Paul Ryan

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I just want to respond to a few things the gentleman from South Carolina said. Number one, the cap is indexed to inflation at the CPI or another inflation adjuster, such as, in the case of Medicare, medical inflation, Medicare price. So how can he say that it is a cut if each of these programs grows by inflation plus new beneficiaries and the inflation within those kinds of programs? The problem we have, Mr. Chairman, is when we put most of the Federal Government off limits to budget discipline, it grows out of control. I hope that those who are in charge of discretionary spending in Congress also join with us in trying to control mandatory spending, because if we can control mandatory spending, we can get our hands around the big problem in our budget system in the Federal Government, and that is out-of-control spending. We do this in an honest way, we do this in a sincere way, and we do this in a way to protect those. That is why earned entitlements are off limits, like Social Security and Medicare benefits. We do this in a way that we protect beneficiaries, we protect them from inflation, and we get our hands around the biggest part of our Federal budget, entitlements.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I just would like to bring some illumination to this with numbers. This brinksmanship that this process brings us to has brought us a lot of extra spending. In fiscal year 2002, the discretionary spending level in the budget resolution was $661 billion. We spent $734 billion. In FY 2003, the discretionary spending level was set out in the budget resolution at $750 billion. We ended up spending $849 billion. In FY 2004, the discretionary spending was $784 billion. We ended up spending $873 billion. This brinksmanship brings us to this overspending limit. This amendment stops that.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. Chairman, let me just briefly explain what this amendment does. What this does is this elevates the budget resolution to a level of a law. Specifically, this would change the current nonbinding concurrent budget resolution into a joint resolution, which would give the force of law when signed by the President. This would encourage the President to get involved early in the process, instead of having this typical annual brinksmanship that we have in the budget process at the end of the year, so that we can settle on the numbers between the other body, this body, and the White House and move on to good legislation. A joint resolution would be binding and have the force of law so that both the Congress and the White House would work these issues out in the beginning of the annual year. The simplicity of this budget resolution makes agreements easier to reach because negotiations will be forced early on in the process. I would like to go through how this would work. I have a chart that makes it easier for me to explain this. First, like we have anytime, the President submits his budget. Then Congress would pass a joint budget resolution. Then the question is whether the President would sign it or not. If with those negotiations the President then signs that joint budget resolution, then Congress passes its appropriations, its reconciliation, its tax and entitlement bills and its conference reports, and the President signs those bills into law. Very easy, very clear process. If, for example, the President does not sign that joint budget resolution, there is a fallback provision similar to what we have today, where it would go back to Congress and Congress would adopt a concurrent resolution, much like we have right now. For example, this year, where we actually do not have a concurrent resolution in place because we could not get one through the other body, we would end up deeming it. The point is this, Mr. Chairman: we have to front-load this system so we can get these agreements reached at the beginning of the year so we can move forward on the same page. Most importantly, we need to make this budget have the force of law so that it can be enforced. That is the problem. Our budget resolutions ends up becoming mere guidelines and do not actually have the force of law. Therefore, they are not enforceable. We always break our budgets. If we make this have the force of law, it becomes enforceable. Therefore, we can actually stick to the budgets we have. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, before yielding to my cosponsor of this amendment, I yield myself 10 seconds. Number one, the President already has the power to sign these bills into law. He signs appropriation bills, he signs tax bills, he signs entitlement bills. So this does not give him new power he does not already have. Number two, the gentleman from South Carolina, who is a leader in this area, has been a leader in this area for a long time, sponsored a bill in 1991 that did just this. So I think this is a good idea.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding the gentleman supported this in the past. Either way, good people can disagree on these things. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht).

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, a couple of us were not in Congress back then when you guys decided that, so we have been consistent.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remainder of the time. Mr. Chairman, I want to answer the points the gentleman from South Carolina made. We did look at the issue of whether there are tax expenditures included in the enhanced rescission power, and some raised the constitutional question. Because in article I, section 7, the U.S. Constitution clearly states that bills for raising revenue shall originate only in the House of Representatives. There are some who have a constitutional concern, and this is a debated point, that it would be unconstitutional for the President to alter tax legislation because this would be an originating bill even after this other bill would be passed into law. So there is a constitutional question about the tax expenditure side. But, more importantly, we want to focus on spending. We wanted to focus this tool to go after wasteful spending. Let me just conclude with showing a few things that we have done around here. Both parties are to blame for this; 13.4 million for community resilience project in Virginia. Mr. Chairman, $916,000 for a study about what makes a meaningful day, $500,000 for the Anaheim Resort Transit to fund buses for Disneyland, $270,000 for wool research in Montana and Wyoming, $72,000 for the study by the National Institute of Health on dorm room wall decorations and Web pages. These are ridiculous expenditures that I believe are an embarrassment to this body, and it is a good thing, and I think we all agree, to have the President have the ability to bring those things out and send it back and have us vote on those things in the light of day instead of tucking them in big appropriations bill.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Toomey).

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. Chairman, I will explain this. We are going to go after wasteful spending in another direction with this amendment. This is a bipartisan amendment with the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm), also with the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), who is not here with us on the floor this moment, supporting this amendment. This is what we call enhanced rescissions. The way this amendment works is that the President, after signing a bill into law, an appropriations bill into law, has the ability to pull out a wasteful spending measure or a number of wasteful spending measures that he or she deems wasteful. Now, this makes sure that we retain the power of the purse so that that bill comes back to the House and the Senate among expedited procedures where we vote up or down on that rescission package. Now, if my colleagues will recall, during the line item veto debate of a number of years ago, the Supreme Court ended up striking down the line item veto. The reason the Supreme Court struck down the line item veto is a reason I agree with, which was it is unconstitutional for the legislative branch to delegate its lawmaking power to the executive branch the power of the purse. So what we are doing in place of that is this. As a consequence to those who oppose the line item veto at the same time, they were the folks who were actually proposing this legislation, what happens is the President pulls out spending from a spending bill, sends it back to Congress on an expedited procedural basis, Congress votes up or down on those spending cuts. And we have the final say as to whether or not that spending occurs. Now, the great point of all of this is we end up having to vote on these huge appropriation bills. Last year's omnibus appropriation bill had seven different appropriation bills bundled into one. So we had one vote on the conference report up or down. So we had to vote on veterans health care, on Labor Department spending, on Health and Human Services; but we also had to vote for the $50 million rain forest museum in Coralville, Iowa. This gives the President the ability to say we probably should not be spending money on that rain forest museum in Coralville, Iowa, and a few other things. I am pulling those out of this bill and sending it back to Congress for a revote, and then Congress has the final decision as to whether or not that spending takes place. We retain the power of the purse, but we have a tool to go after wasteful spending. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remaining time to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Toomey).

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the cosponsor of this amendment, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Neugebauer).

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, that is up to the Committee on the Budget.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's indulgence. First of all, it is true that you could eliminate a piece of pork here on the House Floor and it could get placed back in on the Senate floor. But by these rules, at least that amount of money would have to be saved, because the 302(a) allocation will go down by that amount. It would be up to the Committee on Appropriations to decide where that money comes from. But the point is, that money would have to be saved.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman briefly yield again?

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I can explain it. Basically, it works like this. A Member brings an amendment to the House Floor to cut spending. The 302(a) allocation goes down by that amount. At the end of the day, the conference report for the appropriation bills goes down by the lower of the two different amounts between the House amendments and the Senate amendments. At the end of the year, because the 302(a) will have gone down by that amount, the Committee on Ways and Means can use the savings for tax relief. If it does not do that by the end of the fiscal year, the savings, the lower of the amendments between the House or the Senate, is going toward deficit reduction. That is essentially how it works. I know it is complicated.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I bring this amendment to the desk with my cosponsor, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Neugebauer). Let me briefly explain it. This is what we call budget protection accounts. Here is how the current appropriations process works. If we have a piece of spending in the budget that we think is wasteful, let me take two examples here; the $200,000 for the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in Cleveland, Ohio, or the $500,000 for the Anaheim Resort Transit to fund buses at Disneyland, or the $50 million to fund the Coralville Rain Forest Museum in Coralville, Iowa. Let us take, for example, if we want to get rid of that spending, we can bring an amendment to the floor, pass it, make sure that spending does not go to those projects, but by the rules of this institution, that money has to be spent somewhere else in the Federal government. That is ridiculous, Mr. Chairman. All we are proposing is this: if Members can come to the floor with amendments to eliminate or reduce wasteful spending, they ought to be able to save that money. That is all we are proposing. So what we do here is when a cutting amendment comes to the floor to reduce spending, the entire 302(a) allocation, the entire discretionary allocation goes down by the amount of that amendment. So that at the end of the year, that money either goes to reducing the deficit or that money goes to reduce taxes. We have a mechanism that makes sure that this reconciles with the other body appropriately. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The Chairman pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. This way the President could veto breaking the budget caps early in the process and we could keep to these numbers.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. But we waive our budget caps all of the time under the current system.

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, this is part of our larger effort, which is in our substitute. But what this will do is allow to have a sequester to kick in if Congress exceeds its spending items. Just like the sequesters we have talked about before in the old Committee on the Budget days, if Congress overspends, because we have this in law, a sequester kicks in and brings spending back into conformity with the budget.