Bobby Scott

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I want to express my appreciation to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Bachus); the chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum); the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde); and the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly), as well as the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), for working with us in preparing this bill for presentation today. Mr. Speaker, I believe this anti-stalking bill, as amended, provides valuable additional tools to law enforcement in preventing the crime of stalking and the dreadful impact it has on its victims. The first anti-stalking bill was passed in California approximately 9 years ago, and since then all 50 States have enacted anti-stalking statutes. Congress passed its first anti-stalking law in 1996. This bill, H.R. 1869, as filed, broadened the present Federal jurisdiction and gives Federal authorities more tools in getting at stalking. The gentleman from Alabama has outlined the provisions in the bill as we will consider them. Mr. Speaker, I believe that the bill, as amended, addresses concerns about several of the initial provisions, including the bail provisions, protective orders, and jurisdictional and criminal intent language. Mr. Speaker, while I had reservations about H.R. 1869 in its original form, I now enthusiastically support it. I want to thank those involved for their willingness to address those concerns. I urge my colleagues to support the bill. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding the time. Mr. Speaker, I oppose the rule because the Committee on Rules ruled out of order an amendment that I offered which would ensure that the Civil Rights Act and civil rights laws would apply to the use of these Federal funds. The Edwards amendment would address many concerns. This amendment would address one specific concern, and that is that the bill provides an exception to civil rights laws and specifically allows religious organizations to discriminate on hiring with Federal funds. Now, many religious groups now sponsor Federal programs: Catholic Charities, Lutheran Services. But they cannot discriminate in hiring people with those Federal funds. This bill changes that and says that a program funded under this bill, the sponsor can say that people of the Jewish faith need not apply for jobs funded by the Federal Government or Catholics only will be hired by the Federal funds. That is wrong. The amendment should have been allowed, and it was not. Therefore, I oppose the rule.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, Amendment 5 of the Bill of Rights says that ``no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury except,'' and then it goes on to say, ``nor to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.'' Now, the designation by the President is not due process of law. Usually we have a trial. There is no judicial review in this situation. And even the designation as a foreigner, if they happen to be a citizen and are designated as a foreigner, they have no judicial review and no rights under this bill. We ought to go back to the normal process of due process. If we are going to go after criminals, we ought to go after criminals with the normal process of having a trial.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. Mr. Speaker, this resolution is in direct conflict with a long line of Supreme Court decisions. For example, in 1962 in the Engel decision, the Supreme Court warned that one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lies in the government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services. In the Jager decision in 1989, the Supreme Court refused to review a case that specifically held that prayers at public football games violated the establishment clause of the Constitution, even though student clubs designated the individuals who gave the prayers. In 1997, a Federal court ruled that a moment of silence could be observed before games, but this year, 1999, another circuit court held specifically that prayers before football games were unconstitutional. The really disturbing aspect of this resolution is not whether we agree with that long line of court decisions, but the fact that we are considering the issue in a political forum. In the Barnett case in 1943, the court wrote that ``The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.'' One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, to a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights cannot be submitted to a vote. They depend on the outcome of no elections. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, in the city of Richmond, Virginia, an elementary school was named in honor of former Governor of Virginia Linwood Holton. The program said, Mr. Speaker, that ``Linwood Holton was elected Governor of Virginia in 1969--the State's first Republican Governor since 1886. Holton's most enduring legacy is his embrace of racial integration. He supported court-ordered busing to achieve racial balance in schools. While he was governor, he escorted one of his children to attend a predominantly black school. That act, captured on film, displayed a message of social justice to Virginians.'' Mr. Speaker, rather than promote a politically popular strategy of massive resistance, Governor Holton supported the Supreme Court ruling. So when he went to the schoolhouse door, he went not to display interposition and nullification, but to display a message of social justice. Mr. Speaker, this resolution is wrong because it subjects the complicated issue of religious freedom to the vicissitudes of political controversy, and therefore, I urge my colleagues to reject it.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, comments have been made about the ability of athletes or students to pray voluntarily. There is no prohibition against that. In fact, in 1995, a circuit court ruled that students, quote, are not enjoined from praying either individually or in groups. Students may voluntarily pray together provided such prayer is not done with school participation or supervision. We are not talking about a student's ability to pray. We are talking about the ability of that student to require everyone else to participate.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, first of all, if a physician intentionally kills someone, they will be subject to all of the state laws, criminal laws. But the point here is that if you have a terminally ill patient who has died and is full of drugs, this bill will allow the DEA to come in to determine what the intent of the physician was. Not medical enforcement, not the medical society full of doctors determining whether the appropriate protocol was followed, but a law enforcement officer. The DEA knows which drugs can be possessed and which drugs cannot be possessed. They know nothing about over-prescribing or under- prescribing drugs. We need to encourage pain relief for patients. We ought not be subjecting the physicians to additional civil and criminal penalties if they do just that. Now, if this bill passes, we will be subjecting them not only to additional criminal laws, but also the fact that you violated a law makes you exposed to more civil litigation. So even if the DEA has the common sense not to prosecute, anybody else can come in and sue. That is not what we need, and that is why we need the amendment.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio)

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. Chairman, this amendment strikes section 101 from the bill. That is the part that overturns the Oregon referendum and also exposes doctors to criminal and civil liability. This bill states that alleviating pain in the usual course of professional practice is legitimate, even if the use of controlled substances may increase the risk of death. However, then it turns around and specifically prohibits the intentional use of such substances for causing death. Now, the part about alleviating pain being a legitimate practice under the law is legally meaningless because it does not create a legal safe harbor. It does not create an affirmative defense. It does not say if you are consistent with the medical protocol that you can use that as a defense against a charge of intention. The problem we have is that the case will only arise when you have a terminally ill patient who has died and is full of drugs. DEA comes in and says, well, you killed him intentionally. The DEA has expertise in prohibiting the possession of certain drugs that are totally prohibited, but they have no expertise to know how to prescribe drugs and when too many or not enough drugs have been prescribed. Now, a doctor may be subject to scrutiny by the state medical board if they inappropriately prescribe drugs, but a law enforcement agency, without any expertise, is inappropriate. Even if the DEA decides not to prosecute a doctor, the fact that this bill is on the books will create civil liability, so that anybody can come in and sue the doctor, contrary to the stated purpose of the bill. Then section 101's expansion of DEA authority, potential civil and criminal liability, will likely increase the doctor's reluctance to prescribe sufficient drugs to relieve pain. This is particularly harmful, because physicians already undermedicate under current law for fear of violating laws, and, if we truly want to encourage aggressive pain relief, we should not expose doctors to additional civil and criminal penalties if they do exactly what we want them to do.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Clay) for yielding me the time. Mr. Chairman, we just finished reauthorizing Title I. We also, by two votes, rejected private school vouchers. Now we consider this bill, which will essentially waive all of the valuable provisions in Title I and send for the first time targeted money for low-income public schools, students of public schools to private schools, as vouchers. This kind of bill requires us to focus on what the Federal role of education really ought to be. That Federal role is to do what the States will not do. For example, the historic role of the Federal Government came in 1954 when many States were segregating student by race, separate and inherently unequal schools existed, and the Federal Supreme Court intervened. That is why they intervened. We also found years ago the disabled students were not getting an education, millions of students no education at all. That is why we passed Individuals With Disabilities Education Act. And now, because of Federal intervention, disabled students enjoy an opportunity to get an education. We also found years ago that poor students were not being properly funded. We found that there was an egregious gap in funding between rich and poor neighborhoods. Low-income citizens routinely failed to get reasonable funding. That is why we passed Title I, to target funds to poor students because States and localities just will not do it. The Title I bill we just passed had enough loopholes in it. For example, school districts for the first time can spend all of their money on transportation. We failed to put a limit on the money they could spend on transportation. And because we liberalized the school- wide programs where a majority of the students do not even have to be poor, we have a situation that targeted money, money targeted to low- income students' education can now be spent on transportation, which does not help their education, and a majority of the people benefitting do not even have to be poor. This bill makes matters even worse. It allows States to waive the little targeting that we had in Title I and allows money to be sent to private schools for the first time. That is wrong. Mr. Chairman, if we really trusted States and localities to properly fund education for low-income students, we would not need Title I in the first place. But we do need Title I. And, therefore, we do not need this bill, and I urge my colleagues to defeat it.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1887 would make it a violation of Federal law to knowingly create, sell, or possess with intent to sell a depiction of animal cruelty. At the subcommittee markup, we added a provision which exempted possession and distribution of such materials for scientific, political, historical, educational, artistic religious, or journalistic purposes. Although this narrows the application of the bill considerably, I am not convinced that the bill meets the provisions of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which prohibits reinstructions on speech, including speech that most find disgusting or unpopular. Mr. Speaker, in U.S. v. Eichman, a 1990 case, the Supreme Court said, and I quote, ``If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.'' Mr. Speaker, it is without question that the conduct at issue today is offensive and disagreeable, and it is also clear that we can constitutionally prohibit cruelty to animals. However, it is clear that we cannot prohibit the communications regarding such acts, including the film communications done for purely commercial gains. Mr. Speaker, all States already have some form of animal protection laws which would likely prohibit the crushing of animals in a manner depicted in the so-called crush video films. And prohibiting the crushing of animals in the manner suggested in the bill raises no constitutional issues. But the communication through film is speech, which is protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Films of animals being crushed are communications about the acts depicted, not doing the acts. In fact, the content in these films is no different than the content of a closed-circuit film of actual robberies or other crimes which are used on the Cops on the Beat TV shows in order to compete for rates and advertising revenues that they bring in. In those videos, human beings are intentionally killed or pistol whipped by criminals, and those videos would not be affected by this bill. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to carve out new exceptions to the First Amendment. Although one cannot endanger the public by yelling ``fire'' in a crowded theater and one cannot traffic in child pornography, speech has been restricted in precious few examples. Obscene speech is one type of speech which has been restricted. First, to be obscene, it has to appeal to prurient or sexually unhealthy and degrading interest. Second, it has to violate contemporary community standards which are judged on a State-by-State, indeed community-by-community basis, not a national basis. And third, when taken as a whole, it must be entirely lacking in redeeming literary, artistic, political, or scientific merit. While H.R. 1887 would apply to some obscene material, many videos covered by the bill are clearly not obscene. We have other Supreme Court cases, Mr. Speaker, which indicate that speech can also be restricted when there is a compelling State interest to do so. However, such restrictions must meet the strict scrutiny test, which requires that it is necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that end. Although it is clear that the governmental interests in protecting human rights may be sufficiently compelling to justify restrictions on rights otherwise protected by the Constitution, the question posed by this bill is whether protecting animals' rights counterbalances citizens' fundamental constitutional rights. It would seem from the case in 1993, City of Hialeah, that the answer to that question is no. In that case, the City of Hialeah enacted various ordinances to prevent cruelty to animals by prohibiting animal sacrifices which were part of the Santerian religion. One of the asserted bases for the ordinance was protection of animals. Although the district court found a compelling governmental interest in protecting animals, the Supreme Court invalidated those ordinances as an infringement on the First Amendment's free exercise of religion clause. Although the Supreme Court recognized the governmental interest in protecting animals from cruelty, that interest did not justify violating the rights of citizens to freely exercise their religion. Therefore, on balance, animal rights do not supersede fundamental human constitutional rights. So while the Government can and does protect animals from acts of cruelty, making of the films of such acts are unlikely to constitute compelling State interest sufficient to justify rights which are otherwise protected by the Constitution. Now, one argument to justify this as a compelling State interest is the suggestion of the correlation between serial killers and the indication that they often begin by torturing animals. Yet the suggestion is that the serial killers actually torture the animals themselves, not just watch videos. And certainly there is no indication that a store clerk selling videos is a danger to society. Therefore, it does not appear that there is a compelling State interest to violate the freedom of speech constitutional right. But even if there were a compelling State interest, it fails the strict scrutiny test because it is not narrowly tailored. Although the bill is tailored to avoid some of the more obvious First Amendment issues, it leaves so much of what it is purportedly aimed at is, in fact, uncovered that it falls into the problem encountered by the Hialeah case. There the ordinances prohibited the practices of the Santerians in a way of protecting public health but it did not prohibit practices generally or pursue less offensive ways to accomplish the goals such as requiring the same sanitation activities throughout the city. Here the bill prohibits the commercial use of videos in a way to prohibit the cruelty to animals but does not prohibit personal creation or use of the videos. The bill also exempts serious political, scientific, educational, historical, religious, artistical or journalistic uses of such films as legitimate purposes for disseminating them. It is also apparent the bill does not prohibit maiming, mutilating, wounding, or killing animals in connection with food preparation or for clothing preparation such as bashing heads of baby seals and skinning them sometimes alive and those kinds of videos for hunting and fishing or for pest control. On the other hand, the bill makes illegal depictions of activities that are not illegal when or where made and if those activities are illegal in the State where the depictions are possessed. For example, bullfighting may be illegal in Virginia, so possessing for sale of a film in Virginia depicting a bullfight in Spain would violate the act. Thus, as in the Hialeah case, the bill purports to prevent animal cruelty by stopping the creation and distribution of films but only when it is used for commercial purposes. A more narrowly tailored way to get at such cruelty would be to prosecute those who are actually engaged in the activities considered cruel. So although I commend the author of the bill, the gentleman from California (Mr. McCollum) on his efforts to write a bill which addresses the problems consistent with free speech, I am not convinced that the bill meets the strict scrutiny test for limiting speech because it has not established a compelling State interest, nor is it narrowly tailored to meet that need. I, therefore, must urge my colleagues to vote against the bill. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, could the Chair advise us as to the time remaining.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of our time to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Sanford).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul). (Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Under current law, Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman has indicated, damage from an animal owned by the Federal Government is punishable as destruction of Federal property. More specifically, willful harm to an animal owned by the Federal Government whose damage or injury is valued at less than a thousand dollars and results in a 1-year maximum imprisonment if the damage exceeds the thousand dollars, the maximum punishment is 10 years. One problem with the provision is that police dogs rarely have a technical value which exceeds a thousand dollars, so no matter how vicious or cruel the offense, under current law the felony provisions cannot be invoked. H.R. 1791, the Federal Law Enforcement Animal Protection Act of 1999, would make it a crime to willfully harm any police animal or attempt to do so. The maximum punishment would be 1 year imprisonment unless that harm inflicted disables or disfigures the animal, in which case the maximum penalty would increase to 10 years. At full committee markup, the amendments were offered to specify that we are talking about an act done out of malice to the animal as opposed to simply responding to an attack by the animal and to establish a clear line between the felony injury and the misdemeanor. The amendments were accepted and were incorporated in the bill as we are now considering it. With those changes, Mr. Speaker, I support H.R. 1791. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Rothman), a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary and a cosponsor of the legislation. (Mr. ROTHMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bentsen) and ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to control that time.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren) for yielding the time. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to instruct, first because there are no provisions in either the House or Senate version of H.R. 1501 which violate the Second Amendment to the Constitution, and second because the motion suggests an individual right to bear arms, which is, in fact, not found in the Constitution. The argument offered by some and by the sponsor of the amendment is that the Second Amendment prohibits Congress from passing laws regulating individual gun laws. The Second Amendment provides, quote, ``A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.'' Mr. Speaker, the United States Supreme Court declared in 1939, in the case United States versus Miller, that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies only to the right of a State to maintain a militia and not to an individual's right to bear arms. More specifically, the Court stated that the obvious purpose of the Second Amendment was to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of the State militia and that the amendment must be interpreted and implied with that end in view. Following the Miller decision, numerous court decisions have consistently held that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to be armed only by persons using the arms in service to an organized State militia. The modern, well-regulated militia, is the National Guard, a State-organized militia force made up of ordinary citizens serving as part-time soldiers. Courts have consistently held that gun control laws affecting the private ownership, sale and use of firearms do not violate the Second Amendment because such laws do not adversely affect the arming of a well-regulated militia. In fact, during the May 27, 1999, hearing on firearm legislation before the House Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime, I personally asked the executive director of the National Rifle Association to cite any court decision which interpreted the Second Amendment as granting an individual right to bear arms, and he could not cite a single court decision. The sponsor of the amendment likewise has offered his analysis but has been unable to cite a single Supreme Court decision which supports those views. Thus, the Second Amendment does not constitute a barrier to congressional regulation of firearms. Rather, the real challenge before us is to determine what Congress can do in the form of regulating firearms which will actually result in the reduction of gun violence. Now, we do know that some modest provisions currently in existence have made a difference. 300,000 felons, fugitives and others prohibited from receiving firearms were prevented by the Brady law between 1993 and 1998 from making those purchases. Provisions passed in the Senate would bring about a significant reduction in the number of criminals acquiring guns. Unfortunately, those good provisions in the Senate version of 1501 are coupled with counterproductive provisions affecting the system of juvenile justice in this country. Several of those provisions, such as jailing more children with adult criminals and kicking children with disabilities out of school without alternative educational services have been shown to be counterproductive. On the other hand, the bill also contains bipartisan legislation reflecting proven initiatives which will, in fact, reduce juvenile crime. So, Mr. Speaker, we should focus on these reasonable gun safety provisions and proven juvenile justice provisions which will assist localities in substantially reducing the carnage of youth violence in this country and focus not on the counterproductive sound bites and flawed interpretations of the Constitution. I, therefore, ask my colleagues to oppose the motion.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, just for the record, I would like to state that I disagree the with the Dred Scott decision. It has been overturned and is not good law at this time. Second, I would like to point out that some citations made by the supporters of the motion that certain Supreme Court Justices have made certain statements in regard to their interpretation, no case for which those statements were in the majority has ever been cited. Mr. Speaker, I would like to read part of the 1939 Miller case, so that it is clear what the Miller case said: ``In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a [shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument . . . With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces, the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.'' That is the Miller case in 1939. Later, in 1980 in the Lewis case, we have this language from the case: ``These legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties. The Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.'' Mr. Speaker, if we are going to state our opinion about what the constitutional law ought to be, we ought to acknowledge that the clear state of the law is that the Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Appeals decisions are clear that there is no individual right. It has to be connected with the militia. If we wish the Supreme Court would change its mind, then we ought to say that. But the constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court is clear that any right to bear arms must be reasonably related to the well regulated militia.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to make the point that there are, in fact, have been presented two interpretations of the Second Amendment to the Constitution. One, that there is an individual right; another is that the right is connected to the well-regulated militia. I would point out and remind the Speaker that the gentlewoman from California has entered into the record a list of court cases, including Supreme Court cases in 1939 and 1980, and over 20 cases decided in the United States Court of Appeals that support the militia interpretation of the Second Amendment. We have not found a single court decision offered today or previously, just public statements and interpretations supporting the individual right to bear arms. I think that the people can read the court cases for themselves. They will be listed in the Congressional Record. It is an important documentation of the militia interpretation of the second amendment.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I would agree with my colleague that there should not have been carve-outs in those previous bills, there should not have been carve-outs in this bill; and, therefore, this amendment should be defeated.