Bobby Scott

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, for the same reasons that the last carve-out was bad policy, this carve-out is a bad policy. It sets up one system for the popular, another for the unpopular. It violates the principle of equal protection. And whatever arguments are being made for why this carve-out makes sense should have been made against the bill. The carve-outs, all of the carve-outs, should be defeated, and the bill should be defeated.

Mr. SCOTT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, it is a bad policy to carve out exceptions in a bill like this because it creates one system for those that are popular with political clout, another system for those without political support that are unpopular. As the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) pointed out, the constitutional principle of equal protection is violated when we have those that get one system and those in another. That principle of equal protection and constitutional protection is particularly needed when we have unpopular individuals. Those are the ones that really need the constitutional protection. Whatever reason that this carve-out might make sense, those arguments should have been made to the bill in general. But to carve out and have a special exemption I think is wrong, and the carve-out and the amendment, therefore, should be defeated.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. We have many points that will be made during the amendments, Mr. Chairman. I would just respond to the suggestion that this will clear up the situation where complex cases will have to be heard in Federal court. Mr. Chairman, if we have 10 corporations suing 18 different corporations from a number of States, if one plaintiff corporation and one defendant corporation are from the same State, that case involving many different States, involving many different State laws, would be heard in State court. However, if there is a corporation that is systematically ripping off consumers, a simple systematic theft, not complicated, they cannot use the State court. They are relegated to Federal court by this bill. Now, it would only serve to complicate the litigation for the consumers trying to get justice against a wrongdoing corporation. Mr. Chairman, this bill is a bad bill. It serves no constructive purpose. There is no need for it. It is unfair to consumers and, therefore, should be defeated. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Chairman, this is a radical response to a handful of court decisions that some disagree with. The response is to use political clout just to change the system. Now, this is not the first time that we have changed the system when we disagree with a court decision. Even pending cases, for example, in the Oklahoma bombing case, we changed the law right in the middle of the case and forced the judge to reverse a preliminary ruling. After an airline case just a couple of years ago, we changed the law after the crash to enable some plaintiffs to get increased damages. The Committee on Education and the Workforce, Mr. Chairman, has already reported a bill which will have the effect of reversing a lower court decision. The case is now on appeal. That bill, if passed, would reverse the lower court decision. We even enacted legislation about a year or two ago which had the effect of entering final judgment in a child custody case that was pending. So, Mr. Chairman, if one has the political clout, one can come to Congress and change the system to one's advantage and receive special treatment, rather than being relegated to going through the regular court process. That is not fair. This is also a bad bill, Mr. Chairman, because it is not good policy to continually federalize court proceedings. The Federal judiciary has already complained, the Chief Justice has complained about cases being transferred to Federal court. We have even now street crimes, juvenile crimes being more and more handled by Federal courts. Those are supposed to be handled by the State courts and here we are again federalizing cases. Now, the proponents complain that the State courts rule on interests of out-of-state parties. That has always been the case and it will always be the case, and this bill does not change it. In fact, if one has multiple defendants of large corporations, multiple plaintiffs, but not technically a class, State courts can continually hear these cases. One can have billion dollar cases, complex, multi-State, but if one has a plaintiff and a defendant both from the same State, the Federal court will not hear that case, but the State court will rule on other State laws, other State interests. Mr. Chairman, the only people that will be denied the access to State courts will be those who are consumers that need the procedure of a class action to actually hear their cases. Those are cases which are small and cannot be brought as individual cases, so the consumers will be denied, but the large corporations will not. This bill does not reform; it just transfers the cases of consumers into Federal courts and denies them State access. For those consumers who are affected, this bill will cause confusion, because if a State case is filed, this bill allows anybody who alleges that they are affected by the case to start filing motions. The person is not a plaintiff; the person is not a defendant, just a stranger, so that if one is talking about gaming the system, let us have a defendant that does not like being in State court, finds a friend from out of State, brings them in, and starts filing motions in Federal court. Now, the person who is filing, if they do not like being in the class, they can opt out of the class, so they have no legitimate purpose other than to add confusion to the case. So rather than having the plaintiff and the defendant proceeding with the trial or with settlement, this bill allows strangers to come in and delay the proceedings, adding expense and making it less likely that the merits of the case will ever be considered. Mr. Chairman, this bill is unneeded and it is unfair to consumers. It only benefits corporate wrongdoers who want to delay and complicate the cases and, therefore, should be defeated.