Pat Roberts

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I understand that S. 3152 is at the desk, and I ask for its first reading.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I yield to my distinguished friend.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, before I begin, I would like to pay tribute and special thanks to Scott Kindsvater, who happens to come from my hometown of Dodge City, KS, who is a major in the U.S. Air Force and is a congressional fellow in my office. He is an F-15 pilot second to none. He is going to be assigned to the Pentagon. His tour of duty will end about the same time as the election. I thank him for all of his help, all of his homework, all of his study, and for gathering together the material that has been so helpful to me to take part in this foreign policy dialog. I thank my good friend and colleague, Senator Cleland. We again come to the floor of the Senate for what is our fifth dialog with regard to our Nation's role in global affairs and our vital national security interests. This effort has been prompted by our conviction, as the Senator has said, that such a dialog, such a process is absolutely necessary, if we are to arrive at a better bipartisan consensus on national security policy, a consensus our Nation deserves and needs but has been lacking since the end of the cold war. Both Senator Cleland and I have the privilege of serving together on the Senate Armed Services Committee. The distinguished Presiding Officer also serves on that committee and provides very valuable service. As a matter of fact, Senator Cleland and I sit directly opposite one another. During hearing after hearing on the leading national security issues of the past 4 years, it became obvious that while we did not agree on each and every issue, we shared many similar views and concerns. I call it ``the foreign policy and national security eyebrow syndrome''; that is to say, when Max and I hear testimony we think is off the mark, a little puzzling, or downright silly, our eyebrows go up, and that is usually followed by a great deal of head shaking and commiserating. The result has been a series of foreign policy dialogs: No. 1, what is the U.S. global role? No. 2, how do we define and defend U.S. vital national security interests? No. 3, what is the role of multilateral organizations in the world today and our role within them? No. 4, when and how should U.S. military forces be deployed? Today Senator Cleland has chosen a theme taken from the 19th century military strategist, Gen. Karl von Clausewitz, called ``The Trinity of War Making,'' or the role of government, the military, and the public in conducting and implementing our national security policy. Finally, in closing these dialogs for this session of Congress by Senator Cleland, I have prepared a summary of agreed upon principles which we suggest to this body that both he and I believe represent a suggested roadmap for the next administration and the Congress. With regard to two of the Clausewitz so-called trinities, the need for government to gain public support for national security policy, Senator Cleland already summarized our purpose very well when he said: We must find more and better ways of communicating with our constituents on the realities of our national interests and the costs in securing them. Senator Cleland went on to say: We must find more and better ways to increase the exchange of experiences and ideas between our Government and our military. Finally, Max said: We must find more and better ways of ensuring that both the executive and our legislative branches properly fulfill their constitutional responsibilities in the arena of national security policy. In this regard, I will comment on the first of Senator Cleland's points, the fact that our political leadership must make sure that the public understands and supports the use of military force. Former Joint Chief of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell asserted our troops must go into battle with the support and understanding of the American people. General Powell contended back in 1993 that the key to using force is to first match the political expectations to military means in a wholly realistic way and, second, to attain very decisive results. He said a decision to use force must be made with clear purpose in mind and added that if the purpose is too murky--and, goodness knows, we have had a lot of that in recent years--our political leadership will eventually have to find clarity. As Senator Cleland has pointed out already, unfortunately, today it seems that national security and foreign policy issues represent little more than a blip on the public's radar screen. Obviously, the public this evening will be tuned to either the baseball playoffs or the debate. He quoted news surveys and polls showing foreign policy and defense ranking last among issues cited by the public as most important that face the country. That is amazing to me. A case in point: While we are all hopeful that the situation in the former Yugoslavia will result in the end of the Slobodan Milosevic regime and the possible transition to a more democratic government, U.S. and NATO military intervention and continued presence in the Balkans lacks a clearly defined policy goal or any realistic timetable for any conclusion. As a result, while most Americans may have really forgotten about or are not focused on Kosovo today, nevertheless, 6,000 American troops still remain there and could remain there for another decade. That is a difficult sell with regard to public understanding. In that regard, as Senator Cleland has pointed out, Congress bears part of that responsibility. It is easy to criticize, but we bear part of that responsibility. Unclear political objectives do not allow our military leaders to create clear, concise, and effective