Richard Shelby

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of S. 2052, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, to authorize appropriations for intelligence-related activities and programs of the United States Government. This important legislation was reported favorably out of the Committee on May 7, 1998, by unanimous vote, consistent with the long-standing, bipartisan nature of the Select Committee on Intelligence. Following receipt of the President's budget, the Select Committee undertook a thorough review of the budget request for intelligence for fiscal year 1999. That review was informed, in part, by several hearings and briefings as well as the findings and recommendations of a group of outside experts--known as the Technical Advisory Group--that the distinguished Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kerrey, and I tasked last December to address key questions facing the Community. In addition, the Committee staff recently completed indepth audits and reviews of the use of ``cover'' by the Central Intelligence Agency and the administration of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. These reviews and audits led to Committee action with respect to the authorities, applicable laws, and budget of the activity or program concerned. As a product of these reviews, the Committee came to some rather startling and disconcerting conclusions about the overall health and direction of the Intelligence Community. For example: First, the CIA's foremost mission of providing timely intelligence based on human sources (``HUMINT'') is in grave jeopardy. CIA case officers today do not have the training or the equipment needed to keep their true identities hidden, to communicate covertly with agents, or to plant sophisticated listening devices and other collection tools that will provide timely intelligence on an adversary's intentions. Second, what many see as the ``crown jewel'' of U.S. Intelligence-- the National Security Agent's SIGINT capability--likewise is in dire need of modernization. The digital and fiber-optic revolutions are here-and-now, but NSA is still predominantly oriented toward Cold War- era threats. The Director of NSA, Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan, has recommended major changes in how NSA performs its vital mission-- changes our Committee endorses--but these changes were not reflected in the President's budget request. Third, promising technologies and systems for detecting missiles and other threats have been short-changed in the budget request. Likewise, robust funding for new tools for conducting information warfare, new sensors to detect and counter proliferation, and moving to smaller and cheaper satellites to support the war-fighter are not included in the budget request. And fourth, the quality of analysis within the Intelligence Community is poor and getting worse. Responding to the failure to predict the Indian nuclear tests, the Director of Central Intelligence commissioned retired Admiral David Jeremiah to review what went wrong and why. Among other findings, Admiral Jeremiah concluded that intelligence community analysts were complacent; they based their analyses on faulty assumptions; and engaged in wishful thinking. It is my belief that such is the state of analysis as it relates to many issues and problems, including political-military developments in China, the ballistic missile threat, and more. We can and should expect more from the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community has been forced by budgetary pressures to choose between funding current operations (such as Bosnia) and investing in the future. This is the case even after personnel reductions of over 20 percent in the Intelligence Community have been made over the past decade. In many ways, then, the problem confronting U.S. Intelligence is similar to that confronting the Department of Defense: How to pay for the necessary investments in future, ``winning- edge'' capabilities when the policymakers emphasize current operations? And, equally important, how to sustain the quality of life and skills- level of personnel who are already stretched thin by high operations tempo and lengthy overseas deployments? To address these challenges, Senator Kerrey and I tasked the staff to find and cut any and all poorly justified or redundant programs out of the budget. And, in fact, significant cuts were made to a wide range of lower-priority intelligence programs and activities. If it was poorly justified, redundant, or low-priority, then we cut it. These actions are entirely consistent with our oversight responsibilities, and the American people would expect no less. The Select Committee then took those funds and applied them against the highest priority intelligence needs and targets. Earlier this year, Senator Kerrey and I prepared intelligence budget guidance to direct the staff's budget work. That guidance emphasized the need for strengthened investment in areas such as advanced research and development, counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter- narcotics, personnel training, information operations, effective covert action, and enhanced analysis. These are precisely the areas the Committee has historically supported and the keys to future intelligence successes--whether to support military commanders, policymakers in Washington, or American diplomats. This approach of cutting low-priority projects and redirecting those funds into high-payoff, futuristic technologies and systems, is fiscally responsible and reflects the need for difficult choices in an era of scarce resources. This budget is full of tough choices. For example, the Committee recommended cutting certain ``legacy'' programs and activities at NSA in order to pay for the collection systems and processes of the future, as recommended in General Minihan's study of the future SIGINT architecture needs (the ``Unified Cryptologic Architecture''). Likewise, the Committee recommended cutting the number of CIA contractors, and reduced spending on costly infrastructure programs. None of these actions were easy--and in fact I am concerned that the Select Committee may have cut the intelligence budget too deeply in order to reach agreement with the Senate Armed Services Committee. That being said, this legislation is sound, it is balanced, and it is worthy of strong bipartisan support. My colleagues and the American people must come to understand that to save lives on the battlefield, to preclude terrorist attacks against Americans, to root out spies in our midst, and to give diplomats the information they need to forestall conflict in the first place, we need an effective, revitalized Intelligence Community. And that it is precisely what the Intelligence Authorization Act seeks to do. In summary, the Select Committee made the tough choices. We cut programs in order to invest in the future. We concluded that the intelligence budget can be cut, but it must be done in a careful, precise way, and based on specific programmatic recommendations. And we did it in a fully bipartisan manner. I applaud and appreciate the efforts of the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kerrey from Nebraska, and all the Members of the Committee, who labored long and hard on this bill. It is one of the most important pieces of legislation this body will consider this year, and I urge its passage. Pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement, the Armed Services Committee has been discharged from consideration of the Intelligence Authorization Bill. Although the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and I had previously agreed that the Armed Services Committee would not report the Intelligence Authorization Bill until three days following completion of Senate Floor consideration of the Defense Authorization Bill, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee has informed me that his committee has completed its review of the Intelligence Authorization Bill and does not recommend any amendments. We agree that it is appropriate for the Senate to consider the intelligence Authorization Bill at this time. We also agree, however, that this unanimous consent agreement to discharge the Armed Services Committee from further review of the Intelligence Authorization Bill will not serve as a precedent for requiring the Armed Services Committee to report future Intelligence Authorization Bills until it has had an adequate amount of time to review such legislation. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the cost estimate for the bill.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to salute a great Alabamian and a great American whose life was cut short by war-- Lieutenant James Edwin ``Jimmy'' Walker. I did not have the pleasure of knowing Jimmy, but many people from my home state who knew this young man have nothing but praise for him. Born in 1913, Jimmy became one of the most outstanding athletes in the history of Holt High School. He was the captain of the football, baseball, and basketball teams, leading his small school to athletic prominence in the state. Jimmy's former high school coach and teacher described him as having ``superior athletic abilities, and as being a great and popular leader.'' He further described Jimmy as ``a joy and an inspiration to those who had the good fortune to work and play with or for him.'' In 1932, Jimmy entered the University of Alabama, in Tuscaloosa, on an athletic scholarship. Throughout his three years of varsity competition, he started on both the football and basketball teams. On campus, as well as on the athletic field, Jimmy was well known, loved and respected. He was a member of the ``A'' Club, Alabama Quadrangle, Jason's Honorary Junior Society, Pi Gamma Alpha Fraternity, O.D.K., Cotillion Club, and the Court of Appeals of the Student Government. Notably, Jimmy was captain of the victorious Rose Bowl and national championship football team of 1935, as well as captain of the 1934 Crimson Tide Basketball team. He was an All-Conference, All- Southeastern, and All-American basketball player while remaining active on campus and successful in the classroom. Jimmy ultimately received his Bachelor of Science degree in 1935. Jimmy continued in athletics, coaching basketball at Virginia Military Institute. As in high school, Jimmy led a small school to great heights. His teams were outstanding, consistently ranking higher than the much larger southern schools. At the time, newspapers called his accomplishment ``a coaching masterpiece.'' Despite his considerable professional and personal success and his growing notoriety, Jimmy asked for a leave of absence from coaching to join the United States Navy at the start of World War II. When he became a First Lieutenant in the Navy, he told his family that he had finally ``made the team.'' After a period of distinguished wartime service, on December 22, 1943, this Alabama sports-hero-turned-Naval- officer sadly died in South America, from wounds received while in the performance of his official duties. Jimmy died serving his country. He was a true leader, not only on the athletic field but in all areas of life. As a coach, a student, and a military officer, he was a fine role model for those around him. His dedicated, patriotic spirit will be remembered for a long time. He truly gave his all for victory. Today, 45 years after his untimely passing, my thoughts are with Jimmy's family and friends. His spirit will forever live on in those who knew him. Perhaps Jimmy's sister, Neta Walker Laycock, of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, captured his outstanding personality best when she said: ``If you knew him, you loved him. If you didn't, you missed a treat.''

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment offered by Mr. Sessions and commend his effort to bring attention to the important, though obscure issue of tritium production. Since the looming threat of nuclear war dissipated in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, our strategic forces have been pushed to the sidelines. But recent events in the Asia subcontinent remind us not only of the danger from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction but also of the imperative to maintain the deterrent effect of our strategic weapons stockpile. Tritium is a radioactive isotope that is used in every nuclear warhead in our nation's stockpile. Like all radioactive matter, tritium decays over time. To compensate for the loss from decay, it is necessary to periodically replenish the level of tritium in each weapon. Despite this constant demand, tritium has not been produced for strategic purposes since 1988. Replenishment in the weapons stockpile has continued, however, by recycling tritium from nuclear weapons as they are dismantled. This is only an interim measure, and it is clear that the U.S. will have to resume tritium production sometime soon. In 1995, the Department of Energy decided to follow a dual-track approach whereby the two most promising options for tritium production would be explored. The first option is to purchase the radioactive gas from a commercial nuclear reactor. The second alternative is to design, construct, and test an accelerator system, which is called the Accelerator Production of Tritium or APT. The Department of Energy was directed by last year's National Defense Authorization Act to conduct an interagency review of tritium production policy issues. The Authorization Act also directed the Energy Department to determine which of two tracks will serve as the primary source of tritium production by the end of this year. There are forces in Congress, however, who are determined to derail this process. Proponents of APT are trying to prohibit the production of tritium at a commercial reactor. This misguided attempt would leave the Department of Energy with no choice other than using APT as the source for tritium production. Make no mistake about it, this is a thinly disguised attempt to mandate one particular technology that benefits one particular state. It is unfortunate that some are willing to put parochial interests in front of the national security imperative to develop a cheap, safe source of tritium. As the Secretary of Energy stated, the selection of tritium production should be based on ``a careful and deliberate review of the cost, technical, schedule, and policy issues associated with each option.'' These sentiments are supported by the Administration and the Department of Defense. I suspect that all of us who believe in fair and honest competition would agree that Congress should not interfere with the Department of Energy's process for selecting a tritium production source. If proponents of the APT are successful in their efforts however, Congress will do just that, and the decision will be based not on the merits of either option but solely on politics. The Congress and the taxpayer should be aware of the staggering differences in the price tag associated with each competing technology. The Congressional Budget Office estimate that APT will cost from $6.72 billion to construct. In addition to the initial construction cost, the APT option will require an annual appropriation of $150 million to operate. Furthermore, these estimates are based on preliminary conceptual designs, and the taxpayer of course will be asked to pay for any likely cost overruns. On the other hand, Mr. President, the commercial reactor option would only cost $1.8 to $2 billion. Moreover, this initial investment is similar to a loan, so every tax dollar spent will be returned to the Treasury. This has been certified by several independent reviews. I would like to add that this option does not require any additional appropriated funds because the commercial reactor owner, not the Treasury, will pay any cost overruns. If selected by the Department of Energy, a commercial reactor could begin producing tritium by 2003. This is two years ahead of the scheduled that the Departments of Energy and Defense have laid out as necessary to maintain the nuclear stockpile at the START I level. It uses a proven design which is currently being demonstrated. The commercial reactor also provides the Department of Energy with the flexibility to change tritium production quantities in response to changing need without major cost implications. Serious concerns have been raised about the technical feasibility of the accelerator option. While proponents of APT tout its supposed benefits, I would like to point out that the APT does not exist. It is still a paper concept. Also, several components that are critical to the development of this accelerator are still in the prototype stage. Even if the APT is developed on schedule, it would not be operational until 2007, which is two years after the Department's target date. As a result, the ATP option will require that the Department of Energy will have to find an interim source of tritium until the APT is proven. Any unforeseen delays in the development of the accelerator technology will extend the Department's reliance on an interim source. Mr. President, the issue before us can be boiled down to this: Should Congress dictate the tritium production method as a political favor regardless of technological risk and cost? I strongly believe that the commercial reactor option should not be removed from consideration by legislation fiat. Instead, the Senate has a responsibility to preserve the integrity of a process that rewards merits and competition. I urge my colleagues to support the Session's amendment and preserve the Department of Energy's dual-track options for tritium production.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to honor Mr. Michael E. Stephens, the founder of ReLife, Inc., a nation-wide rehabilitation system, and the namesake of the Michael E. Stephens College of Business at the University of Montevallo in Alabama. Mr. Stephens is a remarkable man, a distinguished citizen and a leader in the field of health care and physical rehabilitation. Mr. Stephens was born and raised in Alabama and began attending the University of Montevallo in 1962. However, his path through college was a long, complicated one. Though Michael Stephens is today a highly successful entrepreneur, recognized for his many accomplishments and his generous civic spirit, his first attempt at college was incomplete! Instead, Mr. Stephens left the University in 1966 for a series of jobs in the insurance industry. Several years later, at the age of 26, he broke his neck in a horrible diving accident. Despite being told he would never walk again, with extensive rehabilitation--and steely determination--Michael Stephens overcame the most significant obstacle of his life. Amazingly, he fully recovered in less than a year, and almost ten years after he had begun his college education, Mr. Stephens returned to the University of Montevallo. Michael Stephens received his undergraduate degree in business from the University of Montevallo in 1973 and his Master's Degree in 1975 from the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He went to work in rehabilitative services for the Lakeshore Rehabilitation Hospital. Based upon his own experience, Mr. Stephens was committed to providing comprehensive services and quality care to people with physical disabilities. Under his leadership, Lakeshore Hospital became a world- class rehabilitative center. By introducing new rehabilitative services, such as speech therapy, recreational programs, psychological counseling and outpatient job training, Mr. Stephens created a new way of dealing with disability. In fact, Forbes Magazine said, ``Stephens turned little Lakeshore into a model laboratory for his idea about rehabilitation.'' In the mid-1980's, he founded the Lakeshore Foundation, a non-profit organization designed to assist people with physical disabilities. Specifically, the Foundation focused on training athletes. Almost overnight, Mr. Stephens' athletic program grew. Lakeshore's athletes went on to become among the most successful in the paralympics: breaking records in all events and winning numerous gold, silver and bronze medals. His successful approach to rehabilitation led to his founding of ReLife, a publicly-traded national health-services corporation, in 1986. Through ReLife, Mr. Stephens realized his dream of reinventing rehabilitation. By 1992, ReLife ran over forty rehabilitation facilities. In 1994, when ReLife merged with HealthSouth Corporation, Michael Stephens focused his attention and considerable talents on other needs of his community. He became a member of the board of trustees of the Alabama Symphony Orchestra and the Naples, Florida Philharmonic Center for the Arts. Additionally, he is a former member of both the President's Committee on Hiring the Handicapped and the National Association of Rehabilitation Facilities and is active in the Alabama State Health Coordinating Council. Mr. Stephens' business prowess is not limited to rehabilitation: he also owns several car dealerships, a real estate development company and a champion horse breeding farm. His leadership was recognized by the University of Montevallo in 1995, when he was awarded the Doctor of Humane Letters. Mr. Stephens serves as a member of the Board of Trustees of the University, and recently donated one million dollars to their capital funds campaign. As a result of business endeavors, community service, philanthropic projects and long-standing support for higher education, on October 9, 1997, the University of Montevallo honored Mr. Stephens by deciding to re-name the business school the Michael E. Stephens College of Business. The citation issued by the University's Board of Trustees stated: ``His leadership and service deserve lasting recognition and are worthy of holding as exemplary to this and future generations of Montevallo students, faculty, alumni and friends.'' Mr. Stephens has promised to remain very active in the Stephens College of Business, and I believe that all of the current and future Montevallo students will benefit greatly from his involvement. On that day last year, Michael Stephens, loved and respected by all who have known him, was honored as a friend and leader to not only the University of Montevallo, but all the citizens of Alabama. I, too, want to honor Mr. Stephen's example of strength, vision, courage and community spirit. On behalf of my wife, Annette, an alumna of the University of Montevallo, we wish Michael Stephens our sincerest thanks and congratulations for his dedication to making a difference.