons of mass destruction to a terrorist cell that will use that capability against the United States. Now, remember, the criminal justice model of gathering evidence and presenting a case does not apply here. By the time you have evidence, it is too late. We will not lose buildings and thousands of people when that happens. We will lose whole cities and hundreds of thousands of people. Iraq is absolutely a component in the war against terrorism. Let me try to make that point. In light of the events of September 11, 2001, I believe this body has more reason to support action against Iraq than it had in the winter of 1991. That is a pretty strong statement. Because preventing weapons of mass destruction from being acquired by terrorist cells should be the No. 1 policy priority of this Federal Government. This means neutralizing regimes that possess or seek such weapons and are predisposed to harboring, assisting, sympathizing with the bin Ladens of the world. That is a real priority for us. Yes, there is more than one fundamentalist maniac with a significant and diverse following. I support the resolution endorsed by the White House and sponsored by Senators Lieberman and Warner because I think our President realizes-- most Senators realize--what leaders like Abraham Lincoln and Harry Truman realized: No matter what the short-term consequences would be in regards to politics, American survival must be assured. It is a first priority. It is our highest agenda. There is reasonable concern about downside risk. You bet there is. I have those concerns. I share those concerns. I have been listening to these concerns during the debate on this subject. We have had several days of very good debate. The President and his national security team know that. All Members of the House and Senate and all thinking Americans know that. Yes, there is real concern. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence. I have asked question after question after question in the ``what if'' category. What if Saddam Hussein uses his weapons of mass destruction--of course, that means he has reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction capability, posing an ever-increasing threat--what if he uses those reconstituted weapons of mass destruction against our troops, against Gulf State partners that will support us, against Israel, or against his own people? He has done that before. Will Israel, if attacked, simply remain on the sidelines? Will we see prolonged combat? Will there be a violent upheaval in the Mideast, in the Arab nations? What happens if we win? There has been a lot of discussion about that. How long will we have to stay? What kind of infrastructure improvements will we have to pay for if, in fact, that is the case? What do we win? How do you win a war against a tyrant who may well destroy his own country and kill his own people, blame us, or who would launch or sponsor a terrorist attack in the United States as a result of our involvement, all in the name of self-preservation? Those are tough questions. Those are very real concerns. The distinguished Senator from West Virginia indicated we need more time to answer these concerns. How many casualties if, in fact, we go into military action against Iraq? Mrs. Boxer, the distinguished Senator from California, asked the question, how much will it cost? Maybe it was reversed. Maybe Senator Byrd asked that question, and Senator Boxer asked about casualties. What about military tactics? I must say that is probably the last thing I hope the Pentagon would share with the Congress, for obvious reasons. What about the sacrifices in regards to the American people? How much will it cost? All of these concerns and all of these dangers are real. But, my colleagues, there are no specific and easy answers to these questions. As much as we would like otherwise, the intelligence community and the President and the administration, our military cannot provide absolute, specific answers. They can try to be specific, but absolute answers? I am sorry. They do provide estimates, based upon the best collection and analysis that is possible. This debate and the issues at hand demand candor. President Bush has been candid. As the President said, the hope is we don't have to take military action. But if that becomes necessary, it will be difficult. Time after time in history, and in repeated testimony from those within our intelligence community, we see the greatest risk is to do nothing. We are not free unless we are free from fear. Americans have known fear--be it during the Cuban missile crisis or in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor or the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. We must not, however, accept fear as our destiny. We must be proactive in regards to national security. We must be preemptive. Yes, preemptive, that new doctrine that is causing a rethink of our foreign policy, our military strategy, our politics, our foreign relations. It is a brand new world. It is an asymmetrical world. It is a world that was written about by Samuel P. Huntington when he wrote the book ``The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order,'' the preemption doctrine. Here we are and we are debating it. Make no mistake, this has nothing to do with partisan rivalry. This is about our future, both immediate and long term. This is the state of affairs we leave for our children and our grandchildren. Senator Warner just made a statement on the floor I am going to quote again, almost 40 years ago to this date, when President John F. Kennedy addressed the Nation in regard to the Cuban missile crisis. He said: This nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum--in the Organization of American States, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful-- Here is the key phrase: . . . without limiting our freedom of action. In that regard, I hope we follow President Kennedy's advice. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution introduced by Senators Warner and Lieberman and to oppose the various 13 amendments that would weaken the resolution and our resolve. I ask unanimous consent that an article entitled ``A Chronology of Defiance'' by Michael Kelly; an article called ``The Myth of U.N. Support'' by Charles Krauthammer; and an article, ``The Weight of American Empire,'' which talks in detail about the new policy of preemption, by John Keegan, be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on behalf of the resolution that Senator Inhofe of Oklahoma, myself, and others today offer to designate next week, October 6-12, 2002, ``National 4-H Youth Development Program Week''. I thank my colleague from Oklahoma for initiating this well-deserved tribute to 4-H for being such a positive influence on tomorrow's leaders--as it has done so well for the past century. Throughout the years I have met with many of Kansas's finest young people. Many of whom I have recommended for scholarships and awards, had the honor to nominate to one of the service academies, or had the chance to meet and visit with in person. I am impressed with the caliber and character that the young leaders in my state possess. Mr. President, I am equally impressed with the high percentage of these leaders who happen to also be members of 4-H. 4-H is an organization that strives to ``Make the Best Better.'' I commend them for their efforts in providing tomorrow's leaders with the opportunity to apply the valuable leadership skills that they develop as 4-H members. Although 4-H began in rural America over a century ago and has grown to nearly 7 million members nation-wide, it has remained consistent in its focus of being a positive and motivating influence in the lives of America's youth. There is a reason that so many of the young leaders from my state happen to also be 4-H members. 4-H has given them the guidance, the resources, the support, and most importantly the courage to face all the challenges and responsibilities that being a leader involves. The events of September 2001 have taught us that tomorrow's leaders will continue to face new and difficult challenges. Therefore, Mr. President, I will also, in addition to offering well-deserved praise to 4-H on a 100 years of success, issue 4-H the serious challenge to continue to work hard to keep the youth of today involved in their clubs and their communities, so that they may be prepared to assume the responsibility of leadership when they are called to do so. Mr. President, I'd like to again congratulate 4-H on a century of service to our nation's youth and I wish them another 100 years of success. I thank my colleagues. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I would respond to the Senator by simply indicating, there is nothing that hurts the truth more than stretching it. I understand if somebody reads a headline and gets upset about it. I would, too. But the headlines I have from the Kansas press--and the Senator is correct; I was at the meeting and introduced the candidate. The candidate introduced Lynne Cheney, the wife of the Vice President. The Vice President gave a very standard speech. Here is the headline, ``Cheney Talks About Iraq at Congressional Fundraiser.'' He said that our candidate would be ``an effective voice for Kansas, a fine addition to your State delegation, which is already one of the best in the country,'' which I appreciated. But I find nothing here that has anything to do with politics. And then here is another one, ``Fundraiser for Taff Draws 500.'' From the Kansas City Star, ``Cheney Talks Tough at Taff Fundraiser.'' But the two things were separated. It was a very sobering discussion on the policy of preemption and what we face in Iraq. As a matter of fact, the Vice President, in a private session, said the Congress ought to be asking tough questions, which we are, and urged bipartisan support. I heard every word. For the life of me, I just did not hear that kind of inference at all. I wanted to come to the floor--I thank the Senator for yielding to me--to indicate that simply was not the case. If we are into a situation where we are inferring we are trying to politicize this effort, that is not the case with the Vice President. We can't be in the business of the security of the American people and sending wrong messages to Saddam Hussein unless we get the facts straight. In doing that, I am not trying to perjure the intent or the concern of the distinguished majority leader. It just did not happen. I wanted to set the record straight.

Mr. ROBERTS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask the Senator from Arizona if he is aware, along the same vein of comments that were made by the distinguished majority leader in reference to the Vice President--I share the same concern he has mentioned--is the Senator aware when the Vice President was in Kansas, basically they are accusing the Vice President of politics in regard to the Iraq debate in urging an audience in Kansas to vote for a GOP congressional candidate?

