Richard Shelby

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. SHELBY. He was going to complete it after this.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. I am concerned with section 1134 which requires the DCI to provide certain information, including information contained in special access programs, to the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committees. I note that this language on special access programs was added after the bill was passed by the Senate. I wish to clarify that the legislative intent of this provision does not wish to clarify that the legislative intent of this provision does not include expanded information relating to intelligence operational activities or sensitive sources and methods. I ask for the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee's clarification regarding the companion section in the State Department Authorization bill, section 1131. Am I correct in understanding that this provision does not levy the same requirement upon the Director of Central Intelligence that is required of the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Commerce?

Mr. SHELBY. I thank the Chairman for that explanation and yield the floor. I look forward to fully reviewing those provisions in the Intelligence Committee next year.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 60 minutes for debate with the time divided as follows: Forty minutes equally divided between the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee; 20 minutes under the control of Senator Levin. I further ask unanimous consent that following the use or yielding back of time, which we anticipate, the conference report be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any additional statements relating to the conference report be printed in the Record.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, following my remarks, an editorial which appeared recently in the New York Times dealing with drug kingpin legislation, and specifically the due process problem I raised, be printed in the Record.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to ask that my colleagues support the conference report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. I want to thank my colleagues in the House for their work on this legislation and especially Chairman Goss and Ranking Member Dixon for their leadership in the conference. I believe that the conference committee put together a solid package for consideration by the full Senate that fairly represents the intelligence priorities set forth in both the Senate and House versions of the Intelligence Authorization Act. I am pleased to report that the conference committee accomplished its task in a bipartisan manner, and I want to thank my colleague from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey, for working so closely with me to produce this legislation. I believe that the conference report embraces many of the key recommendations that the Senate adopted in its version of the bill. We recommended significant increases in funding for high-priority projects aimed at better positioning the Intelligence Community for the threats of the 21st century, while at the same time reducing funds for programs and activities that were not adequately justified or redundant. In so doing, we authorized a moderate increase in overall funding for intelligence programs above the President's request. This is a positive step and I hope that next year the administration will follow our lead and begin to reinvest in our intelligence gathering capabilities. The conference report includes key initiatives that I believe are vital for the future of our Intelligence Community. These initiatives include: 1. bolstering advanced research and development across the Community, to facilitate, among other things, the modernization of NSA and CIA; 2. strengthening efforts in counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-intelligence, and effective covert action; 3. expanding the collection and exploitation of measurements and signatures intelligence, especially ballistic missile intelligence; 4. boosting education, recruiting, and technical training for Intelligence Community personnel; 5. enhancing analytical capabilities; 6. streamlining dissemination of intelligence products; 7. developing our ability to process, exploit and disseminate commercial imagery; and 8. providing new tools for information operations. I believe that the conferees have provided the funds and guidance necessary to ensure that military commanders and national policymakers continue to receive timely, accurate information on threats to our security. At the same time, we have found some critical areas within the Community that are in need of major improvements. In the Senate, we had a distinguished panel of Americans with a broad range of expertise--our Technical Advisory Group--that took a look at some key areas within the Intelligence Community and brought forward some very important recommendations. We thank all the members of the Technical Advisory Group for their time and efforts. I will briefly summarize some of their findings, to the extent that I can in open session, along with some of the other findings of our conference. First, our ability to collect and analyze information on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires renewed emphasis and innovative thinking. As our potential enemies seek out the ability to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, we must develop the ability to detect these efforts. This bill places a great deal of emphasis on our ability to collect such information known as Measurements and Signatures Intelligence or MASINT. Second, both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees agree that our Intelligence Community and our Defense Department must move quickly to address what our Technical Advisory Group identifies as a critical shortfall in our ability to properly task, process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence information collection by our airborne and overhead imagery assets. As we modernize our Imagery Intelligence or IMINT architecture, the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees agree that we should not be spending the taxpayers money on collection architectures that we may not be able to utilize fully. Third, we have once again placed strong emphasis on recapitalizing the National Security Agency's information technology infrastructure. As we demand more from our Intelligence Community in a number of areas, we also demand fiscal responsibility. The conference report includes a number of reductions to programs that were not adequately justified or were redundant with other elements within the Intelligence Community. The legislation contains some important new authorities for the Intelligence Community. I'll mention some of the highlights: First, there are new protections for the identities of former covert agents and for the operational files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency or ``NIMA.'' Second, there are new counterintelligence authorities--these include provisions allowing access to government computers used in classified work by executive branch employees. Also, there are new requirements for the FBI to begin its consultation with agencies that they are investigating at a far earlier stage than before. Third, we have established a commission to study the role and missions of the National Reconnaissance Office or ``NRO.'' This commission will look at the NRO from top to bottom--its findings and recommendations to us and the Senate Armed Services Committee will serve to guide our committees on the future funding and operations of the NRO. I look forward to working with the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee to ensure that the best candidates are selected for membership on this very important commission. If any Member of the Senate wishes to review the classified portions of the bill, they are available off the Senate floor. Finally, Mr. President, there is a significant piece of legislation in this bill that is intended to go after foreign international drug traffickers and those that support their illicit activities. Title eight of this bill, the so-called ``Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act,'' is modeled after the Executive Order that targets the assets of named Colombian traffickers and those that assist them in their trafficking activities. Mr. President, I support strongly efforts to target and destroy significant foreign drug trafficking organizations. I have placed significant emphasis on counter-narcotics in this and every Intelligence Authorization bill since I became Chairman of this Committee. The record is clear. The existing Colombian program has been highly successful. I would be the first to support the President if he chose to expand the program in a thoughtful and measured way. In fact, the Chief Executive already has the constitutional and statutory authority to do so. The President does not need this legislation to expand the scope of this program. Accordingly, Mr. President, I, along with other Members of Congress, have expressed concern with this legislation because it may have some very serious unintended consequences for innocent American citizens. Although the express language of the ``Kingpin'' legislation deals exclusively with foreign persons and entities, it will affect American citizens. Lurking within the seemingly innocuous language is the real possibility of unwitting and innocent American citizens being caught up in its global net. For example, an American business owner may be a joint venture partner with a foreign company that has been designated as ``supporting'' the activities of a foreign narcotics trafficker. Although the American person may be completely unaware of the illicit activities of their foreign partner, their own assets will also be blocked if they are jointly held. The ``Kingpin'' legislation does not provide an opportunity for an American person to seek judicial