F. Sensenbrenner

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make three points. First, under the 60-day time frame proposed by the gentlewoman's amendment, the time under the War Powers Act for Congress to make a decision following an attack will have expired and, consequently, less than the full House will make the important decisions relative to under what circumstances American troops will be committed overseas. Under the 49-day time limit, that problem will not exist because the House will be reconstituted and repopulated before the War Powers Act limitation expires. Secondly, the purpose of this bill is to require special elections to be held in those States with slower special election processes, to be held as quickly as possible within the 49-day period. The gentlewoman from California has read parts of the letter that Mr. Kennedy, who is the Executive Director of the Wisconsin Elections Board has written. I would respond to that simply by saying if Virginia repopulates the House, or its delegation to the House within 12 days and it takes at least 62 days for Wisconsin to do so, 50 days will elapse, or almost 2 months will elapse while Wisconsin has either a reduced or no delegation in the House, but the House keeps on legislating. And that is not fair to the people of my State, and it is not fair to the people of the other States, including the gentlewoman from California's own State that have relatively slow special election procedures. So that is why this bill is here, is to speed up the process by which States can fill up their delegations to the House so that they will be fully represented when important decisions are made. And should this bill go down and the slow States continue to be really slow, then their delegations will either be nonexistent or have a relatively few number of Members. Now, the final point I would like to make is that we have heard everybody who is against this bill say that this is too fast and too slow. Well, to speed up the process of repopulating the House, quicker than when special elections can be held, will require a constitutional amendment. We did debate a constitutional amendment and it was defeated by a vote of 63 ayes to 350-plus noes. This House is firmly on record against an appointment procedure however it is done. So now we have to figure out how to make the special election procedure occur as quickly as possible and yet maintain fairness. The 49 days required under this bill is the way to do it to get people here to make important decisions under the War Powers Act. Sixty days or a longer period of time simply will not cut it. Defeat the amendment and pass the bill.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 96, I call up the Senate bill (S. 5) to amend the procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions to assure fairer outcomes for class members and defendants, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on S. 5.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of S. 5, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Today marks the culmination of nearly a decade of legislative efforts to end systematic abuse of our Nation's class action system. We stand on the cusp of sending landmark legislation on civil-justice reform to the President that has been approved by increasing majorities each time it has been considered by the House in each of the last three Congresses and which passed the other body last week with an overwhelming majority of 72 votes. Since these reforms were first proposed, the magnitude of the class action crisis, the need to address it has become more and more urgent. The crisis now threatens the integrity of our civil justice system and undermines the economic vitality upon which job creation depends. A major element of the worsening crisis is the exponential increase in State class action cases in a handful of ``magnet'' or ``magic'' jurisdictions, many of which deal with national issues in classes. In the last 10 years, State court class actions filings nationwide have increased over 1,315 percent. The infamous handful of magnet courts known for certifying even the most speculative class action suits, the increase in filings now exceeds 5,000 percent. The only explanation for this phenomenon is aggressive forum shopping by trial lawyers to find courts and judges who will act as willing accomplices in a judicial power grab, hearing nationwide cases and setting policy for the entire country. A second major feature of the present class action crisis is a system producing outrageous settlements that benefit only lawyers and trample the rights of class members. Class actions were originally created to efficiently address a large number of similar claims by people suffering small harms. Today they are too often used to efficiently transfer the large fees to a small number of trial lawyers, with little benefit to the plaintiffs. The present rules encourage a race to any available State courthouse in the hopes of a rubber-stamped nationwide settlement that produces millions in attorney's fees for the winning plaintiff's attorney. The race to settle produces outcomes that favor expediency and profits for lawyers over justice and fairness for consumers. The losers in this race are the victims who often gain little or nothing through the settlement, yet are bound by it in perpetuity. And all Americans bear the cost of these settlements through increased prices for goods and services. The bill before the House today offers commonsense procedural changes that will end the most serious abuses by allowing more interstate class actions to be heard in Federal courts while keeping truly local cases in State courts. Its core provisions are similar to those passed by this body in the last three Congresses. S. 5 also implements a consumer bill of rights that will keep class members from being used by the lawyers they never hired to engage in litigation they do not know about or to extort money they will never see. Madam Speaker, when the House considered this important reform in the last Congress, I remarked that, ``The class action judicial system has become a joke, and no one is laughing except the trial lawyers . . . all the way to the bank.'' I imagine that laughter turned to nervous chuckles when S. 5 emerged unscathed from the gauntlet in the other body with 72 votes last week. Today, as the House prepares to pass this bill, I suspect you could hear a pin drop in the