William Roth

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Special Committee on Aging be authorized to meet Wednesday, September 13, 2000 from 10:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m. in Dirksen 608 for the purpose of conducting a hearing.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Small Business be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, September 13, 2000, beginning at 9:30 a.m. in room 428A of the Russell Senate Office Building to hold a roundtable entitled ``What Is Contract Bundling?''.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. I ask the distinguished Senator how much time would he like.

Mr. ROTH. I yield 20 minutes to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I am as concerned about China's repression of its citizens as anyone in this Chamber. But I believe that in passing PNTR, Congress will actually take its most important step by far in fostering democracy and improving human rights in China. That's because by enacting H.R. 4444, we will permit Americans to fully participate in China's economic development, thereby opening China to freer flows of goods, services, and information. Ultimately, that opening will change China's economy from one based on central planning to one based on free markets and capitalism. Moreover, H.R. 4444 will create a special human rights commission that will expose, and suggest remedies for, China's abusive human rights practices. The forces unleashed by American and other foreign participation in China's market opening will help sow the seeds of democracy and human rights. As Ren Wanding, the brave leader of the 1978 Democracy Wall Movement said recently, ``A free and private economy forms the base for a democratic system. So [the WTO] will make China's government programs and legal system evolve toward democracy.'' We should remember that in East Asia, the flowering of democracy in such former authoritarian countries as South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand did not occur until economic growth in each had produced a substantial middle class. American trade and investment, which will be fostered by PNTR, will help create just such a middle class in China, a group who will wield influence, and whose interests will inevitably diverge from the interests of the Communist Party. But American companies will do more than simply assist in the development of a middle class. These firms will also bring with them business practices which coincide with traits best suited to democracies. As Michael A. Santoro, a professor at Rutgers University who has studied the impact of foreign corporations on human rights conditions and democratization in China for over a decade, said in testimony before the Finance Committee, ``When Chinese workers learn the lessons of the free market they are also learning an important lesson about human rights and democracy.'' Unlike workers in state-owned enterprises whose advancement often depends on fealty to the Communist Party, workers in American firms advance based on merit. Such workers, who acquire wealth, status, and power through their own hard work instead of connections to the Communist Party are far less likely to respect the party or its functionaries. And make no mistake, today's best and the brightest in China all want to work for foreign businesses rather than in stifling state-owned enterprises, let alone for the government itself. Moreover, American firms are almost uniformly considered the most desirable because of the opportunities they offer. Now, to compete in the global market place, foreign firms doing business in China must permit free flows of information. And such flows of information, of course, are the lifeblood of democratic government. Professor Santoro stated the case well before the Finance Committee: ``In the same way that information sharing is essential to good decision-making and operational effectiveness in a corporation, free speech is essential to good decision-making in a democracy. It is hard to imagine that ideas about the importance of information flow can be confined to corporate life. Inevitably, those who work in foreign corporations and have gotten used to the free flow of economic information will wonder why their government restricts the flow of political information.'' In addition to introducing ideas about information flow within their organizations, foreign corporations are at the leading edge in terms of pressing the Chinese government toward greater legal reform and regulatory transparency. Indeed, if China is to realize the full benefits of trade with the rest of the world and comply with its WTO obligations, it has no other choice than to institute the rule of law. In fact, China is readying itself for this transformation by engaging, among others, Temple University in providing training in the development of China's business law system with a special emphasis on WTO compliance. Temple Law School has been asked by senior officials of the Chinese government to educate more judges and government officials and to establish a business law center. This endeavor will enable American and Chinese legal scholars to do joint research on issues related to business law and WTO compliance in China. It will also enable American legal scholars, attorneys, judges and government officials to meet with their Chinese counterparts on a regular, organized basis to provide input into proposed or needed legislation and enforcement in an emerging Chinese legal system that will regulate aspects of a market economy. Mr. President, foreign firms, in a very real sense, constitute the vanguard of social change in the PRC. As Professor Santoro said, ``Ultimately these social changes will pose a formidable challenge to China's government, as profound contradictions emerge between the Communist Party's authoritarian rule and China's increasingly free economy and society being created by private enterprise and the free market.'' Meanwhile, the United States and other countries must continue to press China on its human rights abuses. Such public condemnation complements the special changes that will accelerate