Paul Sarbanes

Mr. SARBANES

Mr. SARBANES. The Senator is absolutely right. When you talk about trade you have to talk about trade balance. Now, we ran a trade balance from the end of World War II until 1975. We were exporting a little more than we were importing. The imports that were coming in were causing dislocation in our economy, no question about it. But at the same time we were gaining a plus from the exports. In fact, there were a little more exports than there were imports. What has happened, as the Senator from South Carolina points out, we are now importing far, far, far more than we are exporting. In fact, as he points out with respect to trade goods it has been an almost $2 trillion deficit since 1975. Everyone comes along and says, ``Look, we have a little more exports.'' Look at how many more imports we have. All of those imports are costing people jobs. So the displacement of jobs taking place by the increase in imports far, far, far exceeds the additional jobs gained from the expansion of exports. That is what people have to understand and they are not understanding it. To the extent we run these trade deficits then we end up losing our position as a creditor nation. This is a devastating chart, showing the United States in a creditor position in 1980, and look what has happened to us. We have come down just like this, and by the end of the year we will be at $1 trillion deficit debtor status. Debtor status, $1 trillion, the United States. In 1980, less than 20 years ago, we were in a creditor status to the tune of $400 billion. So there has been an almost $1.5 trillion deterioration in our international position in less than 20 years. It is the very thing the Senator from South Carolina is talking about.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. SARBANES. The American market is still the most lucrative market in the world. They want access into the American market. I cannot accept for a moment in these bilateral dealings, countries won't negotiate a trade agreement with the President which could then be submitted to the Congress for the Congress to consider, to amend if it deemed it advisable, and to vote on. We have done that consistently, as the Senator pointed out, including the telecommunications agreement, a very complicated measure. We do it in arms control agreements. They are open to amendment and are a far more serious matter than a trade agreement. I want to say one other thing to the Senator because he talked about the Chinese getting the investment and the plants in their own country, and he uses the example that occurred in Brazil. The Chinese don't make any bones about it. They don't like to conceal it. The Washington Post had an article last week, and here is the heading to the article, ``China Plays Rough: Invest and Transfer Technology or No Market Access.'' Invest and transfer technology or no market access. The article went on to describe how China forces United States companies to transfer jobs and technology as a price for getting exports sales. They say, ``We will take the exports but you have to give us the investment and the technology,'' and that means in the future they won't take other exports because they won't need them. They will have the investment and the technology to produce the goods themselves, and I predict not only will they do it for themselves they will then be producing and selling them internationally, and they will go from being an importer of American high-technology products to being an exporter themselves of high-technology products from the investment technology that we are compelled to give to them.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I want to get into the Record the figures that underlie this chart on the deterioration in the U.S. net foreign investment position. In 1976, the United States had a $180 billion positive net position. We were a creditor nation, to the extent of $180 billion. That rose until, in 1980, it hit its peak at just under $400 billion. That is net. That is in our favor, $400 billion. Since 1980, that has begun to deteriorate, as we can see. It crossed into the minus figures in 1986, at minus $13 billion. In 1986, 11 years ago, we were at $13 billion minus. Since then, it has come down and we were at $870 billion in 1996, and it is estimated that the 1997 figures will go to $1 trillion in debt, in a debtor position. This is incredible that, in just over 10 years, we have gone from balance in our net foreign investment position to a $1 trillion debtor position. I mean, we have been adding it at the rate of $100 billion, $120 billion, and $150 billion a year because of what happened to our trade balance, which the able Senator from South Carolina pointed out. So we have now come down to the point where we are $1 trillion in a debtor position--the world's largest debtor country. Now, these are the issues we ought to be addressing. Fast track doesn't begin to address that issue. All fast track is trying to do is get the Congress to give up its right to review these agreements. Everyone says, well, we ought to do that. Look at how we have been doing on the trade front. Well, how have we been doing on the trade front? Look at this deterioration over the last 20 years. By coincidence--perhaps not so much by coincidence--ever since we started doing fast track, we started getting deterioration in the trade balance, year after year. I think these trade agreements need to be brought back to the Senate to give us a chance to review them. If they had to come back here and be reviewed, not on a ``take all or nothing'' basis, which, of course, is a loaded deck because as soon as that happens, then the argument they make to you is not economic; it is political. If the President negotiates a trade agreement, let's say, with Chile, and then he brings it to the Congress on fast track, all or nothing, then we start asking economic questions about the trade agreement. We say, well, you know, this balance here doesn't seem to work. You don't open up their market the way you should and so forth. The next thing they say to you is, oh, well, we have to approve it; otherwise, the political relationship will go to pieces. That is what we were told on the Mexico agreement. We had debate on the floor of the Senate, and piercing remarks were made about the economics of that Mexican agreement and how it would not work and how disadvantageous it was. Well, then the argument shifted in order to try to push it through. The administration didn't talk anymore about the economics of it; they started talking about the politics of it. They said: Well, Mexico is our next-door neighbor. If we don't approve this trade agreement, we will have a crisis in our relationship. In effect, that was probably true. But that's the argument that then is used, not the economic argument. So I think these agreements ought to be brought to the Senate. We ought to have a chance to amend them, if we choose to do so, not give away or derogate our authority in that important regard. Frankly, I think if the agreements have to come to the Senate in that form, they are going to negotiate tougher agreements. If the administration knows that those agreements are going to be submitted to the Congress and subject not only to the up-or-down vote of the Congress, but also subject to amendment, they are going to have to negotiate a much tighter agreement that will withstand scrutiny. And I think it will achieve a better balance, a better balance between our opportunity to go into the other countries' markets and their opportunity to come into our market because, clearly, what has been happening for the last 20 years is that our market has been opened up far more than other nations have reciprocated.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, what is the time situation?

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, in view of that, I think the other side should now use some of its time since we are down now to 40 minutes and they have almost double as much. How much is on the other side?

Mr. SARBANES. They have about twice as much time as we have.

Mr. SARBANES. All I am trying to protect again is the situation in which all time is used up on this side and then there are 80 minutes left on the other side.

Mr. SARBANES. The problem about that solution is it will then use up part of the 40 minutes that we have left which the Senator has calculated is needed in order to complete the remainder of his speakers that we have.

Mr. SARBANES. Forty minutes.

Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield, our people are not here because we had calculated that the time would go back to your side. And the fact there is so much of an unbalance, I think demonstrates that.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. SARBANES. In 1975 we first provided fast track. On this chart, this is 1975. Look at what happened with the trade balance.

Mr. SARBANES. I say to the Senator, if he is supporting fast track, he is the one who wants to try the same thing because this was all under fast track.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield? Will the Senator yield me 2 minutes?

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. SARBANES. Madam President, in light of the comments, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a press release from the Economic Strategy Institute entitled ``New ESI Study Finds Causes and Costs of Trade Deficit More Complex Than Traditional Economic Rhetoric.''

Mr. SARBANES. It says: For years mainstream economists and economic journalists explained away public concern over the U.S. trade deficit by arguing the true cause of the deficit was the huge U.S. Federal budget deficit and, more recently, low U.S. savings. Exactly the argument the Senator from New York has just made. However, a new study released today by the Economic Strategy Institute refutes these traditional explanations and argues they are no longer adequate to explain what is, in reality, a significantly more complex problem negatively affecting a wide variety of economic statistics, including aggregate demand, gross domestic product, the budget deficit, business-financed research and development, wage rates, and exchange rates. And then it goes on in effect to say that this traditional analysis is really simplistic; it doesn't really answer the situation. It is almost dismissive of any trade deficit problem. In fact, if you look at the movements here, there is not a direct correlation between the various factors the Senator talked about. I mean you have a decline in the goods trade balance here at the time the trade deficit is still going up.

Mr. SARBANES. I am sorry. You have an improvement in the trade deficit when the deficit was going up. Then here the deficit has been coming down, the domestic deficit, yet the trade deficit has been worsening.

Mr. SARBANES. Absolutely.

Mr. SARBANES. What do you do when you don't have a budget deficit and you are still running large trade deficits?

Mr. SARBANES. That's what I think needs to be done.

Mr. SARBANES. That is why I wanted to submit that study for the Record.

Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield further? To the extent there are such investments, those then become claims which foreigners hold against us. So what has happened is we have gone from being a creditor nation in 1980, where we were a creditor nation to the tune of $400 billion, to today where we are a debtor nation to the tune of $1 trillion. So, because they sell more to us than we sell to them, they build up claims against us and we become a debtor. Now we are the biggest debtor nation in the world.

Mr. SARBANES

Mr. SARBANES. First, I want to commend the very able Senator from Rhode Island for a very thorough and thoughtful analysis of the issues surrounding this legislation. Obviously, a great deal of work went into that statement, and I think the distinguished Senator touched on a number of very important and critical issues. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the motion to proceed to S. 1269. This legislation would provide trade agreement approval procedures, so- called fast-track procedures, for implementing the results of trade agreements that require changes in U.S. law. In my view, this is a poorly conceived piece of legislation that does not serve the interests of the American people. First, let me observe the fast-track procedures are relevant only to a narrow range of trade agreements, specifically, those agreements which require Congress to make changes in existing U.S. law in order for the agreements to be implemented. Most trade agreements do not require legislative changes and, therefore, fast track consideration would in effect be inapplicable to them. It is my understanding, for example, that the Clinton administration has negotiated over 220 trade agreements. Only two required fast-track authority--NAFTA and the GATT Uruguay round agreement. So let me just observe at the outset that there is a great deal of overstatement going on as to the importance of fast-track authority to the administration's ability to negotiate trade agreements and open foreign markets to U.S. exporters. The fact is that for the overwhelming majority of trade agreements, fast-track authority is not needed. And based on its own record, the administration has concluded a large number of such trade agreements without fast-track authority--not under fast-track authority. The question then becomes, for the narrow range of trade agreements that will require legislative action by the Congress, because the trade agreement reached requires a change in U.S. law, what is the appropriate role for the Congress in approving those agreements? Now, article II, section 8 of the Constitution explicitly grants Congress the authority ``To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations . . .'' The authority of Congress to approve trade agreements is unquestioned. And it is very clearly spelled out in the Constitution. So the issue is simply, how should the Congress best exercise this authority? I want to go back just a little bit historically and trace some of the evolution of trade negotiating authority in order to bring us to set the current situation in context. As many have observed, up until a couple of decades ago, most trade agreements dealt with setting tariffs on traded goods. Up until 1930, Congress passed occasional tariff acts that actually set tariff terms. However, Congress became increasingly reluctant to set tariff schedules in legislation. And in 1934, in the Reciprocal Trade Act--I emphasize the word ``reciprocal'' --the Reciprocal Trade Act, Congress granted to the President for the first time so-called proclamation authority, the power to set tariffs by executive agreement with U.S. trading partners. But that was a power with respect to the setting of tariffs that was limited, specifically limited within certain limits and for fixed periods of time. From the 1930's through the 1960's, Congress extended the 1934 act authorizing the President to negotiate reductions in U.S. tariffs in exchange for comparable reductions by U.S. trading partners. Congress would typically limit how much tariffs could be reduced. In other words, we would set the range below which the administration could not go. We would give a range how long negotiations could go on, and the Congress even exempted specific products from the negotiations. But once the reductions were negotiated within the range that the Congress had established, the President then issued an order proclaiming the new tariffs and trade agreements between 1934 and 1974 were negotiated pursuant to this authority. Now, during the 1960's, trade talks began to expand into nontariff trade areas that were governed by existing U.S. law; in other words, the trade talks began to involve matters that were not tariff matters but matters that were covered by our law. The Kennedy round GATT negotiations, for example, required for the first time changes to U.S. antidumping laws. We had antidumping laws on the books. The negotiated agreement required changes in those antidumping laws. The Congress made clear at that time that the executive branch had to obtain authority from the Congress to change a U.S. law in a trade agreement. The executive branch can't go and negotiate a trade agreement and simply by signing off on the trade agreement change an existing law without the approval of the Congress. Now, proclamation authority for the President, which had been used in the reciprocal trade agreements for tariffs, did not extend to authority to proclaim all changes to U.S. law called for in a trade agreement. Fast track was a procedure first enacted by Congress in the Trade Act of 1974 to deal with trade agreements that called for changes in U.S. law. What fast track provided for was a commitment by the Congress before the negotiations started that whenever an agreement came back from the trade negotiations, the executive branch could write legislation implementing the trade agreement and have that legislation voted on by the Congress without any opportunity to change or amend it. In other words, it had to be voted as presented by the administration. Only 20 hours of debate are allowed and a floor vote must take place within 60 days after the legislation is submitted. Now, since its initial enactment, fast-track