F. Sensenbrenner

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Speaker, reclaiming my time, yes, this provision is intended to respond to concerns that class actions with a truly local focus should not be moved to Federal court under this legislation because State courts have a strong interest in adjudicating such disputes. At the same time, this is a narrow exception that was carefully drafted to ensure that it does not become a jurisdictional loophole. Thus, each of the criteria is intended to identify a truly local class action. First, there must be a primarily local class. Secondly, there must be at least one real local defendant. And by that the drafters meant that the local defendant must be a primary focus of the plaintiffs' claims, not just a retailer or other peripheral defendant. The defendant must be a target from whom significant relief is sought by the class, as opposed to just a subset of the class membership, as well as being a defendant whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the class. For example, in a consumer fraud case, alleging that an insurance company incorporated and based in another State misrepresented its policies, the local agent of the company named as a defendant presumably would not fit this criteria. He or she probably would have had contact with only some of the purported class members and, thus, would not be a person from whom significant relief would be sought by the plaintiff class viewed as a whole. And, from a relief standpoint, the real demand of the full class in terms of seeking significant relief would be on the insurance company itself. Third, the principal injuries resulting from the actions of all the defendants must have occurred in the State where the suit was filed. This criterion means that all or almost all of the damage caused by the defendants' conduct occurred in the State where the suit was brought. If defendants engaged in conduct that allegedly injured consumers throughout the country, the case would not qualify for the local controversy exception, even if it was only brought as a single State class action. And, fourth, no other class action involving similar allegations has been filed against any of the defendants over the last 3 years. In other words, if we are talking about a situation that results in multiple class actions, those are not the types of cases that this exception is intended to address. I would like to stress that the inquiry under this criterion should not be whether identical or nearly identical class actions have been filed. Rather, the inquiry is whether similar factual allegations have been made against the defendant in multiple class actions, regardless of whether the same causes of action were asserted or whether the proposed plaintiff classes in the prior case was the same. Madam Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the distinguished majority Whip.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I will be happy to explain. The mass action provision was included in the bill because mass actions are really class actions in disguise. They involve an element of people who want their claims adjudicated together, and they often result in the same abuses as class actions. In fact, sometimes the abuses are even worse because the lawyers seek to join claims that have little to do with each other and confuse a jury into awarding millions of dollars to individuals who have suffered no real injury. Here is how the mass action provision and the current amount-in- controversy provision would work in tandem: suppose 200 people file a mass action in Mississippi against a New Jersey drug manufacturer and also name a local drug store. Three of them assert claims for a million dollars apiece, and the rest assert claims of $20,000. The Federal Court would have jurisdiction over the mass action because there are more than 100 plaintiffs, there is minimal diversity, and the total amount of controversy exceeds $5 million, and a product liability case does not qualify for the local occurrence exception in the provision. Then the question becomes, which claims would, in the mass action, the Federal judge keep in Federal Court, and which would be remanded? At this point the judge would have to look at each of the claims very carefully and determine whether or not they meet the $75,000 minimum. In this regard, I would note that the plaintiffs often seek to minimize what they are seeking in the complaint so that they can stay in State court. For example, sometimes plaintiffs leave their claim for punitive damages off the original complaint to make it seem like their claims are smaller than they really are. It is our expectation that a Federal judge would read a complaint very carefully and only remand claims that clearly do not meet the $75,000 threshold. If it is likely that a plaintiff is going to turn around in a month and add an additional claim for punitive damages, the Federal court should obviously assert jurisdiction over that individual's claims. Finally, I would like to stress that this provision in no way is intended to abrogate 8 United States Code 3867 to narrow current jurisdictional rules. Thus, if a Federal court believed it to be appropriate, the court could apply supplemental jurisdiction in the mass action context as well. With regard to the exceptions, it is our intent that they be interpreted strictly by a court so that they do not become loopholes for an important jurisdictional provision. Thus, the first exception would apply only in a situation where we are talking about a truly local single event with no substantial interstate effects. The purpose of this exception is to allow cases involving environmental torts, such as a chemical spill, to remain in State court if both the event and the injuries were truly local, even though there are some out-of-state defendants. By contrast, this exception would not apply to a product liability or insurance case. The sale of a product to different people does not qualify as an event, and the alleged injuries in such a case would be spread out over more than one State or contiguous States even if all of the plaintiffs in a particular case came from one single State. The third exception addresses a very narrow situation, specifically a law like the California Unfair Competition Law, which allows individuals to bring a suit on behalf of the general public. Such a suit would not qualify as a mass action. However, the vast majority of cases brought under other States' consumer fraud laws which do not have a parallel provision could qualify as removable class actions. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Democratic substitute amendment and urge my colleagues to reject it. The new math behind the substitute amendment rests on the following arithmetic: if you add a number of amendments rejected by large bipartisan majorities in the other body last week and combine them with the amendment ideas overwhelmingly rejected on the House floor by a bipartisan vote last year, the sum will somehow equal a credible solution. Funny math. Mr. Speaker, this formula simply does not add up. The American consumers and businesses will be left with change in their pockets if the amendment passes. The Democratic substitute is less than the sum of its parts and represents a quotient that renders Senate Bill 5's core reform elements meaningless. The individual elements of this proposal deserve some comment and explanation. First, I note with some amusement that the substitute totally recycles the findings of S. 5. The pages of findings discuss abusive class action windfall settlements for trial attorneys, forum shopping, and the need for more of these large interstate class action cases to be in Federal court. While the minority substitute reargues the compelling case for reform of the class action system, it is followed by text that will only perpetuate the crisis the findings identify. Their admitting you have a problem is the first step to recovery, and we appreciate that admission; but the minority sponsors clearly are not ready for step two. One element of the substitute amendment is the State attorney general provision allowing any class action to be brought by or on behalf of the State attorney general to be in State court. This provision is unnecessary because when State attorneys general sue on behalf of their citizens, those actions are almost always ``parens patriae'' actions, and not class actions; and the former will be in no way affected by this bill. Also, the provision could produce troubling associations between attorneys general and plaintiffs' lawyers. For these reasons, the Pryor amendment in the other body that this provision copies verbatim failed to garner even 40 votes on the Senate floor last week. A second element of the substitute is the ``choice of law'' provision. This provision would not only eviscerate the bill, but also would overturn 70 years of established Supreme Court precedent and would export to Federal courts a primary expedient of class action abuse we seek to remedy: the reckless application by local courts of the law of one State to the entire Nation in large interstate cases. This provision is reprinted from a Senate amendment by Senator Feinstein and Senator Bingaman. It was also soundly defeated. The third element of the substitute is the so-called labor and civility rights carveout. This provision seeks to keep all class actions involving alleged civil rights and labor law violations in State court, despite the fact that the most generous racial discrimination and employment class action settlements in recent years have been in the Federal courts. The language was also offered in the other body and rejected. Other major elements of the substitute include one our colleagues might remember as the Jackson-Lee House floor amendment to the bill in the last Congress. That amendment makes companies that incorporate abroad for tax purposes a citizen of a State and punishes them by keeping them out of Federal court. This is at least an admission that going into certain State courts as a defendant is indeed punishment, and that amendment was defeated in this House by the last Congress by a vote of 183 to 238. There is also a loophole creating a provision on mass actions and a completely unnecessary public disclosure provision, both based on Senate amendments in the other body that were offered and withdrawn. What the minority has chosen as a substitute package certainly belies any grumblings about the lack of regular order this year. Since there is not a single original idea among the provisions that has not already been debated and defeated either in this House or the other body, it is hard to give credence to such complaints. This is a package of oldies but not goodies; oldies that have been rejected and should not be resurrected. Finally, Mr. Speaker, a vote on this substitute is clearly just a vote to further deny or delay meaningful class action reform, and a vote on the substitute could not in any way be construed as reform of any kind but, rather, support for the trial-lawyer-dominated status quo. I urge my colleagues to reject this recycled package of recycled amendments. The time for reform of a class action system which is out of control is now. I urge my colleague to vote ``no'' on the substitute, and ``yes'' on S. 5. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a bill to make technical corrections to the United States Code. The bill updates cross references, corrects typographical errors, and makes stylistic changes such as conforming the capitalization of certain words. The Office of Law Revision Counsel has prepared the bill and submitted it to the Committee on the Judiciary as a part of the responsibilities of the Office under section 285b of Title 2, United States Code that have been enacted into positive law so that those titles may be kept current. Anyone with questions about the bill should contact Robert Sukol, Assistant Counsel, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, H2-304 Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC, 20515-6711. The telephone number is (202) 226-9060.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, on February 28, 2002, the House Subcommittee on the Constitution held a legislative hearing on H.J. Res. 67, Representative Brian Baird's proposed constitutional amendment to allow lawmaking by an appointed House of Representatives following a terrorist attack. During the 107th Congress, a bipartisan working group co-chaired by then-House Republican Policy Committee Chairman Christopher Cox and House Democratic Policy Chairman Martin Frost, met regularly to discuss the issues surrounding continuity in government, including constitutional amendments. As a result of those working group meetings, the House passed H. Res. 559 during the 107th Congress, expressing the sense of the House that each State should examine its existing procedures governing special elections so that, in the event of a catastrophe, vacancies in the House could be filled in a timely fashion. Unfortunately, only one state, California, responded to that request. Consequently, the House responded precisely as the Founders would have expected the House to respond, namely by acting pursuant to Congress's authority under the Constitution to ensure that the House is repopulated expeditiously through elections in extraordinary circumstances. To that end, H.R. 2844, the Continuity in Representation Act, was introduced in the 108th Congress. The bill received a hearing before the House Administration Committee on September 24, 2003, and it was marked up by both the House Administration (on November 19, 2003) and House Judiciary Committees (January 21, 2004). Amendments adopted on the House floor included one that would protect the rights of military and overseas voters to participate in the expedited elections, and a provision that provided explicitly that all federal laws governing the administration of federal elections would apply. Because H.R. 2844 was a bipartisan bill that resonates best with America's democratic values, on April 22, 2004, it passed the House on an overwhelming bipartisan basis by a more than 3-to-1 margin, by a vote of 306-97. As part of a bipartisan agreement, I agreed to a markup of Representative Baird's proposed constitutional amendment (H.J. Res. 83 in the 108th Congress) in the Judiciary Committee. That was done on May 5, 2004. Committee Members all had the opportunity to offer amendments to H.J. Res. 83 to either perfect its language or replace it entirely with the text of any other version of the amendment. During the markup, I asked if there were any Members who wanted to offer amendment more than half a dozen times. The Judiciary Committee adversely reported out H.J. Res. 83, so all Members could have an opportunity to vote on it on the House floor. The constitutional amendment the House voted on was the approach supported by Representative Brian Baird, the Member who is widely regarded as the most outspoken House proponent of appointed Members. This proposal and a host of others have been extensively studied by scholars both inside and outside of Congress, including during the last Congress, and by previous Congresses, going back some 50 years. It remains a terrible idea because it would introduce into our Founding document, for the first time, the concept that laws can be written by an unelected aristocracy. That is a bad idea now, and it was a bad idea then, when the House of Representatives, controlled by both Democrats and Republicans, rejected all constitutional amendments authorizing appointed House Members sent to it by the Senate, even during the height of the Cold War. The conclusion of the Continuity in Government Commission's (a privately-funded commission's) report recommending a constitutional amendment that would deny the right to self-government under laws enacted by elected representatives states that ``The exact details of a solution are less important than that the problem be addressed seriously and expeditiously.'' (This is from page 31 of the re- port, which can be found at http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/ report/report.html.) On June 2, 2004, the House voted on H.J. Res. 83 and generally on the question of whether Americans should be governed by laws passed by an unelected aristocracy. There are only two ways to go on the issue: either you support an appointed House--the ``details,'' by the Continuity in Government Commission's own admission, are relatively unimportant--or you support preserving lawmaking by an elected House. Representative Baird, the author of H.J. Res. 83, said of a constitutional amendment--quote--``The more urgent matter is to put that measure before the body.'' On June 2, 2004, that measure was put before the House, and the House overwhelmingly rejected it by a vote of 63-353, a margin of over 5-1. That margin of defeat of a constitutional amendment is historically large. The right to self-government under laws passed by the People's chosen representatives has endured since America's birth, through two World Wars, a Civil War, a Cold War, and now a war against terrorism. The terrorists would like nothing more than to make us rewrite our Constitution to reflect their twisted vision of autocratic rule. The Continuity in Representation Act rejects that terrorist vision and would preserve the right to elected representation.