Pat Roberts

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. All of us should support Senator Bond. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Baucus- Roberts amendment to engage China on the important issue of rapid industrialization and the environment. The amendment would permit appropriated funds for the US-Asia Environmental Partnership (USAEP)-- an initiative of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)--to be used for environmental projects in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In other words, the U.S. government would finally be able to, for example, help U.S. businesses connect with provincial and municipal governments in China to initiate badly needed environmental engineering projects. This work is necessary to attempt to prevent a possible long-term environmental catastrophe resulting from intense industrialization and development in the PRC and Asia in general. Why should one care whether Chinese or Asian people breath clean air or drink clean water? Besides the obvious humanitarian concern, a ruined environment throughout Asia will--at some point--effect us here in the United States and our interests. This is common sense. The Baucus-Roberts amendment also sends a strong pro-engagement message to the PRC since the U.S. excluded de jure or de facto the PRC from U.S. foreign aid programs with passage and signing of the FY 90-FY 91 State Department Authorization, specifically section 902 of H.R. 3792. Our government purports to be concerned about global environmental issues, Mr. President, about avoiding contamination of the world's water, air, and soil. Yet, we prohibit ourselves from consulting and cooperating on a government to government basis with the one nation with the greatest potential to impact the world's environment over the next 50 to 100 years. That makes no sense. What is the United States-Asia Environmental Partnership? It is a public-private initiative implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Its aim is to encourage environmentally sustainable development in Asia as that region industrializes at a phenomenal rate. By ``environmentally sustainable development,'' we mean industrial and urban development that does not irreparably damage the air, water, and soil necessary for life. It's really that simple. US-AEP currently works with governments and industries in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. In creating US-AEP, the U.S. government recognized the long-term environmental hazards of Asia's rapid industrialization and the need for the U.S. government to engage on the issue. The program provides grants to U.S. companies for the purpose of facilitating the transfer of environmentally sound and energy-efficient technologies to the Asia/Pacific region. Again, the objective is to address the pollution and health challenges of rapid industrialization while stimulating demand for U.S. technologies. In cooperation with the U.S. Department of Commerce, US-AEP has placed Environmental Technology Representatives in 11 Asian countries to identify trade opportunities for U.S. companies and coordinate meetings between potential Asian and U.S. business partners. Mr. President, on the basic issue of the global environmental impact of Asian industrialization, specifically Chinese modernization, the Senate has the responsibility to authorize at least some cooperation between Beijing and Washington. I ask for my colleague's support for this common sense amendment.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I support the Baucus-Roberts amendment to engage china on the important issue of rapid industrialization and the environment. The amendment would permit appropriated funds for the US-Asia Environmental Partnership (USAEP)--an initiative of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)--to be used for environmental projects in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In other words, the U.S. government would finally be able to, for example, help U.S. businesses connect with provincial and municipal governments in China to initiate badly needed environmental engineering projects. This work is necessary to attempt to prevent a possible long-term environmental catastrophe resulting from intense industrialization and development in the PRC and Asia in general. Why should one care whether Chinese or Asian people breath clean air or drink clean water? Besides the obvious humanitarian concern, a ruined environment throughout Asia will--at some point--affect us here in the United States and our interests. This is common sense. The Baucus-Roberts amendment also sends a strong pro-engagement message to the PRC since the U.S. excluded de jure or de facto the PRC from U.S. foreign aid programs with passage and signing of the FY 90-FY 91 State Department Authorization, specifically section 902 of H.R. 3792. Our government purports to be concerned about global environmental issues, Mr. President, about avoiding contamination of the world's water, air, and soil. Yet, we prohibit ourselves from consulting and cooperating on a government to government basis with the one nation with the greatest potential to impact the world's environment over the next 50 to 100 years. That makes no sense. What is the United States-Asian Environmental Partnership? It is a public-private initiative implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Its aim is to encourage environmentally sustainable development in Asia as that region industrializes at a phenomenal rate. By ``environmentally sustainable development,'' we mean industrial and urban development that does not irreparably damage the air, water, and soil necessary for life. It's really that simple. US-AEP currently works with governments and industries in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. In creating US-AEP, the U.S. government recognized the long-term environmental hazards of Asia's rapid industrialization and the need for the U.S. government to engage on the issue. The program provides grants to U.S. companies for the purpose of facilitating the transfer of environmentally sound and energy-efficient technologies to the Asia/Pacific region. Again, the objective is to address the pollution and health challenges of rapid industrialization while stimulating demand for U.S. technologies. In cooperation with the U.S. Department of Commerce, US-AEP has placed Environmental Technology Representatives in 11 Asian countries to identify trade opportunities for U.S. companies and coordinate meetings between potential Asian and U.S. business partners. Mr. President, on the basic issue of the global environmental impact of Asian industrialization, specifically Chinese modernization, the Senate has the responsibility to authorize at least some cooperation between Beijing and Washington. I ask for my colleagues support for this common sense amendment.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the chairman for yielding. The way I understand the amendment, as crafted by the distinguished Senator from Iowa and the distinguished Senator from California, it is that they would strike the appropriations process to lease UC-35 aircraft. We are not talking about--I took some notes--either Gulfstreams or Boeing 727s or Learjets and, as a matter of fact, I do not think, with all due respect to my colleagues, we are talking about pampering or mollycoddling or glasses of champagne in regard to this aircraft. We are talking about basically the operational support airlift aircraft, and the capability and the importance that these aircraft have in performing the missions as deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Secretary of Army, all three of which have put these particular aircraft--nine UC-35s--on their unfunded list. So if we are going to go to ``gulfstream.com''--I don't know if the Commandant of the Marine Corps has a dot com or the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of the Army, but they certainly had these aircraft on the unfunded list. Now, let me talk a minute about the GAO report. The Senator from California was exactly right when she stated the response from the Department of Defense to the GAO and all the criticism of the GAO. As a matter of fact, let me say something about the GAO. It is a lot like an economist. I hope someday to find an expert witness from the General Accounting Office with one arm so he can't say ``on the other hand.'' I don't know how many times, when I had the privilege of being the chairman of the House Agriculture Committee in the other body, we would have GAO reports that were highly critical of many of the programs that we had under our jurisdiction. I am finding out in the Intelligence Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and, yes, the Agriculture Committee--we ought to have it before the Ethics Committee--but, at any rate, in these three committees, we still have expertise in the GAO. Sometimes it is very helpful and other times I think a little myopic. But at any rate, this is what the Department of Defense says in regards to the GAO report. They agree. The Department agrees with many of the findings in the GAO report. Accordingly, it will take the GAO's findings into consideration in future determinations of operational support airlift requirements. So they agree that this inventory should be based solely on joint wartime readiness requirements of the commands as opposed to any kind of personal use, as described in great detail by my two friends and colleagues. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the GAO draft report. I do not think that is the issue. The issue is whether or not we will lease nine. And they would go three to the Army, three to the Navy, and certainly three to the U.S. Marine Corps. They are on the unfunded list. Now, if this amendment is successful, they will not be leased and they will not replace, as the distinguished chairman has pointed out, aging aircraft, C-12s. I think, over the long term, this will provide a greater test to see, under a cost-benefit standard, as to whether or not this is in the best interests of the taxpayer, as we provide this aircraft.

Mr. ROBERTS. I don't have time. I will see at the end, if I can ask for more time, and I would be delighted to yield to my good friend. In war, this fleet--I am talking about operational support airlift aircraft--is maintained and ready to provide the commander quick transportation and to remote locations. The distinguished Senator from Iowa said--if I can find my notes-- that we are not at war. Well, we are not at war. Some people in Kosovo might challenge that. But we are involved in 141 nations. We have U.S. troops--men and women in uniform--in 141 nations. Fifty-five percent of all the nations in the world have U.S. troops stationed in those countries. The operational airlift capacity that is provided by these nine UC-35 aircraft is absolutely vital on those missions. What am I talking about? Joe Ralston is the new Supreme Allied Commander. He took the place of Wesley Clark. The first obligation, as he told me in a courtesy call, is to pay as many courtesy visits as he can to his counterparts in Russia. How is he going to get there? What happens if something breaks out in Kosovo? How does he get there? No, we are not at war, but in terms of our obligations and in terms of our military being stretched and stressed and hollow, it seems to me we ought to be very careful when we talk about operational support airlift aircraft. Let me give you another example. I have a congressional fellow in my office. He is an F-15 pilot. I know one case where his aircraft, in support of Operation Southern Watch--that is to prevent drugs from coming into this country--had to divert due to a massive fuel leak. Again, in regards to this operational support airlift aircraft, basically what happened, it was dispatched with maintenance crews and the very critical parts to fix the aircraft very quickly and return it to mission ready status. That is what these aircraft are used for. As a matter of fact, I have here a statement that only 5 percent of these aircraft, in terms of missions, were ever even used by generals. Here it is: In fiscal year 1999, less than 5 percent of the operational support missions were for generals or admirals. What does the 95 percent do? The operational support airlift mission does provide--as determined by the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Army, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps--efficient and effective transportation of commanders, key staff personnel, couriers, critical spare parts, and equipment in support of both peacetime and wartime operations. These missions, according to the people who fly them, are typically unpredictable, high priority, and require very short notice in regards to the airlift of the people, the cargo, and the mail. These lifts are normally in support of contingency deployments--goodness knows, we have those today in 141 nations --not compatible with commercial transportation or larger aircraft. The critical delays in the transportation of senior leaders, key staff personnel, urgently needed parts, supplies, and software could ultimately impact unit effectiveness and combat readiness. I want to say, in closing, that my distinguished friend from Iowa referred to a so-called--I know he was not being specific in regards to the Marine Corps--``General Smith'' in the Marine Corps who would look around to other generals who might have a Gulfstream or a 727 or a Learjet, or whatever, and say: Gee whiz, I would like to have that perk. I just want to set the record straight. I asked the Marine Corps, I asked the Commandant: What about this statement, Mr. Commandant? I am talking about ``General Jim Jones.'' And this is the statement that worried me because it is very similar to the statements that have been made on the floor by the proponents of this amendment. The response was: The Pentagon already has enough aircraft to taxi Generals and Admirals around the world. In fact, they have more than 300 executive aircraft, including more than 100 jets suitable to transport high-ranking officers. I asked the Commandant, I said: Will you please comment about this statement. And the response was: The 3 UC-35s are for Active Marine Corps forces, not the Navy. The Marine Corps does not provide executive airlift. Let me repeat that: The United States Marine Corps, according to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, does not provide executive airlift. [The Marine Corps has] a small fleet (24) of Operational Support Airlift aircraft that are tied directly to a Joint Staff validated wartime requirement. . .. These aircraft support Marine Forces deployed [around the world]. The need to replace---- And this is what the chairman of the committee was trying to point out-- aging/obsolete CT-39G aircraft has been accelerated by the transfer of 2 of the Marine Corps 3 remaining CT-39s to the Navy. . . We do not even have the obsolete aircraft. That is nothing new for the Marine Corps. We do not even have that. I continue with the answer in regards to that statement that has been stated by the Commandant: The increased performance and short field capability of the UC-35 will ensure OSA support to forward deployed Marine Corps forces remains viable well into the 21st century. Again, I am quoting from the Commandant: The Marine Corps has placed 3 UC-35s on the Commandant's FY00 APN Unfunded Priority List in order to accelerate delivery to the West Coast and Okinawa to support Marine forces. [These] Missions are typically unpredictable, high priority, and require short notice airlift of people, cargo, and mail. These lifts are normally in support of contingency deployments not compatible with commercial transportation, common user airlift, or other organic airlift. That is a long way from being mollycoddled or thinking that you must have a perk aircraft because some other admiral or general might have a perk aircraft. I agree with the Senators from Iowa and California, we must make sure that the Department of Defense, as is indicated by their response, adheres to the GAO report, without question. Nobody wants to soak the taxpayer for any kind of generals' special fleet. That is not what this does. This amendment would strike nine unfunded priority requests by the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. I will put that dot com at the end of my remarks and hope people will pay attention to the people who have that responsibility. I hope my colleagues will oppose the amendment.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I am concerned that the current primary instructional facility, Bell Hall, at the Command & General Staff College, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is becoming incapable of performing its mission of preparing officers for positions of increased complexity and responsibility within the United States Army and other services. Bell Hall is the central academic and instructional facility of the C&GSC but the building's deteriorating physical plant and patchwork communication infrastructure can no longer support the instructional requirements contained in current and evolving Army curriculum. I am concerned that if a replacement facility is not constructed as soon as possible maintenance costs will continue to increase while Army Operation and Maintenance resources decline and student access to state-of-the-art technology required to teach advanced warfighting skills will remain limited.

