Ed Royce

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, to begin with, I would like to also submit later for the Record a letter by 200 retired generals and flag officers and admirals in terms of why they are opposed to this deal and why they feel it would make the national security challenges for the United States more problematic. The second point I would make is that Nasrallah, who is the head of Hezbollah, says this about this deal: Iran will become richer and wealthier and will also become more influential under the deal reached this week. This will also reinforce the position of its allies. A stronger and wealthier Iran in the coming phase will be able to stand by its allies and especially the Palestinian resistance more than at any other time in history. What does that mean? I can tell you what it means because, in 2006, when I chaired the Terrorism Subcommittee, we were in Haifa when Nasrallah was firing off the Iranian-made rockets with 90,000 ball bearings in the warheads into the town of Haifa; there were 600 victims inside the trauma hospitals, and now, Iran has transferred over 80,000 missiles. What is it Nasrallah wants that he doesn't have currently? He wants guidance systems so that those missiles will hit targets, such as individual buildings in Tel Aviv, the airport, Jerusalem. That is what he needs. That is what Iran is telling Nasrallah it will provide. It needs the hard currency and with this agreement will come the hard currency. It is also committed to restock the inventory that Hamas used when it fired off its rockets into Israel from Gaza and to rebuild the tunnels; all of this is what the Iranians seek to fund, but to do that, they need the sanctions lifted. When they lift those sanctions, who is going to be the primary beneficiary? It is going to be people such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps that will be strengthened. Look, Mr. Speaker, if this agreement goes through, Iran gets a cash bonanza. It gets a boost to its international standing. It gets a lighted path toward nuclear weapons. With sweeping sanctions relief, we have lessened our ability to challenge Iran's conduct across the board. As Iran grows stronger, we will be weaker to respond. The question before us today is whether temporary constraints on Iran's nuclear program are worth the price of permanent sanctions relief. When I say the Revolutionary Guard is going to be the beneficiary, I say that because they are the ones that have taken over so many of the major companies in Iran and they are working to destabilize the entire Middle East. That organization fuels the Assad regime in Syria today. Those rockets are being launched by the Quds Force into Israel. They are going to provide them with more weapons and more military personnel. That organization backs the Houthi rebels. There were 200 Quds Forces that were on the vanguard when they overthrew our ally in Yemen, and they overran that country. It is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American troops in Iraq. The IRGC exports terrorism throughout that region. It holds sway over Iran's nuclear program. It brutally, brutally represses internal dissent, and as part of the Iranian agreement, the IRGC is going to be bolstered in a big way, and I will explain how else. It is going to have the funds to build up its tanks, its fighter jets, and the intercontinental ballistic missiles. The European sanctions on the elite Quds Forces--this is the group that does the political assassinations, assassinations outside Iran, and does the terrorist work outside of Iran--that is going to be lifted on the European side. The administration signed off on these concessions. The deal will allow sales of aircraft and parts to Iranian airlines, which the Quds Force uses to move its people and weapons throughout the region. The IRGC controls key parts, as I said, of the Iranian economy--the largest construction companies, the telecom sector, shipping. Ninety current and former IRGC officials and companies will be taken off the sanctions list as a result of this deal. Even sanctions on the head of Iran's elite Quds Force, General Soleimani, will be coming off. Soleimani had been involved in the plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington, D.C. While still under a UN travel ban, Soleimani traveled to Moscow on July 24, 10 days after the Iran nuclear agreement was announced, and he held meetings with the Russian Defense Minister and with President Vladimir Putin. Believe me, those meetings are about weapon systems, which the Russians want to sell to the Quds Force, to the Iranians. The IRGC is the biggest sponsor of terror throughout the Middle East and even tried to carry out a terrorist attack here. Under the nuclear agreement, as Iran is reconnected to the global economy, the IRGC is going to be the biggest winner. The agreement helps legitimize Soleimani and gives additional resources to the mastermind behind the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism and eyeing future weapon sales. It was Russia that teamed up with Iran in the eleventh hour, after we thought this deal was done, to insist on one more thing, the lifting of the arms embargo. I just ask you: If they did that, whose side do you think Moscow is going to take when Iran tests this agreement? Now, we talked a little bit about the younger generation in Iran. Yes, yes, 55 percent is under 30, but it is not those 55 percent under 30 that are going to be empowered. The ones holding the strings now-- because of the way the Iranian economy works--are the generals, are the clerics. They are the ones that have taken over the companies. When you have got $60 billion to $100 billion, depending upon whose figure you use, and you lift the escrow on that and that money goes back to Iran, it is their accounts that it is going to go into, and they are going to control the contracts going forward. How is that going to liberalize the economy or work to the benefit of the next generation in Iran? No, it makes it more certain that the tyranny that this theocracy imposes is going to be strengthened. We reverse decades of bipartisan U.S. policy; we remove the Security Council resolutions against Iran's illicit nuclear program, and we okay Iran as a nuclear threshold state. That