F. Sensenbrenner

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in support of H.R. 809, the Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 2001, which I have introduced along with the committee's ranking member, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde). This bill makes six separate technical corrections to our antitrust laws. Three of these corrections repeal outdated provisions of the law. One clarifies a long existing ambiguity relating to the application of the law to the District of Columbia and the territories, and two correct typographical errors in recently passed laws. This bill is identical to a bill which the House passed by a voice vote last year, except that two typographical corrections have been added. The committee has informally consulted with the antitrust enforcement agencies, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, and the agencies indicate that they do not object to any of these changes. In response to written questions following the committee's November 5, 1997 oversight hearing on the antitrust enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice recommended two of the repeals and the clarification contained in this bill. First, H.R. 809 repeals the Act of March 3, 1913. That act requires all depositions taken in Sherman Act cases brought by the government be conducted in public. In the early days, the courts conducted such cases by deposition without any formal trial proceeding. Thus, Congress required that the depositions be open as a trial would be. Under the modern practice of broad discovery, depositions are generally taken in private and then made public if they are used at trial. Under our system, section 30 causes three problems: First, it maintains a special rule for a narrow class of cases when the justification for that rule has disappeared. Second, it makes it hard for a court to protect proprietary information that may be at issue in an antitrust case. And, third, it can create a circus atmosphere in the deposition of a high profile figure. In an appeal in the Microsoft case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit invited Congress to repeal this law. Second, H.R. 809 repeals the antitrust provision in the Panama Canal Act. Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act provides no vessel owned by someone who is violating the antitrust laws may pass through the Panama canal. The committee has not been able to determine why this provision was added to the act or whether it has ever been used. However, with the return of the canal to Panamanian sovereignty at the end of 1999, it is appropriate to repeal this outdated provision. The House Committee on Armed Services has jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Act, and I appreciate the willingness of that committee's chairman, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Stump), to expedite this noncontroversial bill. Third, H.R. 809 clarifies that section 2 of the Sherman Act applies to the District of Columbia and its territories. Two of the primary provisions of antitrust law are section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade, and section 2 prohibits monopolization. Section 3 of the Sherman Act was intended to apply these provisions to the District and the various territories of the United States. Unfortunately, however, the ambiguous drafting in section 3 leaves it unclear whether section 2 applies to these areas. The committee is aware of at least one instance in which the Department of Justice declined to bring an otherwise meritorious section 2 claim in a Virgin Islands case because of this ambiguity. This bill clarifies both section 1 and section 2 apply to the District and the Territories. All of the congressional representatives of the District and the Territories are cosponsors of this bill. Finally, H.R. 809 repeals a redundant antitrust jurisdiction provision in section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. In 1955, Congress modernized the jurisdictional and venue provisions relating to antitrust suits by amending section 4 of the Clayton Act. At that time it repealed the redundant jurisdictional provision in section 7 of the Sherman Act but not the one in section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. It appears this was an oversight, because section 77 was never codified and has been rarely used. Repealing section 77 will not diminish any jurisdiction or venue rights because section 4 of the Clayton Act provides any potential plaintiff with broader jurisdiction and venue rights in section 77. Rather, the repeal simply rids the law of a confusing, redundant, and little-used provision. Finally, the bill corrects an erroneous section number designation in the Curt Flood Act passed in 1998, and it inserts an inadvertently omitted period in the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act. Neither of these corrections makes any substantive change. I believe that all of these provisions are noncontroversial and they will help clean up some underbrush in the antitrust laws and recommend that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 741) to amend the Trademark Act of 1946 to provide for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, in order to carry out provisions of certain international conventions, and for other purposes.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the arguments made by my friend, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), because I think that the purpose of this bill is to make the process of adjudicating a common disaster lawsuit, such as one arising from a plane crash or a train wreck, more convenient to all of the litigants concerned. That provides for the consolidation of these cases in a manner that has been described for determining liability and punitive damages, but not for determining compensatory damages. So overall, it makes the system fairer for all litigants, although it might make the system a bit inconvenient to some litigants. So I think we have a balancing effect here. I am just concerned over a common disaster case bringing about a huge plethora of lawsuits that would be filed in courts all over the country. Given where the plaintiffs would live who were injured or killed in the plane crash, or where the airline was located, where the crash occurred, or the manufacturer of the plane and its component parts were situated, we could have lawsuits on the same disaster going on in every court. Sooner or later there would be appeals which would be expensive, that would have to be consolidated so there would be a single law that would be applicable to everybody. We can short-circuit that problem by the type of consolidation that is being proposed in this bill. The administrative office of the U.S. courts and the multidistrict litigation panel of the judicial conference of the United States have supported this bill. They do not like to see an expansion of Federal jurisdiction, but they see this as necessary for the streamlining of the adjudication of these claims. Someone said, ``Justice delayed is justice denied.'' Whenever we have a complex case like this, there are delays that are in and of the nature of the litigation. But I believe that this will speed up the final resolution in bringing to closure any litigation that may arise as a result of one of these disasters. I would hope that the bill would be passed for that reason. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record two letters related to this matter. The letters referred to are as follows: Judicial Conference of the United States, Washington, DC, March 13, 2001. Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, I write to express the support of the federal judiciary for H.R. 860, the ``Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001.'' This bill was reported favorably on March 8, 2001, by the Committee you chair. H.R. 860 will facilitate the resolution of claims by citizens and improve the administration of justice. Section 2 of the bill amends 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407, the multidistrict litigation statute, to allow a judge with a transferred case to retain it for trial or to transfer it to another district. Presently, section 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions pending in multiple federal judicial districts with common questions of fact ``to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.'' It also requires the Judicial Panel to remand any such action to the district court in which the action was filed at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings, unless the action is terminated before then in the transferee court. Although the federal courts had for nearly 30 years followed the practice of allowing a transferee court to invoke the venue transfer provision (28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a)) and transfer the case to itself for trial purposes, the Supreme Court in Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998), held that statutory authority did not exist for a district judge conducting pretrial proceedings to transfer a case to itself for trial. The Court noted that the proper venue for resolving the desirability of such self-transfer authority is ``the floor of Congress.'' A proposal to amend section 1407 in response to the Lexecon decision was approved by the Judicial Conference at its September 1998 session and is supported by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. As experience has shown, there is wisdom in permitting the judge who is familiar with the facts and parties and pretrial proceedings of a transferred case to retain the case for trial. Also, as with most federal civil actions, multidistrict litigation cases are typically resolved through settlement. Allowing the transferee judge to set a firm trial date promotes the resolution of these cases. Section 3 of H.R. 860 adds a new section 1369 to title 28, United States Code, entitled ``multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction.'' It essentially provides that the United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over any civil action that arises from a single accident or event in which at least 25 persons have died or been injured at a particular location, where any such injuries result in alleged damages exceeding $150,000 by each plaintiff and which involves minimal diversity between adverse parties. The legislation also requires that one defendant must reside in a state that is different from the location of the accident or the residence of any other defendant or that substantial parts of the event took place in different states. The transferee court would be authorized to determine issues of liability and punitive damages and would remand cases to the transferor court for determinations of compensatory damages, unless the court finds, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, that the action should be retained for the determination of damages. The district court, however, must abstain from hearing an action under the bill if a substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single state of which the primary defendants are also citizens and the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that state. Upon consideration of related proposals during the 100th Congress, the Judicial Conference in March 1988 approved in principle the creation of federal jurisdiction that would rely on minimal diversity to consolidate multiple litigation in state and federal courts of cases involving personal injury or property damage and arising out of a single event. The Conference endorsed the idea of redirecting diversity jurisdiction to serve a purpose that state courts are not able to serve, namely to facilitate the consolidation of scattered actions arising out of the same accident or event and thereby ``to promote more expeditious and economical disposition of such litigation.'' Today, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation can transfer to one judge for pretrial proceedings those cases involving common questions of fact that are pending in federal courts throughout the country. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407. Section 3 of H.R. 860 would expand federal jurisdiction by allowing state cases arising from a single event (such as a plane crash or hotel fire) to be brought into such process as a result of filing, removal, or intervention. Section 3 of the bill would avoid multiple trials on common issues, minimize litigation costs, and ensure that litigants are treated consistently and fairly. Thus, this legislation will promote the resolution of litigants' claims in these unique and related cases. Thank you for taking prompt action on this important and necessary legislation. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Mike Blommer, Assistant Director, Office of Legislative Affairs (202-502-1700). Sincerely, Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to introduce the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001. This legislation addresses two important issues in the world of complex, multidistrict litigation. Section 2 of the bill would reverse the effects of the 1998 Supreme Court decision in the so-called Lexecon case. It would simply amend the multidistrict litigation statute by explicitly allowing a transferee court to retain jurisdiction over referred cases for trial, or refer them to other districts, as it sees fit. In fact, section 2 only codifies what had constituted ongoing judicial practice for nearly 30 years prior to the Lexecon decision. Section 3 addresses a particular specie of complex litigation--so- called `disaster' cases, such as those involving airline accidents. The language set forth in my bill is a revised version of a concept which, beginning in the 101st Congress, has been supported by the Department of Justice, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, two previous Democratic Congress, and one previous Republican Congress. Section 3 will help to reduce litigation costs as well as the likelihood of forum shopping in single-accident mass tort cases. All plaintiffs in these cases will ordinarily be situated identically, making the case for consolidation of their actions especially compelling. These types of disasters--with their hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs and numerous defendants--have the potential to impair the orderly administration of justice in federal courts for an extended period of time. Mr. Speaker, during the eleventh-hour negotiations with the Senate last term, I offered to make three changes in an effort to generate greater support for the bill. As a show of good faith, I incorporate those changes in the bill I am introducing today. They consist of the following: First, a plaintiff must allege at least $150,000 in damages (up from $75,000) to file in U.S. district court. Second, an exception to the minimum diversity rule is created: A U.S. district court may not hear any case in which a ``substantial majority'' of plaintiffs and the ``primary'' defendants are citizens of the same state; and in which the claims asserted are governed ``primarily'' by the laws of that same state. In other words, only state courts may hear such cases. Third, the choice-of-law section will be stricken. It confers too much discretionary authority on a federal judge to select the relevant law that will apply in a given case. In sum, Mr. Speaker, this legislation speaks to process, fairness, and judicial efficiency. It will not interfere with jury verdicts or compensation rates for litigators. I therefore urge my colleagues to join me in a bipartisan effort to support the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2001.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New Jersey (Mrs. Roukema). (Mrs. ROUKEMA asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach), the distinguished former chairman of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) for yielding again. Mr. Chairman, the problem is that it ended up not being technical in nature and it ended up changing substantive rights in the bill, which is something that we had decided to keep out of the technical amendment. I would further point out to my friend, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), that the change was made prior to the Committee on Rules holding its hearing yesterday, and the amendment that was before the Committee on Rules was the revised text.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, all of the amendments that were made in order by the Committee on Rules were redrafted to reflect the Union Calendar print that has been submitted to the House for its consideration. So of the five amendments that were made in order by the Committee on Rules, all of them had to be redrafted, recognizing the fact that the text of the bill as reported from committee is not the text of the Union Calendar printed as before the Committee of the Whole today.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time. Mr. Chairman, this is a technical amendment. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) is complaining about the fact that there is an omission in the technical amendment, and the fact that it is substantive in nature means that the provisions that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) is complaining about do not belong in a technical amendment. Now, the question before the committee, when we vote on this amendment, is whether or not to pass a technical amendment that is needed to clean up the bill and to make its provisions easier to understand and easier to execute when the court has questions placed before them. A no vote means that people want to make it harder to understand and harder to execute. I would urge the House to support this amendment so that it can be made easier to understand by everybody. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) for yielding. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the gentlewoman has pointed out an unequal treatment in this bill which needs correction. I am happy to support the amendment of the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) and hope that we can get it passed quickly.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to support the amendment. I think the points made by my colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green) are absolutely correct, and I believe that this would be a significant improvement to this bill and hope that the committee adopts it.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the substitute amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), my colleague, and others. This amendment is problematic for several very important reasons. First, it eviscerates more than 3 years of careful consideration, analysis, negotiation and compromise embodied in H.R. 333's needs-based reforms. For example, one provision of this amendment completely rewrites the standard for overcoming the presumption of abuse in cases where debtors have the ability to pay debts. Although I did not participate in the negotiations that transpired between the House and the Senate last year, I am informed that H.R. 333's provisions are the product of intense analysis and exhaustive negotiation. Second, the substitute amendment introduces truly novel concepts that have, to my knowledge, not been the subject of any oversight hearing by the House Committee on the Judiciary. These provisions, although perhaps well-intentioned, attempt to address various privacy issues perceived to be present in the bankruptcy system. Under current law, most information filed in connection with a bankruptcy case is available to the public. Both the Justice Department and the Judicial Conference of the United States, however, have recently begun to consider whether unlimited public access to such information through the Internet and other electronic means should somehow be restricted. Nevertheless, the substitute imposes a broad array of restrictions and requirements with regard to this matter and provides for the award of punitive damages for their violation under certain circumstances. Rather than slip these substantive provisions in in an amendment filed on the eve of floor consideration of this bill, they should be the subject of an oversight hearing where they can be aired in the light of day and the public should be given an opportunity to be heard. Third, this amendment attempts to include in the bill amendments that were roundly defeated during the Committee on the Judiciary's markup of H.R. 333 last month. Out of 18 amendments considered during the markup, the bill was reported with only one modest amendment making minor technical and conforming revisions. The bill as reported clearly reflects the considered judgment of the Committee on the Judiciary that H.R. 333 is the product of an exhaustive and mandatory process, as well as extensive negotiation, and does not need to be further amended. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to oppose this substitute amendment Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas). (Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the very distinguished gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran). (Mr. MORAN of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the other very distinguished gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Chairman, this bill has been percolated through the Congress for the last 4 years. It has probably been one of the most debated, amended and negotiated bills that have come before the Congress of the United States in the last 25 years. At the end of the last Congress, overwhelming majorities in both Houses approved this bill. It was a voice vote in the House, and the vote in the other body was 70-28. I think that shows that the vast majority of Members of both political parties are happy with the compromises that have been reached as a result of almost 4 years of painstaking and seemingly never ending negotiations. We hear an awful lot about the fact that bankruptcy reform is necessary. My friends on the other side of the aisle say, yes, we support bankruptcy reform but not this bill. That argument to me seems to be that the perfect is the enemy of the good. In any legislative body where compromise is the rule in order to pass legislation, the perfect is probably never attainable. This bill is a good bill. It is a bill that will make a dent on the $400 that every family in this country who pays their bills has to pay in increased taxes, increased costs for goods, increased costs for services as a result of about $44 billion a year being written off in debt and bankruptcy. I think probably the best statement that was made during the debate came early on several hours ago, where our present bankruptcy laws are now being used by some as a financial planning tool. Bankruptcy should never be an item of financial planning. What it should be is a system of last resort, to allow people who have gotten in over their heads in debts to wipe the slate clean and to have a fresh start. This bill takes care of most of the abuses in the present bankruptcy system. It is a good bill. It is one that has been vetted by practically everybody who has been interested in this piece of legislation. It is not a perfect bill. I will be the first one to admit it. But it is a significant improvement. I would urge support for this bill and opposition to this last amendment that goes back to some of the practices of the bad old days.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, at the request of the Committee on Financial Services, I hereby submit for the Record correspondence between that Committee and the Committee on the Judiciary relating to the Financial Services Committee's agreement to waive its consideration of H.R. 333, the ``Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001.'' Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC, February 21, 2001. Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Jim: On February 14, 2001 the Committee on the Judiciary ordered reported H.R. 333, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001. As you know, the Committee on Financial Services was granted an additional referral upon the bill's introduction pursuant to the committee's jurisdiction under Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives over banks and banking, credit, and securities and exchanges. Because of your willingness to consult with the Committee on Financial Services regarding this matter, your continuing support for our requested changes, and the need to move this legislation expeditiously, I will waive consideration of the bill by the Financial Services Committee. By agreeing to waive its consideration of the bill, the Financial Services Committee does not waive its jurisdiction over H.R. 333. In addition, the Committee on Financial Services reserves its authority to seek conferees on any provisions of the bill that are within the Financial Services Committee's jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference that may be convened on this legislation. I ask your commitment to support any request by the Committee on Financial Services for conferees on H.R. 333 or related legislation. I request that you include this letter and your response as part of your committee's report on the bill and the Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation on the House floor. thank for your attention to these matters. Sincerely, Michael G. Oxley, Chairman.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution, an order of business resolution, providing for the consideration of H.R. 333, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001. I want to commend the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions); the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the chairman of the Committee on Rules; and all the members of the Committee on Rules for reporting a fair, balanced, and appropriate rule for consideration of this important bankruptcy reform bill. Mr. Speaker, this rule is not unlike rules passed in the 105th and 106th Congress providing for the consideration of bankruptcy reform bills. This structured rule provides ample time for debate and consideration of opposing views. It makes in order one minority substitute and provides one hour of debate on that substitute. It also makes in order a technical amendment which I will be offering which will make some minor technical corrections in the bill. Mr. Speaker, this is a good rule and I urge the Members to support this resolution.