Bobby Scott

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, unlike many of the others, this bill is narrowly drawn, and it is my understanding, and my colleague from Virginia, I think, can correct me if I am wrong, but the usual problem we have in this case is you have an injured party without any recourse at all. This bill requires insurance on the part of the pilot. And so if there is negligence, the injured party does have recourse. He has recourse against the insurance policy, but he does not have recourse, in the bill, to the organization, the volunteer organization that just matched the pilot and the injured party together, so that the party, injured through ordinary negligence, would have recourse against the insurance policy covering the airplane and the pilot. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise to speak against the bill Mr. Speaker, I do not support the legislation because it will have a significant adverse effect on the ability of unpopular plaintiffs to seek recourse in our courts, and it will operate to benefit foreign corporate defendants at the expense of domestic counterparts and will skew the playing field against injured victims. Now, a lot of organizations oppose the bill, and I would like to read from a letter from the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Chief Justice of the United States presiding, in a letter to the committee chairman. It says that ``section 2 of the bill would reinstitute a rule eliminated in 1993 upon the recommendation of the Judicial Conference, approved by the Supreme Court, and after review by Congress, because of the serious problems it engendered during a 10-year period of operation. Section 2 also would amend rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a manner consistent with the longstanding Judicial Conference policy opposing direct amendment of the Federal rules by legislation.'' The letter goes on to say that the bill ``would directly amend civil rule 11 to remove a court's discretion to impose sanctions on a frivolous filing and eliminate the rule's `safe-harbor' provisions. The bill undoes amendments to rule 11 that took effect on December 1, 1993, and would bring back the provisions that were first introduced in 1983 and removed from the rule in 1993, after a decade of signally bad experiences with the operation and effects of the 1983 rule.'' The Judicial Conference of the United States goes on to state: ``Like H.R. 4571, the 1983 version of rule 11 required sanctions for every violation of the rule. It spawned thousands of court decisions and generated widespread criticism. The rule was abused by resourceful lawyers, and an entire `cottage industry' developed that churned tremendously wasteful satellite litigation that had everything to do with strategic gamesmanship and little to do with underlying claims. Rule 11 motions came to be met with countermotions that sought rule 11 sanctions for making the original rule 11 motion. ``Some of the serious problems caused by the 1983 amendments to rule 11 included: ``Creating a significant incentive to file unmeritorious rule 11 motions by providing a possibility of monetary penalty.'' It goes on to cite other problems that occurred that were cured in 1993. The letter goes on: ``The 1993 amendments to rule 11 were designed to strike a fair and equitable balance between competing interests, remedy the major problems with the rule, and allow courts to focus on the merits of the underlying cases rather than on rule 11 motions.'' It goes on to say that the ``experience with the amended rule since 1993 has demonstrated a marked decline in rule 11 satellite litigation without any noticeable increase in the number of frivolous filings. In June 1995, the Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey of 1,130 lawyers and 148 judges on the effects of the 1993 rule 11 amendments . . . The Center found general satisfaction with the amended rule. It also found that more than 75 percent of the judges and lawyers would oppose a provision that would require a court to impose a sanction when the rule is violated. A majority of the judges and lawyers, both plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers, believed that groundless litigation was handled effectively by judges. ``Undoing the 1993 rule 11 amendments, even though no serious problem has been brought to the Judicial Conference rules committee's attention, would frustrate the purpose and intent of the Rules Enabling Act.'' It goes on to criticize the provisions in section 3, the mandatory application to State laws, and section 4, the provision on forum shopping. Mr. Speaker, in addition to the Judicial Conference, other organizations oppose the legislation. The NAACP, the Public Citizen, the Alliance for Justice, People for the American Way, the American Association of People with Disabilities, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the American Bar Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, National Partnership for Women, National Women's Law Center, the Center for Justice and Democracy, Consumers Union, National Association of Consumer Advocates, USAction, U.S. PIRG, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund all oppose the legislation. Mr. Speaker, one of the additional problems with the bill is the chilling effect it may have on