Bobby Scott

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis), a stalwart in the Civil Rights movement.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington, DC, (Ms. Norton), the sponsor of the legislation.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Davis).

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution which honors the 40th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the many civil rights advances since its enactment. I want to first commend our colleague, the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, for introducing the resolution. I also want the record to reflect her long efforts to make real the promise of our civil rights laws as Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, working with the New York Human Rights Commission as a legal scholar, and a distinguished Member of this House. It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Civil Rights Act. It is a monumental achievement, reflecting the best values of this Nation: equality, fairness, and respect for the dignity of all people. No one should forget how difficult it was to get this legislation through, how hard the forces of bigotry fought its passage, how strong the resistance was, and still is, to its enforcement. Reflecting on these past achievements should be an occasion, most of all, for us to learn from the past and to remember that our society has changed for the better. We can be more inclusive. We can fight Big Industry. We can continue our progress as a Nation toward the promise that all people are created equal and that our Nation will treat every person in that spirit. The resolution notes that the struggle did not end with this watershed legislation. Rather, it marks an important milestone in the fight against discrimination. Today, as our Nation continues that fight, we should draw inspiration from this achievement to move forward and tackle the remaining threats to equality. This anniversary gives us the opportunity to reflect and remember that true progress is possible, even against tremendous odds. That experience proves that we have no right to resign ourselves to the remaining injustices because we know what is possible. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution, and I commend the gentlewoman from Washington, DC, for introducing it. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop).

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. I again want to thank the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia for her leadership. I urge Members to not only remember the need for the Civil Rights Act but also to commit to support its principles. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1731. Although I agree with the purpose of the bill, my position is based on the reliance in the bill of mandatory minimum sentencing. By adding mandatory minimum sentencing and denying probation and concurrent sentences, the bill imposes unnecessary and unproductive restrictions on the ability of the Sentencing Commission and judges, in individual cases, to assure a rational and just system of sentencing as a whole and for individuals. The notion that Congress is in a better position to determine at the front end what the sentence has to be for an individual case than the judge who has heard the case and applies guidelines established by the sentencing professionals not only defeats the rational sentencing system that Congress adopted but also makes no sense in our separation of powers scheme of governance. Moreover, the notion of mandating a 2-year or 5-year sentence to someone who is already willing to risk a 15-year sentence is not likely to add any deterrence. Mandatory sentences do not work. They have been studied extensively and have been shown to be ineffective in preventing crime. They distort the sentencing process. They discriminate against minorities in their application, and they waste money. In a study report entitled ``Mandatory Drug Sentences: Throwing Away the Key or the Taxpayers Money?'' The Rand Corporation concluded that mandatory minimum sentences were less effective than either discretionary sentencing or drug treatment in reducing drug-related crime and far more costly than either. The Judicial Conference of the United States has reiterated its opposition to mandatory minimum sentencing over a dozen times to Congress, noting that though sentences ``severely distort and damage the Federal sentencing system . . . undermine the Sentencing Guideline regimen'' established by Congress to promote fairness and proportionality,'' and ``destroy honesty in sentencing by encouraging charge and fact plea bargains.'' The U.S. Sentencing Commission indicated its opposition to the Senate bill, which is virtually identical to this bill, for similar reasons. Both the Judicial Center in its study report entitled ``The General Effects of Mandatory Minimum Prison Terms: a Longitudinal Study of Federal Sentences Imposed'' and the United States Sentencing Commission in its study entitled ``Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System'' found that minorities were substantially more likely than whites under comparable circumstances to receive mandatory minimum sentences. The Sentencing Commission also reflected that mandatory minimum sentences increased the disparity in sentencing of like offenders with no evidence that mandatory minimum sentencing had any more crime-reduction impact than discretionary sentences. Chief Justice Rehnquist has spoken often and loudly about these wasteful cost increases. One quote attributed to him says: ``Mandatory minimums are perhaps a good example of the law of unintended consequences.'' Mr. Speaker, there is one good part of the bill, and that is an authorization for funding to investigate consumer credit card fraud cases. I introduced in the committee a newspaper report of an identity theft case in which a Senator from New Mexico, Senator Domenici, was the victim. It involved about $800 worth of fraudulent credit card purchases. We checked with the FBI. No action is being taken on this case because of limitations on resources. That is not surprising because these cases often involve stolen credit cards with the card stolen in one jurisdiction, purchases made in another jurisdiction, a suspect living entirely somewhere else, and so the local place cannot effectively investigate these cases. They can be solved because there is usually a paper trail leading right back to the suspect, but it takes resources. Mandatory minimum sentences will do nothing in cases that are not investigated and not prosecuted, and this bill does provide funds to investigate and prosecute cases such as Senator Domenici's. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, because this bill primarily focuses on the narrow piece of the identity theft problem, much of which has nothing to do with consumer identity theft, through the discredited and ineffective and costly mechanism of mandatory minimum sentencing, I cannot support the bill. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary and a former assistant U.S. Attorney.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, having heard the chairman's explanation, I was wondering if the gentlewoman from Texas could respond.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. I yield to the gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. My colleagues, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Schrock), the gentlewoman from Virginia (Mrs. Jo Ann Davis), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Cantor) and I represent the Richmond and Hampton Roads area of Virginia. Richmond is the home of the Port of Richmond. Hampton Roads is not only the home of the Port of Hampton Roads, but also the home of the world's largest Navy base and other strategic military installations, a nuclear power plant, and an oil refinery. It is considered one of the most target-rich areas of the Nation for terrorist attack. Each year over 2,500 commercial vessels enter the Port of Hampton Roads alone, so adequate funding for port security is a significant issue for those of us who live in Richmond and Hampton Roads. To guard against vulnerabilities, such as cargo containers being used to smuggle chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or the ships themselves being used as weapons, the Coast Guard has estimated it will cost approximately $1.1 billion to properly protect our ports from terrorism. Congress has taken the lead in supporting port security grants by appropriating a little over $500 million since 9/11. This bill contains another $125 million but still leaves us almost $500 million short of the Coast Guard analysis. The amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Millender-McDonald) would close the gap by an additional $275 million. These funds will ensure that ports will be able to pay for adequate security measures to protect all Americans against terrorist attacks from our seaports. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Millender-McDonald) for her detailed analysis that she has provided us which shows that even after the transfer, FEMA will have more money than it had last year even though it ran a surplus last year of over $500 million. Furthermore, I want to thank the gentlewoman for pointing out that the $400 million is a small portion of the $16 billion in customs fees generated by the maritime industry. This bipartisan amendment is supported by the American Association of Port Authorities and the Port Security Council of America. I ask that we support the amendment.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. I rise today in support of H. Res. 612, introduced by my colleague from Virginia, Mr. Cantor. On March 26, 2004, there were a series of devastating fires in Richmond, Virginia. The first fire began shortly after 12:30, and spread quickly. Wind gusting to nearly 20 mph blew burning debris onto other buildings. The fires resulted in the destruction of numerous buildings and property, and spread through city blocks and a section of the Virginia Commonwealth University campus. A total of 29 buildings suffered damage, with 19 being condemned by either water or structural damage. Yet, the destruction and damage could certainly have been worse. It was only through the combined efforts of the firefighters who responded to the scene that the fire was contained as quickly as it was. Local firefighters who initially answered the call were later assisted by firefighters from fire stations throughout the region. There were about 200 firefighters on the scene, along with 50 pieces of equipment. Together, they worked to defeat the blaze--and fought the challenging wind, smoke and heat conditions in order to save the remaining area. We thank them today for their heroic efforts to contain the damage and to protect human lives. It is appropriate for us to also recognize the efforts of the police on March 26th. As always, they were instrumental in keeping our citizens safe. For example, they evacuated several buildings and about 50 nearby homes, going door to door. And last, today, we recognize the countless private citizens, volunteers and organizations that--along with the firefighters, police, and public servants--worked as a seamless team preserving and protecting human lives, defending property, and providing food and comfort to all affected. All of these individuals deserve our recognition, and our gratitude. They met their community's call to duty by providing brave and steadfast assistance and upholding the finest traditions of the Commonwealth of Virginia. We, and all Americans, thank you for your supreme efforts.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to thank the gentleman for his comments and for his leadership on this legislation.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3866, the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004. This legislation updates the ban on steroids to include the several steroid precursors which have been developed since the 1990 ban on steroids went into effect. These precursors have been shown to cause the same reaction in the body as other steroids, and they are just as dangerous in terms of side effects and long-term damage potential. Yet, currently, they are not illegal; and they are widely used by athletes and others seeking to enhance muscle and body development. In addition to being directly ingested, these dangerous drugs are also being consumed as parts of presently legal, over-the-counter nutrition and dietary supplements. Of course, the most important concern driving the bill is the impact these drugs and precursors have on children. Some young athletes are using the drugs with the belief that they can become great in their sport and gain money and fame. However, in addition to risking disqualification from playing sports, they also risk stunted growth, infertility and other long-term health problems and even death. While we must ensure that these dangerous new drugs and precursors do not get in the hands of children or others who would use them improperly, we must also be aware that these same drugs have legitimate uses. If made available for legitimate prescriptions by physicians, they could treat conditions such as body wasting with patients with AIDS and other diseases that result in loss of muscle mass. So, Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join the gentleman from Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner), the gentleman from Michigan (Ranking Member Conyers) and other Members who have helped craft the bill in their effort to get these drugs out of the category of easy access to children and others who would use them improperly and into the laboratory to determine their legitimate, beneficial uses and into the doctor's office where they can be properly prescribed. I, therefore, urge my colleagues to support the bill. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Davis).

