Bobby Scott

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that the gentleman yielded to me. Mr. Chairman, this amendment prevents the Department of Justice from enforcing section 203 of the Voting Rights Act. We know from our hearings that section 203 works. If you enforce section 203, more people vote. It only applies where there is a large number of voters with that particular language, a critical mass, enough to affect an election. If we pass this, it won't encourage people to learn English. There are waiting lists to learn English already. If people could vote, maybe they could have more resources applied to English language. We need a fair opportunity for people to vote. Section 203 brings that opportunity to people. We should reject this amendment and enforce the Voting Rights Act. This is a very important aspect, the Voting Rights Act, and we should enforce the Voting Rights Act, not tell the Department of Justice to fail to support it.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I will be introducing, at the appropriate time, a letter from the national Legal Aid & Defender Association that says, in part, that the LSC-funded program simply cannot keep up with the demand for services. Documenting the Justice gap, a year-long study released by the LSC in October of 2005 revealed that at least 50 percent of eligible clients were turned away from LSC- funded programs due to a lack of resources. In other words, for every client served, at least one eligible client was turned away. This statistic reflects the vast unmet need and is, nonetheless, an underestimate and does not take into account the countless people, eligible people, who did not seek assistance because they were not aware that the LSC programs could help them. This letter says that we are extremely concerned that cuts to LSC- funded programs will have a harmful effect on our judicial system, our economy and businesses, and our society in general. Mr. Chairman, it is significant that this letter is signed by approximately 60 general counsels of our Nation's leading corporations who are asking for this kind of amendment. Actually, they are asking for more resources, but at least this modest amendment ought to be adopted in response to this letter. National Legal Aid & Defender Association, Washington, DC, June 26, 2006. Hon. Robert C. Scott, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Representative Scott: As the general counsel of some of our nation's leading corporations, we are asking for your help. The Legal Services Corporation (LSC), the primary legal lifeline to millions of Americans in times of need, is in jeopardy of having its already inadequate funding further eroded. Today, LSC's funding is less than one-half of the inflation-adjusted dollars that Congress appropriated in FY 1980, and ten million dollars less than the FY 2003 appropriation. In his FY 2007 budget request, President Bush has proposed an additional 4.6 percent decrease from the current $326.6 million appropriation to $310.9 million. We are asking you to reverse this diminution of critical funds by supporting the Corporation's FY 2007 budget request of $411.8 million. Due to recent cuts to the LSC appropriation and rising inflation rates, LSC-funded programs have struggled to help the growing number of our country's impoverished. Poverty statistics show that between 2002 and 2004, the number of people eligible for LSC services increased from 47 million to 49.7 million, which is about one in every six Americans. Sadly, of these nearly 50 million people, more than one third of them are children. To put clients' need in perspective: a family of four must earn a meager $25,000 or less to qualify. LSC-funded programs simply cannot keep up with the demand for services. Documenting the Justice Gap, a year-long study released by LSC in October 2005, revealed that at least 50 percent of eligible clients were turned away from LSC-funded programs due to a lack of resources. In other words, for every client served, at least one eligible client is turned away. While this statistic reflects the vast unmet need, it is, nonetheless, an underestimate and does not take into account the countless eligible people who did not seek assistance because they were not aware that LSC-funded programs could help them. We are extremely concerned that cuts to LSC funding will have a harmful affect on our judicial system, our economy and businesses, and our society in general. While we are mindful of the severe fiscal constraints under which the Congress finds itself, we ask you to act now to ensure that essential civil legal services continue to make differences in the lives of those in need. Please support a FY 2007 LSC appropriation of $411.8 million and join us in upholding the American promise of ``justice for all.'' Sincerely, Kenneth C. Frazier, Merck & Co., Inc., Chair, NLADA Corporate Advisory, Committee; Peter Arakas, LEGO Systems, Inc.; Richard N. Baer, Qwest Communications Corporation; Theodore N. Bobby, H.J. Heinz Company; Paula Boggs, Starbucks Corporation; Charles Burson, Esq., Monsanto Company; Carl J. Busch, Northrop Grumman Corporation; Jim Carter, Nike Inc.; Robert J. Cindrich, UPMC, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; Mike Cockrell, Sanderson Farms, Inc.; Bert Cornelison, Halliburton Company; Julie A. Davis, Retail Ventures Inc.; Morris Davis, Temple-Inland, Inc.; Dodds M. Dehmer, W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company; Catherine A. Lamboley, Shell Oil Company, Immediate Past Chair, NLADA, Corporate Advisory Committee; Nancy C. Loftin, Pinnacle West Capital Corp. and APS; Louis M. Lupin, QUALCOMM Incorporated; Charles W. Matthews, Jr., ExxonMobil Corporation; Ron McCray, Kimberly-Clark Corporation; Kevin M. McDonald, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation; John H. McGuckin Jr., Union Bank of California; Lee R. Mitau, U.S. Bancorp; O. Kendall Moore, U-Save Auto Rental of America, Inc.; Richard Olin, Costco Wholesale Corporation; Patrick T. Ortiz, PNM Resources, Inc.; Joy Lambert Phillips, Hancock Bank; Thomas E. Richardson, Town Pump, Inc.; Scott E. Rozzell, CenterPoint Energy, Inc.; Deborah Dorman-Rodriguez, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Mexico; Paul Ehrlich, adidas International, Inc.; Glenn M. Engelmann, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP; Stephen F. Gates, ConocoPhillips; Craig B. Glidden, Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP; Storrow Gordon, Electronic Data Systems Corporation; Thomas A. Gottschalk, General Motors Corporation; Andrew D. Hendry, Colgate-Palmolive Company; Jim Hornstein, Moldex Metric, Inc.; Michael Jines, Reliant Energy, Inc.; James J. Johnson, The Procter & Gamble Company; Murray L. Johnston Jr., Zachry Construction Corporation; Guy Kerr, Belo Corp.; Ky Lewis, Sharp HealthCare System; Mark I. Litow, Esq., Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company; Dan D. Sandman, United States Steel Corporation; David A. Savner, General Dynamics Corporation; John Schulman, Warner Bros.; William F. Schwind, Jr., Marathon Oil Corporation; Karen E. Shaff, The Principal Financial Group; Lauri M. Shanahan, Gap Inc.; Laura Stein, The Clorox Company; Ronald Taylor, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas; Vivian Tseng, Welch Foods Inc., A Cooperative; John E. Tucker, First Tower Corp.; Rita Tuzon, Fox Cable Networks; Jack VanWoerkom, Staples, Inc.; Jennifer L. Vogel, Continental Airlines, Inc.; Michael T. Williams, Sony Electronics Inc.; Wayne Withers, Esq., Emerson Electric Company; Christopher J. Littlefield, AmerUs Group.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak to two different issues. One is the potential amendment to the Voting Rights Act, where a suggestion may be made to withhold funding for the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. The Voting Rights Act is one of the most important civil rights pieces of legislation in the history of the United States, and we should not do anything to avoid the full and fair enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. That bill should be coming up in a few days. We do not know exactly when. There has been an agreement with leadership that the bill be adopted as it came out of committee. It came out of committee 31-1, so we would hope that the leadership would bring it to the floor. Mr. Chairman, there is another issue that is extremely important, and that is the Legal Services Corporation. If we are going to have people enjoy the rights that they have throughout America, we have to make sure that they have access to courts. The legal Services Corporation, primarily legal aid programs across the country, are extremely important; and we need to make sure that they are fully funded. The bill includes a provision where the number is lower than it should be, and we need to make sure that the amendments to increase Legal Services are adopted. So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's giving me the opportunity to bring these two issues to the floor.