F. Sensenbrenner

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Mexico (Mr. Pearce).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Terry) on this bipartisan bill.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds. Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) is wrong. This bill will save lives. It will save the lives of viable babies who are subjected to this brutal and inhumane treatment. The gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) was not listening when I quoted the Kansas report that said of the partial-birth abortions that were reported under their State law, most of them were on viable fetuses. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time. Mr. Speaker, the major argument that gets to the substance of this bill that the opponents have stated in the last hour is that the findings that Congress makes that are contained in H.R. 760 the Supreme Court will just completely ignore. I will be the first to concede that the Supreme Court does not have to accept congressional findings, nor does the Supreme Court have to accept findings that have been made by lower courts either that reach their own conclusions; but there is a string of cases in the last 20 years or so that have indicated that the Supreme Court will defer to congressional fact finding, and they have been highly and historically deferential to Congress's factual determination, regardless of the legal authority upon which Congress has sought to legislate, as the following case quotes demonstrate. First, ``The fact that the Court is not exercising a primary judgment but sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on government compels the court to be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the legislative branch.'' That is Rostker v. Goldberg, 1981. Second, ``It is for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations. It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.'' Katzenbach v. Morgan, 1966. Third, ``Here we pass on a considered decision of Congress and the President. We are bound to approach our task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch.'' Fullilove v. Klutznick, 1980. Fourth, ``The Supreme Court 'must afford great weight to the decisions of Congress. The judgment of the legislative branch cannot be ignored or undervalued. When the Court faces a complex problem with many hard questions and few easy answers, it does well to pay careful attention to how the other branches of government have addressed the same problem.''' Columbia Broadcasting System v. The Democratic National Committee, 1973. Fifth, ``Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon an issue as complex and dynamic as that presented here.'' Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 1994. Finally, ``We owe Congress' findings an additional measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative power.'' Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 1997, which was the second case. What the opponents of this bill are saying is they do not agree with the findings that are contained in H.R. 760. That is their right, and that is their prerogative; but if this bill passes, they are in the minority, and the majority who voted for this bill will have disagreed with their conclusion on those findings.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. Speaker, this substitute is identical to H.R. 809, and that bill is a phony ban which would grant a giant loophole that allows abortionists to perform partial-birth and third-trimester abortions at will. The substitute, which would prohibit the performance of an abortion after the unborn infant became viable, would not prohibit any abortion, from the substitute, ``if, in the medical judgment of the attending physician, the abortion is necessary to preserve the life of the woman or to avert serious adverse health consequences to the woman.'' The proponents of this substitute admit that their measure would allow any abortion at any stage of pregnancy if the mother's mental health is at risk. Thus, by its own term, this bill would not prohibit partial-birth abortions, nor would it prohibit late-term abortions because it grants the abortionist, who has a financial interest in performing as many abortions as possible, unbridled discretion to determine whether a partial-birth or third-trimester abortion may be performed. Abortionists have demonstrated that they can and will justify any abortion on the grounds that it, in the judgment of the attending physician, is necessary to avert serious adverse health consequences to the woman. For example, Dr. Warren Hern of Colorado, the author of the standard textbook on abortion procedures who also performs many third- trimester abortions, has stated, ``I will certify that any pregnancy is a threat to a woman's life and could cause grievous injury to her physical health.'' This is a man who has a financial interest in performing the abortion, and this is the physician who under the Greenwood substitute would be able to certify that the loophole is proper and the abortion can be performed. I will quote from Dr. Hern again: ``I will certify that any pregnancy is a threat to a woman's life and could cause grievous injury to her physical health.'' The substitute sponsors have stated that even psychological trauma caused by the pregnancy could justify an abortion, including a partial- birth abortion at any stage of pregnancy, including the third trimester. The substitute would also have no effect on most partial-birth abortions because the bill only prohibits abortions after the fetus is viable in the vast majority of partial-birth abortions are performed on babies 4\1/2\ to 5\1/2\ months in development. Before it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a given baby is viable, remember we are dealing with criminal statutes here; and prosecution, if this bill becomes law, the substitute becomes law, must prove that the fetus is viable in order for the ban to kick in. The lung development of babies at this stage of