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1086, the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003. This measure has strong bipartisan support in the Committee on the Judiciary, the House and the Senate, as is evidenced by its cosponsors. It provides important and significant improvements to our antitrust laws. We passed the bill last year, and it passed the Senate more recently with amendments, and we are here today to approve the identical version of the bill. Title I of the bill recognizes that organizations set thousands of standards that keep us safe and provide uniformity for everything from fire protections to computer systems to building construction. When all DVDs are the same size, competitors can manufacture to the standard and compete. When all plugs are the same size, anybody can sell a lamp without having to insist on a particular brand name because they know all lamps have the standard plugs. Without the relief in this bill, industries may be reluctant to agree on a standard out of fear that treble antitrust damages may be available. So this title provides a common sense safe harbor for standards development organizations. Those who voluntarily disclose their activities to Federal antitrust authorities will only be subject to single damages should a successful antitrust suit arise. Those who refuse to disclose their activities or those who take actions beyond their disclosures will be subject to the treble damages under the antitrust statutes. The bill does not exempt anyone from antitrust laws but applies the rule of reason to standards development organizations that are acting in an open and forthright manner. If a violation is found, the organizations are still liable for damages, but single damages, rather than treble damages, which would now apply. However, organizations that commit specific serious antitrust violations, such as conspiring about standards on price, market share or territory division, will still be fully liable for their actions. The rationale for the more favorable treatment of standards development organizations under these circumstances is that standards development organizations, as nonprofits that serve a cross-section of an industry, are unlikely themselves to engage in anticompetitive activities; and, without the risk of treble damages, they can be more innovative in their effort to develop standards which enhance product quality and safety while reducing costs. Title II of the bill, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2003, increases the maximum criminal penalties for antitrust violations so that the disparity is eliminated between the treatment of criminal white collar offenses and antitrust criminal offenses. This title also incorporates a leniency provision that encourages participants in an illegal conspiracy to turn in their co-conspirators. This provision allows the Department of Justice to limit the damages of the cooperating company's civil liability to actual, rather than treble, damages. The Department of Justice will only grant such leniency if the company provides adequate and timely cooperation to both the government and any subsequent private plaintiffs in civil suits. And because the remaining conspirators remain jointly and severally liable to treble damages, the victims' potential recovery is not reduced by leniency in this situation. Finally, Title II of the bill reforms the Tunney Act to strengthen the Act's requirements that courts review antitrust consent decrees in a meaningful manner, not simply as a rubber stamp to such decrees. H.R. 1086 is an important bill that modernizes and enhances enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. I would like to commend the gentleman from Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) and the gentleman from Michigan (Ranking Member Conyers) for their leadership and cooperative efforts on this bill, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time. This is not a serious attempt to deal with a serious problem. This is a chart that shows the mess we have gotten ourselves into. It is the deficit since the Vietnam War, Reagan, and Bush. The Clinton administration cleaned up the mess, and here we are now with a huge deficit. If you run up deficits, you have got to pay out interest on the national debt. This is the interest on the national debt we were projected to pay when this administration came in. This is the interest on the national debt we are going to have to pay for messing up the deficit, $300 billion additional interest on the national debt. $300 billion at $30,000 each, that is enough to hire every unemployed person in the country, over 10 million people. The bill presented today is $367 billion more in debt. The chairman is right, we are not digging into our pockets. We are digging into our grandchildren's pockets. This bill ignores the PAYGO rules of fiscal responsibility. It is a 1-year budget rather than the traditional 5- or 10-year budget. So a lot of the problems are hidden. It is not a serious attempt to deal with a serious problem. We should reject the conference report.