Pat Roberts

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration en bloc of S. 1060 through S. 1062--that is Calendar Order Nos. 115, 116, and 117--that all after the enacting clause be stricken and the appropriate portion of S. 1059, as amended, be inserted in lieu thereof, according to the schedule which I send to the desk; that these bills be advanced to third reading and passed; that the motion to reconsider en bloc be laid upon the table; and that the above actions occur without intervening action or debate.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, housed at Fort Leavenworth's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the Digital Information Technology Test Bed (DITT) established the pilot test bed and core capabilities for the Army's University After Next (UAN) and the Joint and Army Virtual Research Library (VRL). In May 1997, the Office of Secretary of Defense designated the DITT as the DoD functional prototype to conduct concept exploration, operational prototyping, and full requirements definition for multimedia research libraries (multimedia national and tactical imagery) in support of technology-assisted learning, intelligence analysis, C2, and operational decision making. DITT systems can further support warfighting capabilities by fielding innovative systems and methods to store, retrieve, declassify, and destroy DoD-held data. In FY 1999, Congress authorized and appropriate $3.5 million for the DITT program. However, continued funding is needed in FY 2000 and I ask colleagues' support for adding $3 million to the Army FY 2000 budget specifically for the DITT program. amendment no. 487 At the end of Title 8 insert:

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senator. The NCI was intended to be a joint program with the Russian government. At one point the Russians said that they would provide $30 million to the NCI. Due to the current economic crisis in Russia, any Russian assistance to the NCI program will be in the form of in-kind contributions, such as labor and buildings. The NCI has the potential to provide the Russian government with significant economic benefit. According to the Department of Energy, the benefit to the United States is to have the Russian government close or dismantle the nuclear weapons complexes in those ten cities. However, the Russian government has not agreed to close or dismantle weapons-related facilities in these cities in exchange for United States' assistance. In the absence of such a Russian agreement, this initiative could result in great financial benefit for the Russians without any reduction in Russian weapons capability. The provision in question requires that, as a prerequisite for U.S. funding for the Nuclear Cities Initiative, the Russian government agree to close facilities engaged in work on weapons of mass destruction. I assure the Senator from New Mexico that it is not the intention behind this provision to result in the termination of this program. Rather, it is to secure a commitment from the Russian government to do more to support the nonproliferation goals of the NCI effort. It is important to ensure that the Russians participate in the implementation of this program in an equitable way. I believe that the requirement for an agreement will ensure that the Russians participate equitably through in-kind contributions and through the closure of weapons of mass destruction facilities. I believe the provision contained in this bill will afford benefits to the U.S. national security and will assure that the program is on firm footing in the foreseeable future. I look forward to working with Senator Bingaman in overseeing the implementation of the Nuclear Cities Initiative.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, with respect to S. 1059, S. 1060, S. 1061, and S. 1062 just passed by the Senate, that if the Senate receives a message with respect to any one of these bills from the House of Representatives, the Senate disagree with the House on its amendment or amendments to the Senate-passed bill and agree to or request a conference, as appropriate, with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses; that the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees; and that the foregoing occur without any intervening action or debate.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday May 26, 1999, at 9:30 a.m. to conduct a hearing on American Indian Youth Activities and Initiatives. The hearing will be held in room 485 of the Russell Senate Office Building.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, of the Senate Judiciary Committee, be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 26, 1999 to hold a hearing, at 2:00 p.m., in room SD-222 of the Senate Dirksen Office Building on: ``S.J. Res. 3, proposing an amendment to the Constitution, Rights of Crime Victims.''

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Subcommittee on Employment, Safety, and Training be authorized to meet for a hearing on ``Increasing MSHA and Small Mine Cooperation'' during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 26, 1999, at 9:30 a.m.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Forests and Public Land Management of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be granted permission to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 26, for purposes of conducting a Forests and Public Land Management Subcommittee hearing which is scheduled to begin at 2:30 p.m. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on S. 510, the American Land Sovereignty Protection Act.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Immigration, of the Senate Judiciary Committee, be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 26, 1999 at 10:00 a.m. to hold a hearing in room 226, Senate Dirksen Office Building, on: ``The Contribution of Immigrants to America's Armed Forces.''

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Governmental Affairs Committee Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services be permitted to meet on Wednesday, May 26, 1999, at 2:00 p.m. for a hearing to examine the unclassified report of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 26, 1999, to conduct a hearing on ``Corporate Trades 1.''

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask consent for the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry to meet on May 26, 1999 in SH-216 to consider livestock issues.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to meet on Wednesday, May 26, 1999, at 2:00 p.m. on FCC oversight.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, the Finance Committee requests unanimous consent to conduct a hearing on Wednesday, May 26, 1999 beginning at 10:00 a.m. in room 215 Dirksen.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 26, 1999 at 10:15 a.m. to hold a hearing.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 26, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. to hold a closed hearing on intelligence matters.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the distinguished chairman, and I thank the distinguished Presiding Officer for taking my place while I make these comments. Mr. President, I rise to again state my opposition to the BRAC amendment as it is proposed. Let's get it clear. I understand that my colleagues who are offering this amendment are very sincere in their efforts to address the problem of an excess infrastructure, certainly within the Department of Defense. Let me be absolutely clear that I agree with the assertion that there is excess infrastructure. I have no quarrel with that. But let me be equally clear that until I am confident we can focus the BRAC where there is excess infrastructure and until we can ensure that any savings from such a BRAC--a lot has been said about the savings--will go toward modernization, or readiness, or procurement, as opposed to funding the numerous expeditions this administration continues to assign our military, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, I can't support any additional rounds of BRAC at this time. Let me explain in a little bit more detail. ``They'' all understand that there is too much infrastructure for the current force strength. ``They'' know they need to act to reduce it. But the political costs are too high, and ``they'' know the blame for not having another BRAC can be easily passed off to others. We heard a lot of talk about ``they'' from the proponents of BRAC. Unfortunately, the readiness of our Armed Forces suffers because ``they'' are unwilling to act. I would like to get to the definition of who ``they'' are. Most people who follow the excess military infrastructure issue--the BRAC issue, if you will--would say that ``they'' are the U.S. Congress. Senator after Senator has come to the floor with not really arms waving, but with some pretty tough commentary, pointing the finger at the Congress as being ``they.'' However, let me also point out that a strong case can be made that ``they'' are also the civilian and uniformed leadership of the Department of Defense. I am not trying to pick on anybody. I just want to share the responsibility in a fair way. Of course the Congress must approve the additional funds of BRAC, and therefore the responsibility is clearly on the shoulders of the Senate and the House. I accept that responsibility. The distinguished Presiding Officer does as well. Every Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the comparable committee in the House does as well. But the leadership of DOD has not shouldered the responsibility, in my personal opinion, to adequately prepare for future BRAC rounds. They could, by requiring each service to develop a prioritized listing of bases and facilities that are in excess, or the generic description of same, more especially in regards to the mission of the base. I know what they are going to say. Their defense is such as, that would be impossible because of the politics of it; it would bias any future BRAC rounds, and therefore they should not be done until a BRAC is authorized. By ``they'' I am talking about the DOD. ``They'' in this particular instance further state that it would be impractical to categorize the facilities by mission since most facilities are multifunctional, and therefore any future BRAC should, as in theory they have in the past, include all military facilities regarding the BRAC criteria. If we are talking about BRAC, everybody is going to be on the same criteria. Everybody is on the table. Of course, most bases and facilities are multifunctional. After all, they all train, they all have administrative functions, they all have public works tasks, but they all have a clear, primary mission. Additionally, it is a bit disingenuous for the Department of Defense to say that all bases would be included, all are on the chopping block for consideration in any future BRAC round. That is rather disingenuous it seems to me, even if, for example, the service academies would be on the table, or the Norfolk Naval Base, or Andrews Air Force Base, or Fort Hood, or Camp Pendleton were on the table for BRAC consideration. That is not reasonable. That is not going to happen. It is not reasonable to expect that those, or other key facilities where we must have a primary mission, would be seriously considered for closure or for realignment. It is not unreasonable to expect that a similar listing of definable excess capacity could and should be developed and be the focus of future reductions of infrastructure rather than, as I have said, before the ``everything is on the table'' approach in regard to BRAC. Many of my colleagues have heard me voice my concern over what I call ``BRAC purgatory.'' That is, quite simply, what every city in America with a military facility goes through every time a BRAC round is mentioned. What that means in real terms is that the city or the community involved spends a lot of money from their very limited budget to hire so-called ``experts'' or ``consultants'' to help to really protect their base from any future BRAC round. If we can focus BRAC on the primary mission of bases and generically define what we need, and what we don't need, we will spare many communities from ``BRAC purgatory.'' We will let them off the BRAC hook if their facility is not on the excess infrastructure list. We are going to save a lot of communities from ``BRAC purgatory,'' and we are going to save a lot of headaches and a lot of money. I am equally concerned that the Department has failed to develop a strategy for the next round of BRAC. Let me emphasize ``strategy.'' You just can't go to a BRAC and put bases on the chopping block. A specific infrastructure strategy is required for at least three reasons. First, as the military approaches the optimum infrastructure, great care is going to have to be made. It will be required to prevent the cutting of the essential infrastructures. Second, since the military missions and roles are changing --and, boy, are they changing; for example, the Air Force sees itself becoming an expeditionary force rather than a garrison force, and that is happening; the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are all searching for a new mission and a new role--I think the Department of Defense-wide assessment of the types and the number and the location of the military facilities needed to support the national strategy must be developed. There must be a strategy there. Third, both the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Panel strongly recommended consolidation and joint basing for the military to optimize their capability in an atmosphere of reduced budgets and reduced force structure military environment. In isolation, each of those three requirements represents a difficult, a complex, and a contentious undertaking within the military and the Department of Defense. However, when taken as a collective mandate to shape the future infrastructure needs of the military, such an important imperative cannot possibly be accomplished within the guidelines of just a simple BRAC. It seems to me that the Department of Defense has to have the courage and will to oversee the services and direct actions be taken that would set the correct approach to reducing our excessive infrastructure to match our future military strategy. They should do that--not a BRAC commission. The third action that DOD must find the will to take is defining the savings associated with BRAC and establishing a way to funnel those moneys into readiness, modernization, or the procurement or quality-of- life programs. In the April 1998 Department of Defense report on BRAC, they admitted that, ``by their very nature, estimates of savings are subject to some uncertainty.'' That is probably the understatement of this debate. The Department further stated that, ``No audit trail, single document, or budget account exists for tracking the end use of each dollar saved through BRAC.'' Let me repeat that. Senator after Senator has come to the floor and said: Look at the money we are going to save in regard to BRAC. Then they look at the problems with modernization, and procurement, and readiness. Yet no audit trail, no single document, no budget account exists for tracking the end use of each dollar saved through BRAC. However, they assured Congress that, ``The Department is committed to improve its estimates of costs and savings in future rounds of BRAC.'' ``Oh, we are going to get it right next time.'' It seems to me it takes courage to solve that problem, and it takes a dedicated effort to set up the processes to track and direct the BRAC savings into the promised accounts. And it will take more than a ``trust me, it will be much better next time'' assurance before many Members of Congress will let the reported savings, the estimated savings, the reported savings of another round of BRAC simply remain unaccounted for, be lost in the bookkeeping of the Department of Defense, or, in fact, if there are savings, if we can account for savings, they end up in such missions as Kosovo or Bosnia--which have to be funded, by the way, and which we addressed in regard to emergency funding. That is the proper way to fund the final act of courage on the part of the uniformed and civilian leadership of DOD--I use the word ``courage'' in quotes here--that directly impacts the future rounds of BRAC politics of the last round. A lot has been said about this. I understand it. I am not going to rehash that today. But based on a recent memorandum from the Department of the Air Force, it seems to me there is some acquiescence to such pressure to not really carry out the BRAC action directed in the last round. BRAC is a hard sell in Congress under normal times and under the purest of motives. But when actions are taken that clearly disadvantage others and violate the BRAC process for political gain, BRAC is a ``no sell'' in Congress. For the Department of Defense to simply say that all we need is for Congress to authorize additional rounds of BRAC is an easy way to avoid the responsibilities for actions that must be taken by the Department of Defense well in advance of any congressional action. It seems to me the Department of Defense can go a long way to helping us in regard to the BRAC process if they simply develop the fortitude and the decisionmaking to start the process now to correctly and accurately shape and define the infrastructure--not to simply put everything on the table to save money but be required to support the military of the 21st century even if they risk pressure from the White House or Capitol Hill. Without such a strategy, I cannot support another BRAC round that has a poorly prepared and inadequately staffed approach to reducing the excess infrastructure. I urge a ``no'' vote from my colleagues on this matter. Privilege Of The Floor Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Kevin Zumbar, a military fellow, and Zach Terwilliger, a legislative intern, in the office of Chairman Warner, be granted floor privileges for the duration of the Senate's debate on S. 1059, the National Defense Authorization Act.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Smith of New Hampshire be added as an original cosponsor of Roberts amendment No. 377.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I have had the privilege this year to serve as the first chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. I would like to recognize Senator Warner, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, for his vision and foresight in creating this subcommittee to deal with the nontraditional threats to U.S. national security. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities was established to provide oversight for the Department of Defense's efforts to counter new and emerging challenges to vital United States interests. Through a series of hearings and detailed oversight of budget accounts, the subcommittee highlighted: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; terrorism directed at U.S. targets both at home and abroad; information warfare and the protection of our defense information infrastructure; and trafficking of illegal drugs. The subcommittee sought to identify the technology, operational concepts and capabilities we need to deter--and, if necessary--combat these perils. I would like to briefly highlight the initiatives included in this bill to address the emerging threats to our national security: Protection of our homeland and our critical information infrastructure are two of the most serious challenges facing our Nation today. In the area of counterterrorism, the bill before the Senate includes full funding for the five Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams requested by the administration, and an increase of $107 million to provide a total of 17 additional RAID teams in fiscal year 2000. We have further required the Department to establish a central transfer account for the Department's programs to combat terrorism to provide better visibility and accounting for this important effort. We have included an Information Assurance Initiative to strengthen the Department's critical information infrastructure, enhance oversight and improve organizational structure. As a part of this initiative, we added $120 million above the President's budget request for programs to enhance our ability to combat cyber-attacks. In addition, this initiative will provide for a test to plan and conduct simulations, exercises and experiments against information warfare threats, and allow the Department to interact with civil and commmercial organizations in this important effort. The provision encourages the Secretary of Defense to strike an appropriate balance in addressing threats to the defense information infrastructure while at the same time recognizing that Department of Defense has a role to play in helping to protect critical infrastructure outside the DOD. We have included a legislative package to strengthen the science and technology program. This legislation will ensure that since the science and technology program is threat-based and that investments are tied to future warfighting needs. The legislation is also aimed at promoting innovation in laboratories and improving the efficiency of RDT&E operations. The bill also includes a $170 million increase to the science and technology budget request. And finally, in the area of nonproliferation, we have authorized over $718 million for programs to assist Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union destroy or control their weapons of mass destruction. However, it is important to note, this is an increase of $29.6 million over the fiscal year 1999 funding level. I would like to take a moment to share my thoughts on this issue. I am very concerned about the findings of the recently released GAO report that the U.S. cost of funding the nuclear material storage facility in Mayak, Russia has increased from an original estimate of $275 million to $413 million. This Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) project may eventually have a price tag of $1 billion. These increased costs to the U.S. have occurred because Russia has failed to fund its share of the costs of this project. I also understand that the chemical weapons destruction facility will not be open until 2006, in part due to Russia's failure to provide the needed information about the chemical weapons to be destroyed. The CTR program is becoming more and more one-sided. This program is also in the interest of the Russians. Matter of fact, much of the destruction of the Russian inventory, funded by the CTR program, enables Russia to meet its obligations under existing arms control treaties. In addition, I am concerned with the daily press reports that the Russians are enhancing their military capabilities. For example: Earlier this month, President Yeltsin reportedly ordered the Russian military to draw up plans for the development and use of tactical nuclear forces. On May 4, The Russian Defense Minister threatened to reconsider Russian support for the revision of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. On April 16, the Duma unanimously adopted a resolution calling for increased defense budgets. Although I have serious concerns about this program, we included an authorization for CTR at the budget request of $475.5 million, an increase of $35 million over the FY 99 level. However, before FY 2000 funds may be obligated we require the President to recertify that the Russians are foregoing any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and are complying with relevant arms control agreements. The most recent certification by the Administration was completed before these numerous statements by Yeltsi and other Russian officials. I am also concerned with the deficiencies in the management and oversight of the DOE programs in Russia--in particular, the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). If these programs are to succeed, we need to get past the implementation problems pointed out in the GAO report, in press reports, by our House colleagues, and by the Russians. In addition, the Russian economic crisis and lack of infrastructure are making these programs more difficult to manage. I am afraid if we do not exercise strong oversight now we are in danger of losing these programs. I have proposed a number of initiatives that I believe will go a long way towards correcting the deficiencies in the management of the IPP program, establishing a framework for effective implementation and oversight of both programs, and ensuring that sufficient accountability exists. Further, I believe the U.S. nonproliferation goals and U.S. national security will be better served by these improvements. Finally, I believe DoE should spend FY 2000 tightening up the implementation of IPP and NCI rather than broadening the program. Therefore, the committee authorized the IPP and NCI below the administration's request of $30 million for each program. The bill includes an authorization of $15 million for NCI and an authorization of $25 million for IPP, an increase of $2.5 million for each program over FY 99 levels. These are the only programs in the entire DoE nonproliferation budget that the committee authorized below the budget request. Overall, we authorized $266.8 million for DoE nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union countries--an increase of $13.4 million over FY 99. I believe the bill before you takes significant steps to focus the Department of Defense's efforts to counter new and emerging threats to vital national security interests. I urge my colleagues to support this bill. Once again, Mr. President, I am asking the support of my colleagues for a simple sense of the Senate that calls also for complete transparency on the part of the President and Senate consideration regarding the de facto editing of the original North Atlantic Treaty. My sense of the Senate asks the President to certify whether the new Strategic Concept of NATO, the one adopted at the 50th anniversary of NATO in Washington about a month ago--this formalization of new and complicated United States responsibilities in Europe, as evidenced by the war in Kosovo and the possibility of future Kosovos around the world--is in fact a document that obligates the United States in any way, shape, or form. If so, my sense of the Senate affirms that this body be given the opportunity to debate, to accept or to reject, the new blueprint for future NATO operations, these actions which will undoubtedly include substantial components of our own Armed Forces engaged completely outside the province of the original treaty. Yesterday the distinguished Senator from Michigan, my colleague and my friend, Senator Levin, asked where the Congress was in 1990, in regard to the last Strategic Concept adoption. The Senator has rightly pointed out there were changes made in the Concept at that particular time. Without question, that should have been an alarm bell of things to come. But there are key differences, I tell my friend, in the world today as opposed to the world in 1990. Second, and just as important, there are significant differences regarding the Strategic Concept adopted in April of 1999, just a month ago, which is the document that I hope is still on the desk of all Senators, and the Concept that was adopted in 1990 as referenced by the Senator. First of all, Bosnia had not occurred and, more especially, Kosovo was not the proof of the direction that NATO intended to go. That direction is an offensive direction. That is not meant to be a pun. The crafting of language in the new Strategic Concept was carefully done. Look, my colleagues, if you will, at the removal of the following wording of paragraph 35 of the 1991 Concept. I will repeat it: The alliance is purely defensive in purpose. None of its weapons will ever be used except in self defense. That was removed. That removal was not an oversight. The current Strategic Concept sets in motion a new NATO that is inconsistent with article 1 of the 1990 treaty or concept. The North Atlantic Treaty, article 1: The parties undertake as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations to settle any international dispute which they may be involved in by peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. That was in 1990, the reference to the United Nations, to settle any international dispute by peaceful means, not by military means. The original wording and intent of article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty is straightforward. The North Atlantic Treaty, article 4: The parties will consult together when in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity-- All the debate about whether we are conducting a military campaign and crossing borders of a sovereign state, I say it again: The parties will consult together when in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity or political independence or the security of any of the parties is threatened. However, paragraph 24 of the new Concept significantly alters article 4 of the NATO treaty in the following way: Arrangements exist within the alliance for consultation among the allies under article 4 of the Washington Treaty-- My colleagues, pay attention to this-- and, where appropriate, the coordination of their efforts including the responses to such risks. The portion that includes ``the coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risk,'' it is new, and strongly suggests offensive action, i.e., Kosovo. It is a possible response to a threat, and that is a radical shift for NATO--not from 1949 but also from 1990. The new Concept has significantly expanded the global coverage of NATO. For example, paragraphs 20, 21, and 22 clearly indicate a global reach for NATO. Paragraph 20 states: The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro- Atlantic stability, to human suffering and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the conference by spilling over to neighboring countries including NATO countries or in other ways, and could also affect the security of neighboring states. The point is that NATO justifies action well beyond the original boundaries of NATO and now includes threats to member states anywhere in the world. Is that what we want the NATO of the future to be? I say to my friend from Michigan, he is right that Congress was asleep at the switch when the Strategic Concept of 1990 was adopted. But there is no reason for Congress to remain asleep in 1999. In fairness to my colleagues, no one envisioned that in less than 9 years the purely defensive alliance of NATO would have conducted offensive action out of area, against a sovereign nation, albeit a terribly oppressive nation, in an action that was not in our vital national interests. Let me share some comments I have gleaned from the Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest which all Members receive from the U.S. Information Agency. This is from the leading press around the world, as they view, in terms of their commentary, what this Strategic Concept means to them. I know some critics, myself included, will say their views, some of the views, are unimportant or biased or that they are from state-run presses. I know that. But I think they are a valuable tool to understand how we and NATO are being perceived by non-NATO members--and some NATO members as well. Here is the summary--early May: The Alliance's adoption of a ``new strategic concept''. . . has swung to the negative [in regard to the comments by the foreign press]. Criticism of the Alliance's vision of a ``new world order''. . . . many underscored the problems with NATO's expanded purview and questioned the feasibility of trying to promote and impose--beyond European borders and ``by force if necessary''--a ``consistent'' standard on human rights. The vast majority of media outside of Europe remained harshly critical of NATO's [read the U.S.'s] new blueprint, with most reiterating their concerns that NATO is ``transforming itself into a global police force, ignoring the role of the U.N.'' . . . NATO is being enlarged--both spatially and doctrinally--in order to ensure U.S. military and political dominance over Europe, Russia and the rest of the world. I don't buy that, but it is important to understand that other countries certainly think that. It goes on to say: The idea that a part of the world, formed by the most ``civilized'' nations, can be responsible for the respect of human rights in the whole world--resorting, if necessary, to the use of force . . . is neither viable nor fair. They are asking: . . . whether Kosovo is an exception or a rule in NATO's new strategy, and whether the Allies will be equally firm, but also consistent, when its comes to the Kurds . . . Tibetans, Palestinians, Tutsis, Hutus [or] Native Americans. Ethnic cleansing in Chechnya, Turkey, Colombia, Indonesia show that NATO is now punishing randomly, that is only enemies and only those countries that don't have any nuclear weapons. Mr. President, several headlines--and I do not agree with all of these headlines--in May should be brought to the attention of my colleagues. The newspaper Reforma in Mexico: What is the reason for the desire to impose a solution in defense of the Albanians in Yugoslavia while at the same time three ethnic groups that hate each other are forced to co- exist in Bosnia? What could happen in Mexico in the future? Within several months, NATO members [have now agreed] to intervene anywhere they see fit without the need to consult with the U.N. and to run the risk of a veto from Russia or China. This will be a two century jump backwards. That is from Mexico. I am not saying it speaks for the entire country of Mexico, although President Zedillo said much the same thing. Ethnos, a paper in Greece: What occurred in Washington was the U.N.'s complete weakening. It is now a mere onlooker of NATO's decisions and initiatives. What has taken place is the complete overthrow of the legal system. A newspaper called Folha de S. Paulo in Brazil: NATO celebrates its 50th anniversary and in practice formalizes the end of the U.N. As it has become clear this past month, the world's power is, in fact, in NATO, meaning in the hands of the United States. And, almost no Government dares to protest against it. The Economist in Great Britain, a respected newspaper: Limping home from Kosovo would certainly oblige NATO to rethink its post-Cold War aims of intervention, not just for member's defense, but also for broader interest in humanitarian and international order. NATO might go into terminal decline. The Alliance needs to persist in explaining to other countries the principles that guided NATO's decision to intervene in Kosovo. This necessity is not so much to prove that this was a just cause but to reassure a suspicious world that NATO has not given itself the right to attack sovereign nations at whim. Il Sole 24-Ore. of Italy: We cannot say what emerged from the weird birthday-summit war council in Washington is a strategic concept. Indeed, NATO should have been more precise about its future. The war in Kosovo forces us to revise international law as we have known it. This is from a newspaper in a country that is a NATO ally: The concept suggests laying the foundation of an ``ethical foreign policy.'' A democratic West which tolerates ethnic and religious