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, today I introduce a bipartisan bill with my colleagues, Senators John Rockefeller and Carol Moseley-Braun. Entitled the ``Manufactured Housing Improvement Act,'' (MHIA) this bill is designed to modernize the requirements under the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 and to establish a balanced consensus process for the development, revision, and interpretation of Federal construction and safety standards for manufactured homes. Many do not realize that the manufactured homes of today are completely different from those of twenty or even ten years ago. They also do not realize that this is the fastest growing segment of the housing industry, and that it accounts for one out of every three new single family homes sold. Between 1980 and 1990, the industry experienced a 60 percent growth in market share, and last year set a twenty year sales record. There are good consumer-oriented reasons for this tremendous growth--manufactured housing offers quality and aesthetically pleasing housing at an average cost of $37,300, excluding the land. Today, manufactured housing has lowered the threshold to the American Dream of home ownership for millions of Americans, including first-time home buyers, senior citizens, young families, and single parents. At a time when home ownership is becoming harder for the average American to attain, and with more than 5.3 million Americans paying more than 50 percent of their incomes on rent, I believe it is imperative to update the laws that regulate the private sector solution to affordable housing. In order for the manufactured housing industry to remain competitive, Congress must modernize the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974. My bill would do just that. MHIA would establish a consensus committee that would submit recommendations to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for developing, amending and revising both the Federal Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards. This provision will allow the manufactured housing industry to update and create applicable building codes and standards just like other participants in the housing industry. In addition, the committee would be authorized to interpret the standards, thereby eliminating confusion and uncertainty in the market place. The Manufactured Housing Improvement Act would authorize the Secretary of HUD to use industry labeling fees for the administration of the consensus committee and the hiring of additional HUD staff. The Secretary of HUD would also be authorized to use industry label fees to promote the availability and affordability of manufactured housing. This legislation is a very significant step forward in that both the Manufactured Housing Institute and the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform endorse this legislation. The industry participants have modernized the quality and technology of manufactured housing. Congress must now modernize the laws that regulate an industry that provides affordable housing and contributes more than $23 billion annually to our nation's economy.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, today I introduce a bipartisan bill with my colleagues, Senators John Rockefeller and Carol Moseley-Braun. Entitled the ``Manufactured Housing Improvement Act,'' (MHIA) this bill is designed to modernize the requirements under the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 and to establish a balanced consensus process for the development, revision, and interpretation of Federal construction and safety standards for manufactured homes. Many do not realize that the manufactured homes of today are completely different from those of twenty or even ten years ago. They also do not realize that this is the fastest growing segment of the housing industry, and that it accounts for one out of every three new single family homes sold. Between 1980 and 1990, the industry experienced a 60 percent growth in market share, and last year set a twenty year sales record. There are good consumer-oriented reasons for this tremendous growth--manufactured housing offers quality and aesthetically pleasing housing at an average cost of $37,300, excluding the land. Today, manufactured housing has lowered the threshold to the American Dream of home ownership for millions of Americans, including first-time home buyers, senior citizens, young families, and single parents. At a time when home ownership is becoming harder for the average American to attain, and with more than 5.3 million Americans paying more than 50 percent of their incomes on rent, I believe it is imperative to update the laws that regulate the private sector solution to affordable housing. In order for the manufactured housing industry to remain competitive, Congress must modernize the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974. My bill would do just that. MHIA would establish a consensus committee that would submit recommendations to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for developing, amending and revising both the Federal Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards. This provision will allow the manufactured housing industry to update and create applicable building codes and standards just like other participants in the housing industry. In addition, the committee would be authorized to interpret the standards, thereby eliminating confusion and uncertainty in the market place. The Manufactured Housing Improvement Act would authorize the Secretary of HUD to use industry labeling fees for the administration of the consensus committee and the hiring of additional HUD staff. The Secretary of HUD would also be authorized to use industry label fees to promote the availability and affordability of manufactured housing. This legislation is a very significant step forward in that both the Manufactured Housing Institute and the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform endorse this legislation. The industry participants have modernized the quality and technology of manufactured housing. Congress must now modernize the laws that regulate an industry that provides affordable housing and contributes more than $23 billion annually to our nation's economy.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to commend to my colleagues the nomination of Joan A. Dempsey, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, and most recently the Director of Central Intelligence's Chief of Staff. Ms. Dempsey is the first nominee for the newly created position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management. Although Ms. Dempsey was nominated by the President just before the Senate adjourned last November, the Vice Chairman and I have waited to consider the nomination until outstanding issues regarding other positions created by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 were resolved. We have reached an accommodation with the Director of Central Intelligence on these other positions, and we expect the President to put forward a nominee for the position of Assistant Director of Central Intelligence (ADCI) for Administration, soon. We have also agreed to allow the DCI to fill the positions of ADCI for Collection and ADCI for Analysis and Production without exercising the Senate's right for advice and consent, for up to one year, while we assess the new management structure. Ms. Dempsey appeared before the Committee in an open hearing on May 21, 1998. It is apparent that Ms. Dempsey is a well qualified career intelligence professional. The Committee is confident that she is entirely capable of doing a fine job as the Deputy DCI for Community Management. The Intelligence Community is facing a time of revolutionary change that is driven by the explosion of information technology. These rapid changes in technology must be assessed, evaluated and quickly integrated into all phases of the intelligence cycle. The Community must also have the flexibility to quickly focus on new and sometimes non-traditional targets. This requirement for flexibility was most recently underscored by the failure to anticipate the nuclear tests conducted by India. These events caught the Intelligence Community by surprise despite plenty of strategic warning that Indian leaders planned to revise their nation's nuclear policy. I do not agree with those who say that ``we weren't surprised'' by the tests because, in hindsight, they logically followed from what was being said publicly. This was a huge intelligence failure. As Zbigniew Brzezinski said in a recent editorial: ``India's nuclear weapons tests . . . signal a truly consequential intelligence scandal.'' He went on to say: ``. . . it is the task of the intelligence community to detect, in a timely fashion, major foreign initiatives or programs that bear either on American security or affect American foreign policy interests.'' More pointed than my own recent criticisms, Mr. Brzezinski concluded that ``the failure . . . in the case of India suggests significant and truly disturbing incompetence both on the level of collection and analysis within the intelligence community.'' Mr. president, we can debate the nature of the failure, but it was a failure nonetheless. Did the Community fail because of the way collection priorities were assessed and assigned? Was there too much reliance on certain types of intelligence collection