Pat Roberts

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. I am delighted to yield my distinguished colleague and friend 3 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, how much time do we have remaining now?

Mr. ROBERTS. Might I inquire of my distinguished friend from Michigan if he, the minority, seeks any additional time?

Mr. ROBERTS. I would be happy if the Senator would like to proceed at this time. I would like to close, if that is all right.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Sessions be added as an original cosponsor of the Roberts amendment.

Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the distinguished Senator 2 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTS. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. ROBERTS. If the Senator will yield?

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. ROBERTS. Would the distinguished chairman yield for several questions?

Mr. ROBERTS. If I may ask my distinguished friend, the chairman, one other question; that is, I do not think there is any question in the minds of many that to state that you are not going to use grounds forces before you decide to use force was a mistake. There is no question about that. I am not sure I could still support or still support--I never did support--the use of ground troops, unless I know what their specific mission is: What do we expect them to do. And then, if you ``win,'' if we could ever define ``winning,'' what is it that we have won. So from the standpoint of tactics, I say again to the chairman, I am very hopeful, once this war is over, we hope and pray that all of this talk that has been rather critical will be secondary, and, if Milosevic would agree to some of the negotiating principles that have been offered, we shall see. I see where one NATO general indicated it is going to take another 2 months. I hope that is not the case. I hope the Senate Armed Services Committee--and I ask the chairman, would it be his intent to take a hard look. I have a subcommittee that looks at low-intensity conflicts--this became a high-intensity conflict--and military tactics and strategy. I hope we can take a look at this, especially with the asymmetrical threat that Mr. Milosevic has used so well against us. He basically took one look at our tactics and acted accordingly and played rope-a-dope. He has achieved most of his objectives. That seems to me to be a real problem here. I hope we have those hearings. Again, I go back to the genesis of this whole business, and that is a Strategic Concept that puts us in far different pastures. I know there will be some of my colleagues who say this is not a treaty. The fact that we are having this debate today, I think, is encouraging. We had a debate on ratification of NATO expansion last year. To my knowledge, we have not had any debate, or very little discussion, of this Strategic Concept and what it means. So the Senator's cosponsorship of this amendment is much appreciated. If, in fact it is not a treaty, it has the effect of a treaty.

Mr. ROBERTS. If the chairman will, I heartily agree. The war must be over.

Mr. ROBERTS. I have a statement here by a member of the Parliament. Menzies Campbell says: . . .''It is a matter of considerable regret that the House of Commons has never debated properly the issues surrounding the NATO Strategic Concept.'' He argued that, ``Parliament should have had the opportunity to consider matters such as NATO's right of independent action without Security Council authority and further expansion of the alliance and its consequences.'' He said that: Foreign and security policy is the responsibility of the government, but the legislature is surely entitled to express its views. This was also true in regards to the statement by Lord Wallace of Great Britain in the House of Lords. . . .''no intelligent debate''. . .it is ``quite astonishing that we allow British defence strategy to be structured by an international organisation without any form of input and debate by our Parliament.'' Then he went on to say, in drawing the example here in the Senate: Both Republicans and Democrats. . .argue that the. . . [overemphasis on] the enlargement issue in the run-up to NATO's 50th anniversary celebration. . .came at the expense of any meaningful debate over the evolution of NATO and the role that the. . .Alliance will play in the 21st century. If I could ask my distinguished chairman, would he recall the many times that we have had briefings in regards to the situation in Kosovo and the question over and over again that was posed prior to the bombing: Would this be in our vital national security interest? I know the Senator asked that question many times. I know that the distinguished Senator from Utah, Mr. Bennett, who made a very eloquent speech in this Chamber this morning, asked that question. I tried to ask the question in regards to an amendment to the defense appropriations bill last year. I said: Before we would actually commit any troops under this ever-changing concept in that part of the world, would the administration please answer eight questions--as to cost, purpose, exit strategy, end game, and et cetera, et cetera? That public law requirement was not addressed for 6 months. I am worried about the future of NATO, I would say to my distinguished friend. I know the chairman is. I think that Kosovo is a rock that has hit the NATO