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Rogan-Bateman amendment and in opposition to the severe cuts in the NASA budget. The bill before us today has a cut of $1 billion to NASA, an agency which has already seen its budget decline year after year for the past 4 years. I am especially concerned about the impact these cuts will have on future funding of aeronautics research and development programs. This research and development is crucial to preserve our Nation's long- standing lead in the aviation market, to maintain continued advancements in aviation safety, and to continue to provide our military aircraft with technological advantages. We already know that aeronautics R&D funding will be $150 million less in 1999 and further cuts will be made in research in the fiscal year 2000 budget if this $1 billion cut to NASA is sustained. Previous cuts have already resulted in loss of valuable research. For example, one program has already been suspended. That successful program had already started significantly reducing noise of airplane engines. That program has been terminated before it can complete all it needed to do, and that is at a time when we are spending millions of dollars to insulate homes around Chicago's O'Hare's airport because of noise. It makes more sense to continue noise reduction research so houses around all airports could benefit. If the budget cuts remain, other valuable research will also be in jeopardy. We know, for example, Mr. Chairman, that investments in aeronautics research pays off. The aviation industry is the number one positive contributor to the United States balance of trade, now even surpassing agriculture with a net contribution to our economy of more than $41 billion in 1998. This economic advantage is directly attributable to our past investments and research. Every aircraft worldwide uses NASA-developed research. Principles developed from this research have contributed to overall aircraft safety and efficiency, including things like wing design, noise abatement, structural integrity, and fuel efficiency. It is important to remember that research was conducted over 5, 10, or even 20 years before the improvements were actually put on an airplane. So we are talking about long-term, sustained basic research that is necessary. Mr. Chairman, it is also important to note that continued and increased investments in aeronautic research are crucial for advancements in aviation safety and improvements in airport capacity. We know that air traffic is expected to triple in the next decade. New concepts, design, and technologies have to evolve if costs are to be contained and safety and efficiency of aircraft are to be improved. Finally, Mr. Chairman, we also know that funding for aeronautics research is important to the national defense. This research is critical to maintain our military aircraft technological advantage. So any cuts in aeronautics research will raise troubling national security issues. We simply cannot afford to go down the short-sighted road of funding cuts to NASA. Our aeronautic balance of trade, our future airline safety, our military superiority all depend on investments to NASA research. For those reasons, I support this amendment.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would transfer approximately one-half, that is $137 million, of the truth-in-sentencing prison grant funds to crime prevention and drug treatment programs. Mr. Chairman, the fact is that the truth in sentencing funds, which only about half of the States even qualify for, can only be spent for prison construction. At this point some States have already overbuilt their prison space, and my own State of Virginia is trying to lease out space to other States in the Federal Government of about 3,200 excess prison beds. There is no reason for us to provide funds to build prison beds that States do not need. Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, States are already spending tens of billions of dollars on prison construction, so the entire fund of $300 million spread out among the few States that actually qualify cannot possibly make any measurable difference in the number of prison beds built, much less have an overall effect on the crime rate. But if that money is targeted to crime prevention and treatment programs, we can make a significant difference on crime. Mr. Chairman, this truth-in-sentencing policy is a poor policy to begin with. The so-called truth is actually only half truth in sentencing because the half truth is that those who are subjected to the truth in sentencing cannot get out early. The whole truth is that others cannot be held longer either. Virginia changed to 1\1/2\ to 10 year sentence where the average served was 2\1/2\ years to a sentence where everyone served 5 years. They doubled the average time served. The low-risk prisoners cannot get out early, but the high-risk prisoners that could not make parole and could have been held for 10 years cannot be held longer either. Mr. Chairman, another problem with the truth in sentencing is the absence of parole eligibility, eliminates a major incentive the prisoners have to qualify for education and job training programs. They lose their incentive, they do not have to tell the parole board anything, and so they are more likely to come out as dumb, as untrained, as they went in. Education and job training are two of the major components in crime reduction, of recidivism. It is such poor policy, Mr. Chairman, that 23 States did not even ask for money in last year's budget, and so we have a situation where the money could be spent much better. The Conference on Juvenile Justice has just begun, and we can make a commitment to reduce crime by passing this amendment. This amendment would increase funding for building and running boys and girls clubs, in public housing and in sites for at-risk youth by $50 million. Boys and girls clubs have been shown through study and research to be cost- effective ways of reducing crime for at-risk youth. The amendment also provides for an additional $37 million for residential drug treatment for prisoners before they are released and approximately $90 million for drug courts. Both prison drug treatment and drug courts have been shown to significantly reduce crime at a lower cost than just simply jailing drug addicts. So this amendment would not only reduce crime, it will reduce the amount of money that we spend. So let us show our commitment to reducing crime in this country by passing this amendment.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, the Nadler amendment points out the problem of the underlying bill, and that is that without this amendment it may sabotage the enforcement of laws of general application, like civil rights laws, child protection laws and others. We should not subject vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws to individual beliefs. We know that there are some in our society, and we have seen on Web sites the Church of the Creator, where some have strongly held beliefs about race, and we should not make civil rights laws optional. Without this amendment, those people who just do not believe in civil rights can require a showing of a compelling State interest and least restrictive means to complicate the enforcement of civil rights laws by declaring that the compliance with the civil rights laws might violate their beliefs. Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we would not subject our civil rights laws it took us too long to enact and so long to enforce to this kind of situation. I would hope that we would adopt the Nadler amendment so these civil rights laws could be enforced.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. Madam Speaker, this proposed amendment, if enacted by Congress and ratified, would reduce our rights of freedom of speech and expression embodied in the Bill of Rights for the first time in over 200 years. Those freedoms have made this country the envy of the world, and those freedoms have protected us from the kinds of upheavals over religious and political expressions that plague other countries even today. But freedom is not a popularity contest. If that were the case, we would not need a Bill of Rights. Popular expression does not need protection. In fact, the First Amendment only comes into play when there is a need to protect unpopular religious or political expression. I would ask my colleagues to consider the consequences before they start chipping away at the First Amendment. Some refer to this amendment as the anti-flag-burning amendment, but this amendment will not prohibit flag-burning. The truth is that even if this amendment is adopted, flag-burning will still be considered the proper way to honor the flag at ceremonies in order to properly dispose of a worn-out flag. So this amendment has nothing to do with the act of burning the flag. It is the expression, the speech, which is the target of this amendment. Proponents of this amendment seek to prohibit activities and expressions with the flag when they disagree with those expressions. That is why the term ``desecration'' is used, not ``burning.'' ``Desecration'' has religious connotations. In other words, this amendment would give government officials the power to decide that one can burn the flag if he is saying something reverent in a ceremony, but he is a criminal if he burns the flag while saying something disrespectful at a protest. This is absurd, and in direct contravention with the whole purpose of the First Amendment. The government has no business deciding which political expressions are sufficiently reverent and which expressions are criminal because someone important got offended. That is why the practical effect of this amendment will be jailing of political protestors and no one else, because those who steal flags and destroy them, or those who provoke riots by burning a flag, can already be prosecuted under current law. We have already seen the dangers of going down the path of patriotic legislation when in World War II we had laws compelling schoolchildren to pledge allegiance to the flag. We got so wrapped up in our drive to compel patriotism that we lost sight of the high ideals for which our flag stands, and passed laws that forced schoolchildren to salute and say a pledge to the flag, even if such acts violated their religious beliefs. Fortunately for the American people, the Supreme Court put an end to that coercion with the landmark case of West Virginia State Board of Education versus Barnett. Obviously the majority in Barnett, Justice Jackson wrote, ``If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what is orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.'' Madam Speaker, unfortunately today we are poised and anxious to prescribe what is orthodox in politics and nationalism, even when there is no disagreement on this subject matter, and even when there is no evidence that flags are being burned in protest in any number sufficient to provoke an amendment to our Bill of Rights. In fact, history reflects that the only time flag-burning occurs with any frequency is when these constitutional amendments are being considered. Furthermore, Madam Speaker, the proscription required under this amendment is undefined. The text of the resolution states that ``Congress shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States.'' This is the same language presented in the last Congress, and even after several hearings on the subject in the House and Senate, we have no idea of what will constitute desecration or what will constitute a flag. At a hearing during the last Congress, at least one witness supporting the amendment agreed that the use of the flag in advertising could be considered desecration. How many car dealers or political candidates using flags in advertisements will be considered criminals, or will it depend on their political views? Even wearing a flag tie could be an offense punishable by jail under this amendment, because the Federal flag code now considers the flag worn as apparel as a violation. When is a flag a flag? Is a picture of a flag a flag? Is it a flag when the wrong numbers of Stars and Stripes are there before the flag is destroyed? With so many unanswered questions and unintended consequences, I would hope that we would take a closer look at this amendment before we consider passing it. Otherwise, any criminal statute enacted under this amendment will be inherently vague and unworkable. In conclusion, Madam Speaker, I would urge that this body be guided by the words of Justice Brennan when he wrote: ``We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in so doing we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.'' Madam Speaker, let us not betray the freedom our flag represents. I would urge everyone to stand up for the high ideals that the flag represents by opposing this attack on our Bill of Rights.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Edwards).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, some prior speaker said this was a good resolution except for the unconstitutional parts, and I tend to agree with that. I think there is a lot this resolution has to offer except for the parts that we have referred to. I think we just need to, so we know what the Founding Fathers might have envisioned, read what is in the bill that this resolution endorses. First, on discrimination: It provides that a religious organization that is a program participant may require an employee rendering services to adhere to the religious beliefs and practices of such organization, and any rules of the organization regarding the use of alcohol and drugs. Now, the gentleman from Indiana has acknowledged that discrimination may occur. In fact, he wants to extend the title 7 exemption to churches which are allowed to discriminate on a religious basis when they hire people who are ministers and things like that. But this would extend it to federally-sponsored drug programs. And it would be a new day in America when a federally-sponsored drug program can hang out a sign that says, people of certain religions need not apply for a job because of their religions. Let us go along to whether we can have coerced religion. Page 75, line 23, a religious organization may require a program beneficiary to actively participate in religious practice, worship and instruction, and follow the rules of behavior devised by the organizations that are religious in content and origin.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, did I understand the gentleman to say that if one church ran a drug counseling program, that they could have a sign on their door that said Jewish drug counselors need not apply for a job under a federally-funded program?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker I ask unanimous consent that the time of debate be extended by 10 minutes, 5 minutes per side.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, could I inquire as to how much time we have remaining?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I support the notion that faith-based organizations should be able to receive Federal funds where constitutionally appropriate to provide services for individuals in need. We all recognize the contributions that these organizations have made. Some of them, in fact, do a better job than other nonprofits that are not religiously affiliated. But while I support the underlying premise of H. Res. 207, and recognizing the contributions that faith-based organizations have made, I take issue with the reference in the resolution, in H.R. 815, the American Community Renewal Act. This legislation presents considerable policy and constitutional issues relating to faith-based organizations. Mr. Speaker, under current law, religiously affiliated organizations such as Catholic Charities or Lutheran Services in America and the United Jewish Communities are generally permitted to provide social services with government funds so long as the program receiving the funds is not pervasively sectarian or religiously discriminatory. The American Community Renewal Act is a dramatic and extreme departure from current law as it seeks to fund pervasively sectarian organizations to administer substance abuse benefits on behalf of the government. Pervasively sectarian programs are those defined by the United States Supreme Court in which, and I quote, religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of their function is subsumed in their religious mission. In various cases, the Supreme Court has listed several criteria to be used to help to determine if the program is pervasively sectarian such as is it located near a house of worship and abundance of religious symbols on the premises, religious discrimination in the institution's hiring practices, the presence of religious activities, or the purposeful articulation of religious mission. Specifically this resolution and this legislation that is commented by the resolution allows providers to require program participants to, 1, actively participate in religious practice worship and instruction; and 2, to follow the rules of behavior devised by the organizations that are religious in content and origin. Thus, as proposed, the American Community Renewal Act would authorize the use of taxpayer funds to directly coerce government beneficiaries to practice certain religious beliefs, and it does so without adequately notifying participants that they have a right to seek nonreligious services. In addition, it would allow faith-based organizations to engage in employment discrimination based on religion, with public funds. Now title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides for a specific exemption for religious organizations from the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of religion and private employment. For example, a church in hiring the minister can require the minister to have to belong to that particular religion, but this exemption has never been applied to employees of Federal programs sponsored by a religiously affiliated organizations. As proposed, H.R. 815, in 815 those organizations who are receiving Federal funds may deny, for example, drug counselors' employment based on their religion. For example, this bill allows an exemption as follows: Quote, a religious organization that is a program participant may require that an employee rendering services adhere to, A, the religious beliefs and practices of that organization, and B, the rules of the organization regarding the use of alcohol. This means that a federally funded drug program sponsored by a religiously affiliated organization could for the first time since we had meaningful civil rights laws say that drug counselors of other religions need not apply. Beyond the considerable constitutional implications of this legislation there are also several serious policy concerns that should be mentioned. Of particular note is the concern that the legislation would override State licensing and certification of drug and alcohol treatment counselors. Additionally, there is an inclusion of an absolutely absurd congressional finding that, quote, formal educational qualifications for counselors and other program personnel in drug treatment programs may undermine the effectiveness or even may hinder or prevent the provision of needed drug treatment services. To suggest that formal educational qualifications for counselors and other personnel may be counterproductive is not anything that we have evidence to support. Mr. Speaker, there is a reason why we have laws separating church and State activities. We have a long line of Supreme Court cases showing how this could be done and how it is appropriate to be done. This legislation, which references H.R. 815, is an extreme and dramatic departure from that long line of cases, and for that reason the resolution ought to be opposed. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Edwards).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. Speaker, first, I think it is important in terms of the requirement, the coercion of religious activity, I think it is important that I repeat what is on page 75 of the bill: ``A religious organization that is a program participant may require a program beneficiary to actively participate in religious practice, worship, and instruction, and to follow the rules of behavior devised by the organization that are religious in content and origin.'' Mr. Speaker, let us see what some religious groups have to say about this particular piece of legislation. I have a letter from the Working Group for Religious Freedom and Social Services which says ``We, the undersigned religious education, health, civil rights, and civil liberties organizations, are writing to urge you to oppose House Resolution 207 which endorses the substance abuse treatment section of H.R. 815, the American Community Renewal Act, because it would violate the religious liberty rights of Federal taxpayers and social service beneficiaries.'' Mr. Speaker, it goes on to say that the bill will allow religious providers to engage in religious discrimination against employees who are paid through and work on taxpayer-funded substance abuse treatment programs. Although religious institutions are permitted to hire co- religionists in the context of private religious activity, ACRA overrides State civil rights laws and amounts to Federally-funded employment discrimination by requiring employees paid with public funds to adhere to the religious tenets and teachings of the organization. In addition, the act undercuts States' rights by preempting State constitutional and statutory provisions, including civil rights laws. Furthermore, ACRA erroneously states that counselor training undermines effective substance abuse treatment, and the bill requires States that establish such training requirements to give equivalent credit for religious education such as Bible study to course work in drug treatment. This letter is endorsed by 31 organizations, including the American Baptist Churches, American Civil Liberties Union, the American Counseling Association, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and a whole host of other religious organizations. Mr. Speaker, I include this letter for the Record. The letter referred to is as follows: The Working Group for Religious Freedom in Social Services, Washington, DC, June 21, 1999. Dear Representative: We, the undersigned religious, education, health, civil rights, and civil liberties organizations are writing to urge you to oppose H.J. Res. 207 which endorses the Substance Abuse Treatment section of H.R. 815, the ``American Community Renewal Act'' (ACRA) because it would violate the religious liberty rights of federal taxpayers and social service beneficiaries. The bill would amend the federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration statute so that ``pervasively sectarian'' religious institutions, such as churches and other houses of worship, could receive public funds to provide