Bobby Scott

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, the motion to recommit will correct several of the most egregious problems with this resolution. If the amendment is not accepted, we will be voting for an inquiry that cannot end. So long as people send allegations to the committee, the committee will inquire and go on and on and on. The amendment establishes a reasoned approach by which we would consider the allegations before us and come to a conclusion. This amendment would add focus to the deliberations because some of the Starr allegations are not worth inquiring into. In fact, the Republican counsel found some of the allegations so flimsy that he did not even mention them during his presentation to our committee, and many constitutional scholars have already expressed the view that none of the allegations amount to impeachable offenses and the question is not even close. Finally, Mr. Speaker, make no mistake about it. A vote for this amendment is not necessarily a vote for an inquiry, because some who are for an inquiry and others who are against any inquiry all agree that if we are going to have an inquiry, it ought to be fair.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the conferees for producing a conference report which will serve as a foundation for a stronger system of higher education in this country. More students will be able to afford a college education due to the lower interest rates on new loans and the increase in Pell Grant levels. We also target middle school students through the new Gear Up Program, which encourages colleges to provide students with information on college opportunities as well as mentoring and tutorial programs so they will be prepared to enter college after high school. I am also pleased that the conference report retains provisions that I offered during committee deliberations. One will help students with high child care expenses qualify for student aid, and another provision rewards colleges for effectively collecting overdue loans. At the same time, I have concerns about provisions in the conference report that may adversely affect Historically Black Colleges and Universities. The conference report only extends the current exemptions that those schools enjoy for one year, whereas the Senate version would have extended it for four years. There is also a new provision which jeopardizes Pell Grants for students who attend schools with high default rates, many of which have high default rates because of open enrollment practices. While I support the conference report, I hope the Committee on Education and the Workforce will be able to revisit these issues which are critical to the survival of schools which offer opportunities to those most in need. On balance, however, Mr. Speaker, there is no question that this bill represents a major step forward and should be approved.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, yesterday the majority decided to subvert the legislative process and turn a much supported and noncontroversial bill, the reauthorization of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, into a controversial bill grounded in bad juvenile crime policy. Today we find ourselves about to pass another allegedly noncontroversial bill, the Drug Demand Reduction Act, but without the opportunity for public review or comments so we cannot be sure whether it is controversial or not. Yesterday when we passed the bill that increased the number of juveniles to be treated as adults, we ignored the fact that the adult time that the juveniles will get for their adult crime will for the affected juveniles be actually less time as an adult rather than more time as an adult. We need to subject these ideas to public scrutiny and comment rather than basing our decision solely on soundbites. Needless to say, this bill has been introduced very recently. It was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Commerce, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, the Committee on Small Business, the Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, but none of those committees have had hearings. There has been no opportunity for our people to subject the bill to scrutiny. No input from criminologists or medical doctors or sociologists or victims or budget analysts. No opportunity to prioritize this spending as opposed to other ideas that people may have. Because there might be some good ideas, I am going to vote for the bill, but it is no way to legislate. Amendment Offered by Mr. Portman

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) who is a former judge, and I want to thank, as she is approaching the podium, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), a former prosecutor.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. McCarthy.)

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds, prior to yielding to the gentleman from Rhode Island, to point out that when the gentleman talks about rape, robbery, and shooting, we need to point out that two-thirds of the juveniles treated as adults today are treated as adults for nonviolent offenses. We are already that far down the list. There is no State that needs any direction from Congress to decide what to do about people who are shooting, raping and robbing with a firearm. In fact, for those affected by this bill, they will serve less time. And that is, obviously, not the accountability that we want to be talking about. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Kennedy).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to suspend the rules and pass the amended version of S. 2073. The original version of S. 2073 was a simple reauthorization of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act. This new version has added H.R. 3 and the good, effective crime prevention bill, H.R. 1818, but it is the provisions of H.R. 3 that are most egregious. Mr. Speaker, it has been two Congresses since we started debating on how best to reduce juvenile delinquency in this country and today we still do not have a Federal juvenile justice policy that will assist States and communities in addressing this persistent problem. Instead, Congress has elected to go the politically popular route and use sound bites to develop bad juvenile crime policy. Even prominent research organizations such as the RAND Institute finds that the popular sound bite, ``You do the adult crime, you do the adult time,'' has been shown to actually increase juvenile crime. H.R. 3 has not changed much since it was last considered. Unlike H.R. 1818, it still allows children to be housed in adult prisons with adults, where they are five times more likely to be sexual assaulted, twice as likely to be beaten, and 50 percent more likely to be attacked with a weapon than children in a juvenile facility. H.R. 3 requires States to prosecute children as young as 14 in the adult court system, which significance research shows will increase crime. Those crimes will be committed sooner and be more violent if we adopt this policy. Incredibly for the juveniles affected, the studies show that the adult time will actually be shorter than the juvenile time. That is right, the adult time will be shorter. To add insult to injury, in most States the juvenile would be entitled to a preliminary hearing, giving the witnesses and the victims two trials to endure rather than one. H.R. 3 also represents government intrusion at its worst. It would require 37 States to change their juvenile justice, laws including not only my State of Virginia but also California, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Texas and many others. It is also important to understand that by bringing up S. 2073 in the House under a suspension of the rules as we are doing today the Senate no longer have to debate juvenile justice. They have a bill in the Senate, S. 10, which is similar to H.R. 3, and it has not been able to reach the floor because it cannot pass the ``Light of Day Test,'' because when daylight hits S. 10, no one likes what they see. It has been criticized by the National Governors' Association, the National District Attorneys Association, the Children's Defense Fund, and even the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Mr. Speaker, this is the wrong way to establish a Federal juvenile crime policy. We should let the center continue to deliberate until they can pass a juvenile crime bill that actually reduces youth crime. Meanwhile, the House should defeat the motion to suspend the rules and, instead, pass a simple reauthorization of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the Runaway and Homeless Youth Acts. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Clay) control the time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, in closing I would just like to recommend that we review the bill and would notice that the bill started off with a simple reauthorization of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and Runaway and Homeless Youth Act. We also had passed here legislation, H.R. 1818, a prevention bill which will protect children and also reduce crime which included the National Center and the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act. We should pass those. But unfortunately we have in this bill the addition of H.R. 3 which has the incredible result of giving children less time and increasing the crime rate with a study showing those increased crimes will be committed sooner and be more violent. We need to vote ``no'' on this motion to suspend the rules and then pass the reauthorization of the National Center and the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act and then pass H.R. 1818 and forget about H.R. 3.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3892. This bill represents bad education policy because it hurts limited-English-proficient students by placing an arbitrary time limit on services without regard to the individual needs of the student. In addition to our discussions about the education policy involved, we should also discuss the bill's impact on fundamental civil rights protections for LEP students. This bill seeks to void all voluntary compliance agreements between the Federal Office for Civil Rights and the school districts that protect the meaningful access to effective education programs. Now, let us remember that the Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Education is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that school districts provide LEP students with an equal educational opportunity in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the U.S. Supreme Court's 1974 ruling in Lau v. Nichols. Often, when a district is found to be in violation of the law, school districts and the Office of Civil Rights enter into compliance agreements. Those agreements reduce litigation expenses needed to ensure compliance with the law, and in addition, they ensure the schools will be protected from other lawsuits by parents, students and the Department of Justice. They even protect the schools from additional administrative enforcement provisions by the Office of Civil Rights. But by seeking to void all 276 compliance agreements, we will leave school districts vulnerable to a barrage of lawsuits by private individuals and the Department of Justice and subject them to other means of enforcement actions by the Office of Civil Rights. Perhaps what is most egregious about voiding the existing agreements is that we will be doing nothing, absolutely nothing, to address the underlying violations of the school districts affected. Now, let us not pretend that those violations will simply disappear because we have eliminated the compliance agreement. OCR will still have the responsibility to ensure that those school districts are taking appropriate steps to be in compliance with the law. Mr. Chairman, let me close by citing the bipartisan U.S. Civil Rights Commission in 1997, when they said that ``The OCR's current policy does not disturb the traditional State and local autonomy and flexibility in fashioning education programs to assist students with limited English proficiency in addressing their language barriers. Schools remain free to choose between a wide variety of instructional methodologies and approaches, including bilingual education, English as a second language, and an array of other language assistance programs. Overall, OCR has shown exemplary restraint in respecting State and local prerogatives in that it has not sought to place limits on State and local discretion by proposing requirements that in any way limit that discretion.'' So, Mr. Chairman, this legislation represents not only poor education policy but also poor policy from a legal process perspective; and, therefore, I urge my colleagues to vote no on this legislation.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to William A. Tucker, my good friend and long-term community leader in the Third Congressional District of Virginia. Mr. Tucker was born on September 15, 1928 in Greenville, North Carolina and moved to the Hampton Roads area in 1962. Since that time, he has amassed a commendable record of community leadership based on a practice of leading by example. It began with the example he set as a dedicated family man, who, along with his wife Helen Hembly Tucker, raised five children who have given them three grandchildren. Mr. Tucker served in the U.S. Air Force from 1948 to 1974. After leaving active duty in the military, he became involved in a number of community activities. He began work as a Longshoreman and was ultimately elected President of Newport News Local 846 of the International Longshoreman's Association. While in his position with Local 846, he also became involved in other community and civic organizations. He became a life member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Mr. Tucker went on to hold membership in and serve on the Executive Board of the Hampton Democratic Party, the Virginia State Board of Corrections Education Subcommittee, the City of Hampton Charter Review Commission, the City of Hampton Citizen's Unity Commission, the Committee for the Beautification of the City of Hampton, and the Board of Hampton Roads Boys and Girls Club. So, it is with honor that I call attention to the contributions of William A. Tucker before the Congress and the nation and I ask that these remarks be made a part of the permanent records of this body.