diversities, which is stable and economically free, can even fight to give these values to other people. It is a very nice picture, but to impose freedom is a contradiction in terms. Another headline: Al-Dustur in Jordan, the new King of which just paid a visit to this country: The Anglo-American alliance imposed on NATO during the summit in Washington is a new orientation marked by imperialist arrogance and disregard for the rest of the world. Those are pretty strong words. This is a serious danger that faces the world, and to overcome it all non-NATO countries should cooperate and seek to develop weapons of mass destruction. Is that what the new Strategic Concept is leading to in the minds of some of the critics in foreign countries? Al Watan in Kuwait, the country we freed in regard to Desert Storm: NATO does not have a strategy for the next 50 years, except America will remain the master, Europe the subordinate, Russia a marginalized state and the rest of the world secondary actors. That is pretty tough criticism. Asahi newspaper in Japan: One such lesson is that members of an alliance often resort to their own military activities, paying scant attention to the trend of the U.N. Security Council, or international opinion. Another lesson is that the United States, the only superpower, often acts in accordance with its own logic or interests rather than acting as supporter for its allies. This newspaper sums it up: This has relevance to the U.S.-Japanese military alliance. The newspaper Hankyoreh Shinmun of South Korea, an ally: The summit decision to give the Alliance an enlarged role in the future is a dangerous one in that it may serve in the long term to merely prop up America's hegemonic endeavors. The talk of NATO's expanded role confuses everyone and even threatens global peace. NATO's new role could unify countries like Russia and China that oppose U.S. dominance, provoking a new global conflagration between them and the West. In Taiwan, The China Times: NATO's new order requires different agents to act on the U.S.'s behalf in different regions and to share the peace- keeping responsibility for the peace of greater America. In the Kosovo crisis, NATO on one hand tries to stop the Yugoslav government's slaughter. On the other hand, to show respect for Yugoslav sovereignty it also opposes Kosovar independence. This means that a country cannot justify human rights violations by claiming national sovereignty. By the same token, calls for independence in a high tension area are forbidden since they would naturally lead to war. These two principles have now become the pillars of the NATO strategic concept. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait have also repeatedly received similar signals: Beijing should not use force against Taiwan, and Taiwan should not declare independence. There is a parallel. Finally, in India, the newspaper Telegraph: NATO will definitely try to make things difficult for nations like India which are planning to join the nuclear league. Though Russia, and now China, are seeking India's cooperation and active participation to build a multi-polar world order against the United States, Deli appears to be reluctant to play. This reluctance stems from the fear that the West, with help from Pakistan, might turn Kashmir into another Kosovo, highlighting human rights violations in the valley and Kashmir then might become a fit case for NATO intervention. I do not buy that. I do not think we are going to do that. Some of the warnings, some of the descriptions that I have just read to my colleagues, I do not buy, but it shows you the attitude, it shows you how other people feel about the new Strategic Concept. We have the same kind of commentaries from Argentina, from Canada, from Mexico again. La Jornada, a newspaper in Mexico: The decision by NATO leaders to turn that organization from a defensive into an offensive entity and to carry out military actions regardless of the U.N. is a defeat of civilized mechanisms that were so painfully put in place after World War II. If the Alliance really wanted to impose democratic values by force, it should start by attacking some of its own members, like Turkey, which carries out systematic ethnic cleansing campaigns against the Kurds. Tough words. My point remains that this new Strategic Concept, a concept that radically alters the focus and direction of NATO, has been adopted without the consultation of the Senate. Are we willing, as Senators, to stand by and not debate, discuss, or give consent to a document that fundamentally alters the most successful alliance in history? What we discussed, what we ratified in regard to expansion is totally different than the new Strategic Concept. It has had no debate, it has had no discussion and, yet, it is a blueprint for our involvement in the future of NATO. It is a document that fundamentally alters the most successful alliance in history and one that may cost the blood of our men and women and billions of dollars from our Treasury. We should at least debate it. I urge my colleagues to support my sense-of-the-Senate amendment. I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask the distinguished chairman, how much time would the distinguished chairman like?

Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the distinguished Senator 2 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, May 25, 1999 at 10 a.m. in room 226 of the Senate Dirksen Office Building to hold a hearing on: ``Copyright Office Report on Distance Education in the Digital Environment.''

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, May 25, 1999 at 2:15 p.m. to hold a hearing.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, the Finance Committee requests unanimous consent to conduct a hearing on Tuesday, May 25, 1999 beginning at 10 a.m. in room 215 Dirksen.