pregnancy is such that most of them cannot survive if delivered from the mother's womb prematurely. Many of them can survive, but the percentages are such estimates of 39 percent of babies born at 23 weeks that it would be impossible for the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any given one of these babies would have survived in a given case. Given the substitute's failure to define the term ``viable,'' it would not be sufficient to show that the baby had a one in three or one in two or even a three in four chance of survival. Unless the baby was in the seventh month of pregnancy or later, reasonable doubt would remain as to whether that particular baby would have survived outside the womb. Furthermore, the notion that viability is a prerequisite for giving any legal protection to a child is misguided. Premature infants who are born before the third trimester with little or no chance of survival are fully entitled to the protections of law while they are alive. A person could not, for example, just walk into a neonatal intensive care unit and kill an infant who was born 23 weeks into the pregnancy and is in an incubator struggling to survive. That child has only a 39 percent chance of surviving, but his ultimate viability has no bearing on whether or not he is entitled to the protections of the law. In the same way, partially born children with little or no chance of survival outside the womb are entitled to the protections of law. Viability is simply not a prerequisite for legal protection of born or partially born children. For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote against the substitute. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde). (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, the example the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Mrs. Johnson) gave would have fallen under the exception that is contained in H.R. 760. The subsection which is the ban does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself. The real-life story that the gentlewoman from Connecticut's husband faced would have fallen under the exception and would have allowed a partial-birth abortion. That is why this bill should pass and the substitute should be defeated. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King). (Mr. KING of Iowa asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Greenwood substitute and claim the time in opposition.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Hart).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), whose name was taken in vain.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrey) who knows more about delivering babies than practically all of us.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Renzi).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Virginia (Mrs. Jo Ann Davis).

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), the majority leader.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. This motion to recommit should be rejected for several reasons. The overwhelming weight of evidence compiled in a series of hearings indicates that partial-birth abortions are never necessary to preserve the health of a mother and, in fact, pose substantial health risks to women undergoing the procedure. No controlled studies of partial-birth abortions have been conducted nor have any comparative studies been conducted to demonstrate its safety and efficacy as compared to other abortion methods. There have been no articles published in peer review journals that establish that partial-birth abortions are superior in any way to establish abortion procedures. Furthermore, experience indicates that partial-birth abortions are not performed to preserve the health of a woman. The late Dr. James McMahon, developed this method and performed thousands of them, some as late as the ninth month. In 1995, Dr. McMahon submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary a graph and explanation that explicitly showed that he aborted healthy babies even in the third trimester which begins after the 26th week of pregnancy. His own graph showed, for example, that at 29 or 30 weeks one-fourth of the aborted babies had no flaw. Furthermore, leading proponents of partial-birth abortion acknowledge that it could pose additional health risks because, among other things, the procedure requires a high degree of surgical skill to pierce the infant's skull with a sharp instrument in a blind procedure. Dr. Warren Hern testified that he had very serious reservations about this procedure and that he could not imagine a circumstance in which this procedure would be safest. Although he was opposed to legislation banning partial-birth abortion, he also stated, ``You really can't defend it. I'm not going to tell somebody else they should not do this procedure, but I'm not going to do it.'' He also stated, ``I would dispute any statement that this is the safest procedure to use.'' The procedure also poses the following additional health risk to the woman: an increase in the woman's risk of suffering from cervical incompetence, a result of cervical dilation making it difficult or impossible for a woman to successfully carry a subsequent pregnancy to term; an increased risk of uterine rupture, abruption, amniotic fluid embolus, and trauma to the uterus as a result of converting the child to a footling breech position. Finally, a health exception, no matter how narrowly defined, gives the abortionist unfettered discretion in determining when a partial- birth abortion may be performed, and abortionists have demonstrated they can justify any abortion on this ground. Again, Dr. Warren Hern, ``I will certify that any pregnancy is a threat to a woman's life and could cause grievous injury to her physical health.'' I repeat, ``I will certify that any pregnancy is a threat to a woman's life and could cause grievous injury to her physical health.'' It is clear then that a law that includes such an exception would not ban a single-birth abortion; and for that reason, I would urge a ``no'' vote on the motion to recommit.