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, as the Representative for Virginia's Third Congressional District, and the state's first and only Black Congressional Representative since Reconstruction, I take personal pride in celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Virginia played a prominent role in the case. The Davis v. Prince Edward County Public Schools case, one of the cases decided with Brown, was a Virginia case. Also, two of the nation's premier constitutional lawyers in the Brown case came from Virginia. Attorney Oliver Hill, who continues to fight for equal justice for all, and the late Judge Spottswood Robinson, argued the case on behalf of the student plaintiffs in the Davis case. In the Brown decision, the United States Supreme Court unanimously struck down the legal and moral footing of racially segregated public education in this country. The decision overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, an 1896 case which held that a state could maintain ``separate but equal'' public accommodations based on race. When Homer Adolph Plessy, who was one-eighth Black, entered a railroad car reserved by law for whites, he was arrested. He challenged the constitutionality of the law, but the Supreme Court, by a vote of seven to one, found it valid. Although Plessy concerned public accommodations, the policy rationale was applicable to public education, as well. Indeed, the court opined on that point as follows: [W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment than the acts of congress (sic) requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem to have been questioned . . . Justice John Marshall Harlan was the lone dissenter in the 7 to 1 decision. He wrote an opinion containing the following: The destinies of the two races in this country are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments which in fact proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana . . . The thin disguise of ``equal'' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not misled anyone, or atone for the wrong this day done. In overturning Plessy, the Brown Court not only confirmed Justice Harlan's ``thin disguise'' dissenting opinion in Plessy, but also held that even if the tangible features of a segregated public education system were equal, a constitutional violation would still exist. The reasoning of the Court then is still valid today: Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ``tangible'' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does. The Court then discussed the impact segregation has on minority children: To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their heart and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs: ``Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro (sic) group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of negro (sic) children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a [racially] integrated school system.'' Unfortunately, Virginia led the resistance to the Brown decision. Ironically Virginia used language in the Brown decision as legal grounds for its resistance actions: Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. Virginia reasoned that it could avoid integrating its schools by not having any schools at all. As a result, Prince Edward County closed its schools for several years, Norfolk, Front Royal and Charlottesville also closed some of their schools. We overcame ``massive resistance'' and, today, Prince Edward County has one of the most integrated public school systems anywhere. Yet, five decades after Brown, a recent study by the Harvard Civil Rights Project revealed that many students in this country still attend schools and classes that are virtually segregated. So, while we have desegregated public schools, we have not achieved the integration that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., envisioned when he dreamed of the day ``little black boys and girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls and walk together as sisters and brothers''. In fact, the Harvard study data indicates that 70 percent of African American children attend schools that are predominately African American, about the same level as in 1968 when Dr. King died. So, the struggle for equal educational opportunity continues. The promise of equal educational opportunity envisioned by the Brown decision remains unfulfilled. For example, equal educational opportunity does not occur when one jurisdiction spends substantially more per student than an adjacent jurisdiction because of the relative differences in wealth between the two. Unequal funding resources also results in unequal educational opportunity when you consider studies that show that one half of low income students who are qualified to attend college do not attend because they can't afford to. Another example of the educational inequality is the current debate over publicly financed school vouchers which will provide educational opportunities to a privileged handful, but deprive public schools of desperately needed resources. Also in this vein is the inappropriate use of ``high stakes'' tests, many of which are culturally biased and, therefore, diminish opportunities for some students based on their ethnicity. A final important equal opportunity issue in education is the current attack on civil rights in the Head Start program. A slim majority of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives recently voted to weaken the 40-year ban on discrimination in hiring in the Head Start program. Obviously, we have work to do to complete the promise of the Brown decision and Dr. King's dream for our nation. The upcoming celebration of the 50th anniversary of the decision offers us an opportunity to rededicate ourselves to achieving these lofty ideals.