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), a close adviser of Governor Schwarzenegger and the chairman of the Committee on Rules.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), another big supporter of Governor Schwarzenegger.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to recommit.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time. Mr. Chairman, contrary to what my distinguished friend from New Jersey says, there are no onerous new requirements to meet the standard for asylum. Page 2 of the managers amendment incorporated in the bill says the applicant has to establish that he is a refugee within the meaning of this section. The applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular cultural group or political opinion was or will be a central reason for persecuting the applicant. Now, that means that all of the Jewish people who were turned away on the St. Louis prior to the Second World War would have qualified because they were being persecuted in Nazi Germany because of their religion. People who have been engaged in what was used to be called anti- Soviet activities in the former Soviet Union, that was a political opinion, they would have been eligible for asylum. And the comments that the gentleman from New Jersey makes about torture are simply not true. This bill does not impact the obligations of the United States under the convention to prevent torture by prohibiting the deportation of people to countries that torture them. Now, simply what is stated is that the burden of proof is on the applicant, just like it ought to be, like it is on our constituents who apply for Social Security disability. And it sets up standards for determining the credibility of the witness. If the witness comes and says, Gee, I made a mistake because I forgot the birth date and admits to that mistake, that certainly is exonerating evidence. Vote down the amendment. All of these arguments are a red herring.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment, and I wish those that were arguing against the amendment read it and see what it says; and then I think they will be convinced that this is a commonsense change. First of all, let me say that the asylum law was designed to provide safe haven to those who are fleeing persecution in their homeland. It is not to be used as a crutch for economic migrants who are coming to the United States because the grass is greener on our side of the border. Now, the bill as it is currently before us takes away the cap of 10,000 approved asylum applicants who are admitted to permanent residency every year. The Nadler amendment strikes that. The bill as it is before us states that the applicant for asylum has the burden of proof to prove that he or she is eligible to receive asylum in our country. The Nadler amendment strikes it. But every petitioner, whether it is a plaintiff in a lawsuit or someone who is applying for Social Security disability benefits, has got the burden of proof to show that they are entitled to the relief that they are seeking. This bill makes it clear that asylum applicants have to make the same burden of proof as others, and the Nadler amendment strikes that. The other thing that the Nadler amendment strikes is a detailed explanation of how the immigration judge is to determine the credibility of the applicant and the witnesses that the applicant and the government put before the judge. Every trier of fact in court makes the determination based on the credibility of witnesses. Criminal juries can send someone to their death or to prison for life based on their determination of the credibility of the witnesses, and immigration judges should do so also. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) says that 100 percent of the people who show up at the airport claiming asylum are detained. That is not right. Ninety percent of those people are released. Only 10 percent are detained past the airport. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) says that all of the statements or the instances that we raise were pre-1996 law change cases. I will give you two that were after that. Nuradin Abdi who was a Somali national stood accused of providing material support to al Qaeda. The government alleged that Abdi admitted al Qaeda member Iyman Faris and others initiated a plot to blow up a Columbus, Ohio, area shopping small. Mr. Abdi was granted asylum in 1999. Later after traveling to a terrorist camp in Ethiopia, he was arrested when he reentered the United States, and his asylum status was revoked. It was revoked, as the U.S. Attorney's Office puts it, because with the exception of some minor biographical data, every aspect of the asylum application he submitted was false. Now, giving a judge an opportunity to deny a claim based upon a determination that the applicant is lying is in my bill and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) tries to strike that. Again, in 1999 an Egyptian national who had been granted asylum, despite the fact that the INS had provided classified evidence that the alien was a known member of a foreign terrorist organization designated by the Secretary of State, and according to the committee-hearing witness, the INS submitted a report from a New York City detective showing the alien's participation in a meeting with the infamous Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, dedicated to planning acts of terrorism in which the pros and cons of hijacking an airplane were discussed. He got asylum too. Now, while it is true that many terrorists are statutorily barred from receiving asylum, members of terrorist organizations are explicitly allowed to receive asylum. Further, despite any statutory bar to the contrary, asylum regulations and the courts