services on behalf of the government. Although many religiously-affiliated nonprofit organizations currently provide government-funded substance abuse treatment, the ``American Community Renewal Act'' would change current law to permit churches and other religious organizations that include evangelism in their programs, to receive contracts and vouchers for programs in which government social service beneficiaries may be proselytized. In addition to violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, ACRA is an affront to the religious liberty rights of substance abuse and mental health beneficiaries. Although a beneficiary technically has the right to object to a religious provider, ACRA does not provide notice to the beneficiary of his or her right to object. This is particularly disturbing in the context of substance abuse treatment. It is difficult enough for those addicted to substances to seek help. Furthermore, in most instances, even if a beneficiary takes the initiative to seek an alternative provider, the bill makes the religious institution responsible for finding the alternative. The bill would also allow religious providers to engage in religious discrimination against employees who are paid through, and work on, taxpayer-funded substance abuse treatment programs. Although religious institutions are permitted to hire co-religionists in the context of private religious activity, ACRA overrides state civil rights laws and amounts to federlly-funded employment discrimination by requiring employees paid with public funds to adhere to the religious tenets and teachings of the organization. Additionally, the ``American Community Renewal Act'' undercusts state rights by preempting state constitutional and statutory provisions (including civil rights laws). Furthermore, ACRA erroneously states that counselor training undermines effective substance abuse treatment, and the bill requires States that estalbish such training requirements to give equivalent credit for religious education, such as Bible study, to course work in drug treatment. This federal legislation overtly preempts state constitutions and statutes that protect religious liberty, civil rights, and training of treatment providers. Of course, with government dollars comes government oversight. Such entanglement between government and religion violates the Establishment Clause, and demonstrates why the current law's distinction between ``pervasively sectarian'' and ``religiously-affiliated'' institutions better protects religious freedom. ACRA would obliterate this protection and open the door to other programs that provide taxpayer funds to religious institutions, such as school tuition vouchers. For these reasons we strongly urge you to oppose H.J. Res. 207 which endorses the substance abuse section of H.R. 815, the ``american Community Renewal Act.'' Sincerely, American Baptist Churches; American Civil Liberties Union; American Counseling Association; American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; American Jewish Committee; American Jewish Congress; Americans United for Separation of Church and State; Anti-Defamation League; Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs; Catholics for a Free Choice; Central Conference of American Rabbis; CHILD Inc.; Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quaker); General Board of Church and Society, United Methodist Church; General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists; Hadassah; Jewish Council for Public Affairs; Legal Action Center; Na'amat USA; National Association of Alcoholism & Drug Abuse Counselors; National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors; National Council of Jewish Women; National Jewish Democratic Council; People for the American Way; Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Washington Office; The Rabbinical Assembly; Union of American Hebrew Congregations; Unitarian Universalist Association; United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society; Women's American Ort; Workmen's Circle. Mr. Speaker, I also have a letter from a number of drug counseling institutions which says, ``The undersigned organizations oppose House Resolution 207 and the portions of the American Community Renewal Act which will hurt provision of professionally competent alcohol and drug treatment services. ``Unfortunately, the Community Renewal Act will undermine treatment effectiveness. The Act will override State licensure and certification of alcohol and drug counselors, crushing State guarantees of safety in alcoholism and drug addiction treatment. ``The Act actually states that alcohol and drug treatment counseling is not a professional field and that formal education for counselors is detrimental to the practice of effective counseling. This is simply inaccurate. Alcoholism and drug addiction is a disease. Consequently, alcohol and drug counseling has long required specialized knowledge and training compelling the use of professional practitioners. Education equals effective alcoholism and drug addiction treatment. ``Even more troubling, the Act will require States which require formal education to deliver services to `give credit for religious education and training equivalent to credit given for secular course work in drug treatment. . . .' ``Alcohol and drug treatment is a medical service requiring medical knowledge. Treatment professionals specialize in diagnosis and treatment of psychoactive disorders and other substance abuse/use dependency. These counselors and other professionals possess a constellation of knowledge that is unique to the alcoholism and drug abuse counseling profession, and distinguishes ADCs from other related professions and specialties. Religious education and training is not equivalent to training given to the medical specialty of alcohol and drug treatment.'' Mr. Speaker, this