and information? Is the ``Intelligence Community'' acting cohesively as a community, or is it resisting truly effective integration because of concerns over bureaucratic turf? Who brokers potential disputes over such turf and who has the authority to arbitrate agreements that are honored? These are all very important questions and the Intelligence Committee is seeking answers. In my view, the issues facing the Intelligence Community today are not solely a function of the level of resources that are available, even though this is a significant part of the problem. The Intelligence Community is still in many ways reacting to a changing world and not yet anticipating it. The Intelligence Community often displays the symptoms of an entrenched and calcified bureaucracy. This, Mr. President, must change. In the final analysis, our Intelligence agencies are accountable to the American people for two basic things: (1) to alert them to external threats; and (2) to spend their tax dollars efficiently and effectively. A great deal of the responsibility for these matters will rest on this nominee's shoulders. The Committee believes that she possesses the knowledge and leadership qualities that this new position will demand. We look to Ms. Dempsey to assist the DCI in ensuring that the Intelligence Community attains these goals and lives up to the highest standards of accountability as they work toward them. Mr. President, the Committee has reported the nomination of Joan A. Dempsey to be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and we recommend that the nomination be confirmed. I urge my colleagues to support the recommendation of the Committee and vote in favor of Ms. Dempsey's nomination. I yield the floor.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. I rise in support of the Iran Missile Sanctions Act, H.R. 2709. Mr. President, I would like to make three important points regarding this legislation. First, the Administration's efforts to get Russia to stop assisting Iran's ballistic missile program have been an abysmal failure. Second, there is a broader failure of United States proliferation policy--a failure of monumental and potentially deadly proportions. Finally, the Senate must now take a greater role in addressing the proliferation crisis. Passage of the Iran Missile Sanctions Act is a first step. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, many in the United States have been greatly concerned that Russian entities were providing assistance to other state's ballistic missile programs. As evidence mounted, the Clinton Administration responded with diplomatic efforts from the working level up through the high level Commission chaired by Vice President Gore. Diplomatic efforts were supplemented with economic incentives. When additional reports of new and ongoing assistance emerged, including transfers to Iran in probable violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Congress waited for the Administration to impose the sanctions required. When sanctions were not imposed, some in Congress sought additional legislation to ``encourage'' the Administration to impose sanctions. The Administration again urged the Congress to wait--to give the diplomatic process more time, to give the Russians time to get an enforcement mechanism in place. Administration officials have repeatedly assured us that they have the problem under control. They are wrong. The Congressional Research Service summarizes the situation aptly when it reports that: Despite official denials from Moscow through 1997, evidence is growing of a pattern of missile technology transfers to Iran by Russian enterprises, institutes, and individuals, with direct and indirect Russian Government involvement, in violation of Russian commitments under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Russian assistance could significantly accelerate Iran's indigenous missile program . . . There is ample intelligence information that supports this assessment, and I believe it is important for Senators to have the opportunity to review this information. Therefore, Senator Kerrey and I directed the Select Committee on Intelligence staff to prepare a compendium of the classified intelligence reporting on this subject and it is available for Senators to review in S-407. My second point is that the Administration's failure to stop Russia from providing assistance to Iran's missile program is only part of the broader failure of the Administration's non-proliferation policy. There is an ongoing pattern of assistance by Russia, China, and North Korea to rogue states and to other states such as India and Pakistan. There is also a pattern of weak Clinton Administration response to this proliferation. There is a connection. The Indians cited the weak Clinton Administration response to China's proliferation of missiles and nuclear assistance to Pakistan as one of the reasons they decided to test nuclear weapons. Some states seek weapons of mass destruction for prestige or in an attempt to enhance their global role. Countries like India and Pakistan justify their efforts by citing regional security concerns. Others like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea seek these weapons to threaten and intimidate their neighbors, in particular U.S. friends and allies, to threaten forward-deployed U.S. forces, and ultimately to threaten the United States itself. Such states do not wish to confront U.S. conventional military forces--the best in the world--with conventional weapons alone. They prefer to threaten our forces, or our cities, with asymmetric weapons of mass destruction to deter us from carrying out policies to protect our global interests. If states believe they can change the calculation of risks and benefits, they have a strong strategic incentive to acquire these missiles. Our near-total vulnerability to the ballistic missile threat only furthers their incentives. Without stronger disincentives, other states will continue to seek the financial, political, and strategic advantages that may be gained through proliferation, and through taking advantage of our patience and vulnerabilities. They have repeatedly offered carrots without wielding or credibily threatening the stick. Indeed, in many disturbing ways, the Administration's policies toward Russia and China may have enabled or even encouraged proliferation. By failing to respond to dangerous proliferation acdtivities to the maximum extent possible under domestic and international law, they have led others to question the will and ability of the United States to take strong measures to punish proliferators. Unfortunately, the Executive Branch has not yet come to this realization. It appears to be difficult to get this Administration to act with resolve, either by adding backbone to its proliferation policies or by responding to existing and future threats by developing additional means of deterrence and defense. It is difficult to persuade them to make diplomacy and arms control agreements tools of policy rather than policy objectives in-and-of themselves. However, the Congress can not simply stand back and point our fingers at the White House. We must do all that we can do to demonstrate that America has the will and the ability to respond. We must provide adequate funding to the Intelligence Community and to our military forces to detect and deter, and to prevail when deterrence fails. We must put in place the legislative mechanisms to enforce a robust counter-proliferation policy. We must continue to force the Administration to disclose dangerous proliferation activities. And we must make sanctions mandatory. Challenging, deterring, and defending against proliferation won't be easy or cost free. But it is the right thing to do. Mr. President, American lives are at stake. The Senate must act. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the bill before us.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I will wrap it up on this point at this time. I am certainly not going to wrap up this issue. I think this issue is just now becoming ventilated here and shared with my colleagues here in the Senate. A lot of us have known this for a long time. But the IRS reform bill that Senator Roth and Senator Kerrey have been pushing here is about, among other things, the agency overstepping its authority and, in a lot of instances, there are horror stories of abusing taxpayers. But I can't think of a worse way to abuse taxpayers than when the IRS raises taxes through the back door, by the regulatory process, and then we think, how did they do this or why did they do this? Why did we give them the authority to do this? Yet, ultimately, Mr. President, we are accountable to the voters, as we should be. I think this is relevant. I am not going to offer it now in deference to the chairman and the Senator from Nebraska. But I want to make it clear that this is just the beginning of this fight because this makes a lot of sense to the American people. Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I appreciate the chairman's statement. I have worked with him before. I just think it is very, very important for the American people that we, as Members of the U.S. Senate and House, should be the people who lay taxes, or reduce taxes, according to the Constitution. But that is not what is happening. The Internal Revenue Service is doing it through the back door. We should do things through the front door because that is the American way, and I think it is accountable. I have worked with the distinguished Senator from Nebraska on this for several years and got some of this going at his suggestion. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, just for a few minutes I will also talk about the IRS reform legislation and a suggestion that I have that I think would improve it. I am at this point in time well aware that the pending business is another amendment, so I will only speak on this subject if I can. I think perhaps the most important power given to Congress in the Constitution is bestowed to Congress in article I, section 8, the power to tax. This authority is vested in Congress, as the President and Senate know, because as elected representatives, Congress remains accountable to the public, and when they determine tax policy, this should be more so. Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Service effectively has the power to raise taxes through the use of its interpretive authority. Therefore, what I want to talk to the Senate and my colleagues about this afternoon for a few minutes is an amendment, which I am not offering now but I will in a future time, which will build upon past legislative initiatives that afforded protections to taxpayers from attempts by the Internal Revenue Service to bypass Congress and raise taxes through the regulatory decrees. In 1996, Congress passed the Congressional Review Act, which provides that when a major agency rule takes effect, Congress has 60 days to review it. During this time period, Congress has the option to pass what we call a disapproval resolution. The Stealth Tax Prevention Act would expand the definition of a ``major rule'' to include any IRS regulation which increases Federal revenue. For example, if the Office of Management and Budget finds that the implementation and the enforcement of a rule has resulted in an increase of Federal revenues over current practices for revenues anticipated from the rule on the date of the enactment of the statute under which the rule is promulgated, the rule will be found to be major in scope. Therefore, the amendment, or the legislation that I would like to see us adopt, sooner rather than later, would be to allow Congress to review the regulation and to prevent back-door tax increases on hard-working Americans. An excellent example of this occurred last year when the Internal Revenue Service attempted to increase taxes through the regulatory process. In this instance, the IRS disqualified a taxpayer from being considered a limited partner if they ``participated in the partnership's business for more than 500 hours during the taxable year.'' The effect of this redefinition would have been to make these individuals subject to a 2.9 percent Medicare tax. President Clinton had included the identical provision in his universal health care legislation in 1994. When the administration's plan failed, the IRS attempted to subject limited partnerships to the same tax increase by using its regulatory powers. I believe the intent of the Founding Fathers was to put the power to lay and collect taxes in the hands of the elected Members of Congress and no one else--not in the hands of the bureaucrats who are shielded from public accountability, but in the hands of Congress, who is accountable to the American people. The proposed Stealth Tax Prevention Act that I want to see become law would be particularly helpful in lowering the tax burden on small business, which suffers disproportionately from IRS regulations. I believe Americans are paying a higher share of their income to the Federal Government currently than at any time since the end of World War II. Allowing bureaucrats to increase taxes even further at their own discretion through the regulatory process, through interpretation of the Tax Code, I believe is intolerable. I believe this legislation is right and should be passed, and it is clearly in the spirit of the IRS reform legislation. This type of legislation would help rein in the power of the Internal Revenue Service and would leave the tax policy where it belongs, to elected Members of Congress, not unelected and not unaccountable IRS bureaucrats. I strongly urge my colleagues to get with me, to join me in the future in an effort to join the National Federation of Independent Business, NFIB, and the National Taxpayers Union, as well as a lot of my colleagues who would be supporting this type of legislation. The bottom line is that the stealth tax legislation that I have been talking about would improve accountability and it would put it where it belongs--in the hands of Congress and not bureaucrats. I think it is something we have to consider and I believe we will consider in the future. I have talked to the chairman of the Finance Committee about this, as well as other members of the Finance Committee, and they seem to be very interested in this. I am going to try to work with them in the future. I yield to the chairman.

Mr. SHELBY. What is the pending business?

Mr. SHELBY. I would be happy to do that. I think what we need to do in the next few weeks, working together with some of my colleagues like Senator Kerrey and others on the other side of the aisle, is to let our colleagues know what this is and what it does. If we pass this legislation in the future, it is going to be another step toward accountability for us with the American people. I think it is very possible. I will be glad to add the Senator on.

Mr. SHELBY. Will the Senator from Alabama yield to the other Senator from Alabama?

Mr. SHELBY. I would be glad to add you as a cosponsor. I believe we are going to pick up a lot of Senators on both sides of the aisle, I hope.

Mr. SHELBY. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator Bond's amendment to establish a full-time IRS Board of Governors. I firmly believe that oversight of an agency with the equivalent of 100,000 full-time employees, a requested fiscal year 1999 budget of almost $8.2 billion, and a history of wasting $4 billion in an attempt to modernize the tax collection system, is, without question, a full time job. Furthermore, rigorous oversight will be critical to ensuring that the reforms that Congress has in store for the agency will be carried out effectively and expeditiously. I think the prudent strategy is to keep the agency on very short leash given the shocking stories that have come to light from the recent Finance Committee hearings. I have my own ideas as to how to liberate the taxpayer from the IRS--namely the implementation of my flat-tax proposal. But short of comprehensive tax simplification, I strongly support Senator Bond's efforts. Mr. President, the IRS is a very troubled agency that demands the highest level of scrutiny. I strongly urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I feel we owe it to the American taxpayer. Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Managers' amendment to the Resolution of Ratification, and of the Resolution of Ratification itself. Even though the Berlin Wall has crumbled and the Soviet Union has dissolved, NATO remains vital. It is the cornerstone of stability for a continent that is under massive transition. The nations of central and eastern Europe have established democratic forms of government and have deregulated their economies. The accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is the best way to bolster their fledgling democracies and market economies thereby making their newly-won freedom irreversible. Let there be no mistake: our engagement with Europe since NATO was formed in 1949 has not been without its costs and not without its risks. Our engagement with the new democracies of Central Europe will not be without costs and risks either. The expansion of NATO will most likely antagonize Russia. More importantly, as a military alliance, we risk obligating the United States military to defend the citizens of distant and unfamiliar lands. In the end, though, we have found it difficult to stay out of these conflicts. Just about anywhere in the world where there is conflict, our military is there. I believe that disengagement from Europe, as history has repeatedly shown, would have far-reaching consequences. Therefore, I believe that we have no choice but to go forward with our current commitment to an expanded NATO. The Senate should vote to approve the Resolution of Ratification. But, like many senators, I remain concerned at the potential financial costs of expansion. As a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I am concerned that the Administration has not yet come to terms with the price of supporting NATO expansion or more generally with the costs of America's position as the sole superpower. As was the case with Bosnia, there is reason to believe that the Administration is underestimating the costs of expansion in order to make ratification more palatable in the Senate. Without pouring additional funds into the defense budget, NATO expansion costs that are unaccounted for may hinder the Defense Department's ability to carry out missions in other vital areas of the world and at the same time to modernize the force. We have heard a number of cost estimates in the course of this debate. We must keep in mind that the new member nations, as the primary beneficiaries of expansion, must devote the resources necessary to shoulder their fair share of the common burden. And I know that nothing would undermine the support of this body for NATO, or that of the American people, faster than a perception that the new members, or existing members, for that matter, were not living up to their responsibilities in this regard. I am also concerned about another aspect of NATO expansion--one that has received less attention than the broader strategic issues, but one that is critical to the long-term success of an expanded alliance-- namely intelligence and counterintelligence matters. Here too, after a careful review, I have concluded that the long-term national interests of the United States are best served by a vote in favor of the Resolution. But I would like to encourage Senators to take the time to review the report that I will describe shortly, which is available in classified form in S-407. An unclassified summary can be found in the Foreign Relations Committee report, Executive Report 105-14, on the Resolution of Ratification. This report was prepared by the Intelligence Committee staff at the direction of Senator Kerrey, the Committee Vice Chairman, and myself, and submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations and to the Senate at large. It contains the staff's assessment of the intelligence implications of NATO expansion. The report is the culmination of the committee's work over the past year monitoring the progress of the accession process set in motion by the Alliance's decision last July to formally invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join NATO. The staff has routinely reviewed the state of the accession negotiations, a process that concluded in December 1997 with the signing of the accession protocols. Committee members and staff have met numerous times with NATO negotiators as well as representatives from the acceding states, both in European capitals and in Washington, D.C. In preparation for the Senate vote on advice and consent, committee staff held numerous briefings with U.S. and NATO intelligence officials; reviewed documents prepared by the Intelligence Community; and posed numerous questions for the record. The committee directed the Executive branch--the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of State--to submit a formal report on the intelligence implications of enlargement. Committee staff also met with members of the Alliance's Interagency Working Group on NATO Enlargement (IWGNE) to discuss integration efforts in the intelligence field. Finally, committee members and staff traveled to national capitals of the three aspiring members to gain a more detailed, first-hand knowledge of how the civilian and military services of these countries operate, and whether adequate procedures are in place for the sharing of sensitive information with current NATO members. Once again, I would remind my colleagues that the classified committee staff report is available in S-407 for Senators who may wish to read it. The Committee has also prepared an unclassified summary of the report's major findings, and I would like to share with my colleagues the highlights. overview The United States, along with its NATO allies, believes that membership in NATO cannot be granted piecemeal. NATO has thus determined that there will not be a two-tiered security structure within the Alliance. If and when the three accede to full NATO membership, they will share in all rights and obligations, and will be entitled to share in Alliance secrets. The work undertaken bilaterally and through NATO is geared to ensuring that the three invitees take the necessary steps over the transition or pre-accession period to demonstrate that they can and will guard NATO secrets appropriately once they join in April 1999. In assessing the reliability of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in guarding NATO secrets, the following factors are critical: 1. the strength of democratic reforms, with a focus on ministerial and legislative oversight of intelligence services and activities; 2. the degree to which the three countries have succeeded in reforming their civilian and military intelligence services, including the ability of the services to hire and retain qualified Western- oriented officers, and the evolution of political and public support for these services; 3. Russian intelligence objectives directed against these countries, including any disinformation campaigns designed to derail, retard, or taint their integration with the West; 4. counterintelligence and other security activities being pursued by the three countries, and the adequacy of resources devoted to these efforts; and 5. the work underway between the three invitees and NATO to ensure that security standards will be met by the time the three join the Alliance. committee findings As a result of their investigations, the committee staff arrived at a series of key findings. Their report includes general findings, findings derived from the experience of our respective intelligence agencies working together in both bilateral and multilateral fora; and findings relating to the counterintelligence threat, the pace of reform and the NATO work program for intelligence issues. general findings Perhaps most important, the report makes a point that is obvious but nonetheless bears repeating: any intelligence sharing relationship inevitably involves some risks. Nevertheless, I believe that the intelligence relationships with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be, on balance, a net plus for U.S. and NATO interests. As many of my colleagues are aware, cooperation with the three countries on intelligence issues began before the idea of NATO enlargement itself took root. In that respect, sharing intelligence in the NATO context will build on a pattern of bilateral cooperation which has existed for nearly a decade. Based on the information provided to the Committee, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have proven to be reliable in handling operational information and capable of guarding classified information--some of it extremely sensitive. the multilateral context In the multilateral context, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have participated in the Implementation Force and the Stabilization Force operations in Bosnia, and have cooperated actively with U.S. intelligence to provide critical force protection information. The three countries have demonstrated a solid record in the area of information and operational security within the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. In addition, all three countries value their bilateral links to the U.S. and wish to expand them. They view multilateral intelligence cooperation in NATO as a complement to, not a substitute for, these bilateral intelligence relations. the counterintelligence threat The single most critical intelligence issue we face in inviting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO is the counterintelligence question. It is an unavoidable fact that past associations with Soviet intelligence services, together with proximity to Russia, make these countries vulnerable to hostile intelligence activity. Over time, personnel and generational changes, training, and more robust counterintelligence programs by the three countries should reduce further this vulnerability. But for the time being, the threat is there. The problem is not one of attitudes. The legacy these countries inherit from 44 years of Soviet domination makes them suspicious of Russian policies and motives. Indeed, for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the problem is not complacency about the foreign intelligence threat, but ensuring a capability to counter it. Lastly, and to put this issue into perspective, we should recall that Russian and other intelligence efforts to penetrate NATO will continue, irrespective of new Alliance members. the record of reform With respect to the critical issue of reform, all three countries have made significant strides in restructuring, reforming, and redirecting their intelligence services. More needs to be done to attain greater experience in parliamentary oversight of the services, to secure acceptance by politicians of the need for these services to maintain political neutrality, to retain and promote experienced officers with Western orientation, and to enhance computer security. As professionalism increases, morale will improve, and the intelligence services will be looked upon as contributing to common security interests. Adequate funding and visible support from the political leadership will be essential to this process. the nato work program The three invitees are continuing to work with NATO in preparation for their final accession. In cooperation with NATO to date, in a variety of interactions with the U.S. and other current NATO allies, including the sharing of sensitive information through the Partnership for Peace program, IFOR/ SFOR, and in bilateral intelligence cooperation, the three invitees have demonstrated solid records in the area of information and operational security. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have undertaken significant steps to conform to NATO security standards and have enhanced personnel and information security practices. Looking toward accession in April 1999, from a NATO perspective, the intelligence aspects of NATO enlargement appear to be on track. Indeed, the intelligence planning in NATO is currently ahead of the other NATO programs which must be readied for the April 1999 accession date. NATO and U.S. officials have been reviewing the capabilities and intentions of the three governments to handle sensitive information, and the extent to which the military and intelligence services of these former Warsaw Pact members have distanced themselves from their former mentors. The NATO Intelligence Board has worked closely with NATO's Office of Security to ensure adequate security measures are developed with new members. The specific criteria that the Alliance is using to ensure that NATO practices and regulations become standard operating procedures for the three new invitees are based on established security guidelines developed for the Alliance and approved by the member states. Each of the three NATO invitees has thus far achieved or exceeded each criterion set before it, according to the Executive Branch. intelligence committee condition Based on these findings, I together with Senator Kerrey have proposed a condition to the resolution of ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty, which is included in the Managers' amendment now before the Senate. The purpose of the condition is to monitor the progress that the three aspiring members are making in adopting NATO practices and regulations as standard operating procedures in their own intelligence services, and in enhancing their overall procedures for protecting intelligence sources and methods. To monitor the progress in meeting NATO standards during the transition period up to April 1999, as well as to provide a benchmark following formal accession, the condition requires the President and the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the appropriate committees of Congress with three ``snapshots''--two before and one after formal accession of these countries to the alliance. The President is required to report by 1 January 1999, on behalf of all the interested agencies, the progress made by the three countries in meeting NATO membership security requirements. The Director of Central Intelligence