have made it practically impossible for the government to ferret out terrorists who apply. There are a number of reasons for this, including the fact that government attorneys are barred from asking foreign governments about any evidence they may possess about the veracity of asylum claims. Thus, the only evidence available to the government to support an asylum applicant is the lack of credibility to the applicant. However, the ninth circuit is preventing immigration judges from denying asylum claims when it is clear that the alien is lying. Furthermore, the ninth circuit has held that an alien can receive asylum on the very basis that the alien's government believes he is a terrorist, even if we agree. This bill brings back sanity to the asylum laws by overturning these rogue precedents from the ninth circuit. And if any jury in the country can convict a defendant based on its determinations of credibility, certainly an immigration judge should be able to do the same thing. Vote down this amendment, and let us put some common sense into our asylum laws as well as giving hope and shelter to people who can legitimately claim and receive asylum. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary. (Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment which continues to have endless litigation against plugging the hole in the fence south of San Diego. We were able to win World War II quicker than we were able to complete this fence. I think that shows why this amendment is a bad one. I want to tell the membership the short story that illustrates why the fence has to be completed. In early January, I sent two of my staff personally to inspect this area. On the day they visited the Imperial Beach Station at the Border Patrol, they asked to see a demonstration of the AFIS fingerprint system used to identify criminal aliens among those caught across the border. A man picked at random from a holding area of high-risk detainees, who had been apprehended the night before, was selected for fingerprint check. Within 15 minutes the system returned a rap sheet that was 17 pages long. Crimes he committed across three different States included abusing his spouse, raping his daughter and multiple counts of theft. This man was apprehended not far from Smuggler's Gulch and came through the area where the fence is not complete. The Border Patrol says he is typical of the one in three aliens they apprehend coming through the 3- mile unfenced area along the beach. This person is a criminal, and membership of the California delegation complained about the cost of California incarcerating criminal aliens. We can cut down that cost and incarcerate fewer criminal aliens by plugging the hole in this fence and keeping them south of the border. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I have the right to close and will close after the gentleman yields his time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, this bill does not require the States to do anything or not do anything. It has been very clear from the beginning of the debate on this legislation. What the bill does is it says that a driver's license has to meet certain standards if it is to be acceptable for Federal ID purposes, such as getting on an airplane. What the motion to recommit does is force the States to do something, or not do something; and that goes directly against the notion of federalism that is contained in this bill and which was drafted by the Committee on Government Reform. The first vote that we had yesterday on this legislation was on whether we should waive the law relative to unfunded mandates. The vote on that was 228 ``aye'' to 191 ``no.'' The author of this motion to recommit, as well as the 190 who joined him in saying that we should not waive the unfunded mandate law, is now asking the States to have another unfunded mandate. I would urge all of the 191 who voted ``no'' on the Jackson-Lee objection to consideration of the rule to bring this up to join me in voting ``no'' on this motion to recommit, together with the 228 who voted the right way yesterday. Vote ``no'' on the motion to recommit; vote ``aye'' on passage. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and one of the biggest supporters of Governor Schwarzenegger.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I object.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule for consideration of amendments to H.R. 418, the REAL ID Act. The manager's amendment, which will self-execute upon adoption of this resolution, makes technical changes to the bill as well as making a number of substantive improvements. One such modification will be to remove the annual cap on the number of aliens granted asylum who can become permanent residents each year. The current cap of 10,000 has resulted in a multi-year backlog that has caused unnecessary hardship to aliens already found to have been fleeing persecution. Hardly an anti-refugee provision. The manager's amendment also extends the bill's provisions regarding the credibility determinations of immigration judges in asylum proceedings to apply to other requests for relief from removal before immigration judges. Lastly, it includes the text of H.R. 100, introduced by the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), to limit criminal aliens to one bite of the apple in contesting their removal orders. I strongly support all these changes and believe they improve the underlying legislation. Regrettably, at the request of the Committee on Government Reform, the manager's amendment also removes two provisions that I believe address important issues with regard to temporary licenses. One provision clarified the need to clearly mark temporary driver's licenses that States remain authorized to issue people who cannot meet the identity standards as set by this bill. The other provision provided the Secretary of DHS with the ability to intervene, but only in the interest of national security, to reduce the incredible diversity in form and appearance of driver's licenses issued by the States. Today there are over 350 valid driver's license designs issued by the 50 States. And we all know it is very difficult for security officials at airports to tell the real ID cards from the counterfeit ones. I understand why the chairman of the Committee on Government Reform believes these two provisions should not be included at this time; however, it is my hope that as this legislation continues to move through the legislative process, we may revisit these two provisions. Both are widely supported and improve the overall bill. I urge my colleagues to support the rule and the underlying bill.