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 6 minutes. Mr. Speaker, this bill does nothing to improve the system. It does nothing to deal with the insurance rates and the increases in premiums, but it does deny victims compensation when they are victims of malpractice. I think it may be helpful to go a little section by section to see what is actually in the bill to see how it actually does what some of the people are talking about. Section 3, for example, is entitled ``Encouraging Speedy Resolution of Claims.'' Mr. Speaker, injured parties do not need encouragement to get a speedy resolution of the claim. This section only invalidates bona fide claims that are filed after a set deadline. It also creates a confusing matrix because some State deadlines are preempted. Others are not. And so you have that confusing matrix of deadlines and may even miss the deadline by mistake. Section 4 is called ``Compensating Patient Injury.'' Actually, that is the section which limits compensation to innocent victims. It also has what is called the ``fair share rule.'' I think most States, but at least Virginia and many States, allow a victim to collect all of the damages from one defendant. That defendant can then seek contribution from others involved. In practice, that contribution is worked out in advance by who pays for what insurance. This so-called fair share requires the victim not only to prove a separate case against each and every defendant who may be involved but it also requires the plaintiff to decide and prove what percentage each one owes. Often the plaintiff does not know what happened. All they know is they are a victim of malpractice. This provision will require the plaintiff to have a separate case and pay for the expenses of separate cases against each and every person. Otherwise they may be afflicted with the ``empty chair defense'' where everybody in the courtroom starts pointing to an empty chair and says somebody else had 10 percent or 20 percent. Section 5 is ``Maximizing Patient Recovery.'' Actually, that is a provision that limits attorneys' fees making it likely that a plaintiff will not even be able to hire a lawyer. You do not hear any victims groups clamoring for limitation on attorneys' fees. The defendants are not affected by the plaintiff attorneys' fees. They do not pay the plaintiff attorneys' fees. If the award is $100,000 and the plaintiff's attorney charges 50 percent, the defendant pays $100,000. If the lawyer charges 25 percent, still $100,000. If the lawyer does not charge anything at all, just the same, $100,000. The only way that this will help malpractice premiums is if the plaintiff cannot bring the bona fide case at all, cannot bring the case because they cannot hire a lawyer with the fees. That is not fair. It is even more likely when you have this fair share thing where the lawyer has to have five and six cases in the same case. There is another provision called ``Additional Health Benefits.'' That is a provision that says if the victim has health insurance, the benefit of that health insurance goes to the one who committed the malpractice. In Virginia and many other States, if you have health insurance, you benefit. In other States, the health insurance company can get its money back after the case is settled because the malpractice recovery will pay the health expenses. Presumably under that case, the premiums will be lower. But in this bill, the benefit goes to the one who committed the malpractice. This bill is so bizarre that if you are working for a self-insured employer who is obligated to pay the health expenses of an employee and that employee is a victim of malpractice and runs up a $50,000 hospital bill, the business has to pay that $50,000 bill even though the one committing the malpractice is fully insured and could have paid. I cannot wait for some small businesses to come to us and ask why they had to pay the bill as a result of malpractice. Mr. Speaker, there is another provision under ``Punitive Damages.'' This bill provides that if a jury finds by the preponderance of the evidence that the doctor acted with malicious intent to intentionally injure a patient, not just recklessly negligent, acted with malicious intent to injure, that is not enough under the bill, because the evidence does not have to be just by the preponderance of the evidence; it has to be by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Speaker, this bill will not help injured victims of malpractice, and it is unlikely to reduce premiums. A chart of States in order of the costs of malpractice premiums shows some States at the top with caps, some with caps at the bottom, some with caps in the middle. There is no pattern to the chart. They are all over the place. The caps apparently did not make any difference at all. We have heard a lot about the doctor shortage. This is not limited to doctors. This tort reform bill affects the health care provider, a health care organization, an HMO, manufacturer, distributor, supplier, marketer, promoter, a seller of a medical product regardless of the theory of liability on which the claim is based. This does not help victims. It probably will not even reduce premiums. Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we would defeat the bill so that it will not be enacted. That has been the judgment of the United States Congress for the last 14 months. I hope it is still the judgment of the United States Congress. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.