authority has been utilized for five trade agreements: The GATT Tokyo round agreement of 1979; the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement of 1985; the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988; the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, 1993; and the GATT Uruguay round of 1994. Fast- track authority expired in December 1994 at the conclusion of the Uruguay round and has not been extended since, and the Congress is now confronting that question. Now, over that same period of time, hundreds of trade agreements were reached by U.S. administrations. Hundreds of agreements were reached. Other countries were prepared to enter into them, and they did not require fast track and were not submitted under fast-track authority to the Congress. Now, in examining this grant of authority, I first want to differ with one of the assertions that is made by its supporters that the executive branch would not be able to negotiate trade agreements if those agreements were subject to amendment by the Congress. That is the argument that is made. Unless we have this authority, we won't be able to negotiate agreements. As I have already indicated, the vast majority of trade agreements do not require changes to U.S. law and do not utilize fast-track procedures, and the successive administrations have been able to negotiate such agreements without any apparent significant difficulty. Now, the very idea that the Congress should, in effect, delegate to the executive branch the authority to write changes in U.S. law and not have those changes subject to modification or amendment by the Congress represents an extraordinary grant of authority by the Congress to the Executive. My very distinguished colleague, Senator Byrd of West Virginia, spoke to this issue eloquently earlier in this debate, pointing out what a derogation of authority this represents from the legislative to the executive branch. It is my own view that if changes are going to be made in U.S. statutes, those changes ought to be subject to the scrutiny of the Congress and amendment by the Congress. That is the role the Congress is given under the Constitution. Failure to provide for that congressional role, for that discipline, may leave the American people without any recourse to change unwise agreements entered into by the Executive. Who is to say that all of the particular decisions made by the Executive in reaching an agreement are the right ones, or that the balance struck by the Executive is the right one? Is the Congress, then, simply to have to take this package and consider it as an all-or- nothing proposition? That is not what the Constitution calls for, and I don't think Congress ought to be delegating this authority. I recognize that a stronger case can be made for the availability of fast-track authority to approve large multilateral trade agreements involving well over 100 countries, like the Uruguay round of the GATT and bilateral trade agreements like NAFTA. There is a plausible argument that concluding such multilateral agreements might be complicated by the ability of individual countries, then, to make legislative changes in the agreement. That argument has been asserted and, on occasion, recognized by Members of the Congress. However, I point out that argument loses any persuasive weight when only two or a few countries are involved in the trade agreement. This legislation makes no such distinction between multilateral and bilateral trade agreements and would provide fast track for both. It is worth noting that all major U.S. tax, arms control, territorial, defense, and other treaties are done through normal constitutional congressional procedures. We negotiated an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. What can be more important? It is submitted to the Senate for approval. The Senate has the authority, if it chooses to do so, to amend that agreement. There is no fast track on an agreement far more important than trade agreements, involving the national security of our country, where they say to the Senate, ``You must approve this arms control agreement exactly as it was negotiated by the administration, and you can only vote for it or against it.'' We have never accepted that. The argument will be made at the time, ``Don't amend it because we don't want to have to go back and have to renegotiate,'' but clearly our power to amend it is recognized and it is submitted to us under those terms. Now, if the agreement can withstand the scrutiny as to why it ought not to be amended, then it should not be amended. But to bind ourselves in advance that we will only vote it up or down, without the opportunity to amend it, is to give away a tremendous grant of legislative authority. Among the nontrade treaties done under regular procedures during the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's are the Nuclear Weapons Reduction Treaty, SALT I, SALT II, START, Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, the Customs Harmonization Convention, dozens of international tax treaties, Airline Landings Rights Treaty, Convention on International Trade and Endangered Species, Montreal protocol, Ozone Treaty, and on and on and on and on. No one said at the time that the Congress can only consider these to vote yes or no, without the power and authority to amend them; and no one said that unless you give us such a grant of authority, we won't be able to negotiate these treaties. Now let's turn for a moment and examine the question of what benefits have we received from this extraordinary grant of authority to the executive embodied in the fast-track procedures. The fact of the matter is--and I am not necessarily asserting that, because the time period corresponds, the whole cause was fast-track authority--but since fast- track authority was first granted by the Trade Act of 1974, there has been a sharp deterioration in the U.S. balance of trade with the rest of the world. During the period 1945 to 1975, the United States generally enjoyed a positive balance of trade with the rest of the world, running for most of the time a modest surplus. Since then, the U.S. balance of trade has sharply declined. Now, I first want to show a chart that shows the merchandise trade, goods traded. What this chart shows, Mr. President, is this. It begins back in the late 1940's and it comes through to the present day. This is our merchandise trade deficit. We ran a modest but positive balance throughout the 1940's, 1950's, 1960's, and into the 1970's. Here about 1975, this trade balance begins to deteriorate, and it's now down here at $200 billion a year. In fact, from 1948 until 1970, we had a positive merchandise trade balance in each and every year. In 1971 and 1972, we had a slight minus, but it was back positive in 1973, minus in 1974, positive in 1975; and since 1975, every year we have had a negative merchandise trade balance. We have been in deficit on our merchandise trade balance. Listen to the numbers. I will just take a few of them. It was $28 billion in 1977. In 1984, it jumped to $106 billion. It was $152 billion in 1987. It dropped back down; it was down to $84 billion in 1992. It went back up. In the last 4 years, it was $115 billion, $150 billion, $158 billion, and $168 billion--negative trade deficits. Now, this incredible deterioration in the merchandise trade balance was offset somewhat--by no means anywhere near entirely, but it was offset somewhat, to give a full picture--by an improvement in our services trade balance. Again, that had run in balance more or less all the way, and we have had an improvement here, as you can see, over the last few years. The total trade deficits--in other words, adding the two together-- however, continues to show a deterioration in the U.S. economic position. This is what has happened to the total trade balance. We are running along here more or less with a positive balance, and then we have had this deterioration in the trade balance. During the first 9 months of 1997, the United States has been running a trade deficit that is outpacing the 1996 rate. The cumulative U.S. trade deficit from 1974 to 1996, according to the Congressional Research Service, is $1.8 trillion. Let me repeat that. The cumulative U.S. trade deficit from 1974 to 1996 is $1.8 trillion. The cumulative current account deficits, when you offset the surface improvement during that period, is $1.5 trillion. We are running these enormous deficits. This is what we ought to be debating. One argument to turn down this fast-track authority is in order to precipitate a national debate on what our trade policy ought to be and what our trade position is. We have been running these huge trade deficits year in and year out. I defy anyone to assert that that is a desirable thing to do--to run trade deficits of the kind and magnitude that we are talking about here--$1.5 trillion over the last 22 years. What these mounting trade deficits have done, which have persisted over this 20-year period, is they have resulted in the accumulation of U.S. foreign debt obligations that will approach $1 trillion by the end of this year--$1 trillion in foreign debt obligations. The fact of the matter is that our trade deficits over the last 15 years have moved the United States from being the largest creditor nation in the world in 1981 to being the largest debtor nation in the world in 1996. And this debtor status is continuing to deepen. Let me repeat that. These large trade deficits that we have run successively over the last 20 years have moved the United States from being the largest creditor nation in the world in 1981 to being the largest debtor nation in the world in 1996. Just think of that. We have gone from being the largest creditor nation to being the largest debtor nation. And then everyone is saying that the trade policy is a source of great strength. How can it be a source of great strength when we are getting deeper and deeper into the hole as a debtor? This development has raised concerns about the ability of the United States to finance the debt. These are claims that foreigners hold on us. For example, Lester Thurow, in his recent book ``The Future of Capitalism'' wrote: No country, not even one as big as the United States, can run a trade deficit forever. Money must be borrowed to pay for the deficit, and money must be borrowed to pay interest on the borrowings. Even if the annual deficit does not grow, interest payments will grow until they are so large that they cannot be financed. At some point world capital markets will quit lending to Americans and Americans will run out of assets foreigners want to buy. Now, I am not suggesting that all of the blame for this ought to be laid on fast-track authority. There is a complex factor. But what I am suggesting is that contrary to the constant assertions, it cannot be shown by the statistics that fast-track authority has had a positive impact on the U.S. balance of trade. That is what we should be debating. We ought to be debating why is this happening? What can be done about it? What does it do to the United States to become the world's largest debtor country? Now, in many respects the assertion that fast track is needed in order to resolve some of our trade problems, I think, misses the mark. Let me give you a very clear example. The United States bilateral trade deficit with China in 1996 was $40 billion, second only to our trade deficit with Japan, and that trade deficit is continuing to deteriorate in 1997. In other words, the figures for 1997 will be more than the $40 billion figure for the 1996 trade deficit with China. Resolving our trade deficit with China does not require fast-track procedures. It requires a determined effort by our Government to address the type of problem described in a recent Washington Post article entitled, ``China Plays Rough: Invest and Transfer Technology or No Market Access.'' ``China Plays Rough: Invest and Transfer Technology or No Market Access.'' That article describes how China forces United States companies to transfer jobs and technology as a price for getting export sales. That is the so-called offsets issue. Of course, what we are doing is to gain a temporary, momentary advantage we are giving away the long run. In other words, because of this requirement, companies come in. In order to get some exports now, they transfer the technology and make the investments in China which will guarantee that they will get no exports in the future. And the Chinese are requiring that as part of the trade negotiation. Those are the kinds of issues we ought to be addressing here. That is a serious issue. And that has very severe and consequential long-term implications. The ongoing deterioration in the international position of the United States should raise fundamental questions about our trade posture. I defy anyone to look at these charts and this movement in terms of our trade balance and not conclude that we are facing a serious problem here. I am frank to tell you, I think those agreements ought to come to the Congress and let the Congress scrutinize them. The Executive makes these agreements. They develop the package. They do all the tradeoffs. They say, if it goes to the Congress, there will be all kinds of tradeoffs, as if there are no tradeoffs downtown, as if the Executive is not engaged in all sorts of tradeoffs. Who is to say that their tradeoffs better serve the public national interests of the country than the judgments or decisions that Congress would make? Recently, Kenneth Lewis, the retired chief executive of a shipping company in Portland, OR, and a member of the Presidential Commission on United States Pacific Trade and Investment Policy, wrote an article in the New York Times. In that article, he called for a significant dialog on U.S. trade policy and the establishment of a permanent commission charged with developing plans to end in the next 10 years our huge and continuing trade deficits. In fact, Senators Byrd and Dorgan and I have sponsored legislation to establish such a commission. In his article Mr. Lewis wrote: Full discussion is needed on questions like: What is the purpose of our trade policy and what do we want our domestic economy to look like? Who gains and who loses, and to what extent, from the increases in exports and the greater increases in imports? The greater increases in imports, what this chart says. See, everyone comes in, and they say, well, we are going to be able to increase our exports. Everyone says, well, that's a wonderful thing. No one looks at the other side of the ledger, which is this incredible increase which has taken place in imports and, therefore, the deteriorating economic position of the United States as we run these very large trade deficits--$1.5 trillion deficits since 1974, and because of that the United States, which has been the world's largest creditor nation into the 1970's--and we even survived up to 1980 because we had a creditor position before it was worked down. Eventually it was worked down. At the end of this year we will be a $1 trillion debtor, with every indication that it will continue on out into the future--continue on out into the future. Let me go back to this quote from Mr. Lewis: Full discussion is needed on questions like: What is the purpose of our trade policy and what do we want our domestic economy to look like? Who gains and who loses, and to what extent, from the increases in exports and the greater increases in imports? Do American workers benefit, or only consumers and investors? What conditions must exist-- concerning human rights, workers rights, or environmental protections--for us to allow other nations' goods to enter our country? These strike me as the fundamental questions that we are failing to ask about our trade policy, and fast track is not an answer to any of those questions. What we really should do here is not do the fast track. Launch a major debate on our trade policy, a major examination of the trade figures and a major consideration of why the United States is running these large trade deficits. I defy anyone to come to the floor and suggest that running these large trade deficits is to our national interest, that that is a positive situation. It is clearly not a positive situation. Throughout this whole period we ran modest but positive trade balances. In fact, many have said that the United States purposely tried to hold down its positive trade balances in order to help the rest of the world develop subsequent to World War II. So we ran these modest but positive trade balances, and beginning in the mid-1970's-- coincidentally, as I said, about the time we started doing fast-track authority--we began to get this deterioration. That's in the overall trade balance. In the merchandise trade balance, the deterioration was absolutely dramatic, as I have indicated earlier. We just had an incredible deterioration in the goods balance, as we can see by this chart here. This is about a $1.8 trillion deterioration in the trade. Now, it is somewhat offset a bit by the improvement in the service balance. But the net figure comes out to show this figure on total trade balance.