Pat Roberts

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce sweeping legislation to reform and improve math, science, engineering and technology education in American schools. The fields of science, math, engineering and technology are critical to U.S. economic success. Unfortunately, there is growing concern that we do not measure up as evidenced by studies that show our students cannot compete internationally. In fact, over half of students in our esteemed graduate schools are from other countries. Our economic future depends on science and we must ensure that our schools are preparing students for the technological jobs that await them. So many aspects of our national success depends on our technological savvy. For instance, our strong economy has certainly prospered because of technology advances. The economic boom, witnessed by average consumers and Wall Street analysts alike, has high stakes in our continued technology success. Meanwhile, our workforce is increasingly staffed by people from other countries. Later this year, Congress will be asked to again raise the quota of H-1B visas. While these workers are key to our economic success, we must address this problem and grow our own high-tech labor force. Moreover, we cannot forget how adversely our national security could fare if our country were to fall behind in technological pursuits. A key piece of our national security is at stake--the strength of our military is built upon our technological superiority. There is a fundamental need for this legislation. I have introduced the following three bills to help improve the quality of science and technology teachers and curriculum through incentives and better training: The National Science Education Act. These provisions, utilizing the National Science Foundation, set up Science Master Teachers and offer grants to place one in every elementary school. The National Science Education Enhancement Act. Recognizing that we must keep good teachers and help them grow in their career, this bill uses the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to set up Science Teacher Mentors and Summer Professional Development Institutes. It also expands the Eisenhower National clearinghouse to provide that this information be available on the Internet. The National Science Education Incentive Act. This bill provides tax credits to help teachers with up to $10,000 of tuition and encourage the private sector education contributions such as computers, technology service, teacher training and teacher externships. My legislation is mirrored in the House of Representatives with bills by Representative Vernon Ehlers, the vice chairman of the House Science Committee and author of ``Unlocking Our Future: Toward a New National Science Policy.'' Furthermore, I am pleased to have the support and able assistance of the Senior Senator from Maine, Senator Olympia J. Snowe in joining me to introduce this bill. Mr. President, I strongly encourage my colleagues to join me in support of this effort to reform and improve math, science, engineering and technology education in American schools. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bills be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce sweeping legislation to reform and improve math, science, engineering and technology education in American schools. The fields of science, math, engineering and technology are critical to U.S. economic success. Unfortunately, there is growing concern that we do not measure up as evidenced by studies that show our students cannot compete internationally. In fact, over half of students in our esteemed graduate schools are from other countries. Our economic future depends on science and we must ensure that our schools are preparing students for the technological jobs that await them. So many aspects of our national success depends on our technological savvy. For instance, our strong economy has certainly prospered because of technology advances. The economic boom, witnessed by average consumers and Wall Street analysts alike, has high stakes in our continued technology success. Meanwhile, our workforce is increasingly staffed by people from other countries. Later this year, Congress will be asked to again raise the quota of H-1B visas. While these workers are key to our economic success, we must address this problem and grow our own high-tech labor force. Moreover, we cannot forget how adversely our national security could fare if our country were to fall behind in technological pursuits. A key piece of our national security is at stake--the strength of our military is built upon our technological superiority. There is a fundamental need for this legislation. I have introduced the following three bills to help improve the quality of science and technology teachers and curriculum through incentives and better training: The National Science Education Act. These provisions, utilizing the National Science Foundation, set up Science Master Teachers and offer grants to place one in every elementary school. The National Science Education Enhancement Act. Recognizing that we must keep good teachers and help them grow in their career, this bill uses the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to set up Science Teacher Mentors and Summer Professional Development Institutes. It also expands the Eisenhower National clearinghouse to provide that this information be available on the Internet. The National Science Education Incentive Act. This bill provides tax credits to help teachers with up to $10,000 of tuition and encourage the private sector education contributions such as computers, technology service, teacher training and teacher externships. My legislation is mirrored in the House of Representatives with bills by Representative Vernon Ehlers, the vice chairman of the House Science Committee and author of ``Unlocking Our Future: Toward a New National Science Policy.'' Furthermore, I am pleased to have the support and able assistance of the Senior Senator from Maine, Senator Olympia J. Snowe in joining me to introduce this bill. Mr. President, I strongly encourage my colleagues to join me in support of this effort to reform and improve math, science, engineering and technology education in American schools. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bills be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise to lend my support to the proposed legislation by my colleagues, Senator Byrd and Senator Warner, in reference to U.S. obligations and involvement in Kosovo and, in a larger sense, in NATO as well, and in opposition to the amendment to strike that has been offered by the distinguished Senator from Michigan. In this regard, I am a cosponsor of the language introduced several weeks ago by the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner. I had the privilege of being in the Presiding Officer's chair when he introduced his legislation. Senator Warner, after many trips to Kosovo and firsthand experience, became convinced that our united efforts in the Balkans would have no chance of success unless promises made by our allies were kept--obligations for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction so crucial to any positive outcome. Senator Warner, in effect, issued a strong warning to our valued allies, and I believe his legislation has become a catalyst for action. Almost every contributing NATO ally and the officials within the administration, has assured the chairman, that they have been, are, or will step up to the plate and fulfill their financial obligations. I feel with certainty that President Clinton can and will certify the Warner requirements have been met, so essential to achieving peace and stability in Kosovo. Regardless of how Members feel about this legislation or U.S. involvement in Kosovo, we owe Senator Warner a debt of gratitude. The second part of this legislation has been authored by Senator Robert Byrd. His knowledge of the U.S. Constitution has no equal in this body and his tireless efforts in defending and protecting the constitutional prerogatives of this institution will be among the many legacies he will leave us. Senator Byrd has a not-so-unique conviction. He believes, and I believe, that we should balance the need for Presidential flexibility in foreign affairs and our constitutional power of the purse. His legislation signals the end to open-ended--and I emphasize the word ``open-ended''--U.S. peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and by periodic reporting promote actual consultation with the Congress and enable us to abide by the Constitution's directives on the separation of powers. I certainly identify with Senator Byrd's purpose, as I authored a somewhat similar reporting requirement in 1998 during consideration of the Defense appropriations bill, as did Senators Cleland and Snowe. This is not new ground we are plowing. The reporting requirement was a little different. It was after the fact, and it was a foregone conclusion in terms of our involvement. We were trying to better determine the mission, the cost, the timing, et cetera. Again, this is not new ground we are plowing. Notwithstanding the actual content of the Byrd-Warner amendment, it certainly has caused quite a fuss, so much of a fuss that the Senate of the United States is actually in the midst of a foreign policy debate, some $15 billion and 6 or 7 years into intervention in the Balkans. We actually have Senators in both the Republican conference and the Democratic caucus involved in some very spirited debate about the U.S. policy in the Balkans, so emblematic of the so-called Clinton doctrine. Imagine that, foreign policy actually getting some attention in the middle of an election year and a Presidential campaign. That is good. That is not bad; that is good. We need this debate. In fact, I know of two Senators, the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Cleland, and this Senator from Kansas who have braved the morning business hours, always held in the late afternoons, to launch what we call a foreign policy dialog and discuss at length our vital national security interests, the direction of our foreign policy, and the use of force and related topics. A few Senators have joined us, particularly Senators Hutchinson, Hagel, Lugar, and Levin. It was a good dialog. We will have more. But this debate is about an actual amendment calling for the Senate to meet our obligations and responsibilities to be an equal partner with the executive in determining where and why our American men and women in uniform are put in harm's way, and for what purpose, and commensurate with our commitments in regard to our allies. This is almost beyond the hopes of Senator Cleland and myself, who have been trying to attract attention to this topic for the better part of this session. My colleagues, this legislation does us, our military, and the American people a big favor, it seems to me. It places the Congress into a process, a process where we already have a constitutional obligation. Simply put, if we, as a body, believe our continued presence in Kosovo is justified, then we do so by voting to stay. Second, the provision asks the United States to provide a plan to return the peacekeeping responsibility--I emphasize that, the peacekeeping responsibility--to our allies in Europe by the first of October of next year--18 months away. Last, it asks the President to certify that the E.U. and the European members of NATO meet the obligations for the humanitarian assistance and the reconstruction they have promised. This legislation has created quite a fuss. Supporters have been labeled--and I am quoting here--as ``isolationists,'' ``Cassandras,'' and ``blind to the facts.'' The critics of this legislation say, if this amendment is adopted, Europe will be plunged into darkness, NATO will resemble Humpty-Dumpty, and 50 years of U.S.-Europe cooperation will be in danger, not to mention the peace and stability in the Balkans. Really? My colleagues, to suggest that if we ask to bring our combat troops home after an orderly turnover to European peacekeepers, to ask the Congress to vote on their approval or their disapproval of continued U.S. participation in Kosovo, and to ask that the President certify that the Europeans will meet their funding obligations they promised-- if that represents a lessening of our commitment to Europe, this, to me, is histrionics of amazing proportions. Let the critics, let all of my colleagues who oppose this legislation, answer the following questions: First: Are the Europeans capable of maintaining the peace in Kosovo? That is a very important question. Second: Are the Europeans solvent enough to meet their promised fiscal responsibility? I think we all know the answer to that. Does the Congress have any responsibility for foreign policy? Have we asked the President, time and time again, with numerous reporting requirements--as I have indicated, as Senator Cleland, Senator Snowe, and I have over 2 years ago--to better inform and include Congress in foreign policy decisions? Would the United States respond militarily if a conflict erupted in Europe following the passage of this legislation? Does an ill-defined, poorly executed, and ineffective policy in the Balkans have a direct negative effect on our military and our remaining military obligations around the world? I think the answers, my colleagues and critics, is yes to all of those questions. In fact, I think it is a bit condescending or paternalistic, if not outright arrogant, to suggest, as some have stated, that without direct U.S. participation--we are talking about ground troops now, not logistics, not airlift, not intelligence--that the European military would be unable to maintain the peace and war will spread to neighboring nations. Those of us who are privileged to serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee have met repeatedly with our foreign counterparts to learn repeatedly that the European Union members are developing a rapid deployment force with defensive capability--they call it the ESDI--that they say will be, or is right now, capable of maintaining the peace in the Balkans. Are they wrong? We have 17 months to really try to figure that out. As an aside, would our peacekeepers assume a combat role? Do I recall press accounts where Americans are no longer permitted to come to the assistance of other peacekeepers in other sectors, in certain situations, following a skirmish in the German sector? So let me get this right. We are peacekeepers, but we cannot withdraw because of a possible problem that could break out; but we are not allowed to go to other sectors to assist if a problem breaks out? Something is wrong here. Do the opponents of this legislation actually think that because of this provision, the United States will in fact become isolationists? Do opponents think by passing this provision, it signals an end to our participation in NATO or in Europe? That argument is absurd. I think the opponents know it. That is not the issue. Aside from fulfilling our constitutional obligations, the issue is this: The U.S. military is being deployed all over the world by this administration at rates far above that seen in regard to the cold war. We must ensure that we have the forces to be able to respond to threats to our vital national security interests. The point is not to debate whether we should have gone to war in Kosovo--those 20-20 hindsight lessons learned are still in progress, and they should be--but rather to decide how long we will keep draining limited U.S. resources when we still cannot define what our long-term objectives in Kosovo are, or when the Europeans are fully capable of performing the peacekeeping mission again, and they have committed to providing the reconstruction resources and the resources for humanitarian relief. This legislation is, in fact, in concert with the new Combined Joint Task Force mechanism adopted by NATO during the Washington summit. That is the summit that was held last spring. In this regard, we all left town and the NATO ambassadors stayed here. They adopted a new Strategic Concept. I doubt if many Senators have read the new Strategic Concept. I did. I am a little concerned about our mission in that regard. I even had an amendment, that was adopted, that asked the President to certify whether we had obligations and responsibilities on all these new missions in regard to the Strategic Concept. In that Strategic Concept, passed last fall, largely at the request of our European allies, the task force allows NATO members to utilize-- listen up, my colleagues--the task force allows NATO members to utilize noncombat NATO resources in support of an operation that is conducted by a coalition of willing nations without requiring all alliance members to participate in it. That is the concept. That is what this legislation does. There is no reason this CJTF plan would not allow the United States to continue to provide--as the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee said over and over again in this debate--airlift, logistics, intelligence, and, yes, peacekeeping support. What is the end game here? Not only are there no clear objectives that would end our involvement in Kosovo, but there is no understanding, at least from this Senator's standpoint, of what constitutes ``winning the peace.'' I would like somebody to tell me. I would like somebody to tell me, after years of discussion and hearings, especially in the Intelligence Committee and Armed Services Committee, the President, Secretary Albright or National Security Adviser Berger or Gen. Wesley Clark, who is back in Washington after a very tough duty assignment that he conducted so well, or my colleagues who are so critical of this amendment: What is it that winning the peace in Kosovo means? Is it harmonious coexistence of the Serb and the Albanian population in some yet to be defined autonomous or semiautonomous region called Kosovo? Is it when the level of violence, Serb on Albanian, Albanian on Serb, Albanian on Albanian or Serb on Serb or any combination of those, has been reduced to a point that CNN no longer covers it? Or is it when the western nations have kept the peace long enough for generations to pass and the great grandchildren of the combatants no longer remember the atrocities they inflicted on one another? I am all for winning a peace. I don't know of anybody who is not. But I am concerned, and I am afraid the reality is that the U.S. cannot afford to wait. We are not talking about now. We are talking about October from October, 18 months. I say this not out of a lack of compassion for the inflicted innocents of Kosovo--those who I met and whose pleas I have heard and the memories of which I will carry forever--but because our U.S. military is stretched and strained and growing hollow once again, and our world commitments are too great to allow us to stay in Kosovo indefinitely. Some time ago, June 19, 1998, Senator Cleland and Senator Snowe passed an amendment calling for a report from the Executive, what clear and distinct objectives guide the activities of the United States in the Balkans, what the President has identified on the basis of those objectives as the date or set of conditions that define the end point of the operation. That was 2 years ago. There are findings here that pretty well underscore the concern and the frustration we have had, all of us, in a bipartisan way. We have a May 3, 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 25 declaring that American participation in the United Nations and other peace operations will depend in part--this was before Kosovo; this is Bosnia--on whether the role of the U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an end point for U.S. participation can be identified. I think the distinguished chairman's amendment and that of Senator Byrd is commensurate with the Presidential directive. I had an amendment, as I indicated, to the Defense appropriations bill, saying: None of the funds appropriated on or otherwise made available, et cetera, could be obligated or expended for any additional deployment of forces--this is before Kosovo and the bombing, all of that--until the following questions were answered: The reasons why the deployment is in the national security interests of the United States; the number of U.S. military personnel; the mission and objectives, et cetera; the exit strategy. About 6 months to a year later, we finally got a response. I can tell you that the mission has changed dramatically. Then we all wanted to safeguard the return of the refugees and provide a safe haven and end the fighting. Today, I am not sure if we can define ``winning the peace.'' A GAO report that just came says: On the eve of the Senate vote to set a deadline for withdrawing American troops from Kosovo. A GAO report released today said that prospects for lasting peace in Kosovo are bleak. It says it will take another 5 years. Maybe we should have an amendment by those opposed to this amendment simply stating that the GAO indicates there is going to be another 5 years and simply to go ahead and say that, that we tell the truth in regards to how long it is going to take. Last week in our foreign policy dialog, Senator Lugar asked the question: Are we committed to NATO, after the lessons hopefully learned following the isolationist policies of World War I and all we have worked to achieve in the 50 years since World War II? Are we still committed to Europe in that their security involves our security? The answer is yes. His point is well taken. That is not the issue. I submit the conduct of foreign policy is just as important as the alleged or stated goal. And there is the rub for this Senator. Some day I hope to pull together all of the information and reports I have stacked up in my office and address the concern, the frustration, in regard to the planning, the intelligence, the conduct, the law of unintended effects of the Kosovo and Bosnia operations, but now is not the appropriate time. Upon returning from Kosovo and talking with one of the colonels in charge, who was a member of the Airborne, I asked him what he did from the time he got up in the morning until the end of the day, other than the briefing we had. He indicated there was some progress being made.

Mr. ROBERTS. I asked the colonel what he was proud of, what kind of progress he had made. That was the trip that we had in February to Kosovo. He indicated that finally they had found somebody who agreed to serve as a schoolbus driver for the Serb children. Unfortunately, there were no Serb schoolchildren in Urisivic, and they would not have been allowed to attend the Kosovar school had they been there. In addition, there would have had to have been a separate curriculum and separate teachers. But they found a schoolbus driver who was willing to drive the schoolbus if, in fact, there was schoolchildren. These troops were guarding six Serb families in what was called Serb Alley. They were escorted by armored vehicles to shop and get groceries once a week. These families are staying with the hope that their youngsters would return some day, if they are, in fact, still part of Serbia, and so they could continue their businesses. I could go on with example after example. Basically, we asked him what he spent most of his time on. He said, Albanian violence on Albanian. The basic question is, within the next 18 months that we figure out if, in fact, Europe has the capability to conduct the peacekeeping operations. This is not a pullout. This is not an automatic retreat. All this is, is for the Congress of the United States to assume its constitutional responsibility at the end of 18 months, if the President requests it and says it is in our vital national interests, that we vote to stay. I, for one, would vote to stay if, in fact, the President looked me in the eye and said that was the case. I think under the circumstances I have made my point. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. ROBERTS. That is correct.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be granted another 2 minutes to close.

Mr. ROBERTS. The Senator is correct. Last night I asked, under a unanimous consent request, for 20 minutes. I discovered this morning it was 15 minutes. I am merely asking for an additional 5 minutes. Obviously, it will come out of our time.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 20 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I object to further proceedings on the bill at this time.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I understand there is a bill at the desk due for its second reading.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, today the Senate will resume consideration of the military construction appropriations bill. There are nearly 5\1/2\ hours of debate remaining on the Levin amendment in regard to Kosovo. Senators who have statements are encouraged to work with the amendment managers on a time to come to the floor. Following the use or yielding back of time, a vote will occur at approximately 2:30 this afternoon. After the disposition of the Levin amendment, it is hoped the Senate can proceed to a vote on final passage of the bill. For the remainder of the day, it is the intention of the leader to begin consideration of the foreign operations appropriations bill. Senators, therefore, can anticipate votes into this evening's session.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I will rephrase my unanimous consent request to be recognized following the distinguished Senator from West Virginia for 20 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTS. I also have a commitment at 6:30.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, immediately following Senator Biden, I be recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTS. If I might respond to the distinguished Senator, whose amendment I am supporting----

Mr. ROBERTS. It seems we have a lot of commitments here. Obviously, I will yield to the sponsor of the amendment and the author of the amendment. I commend him for the amendment. But that will mean if the Senator from Delaware were looking at probably a quarter to 6, and then the Senator from West Virginia would take how much time?

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, let me again thank my good friend and a distinguished American hero and statesman, the Senator from Georgia, for setting in motion our bipartisan foreign policy dialog. His common sense approach and his insightfulness to our country's national security obligations, I think, have been most helpful and most educational. I say to the Senator, I believe and I hope that our endeavor is accomplishing the original goals we outlined in our first dialog. Our dialog has attracted attention from the media, and some academics. We have been invited to participate in various academic panel discussions and foreign policy dialogs. I hope both our colleagues and the American public have been paying attention in our effort to come to grips with America's role in an environment so different that we cannot even name it, other than calling it the post-Cold War period. When I have the opportunity to go back to Kansas and address the issue of what our vital national security interests are; I realize foreign policy is not a very bright return on the public radar screen which is unfortunate. Robert Kagan recently stated that the campaign for the Presidency should focus more on foreign policy. I certainly think that is the case. He asked a simple question, ``Is the world a safer place than it was 8 years ago?'' His article took us on a world tour of uncertainties, specifically identifying Iraq, the Balkans, China, Taiwan, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, Haiti, Colombia and Russia. A realistic evaluation of emerging patterns in the world lead us to the fact that the world is dangerously close to coming apart at the seams. It is time for a serious debate about foreign policy, and this dialog we have started is a small step in that direction. In our last dialog Senator Cleland and I discussed the importance of identifying and establishing levels of priority to our U.S. vital national interests. Many other think tanks and foreign policy organizations have recommended a similar priority ranking. I noticed the other day in an article that Vice President Gore has recently articulated, a new kind of foreign policy suggestion--a new agenda-- adding the destruction of the natural environment and the AIDS pandemic overseas as ``a threat to U.S. national security interests.'' These unique and unprecedented issues are important issues, however, they have never made the cut in any other U.S. national interest lists. They definitely did not make the cut in the last bipartisan dialog that I had with my friend and colleague from Georgia. Nonetheless, it is a healthy debate, and I think it is a very proper debate for our country and the Presidential candidates. What did make the cut is the fact that the United States does not want a hostile regional hegemon to develop in Europe or Asia. And then, in the meantime, what happened in the Balkans post-Bosnia and post- Kosovo is the fact that we have a paradox of enormous irony. The irony is the United States continues in the role of being a world hegemon, or superpower--the only one. Some critics say we have developed into a humanitarian world global cop and our actions and means are viewed by them as contrary to their own national interests. Mr. President, the consequence of the U.S. role is the rest of the world is responding as any sovereign nation would respond to a hegemon. Former Ambassador Bob Ellsworth, a former Member of the House of Representatives, and Dr. Michael May, wrote in the Los Angeles Times that U.S. military forces are so large, so advanced technologically, and so active all over the world, that a climate of ``hegemony envy'' has developed in key strategic areas in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Ambassador Ellsworth explains, the U.S. post-Cold War, change in posture from defense and deterrence to enlargement and offense, and the Clinton doctrine proclaiming and executing intervention around the world in regard to a rather questionable definition of U.S. vital national interests is creating antihegemonic coalitions against the United States. This current trend of both allies and nonallies asserting themselves against the U.S. is a very troubling digression. The Nobel Prize novelist and diplomat, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, observed that ``President Clinton has found the political legacy he wants to leave behind: The Imperial American Model.'' Obviously, that depiction of American foreign policy is counter to the goal of multilateral cooperation in the world today. As Senator Cleland stated, our third dialog today will focus on the role of multilateral organizations in foreign policy. What are we talking about? Well, currently the United States is a member of a staggering 90 multilateral organizations and numerous other bilateral agreements. It took a great deal of effort by staff and by research specialists to determine the number of multilateral organizations where the U.S. is obligated. I venture to guess, I say to my colleague, that the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Congress, and most foreign policy experts really don't have any idea individually or collectively of the responsibilities, commitments, or obligations or the money that these organizations require of the U.S. all throughout the world. Richard Haass of the Brookings Institution tried to tackle the issue of how much the U.S. should try to do, largely or entirely on its own-- unilaterally--depending on the policy priorities or the level of U.S. national interests versus how much the U.S. should do in cooperation with others. He articulated that the choice is very complicated, as the multilateral options subsume multiple approaches of multiple organizations, including using the U.N. and other international institutions, alliances, and other regional organizations, and coalitions of those able and willing to act. The fact is, the U.S. almost never acts unilaterally, and it probably should not. The U.S. has fought five major wars during the 20th century, and in each of these conflicts the U.S. operated as part of an alliance or a coalition. The recent U.S. actions all were conducted in conjunction with forces from other nations, even as our military superiority has reached a level unmatched in history. Therefore, if the U.S. is going to operate within the constraints of multilateral organizations--and that appears to be the case--the U.S. must structure alliances in such a way that promotes our national interests and ensures that U.S. power is not undermined. The following list of multilateral organizations associated with countries that the U.S. has current, ongoing operations is staggering: Iraq, 23; East Timor, 5; Korea, 42; Kosovo, 6; Yugoslavia, 30; Colombia, 15. We don't have enough time in the rest of the session of Congress to examine all of the multilateral organizations where the U.S. has obligations. Obviously, that is going to be an effort that should take place as we change administrations, whether it be the Vice President or whether it be the Governor from Texas. Today, like my colleague, I want to focus on NATO a bit and offer some possible suggestions for the future of America's alliances. During the Cold War, containment of Soviet power provided a simple and easily definable job of deterrence from Warsaw Pact aggression. The new Strategic Concept that was adopted over a year ago during the 50th anniversary of NATO is a far different concept from the collective defense organization originally developed from the ashes of World War II. If you read the Strategic Concept, you will find that the new commitments outlined have evolved, as I have indicated, NATO from a collective security organization concerned with self-defense to an international crisis management and humanitarian relief operation and organization. Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, recently said: Unbeknownst to many is the fact that the Strategic Concept's most important function is to instruct Alliance military authorities how to configure NATO defense forces so that they are equipped for the full range of Alliance missions, from collective defense to peacekeeping. He also said: The U.S. believes that the most important new elements of the revised Strategic Concept is the recognition that the fundamental tasks of the Alliance is to carry out so-called ``non-article 5'' missions--operations in response to crises that go beyond the defense of a Allied territory. I am concerned that the most important and successful alliance in the history of our country has been so dramatically restructured that the future of the alliance is uncertain. Our force structure cannot stand another swampy intervention with unclear and unsound objectives with no exit strategy in sight. The new Strategic Concept, as tested in Kosovo, in my personal opinion, is drying out the Cold War glue which holds the alliance together. Targeting by committee and escalation warfare has stressed the system and turned a 3-day war into a 78-day war of limited escalation. As indicated by the debate on this floor just about an hour or two ago, an amendment introduced by both Senator Byrd and Senator Warner will cause considerable and useful debate on Monday and Tuesday ending in a critical vote about the future of the Kosovo operation. Gen. Brent Scowcroft expressed his concern last November stating: The revised Strategic Concept of NATO and the U.N. Secretary General separately have taken on the task of advocating the support of persecuted minorities inside state boundaries; that is, humanitarian operations such as those in Kosovo. In Yugoslavia, we heavily bombed a country in an attempt to protect a minority within that country. Now we are in Kosovo presiding over reverse ethnic cleansing--surely a case of unintended consequences. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Dean of the Kennedy School of Government, recently posed several thought-provoking questions: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, what should be the limits of NATO's mission? With the Kosovo crisis, NATO fired its first shot in anger in a region outside the alliance's treaty area, on declared humanitarian grounds. What criteria might NATO draw on to guide a policy on the threat, or use, of its force in a new strategic environment of the 21st century? Some experts predict, and I hope they are not right, that due to the ugliness of Kosovo, NATO may never again mount another military offensive. I fear that Kosovo or future Kosovo-type interventions will also undermine U.N. Security Council credibility. By the way, that credibility is being questioned with the U.N. mission in Africa. Mr. President, if knowing what we know now about the new Strategic Concept and NATO with respect to a Kosovo or a Chechnya or Rwanda, would Senators still support the changes? Again, I maintain that most Senators are not aware of all the obligations listed in the Strategic Concept. I said it at the time, I said it 6 months ago, I said it during the first dialog, and I say it again today. How many people need to be placed in jeopardy before we act? What criteria do we set for humanitarian or C-list interventions? Does the United States intervene with or without NATO allies or U.N. Security Council approval on humanitarian grounds? Can we possibly justify intervention in some areas of the world and not others when none reach the threshold of vital or important national interests? Our country cannot support militarily a future which pursues U.S. and allied interests more widely around the world. The new Strategic Concept that our country is currently operating under effectively enrolls the United States and NATO as a world policeman. Some say that is not all bad. Some say that is what we must do as the world's only superpower. In this regard, as the distinguished Senator from Georgia pointed out, Europe is not standing still. They are proceeding with a Defense Capability Initiative and the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the alliance. I believe it is in U.S. interests for the European alliance to develop their defense capabilities, to strengthen their collective will, and to make a greater contribution to security and defense in Europe. However, my Dodge City gut feeling says, sure, go ahead and provide for your own defense, and bring our American men and women home. The Balkans are in your ball park. You decide the players. However, history and military experience, and the experience and expertise of others, rightly point out that challenges with force structure, allocation, balance, interoperability, and the growing gap in tactics and capability between our countries underlying the auspices of NATO are counterproductive to peace. In Kosovo, the U.S. aircraft flew two-thirds of the strike missions. Nearly every precision-guided munition was launched from an American aircraft, and U.S. intelligence identified almost all the targets. With the current European shrinking defense budgets and a reluctance to support the current mission, the road to ESDI may be a rocky one filled with potholes indeed. Even members of NATO who do not belong to the European Union are worried that plans for yet another new E.U. military force could weaken the collective defense. Another concern of hierarchy and command structure with respect to ESDI, E.U. corps, and NATO still retaining the rights of first refusal and how the U.N. Security Council structure fits among the organizations is also a very troubling problem to overcome. The number one concern should be to preserve NATO as the overarching framework and avoid duplication of effort or any political divisiveness from establishing separate capabilities. The Kosovo crisis raises questions that must be answered about the alliance's capability to reshape itself for new conflicts of the 21st century and at the same time accommodate the E.U.'s ambition to play a greater role in the continent's security. Mr. President, I also want to address the issue of NATO expansion. I realize the NATO membership is an affair of the heart for many nations who aspire to become members. However, as Senator Lugar has alluded to we need to step back a little bit and keep the door open but put the future enlargement on hold. We had a lunch hosted yesterday by the distinguished Senator from Indiana and Gen. Wesley Clark. Gen. Clark emphasized the fact that nations in Europe who aspire to become either members of the European Union, Partnership for Peace, or NATO without recognizing the tremendous fervor and the tremendous emotion involved in regard to their self-determination and what they think will be the bulwark for them and their individual liberty. First and foremost, NATO, I think, must rebuild Russian relations, which were strained over the Kosovo conflict. I know that belief is shared by Senator Levin. We have been working together on a cooperative threat reduction program within the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee which we believe will make some meaningful threat reduction progress and at the same time help rebuild stressed relations. The London Times diplomatic editor, Christopher Lockwood, reflects that NATO's possible new members at the current time cannot contribute militarily with force structure, compatible doctrine, or political and economic stability. I have been a strong supporter of NATO. I will remain a strong supporter of NATO. But I think we have to rethink the current NATO flightpath and answer the hard questions that require our attention. Mr. President, I now want to offer what I think are extremely insightful approaches to the future of multilateral organizations. Richard Haass expressed: Alliances, such as NATO, are one manifestation, although such groupings are rare and likely to become even less common in a world of few fixed adversaries. Much more common are informal coalitions of parties able and willing to work together on behalf of a common purpose--be it to rescue the Mexican economy, contain Sadam Hussein, or enter East Timor. Such groupings are not ideal--they are invariably ad hoc and reactive and lack the legitimacy of more formal regional or UN undertakings--but they are consistent with a world where the willingness of governments to cooperate varies from crisis to crisis and situation to situation, where great power consensus in unreliable, and where U.S. resources, however great, are still limited. Samuel Huntington, in this book ``The Clash of Civilizations'' explain: ``In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against war.'' And, since the Cold War the question of ``Which side are you on?'' has been replaced by the much more fundamental one, ``Who are you?'' Every state has to have an answer. That answer, its cultural identify, defines the state's place in world politics, its friends, and its enemies. Mr. Huntington further explains that we must nurture other Western cultures that identify with the U.S. and accept our civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi civilizational character of global politics. Roberts translation: Why not concentrate in areas of the world where Western values, Western democracy, have been cherished, nurtured, and appreciated? At the same time the U.S. needs to stop trying to impose Western values in areas where they are not and will not take root? Andrew Krepinevich from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently finished a thought-provoking future vision titled ``Transforming America's Alliances.'' He believes that America's alliances are in need of transformation due to the following reasons: Relative decline in U.S. global power, the rise and recovery of great regional power, with an increased focus on Asia, the eroding of current ally durability and reliability, the current military revolution will make power projection more difficult, and finally the growing need to provide for homeland defense. Mr. President, I feel Mr. Krepinevich's assessment undertakes bold steps toward the future in his following statement: If the U.S. is to preserve the current favorable military balance in regions around the globe in the future, it will find itself increasingly dependent upon allies for support. This may require a somewhat different set of alliances than exist today. Restructuring alliance relationships to meet requirements will take years, perhaps decades. Yet the geopolitical and military revolutions that will likely stress the U.S. alliance relationships should be undertaken now. Mr. President, that is what we are trying to do. That is what Senator Cleland and I are trying to accomplish with our foreign policy dialog. America cannot afford to miss this opportunity to shape the future. I thank my colleague for initiating the third dialog. I especially thank my colleagues who have been very patient listening to my remarks. Senator Lugar, Senator Levin, and I welcome their input. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS. That does not give enough time for the distinguished Senator from Michigan or the distinguished Senator from Indiana. I ask unanimous consent we be granted an additional 30 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask the Presiding Officer how much time I have remaining.

Mr. ROBERTS. So the time remaining in regard to both Senators is now 9 minutes?

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to increase the Barry M. Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education Foundation from the current $61 million to $81 million. I am pleased to have the support and able assistance of the Senior Senator from Nebraska, Senator J. Robert Kerrey in joining me to introduce this bill. This increase allows the Foundation to add another 100 young people to the 300 that they now support. This substantial increase will augment the influence the Foundation already has on American higher education. Goldwater scholarships are awarded to college juniors and seniors in math and science. The increased funding in this legislation is set aside for information technology students. Channeling these funds through the existing Goldwater framework will maximize the amount of money directly available to students. These students are selected on the basis of academic merit from a field of approximately 1,200 mathematics, science and engineering students nominated by the faculties of colleges and universities from the fifty states and Puerto Rico. Since 1988, 2,711 scholarships have been awarded, providing about $28 million to outstanding scholars from colleges and universities throughout the United States. Goldwater Scholars are top notch. As evidence, I cite the large number of Goldwater Scholars who have been awarded prestigious graduate scholarships. Goldwater Scholars have won a total of 25 Rhodes Scholarships over the years. Last year alone, almost 20 percent of the awards--six out of 32--were Goldwater Scholars. Goldwater Scholars also populate the ranks of other distinguished fellowships. In the last eleven years, the scholars have won 19 Marshall, six Churchill, nine Fulbright, 23 Hughes, and 65 National Science Foundation fellowships. These are the students we need in our economy. For the U.S. to continue to be competitive and support our growing economy, we must encourage our young men and women to enter the high technology industry. America's explosive demand for highly skilled workers is creating a new labor shortage. Under current conditions, we do not have enough U.S. workers trained in high technology fields. This forces our local businesses to resort to immigration to make up for this shortfall. Highly skilled immigrants enter the country under the H1-B visa waiver program. To help meet the growing demand, Congress raised the cap on H1-B visas from 65,000 to 115,000 in FY 1999 and 2000, and 107,500 in 2001. Unfortunately, even this increase is not enough. A tight labor market, increasing globalization and burgeoning economic growth continue to increase U.S. demands for highly skilled workers. The 1999 cap on H-1B visas was reached in June of last year and it is projected we will reach the cap even earlier this year. Later this month, we expect the Senate to consider another increase of H1-B visas to raise the cap to 195,000 a year for FY 2000, 2001 and 2002. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I firmly believe that we have the responsibility to adequately train our own labor force to meet the business and industry demands of today and tomorrow. We simply cannot rely on workers from other countries to do our sensitive technology work. As we saw in the Y2K reprogram with our great dependence on foreign security workers, we are sorely in need of a domestic technology workforce. Mr. President, I strongly encourage my colleagues to join me in support of this effort to expand the Barry M. Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education Foundation and renew our commitment to educating young people in the fields of math and science. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to increase the Barry M. Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education Foundation from the current $61 million to $81 million. I am pleased to have the support and able assistance of the Senior Senator from Nebraska, Senator J. Robert Kerrey in joining me to introduce this bill. This increase allows the Foundation to add another 100 young people to the 300 that they now support. This substantial increase will augment the influence the Foundation already has on American higher education. Goldwater scholarships are awarded to college juniors and seniors in math and science. The increased funding in this legislation is set aside for information technology students. Channeling these funds through the existing Goldwater framework will maximize the amount of money directly available to students. These students are selected on the basis of academic merit from a field of approximately 1,200 mathematics, science and engineering students nominated by the faculties of colleges and universities from the fifty states and Puerto Rico. Since 1988, 2,711 scholarships have been awarded, providing about $28 million to outstanding scholars from colleges and universities throughout the United States. Goldwater Scholars are top notch. As evidence, I cite the large number of Goldwater Scholars who have been awarded prestigious graduate scholarships. Goldwater Scholars have won a total of 25 Rhodes Scholarships over the years. Last year alone, almost 20 percent of the awards--six out of 32--were Goldwater Scholars. Goldwater Scholars also populate the ranks of other distinguished fellowships. In the last eleven years, the scholars have won 19 Marshall, six Churchill, nine Fulbright, 23 Hughes, and 65 National Science Foundation fellowships. These are the students we need in our economy. For the U.S. to continue to be competitive and support our growing economy, we must encourage our young men and women to enter the high technology industry. America's explosive demand for highly skilled workers is creating a new labor shortage. Under current conditions, we do not have enough U.S. workers trained in high technology fields. This forces our local businesses to resort to immigration to make up for this shortfall. Highly skilled immigrants enter the country under the H1-B visa waiver program. To help meet the growing demand, Congress raised the cap on H1-B visas from 65,000 to 115,000 in FY 1999 and 2000, and 107,500 in 2001. Unfortunately, even this increase is not enough. A tight labor market, increasing globalization and burgeoning economic growth continue to increase U.S. demands for highly skilled workers. The 1999 cap on H-1B visas was reached in June of last year and it is projected we will reach the cap even earlier this year. Later this month, we expect the Senate to consider another increase of H1-B visas to raise the cap to 195,000 a year for FY 2000, 2001 and 2002. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I firmly believe that we have the responsibility to adequately train our own labor force to meet the business and industry demands of today and tomorrow. We simply cannot rely on workers from other countries to do our sensitive technology work. As we saw in the Y2K reprogram with our great dependence on foreign security workers, we are sorely in need of a domestic technology workforce. Mr. President, I strongly encourage my colleagues to join me in support of this effort to expand the Barry M. Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education Foundation and renew our commitment to educating young people in the fields of math and science. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each, with the following exceptions: Senator Harkin for up to 20 minutes, Senator Helms for up to 10 minutes, and Senators Roberts and Cleland in control of 60 minutes total.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I am going to begin my remarks. We had originally intended for Senator Cleland to begin this dialog. But I am going to go ahead since he has been detained. Then he can follow me. I do not think that is going to upset the order at all. I thank my good friend, the distinguished Senator from Georgia, for this continued initiative and for his leadership in continuing our bipartisan foreign policy dialog. As I said back in February during our first discussion, our objective is to try to achieve greater attention, focus, and mutual understanding--not to mention a healthy dose of responsibility-- in this body in regard to America's global role and our vital national security interests. Our goal was to begin a process of building a bipartisan coalition, a consensus on what America's role should be in today's ever-changing, unsafe, and very unpredictable world. This is our second dialog. We will focus today on how we can better define our vital national interests. In doing our homework, both Senator Cleland and I have been doing a lot of reading and pouring over quite a few books and articles and commentaries and reports and legislation and speeches and position papers and the like. If it was printed, we read it. We have also been seeking the advice and counsel of everybody involved--in my case, the marine lance corporal about to deploy to Kosovo, to the very serious and hollow-faced old gentleman I visited at a Macedonian refugee camp, as well as foreign dignitaries and the military brass we admire and listen to as members of the Armed Services Committee, and all of the current and former advisors and experts and think tank dwellers and foreign policy gurus and intelligence experts. Needless to say, our foreign policy and national security homework universe is ever expanding and apparently without end. I hope I didn't leave anybody out. We both now have impressive bibliographies that we can wave around and put in the Record and we can recommend to our colleagues to prove that our bibliography tank, as it were, is pretty full. We have very little or no excuse if we are not informed. There was another book I wanted to bring to the attention of my colleagues. Its title is ``Going for the Max.'' It involves 12 principles for living life to the fullest, written by our colleague and my dear friend, with a most appropriate and moving foreword from the Senate Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd Ogilvie. This is a very easy and enjoyable read with a very inspirational message. Chapter 10 of Max's book states--and this is important--that success is a team effort, that coming together is a beginning, keeping together is progress, and working together is a success. That is a pretty good model for our efforts today and a recipe for us to keep in mind in this body as we try to better fulfill our national security obligations and to protect our individual freedoms. Thank you and well done, to my distinguished friend. Senator Cleland, in his remarks, will quote Owen Harries, editor of the publication, the National Interest. He will point out the need for restraint in regard to exercising our national power. Editor Harris warned--and this is what Senator Cleland will say-- It is not what Americans think of the United States but what others think of it that will decide the matter. When we are talking about ``matter,'' the ``matter'' in this case is stability and successful foreign and national security policy. I could not agree more. Senator Cleland will go on to quote numerous statements from foreign leaders and editorials from leading international publications and commentaries from respected observers around the globe, from our allies and from the fence sitters and our would-be adversaries. Sadly, I have to tell my colleagues that all were very critical of U.S. foreign policy. The basic thrust of the criticism, as described by Senator Cleland--and he will be saying this. Again, I apologize that I started first. In the order of things, we are sort of reversing this. I am giving him a promo, if that is okay. At any rate, Senator Cleland will state: The United States has made a conscious decision to use our current position of predominance to pursue unilateralist foreign and national security policies. Senator Cleland is right. Dean Joseph S. Nye of the Kennedy School of Government and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs warns about the CNN effect in the formulation and conduct of our foreign policy; the free flow of information and the shortened news cycles that have a huge impact on public opinion, and placing some items at the top of the public agenda that might otherwise warrant a lower priority; diverting attention from the A list of strategic issues of vital national security. What am I talking about? What does this criticism really suggest? We need to take the spin off. We need to take off our rose-colored, hegemonic glasses and take a hard look at the world and what the world thinks of us. I have a suggestion. It would only take Senators 10 minutes a day. Every Member of the Senate can and should receive what are called ``Issue Focus Reports.'' These are reports on foreign media reaction to the world issues of the day. They are put out by the State Department. We at least should be aware of what others think of us and our foreign policy. Unfortunately and sadly, it is not flattering. For instance, the February 24 Issue Focus detailed foreign commentary from publications within our NATO allies, those who comprised Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, headlines of 39 reports from 10 countries. If my colleagues will bear with me a moment, these are some of the headlines. This is the Issue Focus I am talking about. It is a very short read. Senators could have that or could have this report at their disposal every week. Again, these are leading publications--some liberal, some conservative, some supportive of the United States and some not. Just as a catch-as-catch-can summary, listen to the headlines: Kosovo Unrest--A Domino Effect; Another War?; Wither Kosovo?; Holding Back The Tide Of Ethnic Cleansing; Losing The Peace; By The Waters of Mitrovica; West Won The War, But Now Faces Losing The Peace; Holding Fast In The Kosovar Trap; Speculation On U.S. Domination In The Balkans; Whoever Believed In Multi-Ethnic Kosovo; Kosovo Calculations; The U.S. Is Playing With Fire; The West Is Helpless In Kosovo; Mitrovica, The Shadow Of The Wall Is Back; Military Intervention Against Serbia A Mistake; U.S. and Europe Are Also Clashing In Mitrovica; Kosovo Chaos Is A Trap For NATO; A Failure That Burns; The Difficult Peace. It goes on and on. This kind of reading would help us a great deal in understanding how others really think of us. The March 24 Issue Focus, based on 49 reports from leading newspapers and publications in 24 countries, assessed the U.S. and NATO policy 1 year after Operation Allied Force in the bombing of Kosovo. Summed up, the articles conclude it is time to ask some hard questions. Some unsettling headlines--again, this is a wide variety of publications from all ideologies and the whole political spectrum: A War With No Results; No End To The Kosovo Tragedy; Europe's Leaders Warned Of A New Crisis; The West Fiasco In Kosovo; Halfway Results; A Year Later: Where Do We Stand; A Victory Gambled Away; No Sign Of Will For Peace; Making Progress By Moving Backwards In The Balkans. Again, it goes on and on. I don't mean to suggest that we should base our foreign policy on foreign headlines or perceived perception with regard to criticism in foreign countries. If we take the spin off, I think a case can be made that we are seeing a world backlash against U.S. foreign policy no matter how well-intentioned. A timely article last month by Tyler Marshall and Jim Mann of the Los Angeles Times summarized it very well when they said: The nation's prominence as the world's sole superpower leaves even allies very uneasy. They fear Washington-- By the way, I certainly include the Congress-- has lost its commitment to international order. America's dominant shadow has long been welcomed in much of the world as a shield from tyranny, a beacon of goodwill, an inspiration of unique values. But, ten years after the collapse of Communism left the United States to pursue its interests without a world rival, that shadow is assuming a darker character. In the State Department, it is called the hegemony problem, a fancy way of describing the same resentment that schoolchildren have for the biggest, toughest, richest and smartest kid in school. The Marshall and Mann article goes on to say that America is suffering from a bad case of ``me first,'' that during the administration years we have seen a lot of focus and it has been on new objectives, pressing American commercial interests, the championing of democracy--certainly nothing wrong with that--and then the intervention, militarily, to protect human rights. They state the goals that concern the foreign leaders are less than the manner in which they have been pursued, a manner that appears inconsistent and sporadic and capricious. The article cites very serious backlash. Thirty-eight nations rallied to fight Iraq in 1991. Only Britain answers to the call today. Today, the French--our oldest ally--along with China, India, and Russia, have all discussed independently, or in consultation, ways to counter the balance of the enormity of American power. Japan is making plans to develop an independent military capability. In Europe, pro-Americanism is on the wane. European leaders cut their teeth on the protests of the 1960s, not the American aid packages of the 1950s. The situation in Russia is especially perilous with Russians seeing secondhand treatment--by their definition--with the U.S. in regard to their continued economic morass, NATO expansion, Kosovo, and the American condemnation of Moscow's war against Chechnya. Under the banner of the law of unintended effects, Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer opined the cost of our occupancy of Bosnia and Kosovo which has already cost tens of billions of dollars, drained our defense resources, and strained a hollow military which is charged with protecting vital American strategic interests in such crises areas as the Persian Gulf, the Taiwan Strait, and also the Korean peninsula. But he cited another cost, as he put it, more subtle and far heavier. He said that Russia has just moved from the democratically committed, if erratic, Boris Yeltsin to the dictatorship of the law, as promised by the new President, former KGB agent Vladimir Putin. I have his article. It is called ``The Path to Putin.'' I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS. Charles Krauthammer points out in the article--and I will read a little of it--that, basically, what the Russians thought was the path from Kosovo to Putin is not that difficult to trace. It goes through Chechnya. Americans may not see the connection, but the Russians do. The Russians have been operating under the assumption that to be a good international citizen, they could not engage in the unilateral use of force without the general approval of the international community. Well, Kosovo certainly cured them of that illusion. Finally, Russia acquiesced in the expansion of NATO under the expectation and assurance that it would remain always a defensive alliance. I am not arguing the pros and cons of that, but simply the reaction in Russia. Russians were doubly humiliated because the Balkans had long been in their sphere of influence, with Serbia as their traditional ally. The result was an intense anti-American, anti-NATO feeling engendered in Russia, and NATO expansion had really agitated the Russian elites, and Kosovo inflamed the Russian public. So Kosovo created what has been called a national security consensus. The demand for a strong leader to do what it takes to restore Russia's standing and status made the confrontation with the United States a badge of honor. I will tell you, in going to Moscow and talking with Russian leaders regarding the very important cooperative threat reduction programs that happened to come under the jurisdiction of my subcommittee, you get a lecture on Kosovo for a half hour even before you have a cup of coffee. So this article has some merit. In regard to Mr. Krauthammer's article: The first Russian beneficiary of Kosovo was then-Prime Minister Primakov. But it was Prime Minister Putin who understood how to fully exploit it. Applying the lessons of Kosovo, he seized upon the Chechen provocations into neighboring Dagestan to launch his merciless war on Chechnya. It earned him enormous popularity and ultimately the presidency. We are now saddled with him for four years, probably longer, much longer. We hope the man without a face--which is how some describe Putin--we hope we can work with him and build a positive relationship. I think under the law of unintended effects, this is a good example. In China, obviously, the political wounds fester in the wake of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade; the Taiwan issue, charges of espionage, and the criticism of human rights; and continued controversy over whether or not Congress will approve a trading status that will result in the U.S. simply taking advantage of trade concessions that the Chinese have made to us. In Latin America, the lack of a so-called fast-track authority and U.S. trade policy is muddled. You can drive south into Central America and into trade relations with our competitors in the European Union. My friend from Nebraska, Senator Hagel, who will join us in about an hour, put it this way: It worries me, first, because most of us are not really picking this up on our radar--this sense that we don't care about what our trading partners or allies think. It is going to come back and snap us in some ways. It will be very bad for this country. Well, the criticism from the Marshall and Mann article becomes very harsh when they cite why the U.S. has become so aloof. I am quoting here: * * * a President who engages only episodically on international issues and too often has failed to use either the personal prestige or the power of his office to pursue key foreign policy goals. * * * a Congress that cares little about foreign affairs in the wake of the Cold War and seems to understand even less. * * * a poisonous relationship between the two branches of our Government putting partisanship over national interests * * * an American public inattentive to world affairs and confused by all of the partisan backbiting now that the principal reference point--the evil of communism--has all but vanished as a major threat. Indeed, that is a pretty harsh assessment. Aside from all the criticism and 20/20 hindsight--and it is easy to do that, trying to chart a well-defined foreign policy course is more complicated and difficult today than ever before. Both Senator Cleland and I understand that. As chairman of the newly created Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it seems as if we have a new emerging threat at our doorstep almost every day. I am talking about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue nations, ethnic wars, drugs, and terrorism. Concluding our second hearing on the subcommittee this session, and again asking the experts, ``What keeps you up at night?'' the answer came back: ``Cyber attacks and biological attacks'' from virtually any kind of source, and the bottom line was not if, but when. So it is not easy, but if we are worried about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we should also be worried about the proliferation of overall foreign policy roles, not to mention the role the U.S. should play in the world today. Some may say events of the day will determine our strategy on a case- by-case basis. That seems to be the case. But I say that is a dangerous path, as evidenced by adversaries that did not or will not believe we have the will to respond. Former National Security Adviser, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, put it this way in a speech at the Brookings Institution National Forum, and he said this in response to some questions: The nature of our approach to foreign policy also changed from, I would say, from foreign policy as a continuing focus of the United States, which it had been for the 50 years of the Cold War, to an episodic attention on the part of the United States, and thus without much of a theme, and further to that, a foreign policy whose decisions were heavily influenced by polls, by what was popular back home or what was assumed to be popular. General Scowcroft went on to say: So at a period when we should have been focusing on structures to improve the possibility that we could actually make some changes in the way the world operated, and some improvements, we have frittered away the time. I think never has history left us such a clean slate as we had in 1991. And we have not taken advantage of it. One point on looking ahead from here. I think we have begun engaging on a fundamental transformation of the international system with insufficient thought. We, NATO, President Clinton, the U.N. Secretary General, are moving to replace the Treaty of Westphalia, replacing the notion of the sovereignty of the nation-state with what I would call the sovereignty of the individual and humanitarianism. That is a profound change in the way the world operates. And we're doing it with very little analysis of what it is we're about and how we want this to turn out. Evidenced by the Charles Krauthammer article. Again I quote from the general: In Kosovo, just for example, we conducted a devastating bombing of a country in an attempt to protect a minority within that country. And, as a result, we're now presiding over reverse ethnic cleansing. What's the difference between Kosovo and Chechnya? That is a question not many of us want to ponder. How many people must be placed in jeopardy to warrant an invasion of sovereignty? Where? By whom? How does one set priorities among these kind of crises? And, events of the day, again dominated by the so-called CNN effect, ignore the same kind of core questions posed by General Scowcroft and reflected again in an article by Doyle McManus the Washington Bureau Chief of the Los Angeles Times: When should the United States use military power? President Clinton has argued in the Clinton Doctrine that Americans should intervene wherever U.S. power can protect ethnic minorities from genocide. I would add a later UN speech seemed to indicate a backing off from that position. How will the United States deal with China and Russia, the two great potentially hostile powers? What is the biggest threat to our nation's security and how should the U.S. respond? Weapons of mass destruction head the list of course, but the President has added in terrorism, disease, poverty, disorder to the list. I know about the Strategic Concept of NATO, when that was passed during the 50-year anniversary last spring in Washington. Those of us who read the Strategic Concept and all of the missions that entailed-- moving away from a collective defense--we were concerned about that. We asked for a report as to whether that obligated the United States to all of these missions. Finally, we received a report from the administration of about three pages. The report said we are not obligated and not responsible. If we are not responsible for the Strategic Concept of NATO, what are we doing adopting it? When the U.S. acts, should it wait for the approval of the United Nations, seek the approval of our allies, or strike out on its own? However, my colleagues, the biggest question remains and it was defined well by retired Air Force Brigadier General David Herrelko who wrote in the Dayton Daily News recently: ``The United States needs to get a grip on what our national interests are, what we stand for and what we can reasonably do in the world before we can size our military forces and before we send them in harms way. We must hammer out, in a public forum, just what our national priorities are.'' He says, and I agree, we cannot continue adrift. Consider this retired military man's following points: More Americans have died in peacekeeping operations (Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia) than in military actions (Iraq, Panama, Grenada and Yugoslavia). We have a president seeking United Nations approval for military intervention but skipping the dialogue with Congress. I might add, the Congress skips the dialog with the President. We commit our military forces before we clearly state our objectives. We gradually escalate hostilities and we leave standing forces behind. Some 7,000 now in Kosovo, and the peacekeepers. When there was no peace, they became the target. General Herrelko ends his article with a plea: ``We are starved for meaningful dialogue between the White House and the Congress.'' I agree Mr. President and would add we are starved for dialogue here in the Senate as well and that is why we are here. And, as Senator Cleland has pointed out, our goal is not to achieve unanimity on each and every issue but to at least contribute to an effort to focus attention on our challenges instead of reacting piecemeal as events of the day take place. And, goodness knows even if the foreign policy stadium is not full of interested spectators, we do have quite an array of players. LA Times Bureau Chief McManus has his own program: Humanitarian interventionists, mostly Democrats and President Clinton with Kosovo being the prime example. Nationalist interventionists, mostly Republicans who would intervene in defense of democracy, trade and military security. Realists, both Republicans and Democrats I think Senator Cleland would be in that category. skeptical about intervention but wanting the United States to block any concert of hostile powers. Minimalists, those who think the United States should stay out of foreign entanglements and quarrels and save its strengths for major conflicts. Richard Haass, former foreign policy advisor in the Bush administration and now with the Brookings Institution, has defined the players in the foreign policy program much along the same lines as Senator Cleland did in his opening remarks during our first forum last month: Wilsonians who wish to assist other countries achieve democracy; Economists, who wish to promote trade, prosperity and free markets; Realists, who wish to preserve an orderly balance of power without worrying too much what kind of states are doing the balancing; Hegemonists who want to make sure the United States keeps its status as the only superpower; Humanitarians, who wish to address oppression, poverty, hunger and environmental damage; And, Minimalists, who wish to avoid spending time or tax dollars on any of these matters. I'm not sure of any of my colleagues would want to be identified or characterized in any one of these categories but again the key question is whether or not the members of this foreign policy posse can ride in one direction and better define our vital national interests and from that definition establish priorities and a national strategy to achieve them. Fortunately, as Senator Cleland has pointed out, some very distinguished and experienced national security and foreign policy leaders have already provided several road maps that make a great deal of sense. What does not make a great deal of sense is that few are paying attention. Lawrence Korb, Director of Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations, in a military analysis published in a publication called ``Great Decisions'' has focused on the Powell Doctrine named after retired Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell, citing the dangers of military engagement and the need to limit commitments to absolutely vital national interests. On the other hand, the sweeping Clinton Doctrine emphasizes a global policing role for the United States. How do we reconcile these two approaches? I am not sure there is only one yellow brick foreign policy road but there are several good alternatives that have been suggested: First, I am going to refer to what I call the ``Old Testament'' on foreign policy in terms of vital national interests. This is the Commission on America's National Interests, 1996. Second, a national security strategy for a new century put out by the White House this past December. If you are being critical, or suggesting, or if you have a different approach than the current policy, as I have been during my remarks, you have an obligation to read this. The White House put this out as of December of 1999. Third, adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs by Ashton Carter former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security in the first Clinton administration and currently professor of science and international affairs at Harvard. We had him testify to this before the Emerging Threats Subcommittee just a month ago. Fourth, defining U.S. National Strategy by Kim Holmes and Jon Hillen of the Heritage Foundation, a detailed summary of threats confronting us today with appropriate commentary about their priorities. Fifth, transforming American Alliances by Andrew Krepinevvitch of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He has been of real help to us in regard to the Emerging Threats subcommittee, and also the full Committee on Armed Services. Sixth, a highly recommended article ``Back to Basics: U.S. Foreign Policy for the Coming Decade,'' by James E. Goodby, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former Ambassador to Finland and Kenneth Wisebrode, Director of the International Security Program at the Atlantic Council of the United States. In this regard, Messrs. Goodby and Weisbrode have summarized the concerns of Senator Cleland and myself very well when they said: The most common error of policymakers is to fail to distinguish among our levels of interest, leading to an over commitment to higher level interests. In other words, strategic or second tier interests, if mishandled, can threaten vital interests. But, strategic interests, if well understood and acted upon, can support vital interests. Goodby and Weisbrode do us a favor by following the example of others in prioritizing our vital national security interests: First and vital, homeland defense from threats to well being and way of life of the American people. I can't imagine anyone would have any quarrel with that. Second and strategic, I am talking about peace and stability in Europe and northeast Asia and open access to our energy supplies. Third, and of lesser interest, although it is of interest, stability in South Asia, Latin America, Africa, and open markets favorable to the United States and to world prosperity. The authors suggest how to accomplish these goals with what they call three essential pieces of foreign policy balance: First, stability and cohesion in Europe and between the European Union and the United States; second, mature and effective relations among China, Russia, and the West to include first among all others, a regular forum to oversee the reduction of the risk of nuclear weapons; and third, systematic patterns of consultation and policy coordination of the States benefiting from the global economy and positive relations between those States and the developing world. The authors also suggest the means to their ends by looking ahead and stressing the need for eventual NATO and Russian cooperation and stability, the need for a similar organization and effort between the United States and China, Japan, Russia, and Korea, and lastly, American support for the United Nations. In a self-acknowledged understatement, they state this is going to be a hard and tedious task. This is not easy. But it is absolutely necessary. Now, Mr. Goodby and Mr. Weisbrode are not critical per se, but they issue a warning and this is what we are trying to bring to the attention of the Senate. It is central to what Senator Cleland and I are trying to accomplish with these foreign policy and national security dialogs. The public perception and the private reality suggest worrisome disorganization and a certain degree of impatience with a foggy conceptual foreign policy framework. It is time to return to the basic elements of the American role in the world and to raise the public understanding of them. American strategic planners and policymakers cannot afford to be arbitrarily selective about where and when to engage U.S. power. This would make our foreign policy aimless and lose the support of the American people. They continue: We should set out each of America's interests and how they best may be achieved with the cooperation of other powers. However, this cannot take place until the executive and legislative branches of government resurrect the workable partnership in foreign affairs that once existed but exists no more. And Senator Cleland, my colleagues, that is why we are here today and that is why we are involved in this forum. In my personal view, we are starved for meaningful foreign policy and national security dialog between the White House and the Congress and within the Congress. The stakes are high. I recall well the meeting in Senator Cleland's office between Senator Cleland, myself, and Senator Snowe, worried about our involvement in the Balkans. I had an amendment, we had an amendment; we passed both amendments, setting out guidelines that the administration would respond, saying that before we spend money in regard to the defense appropriations or in the authorization bill, hopefully we can establish a better dialog, trying to figure out what our role was in regard to our constitutional responsibilities, I say to my good friend, without having to come to the floor with appropriations bills and have an amendment and say you can't spend the money for this until you explain this. That is no way to operate. It seems to me we can do a much better job. The stakes are high. As Carl Sandberg wrote of Americans: Always there arose enough reserves of strength, balances of sanity, portions of wisdom to carry the Nation through to a fresh start with ever renewing vitality. I hope this dialog and these discussions, all of the priority recommendations we have had from experts in the field, will help us begin that fresh start. We cannot afford to do otherwise. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a chart that outlines and prioritizes the vital national security interests of the United States as recommended by the many experts and organizations I have discussed earlier in my remarks. This chart was prepared by Maj. Scott Kindsvater, an outstanding pilot in the U.S. Air Force and a congressional fellow in my office.