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 257, I call up the bill (H.R. 760) to prohibit the procedure commonly known as partial-birth abortion, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 1954, the bill currently under consideration.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the news that 10 members of our Armed Forces who died in combat were not U.S. citizens, several bills have been introduced to either ease the naturalization requirements of legal permanent residents in the Armed Forces or to provide immigration benefits to the surviving family members of those killed in service to America, or both. We can never adequately express our gratitude to those noncitizen members of our military who made the ultimate sacrifice, but we can bring reasonable changes to the naturalization process for other permanent resident service members willing to make the same sacrifice and to provide immigration benefits to family members of those who died. The Committee on the Judiciary has worked closely with those who have introduced bills on this issue, including the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Hastings), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost), the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones), the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Solis), the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Gutierrez), and the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa), as well as the ranking member, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims ranking member, the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), to come up with a bipartisan compromise bill. In addition, six Members not on the Committee on the Judiciary testified at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims regarding their legislation. H.R. 1954, the Armed Forces Naturalization Act is a consensus bill in which I have done my best to address the concerns of the other interested Members and to balance competing priorities. I am grateful that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) have signed on as original cosponsors. Not every Member got everything they wanted in this bill, but each of the Members we consulted with got something that they wanted. As a result, we have a bill that should easily be able to pass the House with support from Members with widely varying views on immigration who all want to honor the service to our country of permanent residents in the Armed Forces. H.R. 1954 reduces the military service requirement to apply for naturalization during peacetime from 3 years to 1 year. Some of the earlier bills reduced the requirement to 2 years and another bill reduced it to zero years. One year is an obvious compromise. It lowers the required years of service while maintaining the requirement that a military member must still establish their worthiness for expedited naturalization through a period of honorable military service during peacetime. For soldiers, this bill also waives the fees for the naturalization petition or naturalization certificate, along with related State fees and waives the fees for the posthumous citizenship application. This will ease the financial burden for military members who perform an outstanding service for our country and receive little money in return. The bill permits the revocation of citizenship if a person is separated from the Armed Forces under other than honorable conditions before the person has served honorably for 5 years in either peacetime or wartime. In addition to the 5-year military revocation, an alien would remain subject to denaturalization at any time if, for example, the alien committed fraud to gain citizenship or the underlying green card. I would also add that this bill does not allow for the naturalization or acquisition of permanent resident status to undocumented aliens. H.R. 1954 would require the Departments of Homeland Security, State and Defense to ensure that naturalization applications, interviews, filings, oaths and ceremonies are available to the maximum extent practicable at U.S. embassies, consulates and military installations. Currently, a soldier must be physically present in the United States to file a naturalization application, to be interviewed for the application and to take the oath of citizenship. This requirement causes some soldiers who are stationed outside the United States to leave their post abroad and to return the United States at their own expense. This is both expensive and causes unnecessary interruption in their military service. The bill would also permit surviving immediate family members of both military members who are U.S. citizens before death and immigrant military members who are granted citizenship posthumously to apply for immigration benefits as if the military family member had not died. Under current law, family members of posthumous citizens cannot apply for immigration benefits through the posthumous citizen. This bill would permit the spouse, the children and certain parents to do so. Under current law, a lawful permanent resident spouse of a U.S. citizen may apply for naturalization in 3 years instead of 5 years. If the U.S. citizen spouse happens to be in the military and dies during military service, the lawful permanent resident spouse may apply for naturalization immediately rather than wait 3 years. H.R. 1954 extends this immediate eligibility for naturalization to lawful permanent resident spouses of military members who gain U.S. citizenship posthumously. Finally, the bill would waive the affidavit of support/public charge ground of inadmissibility for family members applying for adjustment of status. If the military member was the breadwinner, we elected not to penalize the immediate relative because their means of support died during service to our country. I urge my colleagues to support this carefully crafted and broadly supported compromise bill. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Hastings).