bringing important, legitimate, unpopular actions. This is due to the fact that much of the impetus of the 1993 changes stemmed from abuses by defendants in civil rights cases, namely, that civil rights defendants were choosing to harass civil rights plaintiffs by filing a series of rule 11 motions intended to slow down and impede meritorious cases. Although the bill states that the proposed rule 11 changes shall not be construed to ``bar or impede the assertion of new claims or remedies under Federal, State or local civil rights law,'' the language does not clearly and simply exempt civil rights and discrimination cases under current law, as should be the case. Determining what a new claim or remedy might be would just add to the litigation. Certainly, it does not cover the fact that this bill and rule 11 do not offer an attorney the ability to appeal a rule 11 sanction. History has demonstrated that civil rights lawsuits are often extremely unpopular, particularly in certain parts of the country where some judges almost automatically consider civil rights cases as frivolous. In such courts, plaintiffs' attorneys could be unreasonably subject to sanctions, even suspensions, without appeal contrary to the purpose of rule 11. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to comment that the letter from the Judicial Conference of the United States outlining the survey results, showed a majority of judges, lawyers, both plaintiffs and defense lawyers, believed that groundless litigation was handled effectively by the judges and preferred the 1993 amendment. Mr. Speaker, I submit herewith the letter from the Judicial Conference for the Record. Judicial Conference of the United States, Washington, DC, July 9, 2004. Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 2138 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Judicial Conference, I write to urge you to reconsider your position on the ``Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004'' (H.R. 4571). [Section 2 of the bill would reinstitute a rule eliminated in 1993 upon the recommendation of the Judicial Conference, approval by the Supreme Court, and after review by Congress, because of the serious problems it engendered during a ten-year period of operation. Section 2 also would amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a manner inconsistent with the longstanding Judicial Conference [policy opposing direct amendment of the federal rules by legislation.] Section 3 of H.R. 4571 would apply the revised federal Rule 11 to certain state court actions, while section 4 would amend the venue standards governing the filing of tort actions in both the federal and state courts: Sections 3 and 4 implicate federal-state comity interests and raise important policy and practical concerns. section 2 [Section 2 would directly amend Civil Rule 11 to remove a court's discretion to impose sanctions on a frivolous filing and eliminate the rule's ``safe-harbor'' provisions. The bill undoes amendments to Rule 11 that took effect on December 1, 1993, and would bring back the provisions that were first introduced in 1983 and removed from the rule in 1993, after a decade of signally bad experiences with the operation and effects of the 1983 rule. Like H.R. 4571, the 1983 version of Rule 11 required sanctions for every violation of the rule. It spawned thousands of court decisions and generated widespread criticism. The rule was abused by resourceful lawyers, and an entire ``cottage industry'' developed that churned tremendously wasteful satellite litigation that had everything to do with strategic gamesmanship and little to do with underlying claims. Rule 11 motions came to be met with counter motions that sought Rule 11 sanctions for making the original Rule 11 motion. [Some of the other serious problems caused by the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 included: (1) Creating a significant incentive to file unmeritorious Rule 11 motions by providing a possibility of monetary penalty; (2) engendering potential conflict of interest between clients and their lawyers, who advised withdrawal of particular claims despite the clients' preference; (3) exacerbating tensions between lawyers; and (4) providing little incentive, and perhaps a distinctive disincentive, to abandon or withdraw a pleading or claim--and thereby admit error--that lacked merit after determining that it no longer was supportable in law or fact. The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 were designed to strike a fair and equitable balance between competing interests, remedy the major problems with the rule, and allow courts to focus on the merits of the underlying cases rather than on Rule 11 motions. The rule establishes a safe harbor, providing a party 21 days within which to withdraw a particular claim or defense before sanctions can be imposed. If the party fails to withdraw an allegedly frivolous claim or defense within the 21 days, a court may impose sanctions, including assessing reasonable attorney fees.] The 1983 Rule 11 authorized a court to sanction discovery-related abuse under Rule 11, Rule 26(g), or Rule 37, which created confusion. Under the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, sanctioning of discovery-related abuse was limited to Rules 26 and 37, which provide for sanctions that include awards for reasonable attorney fees. The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 culminated a long, critical examination of the rule begun four years earlier. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Advisory Committee) reviewed a significant number of empirical examinations of the 1983 Rule 11, including three separate studies conducted by the Federal Judicial Center in 1985, 1988, and 1991, a Third Circuit Task Force report on Rule 11 in 1989, and a New York State Bar Committee report in 1987. The Advisory Committee took note of several book-length analyses of Rule 11 case law. The 1991 Federal Judicial Center survey noted that most federal judges believed that the 1983 version of Rule 11 had positive effects. But the study also noted that most judges found several other methods more effective than Rule 11 in handling such litigation and, most significantly, that about one-half of the judges reported that Rule 11 exacerbates behavior between counsel. After reviewing the literature and empirical studies of problems caused by the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, the Advisory Committee issued in 1990 a preliminary call for general comment on the operation and effect of the rule. The response was substantial, calling for a change in the rule. The Advisory Committee concluded that the cost-shifting in Rule 11 created an incentive for too many unnecessary Rule 11 motions. Amendments to Rule 11 were drafted. The Supreme Court promulgated and transmitted the amendments to Congress in May 1993 after extensive scrutiny and debate by the bench, bar, and public in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act process (28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2071-2077). [Experience with the amended rule since 1993 has demonstrated a marked decline in Rule 11 satellite litigation without any noticeable increase in the number of frivolous filings. In June 1995, the Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey of 1,130 lawyers and 148 judges on the effects of the 1993 Rule 11 amendments. About 580 attorneys and 120 judges responded to the survey. The Center found general satisfaction with the amended rule. It also found that more than 75 percent of the judges and lawyers would oppose a provision that would require a court to impose a sanction when the rule is violated. A majority of the judges and lawyers, both plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers, believed that groundless litigation was handled effectively by judges. Undoing the 1993 Rule 11 amendments, even though no serious problem has been brought to the Judicial Conference rules committees' attention, would frustrate the purpose and intent of the Rules Enabling Act. Section 2 of H.R. 4571 would effectively reinstate the 1983 version of Rule 11 that proved so contentious and wasted so much time and energy of the bar and bench. Section 2, indeed, in some ways seems to go beyond the provisions that created serious problems with the 1983 rule. It may cause even greater mischief. Rule 11 in its present form has proven effective and should not be revised.] sections 3 and 4 [Section 3 would extend the new requirements of a mandatory Rule 11 to all state court litigation that the state court deems, on motion, to affect interstate commerce.] Two features of this provision stand out. First, it would directly regulate the practice and procedure of state courts, mandating a federal standard for the imposition of sanctions for the filing of frivolous or ungrounded complaints and other papers in state court. At present, states have been free to adopt their own rules of practice, including a version of Rule 11, if a state so chooses. Second, section 3 does not specify the actions to which it would apply. Rather, it imposes on state judges a broad generalized test to determine whether or not federal Rule 11 would apply in a given case. If enacted, this section could affect the cost and duration of a very large number of civil actions in state courts. [Section 4 seeks to prevent forum shopping by specifying the places where a plaintiff may bring a ``personal injury'' claim by imposing a federal standard for determining the venue of state law personal injury claims, in both state and federal court. Such a federal standard would displace existing state venue rules or statutes.] It would also significantly alter the statutes in title 28, United States Code, that now govern venue (section 1391) and transfer of venue (section 1404) in the federal courts. The Judicial Conference opposes the enactment of H.R. 4571 for the reasons stated above as to section 2. Sections 3 and 4 would make important changes in the administration of civil justice in both federal and state courts. The Judicial Conference has not had the opportunity to formally assess the advisability or impact of these sections, but notes that they may substantially affect federal-state comity interests and raise important policy and practical concerns. The Judicial Conference greatly appreciates your consideration of its views: If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Michael W. Blommer, Assistant Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, at (202) 502-1700. Sincerely, Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. BERMAN). (Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters).

