William Roth

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. I want to speak next.

Mr. ROTH. I also ask unanimous consent that Senator Brownback be added as a cosponsor.

Mr. ROTH. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, Senator Moynihan and I introduce a bill to limit the tax benefits of so-called ``stapled'' or ``paired-share'' Real Estate Investment Trusts (``stapled REITs''). Identical legislation is being introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Archer. In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (``1984 Act''), Congress eliminated the tax benefits of the stapled REIT structure out of concern that it could effectively result in one level of tax on active corporate business income that would otherwise be subject to two levels of tax. Congress also believed that allowing a corporate business to be stapled to a REIT was inconsistent with the policy that led Congress to create REITs. As part of the 1984 Act provision, Congress provided grandfather relief to the small number of stapled REITs that were already in existence. Since 1984, however, almost all the grandfathered stapled REITs have been acquired by new owners. Some have entered into new lines of businesses, and most of the grandfathered REITs have used the stapled structure to engage in large-scale acquisitions of assets. Such unlimited relief from a general tax provision by a handful of taxpayers raises new questions not only of fairness, but of unfair competition, because the stapled REITs are in direct competition with other companies that cannot use the benefits of the stapled structure. This legislation, which is a refinement of the proposal contained in the Clinton Administration's Revenue Proposals for fiscal year 1999, takes a moderate and fair approach. The legislation essentially subjects to the grandfathered stapled REITs to rules similar to the 1984 Act, but only to acquisitions of assets (or substantial improvements of existing assets) occurring after today. The legislation also provides transition relief for future acquisitions that are pursuant to a binding written contract, as well as acquisitions that already have been announced (or described in a filing with the SEC). Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, Senator Moynihan and I introduce a bill to limit the tax benefits of so-called ``stapled'' or ``paired-share'' Real Estate Investment Trusts (``stapled REITs''). Identical legislation is being introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Archer. In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (``1984 Act''), Congress eliminated the tax benefits of the stapled REIT structure out of concern that it could effectively result in one level of tax on active corporate business income that would otherwise be subject to two levels of tax. Congress also believed that allowing a corporate business to be stapled to a REIT was inconsistent with the policy that led Congress to create REITs. As part of the 1984 Act provision, Congress provided grandfather relief to the small number of stapled REITs that were already in existence. Since 1984, however, almost all the grandfathered stapled REITs have been acquired by new owners. Some have entered into new lines of businesses, and most of the grandfathered REITs have used the stapled structure to engage in large-scale acquisitions of assets. Such unlimited relief from a general tax provision by a handful of taxpayers raises new questions not only of fairness, but of unfair competition, because the stapled REITs are in direct competition with other companies that cannot use the benefits of the stapled structure. This legislation, which is a refinement of the proposal contained in the Clinton Administration's Revenue Proposals for fiscal year 1999, takes a moderate and fair approach. The legislation essentially subjects to the grandfathered stapled REITs to rules similar to the 1984 Act, but only to acquisitions of assets (or substantial improvements of existing assets) occurring after today. The legislation also provides transition relief for future acquisitions that are pursuant to a binding written contract, as well as acquisitions that already have been announced (or described in a filing with the SEC). Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Madam President, I rise today to introduce legislation to make a technical correction to the diagonal measurement of video displays in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States agreed to phase down U.S. tariffs on ``13-inch'' television receivers, monitors, and picture tubes, and on combination TV/VCRs, over the period from 1995 to 1999. The tariff on receivers and monitors was to be reduced from 5 percent to zero, on picture tubes from 15 percent to 7.5 percent, and on combination TV/VCRs from 3.9 percent to zero. The ``13- inch'' designation historically has included television products whose picture tubes are approximately, but not exactly, 13 inches by diagonal measurement. The 1997 HTSUS, however, converted the diagonal picture tube measurement into 33.02 centimeters or exactly 13 inches. With the implementation of the 1997 HTSUS, the former ``13-inch'' televisions have been classified as larger than 13-inches and assessed a higher rate of duty. I am proposing this technical correction to amend the HTSUS to allow television receivers, monitors, and