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, this bill has nothing to do with fiscal responsibility. If we were interested in fiscal responsibility, we would not have passed the tax bill just a few minutes ago that adds, over the course of just a few years, trillions of dollars in new deficits without any way to pay for it. Mr. Speaker, 5 years ago we had a $5.5 trillion 10-year surplus. Now those 10 years look like they are going to come in at about a $3.5 trillion deficit, a $9 trillion reversal. If this bill had been in effect during those years and the President had used his new powers the way we might hope, we might have saved a few hundred thousand dollars, a few million, maybe even a few billion, but that is negligible compared to the $9 trillion reversal. And that is if the President used the new power in a fiscally responsible manner. Nothing in the bill prevents the President from using his new powers to coerce even more irresponsibility, such as using it as a hammer to coerce Members to support new tax cuts without paying for them. Finally, Mr. Speaker, on the tax provisions, the bill only allows the President to veto teeny weeny, little targeted tax cuts, but does not allow him to veto huge, gargantuan, irresponsible, unpaid-for tax cuts. Mr. Speaker, this path to fiscal responsibility is paved with hard choices. This ineffective gimmick is not one of them. We should reject the bill.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 367 honoring and praising the National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution on the 100th anniversary of being granted its Congressional Charter. The National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution was chartered by Congress 100 years ago on June 9, 1906. The charter was signed by Theodore Roosevelt, who was a member. The resolution, which is sponsored by the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble), recognizes this anniversary and honors and praises the National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution on the occasion of this anniversary for its work to perpetuate and honor the memory of the brave men who fought to gain freedom during the American Revolution and for the society's unfailing devotion to our Nation's youth. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution and urge my colleagues to support it. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in support of H.R. 4356, the Emergency and Disaster Assistance Fraud Penalty Enhancement Act of 2005. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we were all appalled to learn of the rampant schemes of fraudulent benefiting of government funding intended for victims of the disasters. While these crimes are now being prosecuted under existing fraud laws, I believe that the crime warrants specific and enhanced emphasis to put on notice those who would take criminal advantage of the government's need to focus on speed and comprehensive assistance in times of disasters and emergencies. This bill would establish the specific crime of fraud in connection with major disaster or emergency benefits and increases the penalties currently available for such acts. Recognizing the particular egregiousness of fraud claims surrounding emergencies like Hurricane Katrina, the bill also directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission to increase penalties under the sentencing guidelines for those individuals who would fraudulently seek to benefit from funding intended for victims of natural disasters and Presidentially declared emergencies. While I generally do not support specific directives to the Sentencing Commission to increase penalties for crimes, I believe this particular category of crime is egregious enough to warrant more punishment than fraud in general, with appropriate considerations for mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Mr. Speaker, I am in favor, as we all are, of seeing increased benefits being made available for victims of disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. Many have lost everything and are now without a permanent home or compensation for their losses. Many are still not able to return to the area. Many still need ongoing assistance. We can all agree that the limited disaster and emergency benefits that are made available to victims should only go to legitimate victims, not to scam artists or cheats who recognize that humanitarian concerns in the middle of a disaster require a waiver of traditional checks and balances in favor of speed and getting the relief to the suffering victims. Those who cheat and scheme at these times deserve more punishment. Accordingly, I am supportive of this legislation, and I urge my colleagues to support the bill. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution on the Iraqi war. Mr. Speaker, as we discuss what to do now, we must first acknowledge the fact that we cannot discuss an exit strategy for leaving Iraq without first stating what the entry strategy was, and then stating what we are trying to accomplish now. We were originally told we invaded Iraq because they had weapons of mass destruction. That turned out not to be true. We were then told that we invaded Iraq because the Iraqi leaders were connected with the 9/11 attacks. That turned out not to be true. The rationale that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States was exposed as untrue even before the invasion. A letter from the Director of the CIA to the Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee dated October 7, 2002, specifically stated that the CIA believed that Iraq and Saddam Hussein did not pose a terrorist threat to the United States and would not be expected to pose such a threat unless we attacked. Mr. Speaker, after it became clear that there were no weapons of mass destruction, that Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, and that Iraq posed no terrorist threat to the United States, we have been subjected to the excuse of the week for being in Iraq. We were told that we needed to capture Saddam Hussein for our safety. He has been in jail for over a year, and yet we are still in Iraq. Then the rationale changed that we needed to capture al Zarqawi. We did that, and we are still in Iraq with no apparent plan to leave. The rationale for this week is we are still in Iraq in order to establish a democracy. We have to recognize that the nature of a democracy is that it cannot be imposed on anyone. Further, if the purpose is to establish a democracy in Iraq, it is ironic that the citizens right here in Washington, D.C. cannot elect a representative to vote on this very resolution. Mr. Speaker, the simple fact is that we made a mistake and the only sensible rationale for still being there is because we made a mess and we have a moral responsibility to clean up that mess. And so we have to acknowledge that we are in quagmire, and it will become clear that there are no good results that can occur. Cut and run, bad result. Stay the course to prove we have resolve, bad result. Don't worry, be happy, bad result. Continue to pretend that success is around the corner, bad result. I use ``quagmire'' lightly because this administration's poor planning has strained our troops with many units in their second and third tours. Attacks on the United States are increasing, not decreasing. During the course of our occupation, the number of insurgents has dramatically increased, and our presence in Iraq has been counterproductive, just as the CIA predicted. As of today, 2,500 servicemembers have been killed and many more wounded. Our military equipment is wearing out much faster than normal. Emergency reserve stocks have been stripped. We have endured the embarrassment of torture at Abu Ghraib prison and questionable detention policies at Guantanamo Bay, and we have not begun to effectively deal with the issue of corruption in private contracts. Despite spending billions of dollars on electricity and reconstruction, over half of the Iraqi households lack clean water, and 85 percent lack reliable electricity. Mr. Speaker, we have to be reminded when we first invaded Iraq the administration instructed the Budget Committee not to even budget for the war because it would cost so little. But now we have appropriated almost $400 billion, not including future medical costs for injured troops, and that has to be compared with the $7.4 billion that it cost us to defeat Iraq in the Persian Gulf war. Meanwhile, we have problems at home. There are shortfalls in the Department of Veterans Affairs, cuts in first responder grants, only 5 percent of our containers in our ports are being screened, and the administration has failed to adequately implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. Mr. Speaker, we are not more secure. We are less secure as a result of the war. Many experts have concluded that the military has done as much as it can, and so our exit strategy must include the use of diplomacy and politics using the lessons we have learned from our mistakes. But today, instead of honestly assessing what we are going to do in Iraq, we are considering this resolution which repeats all of the disparaged reasons for the invasion and proclaims its success, not a civil war is just around the corner, and that we should follow the strategy of don't worry, be happy. In contrast, any real debate would have us start with an honest assessment of our situation. But without articulating why we invaded in the first place and what we want to accomplish now that we are there, we cannot have an exit strategy. There can be no coherent discussion of an exit strategy while we are being directed by this resolution to accept the smiling face, don't worry be happy description of our situation in Iraq. Mr. Speaker, we should defeat the resolution.