Ed Royce

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. I yield another 30 seconds to the gentleman.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Guthrie), a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Education and the Workforce Committee.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Donovan), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson), a true American hero who served this country with distinction in Korea and in Vietnam and as a prisoner of war for nearly 7 years.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gohmert).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Perry), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I think we all know why we are here to debate this resolution today. The bottom line is that, for those of us that were involved in this agreement, we always thought that international inspections were going to be done by international inspectors, not by the Iranians, not by those in the Iranian regime. Whether you like the Iran agreement or not, one thing I think all Members can agree on is that sound verification must be the bedrock of any viable agreement. Iran cannot cheat and get away with it. And the reason this is an issue for us is because Iran has cheated on every past agreement. That is why the verification was so important. The problem is key aspects of this verification agreement have not been presented to Congress to review. Indeed, there are two separate arrangements agreed to between Iran and an arm of the U.N. here, the International Atomic Energy Agency. One is regarding the regime's past bomb work, of which there are a thousand pages of evidence that the IAEA tell us about, and the other involves access to the Iranian military base at Parchin, where that evidence shows that that testing took place. In order to fully assess the agreement, Members of Congress should have access to these documents. This is especially important since Iran will almost certainly treat these arrangements as setting a standard for future IAEA requests to access any suspicious sites, especially military sites, since they have made it clear nobody is going to their military sites. Physical access by the IAEA to Parchin is critical to understanding Iran's past bomb work. This is where ``Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel,'' to quote the IAEA. Why did they do it? To conduct experiments related to the development, say the international inspectors, of nuclear weapons. Iran has blocked the international inspectors' access to Parchin for years. In the meantime, we are told by those inspectors that they watch on spy satellite as Iran bulldozes and paves over this site and then paves over the site again. If the international inspectors cannot attain a clear understanding of the experimentation that took place, then the United States will have great difficulty figuring out how long it would take Iran to rush toward a nuclear weapon. In recent congressional testimony, administration officials expressed confidence in their access to suspicious sites that the agreement provides the IAEA. Yet, these separate arrangements have the potential to seriously weaken our ability to verify the agreement as a whole even is true, that Iran is going to do self-inspections here, which is what Iran asserts. Mr. Speaker, the history of Iranian negotiating behavior, as we know, is to pocket past concessions. And then what do they do? They push for more and more and more. The separate arrangement agreed to between the IAEA and Iran regarding inspection of the facilities at Parchin will almost certainly be regarded by that government in Iran as a precedent for their IAEA access to future suspicious sites in Iran. In other words, if you don't get access to this site, you are not going to get access to other military sites where there is evidence that the same type of thing has occurred. So if Iran won't let international inspectors do the international inspecting today, what makes us think that the Iranians will allow intrusive terms to these agreements in the future after sanctions have been lifted when we find evidence of the next site? I have little doubt that the side deals of today will become central to the agreement's verification provisions tomorrow. This makes it imperative that these agreements are made available to Congress. Mr. Speaker, 350 Members of this House, Democrats and Republicans--I think we had the majority of the Democrats, and I think we had every Republican--wrote to Secretary Kerry last fall. Iran's willingness to resolve concerns over its bomb work, as we said in that letter, is a fundamental test of Iran's intention to uphold a comprehensive agreement. That is why we all wrote that letter together, in order to make that point. The administration once took the same position that we are taking right now on the House floor as well, but it gave that position away in negotiations. It gave away that position. Reviewing these side agreements is critical to understanding whether Iran intends to pass that test. We need access to those agreements. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Schweikert).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Bishop).

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn).

Mr. ROYCE. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Dent), chairman of the Committee on Ethics.