picture tubes, and combination TV/ VCRs with a diagonal measurement of up to ``34.29 centimeters'' (or 13.5 inches) to be classified as ``13-inches''. This action is consistent with our Uruguay Round commitments. I ask unanimous consent that this bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Madam President, I rise today to introduce legislation to make a technical correction to the diagonal measurement of video displays in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States agreed to phase down U.S. tariffs on ``13-inch'' television receivers, monitors, and picture tubes, and on combination TV/VCRs, over the period from 1995 to 1999. The tariff on receivers and monitors was to be reduced from 5 percent to zero, on picture tubes from 15 percent to 7.5 percent, and on combination TV/VCRs from 3.9 percent to zero. The ``13- inch'' designation historically has included television products whose picture tubes are approximately, but not exactly, 13 inches by diagonal measurement. The 1997 HTSUS, however, converted the diagonal picture tube measurement into 33.02 centimeters or exactly 13 inches. With the implementation of the 1997 HTSUS, the former ``13-inch'' televisions have been classified as larger than 13-inches and assessed a higher rate of duty. I am proposing this technical correction to amend the HTSUS to allow television receivers, monitors, and picture tubes, and combination TV/ VCRs with a diagonal measurement of up to ``34.29 centimeters'' (or 13.5 inches) to be classified as ``13-inches''. This action is consistent with our Uruguay Round commitments. I ask unanimous consent that this bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce temporary duty suspension legislation for the active ingredient used in producing Sustiva, a breakthrough drug for treating people with HIV and AIDS. I am pleased to introduce this bill on the active ingredients in a drug that could simplify treatment for HIV patients and could possibly reduce the level of this virus in the bloodstream. By temporarily suspending the imposition of duties, this bill will help DuPont Merck, a company located in Wilmington, Delaware, lower its cost of production and improve its competitiveness. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce temporary duty suspension legislation for the active ingredient used in producing Sustiva, a breakthrough drug for treating people with HIV and AIDS. I am pleased to introduce this bill on the active ingredients in a drug that could simplify treatment for HIV patients and could possibly reduce the level of this virus in the bloodstream. By temporarily suspending the imposition of duties, this bill will help DuPont Merck, a company located in Wilmington, Delaware, lower its cost of production and improve its competitiveness. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, earlier this week, I addressed an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on the Asian financial crisis and the critical role Japan needs to play in bringing that crisis to an end. While Japan has made bilateral assistance available to the countries most affected, Japan clearly is not facing up to the challenges presented by its own economic problems, let alone those of the region as a whole. Japan still constitutes more than two-thirds of East Asia's GDP. Regional recovery, therefore, is impossible without economic growth in Japan. Quite simply, the countries of the region in most dire condition need markets for their goods, and the United States alone cannot serve as the world's only major engine of growth. For Japan's own good, and for the good of the region and the global economy, Tokyo must serve as a second engine of growth. Unfortunately, Tokyo's economy remains mired in its seventh straight year of stagnation, and Japan is failing to take the steps it must take to stimulate and open its economy. At this critical moment in Asia's future, when Japan's role is so vital, Tokyo is failing to provide leadership of any lasting consequence. I hope that Japan can be convinced to change course and implement the bold series of measures I outlined in my speech. Because of the importance of this matter, I ask that the text of my speech be printed in the Record. The speech follows: Address by Senator William V. Roth, Jr. It's a pleasure to be here today--to join CSIS in looking at a vital and very volatile area of the world. That, of course, is Asia--a region that has captivated our attention and generated quite some concern in recent months . . . and for good reason. Today, I will address the Asian financial crisis and the role of each of the major players in the crisis, particularly the role of Japan. The concern these past few months is borne by the fact that Asia, Japan and the United States have a critical stake in the outcome of the problems rocking the economies along the Pacific Rim of Asia. In a global economy, all of us have a stake in seeing Asia's rapid return to prosperity and growth. Our economic interdependence with Japan and the rest of Asia continues to grow by the day, as does our interest in the maintenance of peace and security for the region. That's why I'm convinced that restoring the economic health of Asia is vital to the economic health of the United States. In January, I had the chance to visit the heads of state and economic leaders of Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Japan. In each of the first three countries, I was impressed with the steps taken to address the problems they face, and the resolve they demonstrated to continue on the right path. Each has made strides in opening up to foreign investment and liberalizing its trade regime. In Japan, however, I was disappointed with the seeming inability, and even unwillingness, to do the things necessary to stimulate the country's economy--not only for the sake of Japan, but for the sake of Asia and the global economy as well. Let me leave Japan aside for the moment, and begin by addressing the Asian financial situation as a whole. I believe that if the right steps are taken, Asia can and will emerge from its current problems stronger and more dynamic than ever. This will, of course, take time and inevitably there will be pain and hardship. The most pressing of the steps necessary to restore Asian growth and prosperity is for Indonesia to implement immediately and forthrightly the conditions the IMF imposed upon it as part of its rescue package. From ending crony capitalism to breaking up the monopolies that control so much of its economy, Indonesia must take the steps outlined by the IMF to realize a more open economy. I fear we are facing renewed regional contagion unless Indonesia proves more flexible on this score. Our friends in Thailand, Korea and Malaysia must continue on the path of trade and investment liberalization--a path on which they have embarked and made some significant gains. For its part, China must resist any temptation to devalue its currency to avoid a series of regional competitive devaluations. All the countries of Asia must make the structural reforms necessary to open their markets to freer flows of capital and goods. These reforms are squarely in the interest of everyone in the region because greater economic openness is fundamental to Asia's future prosperity. The agreement to create the ASEAN Free Trade Area was a vital step in this direction. Now, the financial crisis only makes the speed of implementation more critical. The nations of Asia must also very significantly improve financial and economic transparency by making available accurate and timely information on both public and private sector institutions. That is the only way market economies can function efficiently. For our part, the United States must support the process of economic reform under way in Asia and the role of the International Monetary Fund in that process. At the same time, the Fund must be more transparent, flexible and accountable in its operations. In addition, as the IMF's Articles of Agreement make clear, IMF assistance programs should ``facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade.'' Finally, Japan: In my view, the single most important step in ensuring the long-term economic health of the Asia Pacific is for Japan to embark immediately on a fundamental, systemic program of economic reform. Simply put, Japan must become a locomotive for regional growth if we are to see our way out of the Asian financial crisis. It's also clearly in Japan's interest to get its economy moving. We have been waiting seven years for action by Tokyo, yet here's what we see: Japan's economy is likely to finish fiscal year 1997 with negative growth for the first time since 1974. The so-called diffusion index of coincident indicators used by the Government of Japan to gauge the state of the economy was zero in both November and December. Consumer spending was down 4% in January and 5% in December compared to the same months a year earlier, and the willingness of salaried workers' households to spend--expressed as the amount of money set aside for that purpose--is at a record low. Prices are falling due to lack of demand rather than productivity improvements-- indicating the potential for a dangerous deflationary spiral. Two-thirds of Japanese polled just last week say they are getting hurt by what most see as a ``severe recession.'' Pre-tax profits of major corporations outside the financial sector are expected to be down by 2.2% for fiscal year 1997. Japan's auto industry--which makes up 10% of the country's GDP--is making large-scale production cuts. Housing starts have been down on a year-on-year basis for the past 13 months. I could go on, but the point is clear: Japan's economy is in a precarious situation. I believe it should also be clear that the only way for Japan to address the situation is through drastic, fundamental economic change. In my view, Japan needs to take action on four fronts. First, Japan needs immediate economic stimulus. Tokyo must deliver a significant package of tax cuts coupled with a campaign to induce the Japanese public to use those tax cuts for consumption rather than savings. The recent, small, temporary tax cut is of negligible significance. What is needed is a large permanent tax cut, perhaps taking the form of a rebate in the first year to get money into the hands of the public so they'll be encouraged to spend rather than save. Second, to absorb more of the exports from troubled Asian economies, Japan should more quickly open its markets to foreign imports. Keep in mind that there is already a great deal of concern in Congress over the flood of imports that the United States is expecting from Asia. The resulting surge in our trade deficit could lead to increased protectionist pressures. Third, to rid itself of a major source of economic drag, Japan must finally come to terms with its enormous, festering bad loan problem. And finally, Tokyo needs speedier--and real--deregulation. Now, what is Japan doing on these four fronts? Unfortunately, as we all know, very little. The next fiscal stimulus package will consist mainly of public works projects--more bridges and tunnels to nowhere. More pork- barrel projects that help politicians in the elections later this year, but do almost nothing to stimulate the economy. On opening its markets and absorbing imports, Japan has already seen a sharp drop in imports from Asia, and a sharp rise in exports to the United States. In the banking sector, the large amount of funds made available recently to deal with the problem appear headed for use instead to prop up the archaic convoy system. Moreover, the government of Japan is planning yet another ``Price- Keeping Operation'' to boost share prices before FY97 ends on March 31. It seems we will have to wait once again before the Ministry of Finance lets the bad banks fail and deals forthrightly with the massive bad loan problem. On deregulation, the next three-year plan is due out at the end of this month. Meanwhile aspects of the so-called ``Big Bang'' financial deregulation are set to go into effect. The problem is that so far, deregulatory efforts in Japan have yielded little in terms of tangible results. Because of this, and because deregulation is opposed by the bureaucracy, until we see such results, many--including myself--remain skeptical about the Japan's efforts in this area. The bottom line on all four fronts is that Japan is not facing up to the challenges presented by its own economic problems, let alone those of the region as a whole. Instead of stimulating its economy by reducing tax burdens and encouraging its public to spend, Japan is relying again on public works projects that will have no real impact. Instead of opening its markets to the exports crucial to Asia's recovery, Japan is increasing its exports to levels that will soon be politically unsustainable. Instead of finally dealing with its banking mess, Japan is still propping up failed banks. Now, I recognize that Japan has done some significant things to address the Asian financial crisis. Tokyo has committed more funds on a bilateral basis to the various IMF bail-out packages than any other country. I also commend Prime Minister Hashimoto for his attempts to move President Suharto of Indonesia in the right direction. But at this critical moment in Asia's future, when Japan's role is so vital, Tokyo has so far failed to provide leadership of any lasting consequence. Japan still constitutes more than two-thirds of the East Asia's GDP. Regional recovery, therefore, is impossible without economic recovery in Japan. Ironically, it is Japan's enormous resources--its $11 trillion in savings and its massive foreign reserves--that make it too easy for Japan to resist the sorts of changes being forced upon other countries in Asia. Korea and Thailand have no choice but to institute the IMF conditions requiring systemic economic reforms. Those countries face a crisis that has enabled them thus far to advance economic reforms that only months ago were unthinkable. Japan does not face a financial crisis--not yet anyway. Given weak leadership in Tokyo and resistance to the fundamental reforms necessary, I fear that Japan may actually need a crisis if it is ever to get its economic house in order. I hope that I am wrong and that Japan will begin to take the steps necessary to boost its economy and serve as an engine of economic growth. Clearly, it is in Japan's interest to do so, as it is in the interest of Asia and of the United States. Toward this end, we must all remain engaged in encouraging and persuading Japan to move forward. Japan faces enormous challenges in the coming months and years, as does all of Asia. The challenges, however, are far from insurmountable. And global prosperity depends on meeting those challenges head-on. As I have outlined, the road back to prosperity and growth should be fairly clear, though in some instances, politically treacherous. The good news is that most of the steps on that road require increased economic liberalization, greater transparency and reduced regulation. If that road is taken, the Asian financial crisis will have had the positive result of moving the global economy toward a new level of growth and prosperity.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I second what the distinguished Senator from Oregon has just said. First, let me repeat what he said about the distinguished Senator from Texas. I know of no one for whom I have greater respect than the junior Senator from Texas. Ever since she has been a Member of this august body, she has contributed greatly to the debate and discussion of all issues, including those of security and defense. When she speaks, I listen with great care. It is my hope that she will not raise this amendment. As I understand, her proposal is to establish, not study, a binding dispute resolution within the NATO current structure. Frankly, it is my concern that the effort to establish such a mechanism would have the unfortunate impact of reducing U.S. influence, weakening the alliance, and undercutting the North Atlantic Council, NATO's supreme decision- making body. Above all, I think it would increase, increase--not reduce--tensions in the alliance. It is important that we remember NATO is first and foremost a war- fighting institution. It is not and it was never intended to be a mechanism for dispute resolution. That is a charter for the OSCE. I cannot emphasis too much the importance--we already have an international organization in Europe dedicated to mediating and bringing to an end disputes between countries. As an institution of collective defense, it is true NATO, for 50 years, has fostered trust among parties, trust that has provided the foundation for dispute resolution among allies. In its role as an institution of collective defense, NATO's currently flexible methods for handling differences among allies maximizes U.S. influence. Frankly, this is most visible in the alliance's effort to mediate disputes between Turkey and Greece. We should not tinker with this success, the success that NATO has had in resolving differences because of the trust in which it is held by the members of this great alliance. I fear that the proposal would create the impression that the NAC has failed in its realm. I do not believe any of us would say that is true. By introducing the proposal on this resolution of ratification, we would be communicating that the Senate regards Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as more disputatious than NATO's current 16 members. I do not believe that is the sense of the Senate. We should never, never in any way, undermine the supremacy of the NAC over all alliance matters and all alliance bodies. Yet, I fear that is what this proposal would do by creating a new body independent from the NAC. Finally, this proposal would undercut its very own objectives. It would create the very tensions I assume it is intended to diffuse. Members of the Alliance will no longer focus primarily on the Alliance's core mission of collective defense, but will address the Alliance as a means to pursue their own strictly national interests. And, that will change the very culture of the Alliance. How do you think Greece and Turkey are going to respond to this proposal? More importantly how will such a proposal affect their attitudes toward the Alliance? It would certainly change the ways in which these two countries view their membership in NATO and their bilateral relationship within NATO. It will prompt them to become suspicious of the NAC. It will introduce greater tensions between them. As well intentioned this amendment may be, it is nonetheless totally counterproductive. In brief, Mr. President, this amendment would diminish U.S. influence in the Alliance. It would undercut trust between Allies. It will direct the very focus of our Allies away from NATO's core mission of collective defense. It will undercut trust within the Alliance. Ultimately, this proposal will weaken the Alliance. I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment. Therefore, I urge, first of all, my distinguished colleague from Texas not to raise the amendment. But if she does, I urge my colleagues to oppose it. I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, first, let me say there is nothing more important than for this Congress to enact legislation to make the IRS taxpayer friendly. This has become a critical issue, primarily because of the hearings held in the Finance Committee that have shown abuse of taxpayers. That must be changed. Now, as I have said many times, the House version of reform is a good beginning. But I have to emphasize, that is all it is--it is a good beginning. But it does not go far enough to make the kind of changes, the kind of reforms the American taxpayer deserves. The Finance Committee has been working hard to improve that legislation. It is legislation that we will take up with the committee, full committee, in the next 2 weeks. We expect to mark it up and report it out. But I want to emphasize that I will not be satisfied, and I am not going to push forward legislation that does not help the taxpayer as they so fully deserve. Now, Mr. President, as for the Coverdell bill, there is no question where I stand. The fundamental responsibility parents have is to raise children who are prepared for adulthood, children who will themselves become nurturing parents, productive citizens, and vital leaders in the future. Toward achieving this objective, there are few things as important as education. Mr. President, family is the foundation of our children's education. And family is at the heart of the Coverdell bill. The objective here is simple--to empower fathers and mothers to be proactive in directing the educational endeavors of their children--to give them the resources they need to make decisions consistent with their unique needs and determined goals. This bill allows us to join hands with parents everywhere--to let them use their money to educate their children. This bill allows them to increase their contributions from $500 per year to $2,000 per year. This money will be available tax free for college expenses. It allows for withdrawals to be used for elementary and secondary education expenses. And it covers public and private schools. The bill also makes state-sponsored prepaid tuition programs tax- free, not tax-deferred, meaning that students will be able to withdraw on a tax-free basis the savings that accumulate in their pre-paid tuition accounts. Parents will have the incentive to put money away today and their children will have the full benefit of that money tax free tomorrow. Already, forty-four states have pre-paid tuition plans in effect, and the other six have legislation to create a state plan, or they have implemented a feasibility study. Many cities and states are offering families the power of choice when it comes to selecting what school their children will attend. Others are embracing programs that make private schools more accessible. Those who disagree with these important measures are really suggesting that the money earned by these parents does not belong to them, that government is best at determining how their money is spent, that there is no need to change business-as-usual in our effort to improve the way we educate America's children. Clearly, this is not the message we're hearing from home. Our states and communities--our families--are embracing innovative educational programs. They realize the old way isn't working. Many cities and states are offering families the power of choice when it comes to selecting what school their children will attend. Others are embracing programs that make private schools more accessible. These measures are having a positive impact. These measure are an important step forward, and the Senate can demonstrate its leadership on education by adopting this legislation. Let's be bold, Mr. President. Our policies must offer Dad and Mom the resources they need to actively guide Junior's education. The Coverdell bill does this. It is a very important step in the right direction, and I urge my colleagues to support it. It's time for innovation. It's time to empower parents. It's time to prepare for the future. This is what the Coverdell bill is all about. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and it be considered original text for the purpose of further amendment.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, peace and stability in Europe are among America's most vital security interests. In support of these interests, NATO has been the cornerstone of American leadership in Europe and the foundation for security and peace on that continent. The Alliance serves the transatlantic community not only as a proven deterrent against aggression, but also as an unmatched instrument of integration and trust--two key pillars of peace and stability. Through NATO, old enemies have not only been reconciled, but now stand side by side as allies; national defense policies are coordinated between nations that half a century ago were at war; and, on a day to day basis, consultation, joint planning, joint training and cooperation between these countries reinforce the trust and commitment to the shared values that underpin this alliance of democracies. Nearly a decade ago, ``velvet revolutions'' championed by the likes of Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel renewed freedom in Central Europe. These remarkable and peaceful revolutions tore down the Iron Curtain that divided the continent and provided the basis upon which democracy is now flourishing. Today, nearly a decade after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, we begin formal consideration of a resolution of ratification that would extend NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Few votes before the Senate have as much far-reaching significance as this. This vote concerns not only the integration of these three democracies into the Alliance, it is also very much about the strategic relationship between the United States and Europe. It is about America's role in Europe and the ability of the transatlantic community to respond to challenges of the future--both of which hinge on whether the United States wishes to remain a European power and whether we desire a unified, democratic, and larger Europe to remain linked to America. The case I would like to make today is that NATO enlargement is consistent with the moral and strategic imperatives of the Euro- Atlantic relationship. It is central to the vitality of the trans- atlantic community, to the future of a stable and peaceful Europe and, thus, to the ability of America and Europe to work together effectively in promoting common interests in the 21st century. Inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the Alliance will strengthen NATO. It will make NATO militarily more capable and Europe more secure. These three democracies have demonstrated their commitment to the values and interests shared by NATO members: human rights, equal justice under the law, and free markets. Each has a growing economy and a military under civilian control. It is important to note that they also contributed forces to Operation Desert Storm, as well as to our peacekeeping missions in Haiti and Bosnia. They were among the first countries to commit forces to serve side by side with the United States in the stand-off against Saddam Hussein. The admission of these three democracies will add an additional 200,000 troops to the Alliance, thereby strengthening its ability to fulfill its core mission of collective defense. NATO enlargement will eliminate immoral and destabilizing lines in Europe, a division established by Stalin and perpetuated by the Cold War. The extension of NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is an imperative consistent with the moral underpinning of U.S. foreign policy and the North Atlantic Treaty that established the Alliance in 1949. Indeed, Article 10 of the Treaty states that membership is open to ``any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.'' Mr President, this powerful statement reflects the emphasis the Alliance places on democracy and inclusivity. But NATO enlargement is not driven just by moral imperatives. It is also a policy rooted in strategic self-interest and driven by objective political, economic, and military criteria. Indeed, for these reasons, NATO has expanded three times since its founding, and continued enlargement will expand the zone of peace, democracy, and stability in Europe. This benefits all countries in Europe, including a democratizing Russia. Throughout its history, Europe has been a landscape of many insecure small powers, a few imperialistic great powers, and too many conflicting nationalist policies, each creating friction with the other. Twice in this century, these dynamics pulled America into wars on the European continent. They contributed directly to a prolonged Cold War. And the potential for them to create conflict in the future is all too real unless we seize opportunities like the one before us. As Vaclav Havel put it, ``If the West does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West.'' Every time America has withdrawn its influence from Europe, trouble has followed. This we cannot afford. Mr. President, NATO enlargement is the surest means of doing for Central and Eastern Europe what American leadership, through the Alliance, has done so well for Western Europe. This includes promoting and institutionalizing trust, cooperation, coordination, and communication. In this way, NATO enlargement is not an act of altruism, but one of self-interest. Allow me to reemphasize that NATO enlargement benefits all democracies in Europe, including Russia. I say this because there are still those who assert that NATO enlargement is a policy that mistreats Moscow, thereby repeating mistakes made in the Versailles Treaty. That argument is dead wrong. It ignores the hand of partnership and assistance that the West, including NATO, has extended Russia. Last May, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed, providing the foundation for not only enhanced consultation, but also unprecedented defense cooperation. Today, Russian troops serve with NATO forces in Bosnia. And, unlike the punishing economic retribution carried out under the Versailles regime, the West has extended some $100 billion since 1991 to help Russia's democratic and economic reforms, including over $2 billion in weapon dismantlement and security assistance. Others suggest NATO enlargement endangers a positive relationship between Russia and the West. The United States and its NATO allies will not always share common interests with Russia, irrespective of NATO enlargement. Differences over Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus, arms sales, and religious freedom are not related to NATO enlargement. Moscow will always have its own independent motivations. Unfortunately, there are still those in Moscow who reject NATO enlargement out of a desire to preserve Russia's sphere of influence. Let us not give credibility to the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovsky by acceding to these demands. As I have written with my colleague Senator Lugar, the bottom line is that if Russia cannot accept the legitimate right of its neighbors to choose their own defensive security arrangements, then NATO's role in Central and Eastern Europe is even more important. Keeping the above arguments in mind, it follows that the costs of enlargement are insignificant to the costs of rejecting NATO enlargement. I urge my colleagues to consider three severe costs that would be incurred should the Senate fail to ratify NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary: A rejection of NATO enlargement would prompt a massive crisis in America's role as the leader of the transatlantic community. NATO enlargement is a policy that has been championed by the United States, including the United States Senate. Rejection of the resolution before us would vindicate those in Europe who express doubt and who resent U.S. leadership. Rejection of this resolution would spread massive disillusionment across Central Europe. It would stimulate a pervasive feeling of abandonment and rekindle a sense of historic despair. This could prompt political crises. It would surely prompt a turn to more nationalist policies--including nationalist defense policies. A rejection of enlargement would reverse the remarkable development of European security around an Alliance-determined agenda--a development in no small way facilitated by the process of NATO enlargement. Rejection of this resolution would undercut Russia's democratic evolution, stimulating Russian imperialist nostalgia. It would give great credibility to those in Russia who argue that Russia is entitled to a sphere of influence in Central Europe. That would be at the expense of those who desire Moscow to focus on the priorities of economic and political reform. NATO enlargement is a critical, non-threatening complement to the hand of partnership that the West and NATO have extended to Russia. It ensures the secure and