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this amendment. In addition to the other arguments already made against the amendment, this amendment exempts the private schools from Federal enforcement of civil rights laws, even though they are receiving federally funded vouchers. Through legislative trickery, the amendment declares these vouchers are assistance to the student and not assistance to the school and, therefore, the school will technically not be a recipient of Federal funds subject to Federal enforcement of civil rights laws. Although the amendment does contain general antidiscrimination language, it does not contain the very important substantive and procedural rights for parents. For example, the Department of Justice and Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education will be prevented from withholding funds or seeking an injunction, even when there is proven cases of discrimination. Those remedies and the important legal support are not available because of the nonassistance to school provision. So discrimination can only be addressed on a case-by-case basis by the few parents willing and able to finance the litigation. Mr. Chairman, this amendment represents poor public policy because it diverts funds which could be put to better use and, furthermore, deceitfully suggests that children will be able to choose a private school of their choice, when the fact is that the choice will only be available for those who win the lottery, against 40 to 1 odds, and get admitted to a private school which has the tuition low enough for them to be able to afford the balance due after the voucher. And, finally, the amendment contains a provision which sabotages civil rights protections. Mr. Chairman, we should support public education and reject this amendment.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to a couple of things that the gentleman from Kentucky mentioned. First of all, the amendment is drawn so that the money will come out of the truth in sentencing grant. It is a little complicated because of the way the truth in sentencing grant has been combined with others, but the amount of money, the legislative intent is to take it out of the truth in sentencing grant. The gentleman from Kentucky also indicated that we have suggested that prisons do not work. What we have said, Mr. Chairman, is that a scheme that increases the time for the lowest risk prisoners and decreases the time for the highest risk prisoners is not the effective use of prison space. I think it is appropriate now to give an example of what happens when you do these truth in sentencing schemes. As the gentleman whose name is nationally known, Richard Allen Davis, who was in jail on a serious crime, he was given six months to life. He was denied practice parole, denied parole, denied parole, until a California crackdown on crime abolished parole and resentenced everybody. He got 7.2 years. Turned out he had already served it. He was out. He got caught again on a serious offense. You get 8 years, you serve 8 years. They could not hold him longer than 8 years and had to let him out. Then he kidnapped and murdered Polly Klaas. If there had been a parole system where they could have held him longer, he would still probably be in jail on the first offense and certainly in jail on the second offense. That is why I call it half truth in sentencing, because the half truth is that nobody gets out early, but the whole truth is that you cannot hold people longer. This scheme also has another little effect. That is that those who are in prison have no longer any incentive in getting the education, the job training that actually makes a difference in recidivism rates. They know the day they get in, they know when they are going to get out so they do not have to get any education or job training. When truth in sentencing and abolishing parole was studied in Virginia, they found that spending $200 million per congressional district and $100 million per congressional district per year running the prisons would not make a statistically significant difference in the crime rate. That is what their study showed, not a statistically significant difference. That is why the amendment is to take the money out of that program and put it into some programs that will actually reduce crime.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to point out one thing, that we should not confuse percentage of time with length of time. Someone who gets the 5 years and serves 100 percent of the 5 years, serves 5 years. Someone that gets 100 years and serves 50 percent of that time would serve 50 years. That 50 years is not long enough to qualify under truth in sentencing because it is not 85 percent of the time. So we should not confuse the fact that some may be serving 100 percent of a much shorter sentence than one-third or one-half of a much longer sentence. I just think there should not be that confusion.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I could ask two questions. One, I would ask, does the gentleman know Virginia is renting out space to other States because we have 3,000 beds we do not need? The other question is, could the gentleman tell me why Kentucky did not get any money at all from there?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would transfer one-half of the funds in the Truth in Sentencing Incentives Grant program, approximately $105 million, to crime prevention, drug treatment and family resource programs. Mr. Chairman, there are several reasons to move funds from the Truth in Sentencing Incentive Grant program to these other programs, the first of which is that half of the States do not even qualify for the truth in sentencing grants. States like Kentucky and West Virginia and Massachusetts do not even get funds out of this program. Second, Mr. Chairman, the truth in sentencing funds can only be spent for prison construction. At this point, some of the States that do qualify have already overbuilt prison space. For example, my own State of Virginia is trying to lease out to other States and the Federal Government some 3,200 excess prison beds. There is no reason for us to spend money to build prison beds in States that do not even need them. Third, Mr. Chairman, that we encourage States to adopt truth in sentencing systems is of dubious value. The so-called truth in sentencing scheme is actually the half-truth in sentencing. Proponents of truth in sentencing tell you that no one gets out early. That is the half-truth. The whole truth is that no one is held longer either. Mr. Chairman, when States adopt truth in sentencing schemes, the first thing they always do is to reduce the length of sentencing judges have been giving under the parole system and then direct the defendant serve all of the reduced sentence. For example, under a parole system, if a judge says 10 years, the average defendant will serve about a third of the time, with the lowest risk prisoners getting out as early as two years. But the worst criminals who cannot make parole serve the whole 10 years. But with truth in sentencing, everybody gets out at the same time. If the new sentence is 3\1/3\ years, you get 3\1/3\ years, you serve 3\1/ 3\ years. The problem is that the lowest risk prisoners under that system will serve more time, while the most dangerous criminals who could not make parole and would have served all 10 years now get out in one-third of the time. If the State were to double the average time served, the worst criminals would still get out earlier than they do under the parole system. In fact, even if the State tripled the average time to be served, the worst criminals would then serve the same 10 years that they would serve under the parole system. The primary difference is that the taxpayers would have been bilked out of billions of dollars by funding a politician's campaign slogan that has nothing to do with reduction of crime. Mr. Chairman, States are already spending tens of billions of dollars on prison construction every year, so this $105 million spread about the few States that actually qualify cannot possibly make any difference in the number of prison beds to be built, much less have any effect on the crime rate. But if that money is spent on prevention and treatment, we can make a significant difference in crime. For example, Mr. Chairman, the amendment provides for $36.5 million to go to increasing funds for building and running Boys and Girls Clubs and public housing and other sites for at-risk youth. Boys and Girls Clubs have been shown through study and research to be a cost effective way of reducing crime for at-risk youth. The amendment also provides $37 million for residential drug treatment for prisoners before they are released, and approximately $75 million for Drug Courts. Both prison drug treatment and Drug Courts have been shown not only to significantly reduce crime, but also to save money. The money for court-appointed special advocates, child abuse prevention, training and law enforcement and family support will reduce family violence and child abuse, which have been shown to reduce future crime. We can all agree that assisting families of law enforcement officers who have died in the cause of duty is an appropriate thing to do. Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to support this amendment, reduce crime, and save money.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Mollohan-Fox amendment to restore some of the cuts in legal assistance for the poor. As a former Legal Services program board chairman who helped to establish a Legal Services program over 20 years ago, I can attest firsthand to the importance of Legal Services to individuals in my district who cannot afford a lawyer. As a result of legal aid, many of the unscrupulous businesses who once operated with relative impunity are now held in check. I am concerned that if we further reduce the Federal support for these programs, we will give license to the resurgence of such operators to prey on those who are vulnerable and unable to respond because of the cuts in Legal Services. Mr. Chairman, despite the existence of Legal Services programs for the poor, there have never been sufficient funds to reach anywhere near the number of people who need assistance. For example, the American Bar Association in 1995 did a study that revealed that 43 percent of those asking for services had to be turned away because of lack of funding to provide for services. The 1995 funding level was $415 million. Last year the Legal Services Corporation received only $283 million, and even with this amendment, the funding will only be $250 million. So, Mr. Chairman, we have already drastically cut the funding for Legal Services. At this point there is no justification for so drastically reducing the Legal Services Corporation as the current bill requires. I hope that we will assure at least the minimum Federal support that this amendment calls for, so that some of those who are defenseless and helpless against the unscrupulous in our society will have some recourse. I implore my colleagues to support the modest funding for Legal Services for the poor by supporting the Mollohan-Fox amendment.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, first I would like to insert in the Record the transcript later in that proceedings where Mr. Sever did appear in court and the judge indicated that he could not order the IBT to pay for the election. United States District Court Southern District of New York united states of america Plaintiff v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al., Defendants July 29, 1998, 12 p.m. (Hearing resumed) (In open court) The Court: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. The first item I will discuss is my request for a referendum. When I made that request, I had in mind that it was completely for the benefit of IBT. I call your attention to an item in their memorandum, which is very convincing and persuasive. The GEB's decision is consistent with the Court's statement on the record on June 29, 1998 that voluntary payment by IBT officers of the costs of supervision would be a ``breach of a fiduciary relationship and something that is forbidden actually to do by law.'' The thought occurred to me that the union could send a message to the IBT hierarchy that they would agree and it would not be considered by them a breach of a fiduciary relationship if they were voluntarily to agree to contribute some money to a rerun election. However, the memorandum is very persuasive that the cost and the effort involved in such an undertaking would be futile. So my good intention has come practically to naught. I did say that voluntary contributions by the IBT in light of the decision by the Court of Appeals, dissent noted, would be a violation of their trust. Again, I repeat ad nauseam that it occurred to me that if they had a word from the membership that they would not be held to such an account they could then go ahead and make voluntary payments. So my request for a referendum is no longer in order. I am sorry it did not work out the way I thought it might. I still am of the opinion, although I am not sure that I have the authority to order it, that instead of a referendum a poll of a very small but vital universe of 500 would give some indication to the hierarchy whether contributions could be made without being in default of their duty. I leave that to the entire discretion of the union itself. Now let me address some verities. I think we all know that of all the many cases that are filed in this court and, indeed, in all the courts in all the land, if all those cases were to go to trial, the system would come to a creaking halt. Certainly it is not new news for you as practicing lawyers to know that compromises and agreements occur even after verdicts for a plaintiff and a defendant. And it also is not great news for you to understand that when one files an appeal, every effort is made by an instrument of that court to resolve the issue before the need of the decision. I think common sense ought to be considered here. Is it your view that an unsupervised election does not have to put in place any assurance, any guarantee, any rules to demonstrate that a nonsupervised election will still be a democratic election, a free election, and that every effort will be made in a nonsupervised election, of which there have been many in the history of this union, that such an election should not raise any concern or fears that corruption would become the order of the day? That is my concern. As I said, an unsupervised election sounds more fearsome than it can actually be. And what I want here today, and I took the liberty of asking Mr. Sever, a member of the executive team, to come and see if I can employ reason and amicability and some stability to a problem that should be settled, does this unsupervised election, and I am intending to go ahead with that, mean that I have to be concerned with chaos? Mr. Weich: Your Honor, I'm quite confident that an unsupervised election would not be chaotic. Almost every union in the country conducts an unsupervised election under federal labor law. And, of course, this union is additionally bound by the consent decree and its own constitution. I am very confident that safeguards would be in place to insure that corruption does not occur and that the election is carried out in an open and democratic manner. The Court: Would a supervised election give more assurance of orderly procedure? Would it relieve us of certain, perhaps unrealistic, apprehensions that the election would go forward in a more orderly process? Mr. Weich: It's a very difficult question to answer under current circumstances. I can only say, your Honor, that the IBT supports the supervision process. We have said in every public statement and reiterate again today that we would like to see supervision. We insist, though, that the United States be made to meet its obligations under the consent decree to pay for that supervision if it is to occur. The Court: Do you understand my reason for a referendum? Mr. Weich: I do understand. The Court: I was trying to relieve you of the danger of irresponsibility in the event you voluntarily agreed to make contribution. Mr. Weich: I do understand that, your Honor. The Court: And I thought the only way I could deal with that problem on your behalf and somewhat on the Court's behalf was to have the voice of the union say no, you will not be guilty of any betrayal of a fiduciary relationship if you make a voluntary contribution. That was my reason. Mr. Weich: I understand that. The Court: And now that you have convinced me that there is no point to it, I withdraw that request. Let's go on. Ms. Konigsberg: Your Honor-- The Court: You say order the Congress to do something, in this case, to provide funds. Think about this clearly and analyze it. Here is this district court judge telling the mighty sovereign Congress, Do something. And if they say no, what is my next step? Dealing with an old truism, that no court should enter an order which ends up in futility, am I to say I am going to hold the entire Congress in contempt? To think about it shows it is absurd. The same thing holds true, as I said, if I say to the government, Pay. It is your obligation. And if they say, We cannot, what do I do? Hold the United States of America in contempt? I do not think I could possibly survive that. Now the focus here is, Oh, the Attorney General is not inhibited by anything that the committees have said about inhibiting the use of the funds. That is your interpretation. But if I were the Attorney General, I would want more to rely upon than an interpretation. It is not a matter of what we think the inhibition proscribes or what the Court may think or even what the government may think. But before I, as an Attorney General, would be free to do ahead and make my interpretation that the government is free to use certain funds, I would want more assurance than that, than face possible contempt by the House Appropriations Committee. I implore you, why can't we be reasonable about this? Why can't we continue to have a supervised election by some contribution? Mr. Weich: Your Honor, we continue---- The Court: Am I off the wall when I say probably in your own experience that you have entered into compromises even when a verdict has been in your favor? Mr. Weich: Yes, your Honor, that's certainly true. I can only observe that we still await word from the United States whether it is prepared to put any money into this process. It strikes me that on this record, given the union's history of being willing to compromise in the past, it's the decision that the Court of Appeals handed down that at this time would be appropriate for the government to state whether it has any money before the question is put to the union. The Court: You mean money that is absolutely free and clear and under no restrictions? Mr. Weich: Yes. Well, your Honor, you know our position, that there is money that the Court could order the government to pay. Our position there is not an extraordinary one. It's often the case that a government agency tells a federal court that it believes it doesn't have authority to do something or doesn't believe it's required to do something, the Court orders that agency to do it. And, as always, the United States complies. But my point, in response---- The Court: Let's assume you are right, and I do not see how your logic can stand up, I say to the government, Pay, and they say, We cannot, we do not have the funds, whether under restrictions or not. What do I do, hold the United States in contempt? Well, what do I do? I have issued an order. I have said to the government, Pay, and they have said, We cannot. What do I do? Where does that lead us? Mr. Weich: The first place it would lead us---- The Court: Did you ever hear of sovereign immunity? Mr. Weich: Yes, I have. The Court: Do you know what that means? Mr. Weich: Yes, I do. The Court: Who would I hold in contempt? U.S. of America, you are held in contempt. Oh? Either you comply or I will send you to jail. Who will I send to jail, the U.S. of America? Isn't that what a lawyer is supposed to unravel in his thinking when he makes an argument? Is that order that I make now silly? Who would I hold in contempt? Mr. Weich: Your Honor, I---- The Court: Who would I drag into court? Uncle Sam, who is the symbol of America? Who would I hold in contempt? The Appropriations Committee? The subcommittee? The entire House of Representatives? The entire Senate? Whom would I hold in contempt? Do I fill the jailhouse with all these dignified representatives of their constituents? You know, thought is a very important process. It is easy enough to embark on ideas that are grandiose and win favor with a constituency, but you have got to parse it and analyze it. No court is supposed to enter an order which is futile. I have been dealing with this specter. Maybe the symbol of America is Uncle Sam and I will have Uncle Sam, I will even have his beard trimmed for television purposes, and I will put Uncle Sam in jail. The more you think of it, the less appealing it becomes. So unappealing that it is not even worth all the discussion and thought and sleepless nights I have given to this. I have no hesitation where contempt is proper, and again I must remind you that contempt must be by trial to another judge. Do you know that? Mr. Weich: Yes, your Honor. The Court: I am sure my colleagues would applaud my effort to ask them to try a case of contempt against the United States of America. I think that should convince you that it is an idea whose time has now come. Now, can't we deal with this the way lawyers do all the time? Try to reach some understanding and agreement. I have had many cases resolved after a verdict by 12 men and women, good and tried, who found in a civil case by a preponderance, in a criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt, some negotiation. Why can't we do that here? Is there a motive why there is so much obstinacy here and obdurateness about coming to any understanding or realization? Mr. Weich. Your Honor, I ask again that you put the question to the United States if there is money. The Court. What do I do if they say no? You beg the question. You are a lawyer. I have asked you a question. Give me some help. Who do I hold in contempt? Mr. Weich. I'm confident that if you put the question to Ms. Konigsberg whether the United States would obey a lawful order of this Court her answer would be yes, therefore contempt would be unnecessary. If contempt were necessary---- The Court. Is there a danger that I ought to consider sanctions against any lawyer who tries to bring an action or a cause that is absolutely absurd in its very, very root? Again, I have asked you ten times: Whom do I ask another judge to hold in contempt? Mr. Weich. If contempt were necessary---- The Court. Contempt is always necessary if an order is not obeyed. Mr. Weich. Yes. If contempt were necessary, your Honor, there are officers of the United States who stand in for the United States---- The Court. All the officers of the United States? Mr. Weich. No. Ms. Konigsberg---- The Court. Aren't you a little bit ashamed of your begging the question? Mr. Weich. No, your Honor. The Court. All right. That would be quite a newspaper item, having all the 50 states and their senators and representatives hauled to court and put to jail. That would be novel. Instead of history of the law, it would be the hysterics of the law. Again, can I bring you to the peace table? Mr. Weich. Your Honor, we've been at the peace table. We ask whether the United States is intending to come to the peace table. The Court. I want to hear from the United States. Shall I hold you in contempt? Ms. Konigsberg. No, your Honor. The Court. As long as we are in the amusement circle, let me tell you my own personal experience, without much name. At one time in my career I was special assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, a rather important job. There was a case before a very distinguished justice and he wanted the government to produce certain documents. I told the judge I did not have these documents, I did not have control of them, I had never seen them, that they were exclusively in the possession of the Attorney General, who resided in Washington. The judge gave me a brief period of time to produce those documents or to be held in contempt and possibly jailed. I spoke to the Attorney General. I have never seen the documents. I did not know their relevance. I did not even know that they would lead to relevant evidence, and he said, You may not have them. And you must go before the court and say that I will not release them. And then he said, with a broad Texas drawl, David, jail is not too bad at all. They feed you three meals a day. Fortunately, the judge had some generosity and heart and did not hold me in contempt, which would certainly have hurt my career. He certainly did not jail me, but the documents were never produced and there was really nothing that he could do. That was my own personal experience. I am, as the record will show, a very reluctant judge when it comes to dealing either with sanctions or with contempt because that has the very treacherous danger of doing substantial irreparable harm to a lawyer who might be more zealous than smart. Ms. Konigsberg. Good afternoon, your Honor. Let me first address the issue about whether or not it could be perceived as a breach of fiduciary duty for the union's leadership to agree to pay the costs, some of the costs, of the rerun election. It, in the government's view, would not be a breach of fiduciary duty and though the government supports the Court's idea of having a referendum, it would not take a referendum in order to reach that conclusion. The Court.Wouldn't a poll do just as well? I have had some experience in that area. A poll could be done. A universe of 500 is sufficient. It could be done in two or three days. Ms. Konigsberg. That is possible. The Court. By telephone. Ms. Konigsberg. That is possible, your Honor. But whether-- irrespective of any referendum and irrespective of any poll, it cannot be considered a breach of the union's fiduciary duty to pay these costs, and let me explain why. Though I know the Court mentioned that at the prior hearing, I don't consider that a finding by this Court; that was not a matter that was briefed. The union indisputably is going to have to bear the cost anyway of an unsupervised election. The Court. Has anybody an estimate of what that cost would be? Ms. Konigsberg. I would like to know from the IBT what they project that cost to be. I mean, I would suspect it is at least the same amount of money, if not more so, than the amount of money that the union would pay if they share the costs of the election. I think it would be helpful if the Court, if we, could inquire of the IBT what that would cost. But I would suspect it is, at a minimum, $4 million for them to have to pay in any event if they have to conduct their own election. Second of all, it is in the interests of the union membership to have a fair election and to have a supervised election. The union has said itself that they are in favor of a supervised election, and everybody here agrees that the best way to insure a fair, free, democratic election, that all the members and all the public can have confidence in, is to have election officer supervision. So regardless of the relative costs of an unsupervised election versus what they would contribute, the union leadership can decide that this is something that's in the members' interests to have an independent, court-appointed election officer supervise this so that the union membership can be assured of having a fair, free, democratic election. Really what this can be, I suppose, likened to is, is the union saying that it would refuse, in effect, if the government is able to secure the agreement of Congress to pay $4 million, or plus, toward the cost of this rerun election supervised by an election officer, is the union saying that it would refuse to accept the government's money in order to be able to have a supervised election? Because we all agree that they're going to have to pay these costs anyway in an unsupervised election, and we all agree that the election officer supervision is necessary. I mean, I would submit to the Court there is at least a question whether it could be perceived as a breach of fiduciary duty not to agree to pay the costs in order to have a supervised election. So, I think it would be helpful to take the question of a breach of fiduciary duty off the table here. I don't think there is any question that the union leadership can agree to pay this. What the Second Circuit's decision was about was whether the union could be obligated to pay. The Court. The Second Circuit decision completely ignores the very powerful dissent, and although that dissent did not carry the day, it sends a powerful message. Nobody even refers to that. That is bad argument. The dissent did not carry the day. It did not persuade the majority. But it is a very powerful message and should not be ignored. Ms. Konigsberg. We agree, your Honor. But even accepting the majority's opinion, which, of course, we accept, all it says is that the union cannot be compelled---- The Court. That's right. Ms. Konigsberg [continuing]. Based on the misconduct. It does not say that the union voluntarily cannot agree. It also does not say the government is required to continue supervision. But it does not say that they cannot voluntarily agree. And it is clearly in the union members' interests, as the IBT has conceded, to have a supervised rerun election, so that it would not be a breach of fiduciary duty. The Court. I brought you here, Mr. Sever, to lend a helping hand based on your long experience to resolve this problem. Maybe your lawyer will feel a little freer if he has some notion from you that you are willing to help. Mr. Sever. Your Honor---- The Court. You are no longer with the Mets, are you? Mr. Sever. Your Honor---- Mr. Weich. It's Tom Sever, your Honor, not Tom Seaver. Mr. Sever. Your Honor, in due respect, you know, I must indicate that we do have a decision by the Second Circuit of the court. In light of that decision, I did proceed on to the general executive board on July the 20th, and the general executive board rejected to pay for any costs in light of that decision, and, you know, I believe that we ought to--I believe in the judicial system, your Honor. And I believe that we ought to abide by the courts and follow the appropriate procedures of appeal, if necessary. But certainly that's where we stand at this point, your Honor. The Court. All right. But I am asking you: Can you not consider that there may be some room for compromise and negotiations? Mr. Sever. If there would be any room for compromise, your Honor, I would be more than happy to take that back to our general executive board. The Court. Will you do that, please. Mr. Sever. I would take a poll with the board. I would do that if we could have a compromise. The Court. And will you also say it is my---- Mr. Sever. Would you repeat. The Court. It is my passionate desire to see that this matter be resolved. Mr. Sever. It would--I would like to see it resolved, your Honor. However, you know, with respect to my fiduciary responsibility as the general secretary-treasurer, and with the due respect of the cost that may be associated, I believe that, you know, if there could be some kind of a compromise, such as maybe sending out the ballots, that I might be able to recommend that. And that cost would be somewhere around $2 million. I might be able to recommend that to the general executive board. The Court. All right. That is something. Mr. Sever. Thank you, your Honor. The Court. Did you want to say anything? Did you want to say anything? Mr. Weich. No your Honor. The Court. I want this election to go forward. We have had some delays and I think it is time to fish or cut bait. Now, in anticipation that we are going to have an unsupervised election, will you please give me some details of how you plan this election to go. I think my inherent power in terms of my need to manage my own caseload suggests that I can require you to give me some view of your plans. I also think that hope does spring eternal. I think that perhaps the Senate, by its appropriate committees and their wisdom, might decide to allow the Attorney General some freedom in the use of funds. I just do not know how we can urge them to come forward with a yes-or-no answer, but perhaps they will. Is there anything else? Ms. Konigsberg: Yes, your Honor. As the government set forth in its papers, the government believes that the Court has the authority to set a plan for this election, particularly given that the IBT---- The Court: You know their argument about the plan that you suggested, that this is just a disguise, using rhetoric, but to accomplish exactly the same thing that would occur in the hands of the supervised election. Isn't that your argument? Mr. Weich: Yes, your Honor. Ms. Konigsberg: I'm aware of their argument, your Honor. The Court: You have a chance to answer. I think your date is Monday. Ms. Konigsberg: That's right, and we will respond to that on Monday, your Honor. The Court: But the IBT makes a very persuasive argument that this is merely a camouflage and that the Court does not have inherent power to do anything by way of accepting a substitute monitored election. Ms. Konigsberg: We will address that. We disagree. The Court: That is the problem with appointing a special master. Ms. Konigsberg: Your Honor, the government disagrees very strongly with that characterization; that is to say, that there can be no court-appointed election officer in the absence of a supervised election doesn't mean that you throw the baby out with the bath water and that all of the learning under the consent decree about how to have a democratic election---- The Court: I will read your papers and I will study your papers, and I hope to get another version of how an unsupervised election will proceed. Ms. Konigsberg: Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Cherkasky: Your Honor, just very briefly, if I might. We also feel strongly that any---- The Court: Keep your voice up. Everybody wants to hear you. Mr. Cherkasky [continuing]. That any contribution that would be made by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters would not be a breach of their fiduciary duty. The Court: Would not be what? Mr. Cherkasky: A breach of their fiduciary duty. I think all the parties agree---- The Court: I was trying to give you some assurance that under no circumstances would they be crucified on the cross for the sustaining of the fiduciary relationship. Mr. Cherkasky: I understand that, Judge. Certainly, it's--I think they've taken out of context your remarks at previous hearings. They have said previously that they would contribute some sums, so they didn't feel it was a breach of their fiduciary duty or they wouldn't have agreed to contribute anything. Secondly, we would think that, we firmly believe that the Teamsters union, as was indicated yesterday, is a union that has every right to have a fair and free election as quickly as possible and that the membership, we believe, demand that. We also believe there are ways to do polling, ways that you could do polling going to each of the different locals and have a weighting voting process which could be done very quickly, very efficiently, and very inexpensively, so that in fact we could have a very quick read of what in fact the union felt as to the proposition of their making a contribution or not. Finally, as unpleasant as it may be for us, we have to face the fact that this may be an unsupervised election and, your Honor, we will in fact be filing with your Honor a proposal of how to would wind down the matters of the election office. We, in fact, are continuing to spend money, continuing to do work. We have a number of very significant protest matters before us which, in fact, we think urgently need to be completed, and we would in fact by next Monday have a proposal for you if in fact it's necessary, if the draconian happens, how to wind down the election office. The Court: I have a note from my worthy staff: ``You need to give the IBT a timetable for giving more definite statements for unsupervised election.'' Thank you. What would I do without you? What timetable do you need? Mr. Weich: Respectfully, your Honor, it seems to us premature when the government has not, to date, withdrawn its election to supervise to order the IBT to do more than it has done, which is to set forth with a fair bit of specificity how it would conduct an unsupervised election in accordance with federal labor law, the IBT constitution and the consent decree. I really think that as a matter of logic and timing, the United States should conclude its efforts and say, finally, that it does not intend to supervise, if indeed that's the conclusion it reaches, despite our view that it should not be permitted to withdraw that. The Court: If public relations and goodwill have any strong reason, and believe me they do, you cannot possibly estimate the goodwill and public relations game for the IBT to come forward generously to make some contribution. I repeat this ad nauseam: In the ten years that I have been on this case, the union has spent millions upon millions of dollars fighting every single revision of this decree. Millions. Some of it so silly that it has been a mockery and a telltale at cocktail parties. The quarreling over my order for the IBT to provide a $50 secondhand cabinet file, in one matter where there were just a number of limited appearances, one law firm garnered $6 million in fees. I think from my point of view a forthcoming spirit of generosity does not have to wait for Christmas. Yes. Go on. Ms. Konigsberg: Your Honor, because there is such a strong interest in having a prompt rerun election, we believe that there should be a schedule set for the IBT to submit a plan that these two things can occur at the same time and we think that would make sense to do. In addition, I wonder if the IBT has an estimate of what they think it would cost them to conduct an unsupervised election. Mr. Weich: Your Honor, we're prepared to submit additional details about how we would conduct additional details about how we would conduct an unsupervised election next Wednesday, August 5. The Court: Can you give us an estimate of what the cost would be? Mr. Weich: We will do our best. The Court: You will do that? Mr. Weich: Yes, your Honor. The Court: Is there anything else? Ms. Konigsberg: That's it, your Honor. The Court: Nothing else? Mr. Weich: No, your Honor. The Court: Please come up with something. I think after ten years on this case I deserve a break. And I think we have done one tremendous job of ridding this union of a lot of corruption and we are still on it. Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution and particularly the portion of the resolution which allows nonattorneys to conduct depositions behind closed doors and without any member of the committee present. That authority is virtually unprecedented. The authority of having a nonattorney staff conduct the depositions was not given to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight where we heard abuses even with attorneys doing it. The House did grant that authority in the committee on the transfer of technology to China, a select committee on which I sit, but it was understood by the members of the select committee and the Members of the whole House that an issue of that magnitude required swift but thorough investigation, staffed with personnel skilled with the nuances of deposing witnesses with sensitive and potentially classified material. We also recognized that some of the material and witnesses sought for that investigation would require travel to China and experienced staff must be allowed to pursue those matters when Members' schedules might preclude their attendance. The staff members hired for that purpose, the 6-month duration of the committee, will obviously be hired with the appropriate skills for taking depositions. In contrast, this investigation into the 1996 Teamsters election will not address matters of national security but the members of the subcommittee must apply equal vigilance to the rights of witnesses and the appropriate conduct of the investigation. Already the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations has come very close to interfering with an ongoing investigation by the U.S. Attorney's office into the Teamsters election, and we experienced a potentially damaging incident concerning the shocking modification of subpoenas without the approval of the committee. All of this occurred under the watchful eye of the consultants to the committee, whose professional credentials cannot be challenged. In fact, the committee hired these consultants for the majority because the majority stated that it did not have qualified staff with the background, knowledge or experience to conduct the investigation. Now these consultants have given notice that they will be leaving the investigation, so I hesitate to think what will happen when staff who are not attorneys, not experienced in deposing witnesses and who are not required to abide by any codes of professional responsibility are allowed to continue where the consultants left off. This subcommittee must be vigilant in its investigation into the Teamsters election. The rules of conduct must not allow the reckless endangerment of a process designed to prevent another failed election. In the end we must be responsible not only to the Teamsters but also to the taxpayers who paid for the 1996 election and who continue to pay for this investigation. We should not allow nonattorneys who have already been labeled by the majority as incapable of conducting the investigation to be granted the exceptional power to conduct depositions behind closed doors.

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I include for the Record a letter from the U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, which stated that taking testimony from certain witnesses who had been subpoenaed and scheduled to testify would impede an ongoing criminal investigation. The letter referred to is as follows: Department of Justice, Southern District of New York, April 28, 1998. Re Teamsters investigation. Hon. Pete Hoekstra, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, House of Representatives. Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you as Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (the ``Subcommittee'') to request that the Subcommittee not seek to question Brad Burton and Susan Mackie concerning involvement by individuals affiliated with the AFL in fundraising for the 1996 Ronald Carey campaign for re- election as general President of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (``IBT''), a subject which is under criminal investigation by my Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In my carefully considered judgment, such testimony taken at this time could seriously undermine and compromise this very active criminal investigation. While I fully recognize the importance of your Subcommittee's investigation, I respectfully urge you and your fellow members to balance the harm that the proposed testimony on this particular subject may cause to this important criminal investigation and prospective trials against any benefits that could come from the proposed examinations on this topic. We understand that last week the Subcommittee sent letters requesting that these individuals appear to testify before the Subcommittee. We have no objection to testimony being taken from these witnesses, but only as to testimony regarding fundraising for the Carey campaign, which is the focus of the criminal investigation. At the request of Majority counsel, Deputy United States Attorney Shirah Neiman met with you and Congressman Norwood last week to explain, from our point of view, the negative impact we believe questioning these witnesses on this topic could have on the criminal investigation. Ms. Neiman also offered--consistent with grand jury secrecy obligations, and the integrity of the criminal investigation--to brief the Subcommittee or its counsel on matters of interest to the Subcommittee. Mr. Neiman also outlined the matters already in the public record regarding AFL involvement in the Carey campaign which might be of use to you in your hearings. Today, the criminal investigation has resulted in felony prosecutions and guilty pleas of three individuals who are cooperating with the ongoing investigation and an indictment yesterday against the former Director of the IBT's Governmental Affairs Department. We have tried to be as cooperative as possible with all ongoing Congressional inquiries, Election Officer Investigations and Independent Review Board investigations, while at the same time ensuring the integrity of the ongoing criminal investigation and prosecutions. We are making this request because we believe that the criminal investigation and any potential criminal trials will suffer if witnesses are forced prematurely to go forward with deposition and/or public testimony. In addition, should the substance of interviews or testimony become public, the course of the criminal investigation could be irreparably damaged. We appreciate your weighing these factors in making your decision in this matter. Thank you for your consideration. Respectfully, Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney.