Richard Shelby

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Yes. Title VIII covers any still-classified U.S. Government records that are related to crimes committee by the Japanese Imperial Government during World War II.

Mr. SHELBY. Under title VIII, all still-classified records likely to contain such information should be surveyed to determine if they contain relevant information. If records are found to contain information related to actions by the Japanese Imperial Government during the Second World War, those records would be reviewed for declassification by the IWG under the criteria provided in the title. However, in the interests of safeguarding legitimate national security interests, the Director of Central Intelligence still maintains the discretion to protect the disclosure of operational files under section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947. Given the nature and age of the files it is unlikely he will need to exercise this authority. Title VIII requires an agency head who determines that one of the exceptions for disclosure applies to notify the appropriate congressional committees of a determination that disclosure and release of records would be harmful to a specific interest. It is the intent of title VIII that the IWG will be able to undertake an effort to search through U.S. Government records and disclose classified materials under statutory guidelines regarding the activities of the Japanese Imperial Government during the Second World War.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I am disappointed, but perhaps not surprised, to be back on the floor with the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. After 8 years of subordinating national security to political concerns, the Clinton-Gore administration now exits on a similar note. Three days before the election, in the face of hysterical, largely inaccurate, but extremely well-timed media lobbying blitz, the President overruled his national security experts and vetoed this bill over a provision designed to reduce damaging leaks of classified national security information. Ironically, the White House--with the full knowledge of Chief of Staff John Podesta--had previously signed off on section 304 of the Intelligence bill, the anti ``leaks'' provision that prompted the veto. Section 304, which has been public since May and which represents the product of extensive consultations with the Justice Department and the Senate Judiciary Committee, would have filled gaps in existing law by giving the Justice Department new authority to prosecute all unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Section 304 and the rest of the intelligence authorization bill were unanimously approved by the Intelligence Committee on April 27, and adopted by the full Senate without dissent on October 2. The President's Executive Office submitted to the Congress a ``Statement of Administration Policy'' in support of the leaks provision. The conference report was adopted by the Senate on October 12. Let me take a minute to explain why the committee decided, after extensive consultations with the Justice Department, to adopt this provision. While current law bars unauthorized disclosure of certain categories of information, for example, cryptographic or national defense information, many other sensitive intelligence and diplomatic secrets are not protected. And the U.S. Government, in the words of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, ``leaks like a sieve.'' While leakers seldom if ever face consequences for leaks, our intelligence professionals do. These range from the very real risks to the lives and freedom of U.S. intelligence officers and their sources, to the compromise of sensitive and sometimes irreplaceable intelligence collection methods. Human or technical, these sources won't be there to warn of the next terrorist attack, crisis, or war. If someone who is providing us intelligence on terrorist plans or foreign missile programs asks, ``If I give you this information, can you protect it,'' the honest answer is often ``no.'' So they may rethink, reduce, or even end their cooperation. Leaks also alienate friendly intelligence services and make them think twice before sharing sensitive information, as the National Commission on Terrorism recently concluded. Some of section 304's opponents downplay the seriousness of leaks compared to traditional espionage. Yet leaks can be even more damaging. Where a spy generally serves one customer, media leaks are available to anyone with 25 cents to buy the Washington Post, or access to an Internet connection. As important as what this legislation does is what it doesn't do. Media organizations and others have conjured up a parade of dire consequences that would ensue if section 304 had become law. Yet this carefully drafted provision would not have silenced whistle blowers, who would continue to enjoy current statutory protections, including those governing the disclosure of classified information to appropriate congressional oversight committees. Having led the move to enact whistleblower protection for intelligence community employees, I am extremely sensitive to this concern. It would not have criminalized mistakes: the provision would have applied only in cases where unauthorized disclosures are made both willfully and knowingly. That means that the person both intends and understands the nature of the act. Mistakes could not be prosecuted since they are, by definition, neither willful nor knowing. It would not have eroded first amendment rights. In particular, section 304 is not an Official Secrets Act, as some critics have alleged. Britain's Official Secrets Act authorizes the prosecution of journalists who publish classified information. Section 304, on the other hand, criminalizes the actions of persons who are charged with protecting classified information, not those who receive or publish it. Even under existing statutes, the Department of Justice rarely seeks to interview or subpoena journalists when investigating leaks. In fact, there has never been a prosecution of a journalist under existing espionage or unauthorized disclosure statutes, despite the fact that some of these current laws criminalize the actions of those who receive classified information without proper authorization. Critics also cite--correctly--the Government's tendency to overclassify information, especially embarrassing information, the disclosure of which would not damage national security, the standard for classification. But these practices are already prohibited under the current Executive order on classification, E.O. 12958, which not only provides a procedure for government employees to challenge a classification determination they believe to be improper, but encourages them to do so. The real issue is: who decides what should be classified? With commendable honesty, critic Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists went beyond ritual denunciation to spell out his real concern: Section 304, as he told the Washington Post, ``turns over to the executive branch the right to determine what will be protected.'' In fact, designated officials within the executive branch have always exercised that authority. What Mr. Aftergood and the media want is to arrogate that authority to themselves and their sources. While designated classification officials may err, they--not disgruntled mid- level employees--are the ones charged under our laws and procedures with balancing the protection of our nation's secrets with the need for government openness. Mr. President, I am disappointed that President Clinton chose to veto the Intelligence Authorization Act over this provision, and I am especially disappointed at the manner in which this occurred. I believe, however, that it is in our national interest that the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 be enacted into law. Therefore, the bill before the Senate is identical to the conference report vetoed by the President, but for the ``leaks'' provision.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize Mr. Robert L. McCurley Jr., of Tuscaloosa, AL for his dedicated work on behalf of the Kiwanis International Foundation. Mr. McCurley retired on September 30, 2000 after two terms as the president of Kiwanis International's charitable arm. I commend him for his commitment to helping the less fortunate throughout the world. Bob McCurley's duties as Kiwanis International Foundation president have taken him around the world in his efforts to improve the lives of the underprivileged. Under his leadership, the foundation has provided grants to meet the needs of children from Bulgaria and Haiti to India and Cambodia. In particular, the Kiwanis International Foundation has raised millions of dollars to combat iodine deficiency disorders, the leading preventable cause of mental retardation in the world today. Mr. McCurley earned degrees in both engineering and law from the University of Alabama. He is director of the Alabama Law Institute and an adjunct professor at the Alabama School of Law. He has also served as a municipal judge and has authored 12 books on law and government. Mr. McCurley has been a member of Kiwanis in Gadsden and Tuscaloosa for more than 30 years. He led the Kiwanis organization in Alabama in 1983-1984, served as Trustee and then Vice President of Kiwanis International from 1987-1992, and since 1994 has served the Kiwanis International Foundation as a Trustee, Treasurer, and President. In addition to Kiwanis, he has served his community as a volunteer in leadership positions with the March of Dimes, Boys Club, Focus on Senior Citizens, and Association for Retarded Children. Robert L. McCurley Jr.'s charitable work has made a difference in countless lives in Alabama and throughout the world. UNICEF estimates that Kiwanis support of iodine deficiency disorder programs is saving more than 8 million children each year from mental and physical disabilities. I would like to congratulate Mr. McCurley on a stellar term as President of the Kiwanis International Foundation, and wish him and his family the best in the future.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, the Senate has before it the conference report to H.R. 4392, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. The conference report reflects the legislation, S. 2507, that was approved unanimously by the Select Committee on Intelligence on April 27, 2000, and amended and approved by the Senate on Monday, October 2. I thank Senator Bryan, the vice chairman of the committee for his assistance in expediting this conference report. This is Senator Bryan's first year as vice chairman. It has been a pleasure to work cooperatively with him on a wide range of issues, and I regret that this also will be his last year on the committee and in the Senate. The committee has been increasingly troubled by the NSA's growing inability to meet technological challenges and to provide America's leaders with vital signals intelligence, SIGINT. Success in NSA's mission is critical to our national security. Therefore, the conference report reflects the start of our investment in resources and support aimed at restoring the NSA's' capabilities. I am proud to report that the conference report addresses the growing problem of leaks of classified information. The conferees endorsed the Senate provision that will close a gap in U.S. law to ensure the prosecution of all unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Successive directors of Central Intelligence have decried the growing problem of leaks of classified information and the damage it causes to our national security. DCI Tenet has publically stated that the U.S. Government ``leaks like a sieve.'' Arguments that section 304 will stifle the freedom of the press simply don't pass muster. This provision has nothing to do with restraining publication. It simply criminalizes knowing and willful disclosure of properly classified information by those charged with protecting it. The Senate Intelligence Committee unanimously approved this provision and worked closely with the Attorney General and the intelligence community to incorporate changes requested by the Department of Justice. The Departments of Justice and State and the CIA all support the provision as approved by the conference committee. Another provision of the bill is designed to ensure that the State Department corrects the serious, systemic security weaknesses that have repeatedly placed at risk sensitive classified intelligence information collected at considerable risk and expense. This provision would require that the Director of Central Intelligence certify that the retention and storage of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) by any element of the State is in full compliance with all applicable DCI directives relating to the handling, retention, or storage of such information. The bill requires the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to create an analytic capability for intelligence relating to prisoners of war and missing persons. The analytic capability will extend to activities with respect to prisoners of war and missing persons after December 31, 1990. Also, the bill strengthens the IG's requirements to be fully engaged in investigating and responding to possible wrongdoing by senior CIA officials. In the wake of the investigation of former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch this provision will ensure that the CIA policies its senior officials. The conference report also contains the Counterintelligence Reform Act of 2000. S. 2089 was introduced by Senators Specter, Torricelli, Thurmond, Biden, Grassley, Feingold, Helms, Schumer, Sessions, and Leahy in April in the wake of Congressional and other investigations into PRC espionage against the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons laboratories and other U.S. government facilities, and the U.S. government's response. Those investigations focused attention on the application of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and highlighted coordination, information-sharing, and other problems within and among the Department of Energy, FBI, and Department of Justice. The amendment will correct some of the problems in coordinating and sharing information between federal agencies, and will clarify procedures and the statutory roles of various agencies in the investigation and prosecution of espionage and other cases affecting national security. I thank all Senators for their cooperation in this conference report, particularly the members of the committee. I also thank the staff of the Select Committee on Intelligence for their hard work in developing this legislation. Section 304

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. I urge adoption of the conference report and ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. SHELBY. I thank the Senator for his support of this report. I agree with my colleague from Montana that the intention of these funds within the framework established by the ITS account are available to the State of Montana for use in both completing the STARS program, as well as, working on the GIS/GPS project.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, what is the pending business? Is there a quorum call?

Mr. SHELBY. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate will have the opportunity to consider the conference agreement for the fiscal year 2001 Transportation appropriations bill. I believe that this bill strikes a funding balance between the modes of transportation, funds critical safety initiatives, reflects the priorities of the overwhelming majorities of both the House and the Senate, and provides adequate flexibility and direction for the Department as it transitions into the next administration. Mr. President, allow me to take just a few minutes to summarize and highlight a few of the provisions of the conference report that is now before the Senate. Of the three issues that the administration indicated were critical to it in the safety arena, I'm pleased to report that we're three for three. And, so is the administration. These issues have been negotiated in a fashion and with a spirit of accommodating the interests of the House, the Senate, and the administration. Through some creativity and with an awareness of the specific concerns of all the parties, we have been able to meet everyone more than halfway. The compromise language on the hours of service regulations in this conference report allows the Department to move forward with the analysis of the docket, issue a supplemental NPRM, and do everything short of issuing the final rule. I think that is a reasonable compromise and one that should provide the incentive for the administration to fully listen and solicit views on all sides of this issue. As many of you know, I have a concern that NHTSA has ignored calls from consumer groups and critics of the proposes static stability factor rating system in its rush to publish a rollover rating as part of the NCAP program. Notwithstanding that concern, I have been convinced by the distinguished House Chairman, Mr. Wolf, that he believes that NHTSA, in light of our attention to the issue, will now act responsibly in this area. Accordingly, the conference agreement maintains the Senate requirement to conduct a 9-month study at the National Academy of Sciences. The Academy is directed to investigate the usefulness of the information that NHTSA proposes to provide, the scientific underpinnings of the NHTSA approach, and consideration of whether dynamic testing is preferable to the static stability factor calculation--while simultaneously allowing NHTSA to move forward with its proposal. This issue deserves all our attention as it evolved because rollovers are among the most deadly of accident types and providing bad information to consumers could well mean more highway fatalities. People have a right to expect that the information that the Federal Government provides is accurate, unbiased, and based on sound testing methodologies. I am pleased that in the conference agreement NHTSA will have to meet that standard, if not in the short term, at least in the long term. The funding levels keep faith with the recently enacted AIR-21 capital and airport authorizations, and come very close to the President's budget request for FAA operations. The Highway and Transit accounts are funded at the TEA-21 authorized levels; the Coast Guard, adjusted for some of the capital projects funded in the supplemental, is above the President's requested level for fiscal year 2001; NHTSA is above the President's request once it is adjusted downward for the RABA shift that was a non-starter with both the House and the Senate. Amtrak is funded at the President's request and the remaining accounts: Pipeline Safety, the Inspector General, the National Transportation Safety Board are all at or above the President's request. There is no tenable argument that can be made that there isn't enough money in this bill. The conference agreement includes approximately 14 percent more budget resources than the fiscal year 2000 enacted levels. In addition, we have tried to reflect and accommodate the priorities of our subcommittee members, full committee members, and the membership of both the House and Senate. We have listened to what our members have requested us to do and accordingly, the negotiated compromise reflects the priority that members have put on highway and transit spending. There are other issues that have been the subject of some attention-- the most notable of which is the .08 blood alcohol content. The Senate bill included a provision which would hold back a portion of highway funds from states which fail to adopt a .08 blood alcohol content standard. The conference agreement modifies that provision by providing a more graduated, phased-in approach of the highway holdback and more time for states to adopt the .08 standard. I also want to point out that no state incurs the loss of highway funds if they adopt the .08 blood alcohol content standard by 2007. Whatever funds withheld from them starting in 2004 would be returned without penalty under the hold- harmless clause as long as a .08 standard is adopted by 2007. I think this is a reasonable and fair transition to a standard that we know will save lives. Mr. President, there are a few people I would particularly like to thank before we vote. My ranking members, Senator Lautenberg, has been a valued partner in this process during his final year as the ranking member of the Senate Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee. While we have had our disagreements and differences, I have been privileged to work with him and believe this nation's transportation policy have benefitted by the substantial contributions he has made during his tenure in the Senate and on the subcommittee. Senators Stevens and Byrd have provided guidance throughout the year, and made a successful bill possible by ensuring an adequate allocation for transportation programs. My House counterpart, Congressman Frank Wolf and his staff: John Blazey, Rich Efford, Stephanie Gupta, and Linda Muir, have been particularly accommodating and collegial. Finally, Mr. President, I want to thank Steve Cortese and Jay Kimmitt of the full committee staff for their invaluable assistance and advice throughout the process. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the conference report.