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I brought this chart along to explain to people what we mean by fiscal responsibility. When Democrats talk fiscal responsibility, we are talking about taking a deficit and turning it into a surplus. Republicans mean take the surplus and create a big deficit. The 10-year budget, after the Republicans took over, changed a $5.5 trillion surplus to a $5.5 trillion deficit, a swing of $9 trillion. Before you start talking about the war, remember the $300 billion we spent on the war is $.3 trillion. We have had a $9 trillion deterioration. We can do better. The Democratic Caucus has a better budget. The Congressional Black Caucus has a better budget. The Congressional Black Caucus budget, while the Republican budget is $163 billion in the hole, our budget is balanced. We did it without increasing taxes on anyone making less than $200,000, and we spent $160 billion more on veterans benefits, education, health care and other priorities. We can obviously do better, and we must do better, because if we don't control the budget today, there will be no Social Security or Medicare in the future.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, as I understand, the money will be spent for research in the Chesapeake Bay. This is a national priority. And I would hope that the testing and monitoring of the Potomac and Occoquan Rivers, both of which are part of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed will continue. I mean, it is a national priority. We spend substantial resources on the Chesapeake Bay, and this research will go a long way in helping to preserve the Chesapeake Bay.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment by the gentleman from Arizona. The Science Museum of Virginia is one of the leading science museums and education and research facilities in the country, and I do not support any provision which would seek to bar it from receiving funds. While the gentleman's intention may have been to bar the $250,000 earmark contained in the conference report, the language of this amendment is so broad that it would prevent the Virginia Science Museum from competing for any grants or funding streams, competitive or otherwise, included in the act. Now, along with my colleague from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis), I am one of the cochairs of the Congressional Chesapeake Bay Task Force and would like to reiterate the point that the work of the Science Museum with regard to testing and monitoring of the Potomac and Occoquan Rivers, both of which are part of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, are vital to the continuing efforts to restore the Chesapeake Bay. As the Nation's largest and most productive estuaries, it is indeed a national priority. So, too, Mr. Chairman, is the mission of the Science Museum to engage in instruction and research in the sciences to educate children. I would hope that the gentleman would not pursue this amendment. This is an extreme amendment that unnecessarily harms the Science Museum, and I would hope the amendment is defeated.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman asked what is going to happen to the deficit. The red line is the Republican deficit year by year; the blue line is the CBC deficit year by year. We end up with a $2.3 billion surplus, while you are still $163 billion in the ditch.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, the Congressional Black Caucus's budget is one that is fiscally responsible and aimed at reducing disparities in America communities. The CBC alternative is proof that even modest changes can result in tremendous outcomes. A top priority of the CBC is addressing the exploding deficit. We believe that if we do not control the budget today, we will not be able to afford Social Security and Medicare in the future. Our fiscal responsibility produces a balanced budget in 5 years. In fact, our budget will have a surplus of $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2011. Furthermore, it improves the deficit by an aggregate $313 billion and results in savings of $10 billion in interest alone compared to the Republican budget. We did this by returning to the tax structure similar to the one we had during the 1990s when the economy was strong, we created 20 million jobs, and the stock market was doubling every 5 years. But the rollback in tax cuts only affects that portion of an individual's income that exceeds $200,000. Our revenue is used for critical spending and deficit reduction. The CBC alternative is committed to making America more secure by supporting our military, investing in homeland security, and caring for our veterans. It also adds to our security by funding initiatives such as juvenile crime prevention programs and prisoner reentry programs. Some of the funding for national security, urgent homeland security needs, and veterans programs comes from a $9.4 billion reduction in ballistic missile defense, better known as Star Wars. A portion of these funds has been reallocated to protect our troops in Iraq, increase the Army's troop level, maintain current National Guard strength, and provide an additional $1 billion for Navy ship building. Another portion of these funds is allocated to address the vital homeland security needs, including port security grants. We provide an additional $20 billion to improve veterans program. We believe that the sum of all these initiatives will make us more secure as a Nation. On the domestic side, the CBC alternative builds for America's future and addresses domestic challenges by adding $80 billion to education and job-training programs. It also provides more funding for health care, social services, transportation, and scientific research. The CBC alternative recognizes that it is the responsibility of the government to assist in natural disasters that devastate an entire region of our Nation. The CBC budget, therefore, provides the funding for school and college reconstruction and housing in the Gulf Coast and increased funding for the Army Corps of Engineers. And furthermore, Mr. Chairman, the Gulf Coast area shipyards will benefit from the $1 billion in funding for Navy ships. Mr. Chairman, another way of looking at the differences between the CBC alternative and the Republican budget is to start with the CBC budget and work backwards. In other words, what would you have to do to the CBC budget in order to get to the Republican budget? Well, first, you would have to repeal pay-as-you-go budgeting. Then you would have to cut Army body armor and personal support equipment for our troops in Iraq. We would have to decrease the Army's troop level, reduce the National Guard strength, eliminate $1 billion out of Navy shipbuilding, decrease port security and rail security grants, remove Federal air marshals, delay first responder grants and cut $20 billion out of veterans programs, all to fund Star Wars and partially fund the Republican tax cuts for those with incomes over $200,000. Next you would have to cut $80 billion out of education and job training, $20 billion out of health care, and reduce funding for housing, community services, NASA research, Amtrak, the Coast Guard, college financial aid, NIH funding, foster care, Low Income Home Energy Assistance, housing, Medicare, juvenile justice and law enforcement grants, all to fund a portion of the tax cuts going to those with incomes over $200,000. Third, you would have to borrow approximately $300 billion, mostly from foreign governments, to fund the rest of the tax cuts for the wealthiest in our society. And at the end of 5 years, you would have to move from our $2.3 billion surplus in the CBC budget to the $163 billion deficit in the Republican budget. Mr. Chairman, that indeed would be working backwards. We have worked tirelessly to create a budget that is fiscally responsible and recognizes the needs of the American communities around the country. It is fiscally sound, protects and promotes the best values of America, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the bill because it does nothing to reduce corruption and lobbying. Mr. Chairman, I had an amendment that was adopted in the Judiciary Committee. That language was subsequently stripped from the bill by the Rules Committee. That amendment would have simply required a study of the practice by which some lobbyists appear to be charging percentage contingent fees for obtaining earmarks in appropriations bills. Now, when you combine that idea with the K Street Project where you are supposed to be hiring a Republican lobbyist who is supposed to be contributing back to the legislators, you can see just how ugly a practice this can be. My amendment would have simply asked for a study of the prevalence of that practice. Mr. Chairman, these kinds of contracts are illegal when lobbyists are representing foreign governments and are illegal in some activities involving the Executive Branch. They are illegal in 39 State legislatures. However, it does not appear to be illegal lobbying Congress under Federal law. The Congressional Research Service in a memorandum dated September 21, 2000 cites a legal treatise which says that these contracts furnish the strongest incentive to the exertion of corrupting and sinister influences and are utterly void against public policy. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was cited in that same memorandum as saying that they have a tendency in such contracts to provide incentives towards corruption. In fact, an 1853 Supreme Court case said that common law will not lend its aid to enforce a contract to do an act which is inconsistent with sound morals or public policy, or which tends to corrupt or contaminate by improper influences the integrity of our social or political institutions. Mr. Chairman, true lobbying reform ought to remove corruption from lobbying, and if we are going to be serious about that, we ought to at least study the prevalence of these contracts which everybody knows has a corrupting influence. By removing the amendment, it is clear that that was not the purpose of the bill, and I urge my colleagues to oppose the legislation. Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, Sept. 21, 2000. memorandum Subject: Contingency Fees for Lobbying Activities. From: Jack Maskell, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division. This memorandum is prepared in response to requests from congressional offices for information about whether one may lawfully have a contingency fee arrangement for ``lobbying'' activities in which the fee for such lobbying activities is contingent upon the success of ``lobbying'' efforts in having legislation passed in the United States Congress. There is no statute under federal law which expressly addresses the issue of contingency fees with respect to all lobbying activities generally before the Congress. Contingency fees may be expressly barred, however, under certain circumstances. There is in federal law an express prohibition against contingency fee arrangements with respect to seeking certain contracts with the agencies of the Federal Government. Activities which might generally or colloquially be called ``lobbying,'' but which involve making representations on behalf of private parties before federal agencies to obtain certain government contracts, may thus be subject to the contingency prohibitions. The reason for such ban has been explained as follows: ``Contractors' arrangements to pay contingent fees for soliciting or obtaining Government contracts have long been considered contrary to public policy because such arrangements may lead to attempted or actual exercise of improper influence ....'' Contingency fees are also prohibited for lobbying the Congress by persons who must register as agents of foreign principals under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The prohibition is upon agreements where the amount of payment ``is contingent in whole or in part upon the success of any political activities carried on by such agent.'' The covered ``political activities'' of such agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act include any activity which the agent ``intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States ... with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States ...,'' and thus include the activities of ``lobbying'' Members and staff of Congress on legislation or appropriations. Although there is no general, express federal law barring all contingency fees for successful lobbying before Congress, there is a long history of judicial precedent and traditional judicial opinion which indicates that such contingency fee arrangements, when in reference to ``lobbying'' and the use of influence before a legislature on general legislation, are void from their origin (ab initio) for public policy reasons, and therefore would be denied enforcement in the courts. In some instances contingency fee arrangements based on the success of legislation have been upheld in a few courts, however, when the duties contracted for were professional services that did not involve traditional, statutorily defined ``lobbying'' or the use of personal influence before the legislature, or where the client had a legitimate claim or legal right to be asserted in a matter before the legislature (e.g., ``debt legislation''). The concern of potential temptations from overzealousness and undue influences which certain ``all or nothing'' contingency arrangements might engender has also been the reason behind the public policy disfavoring contingency fees in the case of lobbying the legislature. As summarized in one legal treatise: ``Agreements under which the compensation for procuring or influencing legislative action is made contingent upon the success of the undertaking furnish the strongest incentive to the exertion of corrupting and sinister influences to the end that the desired legislation may be secured, and there is a long line of cases which holds that if the agreement is one in which the compensation is contingent upon success in accomplishing the end sought, it is utterly void as against public policy.'' The United Stats Supreme Court addressed the issue in Hazelton v. Sheckells, in 1906. In that case the Court refused specific performance of a contract to convey a deed as compensation for services where ``the services contemplated as a partial consideration of the promise to convey were services in procuring legislation upon a matter of public interest, in respect of which neither of the parties had any claim against the United States.'' As established in the conveyance document, such agreement ``was in substance a contingent fee,'' dependent upon the passage of legislation by the Congress. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the Court, explained that it was the ``tendency'' in such contract agreements to provide incentives towards corruption, and not necessarily any actual corrupt activity in a particular contract or case, that made these contingent arrangements void for public policy reasons. Thus, the Court found that even though the services in this case were legitimate, that ``[t]he objection to them rests in their tendency, not in what was done in the particular case,'' especially since if there had been undue or improper influence ``it probably would be hidden and would not appear.'' The Court stated that ``in its inception'' the contingency fee arrangement ``necessarily invited and tended to induce improper solicitations, and it intensified the inducement by the contingency of the reward.'' The Court found that earlier Supreme Court precedent had established ``that all contracts for a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation were void,'' and refused to enforce the contract in question. The judicial disfavor expressed by the Supreme Court for contingency contracts for lobbying on general legislation dates back at least to 1853, when in Marshal v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., supra, the Court with reference to secret contingent contracts explained: ``It is an undoubted principle of the common law, that it will not lend its aid to enforce a contract to do an act . . . which is inconsistent with sound morals or public policy; or which tends to corrupt or contaminate, by improper influences, the integrity of our social or political institutions. . . . Legislators should act from high consideration of public duty. Public policy and sound morality do therefore imperatively require that courts should put the stamp of disapprobation on every act, and pronounce void every contract the ultimate or probable tendency of which would be to sully the purity or mislead the judgments of those to whom the high trust of legislation is confided. ``. . . Bribes in the shape of high contingent compensation, must necessarily lead to the use of improper means and the exercise of undue influence. Their necessary consequence is the demoralization of the agent who covenants for them; he is soon brought to believe that any means which will produce so beneficial a result to himself are ``proper means''; and that a share of these profits may have the same effect of quickening the perceptions and warming the zeal of influential or ``careless'' members in favor of his bill.'' In a more recent federal case on this subject, a United States Court of Appeals in 1996, in Florida League of Professional Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, upheld against a constitutional challenge on First Amendment grounds the State of Florida's specific legislative ban on contingency fee contracts for lobbying. The court there reaffirmed, albeit reluctantly, the long-recognized judicial precedents concerning the general public policy against such contingency fees for lobbying. The court noted that there was no direct precedent overturning the older Supreme Court cases directly on point on contingency fees and lobbying, but did seem sympathetic and responsive to the plaintiff's arguments that more modern cases on the First Amendment and compensation for advocacy might eventually warrant a different outcome on this issue: ``Florida points out that in cases decided well before the articulation of `exacting scrutiny,' the Supreme Court specifically held that contracts to lobby for a legislative result, with the fee contingent on a favorable legislative outcome, were void ab initio as against public policy . . . [citations omitted]. The League does not contest the applicability of these older decisions to this case. And, we are persuaded that these decisions permit a legislature to prohibit contingent compensation. The League, however, suggested at argument that the extensive, interim developments of First Amendment law established conclusively that the Supreme Court today would strike a contingent-fee ban on lobbying. ``This prediction may be accurate, but we are not at liberty to disregard binding case law that is so closely on point and has been only weakened, rather than directly overruled, by the Supreme Court.'' As to State statutory bans on contingency fees for lobbying, it should be noted that as of this writing most of the States (39) have existing in their state codes an express prohibition against such contingency fees for lobbying activities. See, for example, Alabama (Sec. 36-25-23(c), Michie's Ala. Code); Alaska (sec. 24.45.121 (a)(6), Alaska Statutes); Arizona (sec. 41-1233(1), Arizona Rev. Statutes); California (Government Code, Sec. 86205(f), Annotated Calif. Codes); Colorado (sec. 24-6-308, Colorado Rev. Statutes); Connecticut (Sec. 1-97(b), Conn. Gen. Statutes Ann.); Florida (Sec. 11.047 [legislature]; Sec. 112.3217 [executive branch], Florida Statutes Ann.); Georgia (sec. 28-7-3, Official Code of Georgia Ann.); Hawaii (sec. 97-5, Hawaii Rev. Statutes Ann.); Idaho (sec. 67-6621(b)(6), Idaho Code); Illinois (S.H.A. 25 ILCS 170/8); Indiana (sec. 2-7-5-5, Burns