halls of infamous courthouses located in Madison County, Illinois and Jefferson County, Texas, where for so long the good times have rolled for forum-shopping plaintiffs' attorneys and the judges who enable them. And when this legislation is signed by the President one day soon, those same halls may echo with sobs and curses because this time justice and fairness and the American people will have the last laugh. Madam Speaker, after years of toil, the moment has arrived. The opportunity to restore common sense, rationality, and dignity to our class action system is now before us, and the need for reform has never been more certain. I urge my colleagues to support the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, the amendment in the nature of a substitute completely guts this bill. Every crippling amendment that was rejected either in this House or the other body in this Congress or the previous Congress is incorporated in this amendment. They do not have any new ideas over there. They just repackage and try to regurgitate the old ideas that have been found lacking. The issue in this bill is very clear, and that is that we have to restore some sanity to the civil justice system by dealing with the abuses that a small group of lawyers have turned the class action system into. When the framers of the Constitution wrote that inspired document, they gave Congress the power to regulate interstate Congress. What has happened as a result of the abuse of the class action system is that judges in small out-of-the-way counties, like Madison County, Illinois and Jefferson County, Texas end up being the ultimate arbiters of interstate commerce. This bill puts some balance back into the system. The amendment perpetuates the existing system. Vote ``no'' on the amendments, vote ``no'' on the motion to recommit, and pass the bill. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, once again, critics of the legislation have it backwards. This legislation will streamline jurisdictional inquiries by putting an end to all of the gaming that takes place under the current system, and the so-called delay refers to procedural rules that already exist under the current system. Under existing law, diversity of citizenship between the parties must exist, both at the time a complaint is filed and at the time a complaint is removed to Federal court. However, if the plaintiff files an amended complaint in State court that creates jurisdiction, or if subsequent events create jurisdiction, the defendant can then remove the case to Federal court. Current law is also clear that once a complaint is properly removed to Federal court, the Federal court's jurisdiction cannot be ousted by later events. Thus, for example, changes in the amount of controversy after the complaint has been removed would not subject a lawsuit to be remanded to State court.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the distinguished majority Whip.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Reclaiming my time, Madam Speaker, I am pleased to answer the gentleman. The first factor is whether the claims asserted are of significant national or interstate interest. Under this factor, if a case presents issues of national or interstate significance that argues in favor of the matter being handled in Federal Court, for example, if a class action alleges a nationally distributed pharmaceutical product caused side effects, those cases presumably should be heard in Federal court because of the nationwide ramifications of the dispute and the potential interface with Federal drug laws. Under this factor, the Federal court should inquire whether the case does present issues of national or interstate significance of this sort. If such issues are identified, that point favors the exercise of the Federal jurisdiction. The second factor is whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws other than those of the forum State. The sponsors believe that one of the significant problems posed by multistate class actions in State court is the tendency of some State courts to be less than respectful of the laws of other jurisdictions, applying the law of one State to an entire nationwide controversy and thereby ignoring the distinct and varying State laws that should apply to various claims included in the class, depending upon where they arose. Under this factor, if the Federal court determines that multiple State laws will apply to aspects of the class action, the determination would favor having the matter handled in the Federal court system, which has a record of being more respectful of the laws of various States in the class action controversy. Conversely, if the court concludes that the laws of the State to which the action was filed will apply to the entire controversy, that factor will favor keeping the case in State court. The third factor is whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the plaintiffs have proposed a natural class, a class that encompasses all the people and claims that one would expect to include in a class action, as opposed to proposing a class that appears to be gerrymandered solely to avoid Federal jurisdiction by leaving out certain potential class members or claims. If the Federal court concludes that evasive pleading is involved, that factor would favor the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the class definition and claims appear to follow a natural pattern, that consideration would favor allowing the matter to be handled by a State court. The fourth factor is whether there is a distinct nexus between, A, the forum where the action was brought, and, B, the class members, the alleged harm or the defendants. This factor is intended to take account of a major concern that led to this legislation, the filing of lawsuits in the out-of-the-way magnet State courts that have no real relationship to the controversy at hand. Thus, if a majority of the proposed class action members and the defendants reside in the county where the suit is brought, the court might find a distinct nexus exists. The key to this factor is the notion of there being a distinct nexus. If the allegedly injured parties live in many other localities, the nexus is not distinct, and this factor would weigh heavily in favor of the exercise of Federal jurisdiction over the matter. The fifth factor is whether the number of citizens in the forum State in the proposed plaintiff class