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee for his consideration and ask that the conferees include language in the conference report noting the need to execute this essential project as soon as possible.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senator. Amendment No. 3179 (Purpose: To establish a special subsistence allowance for certain members of the uniformed services who are eligible to receive food stamp assistance)

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, it is my intention to speak for about 10 minutes in reference to the National Defense Authorization Act. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, for his outstanding leadership in the past year. I also thank the distinguished ranking member, Senator Levin, for his leadership as well. This is a good, solid, and positive effort in behalf of our national defense. As a subcommittee chairman, I am particularly proud of the work we were able to accomplish in the subcommittee that we call the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. I would like to review the key provisions contained in this act that fell under the jurisdiction of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee. As the chairman has pointed out, as well as the distinguished Senator from Michigan, in the last year, what we call information warfare, and what some call cyberthreats--and the American public is certainly becoming much more aware of that situation--to the United States, including the Department of Defense, have increased very dramatically. The Department of Defense reported that these attacks on Defense Department systems increased from under 6,000 in 1998, only 2 years ago, to over 22,000 in 1999. That figure is doing nothing but dramatically increasing and there is every indication that this trend is going to continue. From a national economic standpoint in regard to private industry, we are very susceptible and we are very vulnerable. In regard to our national security, we are very vulnerable. I remain concerned that many important, what we call information assurance programs, designed to protect against such cyberattacks, basically remain underfunded by the Department of Defense. For example, at the hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, as of this spring witnesses from the Department once again confirmed that such funding shortfalls remain significant and presented a list of almost $500 million in unfunded requirements in this area. Obviously that is a considerable amount of money. When you compare it to the ever- increasing threats and vuneralabilities, you can see just how important this is. For these reasons, we have included $76.8 million in this bill not only for today's underfunded requirements but also to really try to initiate programs such as training and education. Let me really underscore the word, in regard to education, in something called ``cybersecurity,'' that will continue to provide meaningful solutions far into the future. Senator Warner's initiative--what I refer to as the Roberts-Warner initiative, and the distinguished chairman refers to it as the Warner-Roberts initiative--he has embarked through his leadership and through his research on a whole series of scholarships in information security to attract our young people, the best and brightest; not to rely on those who come to us from foreign countries with ever-increasing higher immigration quotas. We must bring the next generation on to have this expertise. So these Warner scholarships in regard to information security for the Department of Defense will have far-reaching and, most important, positive effects in this situation. Second, I want to talk about the terrorist threats to our citizens and our service members. It shows no sign of diminishing. Especially in regard to the weeks that led up to the millennium celebration, numerous individuals who were suspected of planning terrorist attacks directed at U.S. citizens were arrested in the United States and abroad. This is a threat from state actors and nonstate actors all over the world; and with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of a terrorist attack with a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon is increasing at an alarming rate. We asked the experts who came before the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, the experts whose job it is to determine what represents a vital national security risk: What keeps you up at night? What makes you really worry in regard to a vital national security threat? Their response was largely along two lines of concern: one, in regard to the cyberattacks which we are already experiencing in private industry and the Pentagon experiences every day, and the other one was biological attacks. It is so easy to use, whether it be a state actor or a nonstate actor or anybody connected with organized crime or any individual who wants to cause a great deal of trouble. We, as a nation, must continue to detect and try to deter such attacks, but if such an attack happens, we must be prepared to deal with the consequences. We call this consequence management. We in Kansas, just to the north of Oklahoma City, full well know what kind of a tragedy can occur in regard to consequence management. Stop and think a minute about a terrorist threat and what could happen in our urban areas or, for that matter, anywhere in the country, and my colleagues can understand the seriousness of this problem. Our subcommittee will continue to play a leading role in ensuring the Department of Defense is adequately funded and structured to perform its critical role in the overall U.S. Government effort to, again, deter, detect, and combat terrorism. The bill contains an additional $35 million for these efforts. This year we continue a comprehensive review, initiated last year, of the activities of the Department of Defense to combat terrorism. Obviously, our goal is to make the Department efforts in this critical area more visible and certainly better organized. In fact, at a subcommittee hearing, leading Department of Defense witnesses testified to, No. 1, what their jurisdiction is; No. 2, what they have been doing; No. 3, what they plan to do and what their budget requirements are; and if, in fact, they could ask us for their priority concerns, what would they be. Before this hearing, I asked them to sit in the order of their chain of command to figure out who was in charge and is this effort being properly coordinated and shared, and what about communication. They looked at one another. There were four witnesses and nobody knew who was at the top of the chain of command. Hello, we have a big problem in that respect. We included in the markup a provision to address this. When I say ``we,'' I include the distinguished ranking member of the subcommittee, Senator Bingaman, and the distinguished Senator whose efforts, in part, led to the creation of the subcommittee, Senator Lieberman. We have also worked to increase the capabilities of the Department of Defense to assist in the event of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil involving the use of a weapon of mass destruction. This bill also authorizes over $1 billion, again to support the Russian threat reduction and nonproliferation efforts. During the post- cold-war decade, the U.S. Government has spent--I do not think too many of my colleagues recognize this; I know not too many of our American citizens understand this, but during the post-cold-war decade, the U.S. Government has spent over $4.7 billion in the former Soviet Union to reduce the threat posed by the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable nuclear materials and scientific expertise. After nearly a decade of working in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union, committing ourselves to future efforts, we thought it was important for us to review what these programs have achieved. Senator Levin has spoken eloquently of the need for the continuation of this effort and the intent of the effort. I share his commitment, but I am concerned that for all the good intentions and all the significant investment that has been made, the return of reducing the threat has been too small relative to the $4.7 billion. We can do better. For example, the General Accounting Office found that $481.2 million has been spent since fiscal year 1993 on a program designed to secure the weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, but only 7 percent of the total nuclear material identified as being at risk has been secured. I am troubled by this progress achieved in light of this significant investment. We are not going to scrap the program, but we must do better. In March, the GAO testified that the costs associated with achieving the threat reduction will continue to increase due primarily to the following facts: Russia's inability to pay its share of the costs of these programs, and we are certainly working in that regard with our Russian counterparts; Russia's basic reluctance to provide the United States with needed access to its sensitive facilities. I was in Russia last August attempting to gain greater access. We will continue those efforts. To help solve those problems, this mark contains several initiatives to obtain greater Russian commitment and necessary access to ensure these programs will have a greater chance of attaining their stated objectives, and if we do that, these programs will attain even further widespread support and they can be a success. I call the attention of my colleagues to a modest, but extremely important, initiative in this bill with widespread bipartisan interest that will lead to a major joint field experiment in 2002. I do not know of any commitment that will be undertaken in the future by any of our military services that will not be joint. This experiment will evaluate visions of our military services for future combat forces and ensure they can be brought together effectively for joint military operations to deter and counter the emerging threats to our national security. I am talking about the fact that we lack interoperability. I know the services and the service chiefs say we have this interoperability. With all due respect to the service chiefs and others, we do not have that ability to the degree we need it. That is why we feel we must press ahead with a major joint field experiment if we possibly can. It is absolutely essential. Finally, my colleagues will find in this recommendation an affirmation of the subcommittee's strong support of the Defense Science and Technology Program. This bill includes an increase--I emphasize, an increase--of $446 million to science and technology. That is a 9- percent increase over the President's budget request. It is this investment that will provide for future capabilities to deal with emerging threats to our national security. This is a solid effort; it is a positive effort. It will meet the objective within the constraints of the defense budget for the work assigned to the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. I urge approval of this legislation. I join our able chairman in thanking the majority and minority committee staff, my subcommittee staff, and my personal staff for a job well done. I specifically mention Pam Farrell. If one puts charming and tenacious together, it might be considered an oxymoron. It is not the case with Ms. Farrell. Without her leadership and expertise and being just as tenacious as she can be, we would never have increased the science and technology budget by more than 9 percent over the President's budget. She does an amazing job. I would also like to thank Ed Edens and Joe Sixeas, who is affectionately called Andy, for their work in regard to the counterterrorism efforts we are conducting, more especially with the RAID teams that we now say are CST teams; Chuck Alsup in regard to the joint experimentation initiative; Cord Sterling, who has been in Central America, South America, virtually every country where we have a threat in regard to drugs, working overtime. In regard to cyberattacks, Eric Thoemmes, does an outstanding job. He really has to keep up with that and has done a super job. Then on the cooperative threat reduction programs, Mary Alice Hayward. All of these folks have done an outstanding job. Their minority counterparts have done likewise. We are only as good as our staff. In this regard, I want to pay personal thanks to the staff. I urge the adoption of this legislation. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Major Scott Kindsvater from Dodge City, KS, a major in the United States Air Force, an F-15 pilot, and a congressional fellow, be granted the privilege of the floor during the foreign policy dialog.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Georgia, Senator Cleland, for his role in our ongoing, bipartisan foreign policy dialog. As we approach Memorial Day, I also thank him for his personal sacrifice and example for our great country. This is our fourth foreign policy dialog. It is called the employment of U.S. military forces or what could be better described as the use of force. It couldn't come at a better time, the week prior to the Memorial Day celebration, a day of solemn celebration and reflection, a day to remember our fallen family members, our friends, and our fellow Americans, a day that always makes me very proud of our country and humbled by the self-sacrifice of our men and women who paid the ultimate price so that we may live free. As my good friend from Georgia has seen with his own eyes, it is not the U.S. Constitution that really keeps us free, for it is merely a piece of paper. The marble headstones at Arlington National Cemetery and cemeteries all across America and throughout the world mark what truly has kept us free. And our freedoms will continue to be secured by the brave men and women of our Armed Forces. Samuel P. Huntington, the renowned author and historian in the 1950s, articulated in his book ``The Soldier and the State'' two important military characteristics. The first is expertise to prevail at the art of war; the second is the responsibility for protecting our freedoms, similar to the responsibility that lawyers have to protect American justice and the rule of law and that doctors have to save lives and protect the health of their patients. Quite simply: The role of our Armed Forces is to fight and to win the Nation's wars. Eleven times in our history the United States has formally declared war against foreign adversaries. There have been hundreds of instances, however, in which the United States has utilized military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect our U.S. citizens or to promote our U.S. interests. Of those hundreds of uses of military force where the U.S. did not declare war, some have obviously been successful and some obviously have not. Today, I am not going to discuss the use of military force for the purpose of protecting our vital national interests. Those uses of force in our history have occurred rarely and usually without much opposition due to the future of the Nation. Our forces are equipped and train every day to carry out this task. Those types of conflicts of national survival have easily been defined in terms of the political objectives, clear military strategies to achieve those objectives, and the definition of victory or success is the capitulation of the enemy. The U.S. Armed Forces are no stranger to limited contingency operations, military operations other than war, but the changes in political context of the commitments pose new problems of legitimacy, mission creep, operational tempo, and multilateral cooperation. Although limited