Ind. Statutes Ann.); Kansas (sec. 46-267, Kansas Statutes Ann.); Kentucky (sec. 6.811(9), Kentucky Rev. Statutes); Maine (Title 3, Sec. 318, Maine Rev. Statutes Ann.); Maryland (State Government, Sec. 15-706, Michie's Ann. Code of Md.); Massachusetts (Ch. 3, Sec. 42, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.); Michigan (sec. 4.421(1) Mich. Compiled Laws Ann.); Minnesota (sec. 10A.06, Minn. Statutes Ann.); Mississippi (sec. 5-8-13(1), West's Ann. Miss. Code); Nebraska (sec. 49-1492(1), Revised Statutes of Neb.); Nevada (sec. 218.942(4), Nev. Revised Statutes Ann.); New Mexico (sec. 2-11-8, New Mexico Statutes); New York (Book 31, Legislative Law, Sec. 1-k, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of N.Y. Ann.); North Carolina (sec. 120-47.5(1), Gen. Statutes of N.C.); North Dakota (54-05.1-06, N.D. Century Code Ann.); Ohio (sec. 101-77, Page's Ohio Rev. Code Ann.); Oklahoma (Title 21, Sec. 334, Oklahoma Statutes Ann.); Oregon (sec. 171.756(3), Oregon Rev. Statutes); Pennsylvania (65 Pa. Cons. Statutes Ann. Sec. 1307(a)); Rhode Island (sec. 22-10-12, Gen. Laws of R.I.); South Carolina (Sec. 2-17-110(A), Code of Laws of S.C.); South Dakota (sec. 2-12-6, S.D. Codified Laws); Texas (Government Code, 305.022, Vernon's Texas Codes Ann.); Utah (sec. 36-11-301 (Utah Code Ann.); Vermont (Title 2, 266(1), Vt. Statutes Ann.); Virginia (Sec. 2.1-791, Code of Va.); Washington (Sec. 42.17.230(f), West's Rev. Code of Wash. Ann.); Wisconsin (sec. 13.625(d), Wise. Statutes Ann.). As noted, the weight of judicial opinion has been either to uphold such restrictions against challenges, or in some cases in the absence of an express statute to judicially find such contingency fee arrangements void for public policy reasons. In one instance in the 1980's, however, a provision, enacted as a result of a state initiative, barring all contingency fees for legislative lobbying activities was struck down by a state court as an overbroad intrusion into the right to petition the government. The Supreme Court of Montana found the law ``overbroad because it precludes contingent fee agreements that are properly motivated as well as those that are improperly motivated'' and as such, the ``ability of individuals and organizations to fully exercise their right to petition the government may be severely curtailed by this broad prohibition.'' While the existing state of the law is clearly for most States to continue to expressly prohibit by law contingency fee agreements with respect to legislative lobbying on general legislation, and to have those prohibitions upheld (or to consider such contingency agreements void for public policy reasons where there is no express law, as is the case with respect to lobbying before Congress), other interpretations have permitted such arrangements where an agent, attorney or representative is seeking legislation based upon a claim or similar legal interest or right to be asserted against the government, or when such action involves conduct and activity that is done in the normal course of client representation by an attorney and is not expressly contemplated by the original contract. There have also been cases where legitimate professional services are contracted for, such as, for example, the drafting of legislative language, as opposed to merely engaging another's ``influence'' to ``lobby,'' when such an arrangement for services, even if based on the contingency of the passage of legislation, has been permitted. Such cases have been described as related to contracts where the ``services rendered thereunder did not partake of anything in the nature of lobbying....'' Although relating to legislation, the services in question were not necessarily within a specific or narrow definition of ``lobbying'' in the sense that nothing that was contracted for involved any activities attempting to ``exert private or personal influence with members of the legislature, or in interviewing or bringing pressure to bear on them....'' In making arguments for allowing such contingent fees in cases of professional services rendered in relation to legislation where no undue influences are contemplated or used, and no traditional ``lobbying'' is conducted, it has been suggested that such permissibility of the fee arrangement would have no more ``influencing'' tendency than in the permissible instance of one representing oneself before the legislature (and thus having an even greater financial stake than an agent in the outcome), or if an agent or attorney represented a client before a judicial panel, i.e., a court. Jack Maskell, Legislative Attorney.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I had an amendment that was adopted in the Judiciary Committee, and the adoption of this rule would eliminate that amendment. That amendment would have created just a study of a practice where some lobbyists appear to be charging percentage contingency fees for getting earmarks. Now, when you combine this idea with the K Street Project where you are supposed to be hiring Republican lobbyists who are supposed to be contributing back to the legislators, you can see how ugly a practice this can get. I just asked for a study. And, Mr. Speaker, these kinds of contracts are illegal for agents of foreign governments. They are illegal in some executive branch lobbying. The Congressional Research Service in a memorandum cited these as bad because they furnish the strongest incentive to the exertion of corrupting and sinister influences to the end that the desired legislation may be secured, and there is a long line of cases in which it is utterly void against public policy. The CRS memo cites Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1906, saying that it is the tendency in such contracts to provide incentives towards corruption. An 1853 Supreme Court case said that it is an undoubted principle of the common law, that it will not lend its aid to enforce a contract such as this to do an act which is inconsistent with sound morals or public policy or which tends to corrupt or contaminate. Mr. Speaker, these kinds of contracts are illegal in 39 States because of their corrupting influence. If we are going to have a bill that suggests it is going to do something about corruption, what is wrong with at least studying the prevalence of these contracts which do not appear to be illegal in the Federal Government but everybody knows have a corrupting influence? I would hope that we would defeat the rule so that my amendment, which was adopted in the Judiciary Committee, can be reinserted back into the bill.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, yesterday the Republican leadership brought their higher education bill to the floor. Their claim was that it would strengthen and improve the nation's higher education system by expanding college access for low- and middle-income students. But in reality it fails to provide urgently needed assistance for millions of low- and middle-class families that are trying to figure out how to pay for their children to go to college. This past December House Republicans voted to cut the student loan programs by $12 billion and these cuts included many significant changes to the Higher Education Act, none of which expand access to college or make college more affordable for students and their families. The bill put forward by the majority does nothing to make up for these draconian cuts. Today Mr. Chairman, we offer our substitute in an attempt to make students whole again. Our substitute offers real financial assistance to needy families. It cuts interest rates in half for borrowers in most need by lowering the cost of college by $2.4 billion for students and their families. It lowers the cost of student loan interest rates for middle and low-income families. Specifically, we offer a 3.4 percent fixed interest rate to students who take out subsidized loans between July 1, 2006 and June 30, 2007. Our Substitute also helps boost college participation rates for minority students. It establishes a graduate Hispanic Serving Institution program. It establishes a Predominantly Black Institution program that would boost college opportunities for low-income and first-generation Black college students. Our substitute also increases the tribal college minimum grant and stabilizes tribal college construction by ensuring that funds for used for construction under HEA are guaranteed. Mr. Chairman, the cost of tuition should not stand between a qualified student and a college education. Congress should not miss an opportunity to help American families pay for college. Our bill offers families a real solution to the problem of rising tuition costs. We make good on our promise to put a college education within the reach of American students and families. I urge my colleagues to support this substitute.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the primary academic freedom enjoyed by a university is the freedom to choose whom to admit. Most recently, this principle was reaffirmed in the 2003 decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. The Supreme Court has also recognized that, in exercising this academic freedom, universities may constitutionally consider race and ethnicity, among other factors, to promote the educational benefits of a diverse student body. At the same time, universities must regularly review their admissions policies to ensure that they consider individual admissions factors only as needed to promote their institutional mission. The King amendment tramples academic freedom and chills universities' willingness to consider diversity factors even in the narrowly tailored manner that the Supreme Court has upheld. It creates a burdensome reporting requirement that acts as a disincentive for universities to exercise their academic freedom as permitted by the Court. Furthermore, over reliance on admissions criteria such as standardized tests, which have been found to be culturally biased, may also get caught up in the King amendment. The King amendment also jeopardizes the privacy and confidentiality of individual student applicants. Educational institutions are prohibited by law from disclosing personally identifiable information from students' education records without consent. In fact, even release of information for educational research purposes is permitted only if the information is released in such a way that student identities are not traceable, The King amendment would, in contradiction of this law, require release of raw admissions data for applicants in a manner that would not ensure applicant confidentiality. The King amendment incorrectly assumes that there is a weight given to each admissions factor by universities. However, as the Supreme Court explained in Gratz and Grutter, admissions factors must be considered in an individualized holistic manner and therefore weight will necessarily vary from one application to the next. Finally, the King amendment is opposed by the National Association for College Admission Counseling, the American Federation of Teachers, the National Education Association and the American Council on Education. Mr. Chairman, Congress should not trample on the rights of universities to exercise academic freedom. Nor should we pass an amendment that would violate student privacy rights. I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Chairman, the bill before us purports to strengthen and improve the Nation's higher education system by expanding college access for low- and middle-income students, but in reality, it fails to provide the urgently needed assistance for millions of low- and middle-income families that are trying to figure out how to pay for their children to go to college. This past December, the House majority voted to cut the student loan program by $12 billion, and these cuts included many significant changes in the Higher Education Act, none of which expand access to college or make college more affordable for students and their families. This bill, put forward by the majority, does nothing to make up for those draconian cuts. Mr. Chairman, the Democratic substitute will be offered later this afternoon, which will offer real financial assistance to needy families. For example, it will lower the costs of student loan interest rates for middle- and low-income families, specifically by lowering the direct and Federal Family Education Loans by cutting them in half from 6.8 percent to 3.4 percent. That substitute will also repeal what is called the Pell tuition sensitivity by making sure that all students receive the full benefit of the Pell Grant program without regard to whether they are attending a 2-year community college or a private 4-year institution. That substitute will also boost college participation rates for minority students, establishing graduate Hispanic Serving Institution programs. It also establishes a Predominantly Black Institution program that would boost college opportunities for low-income and first- generation African American college students. Our substitute will also increase the tribal college minimum grant and stabilization of tribal college construction by ensuring that the title III program currently used for construction is guaranteed. Mr. Chairman, we all know that a college education significantly increases the future earning power for students today, and the cost of tuition should not stand between a qualified student and a college education. The Democratic alternative will offer families a real solution to the problem of rising tuition costs and make good on our promise to put college education within the reach of American students and families. The underlying bill does not. I urge my colleagues, therefore, to support the Democratic substitute, and if it is not adopted, to oppose the bill.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, on the afternoon of March 16, 2006, I was at the White House for a meeting with the President and was unavoidably detained, thereby causing me to miss five rollcall votes. I would like to submit this statement for the record to reflect how I would have voted had I been present. On rollcall No. 55, had I been present, I would have voted ``nay''; on rollcall No. 56, had I been present, I would have voted ``aye''; on rollcall No. 57, had I been present, I would have voted ``nay''; on rollcall No. 58, had I been present, I would have voted ``aye''; on rollcall No. 59, had I been present, I would have voted ``nay.''

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following items for inclusion in the Record regarding the House floor consideration of H.R. 4472 on March 8, 2006. Oppose H.R. 4472, the Children's Safety and Violent Crime Reduction Act of 2005 Dear Representative: On behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, a non-partisan organization with hundreds of thousands of activists and members and 53 affiliates nation- wide, we write to express our opposition to H.R. 4472, the Children's Safety and Violent Crime Reduction Act of 2005 (``Omnibus Crime''). H.R.4472 would create ten new federal death penalties and almost 30 new discriminatory mandatory minimums that infringe upon protected First Amendment speech, effectively eliminate federal and state prisoners' ability to challenge wrongful convictions in federal court, make it more difficult to monitor sex offenders and create more serious juvenile offenders by incarcerating children in adult prisons. H.R. 4472 is scheduled for a vote on the House floor on Wednesday, March 8, 2006; we strongly urge you to oppose this legislation. Congress Should Not Expand The Federal Death Penalty Until It Ensures Innocent People Are Not On Death Row The death penalty is in need of reform, not expansion. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, 123 prisoners on death row have now been exonerated. Chronic problems, including inadequate defense counsel and racial disparities, plague the death penalty system in the United States. The expansion of the death penalty for gang and other crimes creates an opportunity for more arbitrary application of the death penalty. In addition to expanding the number of federal death penalty crimes, this bill also expands venue in capital cases, making any location even tangentially related to the crime a possible site for the trial. This raises constitutional as well as public policy concerns. The U.S. Constitution states that ``the Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; and shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.'' This concept is important in order to prevent undue hardship and partiality when an accused person is prosecuted in a place that has no significant connection to the offense with which he is charged. This proposed change in H.R. 4472 would increase the inequities that already exist in the federal death penalty system, giving prosecutors tremendous discretion to ``forum shop'' for the most death-friendly jurisdiction in which to try their case. In carjacking cases, this legislation would effectively relieve the government from having to prove that a person intended to cause the death of a person before being subject to the death penalty. This provision is likely unconstitutional in the context of capital cases. In addition, the bill would allow the death penalty for attempt and conspiracy in carjacking cases, which we believe is unconstitutional. H.R. 4472 Erodes Federal Judges' Sentencing Discretion by Proposing Harsher Mandatory Minimum Sentences This legislation would create 29 new mandatory minimum sentences that would result in unfair and discriminatory prison terms. Many of the criminal penalties in this bill are increased to mandatory minimum sentences, including the sentence for second-degree murder that would be a mandatory sentence of 30 years. Although, in theory, mandatory minimums were created to address disparate sentences that resulted from indeterminate sentencing systems, in reality they shift discretion from the judge to the prosecutor. Prosecutors hold all the power over whether a defendant gets a plea bargain in order for that defendant to avoid the mandatory sentence. This creates unfair and inequitable sentences for people who commit similar crimes, thus contributing to the very problem mandatory minimums were created to address. people could be convicted of a ``gang'' crime even if they are not members of a gang This legislation would impose severe penalties for a collective group of three or more people who commit ``gang'' crimes. This bill amends the already broad definition of ``criminal street gang'' to an even more ambiguous standard of a formal or informal group or association of three (3) or more people who commit two (2) or more ``gang'' crimes. The number of people required to form a gang decreases from five (5) people in an ongoing group under current law to three (3) people who could just be associates or casual acquaintances under this proposed legislation. Under current law it is essential to establish that a gang had committed a ``continuing series of offenses.'' By eliminating this requirement, H.R. 4472 defeats the purpose of a gang law, i.e. to target criminal activity that has some type of connection to a tight knit group of people that exists for the purpose of engaging in illegal activities. H.R. 4472 Jeopardizes a Person's Right to a Fair Trial Innocent people could be convicted of crimes they did not commit if the statute of limitations is extended as proposed in this legislation. The Omnibus Crime bill proposes to extend the statute of limitations for non-capital crimes of violence. Generally, the statute of limitations for non- capital federal crimes is five (5) years after the offense is committed. Fifteen years after a crime is committed, alibi witnesses could have disappeared or died, other witnesses' memories could have faded and evidence may be unreliable. The use of questionable evidence could affect a person's ability to defend him or herself against charges and to receive a fair trial. This legislation would also preclude defense attorneys in child pornography cases from obtaining possession of the alleged child pornography, possibly depriving the defendant of a fair trial. This provision is entirely unnecessary, since federal courts routinely issue extremely restrictive protective orders regarding alleged child pornography. These protective orders preclude duplication or review of the alleged child pornography except as necessary for the preparation of the defense. Giving the government sole possession of the material may well harm the defendant's case. Forensic analysis is often critical in determining whether the material is, in fact, child pornography. Title VI Infringes Upon Constitutionally Protected Speech Under the First Amendment The legislation would require record keeping for simulated sexual conduct. Simulated sexual conduct that is not obscene is protected under the First Amendment. ``Laws that burden material protected by the First Amendment must be approached from a skeptical point of view and must be given strict scrutiny.'' The fact that those laws only burden rather than prohibit protected material does not save them constitutionally. This provision of the bill infringes upon protected speech and is not narrowly tailored to solve the problems of child pornography. Understandably, mainstream producers will comply with the law, but those who are intent on making child pornography are unlikely to do so. This provision is therefore constitutionally suspect. Federal Courts Would Essentially Be Unable To Release Some People on Death Row Who Were Wrongfully Convicted Most habeas corpus petitions that challenge a person's death or criminal sentence are brought to federal court based on a constitutional error that under the law is considered ``harmless'' or ``non-prejudicial.'' These types of legal errors do not involve substantial rights and do not necessarily result in a person being released from custody. H.R. 4472 would prevent federal courts from hearing claims in death penalty cases that involve claims of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment or whether a defendant's lawyer was ineffective during the sentencing phase of a capital case. This provision of the bill has serious implications for the independence of the federal judiciary. Congress' attempt to strip Article III courts of their constitutional habeas corpus jurisdiction is unconstitutional under the doctrine of Separation of Powers. Removing jurisdiction over many habeas claims from Federal courts ignores the Separation of Powers doctrine by eliminating the role of the courts in upholding constitutional rights of prisoners. H.R. 4472 Would Result in the Routine Collection and Permanent Retention of DNA Samples and Profiles From Innocent People The ``Violence Against Women Act of 2005'' (VAWA) was signed into law on January 5, 2006, (P.L. No: 109-162) and dramatically expands the government's authority to collect and permanently retain DNA samples. Under this law, persons who are merely arrested or detained by federal authorities would be forced to have their DNA collected and stored alongside those of convicted felons in the Federal DNA database. However, under current law, DNA samples that are voluntarily submitted to law enforcement authorities are not included in the Combined DNA Indexing System (CODIS). In addition, DNA profiles of individuals arrested but not convicted of crimes can be expunged from CODIS upon receipt of a ``certified copy of a final court order establishing that such charge has been dismissed or has resulted in an acquittal.'' However, H.R. 4472 would permit voluntarily submitted samples to be included in CODIS and would eliminate the expungement provision for people whose DNA was incorporated in the federal database based on an arrest that never resulted in a conviction. Retaining a person's DNA in a criminal database renders him or her an automatic suspect for any future crime. This is problematic for any category of tested persons, but especially for those who have been arrested but not convicted of a crime. In addition, the Omnibus Crime bill would allow states to upload to CODIS DNA samples submitted voluntarily in order to eliminate people as suspects of a crime. This will increase the use by law enforcement of DNA ``sweeps'' and reducing the willingness of citizens to cooperate with the police. H.R. 4472 Will Make It More Difficult To Monitor Sex Offenders by Simply Forcing Offenders Underground The proposed legislation requires sex offenders to update registry information within 5 days of a change in residence, employment or student status. This requirement is unrealistic and works against the goal of being able to monitor sex offenders. If the registration requirements are unrealistic, offenders will fail to register and end up underground, which is contrary to the goal of tracking and locating them. Under the Omnibus Crime bill, states will be required to verify sex offender registry information in persons possibly as frequently as once every three months and required to verify their residences as often as once every month depending on the class of offender. This will be an enormous burden on the states to create and implement systems to track sex offenders on a monthly basis. The bill will also require the work addresses of sex offenders to be available on the Internet. Publicizing information about employers and their addresses on the Internet could ultimately lead to employers refusing to hire former sex offenders. Research has shown that significant supervision upon release and involvement in productive activities are critical to preventing sex offenders from reoffending. Limiting the opportunities of sex offenders to maintain gainful employment is counter- productive to their rehabilitation as well as to keeping communities safe. Children Would Be Put in Federal Prison With Little Opportunity for Education or Rehabilitation Under the Omnibus Crime bill, more children will become hardened criminals after being tried in Federal court and incarcerated in adult prisons. H.R. 4472 would give prosecutors the discretion to determine when to try a young person in Federal court as an adult, if the juvenile is 16 years of age or older and commits a crime of violence. The decision by a prosecutor to try a juvenile as an adult cannot be reviewed by a judge under this legislation. This unreviewable process of transferring youth to adult Federal court is particularly troubling when juveniles are not routinely prosecuted in the Federal system and there are no resources or facilities to address the needs of youth. For the above-mentioned reasons, we urge members to oppose H.R. 4472 when the House votes on the bill on March 8, 2006. Sincerely, Caroline Fredrickson, Director, Jesselyn McCurdy, Legislative Counsel

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I want to refer to a letter that says, ``For the first time, the statute would implicate a wide array of legitimate, mainstream businesses that have never been linked in any way to the sexual exploitation of children.'' It continues, ``In some instances, the proposed amendments are vague and offer little guidance as to what is required of those needing to comply, and in others, they impose requirements that are simply impossible to meet.'' The letter is signed by the Chamber of Commerce, the American Library Association, the National Association of Broadcasters, the National Cable and Telecommunications Association, Screen Actors Guild, American Association of Advertising Agencies, the American Association of Law Libraries and others. February 7, 2006. Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Hatch: We are writing to express our continuing concern with the legislative language contained in S. 2140, the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation of Children Act that would significantly expand the scope of Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2257. As you know, we strongly support the objective of increasing the Justice Department's ability to combat child pornography and exploitation. The members of our broad coalition are committed to protecting children from exploitation. That is why we appreciate and acknowledge the efforts of the sponsors of S. 2140 to address many of the issues raised by prior attempts to amend Sec. 2257. However, serious concerns remain. S. 2140 would significantly expand the types and categories of conduct that would trigger the requirements of Sec. 2257. For the first time, the statute would implicate a wide array of legitimate, mainstream businesses that have never been linked in any way to the sexual exploitation of children. S. 2140 dramatically expands the class of persons required to keep records and to label products under Sec. 2257. Many affected by the proposed expansion are businesses and individuals that have no actual contact or relationship with the performers in question. In some instances, the proposed amendments are vague and offer little guidance as to what is required of those needing to comply, and in others, they impose