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee). (Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, as it has been indicated, there is a serious question in some cases of whether or not the forum shopping is limited, one, to a situation where they cannot file anywhere. But I want to quote from a letter from several civil rights organizations. It states: ``More than a decade ago civil rights organizations, including several of the undersigned organizations, worked to amend Rule 11 because the old rule unfairly discouraged meritorious civil rights claims. Nationwide surveys about the former rule found that motions for sanctions were most frequently sought and granted in civil rights cases.'' This bill ``seeks to take us back to the changes made in 1993 to Rule 11 and force litigants to operate under the terms that we fear, like the former rule we worked so hard to amend, will be used to punish and deter valid claims of discrimination. But'' this bill ``goes even further. Not content with changing rules for Federal courts, the bill extends its reach to State courts,'' where the problem of biased judges would even be more acute. I would point out again that there is no appeal to these cases and this does not apply to cases under existing law that many judges feel are frivolous. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time. Mr. Speaker, there is a significant difference in the civil rights exemption in the underlying bill and this amendment. This amendment is vastly superior because it exempts all civil rights cases, not just those cases that are based on new or evolving law. Many of the cases brought under present laws are treated with hostility. Civil rights cases are often unpopular and some judges do not like to see them. In fact, the Alliance For Justice had a report on Judge Pickering's hearing and said, ``At his hearing, Judge Pickering was asked about his record of strongly favoring defendants in employment cases. Incredibly, Judge Pickering defended his record by opining that almost no employment discrimination cases that come before the Federal courts have merit.'' Obviously, the problem is made worse when you expand the possibility to State courts, where local judges in some areas may have a civil bias. That is why the civil rights lawyers oppose the underlying bill because they do not want those kind of judges empowered to essentially allow mandatory sanctions to prevent those kind of cases from being brought in the first place. I would hope that we would adopt the language in the substitute, but we should defeat the bill.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry. Mr. Chairman, was that section 636?

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill. It is an attack on fundamental rights and unconstitutionally exceeds the power of this body to regulate the judicial branch of government. Within our constitutional framework, although Congress is expected to follow the Constitution, it is not for Congress to make the final decision as to what is constitutional and what is not. Since Marbury v. Madison in 1803, at least until today, there has been a longstanding acceptance of the principle that the United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter of what is constitutional and what is not. And although Congress has some power to regulate the jurisdiction of Federal courts, it cannot totally prevent the Supreme Court from ensuring that States comply with the Constitution. Mr. Speaker, this bill not only violates numerous constitutional principles; it is dangerous policy. If this bill were found to be constitutional, there would be no prohibition against boilerplate language stuck into every bill we consider, stripping judicial review from every controversial issue. Frankly, I am glad that this kind of legislation did not pass before 1954 so Congress did not strip the Supreme Court from jurisdiction over segregation in public schools, or before the 1960s when unelected, lifetime-appointed activist Federal judges required Virginia to recognize racially mixed marriages, overruling the will of the people of Virginia. If this bill ever became law, there would be no Federal law. Some States would rule that DOMA is constitutional. Other States would rule that DOMA is unconstitutional. States will adopt full faith and credit principles in some areas and not in others. A Massachusetts or Vermont couple moving to another State may have their relationship recognized in some States, but not in others. If this bill passes, each State will decide for itself what the Federal law is. Even if it passes, some States will recognize same-sex marriages. Mr. Speaker, simply because we anticipate that we may not like how the Supreme Court will rule on an issue is no reason to prevent the court from ruling. Today, some Members of Congress are afraid of how courts may rule on issues pertaining to marriage. Tomorrow they may be afraid of how the courts may rule on a different issue, such as abortion or gun control. If we strip the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the Defense of Marriage Act, what will we do next? Mr. Speaker, this unprecedented and perilous legislation violates constitutional principles, establishes dangerous procedure, and undermines the credibility of our system of government. For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose the bill.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my colleague, the gentleman from Idaho, of which I am a co-sponsor. The Fourth Amendment provides that ``The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'' The Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are put into practice, in part, by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 41 specifically requires the government to obtain a warrant before a search is conducted. It also requires that the government give notice to a person whose property was seized during a search, or from whose premises property was seized. And the Supreme Court has traditionally held that an officer must knock and announce his presence before serving a search warrant, absent exigent circumstances such as reasonable belief such notice would jeopardize life or limb, or result in destruction of evidence or escape of the person named in the warrant. Moreover, while delayed notice for searches of oral and wire communications are authorized by law under certain conditions, as a general rule, covert physical searches for physical evidence were not permitted prior to the PATRIOT Act. The notice requirement enables the person whose property is to be searched to assert his or her Fourth Amendment rights by pointing out irregularities such as the police have the wrong address, or ensuring that only those areas specified are searched, if the area to be searched is a room in a house, that does not include the car in the garage. The so called ``sneak and peek'' secret search warrant provision allows law enforcement to conduct a secret search on a person's premises or computer without notice. If they get the wrong house or business and it happens to be yours, you may never know about it. Or if the search is conducted improperly, but nothing incriminating is found, you may never know about it. Sneak and peek warrants provide no sanction for failure to notify the subject of the search or for unlawful activity if nobody is aware of it and if no incriminating evidence is found. Law enforcement personnel will need to validate a search only when property is seized and then delayed notice must be given. Meanwhile, the notice can be weeks or even months after the fact. And in that time period, several searches may have been conducted without any results or continuing justification. Moreover, this gives law enforcement officials access to someone's personal property and information without the person's knowledge. Law enforcement personnel can search through your drawers, go through your files including medical and financial records, read your diaries, and surf through computer websites you have visited, just to name a few invasive practices. The person conducting the search will have access to very private, very personal, information about you and your family, without your knowledge. And what if the government agent conducting the search happens to be your neighbor or someone you see at the store or at a PTA meeting? Without your knowledge, that person has continuing access to--and knows the most intimate of details about--your life. This level of privacy invasion is unjustifiable. Preventing terrorism has become a more urgent and necessary goal of law enforcement since the 9/11 tragedies. Yet, we don't want to accomplish for the terrorists something they could not accomplish themselves--reducing the rights, freedoms, and protections our system provides us all. The Otter amendment finds a working middle-ground that will satisfy our country's need for heightened security while at the same time ensuring that our freedoms and protections remain intact. The amendment limits the reasons for sneak and peek warrants to three specific circumstances, when notice would cause either the life or physical safety of a person to be put in danger, flight from prosecution, or the destruction of evidence. It also includes a seven- day time limit for the delayed notice. This time limit creates a pattern of uniformity for those involved in law enforcement and is a reasonable period by which to inform the person subject to the warrant of the clandestine search. In the case where a court finds that notice of the warrant within the seven-day period will lead to one of the three enunciated circumstances, the amendment authorizes unlimited additional seven-day delays. This amendment encourages use of these warrants in appropriate circumstances, will prevent misuse of the practice, and ensures the protection of our civil liberties. Encouraging the judiciary to issue sneak and peek warrants without offering any meaningful guidance on their use will end in disaster. This amendment is unequivocally American. It recognizes the need to protect our country and our selves. It gives meaning to Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act within the parameters of our democracy so that it can be an effective tool rather than a wasted provision. Mr. Chairman, safeguarding the rights guaranteed to us by the Constitution is not a partisan issue. I ask my colleagues to join me in support of this essential legislation to protect the rights of all Americans. Point of Order

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the Literacy, Education and Rehabilitation Act (LERA). The purpose of LERA is to reduce recidivism and the victimization and costs, fiscal and social, associated with such recidivism. Studies have shown that inmate participation in education, vocational and job training, prison work skills development, drug abuse, mental health and other treatment programs, all reduce recidivism, significantly. The Federal prison population has increased more than 7-fold over the past 20 years. In 1984, the population was about 25,000 prisoners. Today, there are more than 175,000 prisoners, and the population is growing. According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the primary reasons for this tremendous growth has been longer sentences resulting from the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act and mandatory minimum sentences. The Sentencing Reform Act established determinate sentencing, abolished parole, and dramatically reduced good time credits. Other sentencing policy by Congressional or administrative action has increasingly limited the discretion of judges and prison officials to impact sentence lengths or confinement options. During the same period, the annual number of prisoners returning to communities has also increased several fold. Currently, about 40,000 prisoners leave Federal prisons each year. The question is whether they leave prison better prepared to lead law-abiding lives, or in a worse position to do so. The addition of a felony record and a Federal prison stay is not, in and of itself, likely to add to a person's job or social development prospects. Unfortunately, the elimination of incentives such as parole, good time credits and funding for college courses, means that fewer inmates participate in and excel in literacy, education, treatment and other development programs. LERA provides incentives and recognitions for achievement by giving the BOP Director the discretion to grant up to 60 sentence credit days per year to an inmate for successful participation in literacy, education, work training, treatment and other development programs. LERA will not only prevent crime victimizations, but also save taxpayers money. Many sentences are excessively long because mandatory sentencing policies do not allow sentencing judges the discretion to distinguish between hardened criminals and those amenable to rehabilitation and preparation for successful re-entry. LERA allows offenders to distinguish themselves.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time. We have heard a lot of people say the budget is good. We have heard some people say it is bad. We have heard some people casting blame, and we have heard some people making excuses. I think it is just helpful to start off with what the facts are. This is a chart showing the deficit back to the Johnson administration, a little bit of deficit, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush deficit, Clinton from deficit to surplus, Bush deficit. The swing from the surplus to the deficit, $750 billion. Now, let us put that in perspective. If we look at the revenue, individual income tax, what everybody pays in individual income tax, $800 billion; deterioration in the deficit, 750. Now, when we run up that kind of debt, we run up interest in the national debt. This is the chart that showed that by 2009, we would be paying virtually nothing in interest on the national debt because we had enough surplus to pay off the national debt. This chart shows that we are going to be paying $300 billion a year in interest in the national debt, $300 billion. At $30,000 each, that is enough to hire 10 million people, more than the total number of people drawing unemployment today. We said we got into that mess to create jobs. This is the chart showing the average job growth, Ford administration back to the Hoover administration. Everybody is net plus until we get to this administration. People look at this chart and say the job growth is good, job growth is bad. Make your own decision.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. This amendment points out the difficulty in the one-way PAYGO. If we have a crunch, we can only deal with it by cutting spending. We cannot deal with it any other kind of way. With the one-way PAYGO, if we want to deal with the problem through tax cuts, if we have health care we want to deliver, we can do it in tax cuts. Just give tax credits. There is no limit to what we can do. But if we have a crunch and the budget is tight, we have got to have this mindless across-the-board cut. If we do it through tax cuts, we could have tax cuts at the same time that we are cutting the spending. This is what happens when we have a two-way PAYGO, that is, if we are going to cut taxes, we have to cut spending. If we increase spending, we have got to raise taxes or any combination. The green was with PAYGO; the red is what happens when we have unlimited tax cuts with PAYGO. This just says we have got to cut mindlessly across the board with spending. If we have a crunch and we have a new need, we cannot make it; we cannot meet it. If we want to meet it, the only way we can do it is through some tax plan where we are unlimited. But if we have a new program, if there is a housing need, if there is a health care need, something new we want to do, we cannot do it. This is why we need a two-way PAYGO and a more sensible way to deal with our budget, not mindless across-the-board tax cuts.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for his remarks and also for his hard work on this legislation. As I have indicated, I agree with the purpose of the legislation. However, I disagree with the use of the mandatory minimums. With mandatory minimums, low level offenders frequently get too much time. The more serious violators often get too little time. That is why we have the Sentencing Commission, that is why we have judges who will hear the evidence and impose the appropriate punishment in the individual case. Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we would reject the legislation so that we could eliminate the mandatory minimums. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman has correctly stated the intent of my amendment.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 218. This bill authorizes so-called qualified active and retired Federal and State law enforcement officers to carry concealed weapons interstate without regard to State and local laws prohibiting or regulating such carriage. ``Law enforcement officer'' includes corrections, probation, parole and judicial officers, as well as police, sheriffs and other law enforcement officials, and just about anybody who has statutory power of arrest and anyone who is engaged through employment by a government agency in the prevention, detection, investigation, supervision, prosecution or incarceration of law violators. In the past, we have considered this bill under the title, Community Protection Act. The rhetoric surrounding the bill was an indication that its purpose was to aid in protecting the public by putting tens of thousands of additional armed law enforcement officers in a position to protect the public as officers travel from State to State and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. From the name of the current bill, it appears that the emphasis now is on the safety of the officers as they travel. Yet the language is exactly the same. One of the problems with even suggesting that purpose of a Federal law is for law enforcement officers to assist in protecting the public outside their jurisdictions is that it may give them encouragement or even a sense of obligation to do so. I submitted for the record in the hearing before the subcommittee a long list of articles and reports in instances where, even in the same jurisdiction, off-duty plainclothes law enforcement officers have shot, or been shot by, other off-duty officers, or gotten shot by them or uniform officers, in gun battles because the plainclothes officers were mistaken as criminals. If off-duty officers in the same jurisdiction are being shot by their fellow officers, encouraging out-of-state officers to join in such activities through a Federal law will certainly only add to the problem. Therefore, any perceived benefit that could arise from such engagement is of dubious value. Now, this is especially true when there are officers from small jurisdictions who may not be trained in how to tell fellow police officers from criminals. Such training would be routine in large cities; but if it is a small jurisdiction where everyone knows everybody, that training would not take place. It is this specter of individually determined engagement in law enforcement actions by out-of-state plainclothes off-duty officers who may not be trained for specific situations that gives police chiefs and local and State governments huge concern. Clearly, they see these officers as more of a challenge to law enforcement than a help. The bill not only takes away the ability for local law enforcement leaders to manage concealed firearms activities from out-of-state officers, but it also overrides the ability of the police department to regulate its own officers. The bill overrides a police chief's ability to regulate his own officers in what they do with their own private funds within their jurisdiction. It also eliminates control over concealed weapons activities of retired officers within their own jurisdiction. Now, it also even overrides a police chief's ability to say what the officers can do with agency-issued guns in their possession within their own jurisdiction. State legislatures can authorize out-of-state off-duty officers to carry concealed weapons within their jurisdictions. Some have, although most have not. I do not know what the liability implications are for local jurisdictions when officers become engaged in out-of-state shoot- outs. Which jurisdiction is liable for the conduct of the out-of-state active or retired officer who may be negligent? The jurisdiction viewed as allowing an unfamiliar, untrained officer to participate in the shoot-out or the jurisdiction that issued the gun and certified the officer to carry it or other concealed weapons across State lines? The liability insurance implications alone should give Congress pause in imposing an interstate concealed-carry provision on State and local governments. Now, most organizations representing policymakers in law enforcement, like police chiefs, have opposed this legislation. Congress should not usurp State and local control of law enforcement activities, as this bill will do. So we should oppose this bill. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary and a highly respected district attorney from Massachusetts.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.