stable regional context in which a democratic Russia will have the best prospects for a normal, cooperative relationship with its European neighbors. Indeed, there would have been no German-French reconciliation without NATO. And, the ongoing German-Polish reconciliation would not be possible without NATO. In fact, as one thoughtful thinker on these matters, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, has written ``with NATO enlarged, a genuine reconciliation between former Soviet satellites and Russia will be both truly possible and likely.'' Finally, Mr. President, NATO enlargement is fundamental to Europe's evolution into a partner that will more effectively meet global challenges before the transatlantic community. An undivided Europe at peace is a Europe that will be better able to look outward, a Europe better able to join with the United States to address necessary global security concerns. A partnership with an undivided Europe in the time- and stress-tested architecture of NATO will enable the United States to more effectively meet the global challenges to its vital interests at a time when defense resources are increasingly strained. Mr. President, allow me to close by pointing out that NATO enlargement is a policy validated by unprecedented public and Congressional discourse on a matter of national security. Over the last five years, NATO enlargement has been the topic of countless editorials and opinion pieces in national and local papers. Over the last two years some fourteen states, including the First State, Delaware, have passed resolutions endorsing NATO enlargement. This policy has been endorsed by countless civic, public policy, political, business, labor and veterans organizations. NATO enlargement has also been repeatedly endorsed by the North Atlantic Assembly, an arm of the Alliance that convenes parliamentary representatives of NATO's sixteen countries. Congress has always been an active player in this organization and I have the honor today of serving as President of the NAA. Congress, in particular, has led the charge for NATO enlargement. Its committees have examined in detail the military, intelligence, foreign policy, and budgetary implications of this long overdue initiative. Since last July alone, twelve hearings have been conducted on NATO enlargement by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations, and Budget. The Senate NATO Observer Group, which I chair with Senator Joseph R. Biden, has convened seventeen times with, among others, the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, NATO's Secretary General, and the leaders of the three invitee countries. For me, it is no surprise--indeed a matter of pride--that Congress has legislatively promoted NATO enlargement every year since 1994. To be exact, this chamber has endorsed NATO enlargement some fourteen times through unanimous consent agreements, voice votes and roll call votes. I only wish all dimensions of U.S. national security policy would receive this much public attention and endorsement. Mr. President, these arguments make it clear that America's best chance for enduring peace and stability in Europe--our best chance for staying out of war in Europe, our best chance for reinforcing what has been a strong, productive partnership with Europe--is to promote a Europe that is whole, free, and secure. What better organization to do this than the North Atlantic Alliance--an organization that has kept the peace for more than fifty years and remains unmatched in its potential to meet the security challenges of the future. The extension of NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is a critical step to ensure that the Alliance remains true to the values of the Washington Treaty, to consolidate the gains in democracy, peace, and stability in post-Cold War Europe, and to ensure that the transatlantic community is fully prepared for the challenges and opportunities of the next century. Mr. President, we should all commend the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, for producing an outstanding resolution and ratification. He has been a true leader in the effort behind NATO enlargement. He has ensured that all Members of the Senate have had ample opportunity to be fully engaged on this important matter. I applaud his leadership. Senator Helms and his colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee have produced, as I said, an outstanding resolution of ratification. I urge my colleagues to give it their unqualified support. Mr. President, I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Kurt Volker, a legislative fellow in Senator McCain's office; Bob Nickle and Ian Brzezinski of my office; and Stan Sloan, who is a member of the CRS, be granted the privilege of the floor throughout the entire debate and any vote on the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.

Mr. ROTH. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, the majority leader will notify the membership as to when this vote will occur if, in fact, the vote is necessary. In the meantime, I withdraw the motion.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. I further ask unanimous consent that at 2:15 p.m., the Senate proceed to executive session and an immediate vote on the confirmation of the nomination of Executive Calendar No. 530, Susan Graber to be a U.S. circuit judge.