is what has been done here. You and I know that, once that process is underway, Iran is going to produce nuclear weapons on an industrial scale when they are at the end of that process, unless they cheat before they get to the end of the process. Secretary Kerry had previously said we do not recognize Iran's right to enrich and that there is no right to enrich in the NPT. However, this agreement legitimizes Iran's vast nuclear program, including its right to enriched uranium, which can be used to produce a nuclear warhead. I guarantee you that everybody in the region is going to be looking at that and saying: We want the same agreement Iran had. We want that same exemption to the NPT. After the agreement's temporary limits expire, Iran's nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any other nonnuclear weapon state party to the NPT. Okay, so we are going to treat Iran like it is Holland, but it is not Holland. It has been caught cheating. That is why we are here. It has been caught cheating in the past, over and over, on their agreements. Iran can have a peaceful nuclear program without the ability to enrich uranium. This is something we all understand. Many countries have this. It is this key bomb-making technology that is so objectionable. We had no problem with the idea of letting them have a peaceful nuclear program; but why give up the right to enrich? Preventing the spread of this dangerous technology has been the foundation of our nonproliferation policy for decades. As a result, over 20 countries have peaceful nuclear energy programs without a domestic enrichment program. In fact, buying fuel for nuclear power plants abroad from countries like Russia is much more cost effective than producing it domestically. You have to ask: Why do they want to produce it domestically? If this agreement is allowed to go forward, the United States will recognize the ability of Iran, the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, to enrich uranium. Despite claims to the contrary, this will set a dangerous precedent; it will greatly undermine longstanding U.S. efforts to restrict the spread of this key bomb-making technology. How can we tell our allies they can't have it if we do this? If fully implemented, this agreement will destroy the Iran sanctions regime, which this Congress has built up over decades, despite opposition from several administrations. We did that in Congress. We pushed this. The billions in sanctions relief that Iran will get will support its terrorist activity, and those billions are just a downpayment. Under this agreement, European sanctions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the leader of its elite Quds Force--Soleimani, again--are removed, and their job is to export the revolution. That means their job is to export terrorism. General Dempsey--I will close with this--testified that Iranian militias, such as those trained and equipped by Soleimani, killed 500 U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Removing sanctions on Soleimani and the IRGC is so shocking that, when the deal was first announced, many thought that it was a mistake, thought that that was not the case. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentleman.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Palmer).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith), chairman of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Westerman).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman another 30 seconds.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Curbelo).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Heck), a member of the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. We did not negotiate this deal alone. Also negotiating this deal was Iran and was Russia and was China--true enough--but when it comes to the question of inspections, I do not have the document that indicates how these inspections will be done; but what I do know is what is reported to be the procedure and what is asserted also by the Iranians to be the procedure. As reported, it is Iran, not international inspectors, who will provide the agencies the photos of the locations. It is Iran that will provide the Agency videos of the locations. It is Iran, not international inspectors, who will provide the Agency the environmental samples. It is Iran that will use Iran's authenticated equipment, not the equipment of the international inspectors. The point I make, again, is that one of the reasons we wanted to have the agreements, the side agreements, the two side agreements, including the one addressing the 12 questions that have never been answered about the thousand pages of bomb work that the IAEA had in its possession, that Iran supposedly conducted at Parchin, was to get Iran to answer these questions. To this day, to my knowledge, scientists in Iran are not available to answer these questions. Now, perhaps if we obtain these documents, these two side agreements, we will have the details that assure us that, finally, these 12 questions have been answered, but I can tell you, during the interim agreement, we only got half of the first question answered, and after that, Iran shut it down. There was to be no more discussion about their past bomb work. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Kelly). (Mr. KELLY of Mississippi asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would just note that over 200 retired generals, flag officers, and admirals signed a letter in opposition; and we have heard continuously, including this week, from retired generals, officers, and admirals about their concerns about this agreement. I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington (Mrs. McMorris Rodgers), the Republican Conference chair.