review of the blocking of their jointly held assets. The result is that Americans may be deprived of their property without due process of law. Let me repeat that, Mr. President, Americans may be deprived of their property without due process of law. Mr. President, I strongly support the expansion of this successful program. I do not, however, support depriving innocent Americans of their fundamental right to due process. Many attempts were made to amend the ``Kingpin'' legislation in conference to make it clear that American citizens have an immediate avenue into Federal District Court should they be snared unjustifiably in this trap. Unfortunately, the sponsors and proponents of this bill in the House and Senate opposed any effort to clarify this fundamental American right. In fact, I have been told that if we were to expressly state that a United States citizen has the right to immediate judicial review, this would, quote, gut the bill, unquote. I disagree. Thomas Jefferson said that our ``Bill of Rights is what the people are entitled to against any government on earth . . . and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference.'' Mr. President, I also believe that our right to due process should not ``rest on inference,'' but rather we should state it clearly and without equivocation. We do not do that in this bill. Mr. President, I fear that in our earnest to pass a ``tough drug bill'' we may have sacrificed part of our freedom. I applaud the sponsors and proponents of this bill for their dedication to protecting our shores from the scourge of illegal drugs. I caution them, however, that their enthusiasm may be dampened as the true implications of this legislation become known. Notwithstanding my concerns, I am encouraged that the conferees did agree to include a provision in the so-called ``Kingpin'' legislation that creates a panel to study whether these kinds of sanction regimes affect U.S. persons doing legitimate business with foreign partners, and whether there are adequate and fair remedies for honest U.S. persons. I commend my colleague from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey, for suggesting this study and also for other areas of leadership on which I have worked with the Senator during my tenure on the Intelligence Committee. He will be leaving the Intelligence Committee at the end of this year whenever his term is up, and we will miss him because he has certainly been a friend, but he has also been a leader to put America's national security first and foremost everywhere it comes up. In my opinion, we have put the cart squarely before the horse dealing with due process. I am confident that such a panel as I alluded to earlier will confirm my concerns and the concerns of others and make substantive recommendations that my well-meaning colleagues will ultimately acknowledge and I hope will be able to accept. The conference committee worked closely together in a bipartisan fashion to produce the comprehensive intelligence authorization act. I urge my colleagues to support its adoption.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to offer the ``Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy Act'' for myself and Senator Bryan. This bill would address the significant deficiencies in the Financial Services Modernization Act passed by this very body last week. Our bill would provide that consumers have (1) notice of the categories of nonpublic personal information that institutions collect, as well as the practices and policies of that institution with respect to disclosing nonpublic information; (2) access to the nonpublic personal information collected and shared; (3) affirmative consent, that is that the financial institution must receive the affirmative consent of the consumer, also referred to as an opt-in, in order to share such information with third parties and affiliates. Lastly, my provision would require that this federal law not preempt stronger state privacy laws. This bill is drafted largely after the amendment Senator Bryan and I offered in the Conference on Financial Services Modernization, but failed to get adopted due to the Conference's rush to pass a financial modernization bill, no matter what the cost. I know some think that opt-in is extreme, but I have to tell you that is what the American people want. Over the past year I have learned a great deal about the activities of institutions sharing sensitive personal information. Many may not be aware, but it had become a common practice for state department of motor vehicles to sell the drivers license information, including name, height, weight, social security number, vehicle identification number, motor vehicle record and more. Some states even sold the digital photo image of each driver's license. I was not aware of this practice going on. When I learned about it and studied it a little closer, I found several groups who were outraged by this practice. One such group was Eagle Forum. Another such group was the ACLU. Still another group was the Free Congress Foundation. Before I knew it, there was an ad hoc coalition of groups not only supporting the issue of driver's license privacy, but demanding it. Thanks to the hard work of these groups, I was able to include an opt-in provision for people applying for drivers licenses at their state department of motor vehicles. That provision sailed through the Senate and then the House. That bill was signed into law by President Clinton. Despite significant lobbying by the direct marketing industry, not one member of the House or Senate took to the floor and said, ``I believe we should not allow consumers to choose whether or not their drivers license information, including their picture, should be sold or traded away like an old suit.'' No, no one objected to the opt-in. As a result, I believe very strongly that Congress has already set the bar on this issue. Opt-in is not just reasonable, it is the right thing to do. Meanwhile, the ad hoc coalition, which is continuing to grow and includes every ideology from conservative to liberal, has signed on to four basic principles with regard to financial privacy. The principles include notice, access and consent, but also a requirement that weak federal laws not preempt stronger state laws. Our amendment incorporates those four basic principles. Now my basic question is this, why would anyone oppose this bill? Only if you believe the financial services industry cannot make money by doing business above the table and on the level for everyone to see in the ``sunshine'' if you will. If you believe that financial institutions make money only by deceiving their customers or leaving those customers in the dark, then maybe you should oppose this bill. I do not subscribe to such a belief. Industry will tell you that if they are required to include an opt- in, consumers will not, and therefore business will shut down. What does that tell you that consumers won't choose to opt-in? It means people don't want their information shared. If that is such a problem, it seems to me the business would spend more time educating the consumer as to the benefits of information sharing. That is where the burden to convince the consumer to buy the product should be--on the business. During the financial modernization debate, the financial industry, along with Citigroup communicated to Congress that they would not be able to operate or function appropriately with an opt-in requirement. I find that very difficult to comprehend, seeing as Citibank signed an agreement with their German affiliates in 1995 affording German citizens the opportunity to tell Citibank ``no,'' they did not want their personal data shared with third parties. I have a copy of the contract to prove it. Entitled, Agreement on ``Interterritorial Data Protection'' one can see this is an agreement on the sharing of customer information between Citibank (South Dakota), referred in the document as CNA, and its German affiliates. On page two paragraph 4, entitled, Use of Subcontractors, Transmission of Data to Third Parties, number 2 reads: For marketing purposes, the transfer of personal data to third parties provided by the Card Service Companies (that is Citicorp of Germany and Citicorp Card Operations of Germany) is prohibited, except in those cases where such personal data is transferred to affiliated companies engaged in banking business in order to market financial services; the transfer of such data beyond the aforementioned scope to third parties, shall require the Card Service Companies' express approval. Such approval is limited to the scope of the Card Customers' consent as obtained on the application form. That ladies and gentlemen, is an opt-in to operate in Germany, by none other than Citigroup, the number one proponent of financial modernization. Now if they can offer financial privacy to individuals in Germany, why on God's green earth can't they agree to an opt-in here in America? Do Germans have special rights over Americans? I should hope not. Mr. President, simply put, this bill is what Americans want. This bill is workable as proven in the Citicorp agreement. The truth is that the American people do not understand the intricacies of banking law or securities regulation. They probably do not know or care much about affiliates or operating subsidiaries. What I do know, is that if you walked outside and polled people from New York City to Los Angeles, CA, and everywhere in between, they would not only understand financial privacy, 90 percent of them would demand financial privacy and the ability to tell an institution ``no.'' Mr. President, in passing the financial modernization bill, Congress gave mammoth financial services companies significant expanded powers and unprecedented ability to collect, share, buy and sell a consumers nonpublic personal financial information. During the debate, many members promised they would address privacy, but only in a separate bill at a later time. Well, Mr. President, the time is now and the bill is the ``Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy Act.'' The financial industry may have won the battle by keeping stronger financial privacy provisions out of the financial modernization bill. But I assure you they have not won the war. They cannot win the war on financial privacy because the American people just won't allow it. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the agreement on ``International Data Protection'' be printed in the Record.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to offer the ``Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy Act'' for myself and Senator Bryan. This bill would address the significant deficiencies in the Financial Services Modernization Act passed by this very body last week. Our bill would provide that consumers have (1) notice of the categories of nonpublic personal information that institutions collect, as well as the practices and policies of that institution with respect to disclosing nonpublic information; (2) access to the nonpublic personal information collected and shared; (3) affirmative consent, that is that the financial institution must receive the affirmative consent of the consumer, also referred to as an opt-in, in order to share such information with third parties and affiliates. Lastly, my provision would require that this federal law not preempt stronger state privacy laws. This bill is drafted largely after the amendment Senator Bryan and I offered in the Conference on Financial Services Modernization, but failed to get adopted due to the Conference's rush to pass a financial modernization bill, no matter what the cost. I know some think that opt-in is extreme, but I have to tell you that is what the American people want. Over the past year I have learned a great deal about the activities of institutions sharing sensitive personal information. Many may not be aware, but it had become a common practice for state department of motor vehicles to sell the drivers license information, including name, height, weight, social security number, vehicle identification number, motor vehicle record and more. Some states even sold the digital photo image of each driver's license. I was not aware of this practice going on. When I learned about it and studied it a little closer, I found several groups who were outraged by this practice. One such group was Eagle Forum. Another such group was the ACLU. Still another group was the Free Congress Foundation. Before I knew it, there was an ad hoc coalition of groups not only supporting the issue of driver's license privacy, but demanding it. Thanks to the hard work of these groups, I was able to include an opt-in provision for people applying for drivers licenses at their state department of motor vehicles. That provision sailed through the Senate and then the House. That bill was signed into law by President Clinton. Despite significant lobbying by the direct marketing industry, not one member of the House or Senate took to the floor and said, ``I believe we should not allow consumers to choose whether or not their drivers license information, including their picture, should be sold or traded away like an old suit.'' No, no one objected to the opt-in. As a result, I believe very strongly that Congress has already set the bar on this issue. Opt-in is not just reasonable, it is the right thing to do. Meanwhile, the ad hoc coalition, which is continuing to grow and includes every ideology from conservative to liberal, has signed on to four basic principles with regard to financial privacy. The principles include notice, access and consent, but also a requirement that weak federal laws not preempt stronger state laws. Our amendment incorporates those four basic principles. Now my basic question is this, why would anyone oppose this bill? Only if you believe the financial services industry cannot make money by doing business above the table and on the level for everyone to see in the ``sunshine'' if you will. If you believe that financial institutions make money only by deceiving their customers or leaving those customers in the dark, then maybe you should oppose this bill. I do not subscribe to such a belief. Industry will tell you that if they are required to include an opt- in, consumers will not, and therefore business will shut down. What does that tell you that consumers won't choose to opt-in? It means people don't want their information shared. If that is such a problem, it seems to me the business would spend more time educating the consumer as to the benefits of information sharing. That is where the burden to convince the consumer to buy the product should be--on the business. During the financial modernization debate, the financial industry, along with Citigroup communicated to Congress that they would not be able to operate or function appropriately with an opt-in requirement. I find that very difficult to comprehend, seeing as Citibank signed an agreement with their German affiliates in 1995 affording German citizens the opportunity to tell Citibank ``no,'' they did not want their personal data shared with third parties. I have a copy of the contract to prove it. Entitled, Agreement on ``Interterritorial Data Protection'' one can see this is an agreement on the sharing of customer information between Citibank (South Dakota), referred in the document as CNA, and its German affiliates. On page two paragraph 4, entitled, Use of Subcontractors, Transmission of Data to Third Parties, number 2 reads: For marketing purposes, the transfer of personal data to third parties provided by the Card Service Companies (that is Citicorp of Germany and Citicorp Card Operations of Germany) is prohibited, except in those cases where such personal data is transferred to affiliated companies engaged in banking business in order to market financial services; the transfer of such data beyond the aforementioned scope to third parties, shall require the Card Service Companies' express approval. Such approval is limited to the scope of the Card Customers' consent as obtained on the application form. That ladies and gentlemen, is an opt-in to operate in Germany, by none other than Citigroup, the number one proponent of financial modernization. Now if they can offer financial privacy to individuals in Germany, why on God's green earth can't they agree to an opt-in here in America? Do Germans have special rights over Americans? I should hope not. Mr. President, simply put, this bill is what Americans want. This bill is workable as proven in the Citicorp agreement. The truth is that the American people do not understand the intricacies of banking law or securities regulation. They probably do not know or care much about affiliates or operating subsidiaries. What I do know, is that if you walked outside and polled people from New York City to Los Angeles, CA, and everywhere in between, they would not only understand financial privacy, 90 percent of them would demand financial privacy and the ability to tell an institution ``no.'' Mr. President, in passing the financial modernization bill, Congress gave mammoth financial services companies significant expanded powers and unprecedented ability to collect, share, buy and sell a consumers nonpublic personal financial information. During the debate, many members promised they would address privacy, but only in a separate bill at a later time. Well, Mr. President, the time is now and the bill is the ``Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy Act.'' The financial industry may have won the battle by keeping stronger financial privacy provisions out of the financial modernization bill. But I assure you they have not won the war. They cannot win the war on financial privacy because the American people just won't allow it. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the agreement on ``International Data Protection'' be printed in the Record.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Nevada an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, how much time do I have?

Mr. SHELBY. I yield as much time as I shall consume. Mr. President, I rise to voice my stringent objection to the conference report of the financial services modernization bill. While I believe we need to modernize the laws that govern this country's financial system, I do not believe we should do so at any price. My colleagues in the Senate should know this legislation comes with a very high price to the American people. In my judgment, the price is simply too high. Let me explain. First of all, I want to say that there are some very good things in this bill, not the least of which is the repeal of two sections of the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act which allow banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to affiliate. Congress has worked on this for many years. Under Senator Gramm's leadership as chairman of our Committee on Banking, this much-needed change will soon become reality. I think that is very positive in this bill. That being said, I think it should be perfectly clear that there remains Depression-era laws on the books, and I hope Chairman Gramm would be interested in working with others on the Banking Committee to repeal those laws as well. In particular, I am referring to the 1930s price control on business checking accounts. To the extent that we are modernizing this country's financial laws, one would think we would eliminate this price control and allow small businesses across this country to receive interest on their checking accounts and enjoy the full benefits of financial modernization. Let me talk just a few minutes on CRA expansion. I also feel compelled to set the record straight on the floor this afternoon on the Community Reinvestment Act provisions in this bill. Make no mistake about it. This bill expands--yes, Mr. President, expands--the Community Reinvestment Act. I know a great deal about this because I, along with Senator Gramm, killed this very bill last year because we were both opposed to the dramatic expansion of CRA in the bill at that time. I don't understand what is different this year. I don't understand why no one is willing to stand up and oppose the expansion of CRA when it is very clear that this bill does, indeed, expand CRA. Why else would the administration support the bill? Why else would Rev. Jesse Jackson support the bill? We all know why. The bill expands CRA. On page 15 of the bill, my colleagues will see a provision entitled ``CRA Requirement.'' This provision says that ``the appropriate Federal banking agency shall prohibit a financial holding company, or any insured depository institution from'' commencing any new activity or directly or indirectly acquiring control of a company engaged in any new activity, if the institution has a less than satisfactory CRA record on its most recent exam. That is a very crucial ``maintenance'' requirement, as we call it in this bill. Last year, the legislation gave the regulators the discretion to impose restrictions for falling out of compliance with CRA. This year, we have inserted a statutory prohibition of conducting new activities. If the institution that was CRA-compliant when elected to become a financial holding company then chooses to engage in a new activity, the regulator could then use the enforcement authority in section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to impose civil money penalties on bank directors and officers. I am opposed to the maintenance requirement today just as much as I was opposed to the maintenance requirement last year. My position has not changed. This expansion does not exist in current law today. If you have a certain bank charter, you can conduct all activities permissible to that charter whether you have a CRA-satisfactory record or not. I believe we are making a grave mistake by expanding CRA. I am extremely disappointed because I know we have reached the point of no return. As conservatives, we will have no legs to stand on if and when we try to revisit this issue. My friends, we are, indeed, paying a very high price for this legislation. Privacy is very important to all Americans. I pose a question to my colleagues: Does anyone know what issue brings together the American Civil Liberties Union, Consumers Union, and Ralph Nader of Public Citizen to Phyllis Schlafly of Eagle Forum and the Free Congress Foundation? It is the bill before the Senate, the financial privacy provisions. All of these groups have formed an unprecedented coalition to oppose this bill simply based on the lack of privacy protections. That is the price the American people are going to pay--their privacy-- if we pass this bill for only a few large financial conglomerates. In an article entitled ``Banks Sell Your Secrets,'' USA Today reported: Consumers across the USA have been shocked and upset to learn banks have been selling their private financial data, from account balances to Social Security numbers. Phyllis Schlafly of the Eagle Forum is quoted: The checks you write and receive, the invoices you pay and the investments you make reveal as much about you as a personal diary, but instead of banks keeping your information under lock and key, it is being collected, repackaged and sold. In September of this year, the Los Angeles Times reported that Charter Pacific Bank of San Fernando Valley, CA, sold 3.7 million credit card numbers to a felon who then allegedly ran up over $45 million worth of charges to the cardholders. It appears the felon also billed customers for access to X-rated web sites the customers never knew about. How do these people explain that to their families, their neighbors, or their church members? The USA Today also ran an article on October 28, 1999, entitled ``Congress Passes Up Chance to Protect Your Financial Privacy.'' Reporting on this specific bill before the Senate today, the article read: Technology already has made it far easier for disparate firms to collect, share and sell warehouses of sensitive data on individuals. And the banking bill would encourage banks, insurance companies, and investment firms to link arms, making data swapping from a wide range of sources much easier. That, my friends, is the point. We are about to pass this afternoon a financial modernization bill that represents industry interests in a big way. However, we have forgotten the interests of the most crucial market participant of all in America--the consumer, the American citizen. Under this bill, the consumer has little, if any, ability to protect the transfer of his or her personal nonpublic financial information. Indeed, the so-called privacy protections in this bill are a far cry from the protection we give taxpayers on their tax returns. It is against the law for an unauthorized inspection or disclosure of an individual's tax return. Violation of this law is punishable by fines, imprisonment, or both. The Internal Revenue Code even prescribes civil damages for the unauthorized inspection or disclosure and the notification to the taxpayer if an unauthorized inspection or disclosure has occurred. I can assure Members these large financial conglomerates will have more information on citizens than the IRS, but we have done virtually nothing to protect the sharing of such nonpublic personal financial information for the American people. Proponents of financial modernization will say the bill includes the strongest privacy provisions ever enacted by Congress. While that sounds great, the reality is the provisions are porous and do not provide the consumer with sufficient information to make an informed decision or the true ability to opt out of information sharing. First, the opt-out requirement does not apply to affiliate sharing. This is significant because the bill allows financial holding companies to affiliate with entities engaged in activities that are ``complementary,'' to financial activities, as well as grandfather commercial companies and those acquired from merchant banking. As a result, the holding company can share a wealth of nonpublic personal financial information with affiliated telemarketers selling nonfinancial products such as travel services, dental plans, and so forth. Should an insurance company be allowed to affiliate with a grocery store chain in order to track an individual's diet? Nothing in this bill prohibits this relationship or sharing of that information. Second, the bill includes an exception to the porous opt-out provision that allows two or more financial institutions to share their customers' nonpublic personal information with telemarketers to market financial products or services offered under a so-called joint agreement. While the financial institution must notify its customers about the sharing of that information, it does not have to provide customers with the ability to opt out of such information sharing. Furthermore, under the joint agreement provision, the nonaffiliated third party could then share the nonpublic personal information with its own affiliate. As a result, the opt-out provision provides no privacy protection at all. For example, a financial institution could endorse a for-profit investment tip sheet service or stock day trading service targeting senior citizens. The financial institution could share confidential information with that tip sheet service or day trading service without affording the customer the right to opt out of it. To be more specific, the institution can give the tip sheet or day trading service a list of wealthy senior citizens or, in the case of an insurance company, a list of recent widows or widowers who recently received a large insurance payment. Is this really what the Senate wants to encourage and endorse? I hope not. The bill also allegedly includes an all-out prohibition against the sharing of customer account number information for marketing purposes. What about sharing account numbers for the purposes of verifying customers' credit card accounts? The bill allows that. It is a way to get around it. Charter Pacific Bank in California claims they sell customer data files to merchants for data verification purposes, not marketing purposes. Therefore, the privacy provisions in the bill allow Charter Pacific to sell the customer account information to anyone, much less a felon, all over again. As if that were not enough, all of a sudden new language has appeared in the conference report telling the regulators to allow for the transfer of personal account numbers to nonaffiliated third party telemarketers if the information is encrypted. Nothing in this bill says financial institutions are prohibited from giving the third party the key to unlock the encrypted information. In fact, that is common practice. This exception completely eviscerates the prohibition of third party telemarketers in the bill. This means U.S. Bancorp in Minnesota could sell the account numbers to MemberWorks all over again. This bill would not prevent it. I believe these privacy provisions are a sham. I have said it before. They are a joke on the American people, and I will not sit by and be a party to this. When the American people, and they will, become aware of what Congress has done, it will be too late. This bill lets the genie out of the bottle. I am sure, as soon as this bill passes, if not before, a lot of people will be running for cover and introducing privacy bills. I bet President Clinton will set up a Presidential commission or something such as that, or a study group, to study the issue. That sounds nice. Too bad the President is not willing to make financial privacy a priority when it really matters, right here and right now, when we are giving financial institutions the unprecedented ability to collect, profile, share, and sell personal nonpublic financial information. Critics claim that requiring a consumer to provide his affirmative consent before sharing information would be a hindrance to the free flow of information and basically unworkable. If this is the case, why did Citibank agree to an opt-in requirement for nonaffiliated third parties to do business in Germany? You heard me right. The biggest and most vocal proponent of this bill signed an agreement with its German affiliates in 1995 that basically required Citibank to obtain consent on the application form before they could share personal data to third parties. Citibank agreed to give Germans more privacy protections than we are giving our own citizens in the United States today. Does that bother anybody else in this Chamber besides me? It should. I think this is a tragedy. I think it is absurd. The banking industry has told us they would oppose this bill if we simply give the consumer the ability to object to the sharing of nonpublic personal information. First of all, I think it is hypocritical of them to threaten us with that position, seeing as how Citigroup voluntarily agreed to provide consumers the ability to opt out in Germany. Second, I believe Congress should not be dictated to by the financial industry or any other industry as to what provisions we put in on behalf of the American consumer. They should not write laws, ever. But Congress should. I have heard many Members talk about empowerment and how we must empower the individual. We spend a lot of time discussing empowerment zones. Why are we ignoring the empowerment principle on this piece of legislation? Why is Congress going to take a walk on this issue? Why is Congress not going to stand up for the American people and assure them the ability to stop a financial institution from profiling individuals based on their most personal behavioral patterns and then selling that information at will? The American people clearly believe this is too high a price to pay for this bill. If we are going to allow the huge financial conglomerates to affiliate to provide services--and we are-- why must we also give them the ability to sell, profit, and exploit an individual's personal nonpublic profile? This is not a partisan issue. It does not matter if you are a Democrat or Republican, conservative, liberal, rich or poor. An individual's financial matters are very private to that individual. Families will not discuss how much money other family members make at the dinner table. It is too private. It is too sensitive. They do not talk about it because they do not want to talk about it and they are in control of what information they share, even with their loved ones. The bitter irony is that while the individual is practicing discretion in America, Congress is belligerently aiding and abetting complete strangers in accessing an individual's most private financial matters, including account balances, where they shop, and what they buy. We are aiding and abetting the felon in California who bought a list of account numbers and charged up to $45 million. We are aiding and abetting third party marketers such as MemberWorks, who bought a list from a bank and then automatically billed individuals' accounts. I have said it before and I will say it again here, we are paying a very high price, a very dear price for this bill. The American people are paying a very dear price for this bill, and they will continue to pay it. It is very difficult for me this afternoon to celebrate this landmark achievement of financial modernization when I know we did so at the expense of every American. I know this bill will pass with a lot of votes, but I urge my colleagues to vote against this bill mainly because of the lack of privacy provisions. Ask your mother, your father, your husband, or your wife about this. They will all tell you that one-stop shopping is not worth giving up their financial privacy. The price is too high--too high. I yield the floor. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I join my colleagues today in mourning the loss of our colleague, John Chafee. John was a good and honorable man who served his state and his country with distinction. A devoted public servant and member of this body for 23 years, Senator Chafee's influence extended beyond the aisles and transcended partisan rhetoric. His accomplishments as a lawmaker and his unquestionable influence among his peers stand as a testament to his ability. Senator Chafee will long be admired and remembered for his devotion to this country both as a soldier and public servant. His distinguished service in the military, including serving in the Marines at Guadalcanal and commanding a rifle company in Korea, were indicative of the man who would never shy away from duty or responsibility. His record as a legislator, governor, and senator in Rhode Island indicate the amount of trust the people of Rhode Island put in John. Although political views may vary from person to person, it is easy to put these differences aside and to recognize men of strong character and integrity. These are qualities which were abundant in John, and his steadying influence in the United States Senate will be truly missed. My thoughts and prayers extend to his family and all those whose lives Senator Chafee touched.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr President, I join my colleagues today in mourning the loss of our colleague, John Chafee. John was a good and honorable man who served his state and his country with distinction. A devoted public servant and Member of this body for 23 years, Senator Chafee's influence extended beyond the aisles and transcended partisan rhetoric. His accomplishments as a lawmaker and his unquestionable influence among his peers stand as a testament to his ability. Senator Chafee will long be admired and remembered for his devotion to this country both as a soldier and public servant. His distinguished service in the military, including serving in the Marines at Guadalcanal and commanding a rifle company in Korea, were indicative of the man who would never shy away from duty or responsibility. His record as a legislator, governor, and senator in Rhode Island indicate the amount of trust the people of Rhode Island put in John. Although political views may vary from person to person, it is easy to put these differences aside and to recognize men of strong character and integrity. These are qualities which were abundant in John, and his steadying influence in the United States Senate will be truly missed. My thoughts and prayers extend to his family and all those whose lives Senator Chafee touched.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. The chairman of the full committee is correct. That is the intent of the conference committee.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to Jimmy E. Alexander, a prominent and respected lawyer from Athens, Limestone County, in northern Alabama. Mr. Alexander passed away last month after a long and distinguished career in law practice. His deep passion for his work took him on a journey from the smallest courtrooms in Alabama, to the great and hallowed halls of the U.S. Supreme Court. His dedication and heartfelt concern for the ``little guy'' was an inspiration. Jimmy will be missed by the many people whose lives he touched and affected. Jimmy was born in Bear Creek, in Marion County, in 1939. After graduation from Russellville High School in 1957, Jimmy went on to continue his education at the University of Alabama, receiving his undergraduate degree in 1960, and his law degree in 1963. Jimmy's innate industriousness and work ethic were tailor-made for his chosen profession. Jimmy quickly developed a reputation as an outstanding criminal defense attorney and successful domestic relations lawyer. Joining the firm of Malone, Malone and Steel directly out of law school, he soon was made partner and ultimately became senior partner of the firm Alexander, Corder, Plunk, Baker, Shelly, and Shipman P.C., in Athens, AL. Jimmy was the city attorney for Athens and Ardmore for 17 years. He served on the city Board of Education for 5 years and was the Alabama Bar Association Commissioner for the 39th judicial circuit for 4 years. It was through these professional forums that Jimmy was able to thrive in his work and gain a statewide reputation as a standout trial attorney. In private practice for 36 years, Jimmy has counseled businesses, commercial clients, and recently, had taken a strong interest in championing the cause of the ``little guy.'' Particularly for the last 15 years, he focused on representing the poor, under represented, physically injured, and financially cheated, many of whom had no where else to turn than Jimmy Alexander. Jimmy developed a particular fondness for taking on big business, insurance companies, and large industry. He represented many high profile cases, and in 1989, won the largest monetary judgment at the time in Limestone County and in another case, setting a precedent for the largest monetary judgement in the entire State of Alabama. His gifted ability even took him before the U.S. Supreme Court, where he argued a case against an insurance company. Jimmy Alexander will be remembered as a dedicated attorney, who brought human compassion to his work. Many of his colleagues have expressed their respect and admiration for his approach to both his work and his life, and I join them in their prayers for him and his family. My thoughts and wishes extend to his wife Rose, and two children, Tonya and Eric, during this difficult time. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to Sergeant Major Gordon R. ``Randy'' Taft, United States Army, a native of Decatur, Alabama, who is retiring this month from active duty after twenty-six years of distinguished service to the country. Sergeant Major Taft, who currently serves as the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency in Fort Belvoir, Virginia, has devoted his professional life to supporting the personal, administrative, and logistics needs of military men and women assigned around the world in defense of our freedom. His accomplishments are many and his reputation for leading and developing young soldiers is legendary. Randy Taft's selfless contributions to the National Defense will be missed, so as he transitions to new opportunities, I want to say thanks to him on behalf of a grateful Nation. Sergeant Major Taft's numerous military awards and decorations reflect the tremendous impact he has had on the lives of America's fighting men and women. His decorations include the Legion of Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Army Commendation Medal, and the Humanitarian Service Medal. But the medals and certificates do not say it all. Like all Sergeants Major in their day-to-day activities and accomplishments, Randy Taft has served as a positive role model for a whole generation of the Army's finest soldiers. Whether he was serving as a personnel specialist, a platoon sergeant, a recruiter, a member of the Army's premier Honor Guard, or as the Senior Enlisted Advisor for the 44,000 person Defense Logistics Agency, he has led by example. His greatest accomplishments are the young soldiers he has helped mold into the kind of citizens this country can be proud to call our Army. Mr. President, I am proud and honored to congratulate Sergeant Major Randy Taft upon the occasion of his retirement from the United States Army.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Resolution of Advice and Consent to the Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Last Thursday, I testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in my capacity as chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, to present my views on the ability of the Intelligence Community to monitor compliance with the CTBT. Today, I would like to make certain general observations, in addition to addressing issues involving CTBT monitoring and verification. By the way: monitoring and verification are different. Monitoring is objective. Verification is subjective; it involves determining the significance of information obtained through monitoring. First, as a general matter, I believe that the treaty will serve as a stalking horse for denuclearization. I do not accuse all of the treaty's supporters of seeking that goal. Yet, a test ban agreement whose first operative sentence appears on its face to outlaw the explosion of nuclear weapons, even in a war of self-defense, surely raises profound questions about the long-term viability of any nuclear deterrent. I fear that the treaty will both undermine and delegitimize our nuclear deterrent. When I say ``undermine,'' I refer to the effect of ratification of, and adherence to, this treaty on the weapons in our nuclear stockpile. Senators Kyl, Warner, and others have ably addressed this issue in the course of the debate. I will not belabor it further, other than to cite, as others have, the conclusion of former Secretaries of Defense Rumsfeld, Cheney, Schlesinger, Weinberger, Laird, and Carlucci. These highly regarded public servants have determined that ``over the decades ahead, confidence in the reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile would inevitably decline, thereby reducing the credibility of America's nuclear deterrent.'' This alone is reason for the Senate to withhold its advice and consent to the treaty. With respect to delegitimizing our nuclear deterrent, Article I of the treaty prohibits ``any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.'' I understand that the U.S. Government does not view that prohibition as applying to the use of nuclear weapons. The President's 1997 transmittal message to the Senate included an article-by-article analysis of the treaty. This analysis explains that the U.S. position in the negotiations was that ``undertakings relating to the use of nuclear weapons were totally beyond the scope'' of the CTBT. The analysis does not make clear whether all other signatories agreed with the U.S. view or whether they acquiesced in it or did something else. It is unfortunate that the CTBT text does not incorporate the U.S. understanding. We are asked to give our advice and consent to that text and only that text. Article 15 of the treaty bars reservations, even one clarifying the meaning of Article I. Because the U.S. understanding of the scope of the prohibition on other nuclear explosions cannot be incorporated in a reservation to the treaty, the U.S. position may be subject to challenge as a matter of law. After all, one normally looks at negotiating history only if the treaty text is unclear. I hope the administration will address this issue to my satisfaction. In the meantime, along with many other concerns about this treaty, I question the wisdom of negotiating an agreement that relegates our right of self-defense to the fine print. I would also draw the attention of Senators to the language of the preamble to the CTBT. The administration points to the preamble for support for its narrow reading of the open-ended language of Article I. The administration notes, correctly, that the preamble does not refer to the ``use'' of nuclear weapons. In the administration's view, the treaty therefore cannot be read to apply to the use of nuclear weapons. Yet, a close reading of the preamble raises more questions than it answers over the ultimate purpose of the CTBT. I hope everybody shares my abhorrence of nuclear weapons. But merely wishing to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle will not accomplish that goal. The one certainty about the CTBT is that, if ratified, the United States will obey it to the letter. Other countries' record of deception and denial with respect to nuclear testing is such that we cannot have the same confidence. And, in the world of the blind, the one-eyed is king. I have supported well-negotiated, well-considered reductions in our nuclear forces. But it is a fact that the American nuclear deterrent has served our Nation well and has served the world well. The United States, under Democratic and Republican administrations, backed by a strong and credible nuclear deterrent, faced down the Soviet threat and served as a force for peace and stability around the world. Therefore, Mr. President, I would not start down this path. Even if the Senate approved the CTBT today, it would be years before the treaty took effect. And by then, decisions would have been made affecting the future of our nuclear deterrent that may be irrevocable. The second reason I intend to vote against advice and consent is that I am convinced that the treaty cannot achieve the goals its proponents have described: to prevent the nuclear powers from developing new nuclear weapons and to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While I cannot go into classified details, as my colleagues are aware, the Washington Post recently reported that Russia continues to conduct what may be low-yield nuclear tests at its Arctic test site. Russia reportedly is undertaking this action in order to develop a new low-yield weapon that will be the linchpin of a new military doctrine. These Russian activities are of particular concern. There is evidence, including public statements from the Russian First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, that Russia intends to continue to conduct low-yield hydro-nuclear tests--that is, nuclear tests--and does not believe that these are prohibited by the treaty. With respect to proliferation, Acting Undersecretary of State John Holum has stated that, with the CTBT in effect, it will be ``very difficult for new countries to develop nuclear weapons.'' Yet, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet has stated that ``[n]uclear testing is not required for the acquisition of a basic nuclear weapons capability . . . [and] is not critical for a first-generation weapon.'' North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are seeking this kind of weapon. Third, it is my considered judgment, as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, that it is impossible to monitor compliance with this treaty with the confidence that the Senate should demand--I repeat, demand-- before providing its advice and consent to ratification. Simply put, I am not confident that we can now, or, in the foreseeable future will be able to, detect any and all nuclear explosions prohibited under the treaty. I have a great degree of confidence in our ability to monitor higher yield explosions at known test sites. I have markedly less confidence in our capabilities to monitor lower yield and/or evasively conducted tests, including tests that may enable states to develop new nuclear weapons or improve existing weapons. I should also repeat in this context North Korea, Iran, and Iraq can develop and deploy nuclear weapons without any nuclear tests at all. With respect to monitoring, in July 1997, the intelligence community issued a National Intelligence Estimate entitled ``Monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Over the Next 10 years.'' While I cannot go into classified details, I can say that the NIE was not encouraging about our ability to monitor compliance with the treaty--nor about the likely utility of the treaty in preventing countries like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq from developing and fielding nuclear weapons. The NIE identified numerous challenges, difficulties, and credible evasion scenarios that affect the intelligence community's confidence in its ability to monitor compliance. Because the details are classified, and because of the inherent difficulty of summarizing a highly technical analysis covering a number of different countries and a multitude of variables, I recommend that Members review this document with the following caution: I believe that newly acquired information and other developments require a reevaluation of the 1997 estimate's assumptions and underlying analysis on certain key issues. I believe such a new analysis will increase concern about monitoring the CTBT. A preliminary summary of the Intelligence community's revised judgment was provided to the committee late last Friday. This document, along with the NIE and the transcript from last week's hearing is available to Members in S-407. Proponents of the treaty argue, in essence, that we will miss no test of strategic significance. Despite the U.S. inability to monitor compliance at any test level, proponents place their faith in multilateral monitoring aids provided under the treaty: the International Monitoring System, a multinational seismic, infra-sound, hydro-acoustic, and radio-nucleide detection system; and the CTBT's on- site inspection regime. Based on a review of the structure, likely capabilities, and procedures of these multilateral mechanisms, which will not be operational for a number of years, and based on the intelligence community's own analysis, I believe that these mechanisms will be of little value. For example, the IMS will be technically inadequate to monitor the most likely forms of noncompliance. The IMS seismic system was not designed to detect ``evasively'' conducted tests. These are precisely the kind of tests Iraq or North Korea are likely to conduct. In addition, the IMS suffers from having been designed with diplomatic sensitivities rather than effective monitoring in mind. Under the so-called ``non-discriminatory'' framework, no country will be singled out for attention. All countries--Iraq and Ireland, North Korea and Norway--will receive the same level of verification. Lastly, it will be 8 to 10 years before the system is complete. Because of these shortcomings, and for other technical reasons, I am afraid that the IMS is likely to muddy the waters by injecting questionable data into what will inevitably be highly charged debates over possible violations. With respect to OSI, I believe that the onsite inspection regime invites delay and deception. For example, U.S. negotiators originally sought an ``automatic green light'' for on-site inspections. Yet, because of the opposition of the People's Republic of China, the regime that was adopted allows inspections only with the approval of 30 of the 51 countries on the Executive Committee. Proponents of ratification, especially, will appreciate the difficulty of rounding up the votes for such a super-majority. I am troubled by the fact that if the United States requested an inspection, no U.S. inspectors could participate in that inspection, and we could send an observer only if the inspected party approved. I am also disturbed by the right of the inspected party to declare areas up to fifty square kilometers off-limits to inspection or to impose severe restrictions on inspectors in those areas. I understand that these provisions mirror limitations sought by Saddam Hussein on UNSCOM inspectors. This leads me to believe that OSI stands for ``Option Selected by Iraq.'' Even if inspectors do eventually get near the scene of a suspicious event, the evidence-- which is highly perishable--may well have vanished. The recently-reported activity at Russia's Arctic test site raises questions both as to our monitoring capabilities and Russian intentions under the CTBT. The Washington Post reported that Russia continues to conduct possible low-yield nuclear tests at its Arctic test site. The Washington Post also reported that the CIA cannot monitor such tests with enough precision to determine whether they are nuclear or conventional explosions. Mr. President, I have tried to convey some serious concerns about the practicality of this treaty, and that is extremely difficult to do in an unclassified forum and in such a short time. I urge my colleagues, as they consider their position on this treaty, to immerse themselves in the details. For further information on treaty monitoring and the reported activities at the Russian test site, I urge Members to review the materials available in S-407. In closing, Mr. President, I would like to make some general points. First, I believe that, when foreign and national security policies come before the Senate, we must put the Nation's interests first. Second, while arms control agreements may be useful to the extent they advance our national interests, they are not a substitute for sound policy. Good agreements are an instrument of good policy. Bad agreements, pursued for agreement's sake, do not serve our Nation's interests. Lastly, some of my colleagues have held out the option of withdrawal from the treaty, should it be ratified yet somehow fail to lead to the Golden Age that proponents envision. Let me be clear. If this treaty is ratified, there will be no turning back. The history of cold war arms control agreements is instructive. In 1972, the United States signed the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, generally known as SALT I, together with the SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Gerard Smith unilaterally declared that ``[i]f an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized.'' He continued, ``Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.'' In fact, no such agreement was reached in five years or in ten years or in 15 years. Not until 1991, almost 20 years after SALT I, when START I was signed, did the United States and the Soviet Union reach such an agreement. At no point did the United States invoke the Supreme Interest clause to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. It is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which an administration would withdraw from the CTBT. In closing, Mr. President, I believe that there are many reasons to oppose this treaty. The effect on our nuclear stockpile, the inability of the treaty to achieve its goals, and our inability to monitor compliance are each sufficient reason to withhold advice and consent to ratification.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I wish to recognize and pay tribute to Colonel Randall D. Bookout, Chief, Senate Liaison Division, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison for the U.S. Army, who will retire on January 1, 2000. Colonel Bookout's career spans 27 years during which he has distinguished himself as a soldier, leader and friend of the United States Senate. An Ohio native, Colonel Bookout graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1972 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Infantry Branch of the U.S. Army. During his career, he has commanded at the platoon through the battalion levels, where he ably trained and led America's soldiers at home and overseas. In Fort Wainwright, Alaska, he commanded the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, ``The Manchus.'' He has also served in command and staff positions at Fort Carson, Colorado, the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, the Pentagon and overseas in Panama and Korea. Prior to assuming his current duties, he served as the Aide de Camp to the Secretary of the Army. Since January 1996, Randy Bookout has served with distinction as the Chief of the Army's Senate Liaison Office where he has superbly represented the Chief of Legislative Liaison, the Chief of Staff, Army and the Secretary of the Army, as well as promoting the interests of the soldiers and civilians of the Army. His professionalism, mature judgment, sage advice and inter-personal skills have earned him the respect and confidence of the Members of Congress and Congressional staffers with whom he has worked on a multitude of issues. In over four years on the Hill, Randy Bookout has been a true friend of the U.S. Congress. Serving as the Army's primary point of contact for all Senators, their staffs and Congressional Committees, he has assisted Congress in understanding Army policies, actions, operations and requirements. As a result, he and his staff have been extremely effective in providing prompt, coordinated and factual replies to all inquiries and matters involving Army issues. In addition, he has provided invaluable assistance to Members and their staffs while planning, coordinating and accompanying Senate delegations traveling worldwide to over sixty countries. His substantive knowledge of the key issues, keen legislative insight, and ability to effectively advise senior members of the Army leadership directly contributed to the successful representation of the Army's interests before Congress. Throughout his career, Colonel Randy Bookout has demonstrated his profound commitment to our Nation, his selfless service to the Army, a deep concern for soldiers and their families, and a commitment to excellence. Colonel Bookout is a consummate professional whose performance, in over 27 years of service, has personified those traits of courage, competency and integrity that our Nation has come to expect from its professional Army officers. Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to join me in thanking Colonel Bookout for his honorable service to the U.S. Army and the people of the United States. We wish him and his family Godspeed and all the best in the future.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. I, too, share the Senator's understanding, and would note that there is much to praise in both H.R. 1000 and S. 82 without regard to changing budgetary treatment of the aviation accounts. I would be very disappointed if the prospect of a multiyear reauthorization were frustrated by the House's intransigence on changing the budgetary treatment of the aviation accounts to the detriment of all other discretionary spending, including Amtrak, drug interdiction efforts of the Coast Guard, as well as many of the domestic programs funded in appropriations bills other than the one I manage as the Chairman of the Transportation appropriations subcommittee. According to the Administration, the budget treatment envisioned in H.R. 1000 would create an additional $1.1 billion in outlays, which if it were absorbed out of the DOT budget would mean: ``elimination of Amtrak capital funding, thereby making it impossible for Amtrak to make the capital investments needed to reach self-sufficiency; and severe reductions to Coast Guard, the Federal Railroad Administration, Saint Lawrence Seaway, the Office of the Inspector General, the Office of the Secretary, and the Research and Special Programs Administration funding, greatly impacting their operations.'' Clearly, firewalls or off-budget treatment for the aviation accounts is a budget buster that would only further exacerbate the current budget problems we face staying under the spending caps.

Mr. SHELBY. The assurances of my Leader and the distinguished Chairman of the Commerce Committee are all this Senator needs, and I withdraw my filed amendments.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I am pleased that today the Senate has the opportunity to consider the conference agreement for the Fiscal Year 2000 Transportation Appropriations bill, and expect that we will reinforce the Senate's strong support for this legislation, which was passed just 18 days ago by a vote of 95 to 0. The Transportation Appropriations bill provides more than $50 billion for transportation infrastructure funding, and for safe travel and transportation in the air and on our nation's highways, railroads, coasts and rivers. I am pleased that we have reached an accommodation between the House and the Senate Conferees on the Transportation appropriations bill. The House didn't win on every issue, the Senate didn't win on every issue, the Administration didn't get everything that they wanted--there was a fair amount of give and take on the part of all interested parties and I am confident that the result is a balanced package that is responsive to the priorities of the Congress and of the administration. The 302(b) allocation was tight and constrained our ability to do some things that I would have liked to do-- but we have stayed within the allocation agreed to by the House and the Senate and we have a bill that the Administration will sign. I believe this bill represents a balanced approach and a model for how appropriations bills should be constructed. It stays within the allocation, it stays pretty close to the budget request with the exception of denying new user fee taxes and making some firewall shifts that the authorizing committee objected to, it adheres to the commitment made in TEA-21 on dedicated funding for Highways and Transit, it provides adequate--but constrained--levels for FAA, it maintains a credible Coast Guard capital base and operational tempo, and it continues to focus on making further strides in increasing the safety of all our transportation systems. At the same time, Chairman Wolf, Ranking Member Sabo, the senior Senator from New Jersey and I have gone to great lengths to craft a bill that accommodates the requests of members and funds their priorities. Scarcely a day passes where one member or another does not call, write, or collar me on the floor to advocate for a project, a program, or a particular transportation priority for their state. I received over 1,500 separate Senate requests in letter form over the last six months. This bill attempts to respond to as many of those requests as possible. As many of you know, the current fiscal constraints were especially felt in the transit account, where demand for mass transit systems is growing in every state, but funding is fixed by the TEA-21 firewall. I won't belabor that point other than to say we did the best we could under very difficult circumstances. It has been a constant challenge this year to ensure adequate funding for FAA operations, facilities, equipment and research, and for the Airport Improvement Program; for the Coast Guard operations and capital accounts; and for operating funds for the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration. This clearly illustrates the pitfalls of firewalls and the disadvantages of trying to manage annual outlays in multi-year authorization legislation. Our experience this year with this bill is one of many reasons the Congress should reject a proposal to establish more budgetary firewalls around trust fund accounts in the future. I want to mention one other issue that has been the topic of many conversations over the past couple of weeks. That is, the Senate provision concerning the release of personal information by state departments of motor vehicles. My concern is that private information is too available. The proliferation of information over the Internet makes it easy and cheap for almost anyone to access very personal information. I think members would be shocked by what virtually anyone--including wierdos or stalkers--can find out about you, your wife, or your children with only a rudimentary knowledge of how to search the Internet. I believe that there should be a presumption that personal information will be kept confidential, unless there is compelling state need to disclose that information. Most states, however, readily make this information available, and because states sell this information, a lot of information about you effectively comes from public records. Section 350 of the conference protects personal information from broad distribution by requiring express consent prior to the release of information in two situations. First, individuals must give their consent before a state is able to release photographs, social security numbers, and medical or disability information. Of course, this excludes law enforcement and others acting on behalf of the government. Second, individuals must give their consent before the state can sell or release other personal information when that information is disseminated for the purpose of direct marketing or solicitations. I want to be clear: this applies only when the state sells your name, address, and other such information to people who are using that information for marketing purposes. We recognize that states may need time to comply with this provision. And we've proposed to delay the effective date 9 months. In addition, there was concern expressed about this provision being tied to transportation funds under this bill, and the conference agreement eliminates the sanction language and expressly states that no states' fund may be withheld because of non-compliance with this provision. In addition, the Congressional Budget Office has performed a cost estimate analysis of this provision, and found that the total implementation cost for States is well below $50 million nationally. I believe that the general public would be as shocked as my colleagues in the Senate if they learned that states were running a business with the personal information from motor vehicle records. There are a few people I would particularly like to thank before we vote. My Ranking Member, Senator Lautenberg, has been a valued partner in this process, and I'm sorry that we only have one more year to do this together. Senators Stevens and Byrd have provided guidance throughout the year, and made a successful bill possible by ensuring an adequate allocation for transportation programs. My House counterpart, Congressman Frank Wolf and his staff: John Blazey, Rich Efford, Stephanie Gupta and Linda Muir, have been professional, accommodating, and collegial. This last week has been a blueprint for how conference negotiations should be conducted. Senator Lott and his staff have been gracious and extremely helpful in moving this legislation forward. And on the Appropriations Committee staff, I want to recognize Steve Cortese and Jay Kimmitt for their invaluable assistance and advice. I look forward to passing this bill and sending it to the President. I ask unanimous consent that the letter from OMB relating to this conference report be printed in the Congressional Record at the end of my remarks and after the table regarding federal highway aid. From the OMB letter, it is my expectation that the President will sign the bill in its current form. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to include the following table for the Record which shows the estimated fiscal year 2000 distribution of Federal highway fund obligational authority. This table illustrates the state-by-state distribution of non-discretionary highway funds under the conference agreement. It is important to note that none of the discretionary programs, including public lands highways, Indian reservation roads, park roads and parkways, or discretionary bridge are included in this distribution, as these funds are granted on an individual application basis. In addition, these figures do not include the carryover balances from prior years, the final computation of administrative takedown, or the final minimum guarantee adjustments. However, these figures are very close to the actual state distribution that will be made by the Federal Highway Administration based on the agreement outlined in the conference report.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise at this time to engage in a colloquy with the Subcommittee Chairman, the Senator from Missouri. Mr. President, I am concerned about what I feel is an apparent inconsistency and inequity created by two separate and conflicting actions that occurred last spring. One was EPA issuing a final rule implementing a consent decree under section 126 of the Clean Air Act that is triggered in essence by EPA not approving the NOx SIP call revisions of 22 states and the District of Columbia by November 30, 1999. The other was by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in issuing an order staying the requirement imposed in EPA's 1998 NOx SIP Call for these jurisdictions to submit the SIP revisions just mentioned for EPA approval. Caught in the middle of these two events are electric utilities and industrial sources who fear that now the trigger will be sprung this coming November 30, even though the states are no longer required to make those SIP revisions because of the stay, and even though EPA will have nothing before it to approve or disapprove. Prior to this, EPA maintained a close link between the NOx SIP Call and the section 126 rule, as evidenced by the consent decree. I believe a parallel stay would be appropriate in the circumstances. EPA should not be moving forward with its NOx regulations until the litigation is complete and those affected are given more certainty and clarity as to what is required under the law. A stay is very much needed, especially in light of EPA's most recent comments suggesting that it may reverse its earlier interpretation of the Clean Air Act regarding State discretion in dealing with interstate ozone transport problems. The effect of such a reversal would be to force businesses to comply with EPA's federal emission controls under Section 126 without regard to NOx SIP Call rule and State input. The proposed reversal is creating tremendous confusion for the businesses and the States. Under EPA's proposed new position, businesses could incur substantial costs in meeting the EPA-imposed section 126 emission controls before allowing the States to use their discretion in the SIP process to address air quality problems, less stringent controls or through controls on other facilities altogether. Indeed, the fact that these businesses almost certainly will have sunk significant costs into compliance with the EPA-imposed controls before States we required to submit their emission control plans in response to the NOX SIP Call rule would result in impermissible pressure on their States to forfeit their discretion and instead simply conform their SIPs to EPA section 126 controls. The bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is that not only do the States and business community not know what EPA is doing, EPA doesn't know what it is doing. This is hardly a desirable regulatory posture for what clearly is promising to be a very costly and burdensome regulation. Let's be clear what the law is and what it requires, before rather than after the EPA writes and enforces its rules. I think that is a reasonable expectation and a reasonable requirement that the EPA should be able to meet. Mr. Chairman, would you agree with me that the EPA should find a reasonable way to avoid triggering the 126 process while the courts deliberate and we have a better understanding of what the law requires states and businesses to do to be in compliance?