Bobby Scott

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to the joint resolution.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler). (Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond to one of the things that was said. Madam Speaker, in ``Wallace v. Jaffree'' the Court held that the government may give objective instruction about religion in public schools and provide for religiously neutral moments of silence, permit students to engage in private, nondisruptive prayer during the school day, and impose no barrier to organized, student-initiated religious clubs under the Equal Access Act. That is a 1985 decision. Madam Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Indiana (Ms. Carson).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Fazio).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Wynn).

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee). (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume just to thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for his hard work on this, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) for his leadership, and the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), whose subcommittee considered this.

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1023, the Ricky Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund Act of 1998. The purpose of the bill is to establish a fund to provide compassionate payments of $100,000 to individuals with hemophilia who contracted HIV, the AIDS virus, from contaminated blood-clotting products. Hemophilia is a blood-clotting disorder genetically passed to sons by their mothers. In the late 1970s and early 1980s approximately 7,200 boys and men were infected with HIV through the use of blood-clotting products. That is nearly half of all people with hemophilia in the United States. Because these blood-clotting products were derived from pools made up of literally thousands of donors, including prisoners, it has been nearly impossible to conclude causation and liability to any one manufacturer for selling contaminated blood products. Although, as the chairman mentioned, many cases have been settled, of the dozen or so cases that eventually went to trial, the manufacturers were only held liable in two cases, one of which was reversed and the other is still on appeal. To make matters worse, many of the States have passed so- called blood shield laws to protect blood banks from liability when blood-based diseases are passed on to users. Notwithstanding the industry's courtroom success and new blood shield laws, the industry recently established a fund to provide $100,000 to individuals who contracted HIV through contaminated blood-clotting products in exchange for signing waivers releasing the industry from any future liability. Many hemophiliacs and their families have accepted this offer. Unfortunately, the $100,000 industry payment is insufficient to cover the enormous costs of blood-clotting drugs which people with hemophilia must continue to have in order to live a relatively normal life, and the enormous costs of drugs to combat the AIDS virus. Accordingly, this legislation is necessary to provide additional financial assistance. The administration supports this proposal. We want to thank the chairman for the manager's amendment to increase the attorneys' fee provision from 2 to 5 percent, because we support this amendment, because we believe that it will allow claimants greater access to legal counsel in processing their applications under the bill. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt).

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson).

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, violating the Constitution and constitutional violations are not the solution to prison overcrowding. The Constitution is not violated when we deny someone weight training or access to a color television. If we are going to pass legislation like three-strikes-and- you-are-out, or mandatory minimums, if we are going to try to pass those slogans, three-strikes-and-you-are-out has been studied and has been determined to be just a waste of money. Mandatory minimums result in high-risk prisoners getting not enough time and the low-risk prisoners getting too much time. Mr. Speaker, if we are going to pass that legislation, we have to fund the prisons. These violations are not just weight training and color TV. They include rapes, assaults, living in sewer- and rat- infested conditions. We need to fund those prisons and keep these within the constitutional constraints if we are going to pass that legislation. I think there are a lot of easier ways to deal with the prison problem. That is to prevent more crimes before they occur. But if we are going to pass legislation like this, Mr. Speaker, we have to pay the bill. We have very serious, ongoing constitutional violations. We have situations where the consent decrees are the easiest ways for the States to deal with this, if they want. They do not have to agree to a consent decree. We should not tie their hands and force them into litigation, where they may end up in more draconian sanctions than the consent decrees they have agreed to. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3718, which would unconstitutionally limit the authority of Federal judges to remedy inhumane prison conditions. This bill also improperly interferes with the work of the judicial branch of our constitutional system of government. H.R. 3718 is a radical and dangerous proposal with two impermissible goals. First, it would terminate ongoing consent decrees in prison condition cases. Second, it would prohibit judges from issuing prisoner release orders to remedy unconstitutional overcrowding. The effort to terminate consent decrees is totally unwarranted. This amendment only affects those consent decrees that State and local governments want to remain in effect or that are necessary because of current and ongoing violations of Federal rights. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 eliminated all other consent decrees, so the only ones left are those that State and local governments want to remain in effect or are necessary because of current and ongoing violations of the Constitution. A consent decree is a voluntary contract between two parties to end the active phase of litigation. This legislation does not close the case; it simply prohibits States from negotiating a resolution of the case. Therefore, it requires States to expend substantial sums of money to litigate issues for which there is no dispute and for which there is an agreement for the proper resolution of the case. Congress has no business dictating to States how they should resolve litigation involving State institutions. If a State has decided that a consent decree meets the State's needs and is preferable to costly litigation, Congress should stay out of it. Furthermore, Madam Speaker, the Federal termination of prisoner release orders is unnecessary. Most court orders in jail and prison cases do not include prison population caps, and the 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act already requires a three-judge court before any population cap is imposed. And even if there is a cap, prisoners are released only if State officials elect to meet the cap through releases rather than building new facilities or adopting sentencing alternatives. This bill will effectively prohibit courts from enforcing constitutional rights of prisoners by agreement and will only be able to enforce those rights with a full-blown court trial that may result in even more draconian resolutions than a consent decree would have resulted in. Madam Speaker, this legislation is a recipe for chaos. We passed a Prison Litigation Reform Act less than 2 years ago. It eliminated all consent decrees without ongoing violations. The courts are only beginning to address the complicated, practical and constitutional issues raised by this act. Hundreds of cases are pending in trial and appellate courts. The Supreme Court is likely to have a review in the near future. The passage of this bill will only add confusion, delay resolution of pending cases, raise difficult issues of retroactivity, and actually create new litigation. This amendment is counterproductive for all of those who want to streamline prison lawsuits. The 1995 act already strips courts of authority to enforce the Constitution in certain cases. H.R. 3718 takes us further down that dangerous path. Court-stripping threatens the role of the judiciary and our system of checks and balances and should not be expanded. Today, court-stripping hurts prisoners, but tomorrow, it may affect others in our society who rely on courts to administer justice and enforce their rights. I strongly oppose this legislation and urge my colleagues to do the same. Madam Speaker, there are a few cases that I just want to cite that may be affected by this legislation. It has already been pointed out that we passed legislation creating more prisoners, and if we are going to pass that legislation, it is incumbent upon us to build the prisons to accommodate those prisoners. Let me just list a few consent decrees that this bill will terminate. A consent decree was entered in the Virgin Islands in 1994 because prisoners were locked up for 23 hours a day in overcrowded, filthy, rat- and roach-infested cells. One-man cells were used to house four or five prisoners with mattresses on the floor, frequently soaked by overflowing toilets; drinking water was contaminated with sewage. The consent decree remains in effect today, because an evidentiary hearing found many of the problems still persisted. There is no screening for new prisoners for tuberculosis, and mentally ill prisoners are still being housed with the general population and suffering abuse. Several of the mentally ill were badly beaten, and one died. That consent decree would be set aside by this legislation. Another in Hawaii, 1987, to remedy dangerously inadequate medical and mental health care and environmental conditions. The consent decree remains in effect today because the problem still exists. Today, the facility is very overcrowded, with men sleeping on the floor in cells where there are backed-up toilets spilling sewage. Because of the overcrowding, mentally ill and dangerous populations are mixed together with potential risk to both groups. Madam Speaker, there are other cases that would be affected by this. The consent decrees would be eliminated if this bill were to be passed. Prison staff in Louisiana, a Louisiana case, 1995, prison staff were found to be engaging in sexual abuse of women prisoners ranging from vulgar and obscene sexual comments to forcible sexual rape. Prison staff were not only accused of participating in the sexual misconduct but allowing male prisoners to enter female prisons to engage in forcible intercourse with women prisoners. That consent decree would be set aside by this legislation. Juveniles held in New Orleans. Juveniles held in Conchetta facility in New Orleans Parish Prison lack such supplies as sheets, underwear and shoes. They are at risk because of inadequate mental, dental and mental health care facilities and unsafe environmental conditions. Children are regularly beaten by staff. That consent decree would be set aside by this legislation. In the State of Georgia, more than 200 women, some as young as 16 years old, were coerced into having sex with prison guards, maintenance workers, teachers and even a prison chaplain. The sexual abuse comes to light when women became pregnant and were required to undergo abortions. That consent decree would be set aside. So, Madam Speaker, I would hope that we would not expand the prison litigation court-stripping that we passed in 1995, and that we would defeat this bill.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I would point out that in the beginning of the bill, as is indicated, it would eliminate any consent decree that provides for remedies relating to prison conditions. The beginning of the bill says that notwithstanding that section, no court ``* * * shall have jurisdiction to enter or carry out any prisoner release order that would result in the release from or nonadmission to a prison on the basis of prison conditions of the person subject to incarceration, detention, or admission.'' That has essentially eliminated a lot of the jurisdiction the court had in the beginning. If someone were only to provide for unconstitutional violations, at the prison, I am not sure what the court could do. They have been essentially eliminated from anything other than consent decrees. If the locality does not agree to it, the court would essentially be, because of this bill, without remedy to remedy constitutional violations. The law that passed 2 years ago is now being litigated. This bill just takes away the authority from the courts to enforce the constitutional rights of the citizens. I think it should not be passed. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to read the bottom of page 2 of the bill. It says Termination of existing consent decrees. Any consent decree that was entered into before the date of the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, that is in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, and that provides for remedies relating to prison conditions shall cease to be effective on the date of the enactment of this Act. That eliminates all consent decrees, not just those that have as a remedy the release of prisoners. So all of those cases where there are rapes, assaults, and everything else are included.