windshield, and it has been like shattered glass. It does not matter if you feel that involvement is a fine mess we have gotten into or whether or not we think that this policy is the right policy. I am sure the distinguished chairman--I have talked with him about it--will have the full committee or perhaps my subcommittee look at the tactics that have been used, the stress and strain on others, on other services in other parts of the world. I am sure we have talked about the ethics of conducting a war above 15,000 feet; immaculate coercion, where no allied NATO soldier has suffered any casualty as opposed to the people we are trying to help. I know that we have talked, Mr. Chairman, about the law of unintended effects; what is happening today in regard to Russia, China, India, Pakistan, South America, and Central America. President Zedillo of Mexico wondered aloud in the international press: Will NATO now come to enforce human rights within the sovereign territory of Mexico in regards to the Chippewa Indian situation? How about East Timor, Chechnya, Turkey, and the Kurds, et cetera, et cetera? Rwanda, that situation is far more difficult. I don't know, Mr. Chairman. I just think there are a lot of real questions that Members have. If you go back to the basic genesis as to why we are there, it comes right back to the President's speech at the Hague over 2 years ago, reflected in the Strategic Concept of NATO. I thank the distinguished chairman.

Mr. ROBERTS. Would my distinguished chairman yield for one additional question?

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, before I make remarks on behalf of the amendment, which pretty well dovetails the second-degree amendment introduced by the distinguished chairman of the committee, I would like to pay a deserved tribute to our distinguished chairman, the Senator from Virginia, for his leadership in forging a defense bill during a time of great, great challenge. During a time when our military is stressed, strained, and some of us believe hollow, our Nation needs those who will take a stand--a stand, if you will--to really try to fulfill the first obligation of our Federal Government, and that is to safeguard our national security. Our new chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in the tradition of Senator Thurmond, has been the right man at the right time for the right job. He has, without question, reaffirmed the standing of the influence of the committee. He has actually given the committee--in this case, the creation of a new Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee--a chance to take a look at really what our Nation faces in terms of our national security threat in the post-cold-war period. I want to thank him publicly for discussing with me the possibility of being the chairman of that committee and for that appointment. I think the thing I want to mention the most in regard to the chairman's leadership and also that of Senator Levin is the pay raise and retirement reform contained in this bill. After hearing from the Joint Chiefs and knowing that we have a crisis in regard to retention of our men and women in uniform, the chairman, actually during the impeachment process, sat us down to work and really hit the ground running. Despite the criticism of those who wanted a much larger bill, a more comprehensive bill, to address all of the problems that we face in the military--and, by the way, I mention that these challenges include the quality of life issues, the health care issues, the issue of the operations tempo, the issue of the personnel tempo, and then that of mission quality. There are those who said, we are not quite sure that this pay raise or this retirement reform will really address the retention problem. There are others who said they wanted to study it further. I suggest to them that if we studied it actually further, we would be in such a problem with retention we would be past the marrow of the bone. John Warner really took the issue by the horns and provided the leadership. We are sending a message to every man and woman in uniform, saying that we care. And we took action, as I said before, despite the impeachment proceedings and despite a very, very busy schedule here in this Congress. So thank you to John Warner and also to Senator Levin, whose expertise in regard to his oversight and his policy actually keeps the committee with very strong leadership. It is a privilege to serve with both Senators. I will make a statement at a later time in regard to the efforts by Senator Bingaman, who is the distinguished ranking member of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, and what we think we have been able to achieve. Mr. President, I rise with the support of the chairman of the committee, as well as my colleague from Georgia, Senator Cleland, to offer an amendment to this bill, S. 1059. It is my hope that this amendment will reaffirm the Senate's important responsibility of either rejecting or consenting to fundamental changes in the letter and spirit of existing treaties--in particular, when those changes actually broaden the nature of U.S. military missions, responsibilities, and obligations overseas. I ask my colleagues' support for a simple sense-of-the-Senate resolution that calls for complete transparency on the part of the President and Senate consideration in regard to the de facto editing of the original North Atlantic Treaty. My sense-of-the-Senate simply asks the President to certify whether the new strategic concept of NATO, this formalization of new and complicated United States military responsibilities in Europe, as evidenced by the war in Kosovo and the possibility of future Kosovos around the world, is in fact a document that obligates the United States in any way, shape, or form. If so, my sense-of-the-Senate affirms that this body be given the opportunity to debate, accept, or reject the new blueprint for future NATO actions. These future actions will undoubtedly include substantial components of our own Armed Forces engaged completely outside the province of the original treaty. We see this today in regard to the ongoing operations in Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia, and over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These deployments are dominated by U.S. forces, ostensibly because of our responsibilities as a NATO member. During the cold war, the Congress and the American people believed the original Nato Treaty was in our vital national security interest. I am not so sure we know now whether these new NATO missions meet that important criteria for the possibility of spilling American blood and treasure. There has been a transformation Mr. President, and, while yes the world has transformed since 1949, Congress still needs to be given the opportunity to formally consider and endorse what we're signing up for and committing to do in Europe and elsewhere around the world. Given this situation, I believe it is imperative the Senate ask the President to formally certify whether the new Strategic Concept, which was adopted during the 50-year anniversary here in Washington about a month ago, represents commitments by the United States, and, if so, submit the document for formal congressional scrutiny. Let's be honest with the American people, Mr. President. If the new Strategic Concept of 1999 is the particular direction we're headed in regards to Europe, let's give this body and the American people a chance to formally agree or disagree. If only for budgeting reasons, let's understand what we are committing to do so we can plan and budget for it. In this discussion, we must not lose sight of the fact that NATO is a military alliance and the new Strategic Concept of 1999 is its guide for the 21st century. This is a very important document the nineteen nations of NATO have drafted and I encourage every Senator to examine it closely, comparing it with the original North Atlantic Treaty. I believe Senators will find that the new Strategic Concept of 1999 document is completely inconsistent with the spirit of the original treaty in critical areas. That means the treaty has been changed, albeit rather quietly, during the 50-year anniversary celebration, and the United States has formally committed to a new strategic direction in Europe. It's time for the Senate to stop, take notice of what is happening to NATO, and go on record asserting its constitutional role. Through the new Strategic Concept of 1999, President Clinton, along with the member nations of NATO, has quite possibly taken the commonsense notion of mutual consultation for self-defense purposes implicit in Article Four of the original NATO Treaty and altered substantially the very purpose of the NATO Alliance from one of collective self-defense of member territory to international crisis management and humanitarian relief operations. As a matter of fact, I think the Strategic Concept is reflective for the most part in reference to a speech the President gave over 2 years ago at The Hague outlining what he thought the Strategic Concept and the new goals of NATO should be. Additionally, I believe the new Concept document is not merely a tool for justifying existing extraterritorial NATO deployments of American military forces, but is a precedent toward formalizing as U.S. policy the lazy tendency of this Administration and yes, others to rely increasingly on the military services to solve social and political problems in Europe and elsewhere. Problems, I would say, Mr. President, for which other instruments of power are clearly better suited for those tasks. I want to assure my colleagues, Mr. President, I have decided to submit my amendment as a Sense of the Senate because my objective is not to brazenly force the President to do something he, in his authority as Chief Executive to represent the nation in foreign affairs, has decided not to do or would not do. However, I am trying to encourage the Administration to be clear with the Congress and the American people--indeed to seek our consent and the public's approval-- in regards to this national security policy divergence. I am sure opponents of my amendment will argue that the new Strategic Concept of 1999 is only that, a concept, an intellectual exercise, mere musings as to future security challenges in the North Atlantic region. I disagree. My colleagues, do not let the title fool you! The 65-point document states its intent is to be a ``guide that expresses NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces.'' That is a direct quote. For a Congress constitutionally required to provide funding for and oversight to the Departments of State and Defense, those are specific purposes and very clear intentions. I am sure some opponents will also argue that regardless of the specificity of the new Strategic Concept, it is not a formal treaty and therefore should not be sent to the Senate. I really think that is putting the cart before the horse. First, let's get our definitions straight. The U.S. Department of State Circular 175, Procedures on Treaties, defines a treaty as ``an international agreement regardless of title, designation, or form whose entry into force with respect to the United States takes place only after the Senate has given its advice and consent.'' I will certainly concede that the new Strategic Concept is not a treaty per se, that that is only because the Senate has not given nor had an opportunity to give its advice and consent. If we formally adopted the logic that the President should only send actual treaties to the Senate, the treaty clause of article II of the Constitution would become irrelevant, contrary to the framers' intent. My point is that the decision of the President to submit an international agreement to the Senate is largely a political decision. Nonetheless, when a document tacitly commits the United States to a new strategic direction in Europe, it should contain the Senate's stamp of approval. It does not have it. Opponents of my amendment will further argue that the new Concept is not even an international agreement, much less a potential treaty. I believe any document that contains even tacit commitment by the United States and other nations to engage in new types of NATO missions outside the domain of the original treaty, as well as the commitment to structure military forces accordingly, can be considered an international agreement. Incidentally, the U.S. Department of State Circular 175, Procedures on Treaties, also sets forth eight considerations available for determining whether an agreement or an accord should be submitted to the Senate for ratification. Among them: The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting the Nation as a whole--if that is not a description of Kosovo, I do not know what it is--whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of subsequent legislation by the Congress; past U.S. practices as to similar agreements and the preference of Congress as to a particular type of agreement. In mentioning these criteria, I must note that last year Senators Cleland, Snowe, and I attempted to clarify administration policy in the use of military force by attaching several consulting requirements to fiscal year 1999 defense spending legislation. My question is: In order to determine what the strategic plan is, what our obligations are, what we are doing in Kosovo and other areas of the world, does that have to be done each year? Let's get the Senate involved at the outset. It is the Strategic Concept that is at the genesis of this kind of policy. The first State Department consideration is the most significant for purposes of our discussion. I genuinely believe that the new Strategic Concept of 1999 and its predecessor document, without question, involved commitments and risks affecting the Nation as a whole. In fact, I could not have put it more succinctly. That is one of the reasons our distinguished chairman, Senator Warner, wrote to the administration on this issue as the recent NATO summit, the 50-year anniversary, approached. He knew the document's revision was very imminent. He wanted to have a debate here in the Congress before moving forward with the other 19 nations. I commend our chairman for his knowledge, his foresight, and his leadership on this issue. As for the second State Department consideration I mentioned, the new Concept of 1999 probably cannot be given effect without the enactment of subsequent legislation by the Congress--without, that is, huge defense appropriation and authorization acts that try to balance the readiness and the modernization and quality-of-life requirements which this bill tries to address with numerous peacekeeping enforcement missions. Members on both sides of the aisle may also argue--in good faith, I might add--that the Resolution of Ratification for an expanded NATO which passed this body last spring contained conditions for revising NATO's Strategic Concept which effectively constitute a Senate endorsement of the new Strategic Concept of NATO. Again, I disagree. When we compare the actual text of the new Concept and the Resolution of Ratification adopted only last year, not only do we see the complete abandonment of the original 1949 treaty, but it is also a document that has gone way beyond what the Senate actually intended. Section 3 of the Resolution of Ratification as passed by the Senate April 30 of last year contained the following conditions for the new Strategic Concept. Let's compare these with the Concept document. The Ratification Resolution stated: (1) The strategic concept of NATO: (A) Policy of the United States toward the strategic concept of NATO--the upcoming revision of that document will reflect the following principles: (i) First and foremost a military alliance: NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. NATO's success in securing peace is predicated on its military strength and strategic unity. (ii) Principal foundation for defense of security interests of NATO members: NATO serves as the principal foundation for collectively defending the security interests of its members against external threats. However, Senators, I urge you to read this--this document is on your desks--in the Strategic Concept adopted at the 50th anniversary celebration in Washington last month: Strategic Concept point #24: Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context [emphasize the word ``global'']. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind. I must point out, that last phrase is completely original. There is nothing in article 4 of the original NATO treaty even remotely similar to the term ``the coordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.'' It is just not there. I cannot imagine more substantive change to the NATO treaty than adding a collective response obligation for the United States to respond to terrorism and other asymmetrical threats not only in Europe but all around the globe. The Resolution of Ratification continues--again, that was the expansion treaty that was passed as of last year: (iii) Promotion and protection of United States vital national security interests: Strong United States leadership of NATO actually promotes and protects United States vital national security interests. (iv) United States leadership role: [Now, this is in last year's language in regard to the ratification of the expansion.] The United States maintains its leadership role in NATO through the stationing of United States combat forces in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO commands, and through the presence of United States nuclear forces on the territory of Europe. However, 1 year later in the Strategic Concept, point No. 18 --and I urge Senators to pay attention to it: As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reaffirmed in Berlin in 1996, the Alliance fully supports the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities for Western European Union (WEU)-led operations. To this end, the Alliance and WEI have developed a close relationship and put into place key elements of the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defense enhances the security of the environment of the Alliance. Now, Mr. President, the WEU will be using NATO military equipment paid for by the taxpayers of the United States. That may be proper, that may be a role for NATO, but I think we need to review that proposal. The Resolution of Ratification of last year does continue: (v) Common threats: NATO members will face common threats to their security in the post-Cold War environment including-- (I) the potential for the re-emergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe; (II) rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles, or other unconventional delivery means; (III) threats after wider nature, including the disruption of the flow of vital resources, and other possible transnational threats; and (IV), conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes, and the actions of undemocratic leaders. All that was contained in the language when we ratified the expansion in regard to that treaty last year, 1 year later. Strategic Concept point #20: The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non- military risks which are multi-directional and often [very] difficult to predict. These risks include social and political difficulties, ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to [the] crises affecting [the] Euro- Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Nonmilitary risks, Mr. President? Inadequate or failed efforts at reform? What are we talking about? I do not recall those phrases in the Resolution of Ratification. Why would a military alliance such as NATO care about a nonmilitary risk? What is a nonmilitary risk anyway? The Resolution of Ratification continues, as of last year: (vi) Core mission of NATO: Defense planning will affirm a commitment by NATO members to a credible capability for collective self-defense, which remains the core mission of NATO. All NATO members will contribute to this core mission. No argument there. That is the historical purpose of NATO and that is collective security. One year later, with the Strategic Concept, while they were popping champaign corks in regard to NATO being 50 years old: Strategic Concept point #10: To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks: Deterrence and defense: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. Crisis management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. I am glad to see that deterrence and defense is still there. But, again, this emphasis on conflict prevention and crisis management is extremely disconcerting and not consistent with the Resolution of Ratification that was passed in the Senate as of last year. The Resolution of Ratification continues--we are talking about section 7: (vii) Capacity to respond to common threats: NATO's continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common threats. Building on its core capabilities for collective self-defense of its members, NATO will ensure that its military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals promote NATO's capacity to project power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members. This will require that NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts. However, 1 year later, in the Strategic Concept point No. 49: In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance's forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non- Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defense missions. Well-trained and well- equipped forces at adequate levels of readiness and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in providing efficient military contributions. I do not know how this Nation is to fund, structure, and train U.S. military forces to manage parochial crises in Europe, no matter how small, through military operations. Nor do I think that is the best use of our forces, if you consider already we must meet the two major regional conflict response thresholds within serious budget constraints. Again, I do not see this use of military forces endorsed in the Resolution of Ratification that the Senate passed last year. The Resolution of Ratification does continue: The fundamental importance of collective defense: This was last year. The Senate declares that-- (i) in order for NATO to serve the security interests of the United States, the core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO members; and (ii) NATO may also, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on a case-by-case basis, engage in other missions where there is a consensus among its members that there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members. However, once again, in the Strategic Concept, 1 year later, at the celebration, the 50-year celebration, No. 48: The maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro- Atlantic area is of key importance. An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early age. In the event of crises which jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organizations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security. What do we mean by this--``keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage''? Isn't that the job of diplomacy? Anyway, the list of inconsistencies between the Resolution of Ratification and the new Strategic Concept of 1999 goes on and on and on. I have taken a great deal of time of the Senate and my colleagues to be specific about this. Even if they were more consistent, it does not change the fact that the Strategic Concept of 1999 fundamentally alters the nature and the domain of the original treaty that this Senate ratified just a year ago. So, in closing, I think my bipartisan amendment, warrants support because it is time to go on record that the Senate insists that changes to the original scope and purpose of the alliance go through proper channels, specifically article II, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the distinguished chairman for his very kind comments. Would it be helpful, I ask the distinguished chairman, if Members of this body would know that the same basic feeling exists in regards to the British Parliament in the House of Lords?

Mr. ROBERTS. I am worried about the future of NATO. If in fact our involvement in Kosovo was at one time not in our vital national interest, there is, I think, a good argument that can be made--has been made by the national security team and the President--that since NATO's credibility or the future of NATO is now on the line, it is in our vital national security interest. Having said that, and having looked at the war in Kosovo and the tactics used, and the result, and all six of the goals, as outlined by the distinguished Secretary of State in our briefings, being turned on their head as a result of the tactics that have been used in the military strategy, and the law of unintended effects, can you imagine a situation under this Strategic Concept that all 19 nations will ever agree to ever bomb anybody again? On a proactive basis? Where we are going outside of the NATO territory, ignoring the U.N.? I doubt it. Eight nations, right now as I speak, more especially three, want the bombing ended. Many others in this Chamber--not this Senator, for reasons that I could go into, but I will not--did not want to start the bombing campaign. Others wanted to start it. Others wanted to use the ground forces. That debate is going on right now. We are negotiating within the NATO--within the NATO--alliance as opposed to trying to negotiate, as we are trying to do, with Mr. Milosevic, who, by the way, is a thug and an international terrorist and all the things people say about him. That does not enter into this. But can you imagine, Mr. Chairman, under what circumstance, after Kosovo, that NATO would bomb again, or for that matter ever use ground troops? What kind of message does that send to the bad guys and the hard targets and the real people that we should be worrying about all around the world? I think we have decimated--well, there is a stronger word for it, but I will not use it--in regards to NATO. I think under this Strategic Concept we have wandered so far afield and into a dangerous pasture that we are endangering the true mission of NATO, which is collective security, not to mention all the rest of these things that are in this concept. That is what worries me.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President I rise today to introduce an important component to further the scientific understanding of the earth's role as it relates to the environment, specifically the carbon cycle. What sparked my interest in introducing a carbon cycle research bill was a 1998 finding by academic and federal researchers that the North American continent from 1988 to 1992 absorbed an equivalent amount of the carbon dioxide emitted from fossil fuel emissions during the same time. Scientists know it happened, but cannot pinpoint the mechanisms of the process. Although you cannot watch carbon dioxide move into soil, you can see soil with high levels of carbon like river bottomland that has rich dark soil. Naturally, the question arises of how agriculture supplements this natural process. By introducing this bill, it is my intention to follow through on the advice of climate scientists that there is a need for more research because the carbon cycle issue is complex. The bill makes sure that USDA is researching voluntary agricultural best practices such as conservation tillage, buffer strips, the Conservation Reserve Program, and new technology like precision sprayers that have multiple environmental benefits. These voluntary agricultural best practices increase soil carbon levels also tend to reduce soil erosion, reduce fuel costs for producers, improve soil fertility, and increase production. It's a win win win. Nonetheless, there are agencies and individuals with agendas that believe agriculture is a source of greenhouse gas emissions and do not care about the multitude of benefits accruing from production agriculture. Therefore, we must arm agriculture with sound science on the carbon cycle. This bill is intended to give producers and policymakers better understanding of the link between the carbon cycle and voluntary best practices. It authorizes USDA to conduct basic research on the mechanics of carbon being stored in soil and applied research to fine tune voluntary agricultural practices to increase the storage of carbon in soils. Furthermore, research will be helpful in finding out if agriculture can be a tool to solve the challenge of climate change. I also want to make clear that this is a research bill. It has nothing to do with trading carbon credits or setting up a scheme for early action rewards if the Protocol becomes effective. The whole point of this bill is that there needs to be an understanding of the science and examining methods to meet the challenge of climate change without an international treaty. This bill compliments other legislation, such as Mr. Murkowski's bill, that calls for increased energy efficiency research. The bill taps into USDA's broad research capabilities as it relates to production techniques and soil databases, but I have also incorporated state-of-the-art research tools including satellite-based technology. Satellite based remote sensing is becoming more useful as an agricultural production component. Right now, satellites measure the greening up of wheat during spring months, making more precise estimates of wheat harvests. In discussions with remote sensing leaders at the University of Kansas, remote sensing has a role in providing the ``big picture'' as it relates to what agriculture is doing as it relates to the carbon cycle, such as mapping vegetation and estimating the amount of carbon it can store in soil. Because of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's initial research that shows the North American Continent is a net carbon sink, I have included bill language to use air monitors to study the regional interaction of carbon dioxide. For instance, measure the movement of air from Denver to Kansas City. If the carbon dioxide level is lower in Kansas City than Denver, Kansas agriculture and land is absorbing carbon. With this data, scientists can start looking at specific ag practices. It is my hope that the Senate can enact this legislation to be proactive in meeting the climate challenge, encouraging voluntary agricultural best practices and technology that have multiple benefits. This is a strategy that is based on commonsense, not suggestions made by the International Panel on Climate Change that would halt production agriculture as we know it. Producers can use technology to feed a troubled and hungry world, plus absorb carbon dioxide. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President I rise today to introduce an important component to further the scientific understanding of the earth's role as it relates to the environment, specifically the carbon cycle. What sparked my interest in introducing a carbon cycle research bill was a 1998 finding by academic and federal researchers that the North American continent from 1988 to 1992 absorbed an equivalent amount of the carbon dioxide emitted from fossil fuel emissions during the same time. Scientists know it happened, but cannot pinpoint the mechanisms of the process. Although you cannot watch carbon dioxide move into soil, you can see soil with high levels of carbon like river bottomland that has rich dark soil. Naturally, the question arises of how agriculture supplements this natural process. By introducing this bill, it is my intention to follow through on the advice of climate scientists that there is a need for more research because the carbon cycle issue is complex. The bill makes sure that USDA is researching voluntary agricultural best practices such as conservation tillage, buffer strips, the Conservation Reserve Program, and new technology like precision sprayers that have multiple environmental benefits. These voluntary agricultural best practices increase soil carbon levels also tend to reduce soil erosion, reduce fuel costs for producers, improve soil fertility, and increase production. It's a win win win. Nonetheless, there are agencies and individuals with agendas that believe agriculture is a source of greenhouse gas emissions and do not care about the multitude of benefits accruing from production agriculture. Therefore, we must arm agriculture with sound science on the carbon cycle. This bill is intended to give producers and policymakers better understanding of the link between the carbon cycle and voluntary best practices. It authorizes USDA to conduct basic research on the mechanics of carbon being stored in soil and applied research to fine tune voluntary agricultural practices to increase the storage of carbon in soils. Furthermore, research will be helpful in finding out if agriculture can be a tool to solve the challenge of climate change. I also want to make clear that this is a research bill. It has nothing to do with trading carbon credits or setting up a scheme for early action rewards if the Protocol becomes effective. The whole point of this bill is that there needs to be an understanding of the science and examining methods to meet the challenge of climate change without an international treaty. This bill compliments other legislation, such as Mr. Murkowski's bill, that calls for increased energy efficiency research. The bill taps into USDA's broad research capabilities as it relates to production techniques and soil databases, but I have also incorporated state-of-the-art research tools including satellite-based technology. Satellite based remote sensing is becoming more useful as an agricultural production component. Right now, satellites measure the greening up of wheat during spring months, making more precise estimates of wheat harvests. In discussions with remote sensing leaders at the University of Kansas, remote sensing has a role in providing the ``big picture'' as it relates to what agriculture is doing as it relates to the carbon cycle, such as mapping vegetation and estimating the amount of carbon it can store in soil. Because of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's initial research that shows the North American Continent is a net carbon sink, I have included bill language to use air monitors to study the regional interaction of carbon dioxide. For instance, measure the movement of air from Denver to Kansas City. If the carbon dioxide level is lower in Kansas City than Denver, Kansas agriculture and land is absorbing carbon. With this data, scientists can start looking at specific ag practices. It is my hope that the Senate can enact this legislation to be proactive in meeting the climate challenge, encouraging voluntary agricultural best practices and technology that have multiple benefits. This is a strategy that is based on commonsense, not suggestions made by the International Panel on Climate Change that would halt production agriculture as we know it. Producers can use technology to feed a troubled and hungry world, plus absorb carbon dioxide. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to celebrate National Hospital Week. During this week when we pay tribute to our nation's hospitals and health systems. I would like to recognize one particular facility in Kansas that has gone above and beyond the call of duty in order to meet the needs of the community--the Mount Carmel Medical Center in Pittsburg, Kansas. Mount Carmel Medical Center is located in the southeast corner of Kansas. The community has 20,000 residents. About 25 percent of the town's children are from families who live at or below the federal poverty level. More than half of the families in Pittsburg are headed by single parents who often work two jobs. As one of the largest employers in the community, Mount Carmel Medical Center recognized that the entire community was suffering from the lack of quality child care. Teachers noticed that children were unready to learn, they needed immunizations and hearing tests. After a confirmation by the hospital's employee assistance program and a staff- initiated community health assessment, Mount Carmel decided to take action. They formed a partnership with the Pittsburg schools and Pittsburg State University to establish the Family Resource Center to meet many of the community's needs. The Family Resource Center now provides child care to more than 200 children and offers a wide range of social services. It also serves as the site of a free clinic staffed with local physicians for those without health insurance coverage. The Mount Carmel Medical Center has been nationally recognized for its achievements. The American Hospital Association recently awarded the Mount Carmel Medical Center the 1999 NOVA award. NOVA awards recognize innovative community partnerships that address communities' needs. The collaborative outreach efforts of Mount Carmel Medical Center demonstrates true dedication to the community. I am pleased and proud to recognize Mount Carmel Medical Center for its leadership, vision, and achievements. Mount Carmel is an excellent example of a hospital that has made a difference.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until the hour of 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, May 11. I further ask consent that on Tuesday, immediately following the prayer, the routine requests through the morning hour be granted, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then proceed to S. 254, the juvenile justice bill, for debate only until 12 noon.

Mr. ROBERTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROBERTS. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order, following the remarks of Senator Conrad.