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to honor Dr. Emmett O. Templeton of Birmingham, Alabama who recently received the American College of Radiology's (ACR) Gold Medal. Dr. Templeton currently chairs the department of radiology at Montclair Baptist Medical Center in Birmingham and continues to faithfully serve the community. Dr. Templeton is an extraordinary individual who, as Chairman of the board of Chancellors of the American College of Radiology, made a lasting impression on Members of Congress by his straight-talking style. He served his specialty, radiology, and the nation's public policy in health by dealing with problems head-on and working to find solutions. Dr. Templeton has been an asset to all of us in Congress and is deserving of the ACR Gold Medal which recognizes his marvelous achievements. In addition, I have included the remarks made in the ACR Bulletin about Dr. Templeton and why he has been awarded the Gold Medal. Emmett O. Templeton, M.D. At 53, Emmett ``Neal'' Templeton, M.D., is one of the youngest recipients of the ACR Gold Medal. A unique and talented radiologist, Dr. Templeton is perhaps best known for his outstanding contributions and dedicated service to the college. Never one to toot his own horn, Dr. Templeton's unassuming manner, excellent intermediary talents and astute guidance have earned him the widespread respect of his peers. He has played a significant role in the advancement and success of the ACR and has been an inspiration to many of his colleagues in the southeast. An ACR Fellow, Dr. Templeton became actively involved with the ACR fewer than 15 years ago, yet has served on more than 20 commissions and committees and participated for several years on many of them. The wide range of committees he has assisted is a reflection of his avid interest in all aspects of radiology, including accurate coding, practice matters and relationships with clinics and hospitals. ``Neal is an unusually bright and charismatic individual, which is immediately evident to those he meets. It is the reason he has so frequently been chosen for leadership,'' says Milton Gallant, M.D., director of radiology at The General Hospital Center at Passaic in New Jersey. ``Leadership opportunities, coupled with unusual statesmanship and hard work, have resulted in his endeavors being uniformly successful.'' Dr. Templeton has selflessly shared his time and counsel in ACR leadership roles, beginning as vice chair for the Commission on Radiologic Practice, The Commission on Economics, the Committee on State and Economic Legislation of the Commission on Economics, the Committee on Coding and Nomenclature and the Commission on Government Relations have all benefitted from his direction as chair. From 1992 to 1994, he served as vice chair of the Board of Chancellors. The following two years he served as chairman of the board while also serving as chairman of the Commission on Government Relations. In 1996 he was elected ACR president. Bibb Allen Jr., M.D., one of Templeton's partners at Birmingham Radiological Group, saw firsthand the sacrifices Templeton willingly made during his tenure on the Board of Chancellors. ``Neal spent the vast majority of his personal time away from the hospital conducting the business of the college,'' Allen says. ``All radiologists have benefitted from Neal's leadership and skill.'' Dr. Templeton is also a member of the Radiology Residency Review Committee, the AMA Practice Expense Advisory Committee, AMA-CPT Editorial Panel, the Government Relations Oversight Committee and the Practice Expense Advisory Committee panel. His effective management style has made him an accomplished mediator. He is well known for his concern and support for technologists, office managers and office staff, recognizing the importance of their role in the practice of radiology. According to Barbara E. Chick, M.D., past councilor, chancellor and vice president of the ACR, ``His availability to meet with anyone, at any time, to help problem-solve was a great asset to the field of radiology when the ``turf'' battles were so common.'' Chick adds, ``I believe his keen insight has been beneficial to many practices in their marketing and reimbursement activities.'' Templeton has a unique knowledge of radiologic practice and economic matters. He has been appointed to the boards of HMO and PPO organizations as a result of the model hospital and imaging center practices he has demonstrated in his own practice. One of the highlights of his career was his stewardship of diagnostic imaging centers as an alternative to private office or hospital practice. He was an early expert in this concept during a time when the recognition of radiologists as ``physicians'' was not unequivocal. Currently chair of the department of radiology at Montclair Baptist Medical Center, Birmingham, Ala., Templeton earned his medical degree from the University of Alabama in 1973 and completed his internship and residency at the University of Alabama's hospitals and clinics. Even after achieving the highest positions in the ACR, he continues to serve the college and radiology ``in the trenches.'' Michael A. Sullivan, M.D., associate chairman of the department of diagnostic radiology at Ochsner Clinic in New Orleans, sums up Templeton's character nicely: ``Neal is a wonderful individual who is forthright, honest and hard- working. He exemplifies the term `involved radiologist.' ''

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. I understand the concerns of the Senator from Delaware. We expect that in almost all cases intelligence operations exempted from future treaty-implementing legislation will have been authorized in writing. I would note however, that many individual actions might be authorized through general written policies, rather than case-specific authorizations. Neither would I rule oral authorization in exigent circumstances. The Committee believes that intelligence agencies would be well advised to make written records of such authorizations, so as to guard against lax management or later assertions that unrecorded authorization was given for a person's otherwise unlawful actions. Such written records will also protect the government employees from allegations that their actions were not authorized.

Mr. SHELBY. Yes, it is. Section 305 deals solely with the application of U.S. law to U.S. Intelligence activities. It does not address the question of the lawfulness of such activities under the laws of foreign countries, and it is in no respect meant to suggest that a person violating the laws of the United States may claim the purported authorization of a foreign government to carry out those activities as justification or as a defense in a prosecution for violation of U.S. laws.

Mr. SHELBY. That is certainly our intent. If a future law is to qualify under section 305 of this bill, we would expect its status as implementing legislation to be stated in the law, or some other contemporaneous legislative history.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. The Senator from Delaware is correct. The Committee expects that the Justice Department will use its prosecutorial discretion wisely. In some cases, administrative remedies are clearly more appropriate. In each case however--as under all criminal laws-- prosecutors will need to judge whether criminal charges are warranted.

Mr. SHELBY. I agree with the Senator from Delaware 100 percent, and I can assure this body that in passing section 303, no member of the Select Committee on Intelligence intended that it be used as an excuse for investigating the press. That is why the scope of this provision is limited to persons who disclose, or attempt to disclose, classified information acquired as a result of authorized access to such information. Such persons have a duty to protect classified information has no right to disclose that particular information to persons not authorized to receive it, persons, even if he or she should later become a journalist. By the same token, however, the statute is not intended to lead to investigation or prosecution of journalists who previously had authorized access to classified information and later, in their capacity as journalist, receive leaked information.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I want to take a minute or two and talk about my colleague from Nevada, Senator Bryan. He is going to be leaving the Senate soon. As the vice chairman of the committee--a long- term and long-time member of the Senate Intelligence Committee--he has been a delight to work with most of the time. Seriously. He puts a lot of effort into what we do on the Senate Intelligence Committee. I would be remiss if I did not bring that up as we pass this bill tonight. We have a conference to go to. We will be spending a lot of time together in the waning days of this Congress. Dick Bryan served this country well, first as a State legislator, as the attorney general of his State, as the Governor of his State, and in two terms in the U.S. Senate. I have worked with him on a lot of issues, and I can say this: He is a hard worker, he is smart, he is going to be prepared, he is going to be tough, and he is going to put the Nation first.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the Thompson-Torricelli amendment, or the ``China Nonproliferation Act.'' I do so as a Senator who has long been concerned about the threat posed by China's reckless proliferation of nuclear, missile and other technologies, and as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, with responsibility for our intelligence efforts against this critical national security threat. While this amendment applies to other countries, including Russia and North Korea, we are considering it in the context of Permanent Normal Trade Relations for the People's Republic of China, or PNTR. Therefore, my remarks will, for the most part, focus on that country. I should say at the outset that I intend to support PNTR because I believe that, on balance, taking this step will further U.S. national interests. But China remains, in the words of the Director of Central Intelligence, a ``key supplier'' of sensitive technologies to Iran, Pakistan and other countries. I remind my colleagues that the Intelligence Committee has prepared and made available to Members a summary and compendium of recent intelligence reporting on PRC proliferation. It remains available for your review. I understand that only a handful of Senators have availed themselves of this opportunity. I urge each of you to review this very disturbing and revealing material. Without having done so, you will be voting on this amendment ignorant of the facts as we know them. Whether you choose to vote for or against this amendment, you must not do so without a full appreciation of the facts. Suffice it to say that China has not improved its poor proliferation record. In light of the poor Chinese proliferation record, I believe that risks associated with approving PNTR are managed better if the Thompson-Torricelli amendment is enacted with our new trade relationship with China. Since the sponsors and other Senators are addressing the threat to our national security posed by Chinese proliferation, I will focus primarily on some of those aspects of the problem of greatest concern to the Intelligence Committee. Tracking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been among the Intelligence Committee's very highest budgetary priorities. This is because proliferation is one of our most daunting and resource-intensive intelligence challenges. The materials and technology to build nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the missiles to deliver them are not shipped in the open. They are smuggled across borders and shipped under false documents. Vital technical support to a country's missile or nuclear program may fit on a single computer disk or take the form of clandestine visits by technical experts. The materials used in making weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are often dual use, meaning that they may also be used for peaceful purposes. Our intelligence analysts must compile all the facts to determine the likely use of these materials. This really is rocket science, and nuclear science, and biological and chemical science. Tracking proliferation is not only difficult, it is a critical mission. Timely intelligence provides us with the information we need to support our efforts to deter or dissuade countries, like the People's Republic of China and Russia, from selling nuclear, chemical, biological or missile technologies to rogue states or regions of instability. When deterrence and dissuasion fail, timely intelligence also will support efforts to counter the proliferation and use of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. What is especially frustrating for me, as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, is that while the Intelligence Community is doing its job, gathering intelligence at great expense and risk about who is selling and who is buying technologies of mass destruction, this intelligence is ignored by policymakers. Policy makers have frequently circumvented our sanctions laws by avoiding reaching a determination that could trigger sanctions. They have ensured that the bureaucratic process for reaching a determination that would lead to sanctions is never started, or completed, or impossible standards of evidence are set, so that a judgment never has to be reached. A case in point is the notorious M-11 missile. After years of closed door deliberations on this issue, in September of last year, for the first time, the Intelligence Community stated publicly its longstanding conclusion that ``Pakistan has M-11 SRBMs [Short Range Ballistic Missiles] from China. . . .'' Lest anyone miss the significance of these Chinese missiles now in the hands of Pakistan, or their contribution to instability in South Asia, the community assessed further that these missiles may have a nuclear role. Sales of M-11 technology have twice triggered sanctions against the PRC under the Arms Export Control Act and Export Administration Act. The sale of M-11 missiles should, under current law, have triggered additional, even stricter, sanctions. But despite the clear, and public, conclusion of the Intelligence Community, the State Department has suggested that the Intelligence Community's finding that the M-11 missiles were sold by the PRC to Pakistan did not meet its ``high standard of evidence.'' Failure to follow through on the facts, however unpleasant the facts may be, undercuts the credibility of our entire nonproliferation policy. I am hopeful that the Thompson-Torricelli amendment will force a more robust response to the intelligence collected on proliferation. Under this amendment, policy makers will be forced--on an annual basis--to collect the evidence of proliferation and provide a report to Congress. This report will be more comprehensive and focused than those we have received to date. The report must identify persons from China, Russia, North Korea and other states when there is credible evidence that this person has contributed to the design, development, production, or acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or ballistic missiles. The report also will identify any person of a covered country that is engaged in activities prohibited under the relevant treaties and agreements regarding the possession and transfer of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The President is directed in the China Nonproliferation Act to report information on noncompliance with international arms control and proliferation agreements by the covered countries. Finally, the report must include an assessment of the threats to our national security, and that of our allies, resulting from proliferation--whether or not this proliferation can be determined to meet the legal or evidentiary standards the State Department asserts to avoid reaching sanctions judgements. This will go a long way towards compelling the State Department to acknowledge serious instances of nuclear and other proliferation. Furthermore, the Director of Central Intelligence is required to reach a determination regarding what transfer or sale of goods, services, or technology have a ``significant potential to make a contribution to the development, improvement, or production of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or of ballistic or cruise missile systems.'' Again, mandating this report will allow us to avoid the unpleasant situation we have been in for years in which the President has been able to avoid reaching necessary judgements about proliferation activities and their consequences. This report will contribute significantly to the ability of the U.S. Congress to conduct oversight and to make informed judgements on matters of national security. The information detailed in the report should better enable us to judge the appropriateness and, over time, the effectiveness of the sanctions provided for in this amendment. Some have complained that this bill forces the President to impose sanctions. This is not the case. The amendment provides adequate flexibility to the President since he can waive the sanctions. However, he must specify his reasons for doing so, and Congress may disagree through procedures set out in the bill. This legislation will make Presidential decision-making more transparent and will ensure that the President's decisions are based on the best intelligence available. Mr. President, would our citizens want to continue to sell items on the United States Munitions List to an individual that has ``contributed to the design, development, production, or acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or ballistic or cruise missiles'' for a third party or state. Would our citizens want to continue to license dual-use items that could contribute to this individual's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? Would our citizens want to continue to provide that individual Government assistance in the form of grants, loans, or credits? Would our citizens want to continue co-development or co-production of items on our munitions list with that individual? Of course not. Of course not. I hope we can agree that the United States should neither reward nor contribute to proliferation of the weapons that threaten our own Nation. Without question, the imposition of sanctions against another nation or foreign companies is always a serious matter. The imposition of sanctions has significant foreign and economic policy consequences for the United States and should not be undertaken lightly. Because sanctions can be costly for our own American industries, we must be sure there is a clear national security interest that will be advanced by the sanctions. Curbing proliferation meets this test. The President has declared the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to be a ``national emergency,'' and I think most of us agree with that declaration. I support the Thompson-Torricelli amendment because it takes a balanced, measured approach to the problem of sanctioning Chinese proliferation activities, and similar activities of other countries. In particular, it creates a process to ensure that the U.S. response to future activities of proliferation is never again the inaction, indifference, and self-deception that characterizes the current process. I believe this bill will bring us closer to a situation in which the PRC and other supplier nations clearly understand--for the first time-- that there will be serious consequences when they engage in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that threaten the United States, its allies, and friends. Mr. President, I again urge my colleagues to review the available intelligence. The facts speak for themselves, and they speak very loudly indeed. I urge adoption of the Thompson-Torricelli amendment and yield the floor.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to join some of my fellow Senators in remembering the extraordinary life and service of our friend and colleague, Paul Coverdell. It is a somber day in the Senate Chamber, as we deal with this loss. Paul Coverdell served the people of Georgia with distinction for over 30 years. His passing leaves a significant mark on the many lives he has touched over his lifetime. On behalf of myself and my wife Annette, I offer my condolences to Paul's wife Nancy and his family. Anyone who dealt with Paul Coverdell over the years came to respect him. He was honest, loyal, and dedicated to public service. It was these characteristics that Paul brought to the table every day in his life. Paul's vision as a legislator and commitment to the principles and values for which he truly believed were demonstrated time after time in this Chamber. His commitment to improving education in the U.S. sets a high standard for all public officials. His hard work in the Republican leadership and his vision of a prosperous future for all Americans deserves tremendous praise. Personally, it was truly my privilege to know and work with Paul over the years. We sat next to each other recently in the Senate, as can be seen. He will be remembered as a dedicated American who gave much of his life in service to his Nation. I offer my thoughts and prayers to those close to Paul in this difficult time, especially to his family.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. I thank the Chairman.

Mr. SHELBY. I note to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee an issue in the committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S. 2549. on page 126, the report deals with acquisition programs at the National Security Agency (NSA). I fear that the language of the report could have unintended consequences for the on-going efforts to modernize the National Security Agency. The report mandates that the NSA manage its modernization effort as though it were a traditional major defense acquisition program. If this mandate were applied to each of the individual technology efforts within the NSA, such a requirement could impede NSA's flexibility to modernize and upgrade its capabilities. I would ask the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee whether this was the Committee's intent?

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Does this only relate to bringing up the Thompson bill and nothing else?