letter is endorsed by the American Counseling Association, the National Association of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Counselors, the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, the National Association of Student Assistance Professionals, the National Coalition of State Alcohol and Drug Treatment and Prevention Associations, the Partnership for Recovery, which includes the Betty Ford Center, the Valley Hope Medical Association, and a whole host of other organizations. Mr. Speaker, I also place this letter in the Record. The letter referred to is as follows: June 21, 1999. Members, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Members of Congress: The undersigned organizations oppose H. Res. 207 and the portions of the American Community Renewal Act which will hurt the provision of professionally competent alcohol and drug treatment services. Unfortunately, the Community Renewal Act will undermine treatment effectiveness. The Act will override state licensure and certification of alcohol and drug counselors, crushing state guarantees of safety in alcoholism and drug addiction treatment. The Act actually states that alcohol and drug treatment counseling is not a professional field and that formal education for counselors is detrimental to the practice of effective counseling. This is simply inaccurate. Alcoholism and drug addiction is a disease. Consequently, alcohol and drug counseling has long required specialized knowledge and training compelling the use of professional practitioners. Education equals effective alcoholism and drug addiction treatment. Even more troubling, the Act will require States which require formal education to deliver treatment services to ``give credit for religious education and training equivalent to credit given for secular course work in drug treatment . . .'' Alcohol and drug treatment is a medical service requiring medical knowledge. Treatment professionals specialize in the diagnosis, assessment and treatment of psychoactive disorders and other substance abuse/use/dependency. These counselors and other professionals possess a constellation of knowledge that is unique to the alcoholism and drug abuse counseling profession, and distinguishes ADCs from other related professions and specialties. Religious education and training is not equivalent to training given for the medical speciality of alcohol and drug treatment. The Act also mandates States to waive their formal educational requirements under certain circumstances or face lawsuits. Finally the legislation attempts to remedy a problem that does not exist. Religious organizations are already entitled to receive federal funding by complying with the rules for charitable organizations. All of our organizations seek to include spirituality in the lives of individuals. Spirituality is an important component of treatment, and mechanisms already exist to bring this aspect of recovery to patients without changing current law. However, by stating that establishing formal education requirements may hinder treatment and by attempting to equate religious education with knowledge about alcoholism and drug dependence, the Community Renewal Act undermines treatment efforts and removes scarce funding from effective treatment programs. Unfortunately, this legislation ensures that the millions of people suffering from addiction, their families, employers and communities will be harmed by incompetent treatment. The Community Renewal Act will hurt the provision of professionally competent alcohol and drug treatment services. For this reason, we urge you to vote against H. Res. 207. Sincerely, The American Counseling Association; The American Methadone Treatment Association; The American Society of Addiction Medicine; The Association of Halfway House Alcoholism Programs of North America; College on Problems of Drug Dependence; Legal Action Center; The National Association of Addiction Treatment Providers; The National Association of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors; The National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors; The National Association of Student Assistance Professionals; The National Coalition of State Alcohol and Drug Treatment and Prevention Associations; The National Council for Community Behavioral Healthcare; The National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence; National TASC; The Partnership for Recovery; The Betty Ford Center; The Caron Foundation; Hazelden, Inc.; The Valley Hope Medical Association; The Research Society on Alcoholism; Therapeutic Communities of America.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I would ask the gentleman, if on page 75, line 23, the American Community Renewal Act says, ``A religious organization that is a program participant may require a program beneficiary who is elected to receive program services from the organization; one, can require them to actively participate in religious practice, worship and instruction; and two, to follow the rules of behavior devised by the organization that are religious in content or origin.'' Is that in the bill?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, there is also a part in here that has congressional findings. It says, Congress finds that establishing formal educational qualifications for counselors and other personnel in drug treatment programs may undermine the effectiveness of such programs, and such formal educational requirements for counselors may hinder or prevent provision of drug treatment services. Mr. Speaker, I do not know whether people want discrimination or whether they want coerced religion, but religious groups oppose this, professional drug counselors oppose this, civil rights groups oppose it, and we should all oppose this resolution.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis).