Ed Royce

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Harper), a member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hill), a member of the Committee on Financial Services.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Holding), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Coffman).

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, President Reagan walked away from a bad deal in Iceland. He walked away, and then he applied pressure; and as a consequence of that pressure, he then got a good deal. In the case of this administration, they did not walk away from a bad deal during the interim agreement. As a matter of fact, this administration rejected the stronger pressure that this House passed, with a vote of 400-20, and held that bill up in the Senate during its negotiations in the prior Congress and did not give us the leverage we needed for a good deal. But that is still available to us. Frankly, we all have experience with North Korea. We remember what happened. But Iran won't have to cheat like North Korea did to get close to a bomb, and that is because the essential restrictions on Iran's key bomb-making technology expire. They sunset in 10 to 15 years. After these restrictions expire, Iran will be left with an internationally recognized, industrial-scale nuclear program-- and that is what the President concedes. As the President said of his own agreement, in year 13, 14, 15, Iran's breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero. A former State Department official testified to the Foreign Affairs Committee that this sunset clause is a disaster. It will enable the leading state sponsor of terrorism to produce enough material for dozens of nuclear weapons, all under the terms of the agreement. As another expert witness pointed out, the bet that the administration is taking is that in 10 or 15 years, we will have a kinder, gentler Iran. But we are not going to have a kinder, gentler Iran because we are releasing to Iran $100 billion in immediate sanctions relief. That is the down payment. And Iran is guaranteed in all of this a reconnection to the global economy. Now, the point I want to make to the Members here is that that does not go to the average Iranian. It is the Quds Forces; it is the IRGC; it is the clerics that took over the major corporations in Iran; they are the ones that are going to receive that $100 billion, and we already know the impact of that. It is going to solidify the Supreme Leader's grip on power. That is why he did the deal, to keep his revolution intact. We had the bottom falling out of the price of oil. We had hyperinflation in Iran. We were in the position, had we exerted the additional pressure, to force a real choice between economic collapse and actual compromise on this program rather than what we got. But, by removing economic sanctions, the President is withdrawing one of our most successful peaceful tools from confronting the regime; and, as a result, 200 retired generals and admirals concluded this agreement will enable Iran to become far more dangerous. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kinzinger).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Womack).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Costello).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Walberg).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Meehan).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. McCarthy), our majority leader.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Young).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Holding).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Duncan), the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Poliquin).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Rokita).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 days to revise and extend their remarks and to submit extraneous materials on this measure.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation, which would prohibit the President from waiving Iran sanctions and prevent the implementation of this fatally flawed agreement. Last night, we spent many hours debating this agreement. We heard from Members on both sides of the aisle, Members who have deep concerns about where we are headed. Mr. Speaker, let's be very clear. This isn't just a bad deal; it is a disastrous deal. It is a disaster for the United States; it is a disaster for our allies and friends in the region, including Israel. When you think about it, when we think about the letter that we sent--84 percent of us in this House signed a letter asking for four critical things in this negotiation--we got rolled on every one of the four. Iran won on every point. Iran gets to keep its nuclear infrastructure. The Obama administration collapsed on the issue of verification. We don't have anywhere, anytime inspections in here. We have got self-inspections by the Iranian regime with respect to Parchin, which is the one military site where we know--we know--that the Iranians, because of 1,000 pages of documents, did most of their bomb work. They say now: No, no, no, we will do the inspections. We will turn that stuff over, but nobody is going into our military sites. That is the argument they are making. The sunset clause in this means that key parts of this deal expire at the end of the deal. We have got permanent sanctions relief for the Iranian regime, relief that is going to go into their military, in exchange for temporary constraints on Iran's nuclear program. The restrictions on Iran's missile program designed to deliver those weapons--now, this came up in the eleventh hour of this negotiation. No one anticipated it being in the agreement. At the eleventh hour, the Russians came forward and, on behalf of the Iranians, said: We want the lifting of the sanctions, international sanctions, that the community has on the ICBM program and on the arms transfers with respect to Iran. Unbelievably, we ended up getting rolled on this as well. As the Secretary of Defense told Congress, the I in ICBM stands for intercontinental, meaning flying from Iran to the United States. That is why--that is why--we never wanted this lifted. It also provides resources and legitimacy to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, the very same organization that has killed 500 U.S. troops in Iraq. This nuclear deal really needs to be put in a larger context of the administration's Iran policy. It is very dangerous; it is very risky, and I would say it is doomed to fail as a policy, given the fact that we haven't seen any adjustment out of Iran other than a recommittal on the part of the regime in Iran where they say: We are not going to be bound by any of the ballistic missile constraints. We don't intend to follow that, and by the way, we are advancing new ballistic missiles and targeting and putting that into the hands of Hezbollah and into the hands of Hamas. That is the messaging we have seen this week out of Iran. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would just make the point that, with respect to Ronald Reagan, when President Reagan was presented with a bad deal at Reykjavik, while in his negotiations with the Russians, at that point, he walked away from that deal. He pushed away from the deal because, in his mind, we could come back and get a better deal if we stood our ground. This was not the circumstance with respect to our negotiations with Iran. With the Iranian negotiations, we had four points that this Congress--84 percent of us in a letter to the Secretary of State--laid out. Those points were that it was supposed to be anywhere, anytime inspections; it was supposed to last multiple decades; we were not supposed to lift the sanctions up front but do it over the entirety of the agreement in order to get compliance, to ensure we had compliance; and it was to make certain that those 12 questions that the IAEA had asked were answered. These were all important because, again, as Reagan pointed out to the Russians--and threw their own expression back to them--he said: There is an old Russian expression, ``trust, but verify,'' and that is what we need to apply to the agreement. That is the last point I would make here, the verification component of it, when you have side agreements which Congress has not seen and those side agreements, in the case of Parchin--where we have ample evidence of their past bomb work--allow the Iranians to do their own inspections. I mean, I always thought it was going to be international inspectors who did the international inspections, not the Iranians, themselves. For these reasons, I do not think it is analogous. I think, in fact, we should do what Reagan did at Reykjavik, which is to push back and say, no, we need a better deal, and we need a deal with verification-- trust, but verify. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Montana (Mr. Zinke), who served our country with distinction as a U.S. Navy SEAL.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes. I want to underscore the point the gentleman from Illinois made a few minutes ago. This deal effectively shreds the bipartisan Non- Proliferation Treaty, a bipartisan accomplishment, an accomplishment that has served to curtail proliferation for 50 years now. As a consequence of this action, for the first time, we are going to make an exception for Iran, an exception that everyone else is going to demand; and we are going to see an arms race, if this deal goes through, not just in the Middle East, but one that is going to threaten the wider world as well. I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. Hartzler).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 412, I call up the bill (H.R. 3460) to suspend until January 21, 2017, the authority of the President to waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of sanctions pursuant to an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following letter: Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House. Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader. Hon. Mitch McConnell, Majority Leader. Hon. Harry Reid, Minority Leader. Dear Representatives Boehner and Pelosi and Senators McConnell and Reid: As you know, on July 14, 2015, the United States and five other nations announced that a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been reached with Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. In our judgment as former senior military officers, the agreement will not have that effect. Removing sanctions on Iran and releasing billions of dollars to its regime over the next ten years is inimical to the security of Israel and the Middle East. There is no credibility within JCPOA's inspection process or the ability to snap back sanctions once lifted, should Iran violate the agreement. In this and other respects, the JCPOA would threaten the national security and vital interests of the United States and, therefore, should be disapproved by the Congress. The agreement as constructed does not ``cut off every pathway'' for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. To the contrary, it actually provides Iran with a legitimate path to doing that simply by abiding by the deal. JCPOA allows all the infrastructure the Iranians need for a nuclear bomb to be preserved and enhanced. Notably, Iran is allowed to: continue to enrich uranium; develop and test advanced centrifuges; and continue work on its Arak heavy-water plutonium reactor. Collectively, these concessions afford the Iranians, at worst, a ready breakout option and, at best, an incipient nuclear weapons capability a decade from now. The agreement is unverifiable. Under the terms of the JCPOA and a secret side deal (to which the United States is not privy), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be responsible for inspections under such severe limitations as to prevent them from reliably detecting Iranian cheating. For example, if Iran and the inspectors are unable to reach an accommodation with respect to a given site, the result could be at least a 24-day delay in IAEA access. The agreement also requires inspectors to inform Iran in writing as to the basis for its concerns about an undeclared site, thus further delaying access. Most importantly, these inspections do not allow access to Iranian military facilities, the most likely location of their nuclear weapons development efforts. In the JCPOA process, there is substantial risk of U.S. intelligence being compromised, since the IAEA often relies on our sensitive data with respect to suspicious and/or prohibited activity. While failing to assure prevention of Iran's nuclear weapons development capabilities, the agreement provides by some estimates $150 billion dollars or more to Iran in the form of sanctions relief. As military officers, we find it unconscionable that such a windfall could be given to a regime that even the Obama administration has acknowledged will use a portion of such funds to continue to support terrorism in Israel, throughout the Middle East and globally, whether directly or through proxies. These actions will be made all the more deadly since the JCPOA will lift international embargoes on Iran's access to advanced conventional weapons and ballistic missile technology. In summary, this agreement will enable Iran to become far more dangerous, render the Mideast still more unstable and introduce new threats to American interests as well as our allies. In our professional opinion, far from being an alternative to war, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action makes it likely that the war the Iranian regime has waged against us since 1979 will continue, with far higher risks to our national security interests. Accordingly, we urge the Congress to reject this defective accord. Sincerely, Admiral David Architzel, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, US Navy, Retired; General William Begert, US Air Force, Retired; General J.B. Davis, US Air Force, Retired; Admiral William A. Dougherty, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Leon A. ``Bud'' Edney, US Navy, Retired; General Alfred G. Hansen, US Air Force, Retired; Admiral Thomas Hayward, US Navy, Retired; Admiral James Hogg, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Jerome Johnson, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Timothy J. Keating, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Robert J. Kelly, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez, US Navy, Retired; Admiral James A. ``Ace'' Lyons, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Richard Macke, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Henry Mauz, US Navy, Retired; General Lance Smith, US Air Force, Retired; Admiral Leighton Smith, US Navy, Retired; Admiral William D. Smith, US Navy, Retired; General Louis C. Wagner, Jr., US Army, Retired; Admiral Steve White, US Navy, Retired; General Ronald W. Yates, US Air Force, Retired. Lieutenant General Teddy G. Allen, US Army, Retired; Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson, III, US Army, Retired; Lieutenant General Marcus A. Anderson, US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant General Spence M. Armstrong, US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant General Harold W. Blot, US Marine Corps, Retired; Vice Admiral Michael Bowman, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General William G. ``Jerry'' Boykin, US Army, Retired; Vice Admiral Edward S. Briggs, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General Richard E. ``Tex'' Brown III, US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant General William J. Campbell, US Air Force, Retired; Vice Admiral Edward Clexton, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral Daniel L. Cooper, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral William A. Dougherty, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General Brett Dula, US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant General Gordon E. Fornell, US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant General Thomas B. Goslin, US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant General Earl Hailston, US Marine Corps, Retired; Vice Admiral Bernard M. Kauderer, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General Timothy A. Kinnan, US Air Force, Retired; Vice Admiral J.B. LaPlante, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral Tony Less, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General Bennett L. Lewis, US Army, Retired; Vice Admiral Michael Malone, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral John Mazach, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney, US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant General Fred McCorkle, US Marine Corps, Retired; Vice Admiral Robert Monroe, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral Jimmy Pappas, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral J. Theodore Parker, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General Garry L. Parks, US Marine Corps, Retired; Lieutenant General Everett Pratt, US Air Force, Retired; Vice Admiral John Poindexter, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General Clifford ``Ted'' Rees, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Vice Admiral William Rowden, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral Robert F. Schoultz, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General E.G. ``Buck'' Shuler, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant General Hubert ``Hugh'' G. Smith, US Army, Retired. Vice Admiral Edward M. Straw, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General David J. Teal, US Air Force, Retired; Vice Admiral D.C. ``Deese'' Thompson, US Coast Guard, Retired; Lieutenant General William E. Thurman, US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant General Billy Tomas, US Army, Retired; Vice Admiral John Totushek, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral Timothy W. Wright, US Navy, Retired. Rear Admiral William V. Alford, Jr., US Navy, Retired; Major General Thurman E. Anderson, US Army, Retired; Major General Joseph T. Anderson, US Marine Corps, Retired; Rear Admiral Philip Anselmo, US Navy, Retired; Major General Joe Arbuckle, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral James W. Austin, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral John R. Batzler, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral John Bayless, US Navy, Retired; Major General John Bianchi, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Donald Vaux Boecker, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Jerry C. Breast, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Bruce B. Bremner, US Navy, Retired; Major General Edward M. Browne, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Thomas F. Brown III, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Lyle Bull, US Navy, Retired; Major General Bobby G. Butcher, US Marine Corps, Retired; Rear Admiral Jay A. Campbell, US Navy, Retired; Major General Henry D. Canterbury, US Air Force, Retired; Major General Carroll D. Childers, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Ronald L. Christenson, US Navy, Retired; Major