Bobby Scott

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report on H.R. 2215, the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act. I want to commend my colleagues, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), particularly for their leadership in ensuring that we have worked in a bipartisan, cooperative method in developing this conference report. It is because of that kind of leadership that we have for the first time in over 20 years a bill to authorize the programs and funding in the Department of Justice. Mr. Speaker, this bill is based on the provisions that both sides of the aisle in both Chambers can agree on, rather than provisions which divide us based on the disagreements. This is especially true in the juvenile justice provisions in the bill. For years, juvenile justice programs and funding have been characterized in both Chambers by contention and differences. In this bill are two juvenile justice provisions, one developed in the Committee on the Judiciary and one developed in the Committee on Education and the Workforce. Both bills were developed through bipartisan cooperation and agreement, in stark contrast to the contention and rancor which has deadlocked both Chambers on the issue of juvenile justice in recent years. I want to give special credit for the hard work on this bill to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Greenwood), who has worked for years on juvenile justice issues. Juvenile justice bills in the past have been based on the advice of political pollsters and consultants. These bills, however, were developed based on advice of juvenile justice researchers, administrators, judges, psychologists, educators, and other experts in the field. The Committee on the Judiciary bill provides for accountability of the juvenile to the law, as well as accountability of the juvenile justice system to the juvenile and the public through a program of graduated sanctions and services. States and localities are provided with resources to ensure that offenses by juveniles are responded to with an appropriate degree of punishment and/or services, as the individual case requires, graduated and increasing in the level of punishment or services with any subsequent offenses until the problems bringing about such offenses are resolved. The education bill authorizes the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act for the first time in almost 6 years. We have maintained the core requirements of the act that serve to protect juveniles from abuse and that direct resources towards reducing overrepresentation of minorities in the system. This reauthorization also provides resources through a delinquency prevention block grant designed to identify at-risk children and to address difficulties which may lead to juvenile offenses before such offenses occur through proven juvenile delinquency prevention programs. The juvenile justice provision of the report also contains a provision to ensure that the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has continued responsibility for the oversight and planning for the research, evaluation, and statistical functions of the office, in addition to grant and contracting authority for these functions. The research and evaluation arm of that office has been critical to the development of effective juvenile delinquency prevention programs, and this reauthorization reaffirms its important role within the office. In sum, Mr. Speaker, the juvenile justice provisions of this bill will provide the necessary resources to effectively reduce juvenile delinquency and hold juveniles accountable for any offenses they commit. I am also pleased to see several other items in the bill which are the result of bipartisan cooperation. We converted a temporary judgeship in the Eastern District of Virginia to a permanent one, which is of critical importance to the area that I represent. I am also pleased to have worked to include in the bill the bill introduced by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Stupak), providing our brave law enforcement officers with bulletproof vests, and another bill introduced by the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) to provide suitable tributes to those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice protecting the public from criminals. Mr. Speaker, there are provisions in the bill which some would prefer would not be there, and other provisions were left out which some would have preferred were in the bill, but the bill represents a well- reasoned, bipartisan effort to fund important programs in the Department of Justice. I would like to commend the Members on both sides of the aisle, and our respective staffs in both Chambers, for their hard work and accomplishments, as well. I urge my colleagues to support the bill. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, if we talk about malpractice, we ought to talk about malpractice. If this bill passes, there is no commitment from any insurance company to actually reduce rates. There are some provision in here that have nothing to do with malpractice rates. The previous speaker mentioned attorneys' fees and how reducing attorneys' fees will reduce attorneys' fees. It did not have anything to do with malpractice insurance. He said if you have a $1 million settlement, that if you limit lawyers' fees to 23 percent that will do some good. He did not say that the malpractice carrier will pay a million dollars. If it is a one-third fee, they will pay a million dollars. If it is no fee, they will pay a million dollars. This does not have anything to do with malpractice. We ought to focus on the malpractice problem, not just gratuitously hurt the innocent victims of malpractice.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, prior to recognizing the gentleman from Illinois, I ask unanimous consent that the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Solis) be able to control the remaining time on this side.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to join the gentleman from Georgia and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Davis), and am particularly pleased to join my Congressional neighbor, the chief sponsor of the resolution, the gentlewoman from Virginia (Mrs. Davis), in formally recognizing the 100th anniversary of the 4-H Youth Development Program. The 4-H program originally began as a number of separate farm programs for youth. In Illinois, the programs consisted of corn growing clubs. In Ohio, they consisted of soil experiments. In Virginia, the programs began as corn growing boys and tomato canning clubs for girls. In the early 1900s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture organized these various youth groups throughout the country into the 4-H program. The 4-H program began as a way to involve heads, hearts and hands of farm youth in practical hands-on education in agriculture. A fourth H, for health, was added on later because of that important issue. Early extension agents and educators were able to introduce new technology and improved ways of doing things to rural communities through work with youth. Today, 4-H has grown well beyond its original roots. It involves at least 28 percent of U.S. youth during one or more of their K through 12 grade years, and there are approximately 60 million 4-H alumni. Last year, nearly 7 million young men and women participated in 4-H programs. More than half of them were from cities and their suburbs. Over 30 percent are from racial or ethnic minorities. In Virginia, 4-H clubs can be found in each of the State's 107 cities and counties, and through its 4-H education centers, Virginia has the second largest camping program in the Nation. As the 4-H has grown in size, it has also grown in focus. Although working with plants and animals is still a major focus of 4-H, participants can also choose projects in personnel development and leadership, environmental education, science and technology or communications. National 4-H initiatives also include workforce preparation programs dedicated to helping young people acquire basic skills, explore career opportunities and gain experience in the workplace. All in all, 4-H programs provide opportunities, relationships and support for youth to help them acquire the life skills necessary to meet the challenges of adolescence and adulthood. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join my colleague from Virginia, the chief sponsor of the resolution, and salute her for introducing the resolution, and also want to salute the 4-H Youth Development Program as it celebrates its 100th anniversary in 2002, and ask that my colleagues support this resolution. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Davis).

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, this bill before us will not prohibit any abortions. It prohibits a procedure. The abortion will still take place using another procedure, and I will not inflame the debate by describing in detail the alternative procedures that may be used. But I will point out that Nebraska had a law banning this procedure, the so-called partial-birth abortion. Nearly 2 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held in Stenberg v. Carhart that the law was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court said many times in its majority opinion and other times in concurring opinions that in order to make the partial-birth abortion ban constitutional, the law must contain a health exception to allow the procedure when it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. That is what five Supreme Court justices said is necessary to make the bill constitutional. All five of those justices are still on the Supreme Court. In the Stenberg case, the court said, ``The question before us is whether Nebraska's statute making criminal the performance of a partial-birth abortion violates the Constitution as interpreted by Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Roe v. Wade. We conclude that it does for at least two independent reasons.'' They said the first reason was that the law lacks an exception for the preservation of the health of the mother. The Stenberg court reminded us what a long line of cases has held, that, quote, subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may if it chooses regulate, and even proscribe abortion, except, and they put this in italics, when it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother, unquote. It goes on to say in quotes, in case we did not understand it in italics, that the governing standard requires an exception--listen up-- where it is necessary in the appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. The court continues talking about the health exception by saying, quote, Justice Thomas said that the cases just cited limit the principle to situations where the pregnancy itself creates a threat to health. The court says, ``He is wrong. The cases cited, reaffirmed in Casey, recognize that a State cannot subject women's health to significant health risks both in that context, and also where State regulations force women to use riskier methods of abortion. Our cases have repeatedly invalidated statutes that, in the process of regulating the methods of abortion, imposed significant health risks. They make clear that a risk to a woman's health is the same whether it happens to arise from regulating a particular method of abortion or from barring abortion entirely.'' Finally, the court says, ``Nebraska has not convinced us that a health exception is never medically necessary to preserve the health of the mother.'' It continues by saying, ``A statute that altogether forbids the partial-birth abortion creates a significant health risk. The statute consequently must contain a health exception.'' And in case we did not get it, the court said again, ``By no means must a State grant physicians unfettered discretion in their selection of a method of abortion but where substantial medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger the woman's health, Casey requires the statute to include a health exception when the procedure is''--listen up--``necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Requiring such an exception in this case is no departure from Casey, but simply a straightforward application of its holding.'' Mr. Speaker, whatever our views are on the underlying issue of abortion, we ought to read the decision and apply the law. The Supreme Court, in one decision, said at least five times that a health exception must be included for the statute to be constitutional. Furthermore, they put ``necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother'' in italics and quotation marks. This rule that we are considering proposes a bill without a health exception. It prohibits amendments that would create a health exception. The court has made it clear that the health exception is required and, therefore, any bill that passes without the health exception will be found unconstitutional. Thus, this rule which does not allow the required health exception should be defeated.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this motion to instruct conferees on election reform offered by the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin). Mr. Speaker, this motion to instruct does a very simple, but important, thing. It asks conferees to adopt the language in the Senate bill with respect to voting equipment with persons with disabilities. The Senate language says that there must be at least one accessible voting machine in each polling place, a voting machine that would allow voters with disabilities to vote privately and independently just like everybody else. Let me share with you the manner in which most blind voters currently cast their ballots at an election. First, they have to bring someone along with them to help them cast their ballot, or they can have a poll worker assist them. Then they have to let the other person read the ballot to them out loud. This is usually done in a voting booth that is adjacent to other voting booths; and in order to vote, the voter with the disability has to announce his or her choice to the person helping him. All of this is likely to be within listening range of other voters at the polling place. Persons with other disabilities also suffer a compromise of their right to cast a secret ballot. I cannot imagine that this is a manner in which most Americans would be comfortable in voting. Most of us value our privacy and independence in a voting place. Many of us choose not to reveal our voting choices to others. We view it as our right to keep our choices private, but many voters with disabilities do not currently have this option. Their ballot choices are shared with at least one other person and often more. This harsh reality was revealed in a recent GAO report. During the 2000 presidential election, the GAO surveyed hundreds of polling places throughout the country to measure access for voters with disabilities. The GAO found that none, not one, of the hundreds of polling places surveyed allowed voters with disabilities to vote privately and independently. Every polling place required voters with disabilities to vote in the somewhat public manner I referred to. This motion to instruct seeks to remedy this problem by requiring that one voting machine per polling place incorporate assistive technology that allows any voter, including voters with disabilities, to vote privately and independently. Potentially, it could impact millions of voters with disabilities, by allowing them full and equal access to the voting process, and that is the least that they deserve, for that is what most of us expect for ourselves and our constituents when we go to the polling place. It is also likely that for these accessible voting machines to be there, the cost will be borne at least in part by the Federal Government. I commend the gentleman from Rhode Island for his leadership on this issue. I urge my colleagues to support the motion to instruct.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to myself. Mr. Speaker, on constitutional issues, the judicial branch and the Supreme Court is the law of the land, even if those decisions are unpopular. If we had to wait for school integration to be popular in America, people in many States would still be going to segregated schools. It is important that we note that the Supreme Court is the law of the land on constitutional issues. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee). (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, how much time remains on both sides?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I believe the reasoning in the majority opinion in this case is sound. It outlines how the phrase ``under God'' is in violation of all of the differing standards developed by the Supreme Court over the last 50 years to evaluate challenges under the establishment clause of the first amendment to our Constitution. Nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, I tend to agree with the dissent in this case; and the operative language that persuaded me is language on page 9132, which says, ``But, legal world abstractions and ruminations aside, when all is said and done, the danger that ``under God'' in our Pledge of Allegiance will tend to bring about a theocracy or suppress somebody's beliefs is so minuscule as to be de minimis. The danger that phrase presents to our first amendment's freedoms is picayune at most. Judges, including Supreme Court Justices, have recognized the lack of danger in that and similar expressions for decades, if not for centuries.'' But whatever we think of the decision, Mr. Speaker, the only thing worse than the decision is the spectacle of the Members of the United States House of Representatives putting aside discussions of prescription drug benefits under Medicare to take up and pass this resolution. When we were sworn in, we promised to uphold the Constitution, and it is important to acknowledge that any court ruling based on constitutional rights will be unpopular. If the issue were popular, the litigant would vindicate his rights using the normal democratic process. Obviously, the fact that the litigant had to rely on constitutional rights means that he was in the minority. This is the way it always is with constitutional rights. An individual does not need a constitutional right of freedom of speech to say something popular. They only need it when the majority has the legislative and police power to stop them from expressing their views, and the decision will obviously not be politically popular. In that light, Mr. Speaker, what Members of Congress think of the decision is irrelevant. If the judicial branch finds the Pledge to be unconstitutional, which I do not believe it will ultimately do, no bill we can pass will change that. Mr. Speaker, because the decision is based on constitutional rights, it will always be unpopular, and what we think about the decision is irrelevant, and because we have important business to address, I would hope that this resolution will be defeated.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, prior to yielding to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), chairman of the committee, indicated what would happen if we had taken a position on Plessy v. Ferguson or Dred Scott. The litigants in those cases, Mr. Speaker, lost and I suspect that the Congress might have even approved of that. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to rise in support of this legislation to provide for the FY 2003 Department of Defense appropriations. I extend my appreciation to both Subcommittee Chairman Lewis and Ranking Member Murtha for this bipartisan legislation. I have the pleasure of representing portions of the Hampton Roads area--home to Newport News Shipyard and the world's largest naval base, Norfolk Naval base. The recently released 2000 census figures show that the Hampton Roads area is the military capital of the United States. We have 91,615 men and women in uniform that live in the Hampton Roads metropolitan area, more than anywhere else in the country. For these men and women, I am especially pleased that the appropriations bill funds a 4.1 percent pay increase and increases the basic housing allowance for our hardworking military personnel. Now more than ever, it is important that we show our appreciation for our men and women in uniform. I would also like to compliment the Committee for appropriating $250 million for the new carrier, CVN-77. Since 9-11, we have overextended the use of our current carriers. Given the new threats we face, it is appropriate that we proceed with the construction of the new carrier. This is also an item for which the entire Virginia Delegation worked very hard to secure appropriations. In addition to the funding for the new carrier, funding to allow for the construction of the fourth Virginia class submarine is vitally important. Finally, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for funding that would go to science programs at historically black colleges and universities and for institutions serving Hispanic students.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I particularly want to thank the gentleman from Georgia, the gentlewoman from California and the gentleman from New York for their hard work on this bill. It is absolutely necessary, Mr. Chairman, to provide a mechanism for meaningful communication of sensitive information to local and State officials so they can take appropriate action to protect citizens from terrorist attacks. Much of this information will, by necessity, be sensitive, often derogatory information which will be circulated without the target of the information ever being able to respond. For public safety reasons, we have to be able to communicate what is known, but we need to make every effort to ensure that this information is circulated just to those who actually need it and not spread all over town so that the chances are increased that someone's neighbors or friends who happen to work for the government agencies might see it unnecessarily. This bill, because of the hard work of those involved, strikes that appropriate balance. It is slightly different from the Senate version of the bill which tightens the language in regards to privacy and limitations on the kinds of information which will be subject to the provisions of the bill. I would hope that the conferees will adopt the Senate language. It is not inconsistent with the goals of the bill. But I must also add that the bill establishes just a framework for regulations to be developed. It is therefore important that those who develop the regulations and those who implement the regulations follow not only the letter of the law but also reflect the bipartisan spirit by which this bill was developed. Again, I want to thank the gentlewoman from California, the gentleman from Georgia and the gentleman from New York for their hard work on this legislation.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of a $200 million loan guarantee for the Amtrak national passenger rail system and to urge the administration to expeditiously and favorably respond to Amtrak's request. Amtrak services well over 500 cities and towns throughout the Nation and is a safe, efficient, and affordable mode of transporting millions of Americans to work and leisure activities each year. The events of September 11 clearly underscore the need for an alternative mode of transportation to air travel. In the 8 months since the 9-11 attacks, Amtrak ridership has remained strong, despite a weakened economy, significant reductions in travel and tourism, and steep declines in domestic air travel. In my own congressional district, the city of Richmond, Virginia, has invested over $48 million in the restoration of the historic Main Street Station. Amtrak will be a major provider of service; and after 10 years of planning, the first phase of renovations is now finally under way and trains are expected to begin stopping at the Main Street Station within the next 6 to 8 months. Mr. Speaker, passenger rail service is an essential component to our plans to create a multimodal transportation center at the Main Street Station, and an Amtrak shutdown will leave a significant gap in our region's transportation network. A shutdown of Amtrak will also lead to the possible halt in other linked services, including the Virginia Railway Express, which transports 12,000 riders each day, many coming into Washington, D.C. on rail rather than adding to the congestion on Interstate 395. Mr. Speaker, each year, this Congress appropriates significant dollars in the way of subsidies to our highways and national aviation system; yet we fail to provide the same level of support and commitment to passenger rail. A responsible Federal investment in our Nation's passenger rail system is long overdue. I believe this Congress is ready to work toward that end; but in the short term, I urge the administration to make available the resources that Amtrak needs to sustain its national operations.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4623 is a hasty attempt to override the United States Supreme Court decision of just 2 months ago, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Unfortunately, it tries to do exactly what the Supreme Court said could not be done. H.R. 4623 seeks to ban virtual child pornography. It not only defines child pornography to include virtual child pornography that is indistinguishable from real child pornography, but makes even possession of an image that is indistinguishable a crime. Child pornography may be banned and prosecuted. However, pornography that does not involve a real child is just that, pornography which, if not obscene, has been ruled by the Supreme Court to be not illegal. To constitute child pornography, a real child must be involved. The Supreme Court has ruled that computer- generated images depicting childlike characters which do not involve real children do not constitute child pornography any more than a movie with a 22-year-old actor who plays and looks like a 15-year-old engaging in sex would be illegal. The Supreme Court has ruled that pornography, computer-generated or not, which is not produced using real children, and is not otherwise obscene, is protected under the first amendment. H.R. 4623, like the CPPA struck down in Ashcroft v. Free Speech, attempts to ban this protected material and therefore is likely to meet the same fate. The fatal flaw in the CPPA was its criminalization of speech that was neither obscene under Supreme Court guidelines nor child pornography involving the abuse of real children under New York v. Ferber. H.R. 4623 repeats that mistake. Like the CPPA, this bill would not only criminalize speech that is not obscene but also speech that has redeeming literary, artistic, political or other social value. For example, the bill would punish therapists and academic researchers who used computer-generated images in their research and filmmakers who create explicit anti-child abuse documentaries. The bill creates a strict liability offense. Under the bill, prohibited images may not be possessed for any reason, however legitimate. Therefore, any scholarly research that may be used to verify or refute the underlying assumptions in the bill is rendered impossible. Proponents of the bill believe the Court left open the question of whether the government can criminalize computer-generated images that are not obscene and do not involve real children. Obscene images can always be prosecuted, but the Court clearly said that the government cannot criminalize images which are not obscene unless the product involved actual children. In striking down the bill and upholding its decision in Ferber, the Supreme Court stated: ``In contrast to the speech in Ferber, speech that itself is the record of sexual abuse, the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Virtual child pornography is not intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children as were the materials in Ferber. Ferber, then, not only referred to the distinction between actual and virtual child pornography, it relied on it as a reason for supporting its holding. Ferber provides no support for a statute that eliminates the distinction and makes the alternative mode criminal as well.'' In interpreting the Osborne case of 1990, the Court said: ``Osborne also noted the State's interest in preventing child pornography from being used as an aid in the solicitation of minors. The Court, however, anchored its holding in the concern for the participants, those whom it called the victims of child pornography. It did not suggest that, absent this concern, other governmental interests would suffice. The case reaffirmed that where the speech is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the first amendment. The distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retains first amendment protection.'' Proponents also argue that the Court did not consider the harm to real children that will occur when, through technological advances, it may become impossible to tell whether it is real children or virtual children, thereby allowing harm to real children because the government cannot tell the difference for purposes of bringing prosecution. The Court did consider that and said: ``The government next argues that its objective of eliminating the market for pornography produced using real children necessitates a prohibition on virtual images as well. Virtual images, the government contends, are indistinguishable from real ones; they are part of the same market and are often exchanged. In this way, it is said, virtual images promote the trafficking in works produced through the exploitation of real children. The hypothesis is somewhat implausible. If virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice.'' Nor was the Court persuaded, Mr. Speaker, by the argument that virtual images will make it very difficult for the government to prosecute cases. As to that concern, the Court stated: ``Finally, the government says that the possibility of producing images by using computer imaging makes it very difficult for it to prosecute those who produce pornography by using real children. Experts, we are told, may have difficulty in saying whether the pictures were made by using real children or by using computer imaging. The necessary solution, the argument runs, is to prohibit both kinds of images. The argument, in essence, is that protected speech may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech. This analysis turns the first amendment upside down. The government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.'' It also talked about the affirmative defense and said: ``To avoid this objection, the government would have us read the CPPA not as a measure suppressing speech but as a law shifting the burden to the accused to prove the speech is lawful. In this connection, the government relies on an affirmative defense under the statute, which allows a defendant to avoid conviction for nonpossession offenses by showing that the materials were produced using only adults and were not otherwise distributed in a manner conveying the impression that they depicted real children. The government raises serious constitutional difficulties by seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of proving his speech is not unlawful. An affirmative defense applies only after prosecution has begun, and the speaker must himself prove, on pain of a felony conviction, that his conduct falls within the affirmative defense. In cases under the CPPA, the evidentiary burden is not trivial. Where the defendant is not the producer of the work, he may have no way of establishing the identity, or even the existence, of the actors. If the evidentiary issue is a serious problem for the government, as it asserts, it will be at least as difficult for the innocent possessor.'' The Ashcroft decision in essence reiterates the principles of Ferber regarding the boundaries for fighting child pornography, like, number one, nonobscene descriptions or depictions of sexual conduct that do not involve real children are a form of speech which, even if despicable, is protected by the first amendment. The Court said that the government should focus its efforts on education and on punishment for violations of the law by those who actually harm children in the creation of child pornography rather than abridging the rights of free speech of those who would create something from their imagination. Again, the Court said that the fact that the speech may be used to perpetrate a crime is insufficient reason to ban the speech. ``The government may not prohibit speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed `at some indefinite future time.''' Further, the Government said, ``The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.'' So, therefore, Mr. Speaker, this bill just reiterates the mistakes in the original legislation. It is unlikely that the bill will ever be upheld and, therefore, ought to be defeated. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee). (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would just point out that some of the cases, some of the situations that would be covered by this would be crossing State lines from Washington, D.C., to the Commonwealth of Virginia for the purposes of committing fornication. That would be a crime for which, that is, two consenting adults, that would be a crime for which you could be subjected to lifetime supervision and a violation of which could put you in jail for violating the provision of your supervision. The bill needs to be narrowed to cover the kind of cases we are talking about; and for that reason the bill should be opposed, the motion to suspend the rules should be opposed so that we could have a situation where we could actually amend the bill to cover those acts which we are actually trying to cover. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.