is also required to report on or before 1 January 1999, and again not later than 90 days after the date of formal accession of these countries to NATO, on the latest procedures and requirements established in these countries for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, including a comparison of the overall procedures and requirements for such protection in these three countries with those in other NATO member states. I believe that this condition sets forth a balanced approach to monitoring the progress of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic toward meeting the intelligence and security-related requirements for full NATO membership. In what I believe is the unlikely event that a serious problem arises with respect to one or more of the prospective members, the reports due on January 1, 1999 will provide both the Senate and the Executive Branch with an opportunity to address and resolve any such problem before final accession. final assessment I would like to close with the following. In developing an overall assessment of the security risks associated with the inclusion of the three new invitees in NATO, the issue is not only how to ensure that these three countries protect NATO secrets, but also to ensure that the new members, and NATO at large, devote sufficient attention and resources to address the overall non-NATO intelligence threat to the Alliance. To reiterate, based on the information provided to the Committee, the governments of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have demonstrated both an intent and an ability to protect the classified military and intelligence information that would be routinely provided them as members of the Alliance. While past associations make these countries vulnerable to Russian intelligence activity, over time, personnel and generational changes, training, and more robust counterintelligence programs by the three countries should reduce further this vulnerability. As I noted earlier, cooperation on intelligence issues began before the idea of NATO enlargement took root. In that respect, sharing intelligence in the NATO context builds upon a pattern of cooperation of nearly a decade. As with other aspects of NATO integration, it will take some time and technical advice and assistance from other NATO members for the governments of these three countries to totally overcome the legacy of their communist past. As a critical element of such a program, the three governments must devote adequate resources to support professionalized intelligence and counterintelligence services, and must demonstrate their political support for these services' role in safeguarding the democratic political order. Lastly, by the time the three invitees join NATO, a decade will have passed since the collapse of their communist regimes. Contacts with the U.S., other allies, and NATO, coupled with continuing modernization programs and priority assistance efforts from current NATO members, should help to ensure that all three countries satisfy membership security requirements by the time of their accession to NATO in April 1999. In closing, I would like to thank the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, and the Ranking Member, Senator Biden, for including the Shelby-Kerrey condition as part of the Managers' amendment, and for their leadership in ensuring the thorough and expeditious consideration of this historic resolution.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Stevens, Senator Bond, Senator Domenici and their staffs for their efforts on behalf of the citizens of Alabama. Over the last several months, Alabama has suffered greatly as a result of multiple natural disasters. As the state was addressing the flooding in its Southern regions, a series of violent tornados devastated portions of Northern Alabama. These terrible events resulted in loss of life and extensive property and infrastructure damage. In many cases, whole communities were destroyed. While communities have banded together to begin the process of rebuilding their lives, the need for assistance is obvious to anyone who has viewed the destruction firsthand. I appreciate the efforts of the Senator from Missouri as the Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on VA/HUD and Independent Agencies to increase the funding provided by the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. Although there has been extensive promotion of buyouts and relocation, it is my understanding that only 3 million dollars is available to the State of Alabama through hazard mitigation funding for this purpose. These funds are dramatically insufficient to meet the current needs and demands of the communities hit by these disasters. It is my understanding that the State of Alabama will be eligible for the CDBG funds included in this bill to respond to the flood and tornado disasters. Is it the Chairman's understanding that this funding could be used by the State for buyouts?

Mr. SHELBY. If the State is able to use CDBG money for buyouts, this will certainly help them meet the demand for buyouts that currently exceed the funding made available through the hazard mitigation program. Is it correct that States eligible for this funding would be able to obtain waivers from the low to moderate income requirement in order to make use of this funding for the purposes of responding to their disaster needs?

Mr. SHELBY. I want to thank the Senator from Missouri again for his help and effort to ensure that adequate funding is provided for disaster assistance. It is my hope that this funding will be made available expeditiously and equitably to those States currently recovering from disasters. While the funding provided through this bill, due in great part to your assistance, will help, I believe that Alabama will still face huge hurdles in its recovery process. I look forward to continuing to work with you to address the needs of those trying to rebuild.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senate Joint Resolution 42, the resolution of disapproval. Much has already been said on this issue, and I will make my comments brief. The United States Government has been working with the Government of Mexico for over a decade on fighting the flow of drugs. Year after year, we have received promises, commitments, and declarations to reduce the flow of narcotics from Mexico. But we have not seen the concrete actions that are required to block the flow of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana into the United States. For example, in 1997, Mexico agreed to facilitate the extradition of narcotics traffickers. In fact, no Mexican national has been extradited and surrendered to the United States as a result of that agreement. In a recent hearing, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence heard from witnesses from the Justice Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Drug Enforcement Administration on the status of Mexican antidrug efforts. While I cannot go into detail, their testimony was not at all optimistic and was, in fact, extremely disturbing to me. Of greatest concern is the endemic corruption that runs rampant at all levels throughout those Mexican institutions tasked with combating narcotics trafficking. The story on the front page of today's New York Times, describing corruption in the ranks of the Mexican military is, if accurate, especially disturbing, since the military is considered less corrupt than the Federal police force. While Mexican officials often speak of efforts to prevent this corruption, no definitive steps have been taken to target the illicit drug monies that make this corruption possible. New laws are discussed, debated, in some cases even enacted, but they are not implemented. And while there have been a few highly publicized prosecutions of corrupt officials, many more are allowed to retire or are simply reassigned. I wonder whether criminal prosecution is selective and whether such determinations are themselves reflections of such corruption. Again, actions speak louder than words. I understand that the Clinton administration and other regional governments are discussing the concept of a regional approach to drug cooperation certification, to replace the current process. I have serious doubts about replacing the current system with regional certification, since the almost certain result would be that Mexico and others would be given a pass rather than being held accountable for their actions. Simply stated, it would make certification a meaningless process of averaging an array of mediocre and poor performances. Furthermore, before considering Mexico as a member of such a regional group, we should consider Mexico's participation in current regional counternarcotics efforts. It is hardly encouraging. For example, the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force located in Key West, FL, is one such organization. It includes representatives from all of the United States armed services, as well as law enforcement agencies, and an equal contribution from our British and Dutch allies. I urge my colleagues to visit the Task Force and hear their frustrations regarding Mexico. Again, while Mexico says it is using every asset to prevent the transshipment of drugs into the United States, the officials there will tell you this is just not so. They cite example after example of the detection and tracking of drug-carrying ships and planes. But when it comes to handing off these targets to the Mexican authorities, there is either no response or such a limited and late response, the traffickers often escape and disappear into Mexico. When we make informal suggestions that Mexico send its representatives to the multi-national task force to correct this problem, the response is that they are willing to discuss it. But, they have been discussing it for several years now. Mr. President, for these reasons I strongly support the resolution to decertify Mexico. It is time to judge Mexico on its actions rather than empty promises.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. How much time remains for the other side?

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to urge my colleagues to support the passage of S. 1668, the Disclosure to Congress Act of 1998. This legislation directs the President to inform employees of the intelligence community that they may disclose information, including classified information, to an appropriate oversight committee of Congress when that information is evidence of misconduct, fraud, or gross mismanagement. The committee is hopeful that this legislation will also encourage employees within the intelligence community to bring such information to an appropriate committee of Congress rather than unlawfully disclosing such information to the media, as happens from time to time. It is imperative that individuals with sensitive or classified information about misconduct within the executive branch have a ``safe harbor'' for disclosure where they know the information will be properly safeguarded and thoroughly investigated. Further, employees within the intelligence community must know that they may seek shelter in that ``safe harbor'' without fear of retribution. It is not generally known that the Whistle Blower Protection Act does not cover employees of the agencies within the intelligence community. The whistle blower statute also expressly proscribes the disclosure of information that is specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs. In other words, classified information is not covered by the current whistle blower statute. Therefore, employees within the intelligence community are not protected from adverse personnel actions if they choose to disclose such information to Congress. In fact, an employee who discloses classified information to Congress without prior approval is specifically subject to sanctions which may include reprimand, termination of a security clearance, suspension without pay, or removal. Last year, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 which included section 306, a provision with language similar to the bill before you. Section 306, however, was much broader than the language in this bill because it directed the President to inform all executive branch employees that it would not be contrary to law, regulation, executive order, or public policy to disclose certain information, including classified information, to an appropriate committee or their own Member of Congress. The Senate passed that bill by a vote of 98 to 1. Shortly after the Senate vote, the administration issued a Statement of Administration Policy claiming that section 306 was unconstitutional and that if it remained in the bill, in its present form, senior advisers would recommend that the President veto the bill. Last year, in conference, members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence also expressed concern over the constitutional implications of section 306. Our House colleagues were also mindful of the administration's veto threat as expressed in the Statement of Administration Policy. In response to their concerns, the Senate offered an amendment that significantly narrowed the scope of the provision to cover only employees of agencies within the intelligence community, as does this bill. The amendment offered in conference further narrowed the provision by allowing disclosure only to committees with primary jurisdiction over the agency involved. In deference to our colleagues' concerns, however, our committee agreed to amend the provision to express a sense of the Congress that the Congress and executive branch have equal standing to receive this type of information. In conference, members of both committees committed to hold hearings in the second session of the 105th Congress with the intent to fully examine the constitutional implications to such legislation and to pursue appropriate legislative remedy. Our committee fulfilled our obligation by holding hearings on February 4 and 11. The committee heard from constitutional scholars and legal experts on both sides of the issue. An administration representative argued that section 306 and any similar language represents an unconstitutional infringement on the President's authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. The administration asserted the following: The President as Commander in Chief, Chief Executive, and sole organ of the Nation in its external relations has ultimate and unimpeded authority over the collection, retention, and dissemination of intelligence and other national security information. Therefore, any congressional enactment that may be interpreted to divest the President of his ultimate control over national security information is an unconstitutional usurpation of the exclusive authority of the Executive. Finally, the Administration argues that the Senate's language vests lower-ranking personnel in the Executive Branch with a ``right'' to furnish such information to a Member of Congress without prior official authorization from the President or his designee. Section 306 and any similar provision is, therefore, unconstitutional. The committee also heard from constitutional scholars that argued that the President's authority in this area is not exclusive. Hence, Congress also has the authority to regulate the collection, retention, and dissemination of national security information. Their argument was as follows: A claim of exclusive authority must be substantiated by an explicit textual grant of such authority by the Constitution. There is no express constitutional language regarding the regulation of national security information as it pertains to the President. Therefore, the President's authority to regulate national security information is an implied authority flowing from his responsibilities as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. As the regulation of national security information is implicit in the command authority of the President, if is equally implicit in the broad array of national security authorities vested in the Congress by the Constitution. In fact, Congress has legislated extensively over a long period of time to require the President to provide such information to Congress. Therefore, Congress may legislate in this area because the Executive and Legislative Branches share constitutional authority to regulate national security information. This legislation is also constitutional because it does not prevent the President from accomplishing his constitutionally assigned functions and any intrusion upon his authority is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress. The committee found the latter argument to be persuasive and determined that the Administration's intransigence on this issue compelled the committee to act. The bill before you is a modified version of section 306, but still directs the President to inform employees and contractors of the covered agencies that it is not prohibited by law, executive order, or regulation to disclose to the appropriate committee, information that the employee reasonably believes to provide direct and specific evidence of, one, a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; two, a false statement to Congress on an issue of material fact; three, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, a flagrant abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. This bill is intended to ensure that members receive information only in their capacity as a member of the committee concerned. The committee fully appreciates the need to protect national security information, particularly information that might reveal sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Therefore, it is critical that classified information received by a member of one of the appropriate committees be protected in accordance with that particular committee's rules. The Intelligence Committee, for example, must follow a very strict procedure before any classified information could be disclosed to the public. Accordingly, a member is not free to accept classified information as a member of a committee unrestrained by such rules or to withhold knowledge of the information from the committee's leadership. When individual Members are entrusted with classified information, they may not pick and choose what role they wish to play in an attempt to circumvent their responsibility to safeguard our nation's secrets. We cannot disregard our obligations, under Senate rules, in order to serve our own political interests. If a Senator is not a member of one of the applicable committees and is approached by an employee from the intelligence community, it is the hope of the Intelligence Committee that the member would direct the employee to the appropriate committee so that the employee would enjoy the full protection of this legislation. The various national security committees enjoy a long history of trust with the executive branch and this bill is intended to prevent a member or members from inadvertently or intentionally spoiling that record. This bill further directs the President to inform such employees that members of the appropriate committees have a ``need to know'' and are authorized to receive such information. This language is consistent with the argument propounded by the administration in a brief that it filed in the Supreme Court in 1989, namely that . . . the president has uniformly limited access to classified information to persons who have a need to know the particular information, such as a congressional committee having specific jurisdiction over the subject matter. There is no question that the appropriate committees need this type of information to effectively perform their oversight responsibilities and the administration seems to agree that these committees have a ``need to know.'' Our only disagreement is over the means by which this type of information is brought to the attention of Congress. In accordance with Executive Order No. 12,958, classified information must remain under the control of the originating agency and it may not be disseminated without proper authorization. Consequently, an executive branch employee may not disclose classified information to Congress without prior approval. In fact, employees are advised that the agency will provide ``access as is necessary for Congress to perform its legislative functions. . . .'' In other words, an executive agency will decide what Members of Congress may need to know to perform their constitutional oversight functions. We believe that Members of Congress are best positioned to decide what they need to know. If an employee must secure prior authorization before they can bring evidence of wrongdoing to an appropriate committee, we may never get the opportunity to make that assessment. Therefore, this legislation is critical if we are to effectively discharge our constitutional obligations. I urge my colleagues to support this bill as they did last year and send a clear message to the President that the United States Congress will not be subject to the whims of a Chief Executive that may wish to withhold evidence of wrongdoing in the name of national security. Mr. President, before I yield the floor, I send to the desk a Congressional Budget Office cost estimate for S. 1668, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.