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank my distinguished colleague for yielding. Mr. President, before you saddle up to ride on a new trail, it is a good thing to take a look at where you have been. You can avoid a lot of trouble--a lot of ditches, a lot of box canyons--that way. The problem is that in terms of yet another expensive disaster bill for farmers and ranchers--sorely needed--we are indeed in a box canyon. It appears we are going to have to pay quite a price to backtrack, to get to a responsible and reasonable farm program policy to be of assistance to our farmers. We didn't have to go down this trail. I would like to read a quote by the distinguished Senate majority leader. He is doing the best he can, as he sees it, with the disaster bill. But the majority leader said in regard to the new farm bill when it was passed in May, according to CQ Monitor News: What we are doing is putting certainty back in the bill. And I would argue, we're going to be doing it at less cost to the Federal Government during the course and life of this bill than we did under Freedom to Farm because you are not going to see these disastrous supplemental requests in the future. We'd still like to get one for 2001, but in the future you are not going to see them. It won't be necessary. At the same time, we also had many say that the new farm bill was the greatest farm bill ever passed. Here we are, only 4 months out from the passage of the farm bill, and farmers are lined up outside the Farm Service Agency offices in great numbers, with all of the complexities of the bill, and already these folks and a majority of the farm and commodity organizations are also lined up, pushing for a disaster assistance package, a bill the Congressional Budget Office now says will come close to $6 billion. It is a bill that faces an uphill, if not impossible, battle in the House and a possible Presidential veto. How on Earth did we get here after passing the so-called greatest farm bill ever? Because in my view the new farm bill is flawed. Simply put, it provides no assistance to farmers when they need it the most. That so-called and much talked about countercyclical safety net we heard so much about--well, it was not a safety net. It is a hammock. It has holes, and it is lying on parched acres suffering from drought. We are in, as has been said and has also been covered in the press, one of the worst droughts we have ever seen in many parts of the Plains. Pastures are gone. Cattle herds have been liquidated. Combines never left the shed in parts of Kansas. Parts of our great State look like the desert areas of the southwestern United States. I have bankers telling me they cannot cash flow a single producer who does business at their bank. In large part, these cash flow problems are the result of a farm bill that provides no assistance to producers this crop-year when they do not have a crop. When the farm bill was debated months ago, I said I would vote against the bill because it would not have provided the so- called countercyclical assistance to wheat producers in 9 of the last 20 years. Why would you support a farm bill that did not really provide any assistance in about half of the time in the past 20 years, with most of those years being in poor production years caused by droughts, flooding, freeze, insects--the years when we need the assistance the most, 9 out of 20? I did not think that was a very good deal. For that I received some criticism on this floor. I was told it was OK that the bill would not have paid out in 9 of those 20 years because that meant that prices were high and producers would not need the assistance. Let the record show that yesterday in Dodge City, KS, the closing price was $4.67 a bushel on wheat. That is a tremendous price as compared to where it has been, so prices have come up. It is about $2.91 a bushel for corn, $4.28 a bushel on sorghum, $5.61 a bushel on soybeans--great prices. But, with these prices, my producers are barely hanging on. Why? They have no crops to sell. Consequently, the few who did sold early to meet these emergency obligations. This August, I just finished a 105-county listening tour. I wish those ``greatest farm bill ever'' proponents would have been there. My farm meeting in Stockton, KS, America, started out with a farmer telling me: Pat, thanks for voting against that farm bill. I don't think most of us can survive this first year under it. We were counting, under the old bill, on a supplemental payment called the AMTA payment, or at best the equivalent of that payment. It was a common statement all throughout Kansas. The difference is that under that payment, the checks would have been there now and it would have been 60 cents for wheat as opposed to a very small direct payment of 6 cents a bushel for wheat. And the other three components of the countercyclical payment don't work in times such as this. It is true that prices are high. But it is because drought has reduced the supplies. In many instances, my producers had no crop to harvest. And that is true in Montana, it is true in Wyoming, it is true in Colorado, it is true in South Dakota, it is true in Nebraska, and it is true in Oklahoma. But due to these high prices, they are not going to receive any countercyclical payments. There is no loan deficiency payment, and they have no crop to put under loan. One of the criticisms of the farm bill was that it was too complex. Farmers would get payments in maybe one in four mailboxes. If you looked in one mailbox, no payment. If you looked in a second mailbox, no payment. If you looked in a third mailbox, no payment. If you looked in a fourth mailbox, maybe 6 cents a bushel. That is one of the major flaws of this farm bill. It is why I pushed an alternative farm bill approach. It is also why I proposed implementing this bill or any new bill in 2003--the next cropyear to give us enough time to work on it--and doing a budgeted $5.5 billion supplemental AMTA payment plus livestock feed assistance for this year--cash payments, income protection, not a countercyclical payment less than what we are going to spend in regard to this disaster bill. Instead, here we are doing a disaster bill again. Every even numbered year there is disaster assistance proposed and disaster assistance to implement. As long as this farm bill is our current policy, we are probably going to be back here doing one each and every year. This ride into a farm bill box canyon is expensive. It is full of regulatory potholes, all sorts of snakes that come back and bite the producer and truly counterproductive--not countercyclical. Two years ago, we made significant reforms to the Crop Insurance Program. That was the tool under the Kerrey-Roberts bill, or the Roberts-Kerrey bill depending on which one you want to give the credit. If you like it, it is the Roberts-Kerrey bill. If you do not like it, it is the Kerrey- Roberts bill. There are significant reforms. Coverage levels are up. Insured acres are up. Indemnities paid to producers are substantial. We spent $1 billion to address the problems caused by multiple years of losses. Many producers are telling me they are just beginning to realize the benefits of this change. You can insure up to the 85 percent coverage level. However, because of the farm bill that was passed earlier this year, which took money out of crop insurance, we are now doing a disaster assistance bill that works to undermine the very reforms we passed in the year 2000. Again, it didn't have to happen this way. We proposed a farm bill that would have provided assistance in years of both low prices and crop losses. The other side said: No thank you. We proposed a supplemental AMTA package and livestock assistance that would have been paid for in the budget. The checks would be out this month. The other said: No thank you. It took USDA 8 months to provide disaster payments several years ago. They are hard hit today trying to work through all of the paperwork on the new farm bill. I am not sure that will happen in regard to immediate assistance. Here we are again, just like the farm bill. My minority party was shut out of any committee consideration of that bill. And due to the parliamentary situation in which this second- degree amendment was submitted, we have no opportunity to offer amendments to this package. I had a proposal to allow producers to choose between 2001 and 2002 assistance. The other side didn't like that, though it was a better deal for taxpayers. It brought the price down. And, after all, farmers did receive the extra AMTA payment in 2001. Was it perfect? No. But it was a halfway point between those wanting assistance and some in this body who want nothing at all. It worked to protect the Crop Insurance Program by requiring the purchase of crop insurance in order to receive disaster assistance. Why buy crop insurance if you are going to get disaster assistance every year? It tried to make proper use of taxpayer dollars by keeping this spending in check. And it was popular with my Kansas producers on my recent tour in the 105 counties of the great State of Kansas. We will not have a chance to debate any alternative proposals today. This package will probably pass. I am going to reluctantly--heels dragging--support it. I have to support it. The situation is grim-- absolutely grim. It has been hotter out in Kansas. It has been drier out in Kansas. But it has never been as hot and as dry at the same time--even back in dirty thirties--as is the case as of today. But let's be honest with ourselves and the American public. These funds are coming straight from Social Security. It is the other side that has increased the bidding war right at the start of this appropriations process, and we are doing this plain and simple because we have a new farm bill that is flawed and that has created a cash flow vacuum in rural America. There is no question that we need--that our farmers need--this disaster assistance. The situation in farm country hit by drought--the drought that caused increased market prices in other commodity regions, not the farm bill--is recordbreaking. It is severe. By passing-- ``force-feeding'' is the better term--this expensive emergency disaster package, without any chance for amendment, what do we achieve? I will tell you what we achieve. We achieve an issue. I hope the end result is that we achieve a bill. Right now we have an issue. This bill will not pass the House. It will not be signed by the President. It is going to be a little tough for the farmer, it seems to me, to cashflow with politics and an issue at the bank. I hope when we pass this bill--this very expensive bill that is headed for an uphill battle in the House and with the administration-- that we can reach some accommodation in conference. Reluctantly, I will vote for the bill. I don't like the way it has been brought up. I have gone over all of the reasons why I think we should have done it another way. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. In the Emerging Threat Subcommittee we heard from the Bremmer commission, the Gilmore commission, the Hart-Rudman commission, the Center for Strategic and International Studies Group, and the Rumsfeld commission. In virtually every one of those commissions, they indicated the need for greater border security with all of the threats you have mentioned. We just had a hearing before the Senate Agriculture Committee, and Director Ridge just came before the committee. Secretary Ann Veneman of the Department of Agriculture came before the committee. It is another one of those cases where, as we try to reorganize the Department of Homeland Security, people get a little worried about their turf. People get a little worried about past practices. People say: Wait a minute; do we need to transfer that whole agency over to the superagency? There is an agency within the Department of Agriculture called the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. As you know, in working with the bioterrorism bill, I had an agriterrorism section. We tried to ramp up the funding for our basic research universities: Athens, GA, for salmonella; Ames, IA, for the livestock industry; Plum Island, where you don't want to open up any refrigerator doors under any circumstance because of the pathogens that are there. We found now that we can use 3,200 of these employees who have the capability to take a closer look and provide the kind of security the Senator is mentioning, to the Department of Homeland Security, keep the rest of the employees so if a farmer from Kansas or, for that matter, North Dakota says, ``Hey, I have wheat rust,'' he doesn't have to pick up the phone and call Tom Ridge. Or if he is going to try to enforce the Animal Welfare Act, there is no need to do that. But 3,200 more people are needed just to prevent some kind of problem with security and danger or agriterrorism and food security and how easy it would be for the terrorist to use the pharmaceutical that you are talking about to come in and do great damage in our country. The issue is safety, and the higher bar that we must have, now, to guarantee it. The whole thing is, we used to talk about we have to detect, we have to deter, and then, in the worst case scenario, we have to get into consequence management. Are we ready? The answer to that is no. The new paradigm is we have to detect and preempt. We have to go on the offensive and then deter and then get into consequence management. What the Senator from Mississippi has done is simply said to the Department of Health and Human Services, please guarantee the safety of these products before they come in, not afterwards; not after we see some evidence that something will happen. It is a before-and-after question. Sure, that senior citizen before may get a drug that is more inexpensive. He may die. That is a dramatic kind of statement, but it could happen. That is how I would answer the Senator.

Mr. ROBERTS. I think the Senator already asked the question.

Mr. ROBERTS. I am happy to yield.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Breaux- Cochran amendment to the Dorgan amendment on this subject of reimportation of prescription drugs from Canada. It is not my intent to stand here as an expert in regards to how much money the pharmaceutical companies of the United States should spend on advertising, how much money they should spend on R&D or to talk about the global imports where we have price controls in various countries, or even as to where my tie came from. I think the Senator from North Dakota indicated that we have a lot of imports. My tie is from Italy, by the way. It is a gift from my daughter. But the thing I want to talk about is safety, and this tie which came from Italy is safe, at least to the best of my knowledge it is, unless somebody gets ahold of me and yanks on the tie. It is not my desire to talk about the hometown druggist whether it be in North Dakota or in Kansas, where I grew up, or whether you trust the druggist. I do want to talk about safety, and I do want to talk about the fact that Senator Santorum was kind enough to mention that I serve on the Intelligence Committee, used to be chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats on the Armed Services Committee. I am now the ranking member with Senator Landrieu, who is doing an excellent job as chairman. I am a little worried about this in regards to the language--I am not a little worried, but I am concerned about the language of the Dorgan amendment which passed and the safety issue that is raised by the Cochran amendment, which I think is the better approach. Basically, this amendment, for which I am a cosponsor, would require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to certify that prescription drugs that are reimported from Canada are indeed safe before--and that is the keyword, ``before,'' not after. You survey and you have some sort of a panel discussion and determine that at some date later we have a situation where some drug was imported from Canada and it indeed was unsafe. I would hate to think what would happen before we would take notice of that, even in terms of lives being lost. So the key word is ``before'' we allow my constituents in Kansas or the constituents of the distinguished Senator from North Dakota or the distinguished Senator from Michigan and others throughout the United States to receive them. As I have indicated, as a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, ranking member on the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, I see reimportation as another way--I would not have thought of it before 9/11, but today I see it as another way for a terrorist organization to cause many human lives to be put at risk without the proper security measures in place. One might say: Now, Senator Roberts, come on. Prescription drugs from Canada--this really represents a threat? Well, we asked all the experts in the Emerging Threats Subcommittee some time ago, prior to 9/11, what keeps you up at night in this unsafe world? Bioterrorism came in No. 1, and I won't go into the rest of them. We could probably list 100 different threats and the terrorists in their own inimical way would say we are going to do 101. It is an asymmetrical approach. How easy would it be to reenact the Tylenol scare that happened some years ago in regard to some kind of a terrorist threat? We have seen the situation at the Capitol of the United States in regards to anthrax. Dr. Frist, the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, can give us about an hour lecture on that, what we saw then and what we see now in regard to what we have to do in terms of safeguards. I remember Operation Dark Winter, which was done about 2 years ago, about the possibility of using a strain of smallpox from the former Soviet Union in Oklahoma City. Do you know how they distributed that? They did it by basically walking through shopping centers and spraying plants. How easy would it be to use imported drugs from Canada? So this year and years past, during the reimportation debate, Members of both the House and Senate have received statements from people who ought to know in regard to the fact, is there a safety issue? That is from former FDA commissioners, the current and former heads of the Department of Health and Human Services. The statement was made about this administration, past administration--their testimony was exactly the same--and officials of the Food and Drug Administration. They state they cannot assure the American people that reimported drugs are safe. Cheaper, yes. I understand that. I understand the compassion and the caring and the difference between drugs in regard to border States and Canada or, for that matter, any State and Canada. I hope we can bring the prices down. However, are they safe? They have even recently given testimony, all the people I just talked about, as of July 9, about a week or so ago, before the Select Committee on Aging. Why the Select Committee on Aging? Obviously, every letter read by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota was a senior citizen who desperately needs drugs. There is a quote by the Senator from Michigan indicating that Mr. Hubbard said, on balance, he would say it would be OK for somebody who is suffering from some malady to use a Canadian drug. I suppose if I were not in your home State and I were in Canada and sick and I didn't have much of a choice, I would say: OK, Mr. Hubbard, I think that is OK. I think I will take my chances. He is the senior associate commissioner for policy, planning, and legislation at the Food and Drug Administration. But he also testified, as the statement demonstrated by the distinguished Senator from Michigan: FDA cannot assure the public that reimported drugs made in the U.S. have been stored under proper conditions or that they are even the real product because the agency does not regulate foreign distributors or pharmacists. Therefore, unapproved drugs and reimported approved medications may be contaminated, subpotent, superpotent, or counterfeit. I don't know how the supporters of the underlying amendment can read these statements by these experts and possibly indicate we are trying to scuttle the bill. I don't want to scuttle the bill. I want to put in the proper safeguards. I don't want to put lives at risk without assurance to the safety of the American consumer. The question is, Are we, the Members of the Senate, willing to put a new burden of proof on an agency or agencies having to deal with a new set of priorities since September 11? We know in terms of trying to put together a new Homeland Security Agency, it is like pushing a rope; that we will get it done, hopefully by September 11. Here we have yet another large-scale security undertaking that they, the Customs Service, in coordination with other departments and agencies, will have to administer without the resources, without the manpower and training available to them to stop the counterfeit drugs that will put human lives, or could put human lives, at risk. An example from Mr. Hubbard's testimony outlines exact fears we should have in allowing reimportation without the safety guarantee. On May 14 of this year, the Ontario College of Pharmacists, which is a Canadian Government agency, filed charges under the Ontario law against the Canadian Drugstore, Ink. for unlawfully operating an unlicensed pharmacy and using an unregistered pharmacist in filling prescriptions for United States residents. The college also filed charges against a licensed pharmacy and physician in Ontario for helping to facilitate the delivery of prescription and nonprescription drugs to U.S. residents. A drug wholesaler was charged with supplying medications to a nonlicensed pharmacy. Here is the key of the whole debate. As noted by Elizabeth Durant, the executive director of Trade Promotions for the U.S. Customs Service, at the same hearing on the Select Committee on Aging, Customs is working with the Food and Drug Administration to better identify adulterated or misbranded drugs entering our borders. However, she said, at this time they clearly do not have the manpower nor the infrastructure in place to ensure adequately and screen all of the prescriptions that would enter our borders. As an example given in Ms. Durant's testimony, we have a program. Nothing has been said about this program during this entire debate, or at least I am not aware of it, and Customs has really initiated a program called Operation Safe Guard. During a recent phase of this program that took place at two international mail branches, 31 parcels containing 52 types of questionable pharmaceuticals underwent intensive analysis. The analysis shows that eight of the so-called pharmaceutical drugs--and, yes, they were less expensive--or 15 percent contained no identifiable active ingredient. They were phony. And 18 contained a substance that is regulated under the Federal Controlled Substances Act. There is example after example of unscrupulous practices by individuals looking to take advantage of consumers desperately trying to find a more affordable way to get the prescriptions they must have. Yes, we need to provide relief to Kansas seniors, to Minnesota seniors, to West Virginia seniors, to Massachusetts seniors, to Michigan seniors, North Dakota seniors, Oklahoma seniors, and Tennessee seniors. But I cannot in good conscience support a measure that is a public health safety and security risk. Instead of looking to our neighbors to the north for pricing relief and instead of relying on unsure and unsafe practices without the proper personnel and training in place to roll out a plan such as this, we need to focus on passing meaningful prescription drug legislation. Until I can assure my constituents in Kansas that the drugs they are receiving are indeed what is labeled on the package, or an FDA-approved package, I do not think the underlying amendment can be supported. This is why I urge my colleagues to support the Cochran-Breaux amendment. The key word is ``before''; before a drug gets here, it is determined safe. That is what this argument is all about. That is what the debate is all about.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, today I am pleased to honor Melissa Byers of Leawood, KS, for her impressive essay, ``Determining the Role of Peacekeeping in a Global Age.'' This essay won first place in a State-level competition in the 15th Annual National Peace Essay Contest sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace. She received a $1,000 college scholarship, and is competing for national awards of up to $10,000. Melissa is a high school student at Blue Valley North High School in Overland Park, KS. Melissa sets an incredible example for all students in our country. Melissa came into my office and I met with her to extend my congratulations on her accomplishments. I would like to submit her essay into the Record and recognize her fine work. The United States Institute of Peace is an organization created and funded by Congress to promote research, education, and training on the resolution of international conflicts. This National Peace Essay Contest is one of the Institute's oldest activities to promote civic education on international peace for students across the United States. I would like to commend the Institute of Peace and Melissa Byers for their participation. Mr. President, I ask that Melissa's essay be printed in the Record. The essay follows: Determining the Role of Peacekeeping in a Global Age (By Melissa Byers) Throughout the history of the United States, we have adapted foreign policy to meet the unique challenges of the times. Past US foreign policies of imperialism, expansionism, and isolationism were adapted in ways representing a narrow national interest. But global conflicts such as those moderated by the current United Nations missions to the Central Africa Republic, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo, not withstanding the huge ramifications of September 11, require a new foreign policy perspective. The collapse of the Soviet Union effectively ended the Cold War, bringing with it the possibility and the necessity of recognizing that the old order is past and a new order is required. By examining the traditional roles of the military and exploring several case studies, the issues surrounding national policy come more clearly into focus, and we can better begin to formulate and redefine a new way of thinking about the peacekeeping role of the United States military and our national interest. Much has been written about the traditional role of the military, and protecting the homeland is a foundational context in defining the role of the military. Erwin A. Schmidl, a historian for the Austrian Ministry of Defense defines five types of peacetime military operations (1) frontier operations, (2) colonial interventions and counterinsurgency, (3) occupational duties, (4) peacekeeping military operations, and (5) multinational operations (Sismanidis 1). This theory can certainly be applied to U.S. history. In frontier operations, the presence of US military was a stabilizing influence in fulfillment of Manifest Destiny. The US military in putting down the Filipino insurrection of 1901 was an example of colonial interventions and counterinsurgency operations, and the US post-WW II occupation of Germany and Japan in deterring the rise of militant forces was an example of occupational duties. The presence of forces in Haiti in trying to maintain political and economic stability is an example of peacekeeping military operations, and the recent NATO interventions in the old Yugoslavia in preventing ethnic cleansing and genocide is an example of multinational operations. The common thread of national protectionism underpins all five roles, formulating the traditional groundwork for the post-WW II definition of peacekeeping. The timeliness of this essay is evident in the ashes and aftermath of September 11. With the physical destruction of the two World Trade Towers also came down the ideological pillars of an inviolable and invincible United States. Traditionally, wars have been fought between known enemies and specific military targets. The profile of the enemy was defined. But with the fall of the United Soviet Socialist Republic came a new set of variables that changed foreign policy. The profile of the ``enemy'' is not obscured. In many modern conflicts, violence often occurs between subtle ideological or ethnic enemies. The role of modern peacekeepers is evolving around these global human and economic conflicts. On the evening of September 11th, President George W. Bush's address to the nation articulated a shift in peacekeeping policy as it relates to national security and foreign relations, ``America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world and we stand together to win the war against terrorism'' (Bush Sept 11). In the evolving new foreign policy, definitions are broadened, national security is equated with international security, and American interests are linked with global interests. The current evolution of the U.S. military's peacekeeping role stems from United Nations mandates that peacekeepers should maintain international peace and security. As published on the United Nations Website, the role of the peacekeeper is divided into three categories. (1) Cease-fire peacekeeping, in which conflicting countries can pull back, creating a more conducive environment for negotiations. (2) Multi-dimensional peacekeeping, in which experts inspire major political, social and economic change, strengthening national institutions. (3) Humanitarian peacekeeping, in which massive human suffering is relieved, delivering needed support and supplies (What is Peacekeeping?). In the last six months, the role of U.S. peacekeepers has been drastically redefined to include these roles. In response to the threat of global terrorism, the U.S. has broadened homeland defense to include global interests. In a speech, marking the 100-day anniversary of September 11, Bush declared, ``American power will be used against all terrorists of global reach'' (Bush Dec. 20). The U.S. has now begun to build coalitions, attack terrorist networks, employ economic sanctions against those supporting and harboring terrorism, and condemn terrorist attacks wherever they occur. More funds have been made available the military's role, from not only eliminating terrorist targets, but also to providing 2.5 million humanitarian rations inside Afghanistan (Bush Dec. 20). One positive example of U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping happened during the 1999 Kosovo campaign to stop the ethnic cleaning entire of the Albanian community (U.S. White House 41-42). The presence of NATO peacekeepers provided for surrender of Slobodan Milosevic, repatriation of Albanian refugees, and withdrawal of Serbian forces from contested soils (U.S. White House 41-52). The success of the peacekeepers' involvement in Kosovo in promoting democratic principles also increased the security and stability of Europe. In October 2000, the world watched as Kosovo held its first free and open municipal election, and its positive result increased public confidence that peacekeeping efforts could be successful. Negative examples of U.S. military involvement in peacepeekping occurred during operations in Lebanon and Somalia, failing due to a lack of US focus and resolve. During the Lebanese civil turmoil in the eighties, several thousand American, French, British, and Italian peacekeepers intervened to stop bloodshed, yet terrorism and flagging public support forced the peacemakers to withdraw without finding a peaceful solution (Magnuson 54). During the Somalian Conflict in 1992, 30,000 U.S. military troops attempted to open supply routes and disarm local militias, but horrific images of the bodies of U.S. soldiers being drug through the streets of Mogadisu helped to break U.S. national resolve (Carpender). Both missions were designed to decrease localized violence and civilian suffering, with limited international involvement, but in each, American uniforms because the target of heavily armed local militias. While these failed attempts at peacekeeping diminished U.S. international prestige, the most negative result was public disillusionment. Unsuccessful interventions in the civil matters of others countries, compounded by costs of American lives and resources, drastically limits the public resolve to intervene. The tragedy of Rwanda is an example of the negative implications of restricting U.S. military involvement abroad. When the UN Security Council withdrew most of its peacekeepers from Rwanda, it created a deathly vacuum, resulting in the slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis in three months (Kuperman 105). Four months later the UN reversed its decision (Carnegie 4). In part, due to the Somalia experience, the U.S. continued to be reluctant to intervene (Nye 32). Experts project that the timely intervention of 6,000 U.S. troops could have prevented 275,000 Tutsi deaths (Kuperman 100). Lack of U.S. military action partially resulted in the human tragedy of Rwandan genocide, while the guilt of the nations grew and the national consciences appeared to numb. Vietnam is an example of the positive implications of restricting U.S. military involvement abroad. For decades, France and Vietnam had been embroiled in military conflict. When France withdrew, the Americans entered in a peacekeeping role, fearing the domino effect. By 1955, American peacekeepers began advising military and political leaders against the communist forces lead by Ho Chi Minh (Bailey 916- 917). Eventually, peacekeeping forces became military troops, escalating U.S. involvement, distracting the U.S. from its goal of peace, and entangling the U.S. in a long protracted war. Thus, public support decreased. What started out as a peacekeeping effort resulted in 47,355 American casualties, over one million Vietnamese casualties, and at a cost of 352 billion dollars (Bailey A34). The extent of such losses makes for a strong argument in limiting U.S. military engagement abroad. Over the next decade, there is no doubt that the American military must play a leading part in insuring international peace and security. The old order, including the narrow traditional role of the military, is obsolete, and a new order, including a broadened innovative role of military, is required. Experiences in Kosovo, Lebanon and Somalia, Rwanda, and Vietnam testify that it is in our national interest to formulate and redefine broader peacekeeping roles for the United States military. As in the case of Kosovo, the U.S. needs to be bold enough to commit the forces needed to resolve the situation. As seen in Lebanon and Somalia, military objectives need to be well defined in order to avoid escalating entanglement and unnecessary loss of life. To prevent another Rwanda, the U.S. military policy needs to defend human rights violations wherever they occur, yet, move with enough caution and insight to prevent another Vietnam imbroglio. The lessons of September 11 call us to the openness and flexibility of preventative peacekeeping. The United States must realize that it has a vested interest in what goes on outside its borders, and that the best way to protect our national interests is to defend personal and economic rights worldwide. Works Cited Bailey, Thomas A. and David M. Kennedy. The American Pageant. D.C. Health and Company: 1994. Bush, George W. Address to the Nation. The White House, Washington, D.C. 11 Sept. 2001. Bush, George W. President Blocks More Assets in Financial War on Terrorism. Remarks. The White House, Washington, D.C. 20 Dec. 2001. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. Washington, D.C. Carnegie Commission, 1997. Carpenter, Ted Galen. ``Setting a Dangerous Precedent in Somalia.'' 18 Dec. 1992. Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 20. 15 Jan. 2001. Kuperman, Alan J. ``Rwanda in Retrospect.'' Foreign Affairs Jan.-Feb. 2000: 1-8. Magnuson, Ed. ``Nothing but Quicksand; If It Is Hard to Keep the Marines in Lebanon, It Is Harder to Pull Them Out.'' Times 2 Jan. 1984: 54-56. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. ``Redefining the National Interest.'' Foreign Affairs July/Aug. 1999: 22-35. Sismanidis, Roxane D.V. Police Functions in Peace Operations: Report From a Workshop Organized By the United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC: Peaceworks No. 14, 1997. United States. White House. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington: GPO, 2000. ``What is Peacekeeping?'' 15 Jan. 2001. bibliography Albright, Madeleine K. ``Challenges Facing U.S. National Interests at Home and Abroad.'' Center for National Policy. Washington, D.C. 21 Jan. 1999. Albright, Madeleine K. Focus on the Issues: Building Peace and Security Around the World. Dept. of State. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2000. ``Allies in Lebanon Now Feel the Heat.'' U.S. News & World Report 19 Dec 1983: 24. ``Attacks to Erase 1.6 Million Jobs.'' Kansas City Star 11 Jan. 2002: C3. Bailey, Thomas A. and Davis M. Kennedy. The American Pageant. D.C. Health and Company: 1994. Bryan, William Jennings. ``British Rule in India.'' 22 Jan. 1999. New York Journal 17 Jan. 2001. Bush, George W. Address to the Nation. The White House, Washington, D.C. 11 Sept. 2001. Bush, George W. President Blocks More Assets in Financial War on Terrorism. Remarks. The White House, Washington, D.C. 20 Dec. 2001. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. Washington, D.C.'' Carnegie Commission, 1997. Carpenter, Ted Galen. ``Setting a Dangerous Precedent in Somalia.'' 18 Dec. 1992. Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 20. 15 Jan. 2001. Daimbaye, Mirana. ``An Ecumenical Contribution to Resolving Conflict.'' The Ecumenical Review July 2001: 390-396. Fleichman, Jeffrey. ``U.S. Peacekeepers: Changing Role Ahead?'' The Inquirer 31 Jan. 2001: A1+. Global Security: Part 1: Films for Humanities and Sciences. Videocassette. Princeton, NJ: 1997. Global Security: Part 2: Films for Humanities and Sciences. Videocassette. Princeton, NJ: 1997. Hoepli-Phalon, Nancy. ``U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Political System.'' Introduction. Great Decisions 2000: 5-8. ``Iraq/Kuwait-UNIKOM: Background.'' 17 Jan. 2001. Jantzen, Steven L., Kenneth Neill, and Larry S. Krieger. World History: Perspectives on the Past. D.C. Heath Company: 1994. Jett, Dennis C. Why Peacekeeping Fails. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. Kelly, John H. ``6: Lebanon: 1982-1984.'' 18 Jan. 2001. Korb, Lawrence J. ``The Military: What Role In U.S. Foreign Policy?'' Great Decisions 2000: 43-52. Kuperman, Alan J. ``Rwanda in Retrospect.'' Foreign Affairs Jan.-Feb. 2000: 1-8. Kurtz, Howard. ``Kerry Tells of Role in Vietnam Civilian Deaths; Ex-Senator Calls '69 Killings Navy SEAL Unit Accidental.'' The Washington Post 26 April 2001: A1. Macrae, Joanna. ``Humanitarianism: Facing New Challenges.'' Great Decisions 2000: 87-96. Magnuson, Ed. `` `Nothing but Quicksand'; If It Is Hard to Keep the Marines in Lebanon, It Is Harder to Pull Them Out.'' Times 2 Jan. 1984: 54-56. Masland, Tom, et al. ``Fury and Fear (Sierra Leone).'' Newsweek 22 May 2000: 20-22. Mason, Berry and Chris Talbot. ``Britain Steps Up Presence in Sierra Leone as UN Forces Crumbles.'' 7 Nov. 2000. World Socialist Web Site 17 Jan. 2001. Maynes, Charles William. ``U.S. Role in the World: What Are the Choices?'' Great Decisions 2000: 9-18. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. ``Redefining the National Interest.'' Foreign Affairs July/Aug. 1999: 22-35. Power, Samantha. ``Never Again: The World's Most Unfulfilled Promise.'' 18 Jan. 2001. Ransdell, Eric. ``Where the Warlords Still Rule the Roost.'' U.S. News & World Report 12 Dec. 1994: 67. ``Report: Kosovo, Timor Deaths Inflated.'' United Press International 9 Nov. 1999. Schraeder, Peter J. ``Africa: Prospects for the Future.'' Great Decisions 2000: 75-84. Sismanidis, Roxane D.V. Police Functions in Peace Operations: Report From a Workshop Organized By the United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC: Peaceworks No. 14, 1997. Stone, Andrea. ``Pentagon's No. 2: Let Others Take Up Peacekeeping.'' 18 June 2001. USA Today 12 Jan. 2001. ``The Bleeding of Rwanda.'' The Economist. 16 Apr. 1994: 45. United States. Cong. House. Committee on Armed Services. The Impact of Peacekeeping on Army Personnel Requirements. Hearing. 103rd Cong., 1st sess. Microform. Washington: USGPO, 1993. Committee on International Relations. Does UN Peacekeeping Serve US Interest? Part 2. Hearings. 105th Cong., 1st sess. Microform. Washington: US GPO, 1997. Dept. of State. United States Strategic Plan for International Affairs. Washington, D.C.: 1999. White House Fact Sheet on Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: 20 Dec. 2001. White House. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington: GPO, 2000. ``What is Peacekeeping?'' 15 Jan. 2001. Weiss, Thomas G. ``U.S. Role In the UN a Changing Dynamic?'' Great Decisions 1999: 87-97.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I commend Ranking Member Warner for his stewardship of the FY 2003 defense budget process in the Senate. We face many challenges to our national security in this day and age and I am thankful for his leadership. One of those emerging challenges we face is the terrorist threat to our food supply, specifically U.S. agriculture. On the federal, state, and local level, we need to establish procedures to detect, deter, and respond to large scale coordinated attacks against livestock and agricultural commodities. Toward that end, I ask the Senate to support my amendment to authorize, with an offset, $1,000,000 for research, development, test, and evaluation, for basic research for the chemical and biological defense program (PE 0601384BP) for research, analysis, and assessment of efforts to counter possible agroterrorist attacks. It is my hope that universities with established expertise in the agricultural sciences can conduct studies and exercises that lead to better coordination between federal, state, and local authorities as they attempt to detect, deter, and respond to large scale coordinated attacks on U.S. agriculture. Most importantly, I envision universities assisting the Department of Defense in determining what role--if any--our military or defense agencies play in countering agroterroism. I ask my colleagues to support my amendment. I thank the chair. amendment no. 4160

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Florida, who has joined what I call the Speicher Team. I thank him for his interest, for his leadership, for his perseverance, and for his very aggressive action with regard to legislation I am cosponsoring as of today in behalf of Scott Speicher. I rise today in support of the amendment. The amendment simply requires frequent reports by the Department of Defense on their efforts to determine the fate of CAPT, Select, Scott Speicher. Why on Earth would we have to pass legislation requiring the Department of Defense to report back to Congress with periodic reports? It is all about Scott Speicher--Scott Speicher--a lieutenant commander who was shot down in his Navy F-18 fighter within the first few hours of the start of the gulf war. He was streaking towards Baghdad on a strike mission. Within 24 hours, he was declared a fatality by the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense--our first casualty in the Persian Gulf war. Unfortunately for Scott, as we have learned since that time through a series of mistakes and still very unexplained action--and when I say a ``series of mistakes,'' I am talking about an unbelievable set of circumstances that are so bizarre and so unexplainable that it is difficult to imagine. At any rate, through this series of mistakes, there was no confirmation--no confirmation--that Scott Speicher died in the shootdown. Tragically, there was not 1 minute of search and rescue effort made in behalf of Scott Speicher. He was declared a fatality based solely on the report of a fellow flier who saw a bright fireball in the direction of Scott's plane and determined that nobody could have survived that hit. That was relayed up the command to the point that the Secretary of Defense--Vice President Cheney, today--was told that he was a casualty, which he announced on national television. So Scott was dead. He was killed in action. And he remained dead in the eyes of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy until investigations forced upon the DIA--the Defense Intelligence Agency--and the CIA by Congress made it so obvious that the probability was that he survived the shootdown and ended up in the hands of Iraqis, as has been pointed out by the distinguished Senator. But even with this information, the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy again had to be pressured to change his status from killed in action--i.e., KIA--to missing in action. Finally, in January of 2001--10 years later--the Secretary of the Navy changed the status of Scott from KIA to missing in action. It took a lot of effort to get that done on the part of some of my colleagues and what I call the Scott Speicher Team. In February of this year, I wrote to the Secretary of Defense and requested that CAPT, Select, Scott Speicher be designated not as missing in action but as a prisoner of war. My request was based upon ``The Intelligence Community Assessment of the Lieutenant Commander Speicher Case.'' That is what it is called. That is the title. That assessment actually concluded that ``Scott Speicher probably survived the loss of his aircraft, and, if he survived, he was most certainly captured by the Iraqis.'' My colleagues, today is the 25th of June, and yet the Department is still delaying on the obvious. CAPT, Select, Scott Speicher was, and is, and should be a prisoner of war. Let me be clear. I don't know if Scott is alive today. I hope and I pray so. But let me be equally clear. There is no evidence that he is dead either. Either way, colleagues, ``prisoner of war'' is the appropriate designation for the warrior we left behind. Today, we are not here to argue the status of Scott Speicher but, rather, whether or not Senator Nelson, I, others who support this bill, and the Senate go on record as requiring the Department of Defense to report frequently on their efforts to resolve his whereabouts and status. Sadly, my colleagues, my history with the Scott Speicher case says we must keep pressure on the Department if we are to finally determine the fate of an American warrior we left behind in the desert of Iraq. This Nation prides itself on the commitment to our men and women who sacrifice for our freedom. My colleagues, we saw that commitment in the effort to recover the remains of the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attack. We saw that effort on a hilltop in Afghanistan in our efforts to recover a lost Special Forces member. We saw that commitment in the streets of Mogadishu when a Blackhawk helicopter was shot down. We saw that effort in Kosovo and in Bosnia when downed airmen were heroically rescued. In each of our wars or conflicts, the American servicemen were told they would never be left behind. We owe no less to Scott Speicher. If we are to maintain any credibility with the fighting men and women of our military today--that is why it has special pertinence today in the war on terrorism--we must honor our commitment to leave no one behind. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment to keep the pressure on the Department of Defense to determine the fate of Scott Speicher. Senator Nelson indicated that I have a story to tell. Actually, Senator Smith, I, and Senator Grams, who is no longer a Member of the Senate, and others of us became interested in this case by accident. By the way, it is quite a chronology of trying to piece together what happened to Scott with some cooperation or degree of lack of cooperation from the authorities. Let me go over a short history, if I might. January 18, 1991: Secretary of Defense Cheney--as I referred to earlier in my remarks--received word that he was a casualty, and it was announced over national television. He referred to the ``death'' of Commander Speicher. January 26, 1991: His status was established as ``missing in action,'' however, by his commanding officer. May 22, 1991: While the law requires a 1-year interval--let me repeat that. While the law requires a 1-year interval before changing an MIA determination to ``killed in action,'' Commander Speicher's status changed to ``killed in action.'' The Office of Naval Intelligence available evidence did support the KIA status at that particular time-- clear back in 1991. January 13, 1993: We have moved ahead 2 years. The report of the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs concludes that the Defense Intelligence Agency's POW-MIA Office--now called DPMO, the acronym we use--has historically--I am not talking about today's operation, I am talking about the operation back in the early 1990s--has historically been, No. 1, guilty of overclassification; No. 2, defensive toward criticism; No. 3, handicapped by poor coordination with other elements of the intelligence community, i.e., not asking for it; and, No. 4, slow to follow up on live-sighting and other reports. September 30, 1996--another 3 years--May 22, 1991, presumptive finding of death ``was determined to have been in error after a thorough analysis of classified information and status review procedures.'' Chief of Naval Personnel backdated--backdated--the presumptive finding of death. Navy staff states to Senator Smith, on June 22, 1999, that they did not review the intelligence community's information for this finding--did not review the intelligence community's information for this finding, did not take into consideration the available intelligence. Let's move to December 7, 1997 and a front page, New York Times article by Tim Weiner, titled ``Gulf War's First Casualty Leaves Lasting Trail of Mystery,'' in which he writes the story about Scott. When asked by Weiner if Speicher could have survived the crash, he said, ``We don't know.'' That was from ADM Stanley Arthur, Vice Chief of Naval Operations at the time of the loss. He is quoted as believing that ``Commander Speicher had ejected successfully and survived.'' Arthur also said, ``The Warriors believed they had a responsibility . . . You lose one of your own, you go back and get him.'' Move ahead to January 5, 1998: Our Committee on Intelligence in the Senate tasked the Director of Central Intelligence for an intelligence community chronology of the Speicher case. February 19 of 1998: The head of DPMO, the Department of Missing in Action, Mr. Liotta, updates our Senate Committee on Intelligence on the Speicher case and concludes that this loss is the only unresolved U.S. case of Desert Storm. July 1, 1998: Restatement of Federal regulations--a finding of presumptive death is made by the Secretary of the Navy when a survey of all available sources of information indicates beyond doubt that the presumption of continuance of life has been overcome for the purpose of Naval administration that he is no longer alive, that the person is no longer alive. That was not done with Scott Speicher. That was a clarification that came back. It took us until September 9 of 1998: The Senate Committee on Intelligence receives the report of the Director of Central Intelligence in regards to the chronology of the Speicher case. March 12, 1999: Our staff in the Intelligence Committee receives an update on the Speicher case and requested additional rigor by the Defense Intelligence Agency. May 13, 1999: The committee letter to the Director of Central Intelligence. We say the September 1998 chronology report does not enable Senator Smith, Senator Grams, Senator Roberts to make informed judgments about the intelligence process nor the analysis. We request additional data. July 30, 1999: I ask the Intelligence Committee to conduct an inquiry into the Speicher matter, stating that it is my understanding that it is a primary role of U.S. intelligence to assist our military commanders in making informed decisions, and suggest that the assignment of the killed in action status may be in error. Scott's wife, Joanne Speicher Harris, asks the Senate Committee on Intelligence for a full accounting regarding the fate of her former husband. This is some 10 years later. September 15, 1999: The Senate Intelligence Committee holds a member- level briefing with the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Admiral Wilson, the Department of State, and the Secretary of the Navy. Followup questions for the record are sent to the executive branch. October 28 of 1999: We hold a closed, on-the-record hearing with the same folks, and ask them followup questions for the record, and sent that to the executive branch. May 4 of 2000: I author legislation to force the Pentagon and the U.S. intelligence community to better handle cases of military personnel missing in action or unaccounted for. It was passed by this body in the intelligence authorization bill. Then we initiated in the committee to task the Director of Central Intelligence for an assessment. Finally, after learning there was no intelligence wrapped up in this particular case on the fate of Scott Speicher, we ask the DCI, we ask the head of the CIA: Please, please, come in and make an assessment on the fate of Commander Speicher. I also had the committee request the CIA and the DOD inspectors general to jointly and expeditiously examine the intelligence to support the Speicher case. July 25, 2000: The committee holds another on-the-record briefing in regards to the Speicher case. Questions for the record then follow. September of 2000: Congress receives the Intelligence Committee's first ever assessment of the fate of Commander Speicher. I believe the preponderance of evidence does not support the KIA status. Since that time he has been changed to MIA. I might point out that just before President Clinton left office, he reported to the country that he may be alive. Now, since that time, we have followed very closely, in the Intelligence Committee, all of the intelligence assessments that have come in. And let me say the people in charge today are doing that with due diligence. I am not trying to point any fingers of blame. I just do not understand how on Earth this case could have been so badly handled over an 11- or 12-year period. Without really pointing any fingers of blame, we are receiving good cooperation from those people in charge now. But what this legislation will do, what the Nelson-Roberts-Smith legislation will do is make sure that, on a timely basis, we have these reports. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record my letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, dated February 12, 2002, because I think it is very clear that Scott Speicher should be classified a POW. And I feel in my heart--as I say, again, I do not know whether he is alive or not, but I feel in my heart, with continuing intelligence assessment and open- source assessments that we are receiving on a roller coaster timely basis, and more and more publicity and attention given to this issue, and all of the foreign policy discussion and military mission discussion in regards to Iraq, he may be alive. I say he may be alive. I do not know if Scott is alive. But, my colleagues, we must press ahead in behalf of everybody who wears the uniform to determine his fate.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Madam President, I commend ranking member Warner for his stewardship of the fiscal year 2003 defense budget process in the Senate. We face many challenges to our national security in this day and age and I am thankful for his leadership. One of those emerging challenges we face is the terrorist threat to our food supply, specifically U.S. agriculture. On the Federal, State, and local level, we need to establish procedures to detect, deter, and respond to large scale coordinated attacks against livestock and agricultural commodities. Toward that end, I ask the Senate to support my amendment to authorize, with an offset, $1,000,000 for research, development, test, and evaluation, defense-wide in-house laboratory independent research, PE 0601103D8Z, for research, analysis, and assessment of efforts to counter possible agroterrorist attacks. It is my hope that universities with established expertise in the agricultural sciences can conduct studies and exercises that lead to better coordination between Federal, State, and local authorities as they attempt to detect, deter, and respond to large-scale coordinated attacks on U.S. agriculture. Most importantly, I envision universities assisting the Department of Defense in determining what role, if any, our military or Defense agencies play in countering agroterrorism. I ask my colleagues to support my amendment.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to honor Senator Bob Dole and to thank you for your support of H.R. 4608, naming the Department of Veterans Affairs medical and regional office center in Wichita, KS, as the Robert J. Dole Department of Veterans Affairs Medical and Regional Office Center. In the words of Senator Dole, ``Anyone who wants to understand me must first understand Russell, KS. It is my home, where my roots lie, and a constant source of strength. My father's view of the world as ``stewers versus doers'' registered early. From my neighbors, I learned to feel deeply for God, country and family. In Russell, I came to understand there are things worth living for, and, if need be, dying for. The Russell of my youth was not a place of wealth. Yet it was generous with the values that would shape my outlook and the compassion that would restore life's richness after I had begun to doubt my future following the war. Ever since, I have tried in my own way to give back some of what the town has given me. I have tried to defend and serve the America I learned to love in Russell.'' That quote shows Senator Dole's dedication, passion, and love for Kansas and the United States. It only begins to vocalize the relationship he has had with the people of Kansas. Although many of my colleagues know and served with Senator Dole, I want to briefly recount his distinguished record of military and public service. Bob Dole's heroism during WWII earned him two purple hearts and the Bronze Star Medal. While serving our country in the 10th Mountain Division in Italy, he was wounded trying to save a downed radioman. Injured badly and left for dead, Bob Dole survived nine long hours on that battle field paralyzed from the neck down and with a shattered shoulder. After spending time in a field hospital, he was transported back to a military hospital in the United States where he underwent nine surgeries over 3 years. It is a testament to Bob Dole's strength and character that he has overcome unbelievable obstacles. As a, Russell County Attorney, Kansas State Legislator, U.S. Congressman, Senator, longest serving Senate Majority Leader and candidate for president, Bob Dole has tirelessly served the people of Kansas and this country. As a statesman, Senator Dole was always available. He listened and learned from Kansans whose concerns were as diverse as Kansas itself, economic development needs of our State's urban areas, support for disabled Americans, assistance for agricultural producers, and benefits for our veterans. After leaving elected office, Bob Dole has kept giving of himself. In 1997, he agreed to serve as chair for the National World War II Memorial. He has since raised awareness and money to build a national monument in support of those who fought for our country during WWII. Republicans, Democrats, politicians, farmers, veterans, and business owners know and respect the extraordinary statesman from Russell, KS, who still to this day has the receipts from the people of his hometown who helped pay for his medical bills after the war. He is a man of humility, leadership, courage, and pride. I am honored to know this man. The State of Kansas, the Wichita VA, the veteran service organizations represented in Kansas, and I are proud to name the Wichita VA after this deserving figure. The Wichita VA should and will be a lasting and fitting tribute to the man from Kansas. Once again, I thank my colleagues for their support of H.R. 4608.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senator for yielding. The completion of the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act conference report, in my view, represents an absolutely vital and significant step forward for our Nation as we work to protect ourselves from any kind of a terrorist attack involving bioterrorism. I also had the privilege of being chairman and now ranking member of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. We had witness after witness and commission after commission. We asked them: What keeps you up at night? Each and every time when we tried to prioritize the threat that faced this country, bioterrorism was listed as No. 1. I thank Senator Kennedy for his leadership with regard to this bill. I echo the comments by Senator Gregg, who has been extremely helpful and led the effort on our side. I especially thank Senator Frist whose expertise and leadership with the Centers for Disease Control and the Department of Health and Human Services, plus his personal expertise, is second to none. If he is not the godfather of this bill, he is indeed the godprince. So I thank him for those efforts. This bill also represents a significant advancement in helping to protect agriculture and our Nation's food supply from a possible agroterrorist attack. The legislation contains language based on numerous provisions I introduced in the bill some time ago. It was called the Biosecurity for Agriculture Act. I think that was last fall. Specifically, the bill provides funding authorization for $190 million for expanded agroterrorism research in 2002 and such sums as necessary in the future years. This language will allow us to significantly expand our research capabilities to deal with these threats. It will allow us to expand existing research partnerships between the Department of Agriculture and many of our land grant universities to develop first-responder capability in case we have an agroterrorist attack. It is going to create many additional partnerships. It will increase the coordination between the Department of Agriculture and the intelligence community, and undertake research to develop what we call rapid field test kits that will allow us to make a determination of the possible introduction of any pathogen or disease within minutes or hours instead of days or weeks, as often occurs, as of today. In addition, the bill also includes language similar to that I introduced to authorize funding for the upgrades of the Department of Agriculture research facilities at Plum Island, NY, Ames, IA, Laramie, WY, and Athens, GA. These facilities really represent the frontline in the Department of Agriculture's research efforts to prevent disease outbreaks in the United States. Why is the inclusion of this provision in this particular bill so important? I am not aware of any specific threat, but the possibility of agroterrorism or food security attacks is very real, and it has increased since September 11. Second, we know the former Soviet Union had developed literally tons of biowarfare agents that were to be aimed at the North American food supply. Many of these agents are still housed in unsecured facilities. I have been there. Senator Lugar has been there. Many of the scientists are simply unemployed and are willing to work for the highest bidder, and that is a grave concern. Third, we know several of the September 11 hijackers had significant agricultural training. It would be very easy to introduce a disease such as foot and mouth disease or Karnal Bunt, and the effects would be devastating to our grain supply and our livestock production. Our exports would be lost and consumer confidence would simply plummet. Food shortages would occur in our Nation's cities. This is particularly frightening when we realize that agriculture is one of the few sectors of the economy with a trade surplus. Using 1999 numbers, agriculture and agribusiness-related industries accounted for approximately 22 million jobs, almost 17 percent of the gross domestic product. The overall contribution to the Nation's GDP in 1999 was $1.5 trillion. That is at risk. And the cheap U.S. food supply kept the total portion of the individual income spent on food to about a dime or 10 percent--one dime out of the consumer's disposal income dollar for that so-called market basket of food. A terrorist attack would certainly endanger that. The importance of this sector to our economy, and our national security, cannot be underestimated. We must take the steps to protect our agricultural producers, our farmers, our ranchers, and our food supply. This bill represents a very important step. I thank my colleagues who have worked with me on this issue. I thank the staff of the HELP Committee in working with my staff and those on the Agriculture Committee. I thank them for their assistance, including these provisions in this legislation. I yield back the remainder of my allotted time.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the conference report on the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act--the farm bill of 2002. We must have a strong and solid commitment to our family farmers, and we must have a farm bill that provides this foundation. Simply put, through the miracle of modern day agriculture our farmers and ranchers provide significant and mostly unappreci- ated support for trade, jobs, our Nation's balance of payments; they serve as a catalyst for our Nation's economy and provide American consumers with the most plentiful, inexpensive, and safe food supply in the history of the world. So a good farm bill is essential to every American citizen. The authors of the pending bill have tried to do this with myriad commodity, conservation, nutrition, research, and many other programs. I thank them for their efforts. Throughout my career as a Senator, Congressman, and congressional staffer, I have had the privilege to work on no less than six major farm bills and numerous pieces of smaller legislation. I must say that from a policy and process standpoint, this farm bill has certainly been unique. I have always believed we should not play politics with a bill that directly affects the daily lives and pocketbooks of our farmers, ranchers, our consumers, and, yes, even the taxpayer, and those who are hungry and malnourished. That is why I have supported bills written by both Democrats and Republicans. In my view, a farm bill should have two primary goals: First, to provide assistance when needed to those who produce the food for our Nation and a troubled and hungry world. That assistance is needed now given the near revolutionary and dynamic changes we face in agriculture today. Put in Dodge City language, the farmer and rancher today are not in very good shape for the shape they are in. These are tough times in farm country. Second, the bill should provide this assistance through a realistic, reasonable, and predictable farm program policy consistent with the harsh realities of what we face in the global marketplace. I regret to say that I fear this bill fails on both counts. There are other very important goals that should be and are addressed in this farm bill. These include dealing with the environment, nutrition, research, and the new threat of agriterrorism. But my concern is with the commodity title. In this bill we have a real paradox. Those who have seldom or never voted for farm bills in the past during their long years of distinguished service and have made it a practice to regularly criticize previous farm bills have written this bill and have proclaimed it to be the best bill ever written and they are going to vote for it. On the other hand, some who have voted for farm bills in the past, this Member included, knowing no farm bill is perfect or written in stone--knowing that the final product is never the best possible farm bill but the best bill possible--will vote no. I make these comments without questioning the intent of any Senator or House Member who believes this bill is the ``best ever'' and, I might add, who worked very hard through great difficulty to produce this bill. I salute their hard work and tireless efforts but respectfully disagree with their conclusion. However, due to what I consider serious flaws in the bill, I cannot vote for final passage of this conference report. I do not believe the bill before us gets the job done for farmers and ranchers in Kansas and in other parts of the country. In saying this, I pledge to my colleagues and my farmers and ranchers that whatever concerns I have with this bill, I will work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to help make improvements when they are needed. In fact, this bill is a fate accompli, it will pass today and the President will sign it. As least for now, the support for a supplemental is not there. The bill should not be delayed any further. Now, there are some good things in this legislation--including some initiatives I have supported. These include: Equalization of the sorghum loan rate to the corn rate; permanent authority for LDPs on grazed out wheat; a beneficial interest fix for LDPs on the 2001 crops; expanded funding for the environmental quality incentives program, a most important program for our livestock producers; more equitable food stamp benefits; and most importantly, research program authorizations that will allow us to develop the tools needed to protect agriculture and our food supply from terrorist threats and to expand carbon sequestration research to enable the farmer to be a partner in the challenge to reduce global warming. However, as I said, it is the commodity title that raises serious concerns for this Senator. First, there is the timing of this bill and the proposed assistance. We are spending nearly $48 billion in new funding over the next 10 years for our commodity programs. Some argue this investment is supposed to ``restore the safety net'' for our farmers and ranchers and eliminate the need for supplemental assistance in the future. In fact, all programs considered, this legislation will add $73.5 billion to the agriculture baseline which now totals an estimated $183 billion with the new Congressional Budget Office scoring. To say this represents a significant investment in our commodity, conservation, nutrition, and research programs is an understatement, to be sure. I will leave the debate of how much is appropriate--given our budget challenges and given the world farmers face; the world price depression, lack of exports, market interference, unfair foreign subsidization, weather, value of the dollar, and all of the other vagaries beyond the control of the farmer--to another time. Mr. President, what is ironic is that due to the timing of payments in this legislation, the probability is--and I predict--we will be back here later this year with Members and farm organizations asking for an additional supplemental payment or disaster money. My colleagues, we did not have to go down this road. Back in March I introduced legislation that would have provided supplemental assistance within budget for this year's crop. It also would have provided conservation funding for several programs. I introduced this package for two reasons: Our producers and our lenders needed some kind of certainty on the assistance they would receive for this crop year, and second, virtually all planting and lending decisions had already been made for the 2002 crop, this year's crop, and it did not make sense to change the rules of the game in the middle of the 2002 crop year. It made more sense to do an assistance package this year and have the new bill apply to the 2003 crop after our producers and the Department of Agriculture had time to digest the details of the new bill. The second concern: this is a complex bill, to say the least, and farmers and ranchers and lenders and the USDA are going to feel and act like a bear in a briar patch. We are going to do a new farm bill that will require producers and USDA to work through a paper trail of recalculated loan rates for every commodity in every county in the country, base updates, yield updates, and the list goes on. Mr. President, the name of this bill should be the ``Farm Service Agency Full Employment Act''--exactly the opposite of the direction we have been moving in recent years. As a matter of fact, sensing the paperwork and regulatory storm ahead, the USDA actually requested 100 million new dollars to enable the Farm Service Agency folks to come to grips with and administer the new program. They got $55 million by the way. There are going to be some long lines at the Farm Service Agency. Third, and this is a primary concern, when producers find out the final details regarding the so-called safety net, it will not be what they expected due to the form of assistance and the timing. That is not good. Let's walk through an example: We grow a tremendous number of crops in Kansas--wheat, corn, sorghum, soybeans, and even a projected 80,000 acres of cotton this year. When it comes to actual planted acres, wheat remains king in Kansas. Under the supplemental package I introduced, wheat producers would have received 59 cents a bushel on this year's crop. This payment would have occurred before the end of September. We need this money. We are in the midst of a drought in wheat country and we need the assistance now. If a wheat producer receives the maximum countercyclical payment available under this proposed farm bill, he or she would receive additional, combined direct and countercyclical payments on the 2002 crop of 60 cents--about the same thing. But they would not receive the final payment until at least 13 months from now on June 1, 2003. Let me say that again: wheat producers would not receive their final assistance on the 2002 crop until June 1, 2003. For cotton, it would be August 2003 and for corn, soybeans, and sorghum it would be September 2003--a full 16 months from now. How can this happen? Under this proposed legislation, the maximum level of decoupled payments for this year's crop would be 60 cents provided as follows: six cents for an additional direct payment as soon as practicable by the Secretary; up to 19 cents--35 percent of the countercyclical payment--by October 31; assume an additional 19 cents--the difference between 70 percent of the total projected payment and the October payment--to be paid after February 1, 2003; and the remainder, approximately 16 cents--after June 1, 2003. Now, does that sound just a bit confusing? That is because it is. It will take four checks from the Government for producers to receive what they could have received from one check under a supplemental this September. This is not market driven; it is mailbox driven. They will not receive the last payment for this year's crop, the 2002 crop, until they are harvesting next year's crop, the 2003 crop. Just as important, the bill fails to provide assistance to producers when they need it most--when there is no crop to harvest. We have gone back and checked the average marketing-year prices for wheat, according to USDA, on every crop from 1982 to 1999; some 17 years in Kansas. In 9 of those years there would have been no countercyclical payment for wheat had this bill been in effect. These dates would have included the following crops: 1982, 1983, 1984, 1988, 1989, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. Unfortunately, 1995, 1996, and 1989 represent what were basically our worst wheat crops in the past 20 years in Kansas. And the other 6 years represented some of our most marginal crops and difficult financial times. The question is, why on earth should anyone from Kansas or a similar State support a bill that would not have producers of their State's number one crop in nine out of the past 17 years! A farm bill that would not work over half the time in the last 17 years, why support that? Some will argue that producers may actually receive more assistance this crop year under this proposed legislation because of higher loan rates. That may be true--if a producer has a crop to harvest. But the producer who has no crop to harvest gets no benefit from a higher loan rate. Again, this is a major concern for many of my Kansas producers suffering from drought conditions. We have had many reports that this year's Kansas wheat crop has the poorest condition rating since the 1996 crop year. Producers are saying they have already destroyed or will destroy 200 acres, 500 acres, 1,000 acres, even 2,000 acres of wheat. Let me report to my colleagues I have just returned from Dodge City and wheat country this past weekend. I checked the country around Dodge with a long-time friend and farmer and that is precisely what is happening. The only thing you saw was the dust rising behind the tires because there was no crop left. These farmers are begging that we give them the supplemental package because the increased loan rate is going to provide them nothing when they have been wiped out. In addition, there are long standing policy concerns with the loan rate as well. And that brings up an additional concern, that of our trade and export policy. The increase in loan rates is not market- oriented. We are moving down a road that will drive production, lower prices, and reduce our negotiating leverage in international trade negotiations. I realize, appreciate and understand the advocates of higher loan rates always argue they will bring higher prices. However, as they lead to increased plantings and production, they will actually drive prices lower. I would remind my colleagues that the highest loan rates of the last 20 years for wheat were from 1982 to 1986--during the height of the farm crisis of the 1980s. Additionally, a few questions need answers on this issue of loan rates. Why did rice and cotton get to keep their current loan rates, and why do loan rates for the other crops drop in 2004? Does this represent just a tad bit of politics? I hope not. The risk of retaliation and reduced leverage in international trade negotiations is real. For years we have argued that the walls and barriers to trade be torn down by our international competitors. With a ``free trade straight face'' in the past 2 months we have imposed tariffs on steel, we will pass a farm bill that increases the likelihood of surpassing our spending limits under WTO rules, and we are going to pass country-of-origin labeling requirements that will upset many of our largest trading partners and just to make this whole business really topsy-turvy, the majority is holding up expanding trade authority for the President--the only way I believe we can regain market share price and income recovery over the long term. This does not add up. This does not make sense. I understand we do not write farm bills for Brazil, for the European Union, or Canada, or any other country. But we should not write farm bills that guarantee trade retaliation either. Let me stress another concern, and that is what we are robbing from in order to raise loan rates and expand farm program payments to new commodities. We are paying for part of this bill by cutting spending of $2 billion from the major crop insurance program reform that we passed 2 years ago, the Kerry-Roberts bill. That, too, just does not make sense. As a final concern and comment on the commodity title, let us not forget all the promises we have made to farmers, to farm and commodity organizations--everyone in farm country--with regard to the need for a farm savings account. Every farm and commodity organization has supported this concept in resolution after policy resolution. I do not understand how we can include $94 million for payments to apple producers and $10 million for onion producers--neither payment was in the House or Senate bill--but we could not even include the pilot project for a farm savings account that had bipartisan support from numerous Senators. Finally, giving credit where credit is due, this farm bill does emphasize conservation more than any other previous bill. Again, there may be a conservation devil in the details. While we have increased spending for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program--EQIP that is called--to the benefit of many livestock producers, we are spending $2 billion for a new conservation security program that no one truly seems to understand or can explain exactly how it will work. I hope it does work. With all the questions surrounding this proposal, an argument can be made that this money could have been better spent through the EQIP program, additional research funding, or by designating more funding to the trade title of this bill. As we persevered through this farm bill debate over the past year, it was my contention, voiced probably more than many wanted to hear, that we should give some attention to policy and not just to dollar amounts. With all due respect to my very dear friends and colleagues in the House and Senate, I just do not think we have considered all the long- term ramifications of this legislation. Farm bill policy and politics are never easy. We have strong disagreements, but we all have the same goal in mind: Doing what is best for our farmers and ranchers. I had hoped as we wrote this bill and looked in the rearview mirror of the past, we would resist the temptation to return to those policies. Sadly, we seem to have done a U-turn in the middle of our farm policy road while other nations are moving more towards income protection for their farmers and away from market-distorting price supports. We are moving back again to price supports and away from income protection, and none of us knows where that is going to lead. This has been one of the most difficult decisions of my congressional career, but I cannot vote for a bill that would have provided no countercyclical assistance to Kansas wheat producers in 9 of the last 17 years, that will provide an additional direct payment of only 6 cents a bushel for wheat, 1.9 cents a bushel for corn, and 3.6 cents a bushel for sorghum, when Kansas producers, suffering from drought in many areas, could have received payment of almost 60 cents, 33.4 cents, and 40 cents, respectively, on those crops if we had included a supplemental assistance package for this crop. I cannot vote for a bill that will not provide more than two-thirds of its badly needed countercyclical assistance for the 2002 crop until 13 or 16 months from now, until 2003; a bill that increases loan rates when they do not benefit Kansas producers with no crop to harvest; a bill that cuts $2 billion from the Crop Insurance Program and that will greatly increase the odds of the United States violating its world trade agreements and entering into an agricultural trade war with some of our biggest competitors. Despite these concerns, and my vote on this legislation, I pledge to my farmers and ranchers, I pledge to my colleagues and those soon to be beleaguered USDA employees, my assistance to work through these difficult issues on a bipartisan basis. When this farm bill needs fixing--and it will--I will want to be part of the answer as opposed to sitting on the sidelines as a critic. I ask unanimous consent a summary of questions I have received from Kansas farmers, and answers my staff and I have prepared, be printed in the Record.