with China's accession to the WTO. That's why the Congressional-Executive Commission on human rights in China that is created by H.R. 4444 is so important and potentially so effective. Among the tasks of that commission will be monitoring China's compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Specifically, the Commission will monitor: the right of Chinese citizens to engage in free expression without fear of prior restraint; the right to peaceful assembly without restriction; religious freedom, including the right to worship free of interference by the government; the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose a residence within China and the right to leave from and return to China; the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trail and to proper legal assistance; the right to freedom from torture and other forms of cruel or unusual punishment; protection of internationally-recognized worker rights; freedom from incarceration for political opposition to the government or for advocating human rights; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; the right to fair and public hearings by an independent tribunal for the determination of a citizen's rights and obligations; and free choice of employment. In addition, the Commission will compile and maintain lists of persons believed to be persecuted by the Government of China for pursuing their rights. It will monitor the development of the rule of law, including the development of institutions of democratic governance. And the Commission will give special emphasis to Tibet by cooperating with the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues in the Department of State. Finally, the Commission will submit to Congress and to the President an annual report of its findings including, as appropriate, recommentdations for legislative and/or executive action. Given the breadth of the Commission's work and the impact of foreign firms in China, it should come as no surprise that so many of China's most prominent dissidents and human rights advocates support the United States providng permanent normalized trade relations to China. Wang Juntao who was arrested after June 4, 1989, and was sentenced in 1991 to thirteen years in prison as one of the ``black hands'' behind the Tiananmen demonstrations provided the Finance Committee with the following statement, and I quote, ``. . . if one needs to choose between whether or not China should be admitted [to the WTO], I prefer to choose `Yes' . . . In an international environment, independent forces will be more competitive than the state-owned enterprises. Such independent forces will eventually push China toward democracy . . . An overemphasis on economic sanctions will contribute to the growth of nationalism and anti-westernism in China. This will limit both the influence of the U.S. as well as that of the democracy movement in China.'' Wang Dan, who was one of the principal organizers of the 1989 democracy movement; and who during the crackdown that followed, was listed as number one on the Chinese government's black-list of student counter-revolutionaries provided the Finance Committee with a similar statement. ``I support China's entry into the WTO,'' he said, because ``I feel this this will be beneficial for the long-term future of China because China will thus be required to abide by rules and regulations of the international community.'' Martin Lee, the brave and outspoken leader of the pro-democracy Democratic Party of Hong Kong, which yesterday took the largest share of seats in Hong Kong's elections, said that the ``participation of China in WTO would not only have economic and political benefits, but would also bolster those in China who understand that the country must embrace the rule of law. . . .'' Mr. President, it was when China was most isolated in the 1950s through the early 1970s that the Chinese people suffered the most severe depredations. The so-called Great leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution led to tens of millions dying from starvation and untold millions more suffering social dislocation and the worst forms of human rights abuses. Mr. President, at a very minimum, China's opening to the world through its accession to the WTO will make a repeat of atrocities on such an unthinkably vast scale far, far less likely. But I am convinced, Mr. President, that in passing PNTR we will do more. I believe that in passing PNTR we will have taken our most important step in advancing human rights and democratic values in China. I'd like to close with another quote from Ren Wanding, the leader of China's Democracy Wall Movement. Here's what he said: ``Before the sky was black. Now there is light . . . [China's WTO accession] can be a new beginning.'' Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to join me in opposing this amendment. I yield back all the time on both sides.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. ROTH. The Senator probably could have the vote tonight, if he wanted to.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment of my good friend. I do so with some reluctance because I am actually quite supportive of taking whatever action necessary to ensure that the President takes seriously the deadlines set forth in our trade remedy statutes. In fact, I would like to take a few minutes now to express my mounting concern about the White House's actions--or should I say, inaction?--in administering our trade laws. Frankly, I am very unhappy about the President's failure to issue decisions in sensitive trade matters by the deadlines set forth in the statutes. There are many examples. The most notable may be two recent section 201 cases, the first involving lamb meat and the second relating to steel wire rod. Both these decisions languished somewhere at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue for weeks--in direct violation of the law--before the President finally issued his decision. We are seeing the same thing now in the context of the President's decision on modifying the retaliation list in the bananas dispute. I may agree or disagree with whatever decision the President ultimately chooses to make in each of these cases. But the credibility of the trade laws rests on the process being handled with a great deal more respect and seriousness than it has been thus far. With that said, I must still oppose this amendment. As a practical matter, there are many instances in which the process established in the proposal will simply be unworkable. For example, it is not unusual for the ITC to be divided on its recommendation of relief in a particular case. Because the Commission often speaks with many voices, it is unclear which of the Commissioner's recommendations would take effect under my colleague's amendment. This problem may be remedied easily, but it clearly underscores the importance of allowing my committee the time to consider the proposal of Senator Byrd to ensure that we have considered its full implications. At least some of the problems that will arise if this amendment were to become law are already apparent to me, so I must oppose this amendment for the time being. I am also concerned that we are isolating the Chinese for differential treatment in how a trade remedy is applied. While this provision may not be inconsistent with the United States- China bilateral agreement, applying different rule to China in how we administer our trade laws could well jeopardize our ability to secure the benefits of the uderlying trade agreement. I must also oppose the amendment for the reasons that I have stated many times during these deliberations, and that is because of the potential impact that amendments will have on the passage of this legislation. In my view, a vote for any amendment, including this one, is a vote to kill PNTR. The stakes are too high for our workers and farmers to allow this legislation to die. That is why I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment of my good friend. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, September 12, 2000. The purpose of this hearing will be to review the operation of the Office of Civil Rights, USDA, and the role of the Office of General Counsel, USDA.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to meet on Tuesday, September 12, 2000, at 9:30 a.m. on Firestone tire recall.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Environment and Public Works be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, September 12, at 9:30 a.m. to conduct a hearing on proposed U.S. Department of Transportation regulations on planning and environment.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, September 12, 2000 at 9:30 a.m. to hold a hearing (agenda attached).

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, September 12, 2000, to conduct a hearing on ``congressional proposals impacting F.H.A. reserves.''

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Water and Power of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, September 12 at 2:30 p.m. to conduct an oversight hearing. The subcommittee will receive testimony on the status of the Biological Opinions of the National Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service on the operations of the Federal hydropower system of the Columbia River.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I make a point of order a quorum is not present.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I am opposed to the use of forced prison labor in the manufacture of goods for sale in international markets. And, I firmly believe that any allegation, whether with respect to China or any other nation, regarding the use of prison labor ought to be vigorously investigated under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which bars imports of prison-made goods into the United States. That said, I nonetheless rise in opposition to the proposed amendment. I do so for three reasons. First, the amendment is unnecessary. Under section 307 of the 1930 act, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Customs already have ample authority to investigate allegations that Chinese enterprises are using prison labor. No new authority is needed, and no new certification is necessary. Second, there is nothing about China's accession to the WTO or the passage of PNTR that limits in any way the ability of the United States to investigate allegations of the use of prison labor in the manufacture of goods destined for the U.S. market and to bar imports of such goods if the allegations prove true. The WTO contains a provision that expressly permits the United States, as well as other WTO members, to bar entry of goods made with prison labor from their markets. Just to be entirely clear about what the WTO allows, let me quote from the relevant title of the WTO agreement. It states that: nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . relating to the products of prison labor. In other words, we will retain the leverage we need following China's accession to the WTO to encourage China's compliance with its international commitments in respect of prison labor, particularly the 1994 bilateral agreement it signed with the United States. Third, the House bill before us, H.R. 4444, already addresses the issue of prison labor and does so more constructively. The bill creates an executive branch task force to assist the U.S. Customs Service in the effective enforcement of our laws barring imports of goods made with prison labor. As I said at the outset of my remarks, I join those who have been very critical of the Chinese Government for its failure to be more cooperative--on a more consistent basis--in rooting out and ending these practices. But, the proposed amendment would not advance our argument with the Chinese; it would, instead, prove counterproductive, by killing the chances of the passage of PNTR. In light of that fact, I ask my colleagues to join me in opposing this amendment. Again, let me reiterate, it is my deep concern that any amendment would kill this legislation, would kill PNTR. For that reason, I oppose the amendment, and urge my colleagues to do the same. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time, and ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment of my good friend from West Virginia. I do so because of my concern about the impact that amendments could have on this legislation, but also because of substantive concerns I have about his proposal. Before I address the merits of his amendment, I wanted to take a few minutes to respond to the comments he made last week regarding the manner in which this legislation is being considered. He very colorfully described this legislation as a ``greased pig'' and protested that the Senate had not had adequate time to consider its merits. I am sorry that he feels this way, because with all the time I've spent on this legislation and with all the time I've waited for PNTR to be brought to the floor, I can say that this is no greased pig. This legislation has been given a full and adequate hearing. The Finance Committee, which I chair, held three hearings on PNTR this year alone. At these hearings we heard from a full range of witnesses, pro and con, who discussed the significance of this agreement, not just from the perspective of trade, but also from the perspectives of foreign policy, human rights, religious freedom, labor rights, and others. We have also benefited from the careful reviews by the Congressional Research Service, the International Trade Commission and the General Accounting Office, which has a team of analysts who have been following the China negotiations closely for several years now. My committee also held an open markup, where the committee approved PNTR all but unanimously, by a vote of 19 to 1. My committee also considered the House-passed legislation in executive session, where my colleagues agreed with me and the distinguished ranking member, Senator Moynihan, that we should support the legislation as passed. Those actions, together with the hearings on PNTR that have been conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee, the Commerce Committee, and others hardly constitute rushed consideration of this important legislation. Let us not forget that this legislation has been on the floor for consideration by the full Senate for 6 days, and will likely be here for another week. During this time we have been in regular order, and have welcomed all amendments. I would be hard pressed to think of another piece of recent legislation that has received more time and scrutiny that this has. All of us who support PNTR understand well that amending this bill will threaten its passage. Our opponents, I think, understand this even better. In the end, it is an exercise of our prerogatives to vote against amendments, given the threat they pose to the legislation. It is entirely appropriate for us to do so. After all, there is nothing that can be added or subtracted from the legislation that will enhance our access to the Chinese market. There is also nothing that can be added or subtracted that will strengthen the unequivocal support contained in this legislation for human rights, labor rights, and the rule of law. With that said, let me take a few minutes to discuss my colleague's amendment regarding subsidies. Although I unequivocally share Senator Byrd's views regarding the importance of compliance and regarding the significance of China's subsidies commitments, I must still oppose his proposal. I do so, not just because of my already stated concern about amendments, but also because of the substance of this amendment, which, in my view, is both redundant and flawed. I would point my good friend to section 1106 of the Trade Act of 1988. The provision already conditions the President's extension of PNTR to China on a finding that China's state-owned enterprises are not disruptive to our trading interests. While I know that my colleague's amendment is crafted somewhat differently, the fundamental purpose of his amendment is already contained in section 1106. As such, it is redundant, and not necessary. Moreover, this amendment overlooks the fact that we already have a specific time table for China to come into compliance with its commitments in this area--and that is the date of accession. The amendment directs that China identify every entity receiving state support, yet the key feature of WTO disciplines is that they apply to the subsidy programs themselves. The Chinese have already agreed to end all prohibited subsidies, which is far more important that asking for a detailed company-by-company accounting of who gets what prior to China's entry into the WTO. Such an accounting, ironically, would delay accession, undermining the goal of achieving the subsidy disciplines in the first place. All this is not to say that I, as chairman of the Finance Committee, believe that China's integration into the WTO system will be without complications. Setbacks and conflicts are inevitable. Anyone who thinks otherwise misunderstands the magnitude of the task that lays ahead for the Chinese. That is why H.R. 4444 already directs USTR to provide a detailed annual report on China's compliance with its WTO commitments. That is also why the legislation authorizes the funds necessary to allow USTR, the Department of Commerce and other agencies to have the personnel necessary to monitor China's compliance and to take whatever actions necessary to enforce our rights. The WTO process also takes full account of the imperative of monitoring China's compliance. That is why the WTO will establish a transitional review mechanism, through which WTO members will conduct regular reviews of all aspects of China's compliance. These reviews will be conducted as a matter of course and will avoid the need to resort to dispute settlement each time a conflict arises. The Chinese have already agreed to such a review, though the specifics are still being worked out. That is why H.R. 4444 contains an unequivocal statement of Congress's support for such a review. I will take this opportunity to restate to both the administration and to the Chinese that it is imperative that the PRC be subjected to as rigorous a review as possible. This is essential not just for the United States, but also for the viability of the WTO. In the end, I say to my good friend from West Virginia that we share a common objective, to end and I emphasize end--China's prohibited subsidies. At best, however, this amendment simply delays that goal. None of the benefits of China's compliance will become available to us unless we pass PNTR. As I have said many times, any amendment added to this bill will likely kill this legislation, and kill the benefits of China's WTO commitments for our farmers and our workers. That is why I must oppose the amendment of my good friend.