General John R.D. Cleland, US Army, Retired; Major General Richard L. Comer, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Jack Dantone, US Navy, Retired; Major General William B. Davitte, US Air Force, Retired; Major General James D. Delk, US Army, Retired; Major General Felix Dupre, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Philip A. Dur, US Navy, Retired; Major General Neil L. Eddins, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Paul Engel, US Navy, Retired; Major General Vince Falter, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral James H. Flatley, US Navy, Retired. Major General Bobby O. Floyd, US Air Force, Retired; Major General Paul Fratarangelo, US Marine Corps, Retired; Rear Admiral Veronica ``Ronne'' Froman, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral R. Byron Fuller, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Frank Gallo, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Albert A. Gallotta, Jr., US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral James Mac Gleim, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Robert H. Gormley, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral William Gureck, US Navy, Retired; Major General Gary L. Harrell, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Donald Hickman, US Navy, Retired; Major General Geoffrey Higginbotham, US Marine Corps, Retired; Major General Kent H. Hillhouse, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Tim Hinkle, US Navy, Retired; Major General Victor Joseph Hugo, US Army, Retired; Major General James P. Hunt, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Grady L. Jackson, US Navy, Retired; Major General William K. James, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral John M. ``Carlos'' Johnson, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Pierce J. Johnson, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Steven B. Kantrowitz, US Navy, Retired; Major General Maurice W. Kendall, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Charles R. Kubic, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Frederick L. Lewis, US Navy, Retired; Major General John D. Logeman, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Major General Homer S. Long, Jr., US Army, Retired; Major General Robert M. Marquette, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Robert B. McClinton, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral W. J. McDaniel, MD, US Navy, Retired; Major General Keith W. Meurlin, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Terrence McKnight, US Navy, Retired; Major General John F. Miller, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Major General Burton R. Moore, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral David R. Morris, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Ed Nelson, Jr., US Coast Guard, Retired; Major General George W. ``Nordie'' Norwood, US Air Force, Retired; Major General Everett G. Odgers, US Air Force, Retired. Rear Admiral Phillip R. Olson, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Robert S. Owens, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Robert O. Passmore, US Navy, Retired; Major General Richard E. Perraut, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral W.W. Pickavance, Jr., US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral L.F. Picotte, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Thomas J. Porter, US Navy, Retired; Major General H. Douglas Robertson, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral W.J. Ryan, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Norman Saunders, US Coast Guard, Retired; Major General John P. Schoeppner, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Major General Edison E. Scholes, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Hugh P. Scott, US Navy, Retired; Major General Richard Secord, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral James M. Seely, US Navy, Retired; Major General Sidney Shachnow, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral William H. Shawcross, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Bob Shumaker, US Navy, Retired; Major General Willie Studer, US Air Force, Retired; Major General Larry Taylor, US Marine Corps, Retired; Rear Admiral Jeremy Taylor, US Navy, Retired; Major General Richard L. Testa, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Robert P. Tiernan, US Navy, Retired; Major General Paul E. Vallely, US Army, Retired; Major General Kenneth W. Weir, US Marine Corps, Retired; Major General John Welde, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral James B. Whittaker, US Navy, Retired; Major General Geoffrey P. Wiedeman, Jr., MD, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral H. Denny Wisely, US Navy, Retired. Brigadier General John R. Allen, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General John C. Arick, US Marine Corps, Retired; Brigadier General Loring R. Astorino, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Robert E. Besal, US Navy, Retired; Brigadier General William Bloomer, US Marine Corps, Retired; Brigadier General George P. Cole, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Richard A. Coleman, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General James L. Crouch, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Marianne B. Drew, US Navy, Retired; Brigadier General Philip M. Drew, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Larry K. Grundhauser, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Thomas W. Honeywill, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Gary M. Jones, US Army, Retired; Brigadier General Stephen Lanning, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Thomas J. Lennon, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Bobby C. Lee, US Navy, Retired; Brigadier General Robert F. Peksens, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Joe Shaefer, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Graham E. Shirley, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Stanley O. Smith, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Hugh B. Tant III, US Army, Retired; Brigadier General Michael Joseph Tashjian, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General William Tiernan, US Marine Corps, Retired; Brigadier General Roger W. Scearce, US Army, Retired; Brigadier General Robert V. Woods, US Air Force, Retired.

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, to begin with, I would like to also submit later for the Record a letter by 200 retired generals and flag officers and admirals in terms of why they are opposed to this deal and why they feel it would make the national security challenges for the United States more problematic. The second point I would make is that Nasrallah, who is the head of Hezbollah, says this about this deal: Iran will become richer and wealthier and will also become more influential under the deal reached this week. This will also reinforce the position of its allies. A stronger and wealthier Iran in the coming phase will be able to stand by its allies and especially the Palestinian resistance more than at any other time in history. What does that mean? I can tell you what it means because, in 2006, when I chaired the Terrorism Subcommittee, we were in Haifa when Nasrallah was firing off the Iranian-made rockets with 90,000 ball bearings in the warheads into the town of Haifa; there were 600 victims inside the trauma hospitals, and now, Iran has transferred over 80,000 missiles. What is it Nasrallah wants that he doesn't have currently? He wants guidance systems so that those missiles will hit targets, such as individual buildings in Tel Aviv, the airport, Jerusalem. That is what he needs. That is what Iran is telling Nasrallah it will provide. It needs the hard currency and with this agreement will come the hard currency. It is also committed to restock the inventory that Hamas used when it fired off its rockets into Israel from Gaza and to rebuild the tunnels; all of this is what the Iranians seek to fund, but to do that, they need the sanctions lifted. When they lift those sanctions, who is going to be the primary beneficiary? It is going to be people such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps that will be strengthened. Look, Mr. Speaker, if this agreement goes through, Iran gets a cash bonanza. It gets a boost to its international standing. It gets a lighted path toward nuclear weapons. With sweeping sanctions relief, we have lessened our ability to challenge Iran's conduct across the board. As Iran grows stronger, we will be weaker to respond. The question before us today is whether temporary constraints on Iran's nuclear program are worth the price of permanent sanctions relief. When I say the Revolutionary Guard is going to be the beneficiary, I say that because they are the ones that have taken over so many of the major companies in Iran and they are working to destabilize the entire Middle East. That organization fuels the Assad regime in Syria today. Those rockets are being launched by the Quds Force into Israel. They are going to provide them with more weapons and more military personnel. That organization backs the Houthi rebels. There were 200 Quds Forces that were on the vanguard when they overthrew our ally in Yemen, and they overran that country. It is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American troops in Iraq. The IRGC exports terrorism throughout that region. It holds sway over Iran's nuclear program. It brutally, brutally represses internal dissent, and as part of the Iranian agreement, the IRGC is going to be bolstered in a big way, and I will explain how else. It is going to have the funds to build up its tanks, its fighter jets, and the intercontinental ballistic missiles. The European sanctions on the elite Quds Forces--this is the group that does the political assassinations, assassinations outside Iran, and does the terrorist work outside of Iran--that is going to be lifted on the European side. The administration signed off on these concessions. The deal will allow sales of aircraft and parts to Iranian airlines, which the Quds Force uses to move its people and weapons throughout the region. The IRGC controls key parts, as I said, of the Iranian economy--the largest construction companies, the telecom sector, shipping. Ninety current and former IRGC officials and companies will be taken off the sanctions list as a result of this deal. Even sanctions on the head of Iran's elite Quds Force, General Soleimani, will be coming off. Soleimani had been involved in the plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington, D.C. While still under a UN travel ban, Soleimani traveled to Moscow on July 24, 10 days after the Iran nuclear agreement was announced, and he held meetings with the Russian Defense Minister and with President Vladimir Putin. Believe me, those meetings are about weapon systems, which the Russians want to sell to the Quds Force, to the Iranians. The IRGC is the biggest sponsor of terror throughout the Middle East and even tried to carry out a terrorist attack here. Under the nuclear agreement, as Iran is reconnected to the global economy, the IRGC is going to be the biggest winner. The agreement helps legitimize Soleimani and gives additional resources to the mastermind behind the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism and eyeing future weapon sales. It was Russia that teamed up with Iran in the eleventh hour, after we thought this deal was done, to insist on one more thing, the lifting of the arms embargo. I just ask you: If they did that, whose side do you think Moscow is going to take when Iran tests this agreement? Now, we talked a little bit about the younger generation in Iran. Yes, yes, 55 percent is under 30, but it is not those 55 percent under 30 that are going to be empowered. The ones holding the strings now-- because of the way the Iranian economy works--are the generals, are the clerics. They are the ones that have taken over the companies. When you have got $60 billion to $100 billion, depending upon whose figure you use, and you lift the escrow on that and that money goes back to Iran, it is their accounts that it is going to go into, and they are going to control the contracts going forward. How is that going to liberalize the economy or work to the benefit of the next generation in Iran? No, it makes it more certain that the tyranny that this theocracy imposes is going to be strengthened. We reverse decades of bipartisan U.S. policy; we remove the Security Council resolutions against Iran's illicit nuclear program, and we okay Iran as a nuclear threshold state. That is what has been done here. You and I know that, once that process is underway, Iran is going to produce nuclear weapons on an industrial scale when they are at the end of that process, unless they cheat before they get to the end of the process. Secretary Kerry had previously said we do not recognize Iran's right to enrich and that there is no right to enrich in the NPT. However, this agreement legitimizes Iran's vast nuclear program, including its right to enriched uranium, which can be used to produce a nuclear warhead. I guarantee you that everybody in the region is going to be looking at that and saying: We want the same agreement Iran had. We want that same exemption to the NPT. After the agreement's temporary limits expire, Iran's nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any other nonnuclear weapon state party to the NPT. Okay, so we are going to treat Iran like it is Holland, but it is not Holland. It has been caught cheating. That is why we are here. It has been caught cheating in the past, over and over, on their agreements. Iran can have a peaceful nuclear program without the ability to enrich uranium. This is something we all understand. Many countries have this. It is this key bomb-making technology that is so objectionable. We had no problem with the idea of letting them have a peaceful nuclear program; but why give up the right to enrich? Preventing the spread of this dangerous technology has been the foundation of our nonproliferation policy for decades. As a result, over 20 countries have peaceful nuclear energy programs without a domestic enrichment program. In fact, buying fuel for nuclear power plants abroad from countries like Russia is much more cost effective than producing it domestically. You have to ask: Why do they want to produce it domestically? If this agreement is allowed to go forward, the United States will recognize the ability of Iran, the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, to enrich uranium. Despite claims to the contrary, this will set a dangerous precedent; it will greatly undermine longstanding U.S. efforts to restrict the spread of this key bomb-making technology. How can we tell our allies they can't have it if we do this? If fully implemented, this agreement will destroy the Iran sanctions regime, which this Congress has built up over decades, despite opposition from several administrations. We did that in Congress. We pushed this. The billions in sanctions relief that Iran will get will support its terrorist activity, and those billions are just a downpayment. Under this agreement, European sanctions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the leader of its elite Quds Force--Soleimani, again--are removed, and their job is to export the revolution. That means their job is to export terrorism. General Dempsey--I will close with this--testified that Iranian militias, such as those trained and equipped by Soleimani, killed 500 U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Removing sanctions on Soleimani and the IRGC is so shocking that, when the deal was first announced, many thought that it was a mistake, thought that that was not the case. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.