military strategies to accomplish any specific goal. Unclear political goals lead to wars and involvement with no exit strategy. A brief examination of the chain of events leading up to the use of force in Kosovo certainly proves the point: On March 23 of 1999, the Senate conducted minimal debate regarding the use of force in Yugoslavia after troops had already been deployed. S. Con. Res. 21 passed, authorizing the President to conduct military air operations. On March 24, one day later, combat air operations did begin. On March 26, the President notified Congress, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, that operations began on March 24. On March 27, after the fact, the House considered the use of force and failed to pass S. Con. Res. 21 on March 28. On April 30, 18 Members of the House, having serious objection to that policy, filed suit against the President for conducting military activities without any authorization. Then on May 20, 1999, the emergency supplemental appropriations bill for fiscal year 1999 finally passed, and it provided funding for the ongoing U.S. Kosovo operations. On May 25, the 60-day deadline passed following Presidential notification of military operations, and the President didn't seek a 30-day extension, noting instead that the War Powers Resolution is constitutionally defective. Then on February 18, 2000, a Federal appeals court affirmed the district court decision that the House of Representatives Members lacked standing to sue the President relative to the April 30 suit of the previous year. I might add at this juncture that Senators Cleland and Snowe, I, and others had all previously successfully amended various appropriations measures mandating the administration report to the Congress specific policy goals and military strategy objectives prior to the involvement of any U.S. troops. Most, if not all, of those reports were late, were not specific or pertinent to the fast changing situation in the Balkans. We at least tried. And, Mr. President, I remember well the briefing by members of the Administration with regard to why the ongoing military operation in Kosovo was in our vital national interest. I still have my notebook and the list: The Balkans represent a strategic bridge to Europe and the Middle East. The current conflict could spin into Albania and include Macedonia, Greece and Turkey. After all World War I started in the same region. We should act to prevent a humanitarian disaster and massacre of thousands of refugees. If we do not act, it will endanger our progress in Bosnia. The leadership and credibility of NATO into the next century is at stake. We must oppose Serb aggression. With all due respect Mr. President, these arguments did not match the fast-changing conditions in the Balkans. 20-20 hindsight now tells us the incremental bombing campaign and publicly ruling out the use of ground troops exacerbated the refugee tragedy. The present Presiding Officer serves with me on the Senate Intelligence Committee, and we had a hearing after part of these problems developed. Somehow intelligence reports predicting the law of unintended effects went unheeded or were ignored. And, in the end, U.S. stated goals changed when the original goals fell short. We were assured we were fighting, not for our national interest but selflessly to save lives and promote democracy, fighting in behalf of humanity. Mr. President, in my view, neither the Senate, the House or the administration can square these goals with what has actually taken place and is taking place in the Balkans. I don't question the intent. The most optimistic lien today is that Kosovo is liberated after the mighty efforts of the U.S. led NATO coalition. Well, as described by James Warren of the Chicago Tribune, it is a liberated total mess. He quotes British academic and international relations analyst Timothy Garton Ash, a professor at St. Antony's College, Oxford, who reviewed six books on the conflict with unbiased perspective. According to Warren, most Americans have forgotten about the war by now, so they don't care much about the fact the so called winners are totally unprepared for dealing with peace. Violence and chaos reign in Kosovo. The victims and the ``good guys,'' the Kosovars have conducted reverse ethnic cleansing under the noses of U.S. and NATO troops. We have, in fact, created a new Kosovo apartheid. Having failed to stop the killing, we are proving unable to win the peace or prevent revenge inspired reverse ethnic cleansing. Moreover, since the Balkan war, badly fought and with no clear end game, other nations have increasingly been united in criticizing U.S. clout as we wield unparalleled power on the world stage and have reacted with what some refer to as a new arms race. Since we can be sure there will be other calls for intervention in the world, it is incumbent on us to ask whether a more effective approach exists. President Clinton has, in fact, proclaimed to the world, that if a state sought to wipe out large numbers of innocent civilians based on their race or religion, the United States should intervene in their behalf. Stated such, a public support can be garnered for such a policy. But, as Kosovo has demonstrated, things are not that simple. As Adam Wolfson pointed out in his article within Commentary magazine; Certainly the vast majority of Kosovars were subjected to harassment and much worse and their crisis was as President Clinton described, a humanitarian one. But, the Kosovars also had their political objectives and ambitions; an independent Kosovo ruled by themselves; a goal they press for today by political intimidation and violence. The United States has, on the other hand, continued to oppose independence and has supported a multicultural society for Kosovo. Vice President Gore has said that in Kosovo there must be a genuine recognition and respect for difference and the creation of a tolerant and open society where everyone's rights are respected, regardless of ethnic or religious background and where all groups can participate in government, business, the arts and education. These are fine and noble goals but they are ``ours'' not those of the Kosovars. We have two choices. First, we can accept the political ambitions for a mono-cultural and independent state purged of non Albanians or second, we can attempt to stay in Kosovo until we can somehow transform entrenched and long standing political and ethnic culture and teach the values of diversity and religious toleration. This is on small task and in my view, It may not sustainable over the long term both in terms of cost, benefit and public opinion. Will the American people respond? Do they even care? In their book, ``Misreading the Public, the Myth of a New Isolationism,'' Steven Kull and I.M. Destler of the Brookings Institution, make the case that the notion that public attitudes are typified today by new isolationism, greater parochialism and declining interest in the world is simply not true. They argue most Americans do not believe we should disengage from the world and support international engagement and for the United States to remain involved but with greater emphasis on cooperative and multilateral involvement. They also argue that when presented with facts, reasonable goals and alternatives, that public support can be gained. That is the point, Mr. President. We have to do a better job. Member of the Senate need to participate in the daily grind of overseeing Administration policies, passing judgment, and behaving as a co-equal branch. When a majority, if a majority can be found, feels a President oversteps constitutional barriers or threatens to do so, we should respond with statutory checks, not floor speeches and sense-of-the- Senate resolutions. In this regard Senator Cleland has done us a favor with his proposal derived from the current system for Presidential approval and reporting to Congress on covert operations. Senator Cleland has candidly pointed out his bill does not represent a consensus view and his introduction of the legislation is to stimulate further discussion. Let the discussion begin. Mr. President, having spoken to the role of government and the public with the specific example of Kosovo, let me turn to the third topic of the ``Clausewitz Trinity'', the military. Mr. President, I am sure that no General throughout history, be he Clausewitz or Eisenhower would condone sending troops that are not ready into battle. In the not-mincing-any-words department, I am concerned and frustrated that our United States Military today is stressed, strained, and in too many cases hollow. I often say in Kansas that our first obligation as Members of Congress is to make sure our national security capability is equal to our vital national security responsibilities. How do we do this? One way is to do exactly what Senator Cleland and I try to do and that is to personally visit our men and women in uniform stationed here at home and throughout the world. We, along with a majority of members of the Armed Services Committee, visit with and seek advice from the ranks; our enlisted, our non-commissioned officers, officers and commanders. Mr. President, when doing that and when making remarks and observations before many military groups; active duty, reserve and guard units, I always acknowledge those in the military must operate and perform their duties within the chain of command. But, I also ask them for their candor and honesty. And they have provide me and others that with spades. Those in the Navy tell me the Navy cannot or soon will not be able to perform assigned duties with current force structure. The bottom line is there are not enough ships or submarines in the fleet and training and weapons inventories are inadequate. Those in the Army tell me the training and doctrine command is almost broken and peacekeeping operations are taking their toll on combat readiness. Those in the Air Force repeat what is common knowledge--pilot retention problems are legion. The Air Force is short about 1,200 pilots today. Strategic lift in both air and sea is inadequate. The Marines tell this former marine they have significant problems in the operation and maintenance of their Harrier and helicopter fleet. They tell me they are meeting their recruiting and retention challenges but they are working harder and harder to achieve that goal. Overall, those in command tell us--and the figures are plain to see-- that operation and maintenance accounts have been robbed for eight years to pay for ever increasing peace keeping and now peace enforcement missions. Spare parts are hard to come by, we are short of weapons both for practice and combat. Mission capable rates are consistently down. Recent press reports state 12 of 20 major Army training centers are rated C-4, the lowest readiness rating. A Navy Inspector General Report says Navy fliers are leaving port at a lower stage of readiness. The Air Force reports that its readiness rates for warplane squadrons continues to decline. Many units are on frequent temporary duty assignments or are deployed most of the year on missions that many believe are of questionable value. When the troops come home, their training is shortchanged based on the lack of time available for training and lack of resources. Maintenance required for old equipment takes significant time away from other missions, from family and it is very costly. There is another related problem and challenge, that of morale. There is a growing uneasiness with military men and women that their leadership either does not care or is out of touch with their problems. By leadership, I am including the Congress of the United States. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines tell me they are stressed out and dissatisfied and leaving. This has been an anecdotal outpouring from military commanders in the field simply fed up with current quality of life and readiness stress. Pick up any service, military or defense publication or read any story in the press and what we have is equal opportunity frustration. A February study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies warns us about ``stress on personnel and families, problems with recruiting and retention, and for some, declining trust and confidence in the military institution and its leaders.'' Half of the respondents in the survey said their unit did not have high morale and two thirds said stress was a problem. A recent Army study at Fort Leavenworth, the intellectual center of the Army, located in my homes state of Kansas, warned the number of lieutenants and captains leaving the Army is now over 60% compared to 48% a decade ago. In a survey taken at Fort Benning, outgoing captains complained they were disillusioned with the Army mission and lifestyle, struggling to maintain a functional family life. The American soldier has gone from a homeland protector of vital national interests to nomadic peace keeper. His weapons, on the cutting edge, some complain are beginning to rust. During this time there has been quite a transition period Mr. President. Stretching from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, military personnel levels declined by 40 percent, spending dropped 35 percent and meanwhile the number of U.S. forces stationed abroad increased and remains high. Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Jacques Gansler recently stated: We are trapped in a death spiral. The requirement to maintain our aging equipment is costing us more each year in repair costs, down time and maintenance tempo. But, we must keep this equipment in repair to maintain readiness. It drains our resources--resources we should apply to modernization of the traditional systems and development of new systems. So we stretch out our replacement schedules to ridiculous lengths and reduce the quantities of new equipment we purchase, raising the cost and still durther delaying modernization. I am very concerned if what I have described is even close to factual--and I am afraid it is based upon my own conversations with the men and women of our military, that we are headed in a very dangerous direction. I realize the readiness of our military has become an issue in the current presidential campaign. And, it is not my intent to take sides in that debate during this policy forum. I might add I think in some ways this debate is long overdue. Another way to determine our military readiness is to ask those in charge. And, Senator Cleland and I, along with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee did just that last week. The joint chiefs of staff came before the committee. Not without some not so subtle advice from on high. Prior to the joint chiefs testimony, Administration spokesman Kenneth Bacon said Defense Secretary Cohen told the Chiefs he expected them to play straight on the readiness issue, to give the facts, not to ``beat the drum with a tin cup'' but to talk honestly about the pressures they face from the operations their forces are undergoing. Well, Mr. Bacon need not have worried. The Chiefs testified and shot pretty straight. On an annual basis the Marines said they needed approximately $1.5 billion to be the fully modernized 911 force in readiness we expect of them. The Air Force told us they needed $20 to $30 billion, the Navy some $17 billion and the Army $10 billion. That totaled up to somewhere between $48 to $60 billion more the Chiefs feel each service needs to perform its mission. Those figures, by the way, compare with a recent estimate by the Congressional Budget Office regarding the cost the CBO deems necessary to enable the services to meet their mission obligations. Lord knows what the Chiefs would have requested if they had beat the drum with a tin cup. And, I must admit I am disappointed by the suggestion in Mr. Bacon's warning that the chiefs would ever provide anything but their honest testimony before the Congress, after all each of the Chiefs swore to provide their honest, candid assessment during their nomination hearings. I always assume they do just that. With all of the pressures of the current political season, perhaps Mr. Bacon's concern was understandable, after all he is a spokesman. I brought a tin cup to the hearings last week. The distinguished acting Presiding Officer looked with some shock and amazement as I had a tin cup and poured water into it. I described all the missions that the military had. Then I described what they had to work with. I said: Keep pouring the water and some water might come out. In other words, the services can't carry all the water they were intended to carry. Of course, what I didn't say was that I had drilled a hole in the cup. Of course, some of the water was coming out. But it made a good audiovisual tool. I thank the distinguished Senator for his help. I didn't bring one here tonight. Don't worry. We are not going to get anybody wet. To be fair, Mr. Bacon stated he believes our forces are well equipped, trained and led. I will acknowledge the ``led'' part. The point is too much attention has been placed on the tip of the spear of U.S. military might. Mr. Bacon is correct, the Secretary of Defense is correct, and others are correct. I think we all agree that the tip of the spear is ready. It is tough and it is lethal. But, just as important but not often discussed is the shaft of the spear. Range, sustainability, lethality, accuracy and the deterrence capacity of the spear as a weapon is greatly reduced if the shaft is weak or damaged. What comprises the shaft of our military readiness spear? Let us try the adequacy of critical air and sea lift to sustain the force or get the force to the fight in a timely manner. Let us try the adequacy of the reserve of key repair parts and weapons inventory to sustain the battle. Let us talk about the effectiveness and adequacy of training time and funding. We should mention the impact of quality of life from pay to health care to housing on the warrior's willingness--and they are warriors--to commit to a career in the military. We should mention the impact of the significant operational tempo of the military and the impact that has on the total military spear. We should also mention the effect of mission quality and duration on readiness to fight and win the nation's wars; and The services' preparation for the future, joint battlefield in an environment where asymmetric warfare will be the norm and the battlefield may be in an urban environment. I do not mean to pick on Mr. Bacon, notwithstanding his comments, the primary purpose of our military as defined from Clausewitz to Colin Powell is the readiness of the force to carry out the National Strategy. I have grave concerns that if we look behind the tip of the spear of U.S. military readiness, our forces are not ready. And, if that is banging on our readiness capability with a tin cup, so be it. The point is that we in the Congress have the obligation and responsibility to provide the resources our Armed Forces need to protect our vital national interests. There is the real debate that should take place. Our former NATO allied commander, Wes Clark recently asked the real pertinent question. How should the armed services be used? If readiness is a priority, what is it we should be ready for? General Clark said it's high time we had this debate and settled the issue. While I am not sure we will ever settle the issue, it is time for the debate and I have a suggestion, I even have a road map. The Senator from Georgia has during our past dialogues referred to the Commission on America's National Interests and the Commission's valuable 1996 report. As a matter of fact, we have both referred to this report and we found it most helpful. The good news is that the commission has updated its findings for the year 2000. I have it in my hand. It has set forth a clear and easy-to- understand list of recommendations that at least in part can answer the question posed by General Clark and many others: ``Ready for what?'' Senator Cleland referred to this challenge during his testimony with the Joint Chiefs last week. He pointed out, as I have tried to do in some respects, America is adrift, spending a great deal of time in what may be important interests we all agree with but ignoring matters of vital national interest. The authors have summarized the national interest by saying that we have vital national interests: We have extremely important, we have important, and less important or secondary interests. My dear friend knows we are spending an awful lot of time on important issues and less important or secondary issues--as far as I am concerned, not enough time with extremely important and vital. I commend this report to the attention of my colleagues and all interested parties. The commission has identified six cardinal challenges for our next President and the next Congress more along the lines of the principles that we have agreed to and we will recommended in just a moment. I ask unanimous consent the executive summary from the report by the Commission on America's National Interests, which is much shorter than the book, be printed in the Record following the conclusion of our remarks.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, with all those accolades, the Senator missed one--I had one other line in there. I commend my good friend for his commonsense approach to our country's future. I thank him. I applaud him for his leadership. He has begun what I think is a trail-blazing initiative. This has been, as he has indicated, a year-long bipartisan foreign policy dialog endeavor. We thank staff and various folks on the floor for their patience. I learned a great deal from the distinguished Senator from Georgia. He said he learned from me. I learned from him. As the Senator mentioned, we would now like to present our lessons learned from our year-long dialogs, these dialogs that we began because we both felt our foreign policy agenda had run aground. We wanted to start a series of these dialogs, these debates or colloquys, in order to arrive at a consensus concerning the future of our Nation's foreign and defense policies. We condensed our five dialogs into seven foreign policy principles. These principles are not only a compilation of our dialogs, but also a summary of the lessons learned from the various discussions with colleagues, as the Senator has indicated, foreign policy elites, from academia and the government, and from several consultations with many military leaders. These seven foreign policy principles are simple. They are realistic. They are sustainable. We believe they would support and secure our national interests. We strongly believe the following principles are a step in the right direction. We urge the next administration of Congress and all of our colleagues in the Congress to begin the process of trying to articulate a coherent national security strategy. I again yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. ROBERTS. Here is principle No. 2 that the distinguished Senator and I have agreed upon. The President and the Congress need to, first, find more and better ways to increase communications with the American public. We both have talked about this at length in our previous discussion with the American public on the realities of our international interests and the costs of securing them. I could go into a long speech on how I tried to convince the Kansas wheat farmer that first he must have security, then he must have stability, then he must have an economic future, then he may get $4 wheat at the country elevator, but it all starts with security. Second, it finds more and better ways to increase the exchange of ideas and experiences between government and the military to avoid the broadening lack of military experience in the political elite. We must find more and better ways of ensuring that both the executive and legislative branches fulfill their constitutional responsibilities in national security policy concerning military operations other than declared war. And, as a result of our second principle, Senator Cleland sponsored the bill of which I was proud to cosponsor, S. 2851, requiring the President to report on certain information before deployments of armed forces. This bill basically requires the President to report information of overt operations very similar to the law requiring the President to report certain information prior to covert operations. It makes sense to me. I yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 762, S. 2412.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be agreed to.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the bill, as amended, be read the third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered read the third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements relating to the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 1800 and the Senate then proceed to its immediate consideration.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 764, S. 2440.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee substitute be agreed to, the bill be read the third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the bill be printed at this point in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the resolution be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Con. Res. 141 submitted by Senator McConnell.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that any committee amendment be agreed to.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the following bills en bloc: Calendar No. 828, H.R. 3084, and Calendar No. 711, H.R. 2773.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Governmental Affairs Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. Con. Res. 60, and that the Senate then proceed to its immediate consideration.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the concurrent resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Governmental Affairs Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. Con. Res. 70, and the Senate then proceed to its immediate consideration.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the concurrent resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the concurrent resolution be printed at this point in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.J. Res. 110, the continuing resolution just received from the House, be placed on the calendar.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I would like to bring to the attention of the Senate a relatively new organization designed to enhance U.S.-Cuba relations. The Alliance for Responsible Cuba Policy was created in early 1998 to foster better political, economic and cultural relationships between our country and Cuba. Its board is compromised of distinguished Americans, including some of our former colleagues in the Congress. Clearly the time has come to bring ``responsibleness'' to the debate regarding U.S.-Cuba relations. The Alliance has briefed me and my staff regarding their first-hand experience in Cuba. I encourage them to continue their fact finding and information gathering missions to Cuba. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an Activities Report of the Alliance.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I am not really surprised at this man's many accomplishments. Several years ago, our distinguished majority leader, Senator Lott, took an overdue codel to Latin and Central America. I was privileged to go. On one of our first stops, we were briefed on the overall situation, again within the 32-nation sprawling Southern Command. Pressed for time, General Charles Wilhelm gave one of the most complete, pertinent, and helpful briefings I have ever heard. I have been a Wilhelm fan ever since, and I certainly value his advice and his suggestions. General Wilhelm stated our vital national security interests very well when he said the following: I see our future prosperity in the Americas, not in the Far East. . . . Forty-six percent of our exports flow within the Americas, 28 percent to the Far East and 26 percent to Europe. I see the balance shifting even more to the Americas over the first 25 years of this century. The future prosperity of the United States is linked to the Americas. Throughout his career as a United States Marine, General Charles Wilhelm demonstrated uncompromising character, discerning wisdom, and a sincere, selfless sense of duty to his Marines and members of other services assigned to his numerous joint commands. His powerful leadership inspired his Marines to success, no matter what the task. All Marines everywhere join me in saying to the general: Thank you and well done. The results have guaranteed United States security in this hemisphere and throughout the world. In behalf of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, our congratulations to him and to his wife Valerie and his son Elliot on the completion of a long and distinguished career, and I trust more to come. God bless this great American and Marine. Semper Fi, General, Semper Fi.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent there now be a period for the transaction of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent I might be recognized for 20 minutes as in morning business.