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment of my distinguished colleagues from Tennessee and New Jersey. While my friends have in good faith tried to address a critical issue--the serious national security threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery--I believe the approach they take in this legislation is flawed. I say this as a former chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee--the committee with jurisdiction over nuclear export policy. Indeed, it was during my tenure in that position that the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty came up for extension. I spent a good deal of my time in 1995 working to build congressional support for the NPT's permanent and unconditional extension. Without the backing of Congress, the U.S. would not have been able to exercise the strong leadership essential to overcoming opposition from an assortment of countries. Fortunately, on May 11, 1995, the more than 170 countries party to the NPT agreed to extend the treaty without condition or qualification. That was a proud day for me and a truly historic day in our ongoing efforts to make ours a safer and more peaceful world. The amendment before us today reflects similar admirable intentions. However, there is a gap in this legislation between intention and result. In particular, this legislation relies on sanctions that are too widely drawn and too loosely conceived to prove effective in countering proliferation. In addition, this amendment will harm our workers and businesses, our key alliances, and the multilateral non-proliferation regime that is essential to stemming proliferation in a global economy. Finally, I believe this legislation will significantly compromise our ability to address the two most important foreign policy challenges this country faces--China's rise and Russia's potential slide into instability. I will discuss each of these problems in turn, beginning with sanctions. This amendment uses as its principal tool unilateral sanctions. Indeed, this amendment represents the single largest expansion in our reliance on unilateral sanctions since the end of the cold war. And if there is one thing Congress should recognize after so many attempts at using such methods to force other countries to change their behavior, it is that, as Brent Scowcroft put it: . . . the record of U.S. unilateral sanctions is one of unblemished failure. In a global economy, shutting off Chinese and Russian access to American goods and capital markets will not change Chinese or Russian behavior. Indeed, as Frank Carlucci noted in a letter he recently sent me, such actions . . . would likely isolate the United States, not China, giving our European and Asian competitors an open field in providing goods, services and financing to the most populous nation in the world. The fact is that telling China or Russia to buy machinery, aircraft and agricultural products from our competitors in Europe, Canada and Japan, instead of from the United States, does not provide us any leverage. That is because American workers and companies will be punished rather than Chinese or Russian proliferators. Moreover, for the first time, U.S. securities markets will be used as a sanctioning tool. This is a particularly troubling aspect of this amendment because our capital markets have played such an enormously important role in fueling America's record-breaking economic expansion, and the strength of our capital markets is based on a degree of predictability and political certainty that this amendment would undermine. That is one of the reasons why Alan Greenspan opposes this legislation. But there are other reasons he took this position. Let me quote what he said in testifying before the Senate Banking Committee a couple of months ago. I will do so at some length because I think his views-- especially when expressed in such strong and unusually unambiguous terms--are worth heeding: In addition to questioning the value of this amendment, there's a very serious question as to whether it will produce indeed what is suggested it will produce. First let me just say that the remarkable evolution of the American financial system, especially in recent years, had undoubtedly been a major factor in the extraordinary economy we've experienced, and it's the openness and the lack of political pressures within the system which has made it such an effective component of our economy and indeed has drawn foreigners generally to the American markets for financing as being the most efficient place where they can, in many cases, raise funds. But it is a mistake to believe that the rest of the world is without similar resources. Indeed, there's huge dollar markets all over the world to lend dollars. Because of the arbitrage that exists on a very sophisticated level throughout the world, the interest rates and the availability of funds are not materially different abroad than here. We do have certain advantages, certain techniques, which probably give us a competitive advantage, but they are relatively minor. But most importantly, to the extent that we block foreigners from investing or raising funds in the United States, we probably undercut the viability of our own system. But far more important is I'm not even sure how such a law could be effectively implemented because there is a huge amount of transfer of funds around the world. For example, if we were to block China or anybody else from borrowing in the United States, they could very readily borrow in London and be financed by American investors. Or, if not in London, if London were financed by American investors, London could be financed, for example, by Paris investors, and