Mr. ROYCE. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the bipartisan relationship that all of the Members on the Foreign Affairs Committee have, but especially today, the words of Mr. Engel that every Member of this House should be mindful that impugning motives, questioning the motives of those who disagree with us, is not conducive to an honest and fair debate over these issues. I thank him for making that point on the floor today. At this time, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Scalise), the majority whip.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul), chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, in the Foreign Affairs Committee, we have held 30 hearings and briefings on Iran since these negotiations began. We have reviewed this agreement in depth; but, Mr. Speaker, I can come to no other conclusion than not only does it come up short, it is fatally flawed and, indeed, dangerous. I will oppose the measure before us. We should have gotten a better deal. Indeed, when the House passed stiff Iran sanctions legislation--now, this was in 2013--in the prior Congress, we passed this legislation, authored by myself and Mr. Engel, by a vote, a bipartisan vote in this body, of 400-20. The intention of that legislation was to put that additional leverage on Iran and force the Ayatollah to make a choice between real compromise--real compromise--on his nuclear program and economic collapse if he did not. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State and the administration worked to ensure that the other body never took that measure up. This legislation would have put more pressure, as I say, on Iran and might have led to an acceptable deal; but instead of an ironclad agreement that is verifiable and holds Iran to account, we are considering an agreement that leaves Iran, in a few short years, only steps away from a nuclear weapons program, one that would be on an industrial scale. Under the agreement, Iran is not required to dismantle key bomb- making technology. Instead, it is permitted a vast enrichment capacity, reversing decades of bipartisan nonproliferation policy that never imagined endorsing this type of nuclear infrastructure for any country, never mind a country that lives by the motto ``death to America.'' While Members of Congress insisted on anywhere, anytime inspections, U.S. negotiators settled for something called managed access. So, instead of allowing international inspectors into those suspicious sites within 24 hours, it will take 24 days, and that is to commence the process. Worse, there have been revelations in recent days about an agreement between Iran and the United Nations' nuclear watchdog. This agreement sets the conditions in which a key Iranian military site that is suspected of nuclear bomb work--suspected in the sense that we have 1,000 pages of evidence of that bomb work--will be explored. Mr. Speaker, as we have heard, those details have been kept from Congress. We don't have those details in our hands; but it is reported that, instead of international inspectors doing the inspecting, the Iranians, themselves, will take the inspection lead. Iran has cheated on every agreement they have signed, so why do we trust them now to self-police? The deal guts the sanctions web that is putting intense pressure on Iran. Billions will be made available to Iran to pursue its terrorism. Indeed, Iran's elite Quds Force has transferred funds--and this should bother all of us--to Hamas. It has committed to rebuild the network of tunnels from Gaza to attack Israel. Mr. Engel and I were in one of those tunnels last year. They have agreed in Iran to replenish the medium-range missile arsenal of Hamas, and they are working right now, they claim, to give precision-guided missiles to Hezbollah. I can tell you I was in Haifa in 2006 when it was under constant bombardment by those types of rockets, but they weren't precision-guided. Every day, they slammed into the city, and there were 600 victims in the trauma hospital. Now Iran has transferred eightfold the number of missiles, and they want to give them the guidance systems. They need money to pay for those guidance systems. Iran won late concessions to remove international restrictions on its ballistic missile program and on its conventional arms, and that imperils the security of the region and, frankly, the security of our homeland. For some, the risks in this agreement are worth it as they see an Iran that is changing for the better. As one supporter of this agreement told our committee, President Obama is betting that, in 10 or 15 years, we will have a kinder, gentler Iran. But that is a bet against everything we have seen out of the regime since the 1979 revolution. Already, Iranian leaders insist that international inspectors won't see the inside of Iran's military bases and that Iran can advance its missiles and weapons without breaking the agreement. It is guaranteed that Iran will game the agreement to its advantage. So we must ask ourselves: Will international bureaucrats call out Iran, knowing that doing so will put this international agreement at risk? We are not calling them out now as they are transferring weapons. Will this administration, which didn't even insist that four American hostages come home as part of this agreement, be any tougher on Iran in implementing this deal? Does this serve the long-term national security interests of the United States? Does it make the world and, frankly, the region more safe? more stable? more secure? Is there any other reason Iran--an energy rich country--is advancing its nuclear technology other than to make a nuclear weapon? And why do its leaders chant ``death to America'' and ``death to Israel''? The New York Times ran a story on Quds Day, which is the national parade. It was some weeks ago. There was President Rouhani--the so- called moderate--marching in that parade. Behind him, the crowd was chanting. It was chanting ``death to America.'' In front of them, they carried placards on either side of him that read, ``Death to Israel.'' Why does their leader march in the Quds parade, and why does that refrain constantly come from the clerics? I hope that all Members will consider these questions as they consider this vote. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous materials on this measure.