is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other State, and the citizens of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of States. This factor is intended to look at the geographic distribution of class members in an effort to determine the forum State's interest in handling the litigation. If all of the out-of-State class members are widely dispersed among many other States, that point would suggest that the interest of the forum State in litigating the controversy are preeminent. The sponsors intend that such a conclusion would favor allowing the State court in which the action was originally filed to handle the litigation. However, if a court finds that the citizenship of the other class members is not widely dispersed, then a Federal forum would be more appropriate because several States other than the forum State would have a strong interest in the controversy. The final factor is whether one or more class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed in the last 3 years. The purpose of this factor is to determine whether a matter should be subject to Federal jurisdiction so that it can be coordinated with other overlapping or parallel class actions. If the other class actions on the same subject have been or are likely to be filed elsewhere, the sponsors intend that this consideration would strongly favor the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. It is the sponsors' intention that this factor be broadly interpreted and that plaintiffs not be able to plead around it with creative legal theories. If a plaintiff brings a product liability suit alleging consumer fraud or unjust enrichment, and another suit was previously brought against some of the same defendants alleging negligence with regard to the same product, this factor would favor the exercise of Federal jurisdiction over the later-filed claim. Madam Speaker, I now yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher), to provide some examples that illustrate how these six factors would work in litigation.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I yield to the other gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Speaker, reclaiming my time, I appreciate the gentleman's question. Section 4 of the bill gives Federal courts jurisdiction over class action lawsuits in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5 million, excluding interests and costs and at least one proposed class member and one defendant are citizens of different States or countries. For purposes of the citizenship element of this analysis, S. 5 does not alter current law. Thus, a corporation will continue to be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business. However, the bill provides that for purposes of this new section, and section 1453 of title 28, an unincorporated association shall be deemed to be a citizen of the State where it has its principal place of business and the State under whose laws it organized. This provision is added to ensure that unincorporated associations receive the same treatment as corporations for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. New subsection 1332(d)(10) corrects this anomaly.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Speaker, reclaiming my time, under new subsection 1332(d)(6), the claims of the individual class members in any class action shall be aggregated to determine whether the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5 million. The sponsors intend this subsection to be interpreted broadly, and if a purported class action is removed under this provision, the plaintiff shall bear the burden of demonstrating that the $5 million threshold is not satisfied. By the same token, if a Federal court is uncertain about whether a case puts $5 million or more in controversy, the court should favor exercising jurisdiction over the case. This principle applies to class actions seeking injunctive relief as well. The sponsors intend that a matter be subject to Federal jurisdiction under this provision if the value of the matter in litigation exceeds the $5 million, either from the viewpoint of the plaintiff or the viewpoint of the defendant, regardless of the type of relief sought, such as damages, injunctive relief or declaratory relief. The sponsors are aware that some courts, especially in the class action context, have declined to exercise Federal jurisdiction over cases on the grounds that the amount in controversy in those cases exceeded the jurisdictional threshold only when assessed from the viewpoint of the defendant. For example, a class action seeking injunctive relief that would require a defendant to restructure its business in some fundamental way might cost a defendant well in excess of $75,000 under current law, but might have substantially less value to each plaintiff or even to the class of plaintiffs as a whole. Because S. 5 explicitly allows aggregation for the purposes of determining the amount of controversy in class actions, that concern is no longer relevant. To the extent plaintiffs seek to avoid this rule by framing their cases as individual actions for injunctive relief, most Federal courts have properly held that in an individual case the cost of injunctive relief is viewed from the defendant's perspective. This legislation extends that principle to class actions as well. The same approach would apply in a case involving declaratory relief. In determining how much money a declaratory relief case puts in controversy, the Federal court should include in its assessment the value of all relief and benefits that would logically flow from the granting of the declaratory relief sought by the plaintiffs. For example, a declaration that a defendant's conduct is unlawful or fraudulent will carry certain consequences, such as the need to cease and desist from that conduct that will often cost the defendant in excess of $5 million; or a declaration that a standardized product sold throughout the Nation is defective might well put a case over the $5 million threshold, even if the class complaint did not affirmatively seek a determination that each class member was injured by the product. The bottom line is that new section 1332(d) is intended to substantially expand Federal court jurisdiction over class actions, not to create loopholes. This provision should be read broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a Federal court if properly removed by a defendant.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Speaker, reclaiming my time, yes, this provision is intended to respond to concerns that class actions with a truly local focus should not be moved to Federal court under this legislation because State courts have a strong interest in adjudicating such disputes. At the same time, this is a narrow exception that was carefully drafted to ensure that it does not become a jurisdictional loophole. Thus, each of the criteria is intended to identify a truly local class action. First, there must be a primarily local class. Secondly, there must be at least one real local defendant. And by that the drafters meant that the local defendant must be a primary focus of the plaintiffs' claims, not just a retailer or other peripheral defendant. The defendant must be a target from whom significant relief is sought by the class, as opposed to just a subset of the class membership, as well as being a defendant whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the class. For example, in a consumer fraud case, alleging that an insurance company incorporated and based in another State misrepresented its policies, the local agent of the company named as a defendant presumably would not fit this criteria. He or she probably would have had contact with only some of the purported class members and, thus, would not be a person from whom significant relief would be sought by the plaintiff class viewed as a whole. And, from a relief standpoint, the real demand of the full class in terms of seeking significant relief would be on the insurance company itself. Third, the principal injuries resulting from the actions of all the defendants must have occurred in the State where the suit was filed. This criterion means that all or almost all of the damage caused by the defendants' conduct occurred in the State where the suit was brought. If defendants engaged in conduct that allegedly injured consumers throughout the country, the case would not qualify for the local controversy exception, even if it was only brought as a single State class action. And, fourth, no other class action involving similar allegations has been filed against any of the defendants over the last 3 years. In other words, if we are talking about a situation that results in multiple class actions, those are not the types of cases that this exception is intended to address. I would like to stress that the inquiry under this criterion should not be whether identical or nearly identical class actions have been filed. Rather, the inquiry is whether similar factual allegations have been made against the defendant in multiple class actions, regardless of whether the same causes of action were asserted or whether the proposed plaintiff classes in the prior case was the same. Madam Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Democratic substitute amendment and urge my colleagues to reject it. The new math behind the substitute amendment rests on the following arithmetic: if you add a number of amendments rejected by large bipartisan majorities in the other body last week and combine them with the amendment ideas overwhelmingly rejected on the House floor by a bipartisan vote last year, the sum will somehow equal a credible solution. Funny math. Mr. Speaker, this formula simply does not add up. The American consumers and businesses will be left with change in their pockets if the amendment passes. The Democratic substitute is less than the sum of its parts and represents a quotient that renders Senate Bill 5's core reform elements meaningless. The individual elements of this proposal deserve some comment and explanation. First, I note with some amusement that the substitute totally recycles the findings of S. 5. The pages of findings discuss abusive class action windfall settlements for trial attorneys, forum shopping, and the need for more of these large interstate class action cases to be in Federal court. While the minority substitute reargues the compelling case for reform of the class action system, it is followed by text that will only perpetuate the crisis the findings identify. Their admitting you have a problem is the first step to recovery, and we appreciate that admission; but the minority sponsors clearly are not ready for step two. One element of the substitute amendment is the State attorney general provision allowing any class action to be brought by or on behalf of the State attorney general to be in State court. This provision is unnecessary because when State attorneys general sue on behalf of their citizens, those actions are almost always ``parens patriae'' actions, and not class actions; and the former will be in no way affected by this bill. Also, the provision could produce troubling associations between attorneys general and plaintiffs' lawyers. For these reasons, the Pryor amendment in the other body that this provision copies verbatim failed to garner even 40 votes on the Senate floor last week. A second element of the substitute is the ``choice of law'' provision. This provision would not only eviscerate the bill, but also would overturn 70 years of established Supreme Court precedent and would export to Federal courts a primary expedient of class action abuse we seek to remedy: the reckless application by local courts of the law of one State to the entire Nation in large interstate cases. This provision is reprinted from a Senate amendment by Senator Feinstein and Senator Bingaman. It was also soundly defeated. The third element of the substitute is the so-called labor and civility rights carveout. This provision seeks to keep all class actions involving alleged civil rights and labor law violations in State court, despite the fact that the most generous racial discrimination and employment class action settlements in recent years have been in the Federal courts. The language was also offered in the other body and rejected. Other major elements of the substitute include one our colleagues might remember as the Jackson-Lee House floor amendment to the bill in the last Congress. That amendment makes companies that incorporate abroad for tax purposes a citizen of a State and punishes them by keeping them out of Federal court. This is at least an admission that going into certain State courts as a defendant is indeed punishment, and that amendment was defeated in this House by the last Congress by a vote of 183 to 238. There is also a loophole creating a provision on mass actions and a completely unnecessary public disclosure provision, both based on Senate amendments in the other body that were offered and withdrawn. What the minority has chosen as a substitute package certainly belies any grumblings about the lack of regular order this year. Since there is not a single original idea among the provisions that has not already been debated and defeated either in this House or the other body, it is hard to give credence to such complaints. This is a package of oldies but not goodies; oldies that have been rejected and should not be resurrected. Finally, Mr. Speaker, a vote on this substitute is clearly just a vote to further deny or delay meaningful class action reform, and a vote on the substitute could not in any way be construed as reform of any kind but, rather, support for the trial-lawyer-dominated status quo. I urge my colleagues to reject this recycled package of recycled amendments. The time for reform of a class action system which is out of control is now. I urge my colleague to vote ``no'' on the substitute, and ``yes'' on S. 5. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Keller).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I always thought that Federal judges protected the rights of everybody. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Cannon).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I will be happy to explain. The mass action provision was included in the bill because mass actions are really class actions in disguise. They involve an element of people who want their claims adjudicated together, and they often result in the same abuses as class actions. In fact, sometimes the abuses are even worse because the lawyers seek to join claims that have little to do with each other and confuse a jury into awarding millions of dollars to individuals who have suffered no real injury. Here is how the mass action provision and the current amount-in- controversy provision would work in tandem: suppose 200 people file a mass action in Mississippi against a New Jersey drug manufacturer and also name a local drug store. Three of them assert claims for a million dollars apiece, and the rest assert claims of $20,000. The Federal Court would have jurisdiction over the mass action because there are more than 100 plaintiffs, there is minimal diversity, and the total amount of controversy exceeds $5 million, and a product liability case does not qualify for the local occurrence exception in the provision. Then the question becomes, which claims would, in the mass action, the Federal judge keep in Federal Court, and which would be remanded? At this point the judge would have to look at each of the claims very carefully and determine whether or not they meet the $75,000 minimum. In this regard, I would note that the plaintiffs often seek to minimize what they are seeking in the complaint so that they can stay in State court. For example, sometimes plaintiffs leave their claim for punitive damages off the original complaint to make it seem like their claims are smaller than they really are. It is our expectation that a Federal judge would read a complaint very carefully and only remand claims that clearly do not meet the $75,000 threshold. If it is likely that a plaintiff is going to turn around in a month and add an additional claim for punitive damages, the Federal court should obviously assert jurisdiction over that individual's claims. Finally, I would like to stress that this provision in no way is intended to abrogate 8 United States Code 3867 to narrow current jurisdictional rules. Thus, if a Federal court believed it to be appropriate, the court could apply supplemental jurisdiction in the mass action context as well. With regard to the exceptions, it is our intent that they be interpreted strictly by a court so that they do not become loopholes for an important jurisdictional provision. Thus, the first exception would apply only in a situation where we are talking about a truly local single event with no substantial interstate effects. The purpose of this exception is to allow cases involving environmental torts, such as a chemical spill, to remain in State court if both the event and the injuries were truly local, even though there are some out-of-state defendants. By contrast, this exception would not apply to a product liability or insurance case. The sale of a product to different people does not qualify as an event, and the alleged injuries in such a case would be spread out over more than one State or contiguous States even if all of the plaintiffs in a particular case came from one single State. The third exception addresses a very narrow situation, specifically a law like the California Unfair Competition Law, which allows individuals to bring a suit on behalf of the general public. Such a suit would not qualify as a mass action. However, the vast majority of cases brought under other States' consumer fraud laws which do not have a parallel provision could qualify as removable class actions. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time. Mr. Speaker, notwithstanding what we have heard from opponents of this legislation, its passage would not extinguish the legal right of any injured party, whether it be a class action, a mass action, or an individual lawsuit from proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction in the United States. What the bill does do is it puts some sense into the class action system so that the members of the plaintiff's class will be fairly and adequately compensated rather than seeing all of their gains go to attorneys and them just getting coupon settlements from the people who have allegedly done them wrong. I was particularly perturbed listening to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), who said that the kids who start smoking at 13 and 14 years old are going to be denied their day in court, and that the tobacco companies are going to end up cashing in on a big bonanza. Well, I had my staff, while this was going on, look at what has happened to Altria, the parent company of Philip Morris. Since the other body passed this bill, Altria stock has gone down by at least $1.50, or 2 percent. And today, the Reuters story that came out less than an hour ago says that the Dow has been dragged down by Altria. Now, if this was the bonanza to investors in Altria, the stock would not be going down. It is not. That is a fallacious argument. Reject the substitute and pass the bill.