we finance the Paris investors. In other words, there are all sorts of mechanisms that are involved here. So the presumption that somehow we block the capability of China or anybody else borrowing in essentially identical terms abroad as here in my judgment is a mistake. So a most fundamental concern about this particular amendment is it doesn't have any capacity of which I'm aware to work. And by being put in effect, the only thing that strikes me is a reasonable expectation that it would harm us more than it would harm others. The sanctions in this amendment are not only unilateral and uniquely encompass our securities markets; they are also indiscriminate in their application. Sanctions in the amendment would apply to ``persons'' defined as ``any individual, or partnership, business association, society, trust, organization, or any other group created or organized under the laws of a country; and any government entity.'' The problem with mandatory sanctions is that they force a rigid response, one as likely to exacerbate a problem as solve it. At a minimum, they do not permit the discretion necessary to determine whether or not the sanctions provide the best approach to achieving the non-proliferation goals we all share. Let us not forget that the mandatory sanctions of the Glenn amendment did not deter India or Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons. Those sanctions, however, did have an impact. Unfortunately, the impact was a negative one, causing harm to our farmers grievous enough for Congress to provide relief by passing the Brownback amendment. Now even though the President is theoretically able to waive sanctions, Congress gains the power to overturn the President's decision through a procedure similar to and as cumbersome, disruptive and counterproductive to American interests as, the one we currently use in annually renewing normal trade relations with China. For example, the amendment provides fast-track procedures for automatic consideration of joint resolutions, automatic referral of joint resolutions to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee, automatic discharge from committee, and privileged status on the floor of both the House and Senate for the resolutions. In other words, this amendment provides for procedures virtually identical to those specified in the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which has forced Congress to engage in it annual--and notably sterile--debates on China's trade status. PNTR would end this counterproductive process, unless of course this amendment were to pass. If it did, annual votes would resume on sanctions, and not only on China, but also on Russia, North Korea, and undoubtedly other countries as well. In fact, the amendment defines a ``covered country'' to include any country that was previously listed in the Director of Central Intelligence's Section 721 report and identified as a ``source or supply of dual-use and other technology,'' unless that country has not been identified by the DCI for 5 consecutive years. In 1997, the section 721 report listed some of our closest allies, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France, as targets of acquisition for WMD programs. The amendment thus could force us to sanction some of our closest allies, including those who work most closely with us in the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I cannot believe that sanctioning allies who have actively worked with the United States to enforce international nonproliferation agreements will help us in furthering mutual nonproliferation efforts. Surely such actions will make future multilateral cooperation--which is absolutely essential to solving proliferation problems--far more difficult. In fact, that point was made by the Ambassadors of Sweden and France and the Charge of the European Commission in a joint letter they sent me. Here is a part of what they said: We would like to emphasize the member states of the EU are strictly adhering to and enforcing the provisions of the multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers' Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Wassenar Arrangement) and are parties to all the relevant Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention. The EU works closely with the US in stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have worked jointly to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes and to address specific cases. Against this background, we are concerned that [the Thompson amendment] could potentially be used to threaten EU entities with US sanctions. These EU entities are fully subject to EU member states' controls in compliance with all non-proliferation and export control regimes. We are also highly concerned by attempts to broaden the scope of export controls beyond those agreed at the multilateral level. Let us reiterate that the EU and its Member States fully share the United States' determination to effectively combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as we express it in the Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation, which was issued at the May 1998 US-EU Summit . . . However, we urge you to clearly target these pieces of legislation and thus to avoid the surely unintended consequence of undermining US-EU cooperation on non-proliferation matters. We would also like to remind you that any legislation of this type undermines the credibility of multilateral efforts in the field of non-proliferation. This last point the Europeans make--about how this legislation may undermine multilateral nonproliferation efforts is one shared by American proliferation experts such as Frank Carlucci. As he said in his letter to me: The important and serious issue of Chinese arms transfers requires a concerted and effective multilateral-- I emphasize the word ``multilat- eral''-- response, not the imposition of unilateral sanctions which would have no effect on the sources of the transfers. The United States must provide leadership to the international community on this issue, not isolate itself from our allies by pursuing a course of action that no other nation will follow. Just as troubling as the sanctions themselves are the evidentiary standards used to trigger the sanctions. The measure of proof for violation of U.S. nonproliferation and export control policies, and thus the threshold for invoking sanctions contemplated by this amendment, is one of ``credible information.'' When this term has been used in the past, it has been defined as ``information which produces a firm suspicion, but by itself, may not be sufficient to persuade a reasonable person with confidence'' that the sanctionable activity took place. Surely, critical national security actions should be based on a higher standard, especially when they are being applied to our closest allies. There is one other aspect of this amendment that concerns me. Indeed, it is the one I find most troubling of all. This amendment will severely constrain the next administration in developing the sort of coherent, consistent, and comprehensive policies toward China and Russia that the United States has so sorely lacked for 8 years. As important as curbing Chinese and Russian proliferation activities is, we must deal with the whole broad range of challenges these two countries present to U.S. interests. In the case of China, for example, we have an interest in peacefully resolving the cross-straits issue as well as the potentially incendiary problems afflicting the Korean Peninsula, South Asia, and the South China Sea. We have an interest in encouraging China's transition to capitalism and the attendant political reform I believe that transition will help foster. And we have an interest in continuing to press China to provide its citizens basic human rights and religious freedoms. In the case of Russia, we have an interest in fostering the evolution of true democracy, capitalism, and the rule of law; in curbing corruption and in resolving the deadly conflict in Chechnya and the continuing instability in the Balkans. Given these and other critical foreign policy challenges posed by China's rise and Russia's potential slide into instability, we will not hold our policies hostage to individual issues, as important as those issues may be. Stemming proliferation by China, Russia, and other countries will only be possible if we get our overall policies toward those countries right. Let me read something from a report on China put out recently by the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project which I think is instructive. Here is what it says: Encouraging Chinese acceptance of global non-proliferation norms has been a long-term process, concurrent with the larger effort to normalize relations with China . . . During the years of isolation from the West, China's posture rhetorically favored nuclear weapons proliferation, particularly in the Third World, as a rallying point for anti-imperialism. Through the 1970s, China's policy was not to oppose nuclear proliferation, which it still saw as limiting U.S. and Soviet power. After China began to open to the West in the 1970s, its rhetorical position gradually shifted to one of opposing nuclear proliferation, explicitly so after 1983. China's nuclear and arms trade practices did not, however, conform to international non-proliferation regime standards, and major efforts over two decades were required to persuade China to bring its nuclear trade practices into closer alignment with the policies of the other nuclear supplier states. [Yet] there is still a gap that needs to be closed . . . China is still on a learning curve, and endemic problems of a political, cultural and organizational nature exist in China's decision-making apparatus . . . Thus, continued vigilance and diplomatic interchange with China will certainly be necessary on nuclear matters. The missile, chemical and biological areas will also require diligent attention. Up to 1994, China made progress on MTCR requirements. But it is still not clear that its professed restraint applies, as the MTCR requires, to missile components and technology--nor, indeed, that the restraint applies to more than complete `ground-to-ground' missiles. Compliance in this area, which is not defined by treaty, is harder to nail down with standards that China can accept politically--and also entails more scope for ambiguities. The chemical area is defined by treaty, provides for declarations, and lists restricted items, but it covers a very large industrial domain. In short, Mr. President, stemming proliferation by China--or by Russia, for that matter--is a complicated matter that cuts across our broader bilateral relationship. To achieve the goals we all share of ending proliferation, sustained examination, discussion and debate by the Congress and the next Administration is essential. And negotiation and diplomatic interchange with the Chinese and the Russians must not be constrained by unilateral sanctions, as frustrating as those negotiations have been and will continue to be. Proliferation is a matter of vital national interest. In voting against this amendment, I will vote against its flaws but not its intent. In fact, I applaud my friend from Tennessee for raising this issue, and I hope he will continue his work in this critical area next year, when we will have the time to examine the issue thoroughly, and I hope come to agreement on a measure that will gain the support of an overwhelming majority of this Chamber. Only then can we send the Chinese and other proliferators the right message about the urgency with which we view stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, September 12, the Senate proceed to a vote on amendment No. 4117, with time tomorrow morning before 10 o'clock equally divided in the usual form for closing remarks.

Mr. ROTH

Mr. ROTH. In a very real way, isn't this agreement all about whether America, the United States, our workers, our farmers, our businessmen, are going to have access to the Chinese markets? Isn't that what we are talking about?

Mr. ROTH. Absolutely. Visitors heard nothing but the party line. We talked to one person, met somebody else, and we heard exactly the same thing. Now make no mistake, we all understand it is no democracy.