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I will just quote the Bureau of Counterterrorism, Mr. Speaker. They say that the rate of foreign terrorist fighter travel to Syria exceeded the rate of foreign terrorist fighters that travel to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any point in the last 20 years. Individuals drawn to the conflict were diverse in their socioeconomic and geographic backgrounds, highlighting the need for comprehensive countermessaging and early engagement to dissuade vulnerable individuals from traveling to join the conflict. The bill before us today, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 237, is a necessary addition to our national defense. It creates an important deterrent, and it reduces the ability of terrorists to travel. I, again, thank the subcommittee chairman, Mr. Poe, and the ranking member, Mr. Keating of Massachusetts, and the bipartisan cosponsors of the bill before us today. Mr. Speaker, I ask for support of the measure, and I yield back balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. International travel by terrorist recruits poses a deadly and growing threat. It is estimated that ISIS alone has drawn 20,000 foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq. Extremist groups in Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere also draw foreigners into their deadly campaigns. These include thousands of westerners, primarily from Europe, but also a couple of hundred people from the United States so far. The threats are as real as today's headlines: British officials today arrested a man for plotting attacks on U.S. military personnel there in Britain and for planning to travel to Syria to join ISIS, along with his uncle. If they are successful in traveling, these foreign fighters receive terrorist training and they hone their skills there on the battlefield. Some have even appeared as executioners in ISIS' gruesome propaganda videos. If they return home, hardened fighters come back more hateful, certainly more deadly. The killing of four U.S. marines and one sailor in Chattanooga, Tennessee, last Thursday; the attempted attack in Garland, Texas, in May; and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing all demonstrate that the United States is not immune from lone wolf and small-scale attacks of the type that ISIS and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula continue to call for. Surprisingly, the statutory authority to prohibit such travel in support of designated terrorist groups hasn't kept pace with the threat. I want to thank the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Judge Ted Poe of Texas, for his work in introducing H.R. 237, the Foreign Terrorist Organization Passport Revocation Act, as a critical countermeasure. This bipartisan and commonsense bill grants the Secretary of State the authority to refuse or revoke a passport to any individual whom the Secretary determines has helped a designated foreign terrorist organization in realizing its jihadist ambitions. Such authority is not currently spelled out in statute, but depends on interpretation of Federal regulations, and this legislation will write it into permanent law. Mr. Speaker, I would just note that the text before us today grants permissive authority to the Secretary and, thus, the discretion to avoid interfering with law enforcement or intelligence activities that might be compromised if such a revocation were mandatory. While we, of course, expect that the Secretary of State will exercise this authority within the bounds of constitutional due process, the bill also requires a report to Congress whenever such authority is used to help ensure oversight and to provide transparency. Individuals who actively support designated terrorist organizations must be stopped from traveling abroad to learn how to kill Americans and our allies. Spelling this out clearly in permanent law will help prevent misguided individuals from getting further radicalized abroad, which leads to terrorist attacks on the homeland. Again, Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe) and his 10 bipartisan cosponsors for their work in bringing the bill forward, and this measure obviously deserves our support. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC, July 20, 2015. Hon. Ed Royce, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing with respect to H.R. 237, the ``FTO Passport Revocation Act of 2015,'' which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. As you know, H.R. 237 contains provisions that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. As a result of your having consulted with the Committee and in order to expedite the House's consideration of H.R. 237, the Committee on the Judiciary will not assert is jurisdictional claim over this bill by seeking a sequential referral. However, this is conditional on our mutual understanding and agreement that doing so will in no way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary with respect to the appointment of conferees or to any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matters contained in the bill or similar legislation. I would appreciate a response to this letter confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 237, and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the Congressional Record during Floor consideration of H.R. 237. Sincerely, Bob Goodlatte, Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 days to revise and extend and to include extraneous materials on this measure.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe), the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and author of this important legislation.

Mr. ROYCE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 days to revise and extend their remarks and to include any extraneous material on this measure for the Record.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 237) to authorize the revocation or denial of passports and passport cards to individuals affiliated with foreign terrorist organizations, and for other purposes, as amended.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent at this time to withdraw the motion to suspend the rules.