contingency operations may produce short-term benefits, history has shown the lasting results of long-term commitments are very limited at best. The ideas developed by Carl von Clausewitz, famous military theorist of the early 19th century, are profoundly relevant today. The criteria of appropriateness and proportionality are crucial concerns in any military operation other than war. Clausewitz identified any protracted operation that involves enlargement or lengthening of troop commitment is likely to cause multiple rationales for the intervention. When a marine landing party went ashore at Port-au-Prince in Haiti in 1915, neither the Wilson administration nor the Marine Corps nor the Congress would have predicted that they began an operation to protect the foreign lives and property and to stop a civil war that would end 30 years later with an admission of failure in reforming the public institutions of Haiti. Does this sound familiar? Currently, the United States has troops in 141 nations and at sea; 55 percent of the nations of the world have U.S. troops stationed within their borders. From 1956--that is the second term of President Eisenhower--to 1992, the United States used military forces abroad 51 times. Since 1992, the U.S. has used military force 51 times. During that same timeframe of roughly a 400-percent increase in the use of the military as an instrument of power, the military has been forced to downsize and decrease force structure by 40 percent. That type of planning and management of the military reflects poorly on the civilian leadership. All of our services are at the breaking point. I fear there is no more give or elasticity in the force structure of our most valued treasure, the men and women who serve. The can-do, never-say-die attitude of the military and its leadership and the very competence that the U.S. military has displayed in successfully responding to a wide variety of contingencies seems to have encouraged its further use by this administration, acquiesced to by this Congress. A recent study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies of military culture identifies seven areas of concern within our military today. Service members expressed a commitment to values related to effectiveness and sacrifice and discipline, but they had deep concerns about the imbalance between the missions and the resources to perform those missions to a high standard. They felt the Pentagon was out of touch. Quite frankly, they questioned the command support in the face of social concerns. They had concerns about the sense of dwindling understanding of the military so rampant today in our society. They indicated a lot of disgust with civilian leadership behavior not tolerated in their units in the military. Thomas Jefferson said: Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Our military has always exemplified that statement. However, I am concerned that the current use of military force is undermining the trust of leadership at all levels. We cannot continue to accept the status quo. We cannot continue to appropriate the contingency funds for emergency deployments with no end in sight or no planned exit strategy. General Zinni, who is the CINC of the Central Command, expressed concern about the pace of these operations and what it is doing to our service members. He said: We don't have the resources to meet the strategy. It's plain and simple. We don't have enough people, we don't have enough force structure, we don't have the right kinds of things we need to meet the strategy. Since 1991, we have spent over $25 billion on peacekeeping operations. The impact on the war-fighting capability of each of the services, including the time to recover war-fighting skills after peacekeeping operations, is reflected in the current readiness concerns expressed by the Joint Chiefs. As an example, the United States continues to dedicate three divisions in the Balkans rotation: One division training to deploy for peacekeeping operations, one division in the area of responsibility, and one division retraining after deployment--three divisions not ready to execute their primary tasks. Here is an account from a commander in Kosovo, a peacekeeping operation, which is very troubling to me. This is a quote, an e-mail that went from one commander to another. He was reflecting to his friend, who was going to take over his command, what went on in terms of his daily operation: After getting hit in the head by a large rock and getting smashed across the back with a tree limb, I gave the order for the soldiers to open fire with nonlethal munitions. This worked pretty well clearing the crowd back initially. As we continued to fight and move with the people on the hill, I looked over to the landing zone and saw a mob swarming toward the subject and five soldiers. The soldiers started to move out of the landing zone, but they had people around them throwing everything. I grabbed 10 guys and went to help get the five soldiers. When we were 15 meters away, I saw a soldier get smashed over the head with a huge tree limb. He was fine. Thank God for Kevlar. At this point, I took out my 9mm with the intent to shoot. However, I fired several warning shots. The crowd cleared out, and we walked everyone out, including the injured. I want to ask a question. What if those rocks and tree limbs would have been AK-47s and RPGs? I think the debate about a week ago regarding Kosovo and our involvement there would have dramatically changed had that been the case. We continue to maintain multiple wings of aircraft in southwest Asia, and we continue to place American aviators in harm's way every day in Iraq. What most Americans don't know is that although airpower seems sterile, clean, and bloodless on CNN that is not the case--that is not the case. The mission tapes of the men and women flying missions over Iraq reflect the risk. A war America thought we won 10 years ago slowly rages on. Mr. President, 75 percent of our military today joined after 1989. They have known nothing but turmoil in terms of their missions. They have been deployed away from their families for 6-month rotations and, in some cases, three, four, and five times. Their war-fighting capabilities and readiness to execute military operations is not as sharp as it should be. Their morale is low because they are leaving their families. Seventy percent of the force today is married, and they are leaving them for very questionable missions. No wonder sailors and airmen and soldiers are leaving the force and voting with their feet. Only the Marine Corps has maintained their recruiting and retention goals, and they have had a very difficult time achieving that goal. The current military is stressed, it is strained, and it is hollow. As our armed services activity levels have increased and force structure has decreased time for realistic combat training is lost, supply stocks are diminished, and personnel are displaced. Military leadership at all levels suffers from the current strain; leadership crucial in regard to the goal of winning wars. The key to leadership is trust: Trust from the civilian leadership and the public that the military will put together the proper plan to win, trust from the military that the civilian leadership--those of us in the Congress and in the administration--will provide the proper tools to win, and trust to use force judiciously and to gain the political and public support. Congress must trust the President, and the President must trust the Congress to ensure the use of force is necessary, after all other instruments of power and diplomacy have failed. And our national interests dictate that the political objectives still must be achieved. I commend our military leaders for weathering the current storm. I also commend the men and women of the Armed Forces. Whenever I visit a base in Kansas, or overseas, I am always impressed with our citizens in uniform. Their service, integrity, self-discipline, respect for authority, honor, and sacrifice is inspirational; it is a battery charger. I know we have honest disagreements and differences of opinions, and that is good for the system. Debate will continue to occur. Even General Washington had severe disagreements with the Congress about allowing him to perform summary punishments. However, we must mend, heal, and restore harmony to the system by rebuilding the respect, trust, and understanding in the civilian-military relations. In the post-cold-war era, limited contingency operations have become our predominant military endeavor. There are no easy answers to the problems of limited contingency operations. Deciding to intervene and use our military force is a very difficult problem; it is very perplexing. The distinguished Senator from Georgia and I have had long talks about this, trying to set up some kind of a criterion, set up some kind of a list that would make sense, outlining the various reasons for intervention abroad. Listing all of the questions the President ought to ask before the Marines are sent in can best be characterized now as an ``it depends'' doctrine. I acknowledge that the post-cold-war recommendations and the public debate between the foreign policy elite, the Congress, the Secretary of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot agree upon and do not provide a clear set of tests that should be applied before deciding to commit troops to combat in support of less than vital national interests. I wish there were a test or a criterion. That is really the reason Senator Cleland and I entered into the foreign policy dialog. We always seem to be stuck with foregone conclusions in terms of foreign policy and sending our men and women in uniform in harms way. The former Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, identified six tests that he said should be applied when weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. Three of the tests--number one, when vital interests are at stake; number five, with public support; and number six, as a last resort--concern the foreign policy and the political circumstances in regard to the use of force. Tests number two, three, and four concern the relationship between the military means and the political ends. Former Secretary of State, George Shultz on the ``vital interests'' test argued that a wide range of international challenges justify U.S. use of force. And, the last two administrations have uniformly rejected the first vital interest test. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry argued that the use of force might be necessary to support coercive diplomacy when national interests that do not rise to the level of vital are at stake. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has asserted that decisions can only be made on a case by case basis, and it would be counterproductive to define rigidly in advance the conditions in which a decision to use force would be made. But if vital interests need not be at stake, the question remains what degree of U.S. interests justify the use of force, at what level, and with what risks. Mr. President, I would contend that the use of force for other than vital or extremely important national interests, as defined in our second dialogue, has not worked in the post-cold-war period. The role of the military is not to act as the cop on the beat for the whole world. The non-prudent use of force in support of less than vital interests is not worth the current costs to our readiness and military morale. C. Mark Brinkley in the Marine Corps Times said it best when he identified with no other form of government to turn to, Serbs and ethnic Albanians alike turned to the Marines for help. In addition, to more traditional roles of securing the area and suppressing civil unrest, the unit recreated basic elements of daily life: restoring law and order and reopening schools and hospitals, garbage collection, and counselling. The Marines also evolved into a police force for the American sector, patrolling the night and responding to emergencies. However, these operations require significantly different skills than what the armed forces are currently trained to execute. If we are training our peacekeepers to be more like MP's than combat troops, don't we run the risk that the skills needed by a policeman may get them killed when there is combat? Two schools of thought on the use of force have developed, the national interests school which argues that military force should be used only when there is clear cut political and military objectives and in an overwhelming fashion. The other school, the limited objectives school, which would use military force even in ambiguous situations as a means of enforcing international decisions or quelling ethnic conflict. General Colin Powell contended in 1993, the key to using military force is to first match political expectations to military means in a wholly realistic way, and, second to attain decisive results. A decision to use force must be made with a clear purpose in mind, and then adding that if it is too murky, as is often the case, know that leaders will eventually have to find clarity. We are having a hard time doing that in the Balkans today. The decision to use force must also be supported by the public. Presidential leadership requires working with Congress and the American people requires Congress to work with the President to provide essential domestic groundwork if U.S. military commitments are to be sustainable. General Powell asserted the troops must go into battle with the support or understanding of the American people. Mr. President, the pendulum's path has definitely displaced toward the limited objectives school. President Clinton's doctrine of ``global vigilance'' and ``aggressive multilaterialism'' is the current example and policy. Mr. President, the current precision strike and technological advantage that we enjoy today has led to its increased use due to the perceived minimal risk to American aviators. A few cruise missiles or laser guided bombs may fix a short term problem but do not address the underlying long term problems. I would contend that if the intervention is not worth the cost of one American service member then we ought to be thinking about the worth of using military force in the first place. If the U.S. decides to use military force and unleash our military might then the cause had better be commensurate with American national interests and analogous to the risk to American service members. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton pronounced the ``Dover Test'' must be used when deciding to send troops in harms way, and, if the use of force is not worth the consequences of American service members making the ultimate sacrifice arriving at Dover Air Force Base then the military should not be used. If the cause is not worth the risk of one American life then the results and handcuffs placed on the military rules of engagement in an effort to curtail risk actually increase the risk. The situation over time, and the situation we are now faced with in the Balkans and in Iraq. Mr. President, I believe the pendulum of the use of force doctrine needs to swing towards the national interest school of thought. Humanitarian military intervention, in violation of the U.N. charter from attacking other states to remedy violations of human rights, will not rectify the underlying human rights problems. When there is no peace to keep then American service members become targets, not peacekeepers. Our challenge is to understand the need for prudent, limited, proportionate use of military force as an instrument of national power. I now want to offer a very strong and very thought provoking words from the book ``Fighting for the Future,'' by Ralph Peters, former Army lieutenant colonel. It is controversial. I offer it as food for thought. Colonel Peters said: We face opponents, from warlords to druglords, who operate in environments of tremendous moral freedom, unconstrained by laws, internationally recognized treaties, and civilized customs, or by the approved behaviors of the international military brotherhood. These men beat us. Terrorists who rejected our worldview defeated us in Lebanon. ``General'' Aideed, defeated us in Somalia. And Saddam, careless of his own people, denied us the fruits of our battlefield victory. In the Balkans and on its borders, intransigents continue to hold our troops hostage to a meandering policy. Our enemies play the long game, while we play jailbird chess--never thinking more than one move ahead. Until we change the rules, until we stop attacking foreign masses to punish by proxy protected-status murderers, we will continue to lose. And even as we lose, our cherished ethics do not stand up to hardheaded examination. We have become not only losers but random murderers, willing to kill several hundred Somalis in a single day but unwilling to kill the chief assassin, willing to uproot the coca fields of struggling peasants but without the stomach to retaliate meaningfully against the druglords who savage our children and our society. He went on to say, Tomorrow's enemies will be of two kinds--those who have seen their hopes disappointed, and those who have no hope. Do not worry about a successful China, worry about a failing China. Those are words to think about. Limited contingency operations consisting of crisis management, power projection, peacekeeping, localized military action, support for allies, or responding to terrorism require well-defined objectives, consistent strategies to achieve objectives, and a clear, concise exit strategy once those objectives are attained. Otherwise, our country will get involved in operations like those in the Balkans with no end in sight and no peace to keep. Mr. President, in closing, our service members are, in fact, America, they reflect our diverse origins and they are the embodiment of the American spirit of courage and dedication. Their forebears went by the names of doughboys, Yanks, buffalo soldiers, Johnny Reb, Rough Riders, and GI's. For over 200 years they have answered our Nation's call to fight. Our citizen soldiers today continue to carry America's value system and commitment to freedom and democracy. The world we face is still full of uncertainty and threats. It is not a safe world. However, all Americans sleep soundly at night because of the young men and women standing ready to fight and die, if necessary, for our freedoms. It is our duty in this body to ensure they are used appropriately. We have an obligation to do just that in the future, for our sake and theirs. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank my colleague for his contribution. I yield the floor for that purpose.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, how much time remains?

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 2559, the Agriculture Risk Protection Act of 2000. As has been indicated by my colleagues, this legislation provides what we believe are very dramatic reforms to the Crop Insurance Program. It also marks the final product of a legislative initiative Senator Bob Kerrey and I began working on nearly 2 years ago. Senator Kerrey and I decided to undertake this task at the same time Congress was passing the first of several large agriculture assistance packages in 1998. The problems we experienced in 1998 and again in 1999 exposed many of the holes in the current Crop Insurance Program. We agreed that changes needed to be made and that we must work together in a bipartisan manner to achieve program improvements. In fact, this is one of the reforms that was promised as an integral part of the 1996 farm bill. Obviously, those reforms did not take place, but here we are, finally, in an effort to achieve those reforms. Senator Kerrey and I did not just set out to write a bill based upon what we thought needed to be done. Rather, we wanted input from those who were most directly affected by this program. We asked virtually every producer, every farm organization, every commodity group, every crop insurance company, every insurance agent group in the country for input on this legislation. We traveled throughout the country. We held, literally, hundreds of hours of listening sessions here in Washington to get the input both from the organizations and the producers. The responses were overwhelmingly clear: Major changes were needed in regard to the Crop Insurance Program. These groups recommended more affordable crop insurance policies at higher levels of coverage, equalization of the subsidy on something called revenue insurance, provisions to deal with multiple years of disaster, a better program for new and beginning farmers, changes in the product approval process, and, finally, the removal of the regulatory roadblocks that had stifled new product development. Senator Kerrey and I took these recommendations very seriously, and this legislation achieves each of these goals. The process has not been easy. We began our meetings on this issue in September of 1998. We introduced our first legislation, S. 529, the Crop Insurance for the 21st Century Act, last February. We then introduced a second bill, S. 1580, the Risk Management for the 21st Century Act, in September. In March, the Agriculture Committee and the Senate approved the crop insurance legislation that was based largely upon our original bill. Since passage of the Senate bill, we have spent nearly 7 full weeks in conference with the House. There have been many surprises, many bumps in the road, to say the least, sometimes arising at the last minute. I believe those unexpected bumps, however, were appropriate because they helped remind us of the often unexpected, unpredictable risks that our farmers and ranchers face on a daily basis, the same risks that this legislation works to help them manage. The task was difficult and the hours were often long, but in the end we achieved a bipartisan bill that was supported by all 18 members of the conference committee between the House and the Senate. That is no small achievement. Exactly what does this bill do? It makes it easier for producers to purchase the higher levels of coverage by increasing the premium write- downs and reducing the farmer's out-of-pocket expenses. By allowing the producer to produce these higher levels of coverage, I believe we will reduce the need for future disaster bills, those disaster bills that are always a disaster to pass, a disaster to implement, and always seem to come during even-numbered years. The legislation makes the revenue insurance policies that have become enormously popular for producers more affordable as well. This is risk management. These are risk management tools that, hopefully, will lessen the reliance on disaster bills and all of the expenditures that those entail, usually under emergency legislation. The legislation also provides adjustments to something called the average production history, the APH, for those farmers who have experienced a year or years of significant crop losses and disaster. It provides for a new assigned yield system that will benefit new and beginning farmers. The legislation also restructures the board of directors to provide more producer and insurance expertise. The product approval and the research development processes are greatly improved. This will result in the development of new and improved products that will provide our producers with the additional risk management tools they need. We have also strengthened the fraud and abuse penalties in the program. Farmers and ranchers should pay attention to this; critics of the farm program should pay attention to this. Under this legislation, the producers and insurance representatives who would abuse the program face fines of up to $10,000 and possible disbarment from all USDA programs for up to 5 years. Those who would try to destroy the integrity of the program are going to be punished, and they are going to be punished big time. I also comment on several provisions that do not necessarily affect my State and producers but which I know are very important to other Members in this body. In recent years, there have been many complaints that specialty crop producers and certain areas of the country have been ``underserved'' by the Crop Insurance Program. This legislation takes major steps to address these concerns. First, it provides nearly $500 million over 5 years for changes to make something called the Noninsured Assistance Program, or NAP. NAP will work better for these producers. It requires the RMA to undertake studies and report to Congress on ways to better serve these areas. And more than $200 million is provided for expanded research and education to develop new and better risk management products for these producers. Mr. President, in addition to the important crop insurance reforms included in this package, we have also provided $7.1 billion in agriculture assistance for farmers and ranchers who have not enjoyed the booming economic times experienced by the rest of the U.S. economy. Approximately $5.5 billion of this amount will go out as market loss payments, through the AMTA payment mechanism established in the 1996 farm bill. Now, while I understand some of my colleagues believe this is not the best way to distribute these funds, it is the quickest guaranteed manner by which the USDA can make these payments. I remind my colleagues who wanted to develop a new payment formula that in the past 2 years it has taken the Department of Agriculture at least 9 months to make these payments through the disaster and assistance programs that were not paid to producers through the AMTA payment mechanism. I also point out that after a lot of real criticism regarding the AMTA process, the department or the administration came forward with a plan, only to be roundly criticized by virtually every farm organization and commodity group. So I think this is the way to do it. These are emergency payments. As long as we don't have our export markets back, as long as farmers are not experiencing the kind of farm income at the country elevator, and market prices are depressed, I think this is appropriate, and doubtless this will help. We are doing it early. We are doing it early in the spring. It is in the budget. No Social Security money. No emergency money. The farmers, ranchers, and the lenders can sit down, and under consistency and predictability, know what they are getting this fall. I am also pleased that $15 million is included for carbon sequestration research. The preliminary research indicates that agriculture can and will play an important and positive role in the debate regarding global climate change, and this funding is an important downpayment on this research. Senator Kerrey and I worked hard to include this research money. It will enable farmers, again, to play a positive role in taking carbon out of the atmosphere and to mitigate the global climate change problems we have. I could continue to discuss the merits of this legislation, but I will cease and desist. However, I do have a few closing comments. First, this legislation has been a personal priority of mine for many years. It was nearly 20 years ago that my predecessor in the House of Representatives, Congressman Keith Sebelius, cast the deciding vote to create the Federal Crop Insurance Program. Since that time, I have been committed to strengthening this program and making it work for our producers. We promised this in the 1996 farm bill. In addition, an improved Crop Insurance Program has been an underlying promise ever since that bill has been passed. It was a promise I personally made, and today I consider it a promise, hopefully, fulfilled. It has been a pleasure to work with my colleague from Nebraska on this issue. Senator Kerrey is retiring from the Senate when this session ends, and I know passage of this bill before leaving the Senate has been one of his top priorities. We could not have done the job, the committee could not have done the job, the staff could not have done the job, we would not have had this bill without the support, leadership, advice, counsel, and hard work of Senator Kerrey. Furthermore, I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee, Senator Lugar, for his assistance in working with us to get a strong bill out of the conference between the House and Senate. Without his leadership as well, obviously, we would not have this package. Finally, I thank the staff of the Senate Agriculture Committee. The Senate legislative counsel and the Congressional Budget Office spent considerable time on this legislation. As a matter of fact, maybe even too much time. It has been a Herculean effort, and all Members and staff involved deserve to be commended. I would be remiss if I did not mention specifically Bev Paul, who works for Senator Kerrey; Mike Seifert, who works for me; and Keith Luse, the distinguished and able staff director of the Senate Agriculture Committee. They basically did the work and reported to us, and we reported to them to go back to work and they finally produced a bill. They persevered. I close by stating that this is a good and fair bill. For the first time, it is a truly national crop insurance bill that serves all regions of the country. I remind my colleagues that it is a bipartisan bill, supported by all 18 members of the conference committee. It represents a real investment in our farmers and ranchers and the agriculture sector of our economy. I am proud of our efforts on this legislation. I thank my colleagues for their support. I urge its quick passage. It is my understanding that it passed by unanimous consent in the other body, which has a lot of difficulty deciding when to adjourn, let alone passing things by unanimous consent. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, May 25 at 9:30 a.m. to conduct an oversight hearing.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, May 25, 2000, to conduct a hearing.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee on Commerce, Science,and Transportation be authorized to meet on Thursday, May 25, 2000, at 9:30 am.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Public Health, be authorized to meet for a hearing during the session of the Senate on Thursday, May 25, 2000, at 9:30 a.m.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, May 25, 2000, at 10:00 a.m. for a hearing.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet to conduct a hearing on Thursday, May 25, 2000, at 10:00 a.m., in SD226.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet to conduct a hearing on Thursday, May 25, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., in SD226.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, May 25 at 2:30 p.m. to conduct an oversight hearing.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the allotted times for morning business, the Senate then proceed to the conference report to accompany H.R. 2559, the crop insurance bill, and it be considered as having been read, and under the following time restraints: 1 hour under the control of Senator Lugar; 1 hour under the control of Senator Harkin; and 1 hour under the control of Senator Wellstone. I further ask unanimous consent that following the use or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to vote on the conference report, without any intervening action or debate.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Washington.