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, in terms of viewing this as the most intrusive regime, I remember South Africa. We put the kinds of sanctions on South Africa that we tried to get the administration to put on Iran. We had legislation here by a vote of 400-20 to do that, and the administration blocked that legislation in the Senate. That would have given us real leverage. Why do I think so? Because in South Africa, when we put those sanctions on, it actually gave the regime a choice between compromise on its nuclear program and dropping apartheid and changing its system or economic collapse. The choice was made in South Africa to turn over their nuclear bomb to the international inspectors. Now, I would consider that an intrusive regime. I wouldn't consider this one. In the case of Libya, they turned over their weapons programs to international inspectors, allowed them in, allowed them to take them out. I don't know why we say this is the most intrusive regime. It seems to me that, clearly, in cases where we actually forced the issue, where we actually in South Africa put the totality of sanctions in place, that Congress both in the House and the Senate in a bipartisan way felt were mandatory to force the South African hand. In that case, yes, we got them to give up their nuclear capabilities and their right to enrich and all of that. I don't see that here. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Garrett).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Rothfus), a member of the Committee on Financial Services.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Conaway), chairman of the Committee on Agriculture.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Messer), the chair of the Republican Policy Committee.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Trott).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, several Members spoke of Iran's commitments under this agreement. While it is true that Iran has committed to taking certain steps under the agreement, it is also true that Iranians have never complied with any agreement related to its weapons program. So let's start with considering what Iran's leaders have been saying today about this agreement. This is what they say. They say that Iran can pursue the development of missiles without any restrictions. How can that be, given what is in this agreement? Well, President Rouhani--the supposed moderate here--has argued repeatedly that the only restrictions on Iran's missile developments are in the U.N. Security Council resolution. Endorsing the deal, he says, it is not in the agreement itself. They don't recognize the Security Council resolution. So he says: We are not restricted by this agreement. So what the gentleman is quoting, they say they are not restricted by that. Mr. Speaker, Iranian leaders say that Iran can violate the U.N. Security Council resolutions without violating the agreement. Sanctions do not, therefore, snap back if Iran violates the U.N. Security Council resolutions, according to Iran, and that Iran intends to violate the U.N. Security Council restrictions on weapons sales and on imports. This is President Rouhani again: We will sell and buy weapons whenever and wherever we deem it necessary. We will not wait for permission from anyone or any resolution. So Iran's defense minister has said that Iran is negotiating right now to purchase Russian fighter jets. We know they are negotiating in terms of ballistic missiles right now. They are in violation of the agreement, yet we don't see any intention to enforce that. So we have got to ask ourselves: Just what kind of agreement is this? Who is this agreement with? As the committee heard yesterday, it is an agreement with a regime whose world view was founded in large part on a fiery theological anti- Americanism and a view of Americanism as Satanism. I don't have to tell the Members here. I mean, they hear it every week, those of you that are watching what is coming out of Iran ``death to America'' every week. Mr. Speaker, this agreement gives up too much too fast with not enough in return, and we have to judge it on the long-term national security interests of the United States. Does it make the region and the world more safe, secure, stable? In my mind, clearly it does not. So I don't feel this is worthy of the House's support. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Sanford).

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Roskam).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes. Returning to an argument I was making earlier about this body's experience with North Korea, it does look to me like many are willing to concede to Iran the same loopholes that we gave North Korea. Supreme Leader Ayatollah has declared that his country would never agree to anywhere, anytime inspections. That is what is a little confusing about this. Especially, he says, in Iranian military sites. What we are informed of is that Iran is going to do its own inspection at Parchin. Without a full picture of Iran's nuclear program, without full ability to inspect these sites, we will be verifying in the dark, just as we were with North Korea. The Ayatollah is also demanding sanctions be lifted before Iran dismantles its nuclear infrastructure. In short, the Supreme Leader, again, is not going to let international inspectors into the places he builds his secret weapons, and yet he wants billions of sanctions in relief that he could funnel into terrorist groups that he funds, including Hezbollah and Hamas. Just like North Korea, Iran wants its rewards upfront. Again, like North Korea, what is Iran demanding? The best prize of all: the stamp of international legitimacy for its nuclear program. The truly stunning thing about this nuclear deal is that even if Iran fulfills all of its commitments in a few short years, the mullahs will be free from restraints, have international blessing for Iran's nuclear program, and will have billions of dollars that they will use, in my opinion, for destabilizing the region. Because the IRGC controls most of these business contracts, their military controls the contracts. It is not too late to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons, but to do so, we need to learn from our mistakes; and if we don't, the Ayatollah, just like Kim Jong-il before him, will have, in my view, an easy path to the bomb.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gohmert).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Weber).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. Speaker, some of us have seen this before. Some of us were around for the North Korean nuclear agreement, and President Obama's Iran nuclear deal looks increasingly like the dangerous deal that we struck with that regime in North Korea. In 1994, the U.S. Government signed a deal with North Korea that, according to then-President Clinton, would make the United States, the Korean peninsula, and the world safer, in his words. The agreement, we were told, did not rely on trust, but would instead involve a verification program which would stop the North Koreans from ever acquiring a nuclear bomb. That sounds familiar today. Unfortunately, the North Korean deal had holes that you could fire a ballistic missile through. The deal did not dismantle North Korea's program. It committed the United States to rewarding North Korea with large quantities of fuel oil without requiring the regime to implement the terms. Worst of all, the deal relied on inspection provisions that were naive and ultimately were worthless. The predictable result was that, on October 4, 2002, North Korea revealed it had been lying all along and that it had continued to secretly develop nuclear weapons. Four years later, North Korea's dictator, Kim Jong Il, ordered an underground nuclear test, and today, North Korea is a global menace, and it supports and sponsors terrorism, and it is the most unstable nuclear power on Earth. There is a reason why some of us raise these issues. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Rouzer).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Loudermilk).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I guess the point that I would begin by making is that Iran won't have to cheat like North Korea did to get close to a bomb, and that is because the essential restrictions on Iran's key bomb-making technology expire or, in the words of the agreement, sunset in 10 to 15 years. After these restrictions expire, Iran will be left with an internationally recognized industrial scale nuclear program. Iran could even legitimately enrich to levels near weapons-grade under the pretext of powering a nuclear navy. All these activities are permissible under the nonproliferation treaty, and all would be endorsed by this agreement. Indeed, to quote the President, President Obama said, of this agreement, in year 13, 14, 15, Iran's breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero. A former State Department official testified to the Foreign Affairs Committee that this sunset clause is a disaster. It is a disaster as it will enable the leading state sponsor of terrorism to produce enough material for dozens of nuclear weapons, all under the terms of the agreement. As another expert witness pointed out, the bet that the administration is taking is that, in 10 to 15 years, we will have a kinder, gentler Iran. The agreement does not dismantle Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Iran doesn't have to dismantle any centrifuges or give up any of its nuclear facilities. Even Iran's once-secret facility at Fordo, buried under a mountain top, does stay open. Instead, the deal temporarily restricts elements of the program. It does do that. It restricts elements of the program, but it does it in exchange for something else that is permanent. What is permanent in this, as opposed to temporary? What is permanent is the sanctions relief. Key restrictions begin to expire after only 8 years. If fully implemented, this agreement will destroy the Iran sanctions regime, which Congress has built up over decades, despite opposition from several administrations. I will remind the Members again, this was a hard-fought case over several administrations; and, in point of fact, in the prior Congress, myself and Eliot Engel had legislation which would have put additional pressure on Iran that passed here by a vote of 400-20. It was the administration and it was Secretary of State Kerry who made certain that that bill was bottled up in the Senate and could not see the light of day. Now, the billions in sanctions relief that Iran will get up front will support its terrorist activity, but those billions are just a downpayment, as this agreement reconnects Iran to the global economy. One of the things that bothers me most about this is that Iran is not a normal country with normal businessmen running those companies. When those companies were nationalized, they were turned over to the IRGC. They were turned over, basically, to the leaders in the military, and they were turned over to the clerics. As future contracts go forward with Iran, it is that entity that is going to be rewarded. It is going to have the political power. For those of us that hoped to see change in Iran, now the best connected people in Iran are going to be the IRGC leaders. If we think for a minute what that will mean for those that would like to see real change, I think we lost a historic opportunity here to put the kind of pressure that would have forced change, but we did not do that. In a major, last-minute concession--and this is the final point I would make--the President agreed to lift the U.N. arms embargo on Iran, and in 5 years, Iran will be able to buy conventional weapons and, in 8 years, ballistic missiles. Russia and China want to sell these dangerous weapons to Iran, and that is why they pushed. That is why it was Russia pushing, at the eleventh hour, after we thought this agreement was done. The reason we were waiting those extra days is because Russia was running interference for Iran, saying: Oh, no, wait. We also want the arms embargo lifted, including the ICBM embargo lifted. As the Secretary of Defense of our country testified, the reason that we want to stop Iran from having an ICBM program is that the ``I'' in ICBM stands for intercontinental, which means having the capability of flying from Iran to the United States. Ask yourself why Iran wants to build ICBMs, why it is that the Ayatollah says it is the duty of every military man to figure out how to help mass-produce ICBMs. Someone once asked President Kennedy the difference between our space program and the ICBM program that Russia was building at that time, and he quipped ``attitude.'' Kennedy's answer was ``attitude.'' The answer here is that attitude counts for a lot, and the attitude in the regime, when they say they are not even going to be bound by this and are now going to transfer rockets and missiles to Hezbollah and Hamas, tells us a lot about their attitude. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.