requirements that are simply impossible to meet. Expansion of Sec. 2257 as envisioned by the proposed legislation will likely divert even more resources toward legal challenges to the statute and away from the legislation's primary objective of prosecuting those who sexually exploit children. It is important to note that since Sec. 2257 was passed in 1988, the inspection regime of the law has, to our knowledge, never been used. Rather than expanding the scope of Sec. 2257 to cover a myriad of lawful, legitimate, Main-street businesses, we believe effective enforcement of the existing regime is first necessary. Accordingly, any amendments to the statute should be narrow and focused on individuals that seek to harm young people. Finally, from the outset of this process, we have been prepared to discuss the serious concerns our coalition has with the proposals to amend Sec. 2257. However, we are not involved in the negotiation of the current bill language. While we remain committed to working with all interested parties, we do not believe that in its current form, S. 2140 addresses the myriad of legitimate concerns raised by our coalition. We applaud you for your continued leadership and dedication to protecting children and reiterate our commitment to work with you to address this serious issue. Sincerely, United States Chamber of Commerce; Video Software Dealers Association; Americans for Tax Reform; American Library Association; American Conservative Union; National Association of Broadcasters; National Cable & Telecommunications Association; Motion Picture Association of America; Screen Actors Guild; Media Freedom Project; American Hotel and Lodging Association; The American Federation of Television and Radio Artists; Magazine Publishers of America; Directors Guild of America; Digital Media Association; Computer & Communications Industry Association; Association of Research Libraries; The Creative Coalition; Association of National Advertisers; Association of American Publishers; American Association of Advertising Agencies; American Advertising Federation; American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression; Publishers Marketing Association; Freedom to Read Foundation; American Association of Law Libraries

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Madam Speaker, this is a very difficult bill to try to debate because it includes a lot of different bills, everything except the hate crimes bill, which had broad support at least on this side. It includes a variety of slogans and sound bites, many of which have actually been shown to increase crime, disrupt orderly, proportionate, and fair sentencing, it wastes money and violates common sense. Among these approaches are trying more juveniles as adults, the mandatory minimums, new death penalties, and habeas corpus restrictions, which is a process by which dozens of innocent people on death row have been able to show their innocence and escape the death penalty because they were innocent of the underlying charges. It also includes a national sex offender registry that includes misdemeanors and juveniles in the same kind of registration as the most serious predatory offenses. If we are going to be serious about dealing with child sexual abuse, we ought to face the fact that virtually all of the abusers are either related to the child or at least known to the child's family. No studies have shown that these things actually reduce child abuse; and, in fact, anecdotal evidence would suggest that we might be actually increasing crime. Because the people who are the subject of these are unable to get a job, unable to live in any kind of neighborhood, have nothing to lose, the restrictive covenants now restricting where they can live, and all of these things may in fact increase crime. But there are certainly no studies to show that they have reduced by any measurable amounts the amount of child sexual abuse. We are treating more juveniles as adults. That thing has been studied over and over again, and we know that treating more juveniles as adults will increase the crime rates. In every State, the most heinous crimes are already subject to juveniles being treated as adults. So if this passes, we are talking about those who are not now treated as adults who would be treated as adults under this bill. Those are the marginal cases. We know that those marginal cases sent to adult court will not have education and psychological services and family services available in the juvenile court. They will either be locked up with adults or just released on probation. Whatever the adult court judge does will be more likely to have crime in the future than if the juvenile court can provide those services. We know how to reduce juvenile crime. It is the prevention programs. And unlike many bills, there is actually some money in this bill for prevention programs. They work. So those provisions are actually meaningful. We also have reentry programs in here. They work and have been proven to reduce recidivism. So there are at least some provisions of the bill that have something to recommend them. But the mandatory minimums in the bill have been studied. We know from all the studies that mandatory minimums have been shown to waste money, discriminate against minorities, and violate common sense. This bill includes mandatory minimums for juveniles that includes a 20-year mandatory minimum for a fistfight that results in a serious injury, and 10 years mandatory minimum if there is no serious injury; 10 years mandatory minimum for a fistfight in a school yard. This bill cannot be serious. We have death penalties which have been proven to have no effect on crime. Innocent people are convicted. We have a habeas corpus provision that will eliminate the possibility that many of those who are innocent on death row, and we know there are many of them, will not have the opportunity to have their cases adjudicated. We saw in the confirmation hearings for Justice Alito, when he was asked if an innocent person had a constitutional right against execution, and he didn't give a straight answer. We need to make sure people's rights are protected and that habeas corpus provisions are eliminated from the bill.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Madam Speaker, in a couple of days we will be taking up the budget, and as people talk about fiscal responsibility, this chart is the chart they are talking about. This chart shows the deficit over the years, how President Clinton took a $290 billion deficit and converted it into a $238 billion surplus, and as soon as this President came in, there has been a complete collapse. As you talk about the budget, remember this chart. When President Clinton left office, we had a projected surplus of over $5.5 trillion. Now we have for those same 10 years a projected deficit of $3.3 trillion. The war, $300 billion, that is .3. Katrina, $200 billion, that is .2. An almost $9 trillion deterioration in the deficit. And we didn't create any jobs. When they talk about economic improvement, this is the number of jobs created since Herbert Hoover, by administration. This administration, the worst since Herbert Hoover. We need to get our economy straight. We need to get our budget straight, and we can do it if we take the same kind of initiatives we took in the 1990s.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 32, the Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act. The bill amends existing law in a matter designed to intensify the effort to prevent counterfeiting of goods. Counterfeited goods victimize the manufacturer and shortchange purchasers with substandard products. They also expose all of us to risks from unsafe products and deprive Americans of jobs and other benefits from commerce when the authentic goods are not sold. The sale of counterfeit goods is illegal. This bill clarifies any ambiguity there may be in present law. Madam Speaker, when we began working on this bill on a bipartisan basis at the subcommittee level, there was a concern when drafted that the bill went too far and actually criminalizes current legitimate, time-honored practices by law-abiding merchants who legally purchased authentic goods and repackage them in various ways to enhance sales of such goods. We forged an agreement which addressed this potential problem to the satisfaction of all those who had expressed concerns about it. So this bill addresses the problem of counterfeiting of manufactured goods in a manner that should now be considered non-controversial. Accordingly, Madam Speaker, I support the bill, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Madam Speaker, as I indicated before, we need to have hearings on the NSA wiretaps. The question there is not whether or not the wiretaps can take place, but whether or not they take place in the concept of checks and balances. Also, we need to know what kinds of wiretaps are going on, and it would be nice to have hearings on that before we consider the PATRIOT Act. But when one of the previous speakers talked about the due process involved, we have to remind people that the due process is not for the person whose records are being gathered, but due process on the library that does not have enough money to operate the library, whether or not they have a right to go out and hire a lawyer to protect somebody else's rights. The person affected does not have any rights in this situation. It is just the library and their own good will. If they want to go out and protect somebody's rights, they have that opportunity. These are extraordinary rights, police rights and police powers; and we need to make sure that people actually understand what is going on here.