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, in December, the President signed into law legislation intended to respond to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Unfortunately, the legislation that was enacted failed to include several key provisions critical to addressing vulnerabilities found in both the 9/11 Commission Report and of the 9/11 staff report on terrorist travel. To that end, on January 26th of this year, I introduced H.R. 418, the REAL ID Act. The bill, which now has 139 cosponsors, encompasses four of the most important border and document security provisions that the House overwhelmingly approved as a part of H.R. 10 last year. The goal of the REAL ID Act is straightforward. It seeks to prevent another 9/11-type terrorist attack by disrupting terrorist travel. The 9/11 Commission terrorist travel report stated that ``Abuse of the immigration system and the lack of interior enforcement were unwittingly working together to support terrorist activities.'' The report further states that ``Members of al Qaeda clearly valued freedom of movement as critical to their ability to plan and carry out the attacks prior to September 11th.'' Finally, the report observed, ``If terrorist travel options are reduced, they may be forced to rely on means of interaction which can be more easily monitored and to resort to travel documents that are more easily detectable.'' The REAL ID Act contains four provisions aimed at disrupting terrorist travel. First, the legislation does not, does not, try to set States' policy for those who may or may not drive a car, but it does address the use of a driver's license as a form of identification to a Federal official such as an airport screener at a domestic airport. American citizens have the right to know who is in their country, that the people are who they say they are, and that the name on the driver's license is the real holder's name, not some alias. Second, this legislation will tighten our asylum system, which has been abused by terrorists. The 9/11 Commission staff report on terrorist travel states that ``Once the terrorists had entered the United States, their next challenge was to find a way to remain here.'' Their primary method was immigration fraud. Irresponsible judges have made asylum laws vulnerable to fraud and abuse. We will end judge-imposed presumptions that benefit suspected terrorists in order to stop providing a safe haven to some of the worst people on Earth. The REAL ID Act will reduce the opportunity for immigration fraud so that we can protect honest asylum seekers and stop rewarding the terrorists and criminals who falsely claim persecution. Liberal activist judges in the Ninth Circuit have been overturning clearly established precedent and are preventing immigration judges from denying bogus asylum applications by aliens who are clearly lying. If criminal juries can sentence a defendant to life imprisonment or execution based on adverse credibility determinations, certainly an immigration judge can deny an alien asylum on this basis. It is one of the foundations of our system of jurisprudence that juries and trial judges should be able to decide cases on the basis of credibility or lack of credibility of witnesses. This bill will again allow immigration judges to deny asylum claims based on the lack of credibility. The bill also overturns an even more disturbing Ninth Circuit precedent that has made it easier for terrorists to receive asylum. The circuit has actually held that an alien can receive asylum on the basis that his or her government believes that the alien is a terrorist. Third, the REAL ID Act will waive Federal laws to the extent necessary to complete gaps in the San Diego border security fence which is still stymied 8 years after congressional authorization. Neither the public safety nor the environment are benefiting from the current stalemate. Finally, the REAL ID Act contains a common-sense provision that helps protect Americans from terrorists who have infiltrated the United States. Currently, certain terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility to our country are not also grounds for deportation of aliens already here. The REAL ID Act makes aliens deportable from the United States for terrorism-related offenses to the same extent they would be inadmissible to the United States to begin with. The act provides that any alien who knowingly provides funds or other material support to a terrorist organization will be subject to immigration consequences. The REAL ID Act will make America a safer place. It is even endorsed by the 9/11 Families for a Secure America, an association of family members of 9/11 victims. I urge my colleagues to support this bill. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC, February 9, 2005. Hon. Joe Barton, Chairman, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Washington,

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith).